FINAL 
REPORTJAPANESE
EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 1942 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1943
 
 
 
 U. S. SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS JAN
8 1944 
 
 Table of 
Contents| Letter of
Transmittal from the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, to the Secretary of War |  | Foreword |  | Letter of
Transmittal from Commanding General to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, supra |  | Index
to Figures |  | Index to
Tables |   |  |  | Part
I. Evacuation -- Its Military Necessity | 
|---|
 | Chapter |  | 
|---|
 | I. | Action Under
Alien Enemy Proclamations |  | II. | Need for Military
Control and for Evacuation |  | III. | Establishment of
Military Control -- Executive Order No. 9066 |   | Part
II. Evacuation --
Its Development in Summary | 
|---|
 | IV. | The Emergence of
Controlled Evacuation |  | V. | Separation
of
Jurisdiction Over Evacuation and Relocation |  | VI. | The Evacuation Method |   | Part
III. Evacuation --
The Mechanics for its Accomplishment | 
|---|
 | VII. | Organization and
Function of Civil Affairs Division, General Staff, and Wartime Civil
Control Administration and Other Agencies |   | Part IV. Evacuation --
Its Operational Technique | 
|---|
 | VIII. | Development and
Execution of the Evacuation Plan |  | IX. | Voluntary Migration |  | X. | Operation of Civil
Control Stations -- Protection of Evacuees and Their Families |  | XI. | Protection of
Property of the Evacuees |  | XII. | Deferments and
Exemptions from Evacuation |   | Part V. Assembly Center
Operations | 
|---|
 | XIII. | Assembly
Center Location, Construction and Equipment |  | XIV. | Housing, Feeding and
Clothing |  | XV. | Medical
Care and Sanitation |  | XVI. | Employment
of Evacuees in Assembly Centers |  | XVII. | Education,
Recreation, Religion and Assembly Center Newspapers |  | XVIII. | Assembly Center
Security |  | XIX. | Administration
of Assembly Centers |   | Part
VI. Relocation of Evacuees | 
|---|
 | XX. | War Relocation
Authority |  | XXI. | The
Construction and Equipment of Relocation Centers |  | XXII. | Transfer of
Evacuees from Assembly to Relocation Centers |   | Part VII. Related
Activities of Wartime Civil Control Administration | 
|---|
 | XXIII. | Curfew and Travel
Control |  | XXIV. | Repatriation |  | XXV. | Public Relations
Summary |  | XXVI. | Inspection
of Wartime Civil Control Administration Operations |   | Part VIII. Statistical
and Fiscal Summary |  | XXVII. | Fiscal
Summary |  | XXVIII. | Statistical
Summary |   | Part
IX. Pictorial Summary | 
|---|
  | References | 
|---|
 | Glossary |  |  | Appendix |  |  | 1. | Memoranda of March 20,
1942, from the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs Giving
Advance Warning of the First Evacuation |  | 2. | Memorandum of April
23, 1942 -- "Japanese Evacuation Operations" |  | 3. | Delegation to Ninth
Service Command and Letters of Transmittal -- Reports of Survey --
Status of Relocation Center Construction |  | 4. | Standards and Details
-- Construction of Japanese Evacuee Reception Centers (June 8, 1942) |  | 5. | Procedure Memorandum
issued on June 26, 1942 |  
 
 Index 
to Figures |  |  | FIGURE 
NO. | Part I | CHAPTER | 
  | 
|---|
 | 1. | Map
of Military Areas
of the Western Defense Command | II |  |   | Part II |  |  | 
|---|
 | 2. | Phases of the
Evacuation Program | IV |  |   | Part III |  |  | 
|---|
 | 3. | Organization
Chart of
Civil Affairs Division and Wartime Civil Control Administration --
Evacuation Period | VII |  |  | 4. | Organization
Chart of
Civil Affairs Division and Wartime Civil Control Administration --
Post-Evacuation Period | VII |  |   | Part IV |  |  | 
|---|
 | 5a. | Geographical
Distribution, Japanese Population of the United States: 1940 | VIII |  |  | 5b. | Geographical
Distribution, Japanese Population of the United States: 1940 (Color
Projection) | VIII |  |  | 6. | Japanese
Population
Western Defense Command Area: 1940 | VIII |  |  | 7. | Age
and Nativity of
Japanese in Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington: 1940 | VIII |  |  | 8. | Plan
for Evacuating
Japanese Population from Pacific Coast | VIII |  |  | 9. | Exclusion
Areas,
Japanese Evacuation Program | VIII |  |  | 10. | Evacuee Flow Chart | VIII |  |  | 11. | Net Voluntary
Movement of Japanese: March 12 to June 5, 1942 | IX |  |  | 12. | Japanese Voluntary
Migration by State of Destination: March 12 to October 31, 1942 | IX |  |  | 13. | Woodland Civil
Control Station | X |  |   | Part V |  |  | 
|---|
 | 14a-14l. | Detailed
Location Maps of Assembly Centers (12) | XIII |  |  | 15. | Assembly Center Map
with Population and Occupancy Data | XIII |  |  | 16a-16o. | Aerial
Photographs of Assembly Centers | XIII |  |  | 17. | Evacuee Crime Rate --
Offenses Per Thousand Japanese Per Year | XVIII |  |  | 18. | Assembly Center
Organization | XIX |  |  | 19a-19p. | Daily Evacuation
Population Movement of Each Assembly Center (15) | XIX |  |   | Part VI |  |  | 
|---|
 | 20a-20j. | Location of War
Relocation Centers (10) | XXI |  |  | 21. | Relocation Project
Sites (Map) | XXI |  |  | 22. | Typical Plot Plan --
War Relocation Center | XXI |  |  | 23. | Typical Housing Block
-- War Relocation Center | XXI |  |  | 24. | Typical
Administration Group -- War Relocation Center | XXI |  |  | 25. | Typical Military
Police Group -- War Relocation Center | XXI |  |  | 26. | Typical Hospital
Group -- War Relocation Center | XXI |  |  | 27. | Typical Warehouse
Group -- War Relocation Center | XXI |  |  | 28. | Transfers from
Assembly to Relocation Centers | XXII |  |  | Map Insert | I. Exclusion
Areas |  |  |  | Map Insert | II. Assembly
Center Destinations |  |  |  | Map Insert | III.
Relocation Center Destinations |  |  |   | Part VII |  |  | 
|---|
 | 29. | Age and Sex and
Nativity of 2,772 Japanese Requesting Repatriation | XXIV |  |  | 30. | Nisei, Kibei and
Issei Japanese 18 to 39 Years of Age Requesting Repatriation | XXIV |  |  | 31. | Wartime Civil Control
Administration News Releases Concerning Evacuation and Alien Control:
March-November, 1942 | XXV |  |  | 32. | Magazine
Articles and Wartime Civil Control Administration News Releases
Concerning Evacuation and Alien Control: February- November, 1942 | XXV |  |  | 33. | Magazine Articles and
Circulation Concerning Evacuation and Alien Control: February-November,
1942 | XXV |  |  | 34. | Organization Chart,
Public Relations Division | XXV |  |   | Part VIII |  |  | 
|---|
 | 35. | Total Evacuation
Population, March 2 1 to October 31,1942 | XXVIII |  |  | 36. | Japanese Population,
Assembly and Relocation Centers, Western Defense Command Area: June 7,
1942 | XXVIII |  |  | 37. | Growth of Japanese
Population United States: 1870 to 1940 | XXVIII |  |  | 38. | Distribution of
Japanese Population, Arizona, California, Oregon, Washington and Entire
United States: 1900 to 1940 | XXVIII |  |  | 39. | Japanese Population
in Certain Selected Cities, of California, Oregon and Washington: 1900
to 1940 | XXVIII |  |  | 40. | Trends in Sex
Composition of Japanese Population, Arizona, California, Oregon and
Washington: 1900 to 1940 | XXVIII |  |  | 41. | Trends in Nativity of
Japanese Population, Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington: 1900
to 1940 | XXVIII |  |  | 42. | Nativity Trends of
Japanese, Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington: 1900 to 1940 | XXVIII |  |  | 43. | Trends in Age
Composition, Japanese Population United States: 1900 to 1940 | XXVIII |  |  | 44. | Age and Sex
Composition, Japanese Population, Arizona, California, Oregon and
Washington: 1940 | XXVIII |  |  | 45. | Industry of Employed
Japanese 14 Years and Older, by Sex and Nativity, California, Oregon
and Washington: 1940 | XXVIII |  |  | 46. | Japanese
Employed Workers 14 Years Old and Over in Agriculture and Wholesale and
Retail Trade,California, Oregon and Washington: 1940 | XXVIII |  |  Index 
to Tables |  |  | TABLE NO. | Part IV | CHAPTER |  | 
|---|
 | 1. | Japanese Population of 
the Western Defense Command Area, by States and Military Areas: 1940 | VIII |  |  | 2. | Nativity
of the Total Japanese Population and of the Adult Japanese Population
of Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington: 1940 | VIII |  |  | 3. | Age and Nativity of
Japanese Population in Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington: 1940 | VIII |  |  | 4. | Major Industry Groups
of Japanese Employed Workers 14 Years Old and Over in California,
Oregon and Washington: 1940 | VIII |  |  | 5. | Cumulative Net
Voluntary Migration of Japanese from Military Areas: March 12 to June
30, 1942 | IX |  |  | 6. | Japanese Migrants from
Evacuated Areas, by State and County of Origin and by Sex | IX |  |  | 7. | Japanese Migrants from
Evacuated Areas, by State of Reported Destination and by Sex | IX |  |  | 8. | Japanese Migrants from
Evacuated Areas, by State of Origin and by Sex and Nativity | IX |  |  | 9. | Classification of
Interviews by Types of Business as of May 22, 1942, Head Office Zone | XI |  |  | 10. | Total
Interviews and Total Individual Cases Handled by Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco in Connection with the Evacuation Program | XI |  |  | 11. | Property Received for
Storage in Military Areas 1 and 2 and Transferred to War Relocation
Authority | XI |  |  | 12. | Motor Vehicles
Received and Handled by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco | XI |  |  | 13. | Summary of Cases
Served by the Farm Security Administration: Military Areas 1 and 2 | XI |  |  | 14. | Farms and Acreage
Subject to Relinquishment | XI |  |   | Part V |  |  | 
|---|
 | 15. | Average Daily Cost of
Rations per Evacuee | XIV |  |  | 16. | Inpatient Movement
During Reporting Period: August 1 to August 28, 1942 | XV |  |  | 17. | Patient-Days in
Hospitals During Reporting Period: August 1 to August 28, 1942 | XV |  |  | 18. | Operations Performed
During Reporting Period: August 1 to August 28, 1942 | XV |  |  | 19. | Average Number of
Inpatients per Week by Type of Service During Reporting
Period: August 1 to August 28, 1942 | XV |  |  | 20. | Total Outpatient
Treatments by Type of Service During the Reporting Period: August 1 to
August 28, 1942 | XV |  |  | 21. | Total Treatments and
Outpatients for the Reporting Period: August 1 to August 28, 1942 | XV |  |  | 22. | Center Hospital
Medical Staff During Reporting Period: August 1 to August 28, 1942 | XV |  |  | 23. | Average Number of
Cases of Communicable Diseases Reported per Week from August 1
to
August 28, 1942 | XV |  |  | 24. | Births, Deaths, and
Stillbirths for Japanese Inducted Into Assembly Centers: March 21 to
October 30, 1942 | XV |  |  | 25. | Japanese Deaths in
California, Oregon and Washington During First Ten Months of 1942, by
Sex and Month of Death | XV |  |  | 26. | Deaths, Infant
Deaths, and Stillbirths for Japanese in California: 1937-1941 | XV |  |  | 27. | Number of Offenses
Charged.Total Japanese Population of the United States, Calendar Year
1941, and of Assembly Centers, April 25 to October 25, 1942 | XVIII |  |  | 28. | Crime Offenses in
Assembly Centers | XVIII |  |  | 29. | Average Population,
Total Days Occupied by Evacuees, Dates of Occupancy and Maximum
Population of Assembly Centers | XIX |  |   | Part VI |  |  | 
|---|
 | 30. | Preliminary Estimate
of the Cost of Relocation Centers (December 1, 1942) | XXI |  |  | 31. | Quartermaster
Property Shipped to War Relocation Authority Centers | XXI |  |  | 32. | Summary of Transfers
of Evacuees from Custody of the Army to Custody of the War
Relocation
Authority. | XXII |  |  | 33. | Transfers from
Assembly to Relocation Centers | XXII |  |   | Part VII |  |  | 
|---|
 | 34. | Summary by Source and
Disposition of Persons Who Were Offered Repatriation in June,
1942 | XXIV |  |  | 35. | Address, Age, and Sex
of 54 Repatriates Entrained by Wartime Civil Control Administration on
June 6, 1942 | XXIV |  |  | 36. | Distribution of Names
on July 31, 1942 State Department Preliminary Repatriation List Found
in Wartime Civil Control Administration Master Index File | XXIV |  |  | 37. | Distribution of Names
on July 31, 1942 State Department Preliminary Repatriation List Not
Found in Wartime Civil Control Administration Master Index File | XXIV |  |  | 38. | Distribution of Names
Under Wartime Civil Control Administration Responsibility on August 19,
1942 State Department List | XXIV |  |  | 39. | Disposition of Names
Under Wartime Civil Control Administration Responsibility on August 19,
1942 State Department List | XXIV |  |  | 40. | Type of Form Letter
Sent to Residents of Assembly and Relocation Centers in October, 1942 | XXIV |  |  | 41. | Responses Received in
Canvass of Persons on Photostat List and Supplement: October
19-December 31, 1942 | XXIV |  |  | 42. | Lists of Japanese
Requesting Repatriation Transmitted by Wartime Civil Control
Administration | XXIV |  |  | 43. | Age, Sex,
Citizenship, and Place of Education of 2,772 Japanese Requesting
Repatriation as of October 19, 1942 | XXIV |  |  | 44. | Number and Percentage
of Nisei, Kibei, and Issei Requesting Repatriation in Five Age Groups | XXIV |  |   | Part VIII |  |  | 
|---|
 | 45. | Summary of Persons
Evacuated or Otherwise Coming Under the Evacuation Program, March 2 to
October 31,1942 | XXVIII |  |  | 46. | State of Origin by
Center of Destination of Japanese Evacuees | XXVIII |  |  | 47. | Total Persons
Evacuated to Each Assembly and Relocation Center by Civilian Exclusion
Order Number and Area | XXVIII |  |  | 48. | Japanese Evacuation
and Voluntary Migration from Evacuated Areas of Western Defense Command
-- Compared to Census Population of 1940 | XXVIII |  |  | 49. | Daily Population of
All Assembly Centers Including Hospitals: March 21 to October 30, 1942 | XXVIII |  |  | 50. | Evacuees Entering
Assembly Centers by Center and by Type of Induction or Transfer: March
21, 1942 to October 30, 1942 | XXVIII |  |  | 51. | Evacuees on Leave and
Returning to Assembly Centers | XXVIII |  |  | 52. | Evacuees Leaving
Assembly Centers by Center and by Type of Release or Transfer: March
21, 1942 to October 30, 1942 | XXVIII |  |  | 53. | Net Total Persons
Entering and Leaving Wartime Civil Control Administration Assembly
Centers: March 21 to October 30, 1942 | XXVIII |  |  | 54. | Population of
Assembly and Relocation Centers May 1 to November 3, 1942, by Months | XXVIII |  |  | 55. | Total Number of
Evacuee-Days in Assembly Centers and in Hospitals Outside of Assembly
Centers, by Center and Month: March 21, 1942 to October 30, 1942 | XXVIII |  |  | 56. | Estimated Total
Number of Evacuee Families and Average Size of Such Families, by Center | XXVIII |  |  | 57. | Center of Origin and
Destination of Evacuees Transferred from Assembly to Relocation Centers | XXVIII |  |  | 58. | Estimated State and
Relocation Center Destination of Japanese Evacuees, by State of Origin | XXVIII |  |  | 59. | Estimated Persons
Received by War Relocation Authority from Wartime
Civil Control
Administration and Other Sources, to October 31, 1942 | XXVIII |  |  | 60. | Population by Race,
for the United States: 1940 and 1930 | XXVIII |  |  | 61. | Geographical
Distribution of the Japanese Population in the United States: 1940 | XXVIII |  |  | 62. | Nativity of Japanese
in United States: 1890-1940 | XXVIII |  |  | 63. | Growth of Japanese
Population in Certain Selected Cities of California, Oregon, and
Washington: 1900-1940 | XXVIII |  |  | 64. | Sex Composition of
the Japanese Population in Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington:
1900-1940 | XXVIII |  |  | 65. | Nativity of the
Japanese Population in Arizona, California, Oregon
and Washington:
1900-1940 | XXVIII |  |  | 66. | Age of Japanese by
Sex and by Nativity for Arizona, California, Oregon
and Washington:
1940 | XXVIII |  |  | 67. | Employed Japanese
Workers by Major Industry Groups in California, Oregon and Washington:
1940 | XXVIII |  |  | 68. | Japanese-Operated
Farms Compared with All Farms in California, Oregon and Washington,
1920-1940 | XXVIII |  |  | 69. | Acreage of Commercial
Truck Crops Grown by Japanese in California | XXVIII |  |  | 70. | Nativity of All
Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in Arizona, by Counties: 1940 | XXVIII |  |  | 71. | Nativity of All
Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in California, by Counties: 1940 | XXVIII |  |  | 72. | Nativity of All
Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in Oregon, by Counties: 1940 | XXVIII |  |  | 73. | Nativity of All
Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in Washington, by Counties: 1940 | XXVIII |  |  | 74. | Nativity of All
Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in Idaho, by Counties: 1940 | XXVIII |  |  | 75. | Nativity of All
Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in Montana, by Counties: 1940 | XXVIII |  |  | 76. | Nativity of All
Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in Nevada, by Counties: 1940 | XXVIII |  |  | 77. | Nativity of All
Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in Utah, by Counties: 1940 | XXVIII |  |  | 78. | Japanese Employed
Workers 14 Years Old and Over by Sex, Nativity, and Major Occupation
and Industry Groups, for California, Oregon and Washington: 1940 | XXVIII |  |  | 79. | Japanese Employed
Workers 14 Years Old and Over by Sex, Nativity and Major Occupation and
Industry Groups for California: 1940 | XXVIII |  |  | 80. | Japanese Employed
Workers 14 Years Old and Over by Sex, Nativity and Major Occupation and
Industry Groups for Oregon: 1940 | XXVIII |  |  | 81. | Japanese Employed
Workers 14 Years Old and Over by Sex, Nativity and Major Occupation and
Industry Groups for Washington: 1940 | XXVIII |  |  
 
 
 
  WAR 
DEPARTMENT THE 
CHIEF OF STAFF WASHINGTON
  19 July 1943
  DEAR 
MR. SECRETARY:
  There 
is transmitted herewith General DeWitt's final report on the evacuation 
of persons of Japanese ancestry from certain areas on the West Coast.
  Faithfully 
yours, (signed) G.C. Marshall Chief of Staff.
  Washington, 
D. C. HONORABLE HENRY L. STIMSON The Secretary of 
War
 
 
 FOREWORDThis 
volume constitutes a comprehensive report on the evacuation from West 
Coast areas of persons of Japanese ancestry carried out by the Army in 
the interests of military security during the spring of 1942. The 
considerations which led to evacuation as well as the mechanics by 
which it was achieved, are set forth in detail. Great credit, in my 
opinion, is due General DeWitt and the Army for the humane yet 
efficient manner in which this difficult task was handled. It was 
unfortunate that the exigencies of the military situation were such as 
to require the same treatment for all persons of Japanese ancestry, 
regardless of their individual loyalty to the United States. But in 
emergencies, where the safety of the Nation is involved, consideration 
of the rights of individuals must be subordinated to the common 
security. As General DeWitt points out, great credit is due our 
Japanese population for the manner in which they responded to and 
complied with the orders of exclusion.
  (signed) 
Henry L. Stimson Secretary of War.
 
 HEADQUARTERS 
WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMYOFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL PRESIDIO 
OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
  
 June 5, 1943
   SUBJECT: 
Final Report on the Evacuation of Japanese from Certain Military Areas 
in Western Defense Command.
  TO: Chief of Staff, 
United States Army, War Department, Washington, D. C.
  1. 
I transmit herewith my final report on the evacuation of Japanese from 
the Pacific Coast.
  2. 
The evacuation was impelled by military necessity. 
The security of the 
Pacific Coast continues to require the exclusion of Japanese from the 
area now prohibited to them and will so continue as long as that 
military necessity exists. The surprise attack at Pearl Harbor by the 
enemy crippled a major portion of the Pacific Fleet and exposed the 
West Coast to an attack which could not have been substantially impeded 
by defensive fleet operations. More than 115,000 persons of 
Japanese
ancestry resided along the coast and were significantly 
concentrated 
near many highly sensitive installations essential to the war effort. 
Intelligence services records reflected the existence of hundreds 
of
Japanese organizations in California, Washington, Oregon and 
Arizona 
which, prior to December 7, 1941, were actively engaged in 
advancing
Japanese war aims. These records also disclosed that thousands 
of
American-born Japanese had gone to Japan to receive their education and
indoctrination there and had become rabidly 
pro-Japanese and then had 
returned to the United States. Emperor worshipping ceremonies were 
commonly held and millions of dollars had flowed into the Japanese 
imperial war chest from the contributions freely 
made by Japanese here. 
The continued presence of a large, unassimilated, tightly knit racial 
group, bound to an enemy nation by strong ties of race, culture, custom 
and religion along a frontier vulnerable to attack constituted a menace 
which had to be dealt with. Their loyalties were unknown and 
time was
of the essence. The evident aspirations of the enemy 
emboldened by his 
recent successes made it worse than folly to have left any stone 
unturned in the building up of our defenses. It is better to 
have had
this protection and not to have needed it than to have needed it and
not to have had it -- as we have learned to our sorrow.
  3. 
On 
February 14, 1942, I recommended to the War 
Department that the 
military security of the Pacific Coast required the establishment of 
broad civil control, anti-sabotage and counter-espionage measures, 
including the evacuation therefrom of all persons of Japanese ancestry. 
In recognition of this situation, the President issued Executive 
Order
No. 9066 on February 19, 1942, authorizing the accomplishment 
of these 
and any other necessary security measures. By letter dated February 20, 
1942, the Secretary of War authorized me to effectuate my 
recommendations and to exercise all of the powers which the Executive 
Order conferred upon him and upon any military commander designated by 
him. A number of separate and distinct security measures have been 
instituted under the broad authority thus delegated, and future events 
may demand the initiation of others. Among the steps taken was the 
evacuation of Japanese from western Washington and Oregon, California, 
and southern Arizona. Transmitted herewith is the final report of that 
evacuation.
  4. The report comprises nine Parts 
and reference 
matter. Its twenty-eight chapters are supplemented by a pictorial 
summary. In Part I, I have traced the developments 
which led to the 
issuance by the President of Executive Order No. 9066, establishing 
military control over the Pacific Coast. The military necessity for the 
specific action reported is outlined in Chapter II. Part II, 
Chapters 
IV to VI, inclusive, presents a résumé of the 
evacuation method. In 
these chapters the means provided to protect the persons, the property 
and the health of evacuees are described. In succeeding Parts a more 
detailed account of each phase of the operation is found. Part 
III
describes the military organization established to accomplish the 
evacuation. Part IV, Chapters VIII to XII cover 
evacuation operations. 
Part V comprises Chapters XIII to XIX. These offer a 
narrative of 
Assembly Center Operations -- the selection, construction and 
administration by the Army of the temporary residences provided 
evacuees pending their transfer to Relocation Centers in the interior. 
Part VI includes Chapters XX to XXII. This section 
reports the Army's 
participation in preparing semi-permanent facilities for the relocation 
of evacuees and the methods pursued in their transfer to these 
accommodations. In Part VII is found Chapters XXIII 
to XXVI, in which 
collateral aspects of the program are discussed, such as curfew and 
travel control, public relations, inspection and repatriation 
activities. Part VIII, consisting of Chapter XXVII 
and XXVIII, presents 
a fiscal and statistical summary. Part IX concludes 
the report with a 
series of photographs pictorializing the entire operation. Only those 
data essential to an understanding of the subject are included in the 
appendices.
  5. There was neither pattern nor 
precedent for 
an undertaking of this magnitude and character; and yet over 
a period
of less than ninety operating days, 110,442 persons of Japanese
ancestry were evacuated from the West Coast. This compulsory 
organized 
mass migration was conducted under complete military supervision. It 
was effected without major incident in a time of extreme 
pressure and
severe national stress, consummated at a time when the 
energies of the 
military were directed primarily toward the organization and training 
of an Army of sufficient size and equipment to fight a global war. The 
task was, nevertheless, completed without any appreciable divergence of 
military personnel. Comparatively few were used, 
and there was no 
interruption in a training program.
  6. In the 
orderly 
accomplishment of the program, emphasis was placed upon the making of 
due provision against social and economic dislocation. Agricultural 
production was not reduced by the evacuation. Over ninety-nine per cent 
of all agricultural acreage in the affected area owned or operated by 
evacuees was successfully kept in production. 
Purchasers, lessees, or 
substitute operators were found who took over the acreage 
subject to 
relinquishment. The Los Angeles Herald and Express and the San Diego 
Union, on February 23, 1943, and the Tacoma News-Tribune, on February 
25, 1943, reported increases not only in the value 
but also in the 
quantity of farm production in their respective areas.
  7. 
So 
far as could be foreseen, everything essential was provided 
to minimize
the impact of evacuation upon evacuees, as well as upon economy. 
Notwithstanding, exclusive of the costs of construction of facilities, 
the purchase of evacuee motor vehicles, the aggregate of agricultural 
crop loans made and the purchase of office equipment now in use for 
other government purposes, the entire cost was $1.46 per 
evacuee day
for the period of evacuation, Assembly Center residence and transfer 
operations. This cost includes financial assistance to 
evacuees who
voluntarily migrated from the area before the controlled 
evacuation 
phase of the program. It also covers registration and processing costs; 
storage of evacuee property and all other aspects of the evacuee 
property protection program. It includes hospitalization 
and medical
care of all evacuees from the date of evacuation; transportation 
of
evacuees and their personal effects from their homes to 
Assembly 
Centers; complete care in Assembly Centers, including all 
subsistence,
medical care and nominal compensation for work performed. It 
also 
reflects the cost of family allowances and clothing as well as 
transportation and meals during the transfer from Assembly to 
Relocation Centers.
  8. Accomplishment of the 
program in the 
manner selected would have been impossible without the participation of 
the Federal civilian agencies so ably assisting throughout. Under my 
continuous direction, the associated agencies of the Federal Security 
Agency, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, the Farm Security 
Administration of the Department of Agriculture, and the Work Projects 
Administration of the Federal Works Agency accepted major 
responsibilities. The War Relocation Authority; the Departments of 
Treasury, Post Office, Justice, Commerce and Interior; the Division of 
Central Administrative Services of the Office for Emergency Management 
performed an important service from the beginning, and various state 
and local agencies effectively cooperated. The participating Army 
Agencies, particularly the Division Engineers of the United States 
Engineer Corps who supervised the construction of Assembly and 
Relocation Centers, discharged their responsibilities in a superior 
manner. The agencies of my command, military and civilian personnel 
alike, responded to the difficult assignment devolving upon them with 
unselfish devotion to duty. To the Japanese themselves great 
credit is
due for the manner in which they, under Army supervision and 
direction, 
responded to and complied with the orders of exclusion.
  9. 
A 
large quantity of primary source materials not found in the Appendix 
has been selected and bound together. These have been made available in 
triplicate. It is proposed that one set be retained at this 
Headquarters. Two sets are forwarded with this report. It is 
requested that one set be retained in the office of the Adjutant 
General, War Department, and the other forwarded to the Library of 
Congress for future reference. The great volume of secondary source 
materials will remain on file at this Headquarters. All of these data 
will be available for research purposes whenever the Secretary of War 
so directs.
  (signed) J. L. DEWITT, Lieutenant 
General, U. S. Army, Commanding.
 
 
 FINAL 
REPORTJAPANESE EVACUATIONFROM THE WEST COAST1942
 PART IEVACUATION -- ITS MILITARY 
NECESSITY
 CHAPTER 
IAction
Under Alien Enemy ProclamationsThe ultimate decision to 
evacuate all persons of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific Coast under 
Federal supervision was not made coincidentally 
with the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States. It was 
predicated upon a series of intermediate decisions, each of which 
formed a part of the progressive development of the final decision. At 
certain stages of this development, various semi-official views were 
advanced proposing action less embracing than that which finally 
followed.
  On December 7th and 8th, 1941, the 
President issued proclamations declaring all nationals and subjects of 
the nations with which we were at war to be enemy aliens. 
This followed the precedent of the last war, and was based upon the 
same statutory enactment which supported the proclamations of President 
Wilson in this regard. (See 50 U.S.C. 21.) By executive action, certain 
restrictive measures were applied against all enemy aliens on 
an equal basis. In continental United States, the Attorney 
General, through the Department of Justice, was charged with the 
enforcement and administration of these proclamations. Where necessary 
fully to implement his action, the Attorney General was assigned the 
responsibility of issuing administrative regulations. He was also given 
the authority to declare prohibited zones, to which 
enemy aliens were to be denied admittance or from which they were to be 
excluded in any case where the national security required. The 
possession of certain articles was declared by the proclamations to be 
unlawful, and these articles are described as contraband. 
Authority was granted for the internment of such enemy aliens as might 
be regarded by the Attorney General as dangerous to the national 
security if permitted to remain at large. In continental United States internment 
was left in any case to the discretion of the Attorney General.
  On 
the night of December 7th and the days that followed, certain enemy 
aliens were apprehended and held in detention 
pending the determination whether to intern. Essentially, the 
apprehensions thus effected were based on lists of suspects 
previously compiled by the intelligence services, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Military 
Intelligence Service. During the initial stages of this action, some 2,000 
persons were apprehended. Japanese aliens were included in 
their number. However, no steps were taken to provide for the 
collection of contraband and no prohibited zones were proclaimed.
  The 
Commanding General, during the closing weeks of December, requested the 
War Department to acquaint the Department of Justice with the need for 
vigorous action along the Pacific Coast. He sought steps looking toward 
the enforcement of the contraband prohibitions contained in the 
proclamations and toward the declaration of certain prohibited 
zones surrounding "vital installations" along the coast. The 
Commanding General had become convinced that the military security of 
the coast required these measures.
  His 
conclusion was in part based upon the interception of 
unauthorized radio communications
which had been identified as emanating from certain areas along the 
coast. Of further concern to him was the fact that for a period of 
several weeks following December 7th, substantially every ship leaving 
a West Coast port was attacked by an enemy submarine. 
This seemed conclusively to point to the existence of hostile 
shore-to-ship (submarine) communication.
  The 
Commanding General requested the War Department to send a 
representative, and to arrange with the Department of Justice for an 
officer of that agency to meet with him at San Francisco, in order to 
consider the situation "on the ground." His objective was to 
crystallize a program of forthright action to deal with subversive 
segments of the population. 
Preliminary to this a number of discussions had been held between War 
and Justice Department representatives in Washington, D. C. The Provost 
Marshal General, Major General Allen W. Gullion, 
the Assistant Secretary of War, Honorable John J. McCloy, 
the Chief of the Enemy Alien Control Unit, Department of Justice, Mr. 
Edward J. Ennis, and the Chief of the Aliens 
Division, Office of the Provost Marshal General, participated in these 
meetings.
  These 
conferences between War and Justice Department representatives in 
Washington were followed by conferences in San Francisco. Mr. James Rowe, 
Jr., Assistant to the Attorney General, represented the Department of 
Justice. The Commanding General urged that the Justice Department 
provide for spot raids in various areas to determine the presence and 
possession of contraband; that it authorize the ready seizure of 
contraband, and adopt means for collecting and storing it. He further 
requested that the Attorney General declare prohibited zones 
surrounding certain coastal installations. These conferences continued 
over the period between January 2nd and 5th, 1942, and, as an outgrowth 
of these meetings, the Department of Justice agreed to a program of 
enforcement substantially as desired, with certain important 
exceptions. These exceptions are described in an exchange of memoranda 
dated January 5, 1942, between the Commanding General and Mr. Rowe (Appendix to Chapter II infra).
  The 
salient feature of the intended program was an agreement arranging for creation 
of prohibited zones. 
The Department of Justice agreed to declare prohibited zones 
surrounding vital installations and to provide for the exclusion from 
these zones of enemy aliens. The extent and location of these zones was 
to be determined on the basis of recommendations submitted by the 
Commanding General. At the conclusion of these conferences, identical 
memoranda were exchanged on January 6, 1942, between the Commanding 
General and the Assistant Attorney General, Mr. James Rowe, Jr., 
crystallizing the intermediate understandings which had been developed. 
These were:
 "Following is a summary of the 
principles
applicable and procedure to be followed in the implementation of the
proclamations of the President dated December 7th and 8th, 1941, and
the instructions and regulations of the Attorney General, respecting
alien enemies in the Western Theater of Operations. These principles
and procedure were formulated in conferences during the past week
between Lieutenant General J. L. DeWitt, Commanding
General of the Western Theater of Operations, Mr. James Rowe,
special representative of the Attorney General of the United States,
Mr. N. J. L. Pieper, of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and Major Karl R. Bendetsen,
J.A.G.D., Office of the Provost Marshal General.
  "1.
Restricted Areas:
The Attorney General will designate restricted areas. He will entertain
Army recommendations. He will require the Army to determine the exact
description of each restricted area. What further requirements he will
make will depend in large measure upon the nature of the area involved
and the extent of alien enemy population in such area. Indications are
that, should Army recommendations include areas in which there is
resident a large number of alien enemies and
evacuation will thereby be rendered necessary, he will also require the
submission of detailed plans for evacuation and resettlement.
The Army has expressed disinclination to compliance on its part with
such a requirement for the reason that the Justice Department will
undertake an alien enemy registration and will have in its possession
all the information essential for planning purposes once the proposed
restricted areas have been made known to that Department by the Army.
  "2.
Alien Enemy Registration:
The Department of Justice is committed to an alien enemy registration
with the least practicable delay. It is understood that registration
will include provision for finger printing, photographing, and other
information to be filed locally and probably with local police, as well
as at a central office, such information to be compiled alphabetically,
by nationality and race as well as geographical.
  "3.
Apprehension:
United States Attorneys have been or will be instructed to issue
apprehension warrants upon application of the F.B.I., special agents in
charge. F.B.I. agents in charge will entertain Army requests for
apprehensions submitted in writing, or, if time does not permit, oral
requests which shall be confirmed later in writing. In any case where
an alien enemy is found in violation of any of the provisions of the
proclamation or any part of the regulations of the Attorney General
thereunder, he is subject to summary apprehension with or
without a warrant.
Presumably at least he is subject to summary apprehension by the Army
as well as by the civil authorities. Example: A known alien enemy in
possession of contraband is subject to summary apprehension without a
warrant. Example: An alien enemy found within a restricted area without
authority is subject to apprehension.
  "In an
emergency apprehensions may be made without a warrant.
  "4.
Searches and Seizures:
A warrant authorizing the search of the premises of an alien enemy for
the presence of contraband may be obtained merely on application to the
United States Attorney. It is only necessary to support the issuance of
such a warrant that it be stated that the premises are those of an
alien enemy. In an emergency where the time is insufficient in which to
procure a warrant, such premises may be searched without a
warrant.
  "5. Mixed Occupancy
Dwellings: The search of mixed occupancy premises or
dwellings may be by warrant only.
In emergencies involving contraband such as radio transmitters, it may
be necessary to keep the premises under surveillance while a search
warrant is procured. As previously noted, however, in such an emergency
an alien enemy's premises may be searched for contraband without a
warrant.
  "6. Multiple Searches:
The term 'mass raid'
will not be employed by the Attorney General. Instructions which have
been or will be issued to United States Attorneys and to F.B.I. Special
Agents will permit 'spot raids.' That is to say, if lists of known
alien enemies with the addresses of each are prepared by the F.B.I.,
and warrants are requested to cover such lists, a search of all the
premises involved may be undertaken simultaneously. Thus all of the
alien enemy premises in a given area can be searched at the same moment.
  "7.
Much of the effective action will be facilitated by a complete
registration. It is important that it go forward with dispatch.
However, there should be no cessation in the vigorous implementation of
the President's proclamations regarding alien enemies. It appears that
considerable progress of a clarifying nature has been made. Only actual
application of the streamlined mechanics can establish whether there is
need for further change in the principles to be applied and the
procedure to be followed."
  After a series 
of surveys 
made by the Commanding Generals of the several Western Defense Command 
sectors, the Commanding General submitted a number of recommendations 
calling for the establishment of 99 prohibited zones in the 
State of California, and two restricted zones. These were to 
be followed by similar recommendations pertaining to Arizona, 
Oregon, and Washington. 
Primarily, the prohibited zones in California surrounded various points 
along the California Coast, installations in the San Francisco Bay 
area, particularly along the waterfront, and in Los Angeles and San 
Diego. The recommendation as to California was transmitted by the 
Commanding General by letter dated January 21, 1942, was received from 
the Commanding General by the War Department on January 25, 
1942, 
and was forwarded by the Secretary of War to the Attorney General on 
the same date.
  In a series of press releases the 
Attorney 
General designated as prohibited zones the 99 areas recommended by the 
Commanding General in California.{See Inclosures 
to letter of transmittal # 7 and #11.} Considerable 
evacuation thus was necessitated, but most of the enemy aliens 
concerned were able to take up residence in or near places 
adjacent to the prohibited zone. 
For example, a large prohibited zone embraced the San Francisco 
waterfront area. Enemy aliens living in this section were required only 
to move elsewhere in San Francisco. Of course, only aliens of enemy 
nationality were affected, and no persons of Japanese 
ancestry born in the United States were required to move under the
program.
  Although 
some problems were presented which required provision for individual 
assistance, essentially there was little of this involved. By 
arrangement with the Justice Department, the associated agencies of the 
Federal Security Agency were asked to lend assistance in 
unusually needy cases. 
  Mr. Tom C. Clark, 
then the West Coast representative of the Anti-Trust Division 
of 
the Justice Department, supervised this phase of enemy alien control 
and coordinated all activities for the Justice Department. There was 
much conjecture that this was the forerunner of a general enemy alien 
evacuation. Mr. Clark and his Anti-Trust Division staff were deluged 
with inquiries and comments. Public excitement in 
certain areas 
reached a high pitch, and much confusion, the result of conflicting 
reports and rumors, characterized the picture. However, in essence, 
there was no substantial dislocation or disruption socially or 
economically of the affected groups.
 
 CHAPTER IINeed 
for Military Control and for Evacuation 
The Commanding General, meantime,
prepared
and submitted recommendations for the establishment of
prohibited zones in
Arizona, Oregon and Washington, similar to those he had prepared for
California. Upon receipt of these supplemental recommendations,
forwarded by
the Secretary of War, the Attorney General declined to act until
further study.
In the case of Washington State, the recommended prohibited zone
included
virtually all of the territory lying west of the Cascades.
A general enemy
alien evacuation from this area would have been required. More than
9,500
persons would have been affected. No agency was then prepared to
supervise or
conduct a mass movement, and the Attorney General was not convinced of
the
necessity. 
 As early as January 5, in a memorandum of that date to Mr.
Rowe, during the
initial conferences at San Francisco, the Commanding General pointed to
the
need for careful advanced planning to provide
against such economic and social
dislocations which might ensue from such mass evacuation. The point was
also
established that the Army had no wish to assume any aspects
of civil control if
there were any means by which the necessary security measures could be
taken
through normal civilian channels. In order to trace clearly the
developments
which ultimately led to Executive Order No. 9066, and the establishment
of
military control, that memorandum is quoted in full at the end of this
chapter. 
 The Department of Justice had indicated informally that it
did not consider
itself in a position to direct any enforced migrations.
The Commanding
General's recommendations for prohibited zones in Washington and Oregon
were
therefore viewed with particular concern by the Department. Not only
did it
feel that such action should be predicated on convincing
evidence of the
military necessity, it regarded the responsibility for
collective evacuation as
one not within its functions. 
 The Attorney General, on February 9, 1942, formally advised
the Secretary of
War, by letter, that he could not accept the recommendation of the
Commanding
General for the establishment of a zone prohibited to enemy aliens in
the
States of Washington and Oregon of the extent proposed by him. He
stated in
part:
 
"Your recommendation of prohibited areas for Oregon and Washington
include
the cities of Portland, Seattle and Tacoma and therefore contemplate a
mass
evacuation of many thousands * * *. No reasons were given for
this mass
evacuation * * * I understood that * * * Lieutenant General
DeWITT has been
requested to supply the War Department with further details and further
material before any action is taken on these recommendations. I shall,
therefore, await your further advice. 
 "* * * The
evacuation * * * from this area would, of course, present a
problem of very great magnitude. The Department of Justice is
not physically
equipped to carry out any mass evacuation. It would mean that only the
War
Department has the equipment and personnel to manage the task. 
 "The
proclamations directing the Department of Justice to apprehend, and
where necessary, evacuate alien enemies, do not, of course, include American
citizens of the Japanese race. If they have to be evacuated,
I believe that
this would have to be done as a military necessity
in these particular areas.
Such action, therefore, should in my opinion, be taken by the War
Department
and not by the Department of Justice."
  
The Commanding General thereafter submitted a résumé 
of the military 
considerations which prompted his recommendation for a prohibited zone 
in 
Washington and Oregon embracing virtually the westerly half of those 
states. 
The Department of Justice, however, concluded that it was not 
in a position to
undertake any mass evacuation, and declined in any event to 
administer such 
general civil control measures.  
 Meanwhile, the uncertainties of the situation became 
further complicated. The 
enforcement of contraband provisions was impeded by the fact that many 
Japanese
aliens resided in premises owned by American-born persons of Japanese
ancestry. 
The Department of Justice had agreed to authorize its special field 
agents of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation to undertake spot raids without 
warrant to 
determine the possession of arms, cameras and other contraband by 
Japanese, but 
only in those premises occupied exclusively by enemy aliens. The search 
of 
mixed occupancy premises or dwellings had not been authorized except by 
warrant 
only. (See 
Memo 1/5/42 at end of
this chapter.) 
 In the Monterey area in California a Federal Bureau of
Investigation spot raid
made about February 12, 1942, found more than 60,000 rounds
of ammunition and
many rifles, shotguns and maps of all kinds. These raids had
not succeeded in
arresting the continuance of illicit signaling.
Most dwelling places were in
the mixed occupancy class and could not be searched
promptly upon receipt of
reports. It became increasingly apparent that adequate security
measures could
not be taken unless the Federal Government placed itself in a position
to deal
with the whole problem. 
 The Pacific Coast had become exposed to attack
by enemy successes in the
Pacific. The situation in the Pacific theatre had gravely deteriorated.
There
were hundreds of reports nightly of signal lights
visible from the coast, and
of intercepts of unidentified radio transmissions.
Signaling was often observed
at premises which could not be entered without a warrant because of
mixed
occupancy. The problem required immediate solution. It called for the
application of measures not then in being. {It is interesting to note
that
following the evacuation, interceptions of suspicious or unidentified
radio
signal and shore-to-ship signal lights were virtually
eliminated and attacks
on outbound shipping from west coast ports appreciably reduced.} 
 Further, the situation was fraught with danger to
the Japanese population
itself. The combination of spot raids revealing hidden caches of
contraband,
the attacks on coastwise shipping, the interception of illicit radio
transmissions, the nightly observation of visual signal lamps from
constantly
changing locations, and the success of the enemy offensive in the
Pacific, had
so aroused the public along the West Coast against the Japanese that it
was
ready to take matters into its own hands. Press and periodical reports
of the
public attitudes along the West Coast from December 7, 1941,
to the
initiation of controlled evacuation clearly reflected the intensity of
feeling.
Numerous incidents of violence involving Japanese
and others occurred; many
more were reported but were subsequently either unverified or were
found to be
cumulative. 
 The acceptance by the Attorney General of the Washington
and Oregon
recommendations would not have provided the security which the military
situation then required. More than two-thirds of the total
Japanese population
on the West Coast were not subject to alien enemy regulations.
The action
ultimately taken was based upon authority not then existing. It had
become
essential to provide means which would remove the potential
menace to which the
presence of this group under all the circumstances subjected the West
Coast. It
is pertinent now to examine the situation with which the military
authorities
were then confronted. 
 Because of the ties of race, the intense feeling of filial
piety and the strong
bonds of common tradition, culture and customs, this population
presented a
tightly-knit racial group. It included in excess of 115,000
persons deployed
along the Pacific Coast. Whether by design or accident, virtually
always their
communities were adjacent to very vital shore installations, war
plants, etc.
While it was believed that some were loyal, it was
known that many were not. To
complicate the situation no ready means existed for determining the
loyal and
the disloyal with any degree of safety. It was necessary to face the
realties
-- a positive determination could not have been made. 
 It could not be established, of course, that the location
of thousands of
Japanese adjacent to strategic points verified the existence of some
vast
conspiracy to which all of them were parties. Some of them doubtless
resided
there through mere coincidence. It seemed equally beyond doubt,
however, that
the presence of others was not mere coincidence. It
was difficult to explain
the situation in Santa Barbara County, for example, by coincidence
alone. 
 Throughout the Santa Maria Valley in that County, including
the cities of Santa
Maria and Guadalupe, every utility, air field, bridge, telephone and
power line
or other facility of importance was flanked by Japanese. They even
surrounded
the oil fields in this area. Only a few miles south, however, in the Santa
Ynez
Valley, lay an area equally as productive agriculturally as
the Santa Maria
Valley and with lands equally available for purchase and lease, but
without any
strategic installations whatever. There were no Japanese in the Santa
Ynez
Valley. 
 Similarly, along the coastal plain of Santa
Barbara County from Gaviota south,
the entire plain, though narrow, had been subject to intensive
cultivation.
Yet, the only Japanese in this area were located immediately adjacent
to such
widely separated points as the El Capitan Oil Field, Elwood Oil Field,
Summerland Oil Field, Santa Barbara airport and Santa Barbara
lighthouse and
harbor entrance. There were no Japanese on the equally attractive lands
between
these points. In the
north end of the county is a
stretch of open beach ideally suited for landing purposes, extending
for 15 or
20 miles, on which almost the only inhabitants were Japanese. Such a
distribution of the
Japanese
population appeared to manifest something more than coincidence. In any
case,
it was certainly evident that the Japanese population of the Pacific
Coast was,
as a whole, ideally situated with reference to points of strategic
importance,
to carry into execution a tremendous program of sabotage on a
mass scale should
any considerable number of them have been inclined to do so.
  There were other very
disturbing
indications that the Commanding General could not ignore. He was forced
to
consider the character of the Japanese colony along the coast. While
this is
neither the place nor the time to record in detail significant
pro-Japanese
activities in the United States, it is pertinent to note some of these
in
passing. Research has established that there were over 124
separate Japanese
organizations along the Pacific Coast engaged, in varying degrees, in
common
pro-Japanese purposes. This number does not include local
branches of parent
organizations, of which there were more than 310.
  Research and co-ordination
of information
had made possible the identification of more than 100 parent
fascistic or
militaristic organizations in Japan which have had some
relation, either direct
or indirect, with Japanese organizations or individuals in the United
States.
Many of the former were parent organizations of subsidiary or branch
organizations in the United States and in that capacity directed
organizational
and functional activities. There was definite information that the
great majority
of activities followed a line of control from the Japanese government,
through
key individuals and associations to the Japanese residents in the
United
States.
  That the Japanese 
associations, as
organizations, aided the military campaigns of the Japanese Government
is 
beyond doubt. The contributions of these associations towards the 
Japanese war 
effort had been freely published in Japanese newspapers throughout 
California. 
{Some of these newspaper items are as follows: "March 13, 1941. 
Thirty-two 
bales of tinfoil were shipped to Japan through the Japanese Consulate 
General 
and were contributed by Japanese Associations of Fresno County, Kern 
County, 
Delano and San Bernardino." "July 6, 1941. Central California Japanese 
Association announces the collection and transmission to the War 
Ministry of 
the sum of $3,542.05." The Japanese Veterans Association was similarly 
engaged: "March 20, 1941. It is announced that the War Veterans 
Associations in Japan, Germany and Italy, in keeping with the spirit of 
the 
Axis Treaty have formed joint and advisory committees to aid 
and establish the 
new world order. There are 3˝ million veterans and 
reservists headed by 
General Imei who have pledged their cooperation to Axis aims." 
(All 
quotations in this note taken from the Extension of the Testimony of 
the 
Attorney General of California given before the House of 
Representatives, 
Select Committee on National Defense Migration, pursuant to House 
Resolution 
113, 77th Congress, San Francisco Hearings, part 29. Italics supplied.)}
  The 
extent to which Emperor 
worshiping
ceremonies were attended could not have been overlooked. Many 
articles 
appearing in issues of Japanese language newspapers gave evidence that 
these 
ceremonies had been directed toward the stimulation of "burning 
patriotism" and "all-out support of the Japanese Asiatic Co-Prosperity 
Program."
  Numerous Emperor worshiping 
ceremonies had 
been held. Hundreds of Japanese attended these ceremonies, and it was 
an 
objective of the sponsoring organization to encourage one 
hundred per cent
attendance. For example, on February 11, 1940, at 7:00 P.M., 
the Japanese Association of Sacramento sponsored an Emperor worshiping 
ceremony in commemoration of the 2,600th anniversary of the 
founding of Japan. Three thousand attended.
  Another group of 
Japanese met on January 1, 1941, at Lindsay, California. They honored
the 2,601st Year of the Founding of the Japanese Empire
and participated in the annual reverence to the Emperor,
  {The program was as follows:
 a. Singing of Japanese National Anthem; b. Opening of the Emperor's portrait; c. Reading of the Emperor's Rescript; d. Reading of Message of Reverence; e. Bowing heads toward Japan; f. Shouting "Banzai" (Long live the Emperor).}
  and bowed their heads toward Japan in order to
indicate that they would be "* * * ready to respond to the
call of the mother country with one mind. Japan is fighting
to carry out our program of Greater Asiatic co-prosperity. Our
fellow Japanese countrymen must be of one spirit and should endeavor to
unite our Japanese societies in this country * * *" {New World Sun, January 7,
1941: 5:6.}
  Evidence
of the regular occurrence of Emperor worshiping ceremonies in almost
every Japanese populated community in the United States had
been discovered.
  A few examples of the many
Japanese associations extant along the Pacific Coast are described in
the following passages:
  The
Hokubei Butoku Kai. The Hokubei Butoku Kai or Military
Virtue Society of North America was organized in 1931 with
headquarters at Alvarado, Alameda County, California, and a branch
office in Tokyo. One of the purposes of the organization was to instill
the Japanese military code of Bushido among the Japanese throughout
North America. This highly nationalistic and militaristic
organization
was formed primarily to teach Japanese boys "military virtues" through
Kendo (fencing). Judo (Jiujitsu), and Sumo (wrestling). The manner in
which this society became closely integrated with many other Japanese
organizations, both business and social, is well illustrated by the
postal address of some of these branches.
  {For
example, in Alvarado, Alameda County, Post Office Box 213 was the
address of the following:
 (1) Headquarters' Military Virtue Society of
North America (2)
Kinyai Kumia [Kumiai] Finance Association (3) Japanese-American News Correspondent (4) New World Sun Correspondent (5) Hochi Shimbun Correspondent (6) Alvarado Japanese School (7) Takichi Nakamura (President) Military
Virtue Society of North America
  In Sebastopol, Post Office Box 57 was the
address of the following:
 (1) Military Virtue Society of North America (2) Japanese Sunday School (3) Hiroshima Prefectural Society (4) Sabura Baseball Team
  In Suisun, Post Office Box 252 was the address
of:
 (1)
Military Virtue Society of North America (2) Mint Grill (3) Suisun Fishing Club
  In Auburn, Post Office Box 57 was the address
of:
 (1)
Military Virtue Society of North America (2) Japanese School (3) Young Men's Buddhist Association (4) Young Women's Buddhist Association (5) Buddhist Church
  In Lindsay, 157 Mount Vernon Avenue was the
address of:
 (1) Military Virtue Society of North America (2) Japanese School (3) Lindsay Women's Association}
  
The Heimusha Kai. The Heimusha 
Kai was organized for the sole purpose of furthering the Japanese war 
effort. The intelligences services (including the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the Military Intelligence Service and the Office of 
Naval Intelligence) had reached the conclusion that this organization 
was engaged in espionage. Its membership contained 
highly militaristic males eligible for compulsory military service in 
Japan. Its prime function was the collection of war funds for the 
Japanese army and navy. In more than 1,000 translated articles in which 
Heimusha Kai was mentioned, there was no evidence of any function save 
the collection of war relief funds.
  A prospectus 
was issued to all Japanese in the United States by the Sponsor 
Committee for Heimusha Kai in America. That prospectus is quoted as 
follows:
 "The world should realize that
our military action in China is based upon the significant fact that we
are forced to fight under realistic circumstances. As a
matter of historical fact, whenever the Japanese government begins a
military campaign, we, Japanese, must be united and everyone of us must
do his part.
  "As far as our patriotism
is concerned, the world knows that we are superior to any
other nation.
However, as long as we are staying on foreign soil, what can we do for
our mother country? All our courageous fighters are fighting at the
front today, forgetting their parents, wives and children in their
homes! It is beyond our imagination, the manner in which our imperial
soldiers are sacrificing their lives at the front line, bomb after
bomb, deaths after deaths! Whenever we read and hear this sad news, who
can keep from crying in sympathy? Therefore, we, the Japanese
in the
United States, have been contributing a huge amount of money
for war
relief funds and numerous comforting bags for our imperial soldiers.
  "Today,
we, Japanese in the United States, who are not able to sacrifice our
lives for our National cause are now firmly resolved to stand by to
settle the present war as early as possible. We are
proud to
say that our daily happy life in America is dependent upon the
protective power of Great Japan. We are facing a critical
emergency,
and we will take strong action as planned. We do hope and beg you all
to cooperate with us for our National cause." {New
World Sun, August 28, 1937: 4:6 10.} (Italics
supplied.)
  The Heimusha Kai was organized 
on October 24, 1937, in San Francisco. The meeting 
took place at the 
Golden Gate Hall, and there were more than 200 members present. The 
following resolution was passed:
 "We, the 
members of the Japanese Reserve Army Corps in America are resolved to
do our best in support of the Japanese campaign in China and to set up
an Army Relief Department For Our Mother Country." {Excerpt
from Zaibei Nippon Zin [Zen] Shi, published in
Japan, 1940.} According 
to reliable sources there were more than 10,000 members 
of Heimusha Kai 
in 1940.
  Additional illustrations of 
pro-Japanese societies are found in footnotes.
  {The 
Togo Kai. The Togo Kai was organized in 1905 in 
memory of Admiral Togo, 
the hero of the Japanese Russian Naval Battle. (Ref. Japanese Directory 
of Political and Religious Organizations.) The purposes of this 
organization were to promote a greater Imperial Japanese Navy, 
and to 
collect and transmit funds for the Japanese Navy.
  It 
was revealed that there were three Togo Kai branches in the United 
States: One in Sacramento, one in Sonoma County, and one in San 
Francisco. All of these branches worked industriously to raise money 
for the Japanese Navy War Relief Fund. The Togo Kai branches in America 
were controlled by the parent Togo Kai headquarters in Japan. This fact 
is substantiated by reference to telegraphic bank transfers from the 
various branches of the United States to headquarters in Japan.
  The 
Kanjo Kai. "Due to the critical situation that has 
developed in the 
Orient," the Zaigo Gunjin Dan (Retired Army Men's Corps) of Sacramento 
organized the Kanjo Kai (Society for Defending the Country by Swords, 
or the Sword Society) in July, 1937. (Ref. New World Sun, July 18, 
1937; 3:1.) It was the first militant Japanese organization 
that was 
established in the United States by Japanese ex-service men to support 
military action taken by the Japanese government in the Orient.
  The 
following telegram from the Japanese Army Department was received by 
the Kanjo Kai just after the organization of that Society, and was read 
at the first executive board meeting:
 "During 
this emergency, you officials are doing your utmost for the Country and
the Army Department is very grateful. For the establishment of peace in
the Orient, it is necessary for us to adopt positive steps in China."
(Ref. New World Sun, July 18, 1937: 3:1.)
  In 
September, 1940, the Kanjo Kai, together with other organizations in 
Sacramento, gave a farewell banquet for three representatives who were 
sent to the Empire Jubilee Conference in Tokyo. (Ref. New World Sun, 
September 19, 1940: 5:1.)
  Members of the Kanjo 
Kai made monthly contributions of $1.00 or more to Imperial Japanese 
Army War Relief Fund. This proposal was initiated by Consul-General 
Shiosaki during his visit to Sacramento in 1938.
  The 
Nipponjin Kai. The Japanese Association of America 
(Nipponjin Kai) was 
the principal controlling organization in the United States. It 
operated in close cooperation with the consulate and carried out the 
directives of that office. Article 3 of its by-laws provides:
 "Article 
3. This association is organized by the local Japanese association
under the jurisdiction of the Japanese Consulate General of
San
Francisco." (Italics supplied.)
  The 
Japanese 
Association acted as intermediary between the Japanese people in the 
United States and the Japanese government. It aided the collection of 
war relief funds and poll taxes, sponsored organization of corps of 
visitors from the United States to Japan, founded Japanese 
language
schools, disseminated propaganda, welcomed dignitaries and 
visiting 
military and naval officers, encouraged emperor worship, stimulated the 
establishment of subsidiaries and other organizations, and participated 
in a multitude of other pro-Japanese activities. Branches of the 
Japanese Association were established in every community 
where the
Japanese population was such as to warrant such an organization.
  Other 
outstanding Japanese organizations were known to exist in the United 
States. Some of the more prominent ones are listed below. The 
translation of the names of these organizations is indicative of their 
objects.
 Kaigun Kyokai (Navy Association); Aikoku
Fujin Kai (Patriotic Women's Society); Jugo Sekisei Kai
(Behind the Gun Society or Red Heart Society); Hokoku Kai
(Society for Service to the Country); Aikokuki Kenno Kisei
Domei (Patriotic League for Contribution to the Airplane Fund); Jugo
Kai (Behind the Gun Society); Ko-A-Sokushin Kai (Society for
the Promotion of Asiatic Co-Prosperity); Kokuryu Kai (Black
Dragon Society); Kibei Shimin Kai (Kibei Society); Hokyoku
Kai (Rising Sun Society); Zaibei Nipponjin Kai (Japanese
Association of America); Zaibei Nipponjin Kai Renraku Nikkai
Kanji Kai (United Councilor's Convention for Japanese Associations in
North America); Nanka Teikoku Gunjin Dan (Japanese Imperial
Army Men's Corps of Southern California); Jugo Haibutsu
Riyodan (Behind the Gun Waste Utilization Society); Josho
Kai (Ever-Victorious or Invincible Society); Hinode Kai
(Imperial Japanese Reservists); Hokubei Zaigo Shokuin Dan
(North American Reserve Officers' Association); Sokoku Kai
(Fatherland Society); Suiko Kai (Los Angeles Reserve
Officers' Association); Zaibei Ikuei Kai (Society of
Educating the Second Generation in America).}
  One 
extremely important obstacle in the path of Americanization of the 
second-generation Japanese was the widespread formation, and increasing 
importance, of the Japanese language schools in the 
United States. The purposes and functions of these Japanese language 
schools are well known. They employed only those textbooks 
which had been edited by the Department of Education of the Japanese
Imperial Government.
  In 
order to assist the Japanization of the second generation, the Zaibei 
Ikuei Kai (Society for Education of the Second Generation in America) 
was organized in Los Angeles in April, 1940. "With the grace of the 
Emperor, the ZAIBEI IKUEI KAI is being organized in commemoration of 
the 2,600th Anniversary of the Founding of the Japanese Empire to 
Japanize the second and third generations in this country for 
the accomplishment of establishing a greater Asia in the future * * 
*.'" {New World Sun, April 13, 1940: 4:1.}
  In 
California alone there were over 248 schools with 
an aggregate faculty of 454 and a student body of 17,800.
  The 
number of American-born Japanese who had been sent to Japan for 
education and who were now in the United States could not be 
overlooked. For more than twenty-five years 
American-born 
progeny of alien Japanese had been sent to Japan by their parents for 
education and indoctrination. There they remained for extended periods, 
following which they ordinarily returned to the United States. The 
extent of their influence upon other Nisei Japanese could not be 
accurately calculated. But it could not be disregarded.
  The 
Kibei Shimin movement
was sponsored by the Japanese Association of America. Its objective for 
many years had been to encourage the return to America from Japan of 
American-born Japanese. When the movement started it was 
ascertained that there were about 20,000 American-born 
Japanese in Japan. 
The Japanese Association of America sent representatives to Japan to 
confer with Prefectural officials on the problems of financing and 
transportation. The Association also arranged with steamship companies 
for special rates for groups of ten or more so returning, and requested 
all Japanese associations to secure employment for returning 
American-born Japanese.
  During 1941 alone more 
than 1,573 American-born Japanese 
entered West Coast ports from Japan. Over 1,147 Issei, or 
alien 
Japanese, re-entered the United States from Japan during that year.
  The 
557 male Japanese less than twenty-five years of age who entered West 
Coast ports from Japan during 1941 had an average age of 18.2 
years
and had spent an average of 5.2 years in Japan. Of these, 239 had spent 
more than three years there. This latter group had spent an average of 
10.2 years in Japan.
  Of the 239 males who spent 
three years 
or more abroad, 180 were in the age group 15 to 19 (with an assumed 
average age of 17.5 years) and had spent 10.7 years abroad. In other 
words, these 180 Kibei lived, on the average, 6.8 years at the 
beginning of their life in the United States and the next 10.7 years in 
Japan. Forty of the 239 who had spent three or more years abroad were 
in the age group 20 to 24, with an assumed average age 22.5. These were 
returning to the United States after having lived here, on the average, 
for their first 13 years and having spent the last 9.5 years in Japan, 
including one or more years when they were of compulsory (Japanese) 
military age.
  The table below indicates the 
nearest relative in Japan for the age groups 15 to 19, and 20 to 24 
years of age.
 
 | Nearest Relative in Japan | AGE GROUP | 
|---|
 | 15 to 19 years | 20 to 24 years | 
|---|
 | Number | Percent | Number | Percent | 
|---|
 All  | 272 | 100.0 | 163 | 100.0 |  | Father 
or mother | 115 | 42.3 | 66 | 40.5 |  |   
 Father | 67 | 24.6 | 46 | 28.2 |  |   
   Mother | 48 | 17.7 | 20 | 12.3 |   |  |  |  |  |  | Grandparent | 36 | 13.2 | 18 | 11.0 |  | Uncle 
or aunt | 95 | 34.9 | 42 | 25.8 |  | Other
relative | 16 | 5.9 | 30 | 18.4 |  | No
relative indicated | 10 | 3.7 |   
7 |   4.3 |  |   
   Non-relative |   
4 | 1.5 |   7 |   
4.3 |  |     
 Unknown |   6 | 2.2 | - 
- | - - - |  
  It 
will be noted that 42.3 per cent of those in the 15 to 19 year group 
lived with a father or mother in Japan, and that 13.2 lived with a 
grandparent. In other words, more than 5 per cent of this group of 
Kibei had a parent or grandparent in Japan, and it is reasonable to 
assume that in most instances these Kibei lived with this nearest 
relative.
  Combining 
this information with that from the preceding table, it is seen that in 
a group with an average age of 17.5 years who were returning to the 
United States after having spent an average of 7.4 years abroad 
continuously (in other words, from the time they were ten years of age) 
one-half had lived with their parent or grandparent in Japan. Yet, this 
group consists entirely of American citizens.
  Of 
the Kibei in Hawaii, 
Andrew W. Lind, Professor of Sociology, University of Hawaii, says: 
"Finally, there is the rather large Kibei group of the second 
generation who, although citizens of the United States by virtue of 
birth within the Territory, are frequently more fanatically Japanese in 
their disposition than their own parents. Many of these individuals 
have returned from Japan so recently as to be unable to speak 
the English language
and some are unquestionably disappointed by the lack of appreciation 
manifested for their Japanese education." (American Council Paper No. 
5, page 187, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East 
52nd Street, New York.)
  It was, perforce, a 
combination of 
factors and circumstances with which the Commanding General had to 
deal. Here was a relatively homogenous, unassimilated element bearing a 
close relationship through ties of race, religion, language,
custom, and indoctrination to the enemy.
  The
mission of the Commanding General
was to defend the West Coast from enemy attack, both from within and 
without. The Japanese were concentrated along the coastal strip. The 
nature of this area and its relation to the national war effort had to 
be carefully considered.
  The areas ultimately 
evacuated of 
all persons of Japanese ancestry embraced the coastal area of the 
Pacific slope. In the States of Washington and Oregon to the north. 
Military Area No. 1 contains all that portion lying westerly of the 
eastern bases of the Cascade Mountains. In other words, the coastal 
plain, the forests, and the mountain barrier. In California the 
evacuation program encompassed the entire State—that is to 
say, 
not only Military Area No. 1 but also Military Area No. 2. Military 
Area No. 2 in California was evacuated because (1) geographically and 
strategically the eastern boundary of the State of California 
approximates the easterly limit of Military Area No. 1 in Washington 
and Oregon (Figure 1 shows the boundaries of these two Military Areas), 
and because (2) the natural forests and mountain barriers, from which 
it was determined to exclude all Japanese, lie in Military Area No. 2 
in California, although these lie in Military Area No. 1 of Washington 
and Oregon. A brief reference to the relationship of the coastal states 
to the national war effort is here pertinent.
 
 FIGURE 
1   That 
part of the States of Washington, Oregon, and California which lies 
west of the Cascade and Sierra Nevada Ranges, is dominated by many 
waterways, forests, and vital industrial installations. Throughout the 
Puget Sound area there are many military and naval 
establishments as 
well as shipyards, airplane factories and other industries essential to 
total war. In the vicinity of Whidby Island, 
Island County, Washington, at the north end of the Island, is 
the 
important Deception Pass bridge. This bridge provides the only means of 
transit by land from important naval installations, facilities and 
properties in the vicinity of Whidby Island. This island afforded an 
ideal rendezvous from which enemy agents might communicate with enemy
submarines
in the Strait of Juan de Fuca or with other agents on the Olympic 
Peninsula. From Whidby and Camano Islands, comprising Island County, 
the passages through Admiralty Inlet, Skagit Bay and Saratoga Passage 
from Juan de Fuca Strait to the vital areas of the Bremerton Navy Yard 
and Bainbridge Island can be watched. The important city of Seattle 
with its airplane plants, airports, waterfront facilities, Army and 
Navy transport establishments and supply terminals required that an 
unassimilated group of doubtful loyalty be removed a safe distance from 
these critical areas. A reference to the spot map (published in Chapter 
VIII), Figure 6, 
showing the distribution of Japanese population along the frontier, 
discloses a high concentration of persons of Japanese 
ancestry in the Puget Sound area. 
Seattle is the principal port in the Northwest; it is the port from 
which troops in Alaska are supplied; its inland water route to Alaska 
passes the north coast of Washington into the Straits of Georgia on its 
way to Alaska.
  The lumber industry 
is of vital 
importance to the war effort. The State of Washington, with 
Oregon 
and California close seconds, produces the bulk of sawed lumber in the 
United States. The large area devoted to this industry afforded saboteurs 
unlimited freedom of action. The danger from forest fires involved not 
only the destruction of valuable timber but also threatened cities, 
towns and other installations in the affected area. The entire coastal 
strip from Cape Flattery south to Lower California is particularly 
important from a protective viewpoint. There are numerous naval 
installations with such facilities constantly under augmentation. The 
coast line is particularly vulnerable. Distances between inhabited 
areas are great and enemy activities might be carried on without 
interference.
  The petroleum industry of 
California, and its 
great centers of production for aircraft and shipbuilding, are a vital 
part of the life blood of d nation at war. The crippling of any part of 
this would seriously impede the war effort. Through the ports of 
Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego, flow the 
sinews of war -- the men, equipment and supplies for carrying the 
battle against the enemy in the Pacific. A further reference to the 
spot map, Figure 6, in 
Chapter VIII, 
reveals the high concentration of this segment of the population 
surrounding nearly all these key installations.
  In 
his estimate of the situation, then, the Commanding General found a 
tightly-knit, unassimilated racial group, substantial numbers of whom
were engaged in pro-Japanese activities. 
He found them concentrated in great numbers along the Pacific Coast, an 
area of the utmost importance to the national war effort. These 
considerations were weighed against the progress of the 
Emperor's Imperial Japanese forces in the Pacific. 
This chapter would be incomplete without a brief reference to the 
gravity of the external situation obtaining in the Pacific theater. It 
is necessary only to state the chronology of war in the Pacific to show 
this.
  At 8:05 A.M., the 7th of December, the 
Japanese attacked the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor 
without warning. Simultaneously they struck against Malaysia, 
Hong Kong, the Philippines, and Wake and Midway Islands.
  On 
the day following, the Japanese Army invaded Thailand. 
Two days later the British battleships "H.M.S. Wales" and "H.M.S. 
Repulse" were sunk off the Malay Peninsula. The enemy's successes 
continued without interruption. On the 13th of December, Guam 
was captured and on successive days the Japanese captured Wake 
Island and occupied Hong Kong, December 
24th and 25th, respectively. On January 2nd Manila 
fell and on the 27th of February the battle of the Java Sea 
resulted in a crushing naval defeat to the United Nations. Thirteen 
United Nations' warships were sunk and one damaged. Japanese losses 
were limited to two warships sunk and five damaged.
  On 
the 9th of March the Japanese Imperial forces established full control 
of the Netherlands East Indies; Rangoon and Burma 
were occupied. Continuing during the course of evacuation, on the 9th 
of April, Bataan was occupied by the Japanese and 
on May 6th Corregidor surrendered.
  On 
June 3rd, Dutch Harbor, Alaska, was attacked by 
Japanese carrier-based aircraft and, with the occupation by the 
Japanese on June 7th of Attu and Kiska Islands, 
United States territory in continental Northern America had been 
invaded.
  As already stated, there were many 
evidences of the successful communication of information to 
the enemy, 
information regarding positive knowledge on his part of our 
installations. The most striking illustrations of this are found in 
three of the several incidents of enemy attacks on West Coast points.
  On 
February 23, 1942, a hostile submarine shelled Goleta, near 
Santa Barbara, California, 
in an attempt to destroy vital oil installations there. On the 
preceding day the shore battery in position at this point had been 
withdrawn to be replaced by another. On the succeeding day, when the 
shelling occurred, it was the only point along the coast where an enemy 
submarine could have successfully surfaced and fired on a vital 
installation without coming within the range of coast defense guns.
  In 
the vicinity of Brookings (Mt. Emily), Oregon, 
an enemy submarine-based plane dropped incendiary bombs in an effort to 
start forest fires. At that time it was the only section of the Pacific 
Coast which could have been approached by enemy aircraft without 
interception by aircraft warning devices.
  Similarly, 
a precise knowledge of the range of coast defense guns at Astoria, 
Oregon, 
was in the possession of the enemy. A hostile submarine surfaced and 
shelled shore batteries there from the only position at which a 
surfaced submarine could have approached the coast line close enough to 
shell a part of its coast defenses without being within range of the 
coastal batteries.
  In summary, the Commanding 
General was confronted with the Pearl Harbor experience, which involved 
a positive enemy knowledge of our patrols, our naval
dispositions, etc., 
on the morning of December 7th; with the fact that ships leaving West 
Coast ports were being intercepted regularly by enemy submarines; and 
with the fact that an enemy element was in a position to do 
great damage and substantially to aid the enemy nation. Time 
was of the essence.
  The 
Commanding General, charged as he was with the mission of providing for 
the defense of the West Coast, had to take into account these and other 
military considerations. He had no alternative but to conclude that the 
Japanese constituted a potentially dangerous element from the
viewpoint of military security -- that military necessity 
required their immediate evacuation 
to the interior. The impelling military necessity had become such that 
any measures other than those pursued along the Pacific Coast might 
have been "too little and too late".
 
 APPENDIX 
TO CHAPTER IIMemorandum 
from the Commanding General, Western Defense Command, to the Assistant 
Attorney General, Mr. James Rowe, Jr.
 "January 5, 1942
   "Memorandum 
for: Assistant Attorney General Rowe. Subject: Alien 
Enemy Control Requirements.
  "1. 
Reference is made to the summary of report of the Assistant Attorney 
General Rowe to General DeWitt on Sunday, January 4, 1942, at 6:30 P.M. 
(TAB. 'A.')
  "2. 
It should be stated at the outset that the Army has no wish 
to undertake the conduct and control of alien enemies anywhere within
continental United States. 
Impressions to the contrary notwithstanding, the Army would accept 
transfer of such responsibility and authority with the greatest 
reluctance. Its desire is only that the Department of Justice act with 
expedition and effectiveness in the discharge of its responsibilities 
under the Presidential Proclamations of December 7th and 8th. The 
developments which have resulted in the current conferences between the 
Attorney General's representative, and General DeWitt and his staff, 
have been occasioned by the almost complete absence of action 
on the part of the Department of Justice over a period of 
nearly four weeks since promulgation of the mentioned proclamations, 
toward implementing sections 5 and 9.
  "3. 
To the extent that an estimate can now be made, in the absence of 
actual demonstration, the courses of action proposed to be taken by the 
Department of Justice, as set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Tab. 
'A', appear to constitute a great step forward.
  "4. 
While 
some amendment, clarification and implementation may be necessary, it 
appears that section 5 of the proclamation relative to prohibited 
articles
will have been fully implemented when the measures detailed in Tab. 'A' 
have been taken. The means of determining whether all alien enemies are 
complying with the proscriptions of the Proclamations, as repeated in 
the contraband regulations promulgated by the Attorney General, may 
have to be further clarified. This phase of the problem, however, is 
closely associated with warrant issuance aspect of the alien enemy 
program.
  "5. As agreed in the conference 
referred to in 
paragraph 1 hereof, the Commanding General of the Western Defense 
Command has initiated action within the California, Oregon and 
Washington portions of his command (as augmented by the inclusion of 
the Air Corps installations throughout his command), to furnish U. S. 
Attorneys not later than January 9, 1942, a list of the areas 
which are regarded by Army authorities as falling within section 9 of 
the regulations relative to restricted areas. This report will include 
definite descriptions of such areas and will divide them into two 
categories as follows:
  "Category A: Those areas 
within, or through which no alien enemy may be permitted, under any 
circumstances.
  "Category B: Those areas through, 
or within which alien enemies may be permitted on pass or permit.
  "In 
this connection attention is invited to the concluding paragraph of 
Section 9 of the regulations which provides in substance that any alien 
enemy found within any restricted area contrary to the regulations 
shall be subject to summary apprehension. The 
military 
authorities desire to be advised whether, in the opinion of the 
Attorney General, apprehension of alien enemies under such 
circumstances may be without warrant and, if so, whether the military 
authorities are empowered to enforce.
  "In 
order to avoid
absolute confusion in the matter, Army authorities strongly urge that
the Department of Justice undertake to establish immediate
liaison and coordination with all appropriate relief agencies prepared
to alleviate hardship
resulting from compulsory change of residence on the part of alien
enemies residing in Category A, restricted areas. As the Department of
Justice has requested permission to announce that the establishment of
restricted areas has been made by the Attorney General only because the
Commanding General of this theatre has so requested, military
authorities desire it to be unequivocally clear that they
desire that everything possible be done to eliminate unnecessary
hardship and the need for planning and coordination along
this line is strongly emphasized.
  "Depending 
upon the manner in which compulsory eviction from Category A restricted 
areas is handled and upon how the pass and permit system respecting 
Category B restricted areas is developed, the action proposed in 
paragraph 2 of Tab. 'A' appears presently to provide for full 
implementation of Section 9.
  "6. Comments 
relative to paragraph 3 of Tab 'A' entitled 'Search Warrants' 
will be deferred for inclusion in the portion of this memorandum 
relative to particular problems.
  "7. 
As already noted, neither the War Department nor the Army desire to 
undertake responsibility for the alien enemy program in Continental 
United States. In view of this, the comment in paragraph 4 of Tab. 'A' 
to the effect that the Department of Justice is of the view that it is 
better qualified to conduct an alien enemy registration 
than is 
the Army, and in view of the expressed intention of that Department to 
act without delay, it would appear that the action proposed in 
paragraph 4, Tab. 'A', if speedily accomplished will satisfy the need 
for immediate registration of alien enemies.
  "8. 
Reference is made to paragraph 5 of Tab. 'A' relative to 'spot 
raids' and 'mass raids.'
The military authorities in this theatre are of the view that counter 
espionage measures require that the Department of Justice take whatever 
steps are necessary, effectively to provide for simultaneous 'mass 
raids' without warning to determine the presence of prohibited articles 
which may be in possession or under the control of alien enemies, or to 
which such persons may have access. By this type of raid is meant 
'coordinated action' in several areas at the same moment and on 
successive occasions providing for the search of a given number of 
alien enemy premises in each area. Under such circumstances the 
premises to be searched during any such 'mass raid' would be only those 
in which it is known that an alien enemy may be found or in which there 
is cause to believe that an alien enemy may be found. It does 
not mean the 'willy-nilly' raiding of all premises within a prescribed
area. 
The number of premises to be searched during any given 'mass raid' will 
depend upon the circumstances and the means at hand. This type of 
sampling or cross-sectional raiding is regarded as vitally 
important. While 
such raids may not be successful from the viewpoint of rounding up 
great quantities of contraband, they will have the important effect of 
driving contraband more deeply underground with the result that its 
illicit use becomes increasingly difficult.
  "The 
military 
authorities request that they be advised by the Department of Justice 
of its position in this matter. If it is inclined to provide for this 
type of search, advice is requested as to the steps proposed by this 
Department.
  "9. The courses of action proposed 
in Tab. 'A', 
when accomplished, will not solve a number of pressing problems. It is 
neither possible nor practicable to undertake or attempt to illustrate 
all of the problems which may arise in connection with the alien enemy 
program. As limited in the foregoing sentence, some of the problems and 
some of the questions remaining unsolved are:
 "(a). 
A fix is established on a radio transmitter. Transmission of
unlawful radio signals
is established but the location is determined only within a defined
area such as a city block. Manifestly an accurate description of the
premises, the operator's name and a description of equipment can not be
furnished. The operation of such a transmitter is equally unlawful on
the part of a citizen, alien or an alien enemy. Unless a 'John Doe'
search warrant can be obtained and obtained immediately, the
consequences may be grave and the transmitter may be moved without
trace. What action can be taken?
  "(b).
The facts are
sufficient to support the issuance of an alien enemy warrant or a
contraband search warrant, but the responsible law enforcement officer
on the ground is unable to communicate with the issuing authority due
to the lack of means or because of the time element. What action can he
take?
  "(c). A known alien enemy is observed, in
transit, in the possession of contraband
or in the possession of articles believed, for good cause, to be
contraband. If a warrant is procured under present as well as proposed
machinery, the quarry will be lost. What action can be taken?
  "(d).
The unlawful transmission of radio signals
has been established through interception. A series of fixes determines
the location of the transmitter within a general area, such as Monterey
County. Further, there is convincing evidence of shore to enemy
submarine communication. What action can be taken to isolate the area
and conduct an effective search to locate the mobile unit?
  "(e).
An alien enemy is resident with a citizen,
perhaps a relative such as a wife. While it cannot be proven that he
owns or actually controls contraband it can be proven that he has
unlimited access to such. The situation is as potentially dangerous as
if it could be proven that he owned or actually controlled the
contraband. What action can be taken?
  "(f).
Question arises
whether access of the character description in (e) above is unlawful
under the Proclamations. Assuming that it is unlawful, to what extent
may the search, under a contraband search warrant, of a mixed
occupancy dwelling or other premises be carried to determine
access to contraband?
  "(g). The dual
citizen problem is perplexing.
Self-serving declarations of an election are of little meaning,
particularly where conduct is incompatible with the so-called election.
What methods exist or what steps are in contemplation looking toward
the control of
 1. Dual citizens. 2.
Disloyal, subversive citizens (where there has been no overt act
detected).
  "(h).
In the opinion of the Attorney General, to what extent may the
responsible Military Commander in a theatre of operations, contravene
normal processes to take necessary action in an emergency in order to
provide for the internal as well as the external security of his
theatre -- to what extent is the Department of Justice able to take
similar measures?
  "(i). Military authorities are
convinced
of the desirability of close cooperation and collaboration between the
War Department and the Department of Justice in connection with the
instant subject. However, it is considered desirable to request advice
as to the extent to which the Department of Justice is prepared to
assume and to discharge the responsibility of taking whatever steps are
necessary for the prevention of sabotage, espionage, and
other fifth column activities
from enemy alien courses, and the extent to which the Department of
Justice will expect the military authorities to continue the outline of
the necessary steps for progressive implementation of the enemy alien
program.
  "10. The foregoing represents 
the consensus 
of those concerned as understood by the undersigned. It does not 
necessarily reflect the official opinions of anyone concerned. It is 
intended primarily as exploratory of the problem.
 J. L. DeWITT, Lieutenant General, 
U. S. Army."
  Incl. 1.
 TAB "A"Summary of Communication -- January 
4, 1942 "This 
is the summary by Assistant Attorney General Rowe to the Commanding 
General of a conversation with the Attorney General of the United 
States, and Mr. Rowe's understanding of what the Department of Justice 
is prepared to do on questions of Alien Enemy Control referred to him 
by the Commanding General and his staff.
  "1. 
PROHIBITED ARTICLES.
  Besides 
cameras, radios and firearms, the articles prohibited by the 
President's proclamation are to be deposited by all alien enemies with 
local police authorities by Monday night, January 5, 1942, at 
11 p. m. 
Because sufficient publicity was not given to the requirement that all 
prohibited articles be so deposited, the Department of Justice will, by 
release for Tuesday morning, allow all alien enemies at least two more 
days, say, 11 p. m., January 7, to dispose of the articles. An effort 
will be made to obtain sufficient publicity by 
radio and in the press.
  "2. RESTRICTED 
AREAS.
  The Department of Justice 
tonight will by wire direct the United States Attorneys 
in the Western Theatre of Operations, with particular emphasis 
on Washington, Oregon, and California, to telephone Major 
General 
Benedict for recommendations as to what areas should be 
regarded as restricted. 
The United States Attorney will automatically accept the General's 
recommendations, and these areas will immediately become restricted 
areas pending confirmation by the Attorney General. As soon as 
possible, a press release ordering all enemy aliens to evacuate 
restricted areas by a certain date and hour will be issued. Any release 
by the Department of Justice will specifically state that the Attorney 
General has designated these restricted areas at the specific and 
urgent request of the Commanding General. The Army will 
request the Navy
to submit its recommendations through the Commanding General. It is 
believed several days will elapse before the Army will be ready to 
submit its recommendations.
  "3. SEARCH 
WARRANTS.
  New 
forms for search and seizure of prohibited articles in homes controlled 
by, or inhabited by, alien enemies, are to be received tomorrow morning 
by Federal Bureau of Investigation teletype. The question of 
probable cause will be met only by the statement that an alien enemy is
resident in such premises. 
It is Mr. Rowe's understanding that the local United States Attorney's 
interpretation that more information is necessary to show probable 
cause is incorrect. The United States Attorney will issue a search 
warrant upon a statement by a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent 
that an alien enemy is resident at certain premises. It is not 
necessary that the Department in Washington be consulted.
  "4. 
ALIEN ENEMY REGISTRATION.
  The 
Department feels it can conduct an alien enemy registration in 
the Western Theatre of Operations within a week or ten days. 
Tomorrow morning by Federal Bureau of Investigation teletype a 
statement will be sent from Washington outlining a procedure of what 
the Department is prepared to do. The Department feels it can conduct 
such a registration, through the local police authorities, much faster 
than the Army itself. The Department also feels that the existing list 
from the previous alien registration, now in Washington, is in better 
shape than is the impression in San Francisco, and every effort will be 
made to have such lists available in the Western Theatre of Operations.
  "5. 
The Department is willing to make spot-raids on alien enemies 
tomorrow or at any time after the registration, anywhere within the 
Western Theatre of Operations. Mr. Rowe emphasized that such raids must 
be confined to premises controlled by enemy aliens, or where enemy 
aliens are resident. In other words, the Department cannot raid a 
specific locality, covering every house in that locality, irrespective 
of whether such houses are inhabited by enemy aliens or citizens. The 
Attorney General requested Mr. Rowe to make clear to the Commanding 
General that under no circumstances will the Department of Justice 
conduct mass raids on alien enemies. It is understood that the term "mass 
raids"
means, eventually a raid on every alien enemy within the Western 
Theatre of Operations. The Attorney General will oppose such raids and, 
if overruled by the President, will request the Army to supersede the 
Department of Justice in the Western Theatre of Operations.
  "6. 
It was agreed by the Commanding General and his staff and Mr. Rowe that 
certain questions pertaining to raids on localities and the issuance of 
search warrants, particularly referring to raids on localities in which 
radio transmitters are probably to be found, will be transmitted to the 
Department, also for an indication as to how far the Department would 
proceed, as a matter of law and policy."
 
 CHAPTER 
IIIEstablishment of Military
Control -- Executive Order No. 9066After 
a series of conferences between War and Justice Department 
representatives, in Washington, D. C, the Secretary of War 
ordered 
a representative of the Department personally to survey the situation 
along the Pacific Coast. The War Department representative carried back 
to the Secretary the recommendation of the Commanding General 
that some method be developed empowering the Federal Government to 
provide for the evacuation from sensitive areas of all persons of
Japanese ancestry, and any other persons individually or collectively
regarded as potentially dangerous. The Commanding General's 
proposal was reduced to writing in a memorandum for the Secretary of 
War, dated February 14, 1942. It is reproduced in full 
at the end of this chapter. This recommendation was presented 
to the 
Secretary of War on or about February 16th. After consultation between 
War and Justice Department representatives, it was determined that a 
Presidential executive order should be sought authorizing the Secretary 
of War to institute civil control measures. A proposed order was 
drafted in the War Department. With the concurrence of the 
Department of Justice it was presented to the President.
  Executive 
Order No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942, was the direct result of these 
steps. On the day following its signature by the President, the 
Secretary of War designated the Commanding General, Western Defense 
Command, as a Military Commander within the meaning of the Executive 
Order. This meant that the power and authority granted by the 
Order had been delegated to the Commanding General. The 
letter of authority, enclosing a copy of the Order, from the Secretary 
of War was as follows:
 "February 20, 1942
  "COMMANDING 
GENERAL, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, Presidio
of San Francisco, California.
  "Dear General
DeWitt:
  "By
Executive Order, dated February 19, 1942, copy inclosed, the President
authorized and directed me, through the Military Commander whom I
designate, to prescribe military areas for the protection of
vital installations against sabotage and espionage.
The cited Executive Order also authorized and directed the
administering authority to impose such restrictions upon the right to
enter, remain in, or leave any such areas as may be appropriate to the
requirements in each instance. Accordingly, I designate you as the
Military Commander to carry out the duties and responsibilities imposed
by said Executive Order for that portion of the United States embraced
in the Western Defense Command, including such changes in the
prohibited and restricted areas heretofore designated by the
Attorney General as you deem proper to prescribe.
  "In
carrying out your duties under this delegation, I desire, so far as
military requirements permit, that you do not disturb, for
the time being at least, Italian aliens and persons of Italian lineage
except where they are, in your judgment, undesirable or constitute a
definite danger to the performance of your mission to defend the West
Coast. I ask that you take this action in respect to Italians for the
reason that I consider such persons to be potentially less dangerous,
as a whole, than those of other enemy nationalities. Because of the
size of the Italian population and the number of troops and facilities
which would have to be employed to deal with them, their inclusion in
the general plan would greatly overtax our strength. In this connection
it may be necessary for you to relieve Italian aliens from the
necessity for compliance with the Attorney General's order respecting
the California prohibited areas 1 to 88 (Category A). This may
appropriately be done by designating, sufficiently in advance of
February 24, the said areas as military areas and by excepting Italian
aliens from the classes excluded.
  "With due
regard to your
other missions you may use the troops you can now make available from
your general command, but for this purpose the 27th Division and the
3rd Division reinforced are not to be considered as part of your
general command as such troops are assigned to your command only for
specific training.
  "Your attention is invited to
those
provisions of the Executive Order under which you are authorized to
call for assistance, supplies, and services from all Government
agencies. It is desired that you take full advantage of that authority.
  "Removal
of individuals from areas in which they are domiciled should be
accomplished gradually so as to avoid, so far as it is consistent with
national safety and the performance of your mission, unnecessary
hardship and dislocation of business and industry.
In order to permit the War Department to make plans for the proper
disposition of individuals whom you contemplate moving outside of your
jurisdiction, it is desired that you make known to me your detailed
plans for evacuation. Individuals will not be entrained until such
plans are furnished and you are informed that accommodations have been
prepared at the point of detraining.
  "So far as
practicable, fullest advantage should be taken of voluntary
exodus of individuals
and of the facilities afforded by other Government and private agencies
in assisting evacuees to resettle. Where evacuees are unable to effect
resettlement of their own volition, or with the assistance of other
agencies, proper provision for housing, feeding,
transportation and medical care must be provided.
  "I
desire that from time to time you make report direct to me of important
actions and events, particularly with respect to the extent and
location of military areas, and the restrictions applicable thereto.
 "Sincerely yours, "/s/ Henry L.
Stimson, "Secretary of War.
  "Incl. Executive
Order.
 
 Executive
Order No. 9066 AUTHORIZING THE SECRETARY
OF WAR TO PRESCRIBE MILITARY AREAS
   "Whereas,
The successful prosecution of the war requires every possible
protection against espionage and against sabotage
to national-defense material, national-defense premises and
national-defense utilities as defined in Section 4, Act of April 20,
1918, 40 Stat. 533, as amended by the Act of November 30, 1940, 54
Stat. 1220, and the Act of August 21, 1941, 55 Stat. 655 (U.S.C, Title
50, Sec. 104):
  "Now THEREFORE, By virtue of the
authority
vested in me as President of the United States, and Commander in Chief
of the Army and Navy, I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of
War, and the Military Commanders whom he may from time to time
designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such action
necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas
in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military
Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be
excluded,
and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in,
or leave shall be subject to whatever restriction the Secretary of War
or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion. The
Secretary of War is hereby authorized to provide for residents of any
such area who are excluded therefrom, such transportation,
food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessary,
in the judgment of the Secretary of War or the said Military Commander,
and until other arrangements are made, to accomplish the purpose of
this order. The designation of military areas in any region or locality
shall supersede designations of prohibited and restricted areas by the
Attorney General under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, and
shall supersede the responsibility and authority of the Attorney
General under the said Proclamations in respect of such prohibited and
restricted areas.
  "I hereby further authorize
and direct the
Secretary of War and the said Military Commanders to take such
other steps as he or the appropriate Military Commander may deem
advisable to enforce compliance with the restrictions
applicable to each Military area hereinabove authorized to be
designated, including the use of Federal troops and other Federal
Agencies, with authority to accept assistance of state and local
agencies.
  "I hereby further authorize and direct
all
Executive Departments, independent establishments and other Federal
Agencies, to assist the Secretary of War or the said Military
Commanders in carrying out this Executive Order, including the
furnishing of medical aid, hospitalization, food, clothing,
transportation, use of land, shelter, and other supplies, equipment,
utilities, facilities, and services.
  "This
order shall
not be construed as modifying or limiting in any way the authority
heretofore granted under Executive Order No. 8972, dated December 12,
1941, nor shall it be construed as limiting or modifying the duty and
responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with respect to
the investigations of alleged acts of sabotage or the duty and
responsibility of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice
under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, prescribing
regulations for the conduct and control of alien enemies, except as
such duty and responsibility is superseded by the designation of
military areas hereunder."
 Franklin
D. Roosevelt
  The White House, February 19, 1942.
  On 
the same date, the Assistant Secretary of War forwarded a memorandum to 
the Commanding General which contained an outline of a suggested method 
of procedure which might be followed in carrying out an evacuation 
program. This memorandum had been developed by the War 
Department 
representative at the West Coast conferences, and was based upon his 
survey of the situation there obtained. He drafted the Executive Order 
on his return. It is pertinent to quote portions of the memorandum here.
 
 "February 20, 1942
  "My 
dear General DeWitt:
  "In
accordance with my telephone conversation with you today I am enclosing
a memorandum which was prepared in the War Department relating to the
effect of the new Executive Order. It represents, as I said, some
of our thinking on the subject
and I think it may be helpful to you as a guide in the determination of
the steps that you will want to take under the authority of the
Directive which the Secretary of War has sent you today.
 "Very truly yours, "(Signed) John
J. McCloy "John J. McCloy, "Assistant
Secretary of War."
   "Lt. Gen. J. L.
DeWitt Commanding General Western Defense Command
and Fourth Army Presidio of San Francisco, California."
  OUTLINE
MEMORANDUM
 "February
20, 1942
   "... For the purpose of
these instructions, persons resident in the Western Defense Command
will be classified as follows:
 "Class 1
Japanese Aliens "Class 2 American citizens of
Japanese Lineage "Class 3 German Aliens "Class
4 Italian Aliens "Class
5 Any persons, whether citizens or aliens, who are suspected for any
reason by you or your responsible subordinates, of being actually
or potentially dangerous either as saboteurs, espionage
agents, fifth-columnists or subversive persons. "Class 6 All
other persons who are, or who may be within the Western Defense
Command."
  "I suggest the advisability of
the following course of action:
  "7. The progressive
designation
by you of military areas throughout the Western Defense Command of such
extent and in such places as you deem necessary to provide the maximum
protection from sabotage and espionage of installations vital to the
war effort consistent with the means available for evacuation and the
military responsibilities attendant upon evacuation of large numbers of
persons.
  "8. Where necessary, in your judgment,
the designation of protective zones within the
military areas referred to in 7 above, in which you will provide (a)
for the exclusion of all persons in Classes 1, 2 and 5,
and where in your judgment it is essential, and (b) for the exclusion
of persons in Class 3,
so as to afford the maximum protection from espionage and sabotage to
installations vital to the war effort, consistent with the military
responsibilities attendant upon such an evacuation, viz., the number of
troops which will be diverted from training for combat and from other
missions, the fulfillment of which is your responsibility.
  "9.
The promulgation of appropriate restrictive regulations
governing the exercise by any person of the right to enter, remain in
or leave such military areas and any zones within such military areas.
In connection with the initiation, development and accomplishment of
the program outlined above, you will initiate and carry to completion,
without delay, the preparation of detailed plans for the
evacuation
of those classes of persons and individuals who will be excluded from
military areas prescribed by you. In so doing it is desired that you
take full advantage of the provisions of the Executive Order whereby
you are authorized to call upon the other executive departments and
federal agencies for assistance, not only in the furnishing
of services, but also of supplies, equipment and land.
It is the intention that the heads of the several executive
departments, independent establishments, and other federal agencies
will be required and will have full authority to respond to such
requests as you may make upon them in carrying out the provisions of
the executive order.
  "10. In this connection so
far as
consistent with safety the development of your program should be by
stages. In the most critical areas you may consider it necessary
to bring about an almost immediate evacuation of
certain classes, particularly classes 1 and 2.
However, in order to take full advantage of voluntary exodus and of
re-settlement facilities arranged by other agencies, both public and
private, the timing of your program should be most carefully
conceived and coordinated.
Representatives of the Departments of Justice and Agriculture advise
that in those instances where it is consistent with the safety to
afford evacuees reasonable advance notice that they
will be
able greatly to decrease the numbers of evacuees to be cared for by the
Army, and thereby greatly decrease the drain on our military resources;
thus avoiding the diversion of troops from their primary mission, the
defense of the West Coast.
  "11. In providing for
the exclusion of classes of persons and individuals from military areas
prescribed by you, you will make appropriate exception in
favor of the aged, infirm, and the sick.
Persons above the age of 70 years should not be disturbed unless for
sufficient reason, you consider them suspect. Unless you find that the
national safety will not so permit, bona fide refugees in
Class 3
should be afforded special consideration, either through the
development of suitable means to acquire permits to return to
prohibited zones or to remain therein.
  "12. I
desire that
you make known to me your detailed plans for evacuation as soon as
practicable in order to enable the War Department to coordinate with
the Corps Area Commanders concerned any movement you propose to
undertake of evacuees outside of your command to places of temporary
shelter. You will not entrain any evacuees for transportation beyond
your command until you have been informed by the War Department that
accommodations are prepared to receive them at the places of
destination.
  "13. Yours will be the military
responsibility
for processing, evacuation, supplying, rationing and transportation to
the points of shelter. This, of course, applies only to those
evacuees who are unable to re-settle themselves on their own resources
or for whom public and private agencies have been unable to arrange
re-settlement. For persons in this class, the Army will provide shelter,
food and other accommodations, including medical aid and hospitalization
in selected places in the interior until civil authorities can make
other arrangements.
  "14. It will, of course, be
necessary that your plans include provision for protection of
the property,
particularly the physical property, of evacuees. All reasonable
measures should be taken through publicity and other means, to encourage
evacuees to take steps to protect their own property.
Where evacuees are unable to do this prior to the time when it is
necessary for them to comply with the exclusion orders, there is always
danger that unscrupulous persons will take undue advantage or that
physical property unavoidably left behind will be pillaged by lawless
elements. The protection of physical property from theft or
other
harm is primarily the responsibility of state and local law-enforcement
agencies, and you will doubtless call upon them for the
maximum
assistance in this connection. Where they are unable to protect
physical property left behind in military areas, the responsibility
will be yours, to provide reasonable protection, either through the use
of troops or through other appropriate measures. The appointment by you
of a property custodian and the creation by him of an organization to
deal with such property in military areas may become necessary. The
provisions of the Executive Order and the necessity in each given
instance are such that you have authority to take such action, either
directly or through another federal agency. In the development of your
program, it is desired that you accomplish it with the minimum of
individual hardship and dislocation of business and industries
consistent with safety. Report to me from time to time by telephone,
with confirmation in writing, of important action and events,
indicating particularly the location and extent of military areas
prescribed by you and the character of the restrictions promulgated."
  Immediately 
upon the promulgation of Executive Order No. 9066, the War 
Department, with the approval of the President, requested the Congress 
to enact legislation to provide sanctions for the enforcement of 
directives issued under the authority of the Executive Order. A draft 
of proposed legislation for this purpose was transmitted by the 
Secretary of War simultaneously to the Chairman of the Senate 
Military Affairs Committee, and to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives. The concurrence of the Department of Justice as to the 
form and substance of the bill had been obtained.
  The 
body of each letter of transmittal from the Secretary of War 
to the Congress read as follows:
 "There is 
enclosed herewith draft of a bill entitled 'A bill to provide a penalty
for violation of restrictions or orders
with respect to persons entering, remaining in, or leaving military
areas or zones,' which the War Department recommends to be enacted into
law.
  "The purpose of the proposed legislation is
to provide
for enforcement in the Federal criminal courts of orders issued under
the authority of Executive order of the President No, 9066, dated
February 19, 1942. This Executive order authorizes the Secretary of War
to prescribe military areas from which any and all persons may be
excluded for purposes of national defense.
  "It
is impossible to estimate the probable cost to the Government
consequent upon the enactment of such legislation.
  "The
Bureau of the Budget has advised that there is no objection to the
submission of this proposed legislation for the consideration of the
Congress, as the enactment thereof would not be in conflict with the
program of the President."
  While the 
legislation was 
under consideration, the Secretary of War, on March 14, 1942, 
transmitted another letter to the Congress suggesting an amendment and 
urging immediate enactment. The letter of March 14th is as follows:
 "Hon. 
Andrew J. May, Chairman, Committee on Military Affairs, House
of Representatives.
  "Dear Mr. May:
  "By
telephone on Thursday, March 12, 1942, Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt,
commanding the Western Defense Command, requested that action be taken
to expedite passage of S. 2352 and H. R. 6758, bills to provide
penalties for violation of restrictions or orders with respect to
persons entering, remaining in, or leaving military areas or zones.
  "General
DeWitt is strongly of the opinion that the bill, when enacted, should
be broad enough to enable the Secretary of War or the appropriate
military commander to enforce curfews and other restrictions
within military areas and zones.
To that end, it is suggested that in line 3, page 1, of H. R. 6758 the
word "or' be stricken and that after the word 'leave' there be inserted
the words, 'or commit any act in.'
  "General
DeWitt indicated that he was prepared to enforce certain restrictions
at once for the purpose of protecting certain vital national
defense interests but did not desire to proceed until
enforcement machinery had been set up.
  "The War
Department recommends immediate passage of the proposed law.
 "Sincerely yours, "Henry L. Stimson, "Secretary
of War."
   This bill became the 
vehicle for enactment of Public Law No. 503, 
77th Congress, approved March 21, 1942. The Department of Justice was 
consulted in the drafting of this litigation as well as in the 
drafting, processing and presentation of Executive Order 9066.
  Public 
Law No. 503 follows:
 "To 
provide a penalty for violation of restrictions or orders with respect
to persons entering, remaining in, leaving, or committing any act in
military areas or zones.
  "Be it enacted
by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled. That whoever shall enter,
remain in, leave, or commit any act in any military area or military
zone
prescribed, under the authority of an Executive order of the President,
by the Secretary of War, or by any military commander designated by the
Secretary of War, contrary to the restrictions applicable to any such
area or zone or contrary to the order of the Secretary of War or any
such military commander, shall, if it appears that he knew or should
have known of the existence and extent of the restrictions or order and
that his act was in violation thereof, be guilty of
misdemeanor
and upon conviction shall be liable to a fine of not to exceed $5,000
or to imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, for each
offense."
  Previous to that time, on 
February 14, 
1942, the Commanding General had forwarded his recommendations to the 
Chief of Staff, United States Army, as to the necessary measures to be 
taken. (See Appendix to this chapter, Memorandum for The Secretary 
of War from the Commanding General, February 14, 1942.) 
Included in these proposals were provisions for property protection and 
the rendering of necessary social service. It will be noted that the 
military authorities contemplated appropriate provision 
against undue economic and social dislocation
from the beginning. This did not emerge as an underlying policy after 
the program had been initiated but, on the contrary, constituted an 
essential feature during all of the pre-evacuation discussions.
  On 
February 23, the Secretary of War again dispatched a War 
Department representative to San Francisco to act as liaison officer 
between the Department and the Commanding General and to be of any 
possible assistance. Acting upon recommendations of the Western Defense 
Command, the Assistant Secretary of War called upon certain federal 
agencies to designate personnel to participate in developing the 
evacuation program. Prompt responses followed, and by February 27th the 
first of these representatives arrived in San Francisco. Dr. C. L. 
Dedrick of the Census Bureau, Department of Commerce, 
reported at San Francisco. He was shortly followed by representatives 
of the Treasury 
Department, the Federal Reserve System, the Department of Agriculture,
the Federal Security Agency, the Department of Justice, the Alien
Property Custodian, and the Office of Price Administration.
  In 
a subsequent communication dated March 2, 1942, the Secretary of War 
broadened the authority of the Commanding General which had been 
granted him under the previous delegation of February 20, 1942 (see p. 
2, chapter III, supra). Full freedom of action was 
granted to 
obligate funds, to enter into contracts and to acquire the services of 
any persons, firms or corporations in accomplishing the evacuation. The 
letter was as follows:
 "March 2, 1942
  "Lieutenant 
General John L. DeWitt, Commander, Western Defense Command, San
Francisco, California.
  "Dear General DeWitt:
  "By
letter dated February 20, 1942, 1 designated you as one of the
appropriate Military Commanders to exercise the powers vested in me
under Executive Order No. 9066, February 19, 1942, and I delegated to
you such powers as are necessary to carry out the purposes of that
Executive Order. Incident to the exercise of those powers, you are
authorized to employ without regard to Civil Service or
Classification laws or regulations, all persons or agencies necessary
to carry out your duties. You are also authorized to employ
the service of any association, firm, company, or corporation
in furtherance of your mission. You will fix the rates of compensation
so as to correspond as nearly as possible to the rate prevailing for
similar service in the community in which the services are to be
rendered.
  "Under the terms of Executive Order
No. 9001,
dated December 27, 1941, and subject to the limitations thereof and of
the Act of December 18, 1941 (First War Powers Act, 1941,
Public
Law 354 -- 77th Congress), I am expressly authorized to delegate
further the powers therein delegated to me. Pursuant thereto, I
delegate to you, within the limits of the amounts appropriated by the
Congress, the power to enter into contracts and into amendments or
modifications of contracts heretofore or hereafter made, and to make
advance, progress, and other payments thereon, without regard to the
provisions of law relating to the making, performance, amendment, or
modification of contracts.
  "In order to remove
any doubt as to your authority to obligate funds, I specifically
authorize you to obligate funds in such amounts as you deem
necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Executive Order,
and of your instructions, from any funds in an allotted status
available to you, or to incur obligations in excess of such funds,
reporting deficiencies to the appropriate chief of supply arm or
service.
 "Sincerely yours, "Henry
L. Stimson, "Secretary of War."
   On 
March 2nd, the Commanding General issued Public 
Proclamation No. 1, 
establishing the westerly half of Washington, Oregon, and California 
and the southerly half of Arizona as Military Area No. 1. Certain 
prohibited and restricted zones were also established within Military 
Area No, 1. The boundary of Military Area No. 1 had been selected on 
the basis of previous study and the recommendations made by subordinate 
commanders. Highways were used to designate the boundaries in order 
that they would be plainly denoted on the ground and that all concerned 
could be placed on proper notice.
  The boundaries 
of Military 
Areas Nos. 1 and 2, established by Public Proclamation No. 1, were also 
designated on the ground by the erection of appropriate signs. 
Similarly, each prohibited zone created by the Proclamation was marked. 
Later, when additional military areas in the zones were established by Public 
Proclamation No. 2 on March 14, 1942, 
the same action was taken. In order to insure proper public notice of 
the location and extent of each area, zone signs were posted at every 
entrance to each of them. The Commanding General, Ninth Service Command 
(then the Ninth Corps Area), and the Commanding Generals of the 
Northwest, Northern California, Southern California and Southern Land 
Frontier Sectors, Western Defense Command, were directed by 
the 
Commanding General, Western Defense Command, to erect suitable signs. 
The Commanding General, Ninth Service Command, posted the east boundary 
of Military Area No. 1 and all of the other zone and area boundaries 
lying to the east. The Commanding Generals of the Sectors posted the 
prohibited zones within Military Area No. 1. The task, particularly 
that required of the Ninth Service Command, was one of unusual 
magnitude.
 
 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 
IIIFinal Recommendation of
the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army,
Submitted to The Secretary of War.HEADQUARTERS
WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY Presidio
of San Francisco, California Office of
the Commanding General
  
 February 14, 1942
  014.31 
(DCS)
  Memorandum For: The Secretary of War, 
(Thru: The Commanding General, Field Forces, Washington, D. C.)
  Subject: 
Evacuation of Japanese and other Subversive Persons from the
Pacific Coast.
  1. 
In presenting a recommendation for the evacuation of Japanese and other 
subversive persons from the Pacific Coast, the following facts have 
been considered:
 a. Mission of 
the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army.
 (1)
Defense of the Pacific Coast of the Western Defense Command, as
extended, against attacks by sea, land or air;
  (2)
Local protection of establishments and communications vital to the
National Defense for which adequate defense cannot be provided by local
civilian authorities.
  b. Brief
Estimate of the Situation.
 (1)
Any estimate of the situation indicates that the following are possible
and probable enemy activities:
 (a)
Naval attack on shipping in coastal waters; (b)
Naval attack on coastal cities and vital
installations; (c) Air raids
on vital installations, particularly within two hundred miles of the
coast; (d) Sabotage
of vital installations throughout the Western Defense Command.
  Hostile
Naval and air raids
will be assisted by enemy agents signaling from the coastline and the
vicinity thereof; and by supplying and otherwise assisting enemy
vessels and by sabotage.
  Sabotage,
(for example, of
airplane factories), may be effected not only by destruction within
plants and establishments, but by destroying power, light, water, sewer
and other utility and other facilities in the immediate vicinity
thereof or at a distance. Serious damage or destruction in congested
areas may readily be caused by incendiarism.
  (2)
The area lying to the west of the Cascade and Sierra Nevada Mountains
in Washington, Oregon and California, is highly critical
not only because the lines of communication and supply to the Pacific
theater pass through it, but also because of the vital industrial
production therein, particularly aircraft. In the war in which we are
now engaged racial affinities are not severed by migration.
The
Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third
generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United
States citizenship, have become "Americanized", the racial
strains are undiluted.
To conclude otherwise is to expect that children born of white parents
on Japanese soil sever all racial affinity and become loyal Japanese
subjects, ready to fight and, if necessary, to die for Japan in a war
against the nation of their parents. That Japan is allied with Germany
and Italy in this struggle is no ground for assuming that any Japanese,
barred from assimilation by convention as he is, though born and raised
in the United States, will not turn against this nation when
the final test of loyalty comes. It, therefore, follows that
along the vital Pacific Coast over 112,000 potential enemies,
of Japanese extraction,
are at large today. There are indications that these are organized and
ready for concerted action at a favorable opportunity. The very fact
that no sabotage has taken place to date is a disturbing and confirming
indication that such action will be taken.
  c.
Disposition of the Japanese.
 (1)
Washington. As the term is used herein, the
word "Japanese" includes alien Japanese and American citizens of
Japanese ancestry. In the State of Washington the Japanese
population, aggregating over 14,500,
is disposed largely in the area lying west of the Cascade Mountains and
south of an east-west line passing through Bellingham, Washington,
about 70 miles north of Seattle and some 15 miles south of the Canadian
border. The largest concentration of Japanese is in the area, the axis
of which is along the line Seattle, Tacoma, Olympia, Willapa Bay and
the mouth of the Columbia River, with the heaviest concentration in the
agricultural valleys between Seattle and Tacoma, viz., the Green River
and the Puyallup Valleys. The Boeing Aircraft factory
is in the
Green River Valley. The lines of communication and supply including
power and water which feed this vital industrial installation, radiate
from this plant for many miles through areas heavily populated by
Japanese. Large numbers of Japanese also operate vegetable markets
along the Seattle and Tacoma water fronts, in Bremerton, near the Bremerton
Navy Yard, and inhabit islands in Puget Sound opposite vital
naval ship building installations.
Still others are engaged in fishing along the southwest Washington
Pacific Coast and along the Columbia River. Many of these Japanese are
within easy reach of the forests of Washington State, the stock piles
of seasoning lumber and the many sawmills of southwest Washington.
During the dry season these forests, mills and stock piles
are easily fired. (See inclosed map.)
  (2)
Oregon. There are approximately 4,000
Japanese
in the State of Oregon, of which the substantial majority reside in the
area in the vicinity of Portland along the south bank of the Columbia
River, following the general line Bonneville, Oregon City, Astoria,
Tillamook. Many of these are in the northern reaches of the Willamette
Valley and are engaged in agricultural and fishing pursuits. Others
operate vegetable markets in the Portland metropolitan area and still
others reside along the northern Oregon sea coast. Their disposition is
in intimate relationship with the northwest Oregon sawmills
and lumber industry, near and around the vital electric
power development at Bonneville and the pulp and
paper installations at Camas (on the Washington State side of
the Columbia River) and Oregon City, directly south of Portland. (See
inclosed map.)
  (3) California.
The Japanese population in California aggregates approximately 93,500
people.
Its disposition is so widespread and so well known that little would be
gained by setting it forth in detail here. They live in great numbers
along the coastal strip, in and around San Francisco and the Bay Area,
the Salinas Valley, Los Angeles and San Diego. Their truck farms are
contiguous to the vital aircraft industry concentration in
and around Los Angeles.
They live in large numbers in and about San Francisco, now a vast
staging area for the war in the Pacific, a point at which the nation's
lines of communication and supply
converge. Inland they are disposed in the Sacramento, San Joaquin and
Imperial Valleys. They are engaged in the production of approximately
38% of the vegetable produce of California. Many of them are engaged in
the distribution of such produce in and along the water fronts at San
Francisco and Los Angeles. Of the 93,500 in California, about 25,000
reside inland in the mentioned valleys where they are largely engaged
in vegetable production cited above, and 54,600 reside along the
coastal strip, that is to say, a strip of coast line varying from eight
miles in the north to twenty miles in width in and around the San
Francisco bay area, including San Francisco, in Los Angeles and its
environs, and in San Diego. Approximately 13,900 are dispersed
throughout the remaining portion of the state. In Los Angeles City the
disposition of vital aircraft industrial plants covers the entire city.
Large numbers of Japanese live and operate markets and truck farms
adjacent to or near these installations. (See inclosed map.)
  d.
Disposition of Other Subversive Persons.
  Disposed
within the vital coastal strip already mentioned are large
numbers of Italians and Germans, foreign and native born,
among whom are many individuals who constitute an actual or potential
menace to the safety of the nation.
  2. 
Action recommended.
 a. 
Recommendations for the designation of prohibited areas, described as
"Category A" areas in California, Oregon and Washington, from which are
to be excluded by order of the Attorney General all alien enemies, have
gone forward from this headquarters to the Attorney General through the
Provost Marshal General and the Secretary of War. These recommendations
were made in order to aid the Attorney General in the implementation of
the Presidential Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, imposing
responsibility on him for the control of alien enemies as such. These
recommendations were for the exclusion of all alien enemies from
Category "A." The Attorney General has adopted these recommendations in
part, and has the balance under consideration. Similarly,
recommendations were made by this headquarters, and adopted by the
Attorney General, for the designation of certain areas as Category "B"
areas, within which alien enemies may be permitted on pass or permit.
  b.
I now recommend the following:
 (1) That
the Secretary of War procure from the President direction and authority
to designate military areas in the combat zone of the Western
Theater of Operations, (if necessary to include the entire
combat zone), from which, in his discretion, he may exclude
all Japanese, all alien enemies, and all other persons
suspected for any reason by the administering military authorities of
being actual or potential saboteurs, espionage agents, or
fifth columnists.
Such executive order should empower the Secretary of War to requisition
the services of any and all other agencies of the Federal Government,
with express direction to such agencies to respond to such requisition,
and further empowering the Secretary of War to use any and all federal
facilities and equipment, including Civilian Conservation Corps Camps,
and to accept the use of State facilities for the purpose of providing
shelter and equipment for evacuees.
Such executive order to provide further for the administration of
military areas for the purposes of this plan by appropriate military
authorities acting with the requisitioned assistance of the other
federal agencies and the cooperation of State and local agencies. The
executive order should further provide that by reason of military
necessity the right of all persons, whether citizens or aliens,
to reside, enter, cross or be within any military areas shall be
subject to revocation and shall exist on a pass and permit
basis at the discretion of the Secretary of War and
implemented by the necessary legislation imposing penalties for
violation.
  (2)
That, pursuant to such executive order, there be designated as military
areas all areas in Washington, Oregon and California, recommended by me
to date for designation by the Attorney General as Category "A" areas
and such additional areas as it may be found necessary to designate
hereafter.
  (3) That the Secretary of War provide
for the
exclusion from such military areas, in his discretion, of the following
classes of persons, viz:
 (a)
Japanese aliens. (b) Japanese-American
citizens. (c) Alien enemies
other than Japanese aliens. (d)
Any and all other persons who are suspected for any reason by the
administering military authorities to be actual or potential saboteurs,
espionage agents, fifth columnists, or subversive persons.
  (4)
That the evacuation of classes (a), (b),
and (c) from such military areas be initiated on a
designated evacuation day and carried to completion as rapidly as
practicable.
  That
prior to evacuation day all plans be complete for the establishment of
initial concentration points, reception centers, registration,
rationing, guarding, transportation to internment points, and the
selection and establishment of internment facilities in the Sixth,
Seventh, and Eighth Corps Areas.
  That persons in
class (a) and (c) above
be evacuated and interned at such selected places of
internment, under guard.
  That persons in class
(b) above, at the time of evacuation, be offered
an opportunity to accept voluntary internment, under guard,
at the place of internment above mentioned.
  That
persons in class (b) who decline
to accept voluntary internment, be excluded from all military
areas, and left to their own resources, or, in the
alternative, be encouraged to accept resettlement
outside of such military areas with such assistance as the State
governments concerned or the Federal Security Agency may be by that
time prepared to offer.
  That the evacuation of
persons in class (d) be
progressive and continuing, and that upon their evacuation persons in
class (d) be excluded from all military
areas and left in their own resources outside of such
military areas, or, in the alternative, be offered voluntary
internment or encouraged to accept voluntary resettlement as
above outlined, unless the facts in a particular case shall warrant
other action.
  (5)
The Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, to be
responsible for the evacuation, administration, supply and guard, to
the place of internment; the Commanding Generals of the Corps Areas
concerned to be responsible for guard, supply and administration at the
places of internment.
  (6) That direct
communication between
the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army and the
Corps Area Commanders concerned for the purpose of making necessary
arrangements be authorized.
  (7) That the Provost
Marshal
General coordinate all phases of the plan between the Commanding
General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, on the one hand, and
the Corps Area Commanders on the other hand.
  (8)
That all arrangements be accomplished with the utmost secrecy.
  (9)
That adult males (above the age of 14 years) be interned separately
from all women and children until the establishment of family units can
be accomplished.
  (10) No change is contemplated
in Category "B" areas.
   3. 
Although so far as the Army is concerned, such action is not an 
essential feature of the plan, but merely incidental thereto, I, 
nevertheless, recommend that mass internment be considered as 
largely a temporary expedient pending selective resettlement, 
to be accomplished by the various Security Agencies of the Federal and 
State Governments.
  4. The number of persons 
involved in the recommended evacuation will be approximately 133,000. 
(This total represents all enemy aliens and Japanese-American 
citizens in Category "A" areas recommended to date.)
  5. 
If these recommendations are approved detailed plans will be made by 
this headquarters for the proposed evacuation. The number evacuated to 
be apportioned by the Provost Marshal General among the Corps Area 
Commanders concerned as the basis for formulating their respective 
plans. It is possible that the State of California, and perhaps the 
State of Washington, will be able to offer resettlement facilities for 
a given number of evacuees who may be willing to accept resettlement.
  6. 
Pending further and detailed study of the problem, it is further 
recommended: (1) That the Commanding General, Western Defense Command 
and Fourth Army, coordinate with the local and State authorities, in 
order to facilitate the temporary physical protection by them 
of the property of evacuees
not taken with them; (2) That the Commanding General, Western Defense 
Command and Fourth Army, determine the quantity and character of 
property which the adult males, referred to in paragraph 2b (9), may be 
permitted to take with them; and (3) That the Treasury Department or 
other proper Federal agency be responsible for the conservation, 
liquidation, and proper disposition of the property of evacuees
if it cannot be cared for through the usual and normal channels.
 J. L. DeWITT, Lieutenant General, U.S. 
Army, Commanding.
  1 Incl: Map (in dup.).
 
 
 PART IIEVACUATION -- ITS DEVELOPMENT IN SUMMARY
 FOREWORD Part 
II (Chapters IV, V and VI) contains a summary of the evacuation
program. The detailed chronology and analysis of the
operations appear in the succeeding chapters.
  
 
 CHAPTER IVThe Emergence of Controlled EvacuationThe 
voluntary migration phase of evacuation was initiated by the 
promulgation of Public Proclamation No. 1, designating Military Area 
No. 1 as the zone from which persons of Japanese ancestry were to be 
required to leave during the first phase of evacuation. Between March 2 
and March 10, 1942, the discussions as to 
evacuation procedures were general in nature and specific planning had 
not emerged. The voluntary movement did not gain momentum 
because means had not been provided on the ground for aiding evacuees 
in the solution of personal problems incident to their voluntary exodus.
  Prior 
to March 10 the General Staff of the Western Defense Command 
and 
Fourth Army had not engaged in any extensive planning or preparation 
for the program. The tactical duties imposed upon it were such that it 
was unable to do so and at the same time meet the responsibilities 
imposed on the Headquarters by the essentially military aspects of its 
mission. Accordingly, on March 10, by General Order No. 34, the 
Commanding General established the Civil Affairs Division 
as an addition to his general staff. On the day following by General 
Order No. 35 he created the Wartime Civil Control 
Administration as an operating agency of his Command to carry 
out assigned missions involving civil control.
  With 
the creation of these agencies specific plans for the 
evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry
from Military Area No. 1, and the California portion of Military Area 
No. 2 were immediately initiated. The War Department liaison 
representative was designated as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil 
Affairs, General Staff, and also as the Director, Wartime Civil Control 
Administration. The offices of Civil Affairs Division, General Staff, 
and of the Wartime Civil Control Administration were established in the 
Whitcomb Hotel, San Francisco. The Wartime Civil Control Administration 
initiated its operations with a brief, but none the less all-inclusive, 
directive from the Commanding General:
 "To 
provide for
the evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry from Military Area
No. 1 and the California portion of Military Area No. 2 of the Pacific
Coast with a minimum of economic and social dislocation, a
minimum use of military personnel and maximum speed; and
initially to employ all appropriate means to encourage
voluntary migration."
  To 
facilitate the organization of the Wartime Civil Control 
Administration, and to streamline the procurement of personnel, office 
equipment, personal services and supplies, the Division of Central 
Administrative Services of the Office for Emergency Management 
responded to a request to extend its services to the Wartime Civil 
Control Administration. Almost overnight the Office for Emergency 
Management acquired office space in the Whitcomb Hotel, supplied and 
equipped these offices, and engaged qualified personnel to meet the 
requirements of the Director. Mr. Ralph B. Thompson, Regional Director 
of the Division of Central Administrative Services, personally 
supervised these activities. Funds were transferred to the Office for 
Emergency Management from appropriations available to the military 
establishment. This arrangement, which continued throughout the program 
with highly satisfactory results, was confirmed by letters of the 
Commanding General dated March 12, 1942. One of these letters was 
addressed to Mr. Dallas Dort, Director of that agency, and the other to 
Mr. Thompson, the Regional Director. These letters follow:
 (File No. 323.3 WCCA)
  HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND 
FOURTH ARMY Office of the Commanding General Presidio
of San Francisco, California
  March 12, 1942
  "Mr.
Dallas Dort Director, Central Administrative Services Office
for Emergency Management 101 Indiana Avenue, Washington, D.
C.
  "Please
arrange to provide the disbursing account assigned to Mr. Ralph B.
Thompson, Director of Administrative Services, Merchandise Mart, San
Francisco, with funds necessary to service the Wartime Civilian Control
Administration under my command.
  "His account
will be reimbursed currently from funds under my direct control.
  "Funds
to protect obligations up to sixty days should be provided. It is
estimated that $500,000.00 will be sufficient for the time being.
 /s/ J. L. DeWitt J. L. DeWitt, Lieutenant
General, U. S. A., Commanding."
  
 (File No. 323.3 WCCA)
  HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND
FOURTH ARMY Office of the Commanding General Presidio
of San Francisco, California
  12 March 1942
  "Mr.
Ralph B. Thompson, Regional Director Division of Central
Administrative Services 1355 Market Street, San Francisco,
California
  "Dear Mr. Thompson:
  "You
are hereby authorized to commence immediately to render the
administrative services, as outlined in your letter of March 11, 1942,
to the Wartime Civilian Control Administration (under the direction of
the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs, Western Defense Command
and Fourth Army) under my command.
  "Such
services are to be rendered only upon order of Colonel Karl R.
Bendetsen or his designated representative.
  "You
may utilize the procedure and necessary forms now used by you in
servicing other emergency agencies.
  "You
will be reimbursed from appropriations available to the military
establishment upon receipt of Standard Government Form 1080, "Voucher
Adjustment" between appropriations and/or funds, properly supported by
requisitions and vouchers.
  "You will receive
your orders and
requests for service from only one source in each city or location
serviced, that source to be designated in writing by Colonel Bendetsen
or his successor.
  "In performing this service
you will not
be subjected to jurisdiction or clearance with any department of the
Army except upon my specific order.
  "You are not
authorized
or expected to pay any obligations incurred by officers or civilian
officials of the Wartime Civilian Control Administration which have not
been ordered through your office under your regular procedures.
  "By
authority of the Secretary of War, acting under Executive Order No.
9066, dated February 19, 1942, I advise that you are authorized to
contract for printing and binding ordered by the designated officer of
the Wartime Civilian Control Administration without prior approval of
the Government printing office.
  "All special
services
rendered to date, namely the establishment of executive offices and the
teletype services in the Whitcomb Hotel Building at the request of
Colonel W. Fulton Magill are hereby approved.
 Sincerely yours, /s/ J. L. DeWitt J.
L. DeWitt, Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, JLD/tgb
Commanding."
   As an initial 
step in the facilitation of voluntary emigration, 48 Wartime 
Civil Control Administration offices were established, 
one in each important center of Japanese population in the affected 
area. These offices were staffed by representatives of the cooperating 
Federal agencies which had agreed to undertake certain specific 
responsibilities in the program. The Federal Reserve Bank and 
the Farm Security Administration had undertaken to provide property 
protection, under the direction of the Wartime Civil Control 
Administration -- the former, primarily as to business and 
personal property; the latter primarily respecting agricultural 
property. 
The Federal Security Agency, through its various associated agencies, 
had agreed to provide necessary social services. The 48 Wartime Civil 
Control Administration offices (which became known as "Wartime Civil 
Control Administration Service Centers") were staffed by a team with 
one or more representatives from each of these agencies.
  Through 
every available public information channel prospective evacuees 
were urged to prepare for evacuation, and to go to these offices for
assistance in the solution of their personal problems. It was 
stated that they would receive aid in their actual migration to the 
interior. These offices were empowered -- among other things -- to pay 
the cost of transportation of evacuees to points in the 
interior. They undertook to locate specific employment opportunities 
for prospective evacuees.
  This program met with 
measurable success in that approximately 9,000 persons of 
Japanese ancestry voluntarily emigrated from Military Area 
No. 1 to interior points. However, the attitude of the 
interior states was hostile. 
This group considered too dangerous to remain on the West Coast, was 
similarly regarded by State and local authorities, and by the 
population of the interior. The evacuees were not welcome. 
Incidents developed with increasing intensity, with the result that the 
Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs, on March 21, recommended to 
the Commanding General that evacuation be placed on the basis of 
complete Federal supervision and control. By Proclamation No. 
4, 
dated March 27, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry were required to 
remain within Military Area No. 1 and were not permitted to change 
their places of residence.
  Essentially, military 
necessity required only that the Japanese population be 
removed from the coastal area and dispersed in the interior, where the danger 
of action in concert during any attempted enemy raids along the coast,
or in advance thereof as preparation for a full scale attack, would be
eliminated. That the evacuation program necessarily and 
ultimately 
developed into one of complete Federal supervision, was due primarily 
to the fact that the interior states would not accept an 
uncontrolled Japanese migration. Although the initial 
recommendation of February 14, 1942 (appendix to chapter 3, 
page 33, supra) contemplated the internment of 
alien Japanese, this was abandoned 
as a method of operation. Once authority had been granted to set the 
program in motion, the Commanding General encouraged and facilitated a 
voluntary exodus with free choice of destination in the interior of 
persons of Japanese ancestry.
  Voluntary 
evacuation
was Phase I of the program. Through the Federal Security Agency 
initially and, after March 12, 1942, when the Wartime Civil 
Control Administration was established, in cooperation with the other 
participating Federal agencies, the means were provided for assisting 
Japanese in undertaking a free exodus from the West Coast. The 
accompanying functional chart, Figure 2, is illustrative of the phases 
through which the evacuation process progressed. Chapter IX of this report 
presents in greater detail the history of the first phase.
 
 
  During 
the period between March 12, the establishment of the Civil Affairs 
Division, General Staff, and the Wartime Civil Control Administration, 
and the announcement of Proclamation No. 4 on March 27, 1942, plans 
were going forward for the specific kind of evacuation that 
Proclamation No. 4 contemplated. Prior to March 12, when it 
was 
hoped that the evacuation would be characterized primarily by a 
voluntary exodus, the Commanding General had directed the acquisition 
and establishment of two "Reception Centers." These 
two Centers were to be developed at Manzanar and Parker. 
The "Reception Center" at Manzanar, California, is located in Owens 
Valley, Inyo County, at the easterly base of the Sierra. The Parker 
"Reception Center," now known as the Colorado River War Relocation 
Center, is located in Arizona on the Colorado River Indian Reservation 
along the Arizona-California boundary, south of Parker Dam. Originally, 
it was intended that each would have a capacity of 10,000 persons and 
that they would be used to provide temporary housing for 
those who
were either unable to undertake their own evacuation, or who declined
to leave until forced so to do.
  As 
soon as specific 
evacuation plans had been initiated, it was foreseen that relocation 
facilities would have to be developed for virtually all evacuees. 
Accordingly, within a few days following March 12, site-selection 
parties
were formed and dispatched to the interior states in the Western 
Defense Command to seek sites for the development of Relocation 
Centers. The Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, called a 
meeting of representatives of the Bureau of Reclamation, Department of 
Interior, the National Resources Planning Board, the Soil Conservation 
Service, the Farm Security Administration of the Department of 
Agriculture, the Work Projects Administration, and the Corps of 
Engineers, South Pacific Division. The object of this conference was to 
sift available data as to the location of potential Relocation Center 
sites and to organize site-selection parties. Two such parties were 
formed and each was assigned a military transport aircraft. One party 
was dispatched to cover the area lying north of the California-Oregon 
boundary and west of the Rocky Mountains. This party was joined by a 
representative of the North Pacific Division of the United States 
Engineer Corps. A second party was assigned to reconnoiter the area 
lying south of the Oregon-California boundary and west of the Rocky 
Mountains. These groups initiated their survey on March 16, 
1942.
  Following its establishment, the 
Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, on March 12, 1942, 
requested that Mr. R. L. Nicholson, then Regional 
Director of the Work Projects Administration 
for the eleven Western States, come to San Francisco for a 
conference. He had participated in several informal pre-evacuation 
conferences at the request of Mr. Tom C. Clark, then the West Coast 
representative of the Anti-Trust Division of the Department of Justice. 
The Director requested him to join the staff of Wartime Civil Control 
Administration as Chief of the Assembly Center Branch of the Temporary 
Settlement Operations Division. In the course of the discussion, Mr. 
Nicholson stated that substantial numbers of Work Projects 
Administration field staff personnel would be available to Wartime 
Civil Control Administration as that agency's operations were rapidly 
diminishing in scope. The Director, Wartime Civil Control 
Administration asked that such personnel be recruited from Work 
Projects Administration offices to provide Wartime Civil Control 
Administration administrative staffs for assembly centers and for any 
reception centers that might be established. The understanding was that 
all such personnel would join the Wartime Civil Control Administration 
to be administratively responsible to the Director. It was further 
understood that, in accordance with the policy of the Commanding 
General to limit the use of military personnel, all center 
staff operations would be supervised by civilians. 
It was agreed that any personnel not available from among Work Projects 
Administration staff offices would be recruited independently. As 
internal security and police functions were not to be under the control 
of the Assembly Center Managers, the recruitment of police staffs, to 
be administratively responsible to the Director, Wartime Civil Control 
Administration, was not included in the arrangement.
  Later, 
Mr. Nicholson advised that Work Projects Administration personnel, 
including himself, desired to retain their status with that agency 
without prejudice and that the Federal Works Agency (Work Projects 
Administration) would give its consent to an arrangement whereby such 
personnel would remain on the rolls of Work Projects Administration at 
Army expense subject, however, to the complete direction and 
administrative control of the Army. 
Accordingly, in order to preserve the status of such personnel, a 
letter of request from the Commanding General to Mr. Nicholson, dated 
March 28, 1942, was drafted in such manner as to call upon the Work 
Projects Administration, as an agency, to provide Assembly and 
Reception Center managerial personnel. The actual arrangement remained 
as initially agreed, however, viz., that the Commanding 
General,
through Wartime Civil Control Administration as an agency would retain
complete responsibility for the establishment, administration, and
operation of Assembly Centers. All such personnel were 
administratively responsible to the Director, Wartime Civil Control 
Administration, and became a part of that organization. It is 
necessary, therefore, to bear the foregoing in mind in order fully to 
understand the letter of March 28, 1942, which, on its face, does not 
fully reflect the actuality. All plans, policies, and directives were 
developed by Wartime Civil Control Administration, and the manual of 
Assembly Center operations was issued by the Director. The letter of 
March 28, 1942, reads as follows:
 March 28, 1942
  "Mr. Rex 
L. Nicholson, Regional WPA Supervisor W.C.C.A. Whitcomb
Hotel, San Francisco, California
  "My dear Mr.
Nicholson:
  "Under authority granted to me by
executive order of the President No. 9066 dated February 19, 1942, it
is requested that the Work
Projects Administration assume the responsibility for the direction and
management of such assembly points and reception centers as
may be assigned in connection with the program of evacuation
of German, Italian and Japanese enemy aliens and persons of Japanese
ancestry from restricted zones within
the military areas established by my Military Proclamation No. 1 dated
March 2, 1942, and by my Military Proclamation No. 2 dated March 16,
1942.
  "Subject to general direction from my
Assistant Chief
of Staff, Civil Affairs Division, and in accordance with policies
approved by him as the officer responsible for the execution of the
Wartime Civil Control Administration, your agency is authorized to
incur obligations and make expenditures from any funds available to it
or made available to it by the War Department, in carrying out the
duties and functions assigned. In this connection it is desired that
you submit to the Asst. Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division, for
approval, at the earliest possible date, a Budget Estimate of your
fiscal requirements up to May 1, 1942 broken down in such detail as is
immediately practicable. Reimbursement to the Work Projects
Administration for expenditures made from any funds appropriated to the
WPA will be from available funds subject to my control and allocation,
appropriate orders having been issued in respect thereto.
  "General
plans and policies for the operation of Reception Centers and Assembly
points will be worked out by you with my Assistant Chief of Staff,
Civil Affairs Division, and subject to his final approval. The actual
administration and management of the Assembly Points and Reception
Centers will be the responsibility of your agency.
  "After
general plans and policies have been agreed upon, your general
operation will be subject to inspection by my Assistant Chief of Staff,
Civil Affairs Division, and his Deputy for Temporary Settlement
Operations to insure conformance with the general plans and policies
described. In the event that the operation of the Reception
Centers or Assembly Points does not appear to be satisfactory, upon
inspection, it is understood that determinations will be made as to
necessary adjustments and revisions of policy and that such changes
will be communicated to you by my Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil
Affairs Division.
 "Yours
very truly, /s/ J. L. DeWitt J. L. DeWitt, Lieutenant
General, U. S. Army, Commanding."
   Mr. 
Nicholson was succeeded as Chief of the Assembly Center 
Branch, Wartime Civil Control Administration, on June 30, 
1942, by 
Mr. Emil Sandquist, who remained as Chief of that 
branch until completion of the program.
  Meanwhile, 
the construction of the Manzanar and Parker Projects was being pushed. Forty-eight 
Wartime
Civil Control Administration Service Centers were in operation for the
encouragement of voluntary migration and, at the same time, 
site-selection parties were in the interior seeking sites for 
Relocation Centers.
  The 
initiation of detailed evacuation planning established the 
impracticability of undertaking evacuation and relocation in the same 
operation. It became evident that the establishment of intermediate 
assembly facilities would be a prime essential to the accomplishment of 
a rapid, compulsory evacuation. The separation of these phases is best 
illustrated by a reference to the Wartime Civil Control Administration 
Functional Distribution Chart. (Figure 
2, supra.) Accordingly, the selection of 
sites within the zone to be evacuated, near each evacuee community, for 
the establishment of Assembly Centers (initially called 
"Induction Centers")
was undertaken at the same time when these other activities mentioned 
above were under way, viz., interior relocation site selection, the 
encouragement of voluntary migration and the operation of the Wartime 
Civil Control Administration Service Centers. The detailed plan called 
for the acquisition of Assembly Center sites where existing 
installations and facilities could be used to the maximum. Fairgrounds 
and race tracks were the primary source of such locations.
  The 
Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, instituted a survey of 
all available Assembly Center locations with a view to the selection of 
places near to each center of evacuee population and susceptible of 
rapid adaptation to the purpose. The Commanding Generals of the 
Northwest Sector, the Northern and Southern California Sectors, and the 
Southern Land Frontier Sector, were also directed by the Commanding 
General to make recommendations as to suitable sites for this purpose. Seventeen 
such sites
were selected, fifteen of which were ultimately used for evacuee 
housing, in addition to Manzanar and Parker. Twelve of these Centers, 
exclusive of Manzanar, were developed in California, one in Washington, 
one in Oregon, and one in Arizona, exclusive of Parker. The names and 
locations of these Centers are detailed in Chapter 
XIII.
  The North and South Pacific 
Divisions of the United States Engineer Corps 
were requested to provide for the construction of suitable facilities 
at each of these sites, making maximum use of existing structures. The 
contemplated aggregate capacity (exclusive of Manzanar and Parker) was 
set at 100,000. The housing was to be suitable for family units, and 
central messing facilities were to be provided. A maximum of 
four weeks was allotted for completion
of the projects. Thirteen of the fifteen Assembly Centers established 
were within the South Pacific Division of the United States Engineer 
Corps and, notwithstanding this unprecedented assignment, the schedule 
was substantially met. The Division Engineers received their requests 
for action on March 20, 1942, and the deadline was established for 
April 21. Specifications were provided by Wartime Civil Control 
Administration only in essential outline. One requirement was that 
construction be planned so that the reception of evacuees could be 
initiated in advance of completion of the entire Center.
  While 
Assembly Center site selection was under way, and before construction 
was started, the pressure for the initiation of a definite 
evacuation movement reached the point where there was grave 
danger of serious incidents.
  On March 
21, 1942, the Wartime Civil Control Administration organized 
a voluntary evacuation of some 2,100 persons from Los 
Angeles, California, to Manzanar
which was then, of course, still undergoing construction at a rapid 
rate. The Commanding General, Southern California Sector, Western 
Defense Command, provided escort for the convoy of cars and a 
collateral train movement. The Quartermaster, Western Defense Command, 
obtained the necessary transportation and subsistence, and the United 
States Public Health Service provided medical care. An advance party of 
voluntary evacuees had preceded the main party to assist the Manzanar 
Administrative Staff in preparing for the reception of the main party 
of 2,100. Local Los Angeles agencies aided, particularly the Maryknoll 
Mission. (See Chapters VII 
and VIII for division 
of responsibilities.)
  On March 
29, 1942, the first compulsory evacuation of persons of Japanese
ancestry from Bainbridge Island in Puget Sound, Washington, to Manzanar
was executed pursuant to Exclusion Order No. 1, 
dated March 24, 1942.
  When 
Proclamation No. 4 was announced, the construction of Assembly Centers 
on sites already selected was under way. The Work Projects 
Administration had provided a staff at Manzanar and was assembling 
personnel to administer other Assembly Centers as they were developed. Detailed 
plans were being formulated by Wartime Civil Control Administration to
solve a variety of problems
such as those of determining the supply and equipment requirements for 
each Assembly Center, for transportation of evacuees, for health, 
sanitation and education, and for all other Assembly Center operation 
requirements. Also, advanced planning for the designation of Exclusion 
Areas, for their orderly evacuation, for the designation of each 
evacuee group, for the maintenance of family units and of community 
balance within Centers had to be considered. As Wartime Civil Control 
Administration was being organized and a new staff recruited and 
trained, it was necessary to consider and solve these problems and at 
the same time place the program in execution.
  With 
the 
initiation of the Assembly Center construction, initial supply 
requirements for Manzanar had been determined by the Wartime Civil 
Control Administration and requisitioned. These supplies were rapidly 
started toward destination by the Quartermaster, Western Defense 
Command. Plans had to be developed for internal security -- the 
policing of Assembly Centers. The question of evacuee employment, of 
their compensation, of the establishment of many social services such 
as barber shops, beauty shops, shoe repair facilities, clothing stores, 
hospital, optical and dental services, the warehousing of evacuee goods 
and chattels, all had to be considered and met. For none was there 
either precedent or pattern.
  Complex as these 
operational aspects were, the problem was further compounded by the 
public relations aspect of the program. Rumors 
were rampant, public feeling ran high, the affected groups were in a
state of confusion, and unscrupulous interests were seeking to take
advantage of misfortune. There was, therefore, an impelling 
necessity for the formulation of a definitive public information and 
public relations program. This was immediately undertaken. A more 
detailed account of all these aspects of the program will appear in 
ensuing chapters.
 
 
 
 CHAPTER VSeparation of Jurisdiction Over Evacuation 
and RelocationWhen it became finally evident toward the end 
of February that a complete evacuation of all 
persons of Japanese ancestry
from Military Area No. 1, and ultimately from the California portion of 
Military Area No. 2, would be ordered, discussions were initiated in 
Washington as to whether a separate agency should be created to 
undertake evacuee supervision and relocation after the Army had 
attained its objective. The primary basis for these discussions was 
that Army resources should not be expended in any direction not 
essential to the military aspects of the successful prosecution of the 
war. The Attorney General and other representatives of the Justice 
Department were also concerned with several post-evacuation 
considerations, particularly those revolving around the civil 
rights of American-born Japanese. 
Justice Department officials therefore urged the establishment of a 
separate civilian agency to undertake the post-evacuation phases of 
relocation. The Assistant Secretary of War, the Director of the Bureau 
of Budget and the Attorney General all participated in the 
consideration of this problem.
  The desirability 
of 
establishing such an operating agency was generally agreed to when the 
Assistant Secretary of War came to the West Coast for a survey of the 
situation. He arrived at San Francisco on March 7, 1942, and brought 
with him representatives of the Treasury Department and of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The Treasury Department had 
accepted the responsibility of providing means for evacuee property 
protection under the direction of the Commanding General and had 
selected the Federal Reserve System, long its fiscal agent, as the 
instrumentality through which it would discharge this mission. The 
Assistant Secretary of War's party included Messrs. John Pehle, 
John Lawlor, and Ansel F. Luxford 
of the Treasury Department, and Governor M. S. Szymczak 
and Mr. W. B. Pollard of the Federal Reserve 
System. Mr. Milton S. Eisenhower, 
then Assistant to the Secretary of Agriculture, joined the party as he 
had participated in the Washington discussions concerning the proposed 
relocation agency. Mr. Eisenhower returned to Washington after having 
engaged in discussions with the Commanding General, the Assistant 
Secretary of War and other officials about March 11, 1942. Following 
his return, Executive Order of the President No. 9102 
was published on March 18th. Under its terms, War Relocation 
Authority
was established in the Office for Emergency Management in the Executive 
Office of the President. Mr. Eisenhower was named as its first 
Director. Broad powers were accorded. Primarily, however, the new 
agency became responsible for "the relocation (of evacuees) 
in
appropriate places, providing for their needs in such manner as may be
appropriate, and supervising their activities." Its power, 
authority and responsibility are clearly expressed in the order. {See 
Inclosure to letter of transmittal #7.}
  Liaison 
was established between the Director, War Relocation Authority, and the 
Commanding General. Mr. Eisenhower returned to the Pacific Coast about 
the end of March and established temporary offices on the third floor 
of the Whitcomb Hotel building, San Francisco, adjacent to the office 
of the Wartime Civil Control Administration. Because of the primary 
interest of War Relocation Authority in the relocation aspects of 
evacuation, it was agreed that the selection of Relocation 
Center sites by the Army would be suspended, and that all 
data collected would be made available to War Relocation Authority for 
its use.
  The 
Director of War Relocation Authority determined that the 
characteristics for each site should be such that all lands included 
were to be a part of the public domain; that each 
site have an optimum potential for the employment 
of all employables among evacuees there resident; and that there be sufficient 
water and suitable soil
for agricultural development. It was further agreed that War Relocation 
Authority would make the selections subject to the approval of military 
authorities as to military security features. Also, 
it was 
agreed that the acquisition of sites would be through military 
channels, and that the Commanding General, Western Defense Command, 
would notify the Governor of each State concerned, prior to 
acquisition, of the military necessity for the construction 
of a Relocation Center on the chosen area. 
Some time later a formal agreement was executed between the War 
Department and War Relocation Authority, reflecting this understanding 
and providing for the construction of Centers on behalf of War 
Relocation Authority by the Army. This agreement, executed April 17, 
1942, is found in Chapter XX.
  The 
Western Defense Command, therefore, abandoned Relocation Center site 
selection and concentrated its efforts on controlled 
evacuation. 
Emphasis was placed by Wartime Civil Control Administration on evacuee 
property protection, provision for necessary social services, 
establishment of Assembly Centers, the evacuation of Japanese to 
Assembly Centers, operation of Assembly Centers, the construction and 
equipment of Relocation Centers and the transfer of evacuees from 
Assembly to Relocation Centers. It was difficult to locate suitable 
sites which met the standards prescribed. This, in combination with construction 
delays
due to the scarcity of building materials, delayed the ultimate 
transfer from Assembly Centers to completed Relocation Centers for 
approximately four months.
  Assembly 
Centers were originally conceived and established as a 
transitory facility and their adaptation to longer evacuee 
residence
became essential. Bearing in mind the seriousness of the results which 
might ensue from over-long residence in facilities intended only to 
provide temporary shelter, the Director, Wartime Civil Control 
Administration, on April 22, 1942, emphasized these considerations to 
the Director, War Relocation Authority, in a memorandum to the 
following effect:
 "1. The tempo of 
evacuation is under acceleration. Its accomplishment will place
approximately 85,000 evacuees
in assembly centers in the next six weeks. Assembly centers are not
designed to provide suitable semi-permanent housing and other
facilities. They are temporary in nature. Their facilities
are transitory only.
They are made necessary because of the time required to select
relocation sites. Their objective is to meet the demand of military
necessity and to avoid any retarding effect caused by relocation site
selection.
  "2. Assembly centers are not and
cannot, without
the expenditure of tremendous sums of money for space and facilities in
duplication of those which will be provided on relocation sites, be
designed to permit the development and maintenance of a vocational,
educational, recreational and social program. Long residence in an
assembly center is bound to have a demoralizing effect.
  "3.
The grave responsibility for the most rapid selection of
relocation sites
and the compilation of all necessary data to permit speedy acquisition
and construction of relocation centers thereon cannot be overemphasized
in view of the essential characteristics of assembly centers.
  "4.
In this connection, it is suggested that a representative of the office
of the appropriate United States Army Division Engineer
be included in War Relocation Authority site selection parties. This
will produce a two-fold effect. (1) It will facilitate acquisition once
a site is selected and the data compiled because the real estate
section of the Division Engineer's Office will have been accorded the
maximum advance notice. (2) It will facilitate the initiation of
construction for manifest reasons in that advance information on the
characteristics of a site will have been insured.
  "5.
From
the long range point of view and the self-evident desirability of
maintaining sound public relations, the suggestion is made that all
personnel of both WCCA and WRA, and the associated cooperating federal
agencies, bear in mind the necessity for and objective of
assembly centers.
Thus, their essential characteristics will be more readily understood.
The attainment of any social ideal therein is beyond possibility for
manifest reasons and the responsibility is grave to avoid
misinterpretations. Failure to avoid it may initiate a chain
of circumstances resulting in reprisals against our nationals in enemy
hands." 
 
 
 CHAPTER VIThe Evacuation MethodWith 
the formal organization of an Army agency charged with the general 
supervision of all evacuation activities, rather definite property 
protection and social service policies and practices
emerged with a specific evacuation technique. The central theory of 
evacuation, upon which the method and technique was developed, was 
essentially the block system. The coastal strip was ultimately 
subdivided into 108 exclusion areas. Comprehensive 
statistical 
studies of the size and composition of the Japanese population in each 
of the areas were made. As a particular exclusion area became readied 
for evacuation, an Exclusion Order with specific Exclusion Instructions 
was promulgated.
  A Civil Control 
Station was 
established immediately in the exclusion area concerned. This Control 
Station was staffed with a team of experts. On definite dates following 
the posting of an Exclusion Order in an "exclusion area", the heads 
of families, and each individual living alone, were required to report
to the Civil Control Station
in that area for instructions and registration. Representatives of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, of the Farm Security 
Administration, and the associated agencies of the Federal Security 
Agency, comprised the Control Station staff. The Commanding General of 
each Sector provided a military officer with several military police to 
act as a security group. Applications for exemption from evacuation 
were referred to Control Station Provosts. Normally, a representative 
of the United States Employment Service acted as the Station Manager 
for administrative purposes.
  As many as 43 
Civil Control Stations operated simultaneously at the peak of 
evacuation. At this time an average of 3,750 evacuees per day 
were being moved from their homes to Assembly Centers, or, in some 
cases, direct to Manzanar or Colorado River Relocation Centers.
  The 
Department of Agriculture had designated the Farm Security 
Administration as its representative to undertake the responsibility 
for agricultural property protection. Mr. Laurence 
I. Hewes, 
the Pacific Coast Regional Director of the Farm Security 
Administration, supervised these activities. At conferences between the 
Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, and Mr. Hewes, the 
details of the arrangements between the Farm Security Administration 
and Wartime Civil Control Administration were developed. These 
understandings were confirmed by correspondence dated March 15, 1942, 
and March 27, 1942, addressed to the Pacific Coast Regional Director of 
the Farm Security Administration. (Appendix 
(1) to Chapter VI, infra.)
  In 
respect to a telegram dated March 14, 1942 (Appendix (2) to Chapter 
VI) from the Commanding General, the sum of $1,000,000 
was made available from War Department appropriations for the purpose 
of making loans against evacuee crops and farm implements. 
The Farm Security Administration representatives, forming a part of 
Wartime Civil Control Administration, were entrusted with authority for 
making loans from this sum. The objective was to facilitate 
the procurement of substitute farm operators
who would take over evacuated farms and other agricultural property, 
particularly where the financial condition of a given evacuee, or of a 
specific agricultural property, was such that sufficient moneys to 
continue operations could not be obtained through commercial sources.
  Later 
this was augmented by an additional $4,000,000, 
obtained from funds available to the President. Both the evacuees 
and their communities of residence derived much benefit from these loans
because many properties otherwise would have remained idle, and growing 
crops left unharvested. The Farm Security Administration organized for 
the task with great facility and soon developed a complete inventory of 
evacuee agricultural interests. Ultimately satisfactory 
arrangements were made for over 99 per cent of all this property. 
Arrangements were successfully accomplished to keep these properties in 
production without shrinkage in aggregate crop output.
  Measures 
for evacuee property protection 
were rapidly developed following the arrival of the Assistant Secretary 
of War and of the representatives of the Treasury Department and 
Federal Reserve System who accompanied him. When the Wartime Civil 
Control Administration was organized the Director called upon the 
cooperating agencies to organize 48 Service Center teams. 
They complied rapidly. Under the immediate direction of Mr. William H. Hale, 
Vice-President of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, the bank's 
phase of evacuee property protection activities was rapidly developed. 
The arrangement between Western Defense Command and the 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
was formally confirmed in letters from the Commanding General to the 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, dated March 11th and April 5, 
1942. (Appendix (3) 
to Chapter VI.)
  Service 
center offices were established in downtown San Francisco, Los Angeles, 
Portland, and Seattle. These were staffed by personnel specially 
selected to aid evacuees with their problems.
  At 
the request of the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, the 
Federal Reserve Bank also undertook responsibility for the storage 
of evacuee household goods. 
This included the acquisition of suitable warehouses, the employment of 
guards, and the installation of suitable means and methods to ensure a 
control and inventory of the stored property. As will be outlined in 
greater detail later in this report, the Wartime Civil Control 
Administration formulated definite policies, implemented with detailed 
instructions and forms, in the matter of household goods storage. Any 
type of personal property
was accepted for storage, including business property and automobiles. 
Farm implements were warehoused, through the Farm Security 
Administration's organization. As for automobiles and trucks, the Army 
offered to purchase any automobile or truck at Blue Book value, through 
the Federal Reserve Bank, if an evacuee desired to sell. Evacuee 
response to the property protection services was most gratifying, and
clearly indicated their effectiveness.
  As 
already noted, the associated agencies of the Federal Security Agency 
accepted responsibility for providing all necessary social 
and public health services. 
These allied agencies included the United States Employment Service, 
the Bureau of Public Assistance, Social Security Board, and the United 
States Public Health Service. The scope and magnitude of the functions 
performed by these allied agencies will be described in detail in 
subsequent chapters. Mr. Richard M. Neustadt, 
Regional Director 
of the Federal Security Agency, agreed to place all of the facilities 
of the organizations under his direction at the disposal of the Wartime 
Civil Control Administration. The closest liaison was constantly 
maintained. A letter in confirmation of the arrangement made between 
the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, and Mr. Neustadt 
was forwarded by the Commanding General on March 31, 1942. (Appendix (4) to Chapter 
VI.)
  Among the manifold services provided by 
these agencies, the United States Public Health Service 
undertook to examine each evacuee for contagious diseases prior to his 
entry into an Assembly Center. It also undertook the acquisition of infirmary 
and hospital equipment, and medical supplies 
for Assembly Centers, and to make suitable auxiliary arrangements for hospitalization 
of evacuees in private and public hospitals adjacent to Assembly 
Centers. Further, it supervised the entire medical program within the 
Centers.
  The United States Employment 
Service
provided the Manager for each Civil Control Station and Wartime Civil 
Control Administration Service Center. The Bureau of Public Assistance, 
Social Security Board, in collaboration with the United States 
Employment Service, undertook the initial interview of each 
evacuee
to determine his individual problems and the social and property
protection services he would require. These two agencies also 
undertook the recruitment of advanced parties of evacuee workers for 
each Assembly Center. These parties were recruited, organized and 
transported to each Assembly Center well in advance of the induction of 
the first groups of evacuees. Thus the Assembly Center staffs were able 
to organize a skeleton force for the reception of the new Center 
residents.
  At the request of the Director, 
Wartime Civil Control Administration, the Office of Price 
Administration
sent a liaison representative to be available for consultation, advice, 
and the initiation of any necessary action. He established a liaison 
section at Wartime Civil Control Administration, and remained during 
the initial phases of evacuation. This relationship was established 
because it was foreseen that some control might have to be applied to 
arrest widespread deflation of values. This in turn might have 
adversely affected the economic structure of the West Coast. This did 
not prove to be the case. No price control measures were 
applied.
  The Post Office 
Department
effectively cooperated throughout the entire operation. When it became 
essential to devise means for maintaining an account of the progress of 
voluntary migration, postmasters throughout the Western Defense Command 
administered the change of address reporting system. 
Later, 
during Assembly Center operations, branch post offices were promptly 
established in each Center. The Inspectors in charge of the San 
Francisco and Seattle Divisions promptly responded to all Wartime Civil 
Control Administration requirements.
  By 
arrangement with the 
Attorney General, the Department of Justice, through the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, and the United States Attorneys, acted as the enforcing 
agency for all of the Proclamations and Exclusion Orders of 
the Commanding General, promulgated under Executive Order No. 9066. Although 
prosecutions in connection with the Japanese evacuation were few, the
number of cases of violation of the Commanding General's Curfew and
Travel restrictions, applicable to alien enemies, were many. 
Through the agency of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, State and 
local law-enforcement agencies cooperated and assisted in enforcement 
of the evacuation program primarily by reporting promptly any and all 
cases of failure to comply with Exclusion Orders. 
To insure the closest working relationship between Western Defense 
Command and the enforcement agencies of the Department of Justice, 
preliminary understandings for collaboration were embodied in a 
memorandum from the Commanding General to the Assistant Secretary of 
War dated April 20, 1942. (Appendix 
(5) to Chapter VI.)
  The 
cooperation of the participating Federal agencies, and the high 
devotion to duty displayed by all of their personnel was outstanding. 
The willingness of all concerned to apply themselves to the task 
without regard to personal convenience, or to the hours of duty, cannot 
be left unmentioned.
 APPENDIX 
TO CHAPTER VIAppendix 1"15 March 1942
  "Mr. 
Laurence I. Hewes, Jr., Regional Director Farm Security
Administration 30 Van Ness Avenue San Francisco,
California
  "Dear Mr. Hewes:
  "By
virtue of and pursuant to the authority vested in me as Commanding
General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, and in order to
effectuate the removal of any enemy aliens and other persons designated
by me, engaged in farming operations who evacuate from restricted and
prohibited areas lying within my command, you are hereby ordered and
authorized as follows:
  "1. To institute and
administer a program which will insure continuation of the proper
use of agricultural lands voluntarily vacated by enemy aliens
and other persons designated by me, and which will insure fair
and equitable arrangements between the evacuees and the operators of
their property.
  "2.
To incur the necessary administrative expenses, including the payment
of personnel and necessary traveling expenses to be reimbursed by me
upon presentation of reimbursement vouchers.
  "3.
From funds made available or to be made available by me, to make,
service and collect loans, including the provision of
necessary farm management advice and guidance.
  "4.
To redelegate to such officers and employees of the Farm Security
Administration as you may designate, any part of the authority herein
contained.
 "Sincerely yours, /s/
J. L. DeWitt J. L. DeWitt, Lieutenant General, U.
S. Army, Commanding."
  
 
 March 27, 1942
   MEMORANDUM
For Mr. Larry I. Hewes, Farm Security Administration Subject: Exercise
of freezing power of agricultural property.
  1. I
have been directed by the Commanding General to advise you as follows:
  2.
After extended consideration of your mission and the problems attendant
upon its accomplishment, it has been concluded that there is necessity
for a revision in the method and circumstances wherein the freezing
power is now exercised.
  3. In your relationship
with the
Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, you are
regarded as a representative of the Department of Agriculture, and I
understand from my conversations with you that, in the accomplishment
of the mission assigned the Department, you, as its representative, are
employing all of the available departmental agencies. In this
connection, I further understand that the Agricultural War Boards
established in each county by order of the Secretary of Agriculture,
have a membership comprising a representative of every agency of the
Department of Agriculture.
  4. The primary
mission imposed
upon the Commanding General is accomplishment of the evacuation in
satisfaction of military necessity. In the accomplishment of his
mission, he has prescribed that it shall be carried out (a) with a minimum
loss in agricultural production consistent with prompt
execution, and (b) with a maximum of fair dealing to all
concerned.
In the latter case, protection of the property interests of evacuees
and avoidance, so far as practicable, of economic dislocation are major
phases of the prescribed method.
  5. In
responding to the
request of the Commanding General to the Secretary of War, the
Agriculture Department has therefore accepted the mission of performing
the following:
 (a) To do everything
reasonably necessary to prevent any crop loss
subsequent upon evacuation and to reduce to a minimum the spoilage or
loss of growing crops; (b) To assist the evacuee
in providing a substitute tenant or operator and at the same
time to preserve the evacuee's equity to the
fullest practicable extent consistent with the circumstances in each
case; (c) If necessary to take over and operate
property
where, in the absence of such action, growing crops would be neglected
or abandoned or where the evacuee's equity, though of reasonable
substance, would otherwise deteriorate.
  6.
In order to accomplish these objectives it is essential that the power
to "freeze"
agricultural property, crops, farm implements and. agricultural
equipment, lease-hold interests, be readily available for application
in cases of necessity.
  7. As the Agricultural
War Boards
have been organized in each county, it must follow that such Boards are
familiar with local problems and conditions. They also have the
personnel available to make prompt investigation and recommendation
upon the recommendation of the Farm Security field agent. I therefore
propose that the "freezing" powers necessary to the accomplishment of
the objectives stated be applied only upon the recommendation
of the appropriate county War Board; that such boards be the
final arbiter as to whether or not the power to freeze be exercised in
any given case.
  8. In this way, the action taken
to "freeze" in any instance will represent the considered
judgment of all agricultural agencies.
It is immaterial to me whether the agency empowered to "freeze" on such
recommendation is the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, one of its
member banks or agencies, or whether it is the field agent of the Farm
Security Administration.
  9. I am furnishing a
copy of this
memorandum to Mr. William H. Hale, Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco; Mr. Milton Eisenhower, War Relocation Authority; Mr. Ed
Dodd, Director, Western Division, Department of Agriculture; and Mr.
Dave Davidson, chairman, California War Board. Concurrently I am
recommending to the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and
Fourth Army, that he approve the program outlined and that in
furtherance of your mission, where property is "frozen" and operated by
your Agency, funds be made available for such operation, as for the
hiring of operators and for the purchase of feed and seed, etc.
 Karl R. Bendetsen, Colonel, G. S. C, Assistant
Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs, Directing, WCCA.
   Copies
to: Mr. Wm. H. Hale Mr. Milton Eisenhower Mr.
Ed Dodd Mr. Dave Davidson
 
 
 Appendix 
2"14 MARCH
1942
  "CHIEF OF STAFF "WAR DEPARTMENT "WASHINGTON,
D. C.
  "ORDERLY
ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE MISSION ASSIGNED ME UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER NINE
NAUGHT SDC SIX DATED FEBRUARY NINETEEN COMMA NINETEEN FORTY TWO BY
LETTER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR DATED FEBRUARY TWENTY COMMA NINETEEN
FORTY TWO RENDERS IMPERATIVE THE AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR THE MAKING
OF CROP LOANS IN ORDER TO AVOID THE LOSS OF GROWING CROPS PLANTED BY
JAPANESE FARMS
WHO WILL BE EXCLUDED FROM THE PACIFIC COASTAL FRONTIER STOP SUCH FUNDS
ARE NEEDED FOR SPRAYING AND FOR FINANCING OPERATIONS BY PERSONS
PROCURED TO SUBSTITUTE AS FARM OPERATORS IN THE PLACE OF EVACUEES STOP
THE STIMULUS OF VOLUNTARY EVACUATION ON THE PART OF AFFECTED GROUPS
WILL BE GREATLY ENHANCED IF AN ALLOTMENT OF FUNDS FROM THE CHIEF OF
STAFFS CONTINGENT FUND OR THE PRESIDENTS EMERGENCY FUND IS MADE FOR
THIS PURPOSE STOP OFFICERS OF THE FARM CREDIT AND FARM SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION COMMA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE COMMA WORKING IN
COLLABORATION WITH THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM ARE UNDERTAKING TO MAKE
LOANS IN PROPER CASES AND TO ESTABLISH A MEANS FOR SECURITY AND
REPAYMENT ON A SUITABLE BASIS STOP THIS MATTER HAS ALREADY BEEN
REFERRED INFORMALLY TO GENERAL BROWN COMMA BUDGET OFFICER FOR THE WAR
DEPARTMENT STOP PRIORITY ACTION IS URGENTLY REQUESTED.
 "DeWITT "COMDG WDC AND FOURTH ARMY"
  
 
 Appendix 
3"March
11, 1942
  "Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, "San
Francisco, California.
  "Sirs:
  "By
virtue of orders issued by the War Department on December 11, 1941, the
entire Pacific Coast of the United States was established as the
Western Defense Command and designated as a theatre of operations under
my command.
  "By Executive Order No. 9066, dated
February 19,
1942, the President of the United States authorized and directed the
Secretary of War and the military commanders whom he may from time to
time designate to prescribe military areas in such places and of such
extent as he or the appropriate military commander may determine, from
which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which the
right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave, shall be subject to
whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate military
commander may impose in his discretion.
  "The
Secretary of
War, on February 20, 1942, designated the undersigned as the military
commander to carry out the duties and responsibilities imposed by said
Executive Order for that portion of the United States embraced in the
Western Defense Command.
  "On March 2, 1942,
pursuant to
authority vested in me, I issued Public Proclamation No. 1, under which
I designated and established certain military areas and zones. It is my
intention, by subsequent proclamations, to exclude certain persons and
classes of persons from all of Military Area No. 1, and also from such
of those zones described in said Public Proclamation No. 1 as Zones A-2
to A-99 inclusive as are within Military Area No. 2. The evacuees
will include Japanese, German and Italian aliens and persons of
Japanese ancestry
now resident in Military Area No. 1. I am familiar with the
contemplated program dealing with the problem of evacuees and I find
that the prompt execution of such a program is essential to the
successful prosecution of the war and the performance of my duty under
Executive Order No. 9066. Accordingly, I hereby authorize and direct
you to take all steps which in your judgment are necessary or desirable
in order to carry out the objective of the program.
  "You
are
authorized and requested to employ such personnel and set up such
offices within the Western Defense Command as you may consider
advisable, necessary or expedient for the purpose of carrying
out the program of dealing with the property interests of said evacuees.
You are further authorized to employ such personnel and appoint such
sub-agents as you may see fit in connection therewith.
  "You
will be reimbursed for all necessary and proper expenses incurred in
connection with the carrying out of this program. Furthermore, you are
directed to perform any and all acts incident to the accomplishment or
furtherance of this program, and as such you are, of course, entitled
to be reimbursed for all necessary and proper expenses and obligations
arising out of such agency, for which under law such an agent would be
entitled to reimbursement.
  "It is understood
that in
executing the foregoing no warranty of my authority is included nor is
any personal liability imposed upon or assumed by the undersigned.
 "Very truly yours, "J. L. DeWitt, "Lieutenant
General, U. S. Army, Commanding."
  
 
 "Apr 5, 1942
  "Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, "San Francisco, California.
  "Sirs:
  "Reference
is made to my letter dated March 11, 1942, addressed to you, in which I
authorize and direct you to take all steps which in your judgment are
necessary or desirable in order to carry out the objective of the
program dealing with the problem of evacuees from Military Area No. 1,
as designated and established in my Public Proclamation No. 1, dated
March 2, 1942.
  "Last week the Congress of the
United States
enacted and on March 21, 1942, the President of the United States
approved Public Law, No. 503, 77th Congress, under the terms of which
whomsoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in any
military area or any military zone prescribed, under the authority of
an executive order of the President, by the Secretary of War, or by any
military commander designated by the Secretary of War, contrary to the
restrictions applicable to any such area or zone or contrary to the
order of the Secretary of War or any such military commander, shall, if
it appears that he knew or should have known of the existence and
extent of the restrictions or order and that this act was in violation
thereof, be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be
subject to certain penalties stated therein.
  "Accordingly,
by virtue of the additional authority vested in me by said Public Law,
No. 503, 77th Congress, approved by the President of the United States
on March 21, 1942, as well as by virtue of all other authority vested
in me by Executive Order No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942, the orders
and designation issued by the Secretary of War on February 20, 1942,
designating the undersigned as a Military Commander to carry out the
duties and responsibilities embodied by said Executive Order No. 9066
for that portion of the United States embraced within the Western
Defense Command, and pursuant to all other authority vested in me, I
hereby authorize and direct you to continue to take all steps which in
your judgment are necessary or desirable in order to carry
out the
objectives of the program dealing with the problem of evacuees from the
Western Defense Command and particularly Military Area No. 1,
embraced therein.
 "Very
truly yours, "J. L. DeWitt, "Lieutenant General,
U. S. Army, Commanding."
  
 
 Appendix 
4"March
31, 1942
  "Federal Security Agency, "785
Market Street, "San Francisco, California.
  "Attention:
Mr. Richard M. Neustadt:
  "Dear Mr. Neustadt:
  "Under
authority of the Executive Order of the President, No. 9066, dated
February 19, 1942, your Agency has been assigned certain functions and
duties by me, to be performed in aid of the program for
evacuation of German, Italian and Japanese enemy aliens and persons of
Japanese ancestry, from strategic zones
within the military areas established by my Public Proclamation No. 1,
dated March 2, 1942, and Public Proclamation No. 2, dated March 16,
1942.
  "Subject to my directions and instructions
and in
accordance with approved policies, your Agency is authorized and
directed to incur obligations and make expenditures from any funds
available to it in carrying out the duties and functions assigned. In
this connection it is desired that you submit, for approval, without
delay, a budget estimate of your funds requirements to May 1, 1942,
broken down in such detail as is practicable at the present time.
  "Payment
for obligations incurred or funds expended under the approved budget
estimate will be made from funds subject to my control and allocation.
 "Yours very truly, "J. L. DeWitt, "Lieutenant
General, U. S. Army, Commanding."
  
 
 Appendix 
5"At a conference in my office during the
afternoon of April 20, 1942, attended by Mr. Tom C. Clark,
Special Assistant to the Attorney General, Mr. Nat L. Pieper,
Special Agent in Charge, San Francisco office. Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Brigadier-General J. L. Bradley,
Chief of Staff, Colonel Joel F. Watson, Judge
Advocate, Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen,
Assistant Chief of Staff, the following procedure, predicated upon
correspondence exchanged between your office and the Assistant to the
Attorney General, governing procedure and liaison between the War
Department, the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth
Army, and the Department of Justice, was agreed upon:
  "1.
(a) All orders and proclamations issued by me pursuant to the
provisions of Executive Order of the President, No. 9066, dated
February 19, 1942, as the Military Commander designated by the
Secretary of War by letter dated March 20, 1942, to carry out the
provisions of the cited Executive Order, involving enforcement of the
penalties provided by Public Law No. 503, 77th Congress, approved March
20, 1942, will be transmitted to the Assistant Secretary of War by
telephone or telegraph for clearance with the Assistant to the Attorney
General, Mr. James Rowe, Jr. The Department of Justice has indicated
that it will respond with all practicable dispatch and that upon
clearance of such orders and proclamations it will undertake enforcement
of the penalties
provided by the cited law. Thereafter, in the case of any such approved
proclamation or order, direct communication between the local
Department of Justice representative, viz., Mr. Tom C. Clark (or
whomever may be so designated by the Justice Department) for the
several United States District Attorneys, will be authorized.
  "(b)
The present form of general exclusion order and general supporting
instructions employed in effectuating the evacuation of persons of
Japanese ancestry having been approved will not be so submitted. Any
necessary enforcement of the penalties provided by the cited Statute in
connection with evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry under such
exclusion orders and supporting instructions will be
undertaken by the Department of Justice.
For local operational purposes, Sector Commanders are authorized to
communicate directly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Special
Agent in Charge, for the District in which evacuation projects are
entrained. Similar direct communication with the appropriate District
Attorney is also authorized. Warning notices of impending exclusion
orders and copies of the exclusion order will, in each case, be
transmitted to Mr. Nat L. Pieper, Special Agent in Charge, San
Francisco office, for communication to other Federal Bureau of
Investigation Special Agents in Charge and to local police. Similar
material will be furnished Mr. Tom C. Clark for transmission by his
office to the appropriate District Attorneys and the United States
Marshals. Mr. Clark will also continue to undertake to keep the
Department of Justice fully informed as to progress of evacuation as
reflected by the copies of warning memoranda and exclusion orders
furnished him.
  "(c) The form of individual
exclusion order
is currently being submitted to your office for transmission to Mr.
Rose in accordance with the arrangement. Upon approval of the form and
substance of the individual exclusion order, it is the understanding
that the Department of Justice will undertake any necessary enforcement
of the penalties provided by Public Law No. 503, supra.
Once the form and substance of the individual exclusion order has been
approved it is understood that no further clearance with the
Department of Justice will be necessary,
and that individual exclusion orders may be issued without further
reference to the Department of Justice. Communication to arrange the
necessary enforcement of such individual exclusion orders, as presently
understood, will be through Mr. Nat L. Pieper, Special Agent in Charge,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, but should any Court proceedings
develop, local liaison will be through Mr. Tom C. Clark, Special
Assistant to the Attorney General.
  "2. On the
basis of
current understandings the procedure outlined above will be followed.
It is requested, however, that confirmation of the Department of
Justice be obtained as soon as practicable.
 "/s/ J. L. DeWitt, "J. L. DeWitt, "Lieutenant
General, U. S. Army, Commanding."
   
 
 PART IIIEVACUATION -- THE MECHANICS FOR ITS 
ACCOMPLISHMENT
 CHAPTER 
VIIOrganization and
Functions of Civil Affairs Division, General Staff, and Wartime Civil
Control Administration and Other Agencies
 
 
 
  |