NOTES:
  • This transcription is an ongoing process and I'll be posting new sections when finished. All FIGURES (images) from Part III onward have been transferred to DeWittFinalReport02.html for the present (making that a slow-loading page); therefore, the links in the "Index to Figures" are invalid. All photo images from Part IX Pictorial Summary have been posted to DeWittFinalReport03.html. All Tables are being posted to DeWittFinalReport04.html.
  • Main points are in bold text and/or underlined
  • Footnotes are included in text and surrounded by {curly brackets}
  • Comments and corrected text are in [brackets]
  • Updated May 25, 2010

DeWitt Final Report - cover page


FINAL REPORT

JAPANESE EVACUATION
FROM THE WEST COAST
1942


UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1943



U. S. SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS
JAN 8 1944


Table of Contents

Letter of Transmittal from the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, to the Secretary of War
Foreword
Letter of Transmittal from Commanding General to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, supra
Index to Figures
Index to Tables
Part I. Evacuation -- Its Military Necessity
Chapter
I.Action Under Alien Enemy Proclamations
II.Need for Military Control and for Evacuation
III.Establishment of Military Control -- Executive Order No. 9066
Part II. Evacuation -- Its Development in Summary
IV.The Emergence of Controlled Evacuation
V.Separation of Jurisdiction Over Evacuation and Relocation
VI.The Evacuation Method
Part III. Evacuation -- The Mechanics for its Accomplishment
VII.Organization and Function of Civil Affairs Division, General Staff, and Wartime Civil Control Administration and Other Agencies
Part IV. Evacuation -- Its Operational Technique
VIII.Development and Execution of the Evacuation Plan
IX.Voluntary Migration
X.Operation of Civil Control Stations -- Protection of Evacuees and Their Families
XI.Protection of Property of the Evacuees
XII.Deferments and Exemptions from Evacuation
Part V. Assembly Center Operations
XIII.Assembly Center Location, Construction and Equipment
XIV.Housing, Feeding and Clothing
XV.Medical Care and Sanitation
XVI.Employment of Evacuees in Assembly Centers
XVII.Education, Recreation, Religion and Assembly Center Newspapers
XVIII.Assembly Center Security
XIX.Administration of Assembly Centers
Part VI. Relocation of Evacuees
XX.War Relocation Authority
XXI.The Construction and Equipment of Relocation Centers
XXII.Transfer of Evacuees from Assembly to Relocation Centers
Part VII. Related Activities of Wartime Civil Control Administration
XXIII.Curfew and Travel Control
XXIV.Repatriation
XXV.Public Relations Summary
XXVI.Inspection of Wartime Civil Control Administration Operations
Part VIII. Statistical and Fiscal Summary
XXVII.Fiscal Summary
XXVIII.Statistical Summary
Part IX. Pictorial Summary
References
Glossary
Appendix
1.Memoranda of March 20, 1942, from the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs Giving Advance Warning of the First Evacuation
2.Memorandum of April 23, 1942 -- "Japanese Evacuation Operations"
3.Delegation to Ninth Service Command and Letters of Transmittal -- Reports of Survey -- Status of Relocation Center Construction
4.Standards and Details -- Construction of Japanese Evacuee Reception Centers (June 8, 1942)
5.Procedure Memorandum issued on June 26, 1942

Index to Figures

FIGURE NO.Part ICHAPTER
1.Map of Military Areas of the Western Defense CommandII
Part II
2.Phases of the Evacuation ProgramIV
Part III
3.Organization Chart of Civil Affairs Division and Wartime Civil Control Administration -- Evacuation PeriodVII
4.Organization Chart of Civil Affairs Division and Wartime Civil Control Administration -- Post-Evacuation PeriodVII
Part IV
5a.Geographical Distribution, Japanese Population of the United States: 1940VIII
5b.Geographical Distribution, Japanese Population of the United States: 1940 (Color Projection)VIII
6.Japanese Population Western Defense Command Area: 1940VIII
7.Age and Nativity of Japanese in Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington: 1940VIII
8.Plan for Evacuating Japanese Population from Pacific CoastVIII
9.Exclusion Areas, Japanese Evacuation ProgramVIII
10.Evacuee Flow ChartVIII
11.Net Voluntary Movement of Japanese: March 12 to June 5, 1942IX
12.Japanese Voluntary Migration by State of Destination: March 12 to October 31, 1942IX
13.Woodland Civil Control StationX
Part V
14a-14l.Detailed Location Maps of Assembly Centers (12)XIII
15.Assembly Center Map with Population and Occupancy DataXIII
16a-16o.Aerial Photographs of Assembly CentersXIII
17.Evacuee Crime Rate -- Offenses Per Thousand Japanese Per YearXVIII
18.Assembly Center OrganizationXIX
19a-19p.Daily Evacuation Population Movement of Each Assembly Center (15)XIX
Part VI
20a-20j.Location of War Relocation Centers (10)XXI
21.Relocation Project Sites (Map)XXI
22.Typical Plot Plan -- War Relocation CenterXXI
23.Typical Housing Block -- War Relocation CenterXXI
24.Typical Administration Group -- War Relocation CenterXXI
25.Typical Military Police Group -- War Relocation CenterXXI
26.Typical Hospital Group -- War Relocation CenterXXI
27.Typical Warehouse Group -- War Relocation CenterXXI
28.Transfers from Assembly to Relocation CentersXXII
Map InsertI. Exclusion Areas
Map InsertII. Assembly Center Destinations
Map InsertIII. Relocation Center Destinations
Part VII
29.Age and Sex and Nativity of 2,772 Japanese Requesting RepatriationXXIV
30.Nisei, Kibei and Issei Japanese 18 to 39 Years of Age Requesting RepatriationXXIV
31.Wartime Civil Control Administration News Releases Concerning Evacuation and Alien Control: March-November, 1942XXV
32.Magazine Articles and Wartime Civil Control Administration News Releases Concerning Evacuation and Alien Control: February- November, 1942XXV
33.Magazine Articles and Circulation Concerning Evacuation and Alien Control: February-November, 1942XXV
34.Organization Chart, Public Relations DivisionXXV
Part VIII
35.Total Evacuation Population, March 2 1 to October 31,1942XXVIII
36.Japanese Population, Assembly and Relocation Centers, Western Defense Command Area: June 7, 1942XXVIII
37.Growth of Japanese Population United States: 1870 to 1940XXVIII
38.Distribution of Japanese Population, Arizona, California, Oregon, Washington and Entire United States: 1900 to 1940XXVIII
39.Japanese Population in Certain Selected Cities, of California, Oregon and Washington: 1900 to 1940XXVIII
40.Trends in Sex Composition of Japanese Population, Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington: 1900 to 1940XXVIII
41.Trends in Nativity of Japanese Population, Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington: 1900 to 1940XXVIII
42.Nativity Trends of Japanese, Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington: 1900 to 1940XXVIII
43.Trends in Age Composition, Japanese Population United States: 1900 to 1940XXVIII
44.Age and Sex Composition, Japanese Population, Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington: 1940XXVIII
45.Industry of Employed Japanese 14 Years and Older, by Sex and Nativity, California, Oregon and Washington: 1940XXVIII
46.Japanese Employed Workers 14 Years Old and Over in Agriculture and Wholesale and Retail Trade,California, Oregon and Washington: 1940XXVIII

Index to Tables

TABLE NO.Part IVCHAPTER
1.Japanese Population of the Western Defense Command Area, by States and Military Areas: 1940VIII
2.Nativity of the Total Japanese Population and of the Adult Japanese Population of Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington: 1940VIII
3.Age and Nativity of Japanese Population in Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington: 1940VIII
4.Major Industry Groups of Japanese Employed Workers 14 Years Old and Over in California, Oregon and Washington: 1940VIII
5.Cumulative Net Voluntary Migration of Japanese from Military Areas: March 12 to June 30, 1942IX
6.Japanese Migrants from Evacuated Areas, by State and County of Origin and by SexIX
7.Japanese Migrants from Evacuated Areas, by State of Reported Destination and by SexIX
8.Japanese Migrants from Evacuated Areas, by State of Origin and by Sex and NativityIX
9.Classification of Interviews by Types of Business as of May 22, 1942, Head Office ZoneXI
10.Total Interviews and Total Individual Cases Handled by Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco in Connection with the Evacuation ProgramXI
11.Property Received for Storage in Military Areas 1 and 2 and Transferred to War Relocation AuthorityXI
12.Motor Vehicles Received and Handled by the Federal Reserve Bank of San FranciscoXI
13.Summary of Cases Served by the Farm Security Administration: Military Areas 1 and 2XI
14.Farms and Acreage Subject to RelinquishmentXI
Part V
15.Average Daily Cost of Rations per EvacueeXIV
16.Inpatient Movement During Reporting Period: August 1 to August 28, 1942XV
17.Patient-Days in Hospitals During Reporting Period: August 1 to August 28, 1942XV
18.Operations Performed During Reporting Period: August 1 to August 28, 1942XV
19.Average Number of Inpatients per Week by Type of Service During Reporting Period: August 1 to August 28, 1942XV
20.Total Outpatient Treatments by Type of Service During the Reporting Period: August 1 to August 28, 1942XV
21.Total Treatments and Outpatients for the Reporting Period: August 1 to August 28, 1942XV
22.Center Hospital Medical Staff During Reporting Period: August 1 to August 28, 1942XV
23.Average Number of Cases of Communicable Diseases Reported per Week from August 1 to August 28, 1942XV
24.Births, Deaths, and Stillbirths for Japanese Inducted Into Assembly Centers: March 21 to October 30, 1942XV
25.Japanese Deaths in California, Oregon and Washington During First Ten Months of 1942, by Sex and Month of DeathXV
26.Deaths, Infant Deaths, and Stillbirths for Japanese in California: 1937-1941XV
27.Number of Offenses Charged.Total Japanese Population of the United States, Calendar Year 1941, and of Assembly Centers, April 25 to October 25, 1942XVIII
28.Crime Offenses in Assembly CentersXVIII
29.Average Population, Total Days Occupied by Evacuees, Dates of Occupancy and Maximum Population of Assembly CentersXIX
Part VI
30.Preliminary Estimate of the Cost of Relocation Centers (December 1, 1942)XXI
31.Quartermaster Property Shipped to War Relocation Authority CentersXXI
32.Summary of Transfers of Evacuees from Custody of the Army to Custody of the War Relocation Authority.XXII
33.Transfers from Assembly to Relocation CentersXXII
Part VII
34.Summary by Source and Disposition of Persons Who Were Offered Repatriation in June, 1942XXIV
35.Address, Age, and Sex of 54 Repatriates Entrained by Wartime Civil Control Administration on June 6, 1942XXIV
36.Distribution of Names on July 31, 1942 State Department Preliminary Repatriation List Found in Wartime Civil Control Administration Master Index FileXXIV
37.Distribution of Names on July 31, 1942 State Department Preliminary Repatriation List Not Found in Wartime Civil Control Administration Master Index FileXXIV
38.Distribution of Names Under Wartime Civil Control Administration Responsibility on August 19, 1942 State Department ListXXIV
39.Disposition of Names Under Wartime Civil Control Administration Responsibility on August 19, 1942 State Department ListXXIV
40.Type of Form Letter Sent to Residents of Assembly and Relocation Centers in October, 1942XXIV
41.Responses Received in Canvass of Persons on Photostat List and Supplement: October 19-December 31, 1942XXIV
42.Lists of Japanese Requesting Repatriation Transmitted by Wartime Civil Control AdministrationXXIV
43.Age, Sex, Citizenship, and Place of Education of 2,772 Japanese Requesting Repatriation as of October 19, 1942XXIV
44.Number and Percentage of Nisei, Kibei, and Issei Requesting Repatriation in Five Age GroupsXXIV
Part VIII
45.Summary of Persons Evacuated or Otherwise Coming Under the Evacuation Program, March 2 to October 31,1942XXVIII
46.State of Origin by Center of Destination of Japanese EvacueesXXVIII
47.Total Persons Evacuated to Each Assembly and Relocation Center by Civilian Exclusion Order Number and AreaXXVIII
48.Japanese Evacuation and Voluntary Migration from Evacuated Areas of Western Defense Command -- Compared to Census Population of 1940XXVIII
49.Daily Population of All Assembly Centers Including Hospitals: March 21 to October 30, 1942XXVIII
50.Evacuees Entering Assembly Centers by Center and by Type of Induction or Transfer: March 21, 1942 to October 30, 1942XXVIII
51.Evacuees on Leave and Returning to Assembly CentersXXVIII
52.Evacuees Leaving Assembly Centers by Center and by Type of Release or Transfer: March 21, 1942 to October 30, 1942XXVIII
53.Net Total Persons Entering and Leaving Wartime Civil Control Administration Assembly Centers: March 21 to October 30, 1942XXVIII
54.Population of Assembly and Relocation Centers May 1 to November 3, 1942, by MonthsXXVIII
55.Total Number of Evacuee-Days in Assembly Centers and in Hospitals Outside of Assembly Centers, by Center and Month: March 21, 1942 to October 30, 1942XXVIII
56.Estimated Total Number of Evacuee Families and Average Size of Such Families, by CenterXXVIII
57.Center of Origin and Destination of Evacuees Transferred from Assembly to Relocation CentersXXVIII
58.Estimated State and Relocation Center Destination of Japanese Evacuees, by State of OriginXXVIII
59.Estimated Persons Received by War Relocation Authority from Wartime Civil Control Administration and Other Sources, to October 31, 1942XXVIII
60.Population by Race, for the United States: 1940 and 1930XXVIII
61.Geographical Distribution of the Japanese Population in the United States: 1940XXVIII
62.Nativity of Japanese in United States: 1890-1940XXVIII
63.Growth of Japanese Population in Certain Selected Cities of California, Oregon, and Washington: 1900-1940XXVIII
64.Sex Composition of the Japanese Population in Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington: 1900-1940XXVIII
65.Nativity of the Japanese Population in Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington: 1900-1940XXVIII
66.Age of Japanese by Sex and by Nativity for Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington: 1940XXVIII
67.Employed Japanese Workers by Major Industry Groups in California, Oregon and Washington: 1940XXVIII
68.Japanese-Operated Farms Compared with All Farms in California, Oregon and Washington, 1920-1940XXVIII
69.Acreage of Commercial Truck Crops Grown by Japanese in CaliforniaXXVIII
70.Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in Arizona, by Counties: 1940XXVIII
71.Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in California, by Counties: 1940XXVIII
72.Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in Oregon, by Counties: 1940XXVIII
73.Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in Washington, by Counties: 1940XXVIII
74.Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in Idaho, by Counties: 1940XXVIII
75.Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in Montana, by Counties: 1940XXVIII
76.Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in Nevada, by Counties: 1940XXVIII
77.Nativity of All Japanese and of Japanese Family Heads in Utah, by Counties: 1940XXVIII
78.Japanese Employed Workers 14 Years Old and Over by Sex, Nativity, and Major Occupation and Industry Groups, for California, Oregon and Washington: 1940XXVIII
79.Japanese Employed Workers 14 Years Old and Over by Sex, Nativity and Major Occupation and Industry Groups for California: 1940XXVIII
80.Japanese Employed Workers 14 Years Old and Over by Sex, Nativity and Major Occupation and Industry Groups for Oregon: 1940XXVIII
81.Japanese Employed Workers 14 Years Old and Over by Sex, Nativity and Major Occupation and Industry Groups for Washington: 1940XXVIII




WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

19 July 1943

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

There is transmitted herewith General DeWitt's final report on the evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry from certain areas on the West Coast.

Faithfully yours,
(signed) G.C. Marshall
Chief of Staff.

Washington, D. C.
HONORABLE HENRY L. STIMSON
The Secretary of War


FOREWORD

This volume constitutes a comprehensive report on the evacuation from West Coast areas of persons of Japanese ancestry carried out by the Army in the interests of military security during the spring of 1942. The considerations which led to evacuation as well as the mechanics by which it was achieved, are set forth in detail. Great credit, in my opinion, is due General DeWitt and the Army for the humane yet efficient manner in which this difficult task was handled. It was unfortunate that the exigencies of the military situation were such as to require the same treatment for all persons of Japanese ancestry, regardless of their individual loyalty to the United States. But in emergencies, where the safety of the Nation is involved, consideration of the rights of individuals must be subordinated to the common security. As General DeWitt points out, great credit is due our Japanese population for the manner in which they responded to and complied with the orders of exclusion.

(signed) Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND
AND FOURTH ARMY

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA


June 5, 1943

SUBJECT: Final Report on the Evacuation of Japanese from Certain Military Areas in Western Defense Command.

TO: Chief of Staff, United States Army, War Department, Washington, D. C.

1. I transmit herewith my final report on the evacuation of Japanese from the Pacific Coast.

2. The evacuation was impelled by military necessity. The security of the Pacific Coast continues to require the exclusion of Japanese from the area now prohibited to them and will so continue as long as that military necessity exists. The surprise attack at Pearl Harbor by the enemy crippled a major portion of the Pacific Fleet and exposed the West Coast to an attack which could not have been substantially impeded by defensive fleet operations. More than 115,000 persons of Japanese ancestry resided along the coast and were significantly concentrated near many highly sensitive installations essential to the war effort. Intelligence services records reflected the existence of hundreds of Japanese organizations in California, Washington, Oregon and Arizona which, prior to December 7, 1941, were actively engaged in advancing Japanese war aims. These records also disclosed that thousands of American-born Japanese had gone to Japan to receive their education and indoctrination there and had become rabidly pro-Japanese and then had returned to the United States. Emperor worshipping ceremonies were commonly held and millions of dollars had flowed into the Japanese imperial war chest from the contributions freely made by Japanese here. The continued presence of a large, unassimilated, tightly knit racial group, bound to an enemy nation by strong ties of race, culture, custom and religion along a frontier vulnerable to attack constituted a menace which had to be dealt with. Their loyalties were unknown and time was of the essence. The evident aspirations of the enemy emboldened by his recent successes made it worse than folly to have left any stone unturned in the building up of our defenses. It is better to have had this protection and not to have needed it than to have needed it and not to have had it -- as we have learned to our sorrow.

3. On February 14, 1942, I recommended to the War Department that the military security of the Pacific Coast required the establishment of broad civil control, anti-sabotage and counter-espionage measures, including the evacuation therefrom of all persons of Japanese ancestry. In recognition of this situation, the President issued Executive Order No. 9066 on February 19, 1942, authorizing the accomplishment of these and any other necessary security measures. By letter dated February 20, 1942, the Secretary of War authorized me to effectuate my recommendations and to exercise all of the powers which the Executive Order conferred upon him and upon any military commander designated by him. A number of separate and distinct security measures have been instituted under the broad authority thus delegated, and future events may demand the initiation of others. Among the steps taken was the evacuation of Japanese from western Washington and Oregon, California, and southern Arizona. Transmitted herewith is the final report of that evacuation.

4. The report comprises nine Parts and reference matter. Its twenty-eight chapters are supplemented by a pictorial summary. In Part I, I have traced the developments which led to the issuance by the President of Executive Order No. 9066, establishing military control over the Pacific Coast. The military necessity for the specific action reported is outlined in Chapter II. Part II, Chapters IV to VI, inclusive, presents a résumé of the evacuation method. In these chapters the means provided to protect the persons, the property and the health of evacuees are described. In succeeding Parts a more detailed account of each phase of the operation is found. Part III describes the military organization established to accomplish the evacuation. Part IV, Chapters VIII to XII cover evacuation operations. Part V comprises Chapters XIII to XIX. These offer a narrative of Assembly Center Operations -- the selection, construction and administration by the Army of the temporary residences provided evacuees pending their transfer to Relocation Centers in the interior. Part VI includes Chapters XX to XXII. This section reports the Army's participation in preparing semi-permanent facilities for the relocation of evacuees and the methods pursued in their transfer to these accommodations. In Part VII is found Chapters XXIII to XXVI, in which collateral aspects of the program are discussed, such as curfew and travel control, public relations, inspection and repatriation activities. Part VIII, consisting of Chapter XXVII and XXVIII, presents a fiscal and statistical summary. Part IX concludes the report with a series of photographs pictorializing the entire operation. Only those data essential to an understanding of the subject are included in the appendices.

5. There was neither pattern nor precedent for an undertaking of this magnitude and character; and yet over a period of less than ninety operating days, 110,442 persons of Japanese ancestry were evacuated from the West Coast. This compulsory organized mass migration was conducted under complete military supervision. It was effected without major incident in a time of extreme pressure and severe national stress, consummated at a time when the energies of the military were directed primarily toward the organization and training of an Army of sufficient size and equipment to fight a global war. The task was, nevertheless, completed without any appreciable divergence of military personnel. Comparatively few were used, and there was no interruption in a training program.

6. In the orderly accomplishment of the program, emphasis was placed upon the making of due provision against social and economic dislocation. Agricultural production was not reduced by the evacuation. Over ninety-nine per cent of all agricultural acreage in the affected area owned or operated by evacuees was successfully kept in production. Purchasers, lessees, or substitute operators were found who took over the acreage subject to relinquishment. The Los Angeles Herald and Express and the San Diego Union, on February 23, 1943, and the Tacoma News-Tribune, on February 25, 1943, reported increases not only in the value but also in the quantity of farm production in their respective areas.

7. So far as could be foreseen, everything essential was provided to minimize the impact of evacuation upon evacuees, as well as upon economy. Notwithstanding, exclusive of the costs of construction of facilities, the purchase of evacuee motor vehicles, the aggregate of agricultural crop loans made and the purchase of office equipment now in use for other government purposes, the entire cost was $1.46 per evacuee day for the period of evacuation, Assembly Center residence and transfer operations. This cost includes financial assistance to evacuees who voluntarily migrated from the area before the controlled evacuation phase of the program. It also covers registration and processing costs; storage of evacuee property and all other aspects of the evacuee property protection program. It includes hospitalization and medical care of all evacuees from the date of evacuation; transportation of evacuees and their personal effects from their homes to Assembly Centers; complete care in Assembly Centers, including all subsistence, medical care and nominal compensation for work performed. It also reflects the cost of family allowances and clothing as well as transportation and meals during the transfer from Assembly to Relocation Centers.

8. Accomplishment of the program in the manner selected would have been impossible without the participation of the Federal civilian agencies so ably assisting throughout. Under my continuous direction, the associated agencies of the Federal Security Agency, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, the Farm Security Administration of the Department of Agriculture, and the Work Projects Administration of the Federal Works Agency accepted major responsibilities. The War Relocation Authority; the Departments of Treasury, Post Office, Justice, Commerce and Interior; the Division of Central Administrative Services of the Office for Emergency Management performed an important service from the beginning, and various state and local agencies effectively cooperated. The participating Army Agencies, particularly the Division Engineers of the United States Engineer Corps who supervised the construction of Assembly and Relocation Centers, discharged their responsibilities in a superior manner. The agencies of my command, military and civilian personnel alike, responded to the difficult assignment devolving upon them with unselfish devotion to duty. To the Japanese themselves great credit is due for the manner in which they, under Army supervision and direction, responded to and complied with the orders of exclusion.

9. A large quantity of primary source materials not found in the Appendix has been selected and bound together. These have been made available in triplicate. It is proposed that one set be retained at this Headquarters. Two sets are forwarded with this report. It is requested that one set be retained in the office of the Adjutant General, War Department, and the other forwarded to the Library of Congress for future reference. The great volume of secondary source materials will remain on file at this Headquarters. All of these data will be available for research purposes whenever the Secretary of War so directs.

(signed)
J. L. DEWITT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.


FINAL REPORT

JAPANESE EVACUATION

FROM THE WEST COAST

1942


PART I

EVACUATION -- ITS MILITARY NECESSITY


CHAPTER I

Action Under Alien Enemy Proclamations

The ultimate decision to evacuate all persons of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific Coast under Federal supervision was not made coincidentally with the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States. It was predicated upon a series of intermediate decisions, each of which formed a part of the progressive development of the final decision. At certain stages of this development, various semi-official views were advanced proposing action less embracing than that which finally followed.

On December 7th and 8th, 1941, the President issued proclamations declaring all nationals and subjects of the nations with which we were at war to be enemy aliens. This followed the precedent of the last war, and was based upon the same statutory enactment which supported the proclamations of President Wilson in this regard. (See 50 U.S.C. 21.) By executive action, certain restrictive measures were applied against all enemy aliens on an equal basis. In continental United States, the Attorney General, through the Department of Justice, was charged with the enforcement and administration of these proclamations. Where necessary fully to implement his action, the Attorney General was assigned the responsibility of issuing administrative regulations. He was also given the authority to declare prohibited zones, to which enemy aliens were to be denied admittance or from which they were to be excluded in any case where the national security required. The possession of certain articles was declared by the proclamations to be unlawful, and these articles are described as contraband. Authority was granted for the internment of such enemy aliens as might be regarded by the Attorney General as dangerous to the national security if permitted to remain at large. In continental United States internment was left in any case to the discretion of the Attorney General.

On the night of December 7th and the days that followed, certain enemy aliens were apprehended and held in detention pending the determination whether to intern. Essentially, the apprehensions thus effected were based on lists of suspects previously compiled by the intelligence services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Military Intelligence Service. During the initial stages of this action, some 2,000 persons were apprehended. Japanese aliens were included in their number. However, no steps were taken to provide for the collection of contraband and no prohibited zones were proclaimed.

The Commanding General, during the closing weeks of December, requested the War Department to acquaint the Department of Justice with the need for vigorous action along the Pacific Coast. He sought steps looking toward the enforcement of the contraband prohibitions contained in the proclamations and toward the declaration of certain prohibited zones surrounding "vital installations" along the coast. The Commanding General had become convinced that the military security of the coast required these measures.

His conclusion was in part based upon the interception of unauthorized radio communications which had been identified as emanating from certain areas along the coast. Of further concern to him was the fact that for a period of several weeks following December 7th, substantially every ship leaving a West Coast port was attacked by an enemy submarine. This seemed conclusively to point to the existence of hostile shore-to-ship (submarine) communication.

The Commanding General requested the War Department to send a representative, and to arrange with the Department of Justice for an officer of that agency to meet with him at San Francisco, in order to consider the situation "on the ground." His objective was to crystallize a program of forthright action to deal with subversive segments of the population. Preliminary to this a number of discussions had been held between War and Justice Department representatives in Washington, D. C. The Provost Marshal General, Major General Allen W. Gullion, the Assistant Secretary of War, Honorable John J. McCloy, the Chief of the Enemy Alien Control Unit, Department of Justice, Mr. Edward J. Ennis, and the Chief of the Aliens Division, Office of the Provost Marshal General, participated in these meetings.

These conferences between War and Justice Department representatives in Washington were followed by conferences in San Francisco. Mr. James Rowe, Jr., Assistant to the Attorney General, represented the Department of Justice. The Commanding General urged that the Justice Department provide for spot raids in various areas to determine the presence and possession of contraband; that it authorize the ready seizure of contraband, and adopt means for collecting and storing it. He further requested that the Attorney General declare prohibited zones surrounding certain coastal installations. These conferences continued over the period between January 2nd and 5th, 1942, and, as an outgrowth of these meetings, the Department of Justice agreed to a program of enforcement substantially as desired, with certain important exceptions. These exceptions are described in an exchange of memoranda dated January 5, 1942, between the Commanding General and Mr. Rowe (Appendix to Chapter II infra).

The salient feature of the intended program was an agreement arranging for creation of prohibited zones. The Department of Justice agreed to declare prohibited zones surrounding vital installations and to provide for the exclusion from these zones of enemy aliens. The extent and location of these zones was to be determined on the basis of recommendations submitted by the Commanding General. At the conclusion of these conferences, identical memoranda were exchanged on January 6, 1942, between the Commanding General and the Assistant Attorney General, Mr. James Rowe, Jr., crystallizing the intermediate understandings which had been developed. These were:
"Following is a summary of the principles applicable and procedure to be followed in the implementation of the proclamations of the President dated December 7th and 8th, 1941, and the instructions and regulations of the Attorney General, respecting alien enemies in the Western Theater of Operations. These principles and procedure were formulated in conferences during the past week between Lieutenant General J. L. DeWitt, Commanding General of the Western Theater of Operations, Mr. James Rowe, special representative of the Attorney General of the United States, Mr. N. J. L. Pieper, of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Major Karl R. Bendetsen, J.A.G.D., Office of the Provost Marshal General.

"1. Restricted Areas: The Attorney General will designate restricted areas. He will entertain Army recommendations. He will require the Army to determine the exact description of each restricted area. What further requirements he will make will depend in large measure upon the nature of the area involved and the extent of alien enemy population in such area. Indications are that, should Army recommendations include areas in which there is resident a large number of alien enemies and evacuation will thereby be rendered necessary, he will also require the submission of detailed plans for evacuation and resettlement. The Army has expressed disinclination to compliance on its part with such a requirement for the reason that the Justice Department will undertake an alien enemy registration and will have in its possession all the information essential for planning purposes once the proposed restricted areas have been made known to that Department by the Army.

"2. Alien Enemy Registration: The Department of Justice is committed to an alien enemy registration with the least practicable delay. It is understood that registration will include provision for finger printing, photographing, and other information to be filed locally and probably with local police, as well as at a central office, such information to be compiled alphabetically, by nationality and race as well as geographical.

"3. Apprehension: United States Attorneys have been or will be instructed to issue apprehension warrants upon application of the F.B.I., special agents in charge. F.B.I. agents in charge will entertain Army requests for apprehensions submitted in writing, or, if time does not permit, oral requests which shall be confirmed later in writing. In any case where an alien enemy is found in violation of any of the provisions of the proclamation or any part of the regulations of the Attorney General thereunder, he is subject to summary apprehension with or without a warrant. Presumably at least he is subject to summary apprehension by the Army as well as by the civil authorities. Example: A known alien enemy in possession of contraband is subject to summary apprehension without a warrant. Example: An alien enemy found within a restricted area without authority is subject to apprehension.

"In an emergency apprehensions may be made without a warrant.

"4. Searches and Seizures: A warrant authorizing the search of the premises of an alien enemy for the presence of contraband may be obtained merely on application to the United States Attorney. It is only necessary to support the issuance of such a warrant that it be stated that the premises are those of an alien enemy. In an emergency where the time is insufficient in which to procure a warrant, such premises may be searched without a warrant.

"5. Mixed Occupancy Dwellings: The search of mixed occupancy premises or dwellings may be by warrant only. In emergencies involving contraband such as radio transmitters, it may be necessary to keep the premises under surveillance while a search warrant is procured. As previously noted, however, in such an emergency an alien enemy's premises may be searched for contraband without a warrant.

"6. Multiple Searches: The term 'mass raid' will not be employed by the Attorney General. Instructions which have been or will be issued to United States Attorneys and to F.B.I. Special Agents will permit 'spot raids.' That is to say, if lists of known alien enemies with the addresses of each are prepared by the F.B.I., and warrants are requested to cover such lists, a search of all the premises involved may be undertaken simultaneously. Thus all of the alien enemy premises in a given area can be searched at the same moment.

"7. Much of the effective action will be facilitated by a complete registration. It is important that it go forward with dispatch. However, there should be no cessation in the vigorous implementation of the President's proclamations regarding alien enemies. It appears that considerable progress of a clarifying nature has been made. Only actual application of the streamlined mechanics can establish whether there is need for further change in the principles to be applied and the procedure to be followed."
After a series of surveys made by the Commanding Generals of the several Western Defense Command sectors, the Commanding General submitted a number of recommendations calling for the establishment of 99 prohibited zones in the State of California, and two restricted zones. These were to be followed by similar recommendations pertaining to Arizona, Oregon, and Washington. Primarily, the prohibited zones in California surrounded various points along the California Coast, installations in the San Francisco Bay area, particularly along the waterfront, and in Los Angeles and San Diego. The recommendation as to California was transmitted by the Commanding General by letter dated January 21, 1942, was received from the Commanding General by the War Department on January 25, 1942, and was forwarded by the Secretary of War to the Attorney General on the same date.

In a series of press releases the Attorney General designated as prohibited zones the 99 areas recommended by the Commanding General in California.{See Inclosures to letter of transmittal # 7 and #11.} Considerable evacuation thus was necessitated, but most of the enemy aliens concerned were able to take up residence in or near places adjacent to the prohibited zone. For example, a large prohibited zone embraced the San Francisco waterfront area. Enemy aliens living in this section were required only to move elsewhere in San Francisco. Of course, only aliens of enemy nationality were affected, and no persons of Japanese ancestry born in the United States were required to move under the program.

Although some problems were presented which required provision for individual assistance, essentially there was little of this involved. By arrangement with the Justice Department, the associated agencies of the Federal Security Agency were asked to lend assistance in unusually needy cases.

Mr. Tom C. Clark, then the West Coast representative of the Anti-Trust Division of the Justice Department, supervised this phase of enemy alien control and coordinated all activities for the Justice Department. There was much conjecture that this was the forerunner of a general enemy alien evacuation. Mr. Clark and his Anti-Trust Division staff were deluged with inquiries and comments. Public excitement in certain areas reached a high pitch, and much confusion, the result of conflicting reports and rumors, characterized the picture. However, in essence, there was no substantial dislocation or disruption socially or economically of the affected groups.

CHAPTER II

Need for Military Control and for Evacuation

The Commanding General, meantime, prepared and submitted recommendations for the establishment of prohibited zones in Arizona, Oregon and Washington, similar to those he had prepared for California. Upon receipt of these supplemental recommendations, forwarded by the Secretary of War, the Attorney General declined to act until further study. In the case of Washington State, the recommended prohibited zone included virtually all of the territory lying west of the Cascades. A general enemy alien evacuation from this area would have been required. More than 9,500 persons would have been affected. No agency was then prepared to supervise or conduct a mass movement, and the Attorney General was not convinced of the necessity.

As early as January 5, in a memorandum of that date to Mr. Rowe, during the initial conferences at San Francisco, the Commanding General pointed to the need for careful advanced planning to provide against such economic and social dislocations which might ensue from such mass evacuation. The point was also established that the Army had no wish to assume any aspects of civil control if there were any means by which the necessary security measures could be taken through normal civilian channels. In order to trace clearly the developments which ultimately led to Executive Order No. 9066, and the establishment of military control, that memorandum is quoted in full at the end of this chapter.

The Department of Justice had indicated informally that it did not consider itself in a position to direct any enforced migrations. The Commanding General's recommendations for prohibited zones in Washington and Oregon were therefore viewed with particular concern by the Department. Not only did it feel that such action should be predicated on convincing evidence of the military necessity, it regarded the responsibility for collective evacuation as one not within its functions.

The Attorney General, on February 9, 1942, formally advised the Secretary of War, by letter, that he could not accept the recommendation of the Commanding General for the establishment of a zone prohibited to enemy aliens in the States of Washington and Oregon of the extent proposed by him. He stated in part:
"Your recommendation of prohibited areas for Oregon and Washington include the cities of Portland, Seattle and Tacoma and therefore contemplate a mass evacuation of many thousands * * *. No reasons were given for this mass evacuation * * * I understood that * * * Lieutenant General DeWITT has been requested to supply the War Department with further details and further material before any action is taken on these recommendations. I shall, therefore, await your further advice.

"* * * The evacuation * * * from this area would, of course, present a problem of very great magnitude. The Department of Justice is not physically equipped to carry out any mass evacuation. It would mean that only the War Department has the equipment and personnel to manage the task.

"The proclamations directing the Department of Justice to apprehend, and where necessary, evacuate alien enemies, do not, of course, include American citizens of the Japanese race. If they have to be evacuated, I believe that this would have to be done as a military necessity in these particular areas. Such action, therefore, should in my opinion, be taken by the War Department and not by the Department of Justice."
The Commanding General thereafter submitted a résumé of the military considerations which prompted his recommendation for a prohibited zone in Washington and Oregon embracing virtually the westerly half of those states. The Department of Justice, however, concluded that it was not in a position to undertake any mass evacuation, and declined in any event to administer such general civil control measures.

Meanwhile, the uncertainties of the situation became further complicated. The enforcement of contraband provisions was impeded by the fact that many Japanese aliens resided in premises owned by American-born persons of Japanese ancestry. The Department of Justice had agreed to authorize its special field agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to undertake spot raids without warrant to determine the possession of arms, cameras and other contraband by Japanese, but only in those premises occupied exclusively by enemy aliens. The search of mixed occupancy premises or dwellings had not been authorized except by warrant only. (
See Memo 1/5/42 at end of this chapter.)

In the Monterey area in California a Federal Bureau of Investigation spot raid made about February 12, 1942, found more than 60,000 rounds of ammunition and many rifles, shotguns and maps of all kinds. These raids had not succeeded in arresting the continuance of illicit signaling. Most dwelling places were in the mixed occupancy class and could not be searched promptly upon receipt of reports. It became increasingly apparent that adequate security measures could not be taken unless the Federal Government placed itself in a position to deal with the whole problem.

The Pacific Coast had become exposed to attack by enemy successes in the Pacific. The situation in the Pacific theatre had gravely deteriorated. There were hundreds of reports nightly of signal lights visible from the coast, and of intercepts of unidentified radio transmissions. Signaling was often observed at premises which could not be entered without a warrant because of mixed occupancy. The problem required immediate solution. It called for the application of measures not then in being. {It is interesting to note that following the evacuation, interceptions of suspicious or unidentified radio signal and shore-to-ship signal lights were virtually eliminated and attacks on outbound shipping from west coast ports appreciably reduced.}

Further, the situation was fraught with danger to the Japanese population itself. The combination of spot raids revealing hidden caches of contraband, the attacks on coastwise shipping, the interception of illicit radio transmissions, the nightly observation of visual signal lamps from constantly changing locations, and the success of the enemy offensive in the Pacific, had so aroused the public along the West Coast against the Japanese that it was ready to take matters into its own hands. Press and periodical reports of the public attitudes along the West Coast from December 7, 1941, to the initiation of controlled evacuation clearly reflected the intensity of feeling. Numerous incidents of violence involving Japanese and others occurred; many more were reported but were subsequently either unverified or were found to be cumulative.

The acceptance by the Attorney General of the Washington and Oregon recommendations would not have provided the security which the military situation then required. More than two-thirds of the total Japanese population on the West Coast were not subject to alien enemy regulations. The action ultimately taken was based upon authority not then existing. It had become essential to provide means which would remove the potential menace to which the presence of this group under all the circumstances subjected the West Coast. It is pertinent now to examine the situation with which the military authorities were then confronted.

Because of the ties of race, the intense feeling of filial piety and the strong bonds of common tradition, culture and customs, this population presented a tightly-knit racial group. It included in excess of 115,000 persons deployed along the Pacific Coast. Whether by design or accident, virtually always their communities were adjacent to very vital shore installations, war plants, etc. While it was believed that some were loyal, it was known that many were not. To complicate the situation no ready means existed for determining the loyal and the disloyal with any degree of safety. It was necessary to face the realties -- a positive determination could not have been made.

It could not be established, of course, that the location of thousands of Japanese adjacent to strategic points verified the existence of some vast conspiracy to which all of them were parties. Some of them doubtless resided there through mere coincidence. It seemed equally beyond doubt, however, that the presence of others was not mere coincidence. It was difficult to explain the situation in Santa Barbara County, for example, by coincidence alone.

Throughout the Santa Maria Valley in that County, including the cities of Santa Maria and Guadalupe, every utility, air field, bridge, telephone and power line or other facility of importance was flanked by Japanese. They even surrounded the oil fields in this area. Only a few miles south, however, in the Santa Ynez Valley, lay an area equally as productive agriculturally as the Santa Maria Valley and with lands equally available for purchase and lease, but without any strategic installations whatever. There were no Japanese in the Santa Ynez Valley.

Similarly, along the coastal plain of Santa Barbara County from Gaviota south, the entire plain, though narrow, had been subject to intensive cultivation. Yet, the only Japanese in this area were located immediately adjacent to such widely separated points as the El Capitan Oil Field, Elwood Oil Field, Summerland Oil Field, Santa Barbara airport and Santa Barbara lighthouse and harbor entrance. There were no Japanese on the equally attractive lands between these points. In the north end of the county is a stretch of open beach ideally suited for landing purposes, extending for 15 or 20 miles, on which almost the only inhabitants were Japanese. Such a distribution of the Japanese population appeared to manifest something more than coincidence. In any case, it was certainly evident that the Japanese population of the Pacific Coast was, as a whole, ideally situated with reference to points of strategic importance, to carry into execution a tremendous program of sabotage on a mass scale should any considerable number of them have been inclined to do so.


There were other very disturbing indications that the Commanding General could not ignore. He was forced to consider the character of the Japanese colony along the coast. While this is neither the place nor the time to record in detail significant pro-Japanese activities in the United States, it is pertinent to note some of these in passing. Research has established that there were over 124 separate Japanese organizations along the Pacific Coast engaged, in varying degrees, in common pro-Japanese purposes. This number does not include local branches of parent organizations, of which there were more than 310.

Research and co-ordination of information had made possible the identification of more than 100 parent fascistic or militaristic organizations in Japan which have had some relation, either direct or indirect, with Japanese organizations or individuals in the United States. Many of the former were parent organizations of subsidiary or branch organizations in the United States and in that capacity directed organizational and functional activities. There was definite information that the great majority of activities followed a line of control from the Japanese government, through key individuals and associations to the Japanese residents in the United States.

That the Japanese associations, as organizations, aided the military campaigns of the Japanese Government is beyond doubt. The contributions of these associations towards the Japanese war effort had been freely published in Japanese newspapers throughout California. {Some of these newspaper items are as follows: "March 13, 1941. Thirty-two bales of tinfoil were shipped to Japan through the Japanese Consulate General and were contributed by Japanese Associations of Fresno County, Kern County, Delano and San Bernardino." "July 6, 1941. Central California Japanese Association announces the collection and transmission to the War Ministry of the sum of $3,542.05." The Japanese Veterans Association was similarly engaged: "March 20, 1941. It is announced that the War Veterans Associations in Japan, Germany and Italy, in keeping with the spirit of the Axis Treaty have formed joint and advisory committees to aid and establish the new world order. There are 3˝ million veterans and reservists headed by General Imei who have pledged their cooperation to Axis aims." (All quotations in this note taken from the Extension of the Testimony of the Attorney General of California given before the House of Representatives, Select Committee on National Defense Migration, pursuant to House Resolution 113, 77th Congress, San Francisco Hearings, part 29. Italics supplied.)}

The extent to which Emperor worshiping ceremonies were attended could not have been overlooked. Many articles appearing in issues of Japanese language newspapers gave evidence that these ceremonies had been directed toward the stimulation of "burning patriotism" and "all-out support of the Japanese Asiatic Co-Prosperity Program."

Numerous Emperor worshiping ceremonies had been held. Hundreds of Japanese attended these ceremonies, and it was an objective of the sponsoring organization to encourage one hundred per cent attendance. For example, on February 11, 1940, at 7:00 P.M., the Japanese Association of Sacramento sponsored an Emperor worshiping ceremony in commemoration of the 2,600th anniversary of the founding of Japan. Three thousand attended.


Another group of Japanese met on January 1, 1941, at Lindsay, California. They honored the 2,601st Year of the Founding of the Japanese Empire and participated in the annual reverence to the Emperor,

{
The program was as follows:
a. Singing of Japanese National Anthem;
b. Opening of the Emperor's portrait;
c. Reading of the Emperor's Rescript;
d. Reading of Message of Reverence;
e. Bowing heads toward Japan;
f. Shouting "Banzai" (Long live the Emperor).}
and bowed their heads toward Japan in order to indicate that they would be "* * * ready to respond to the call of the mother country with one mind. Japan is fighting to carry out our program of Greater Asiatic co-prosperity. Our fellow Japanese countrymen must be of one spirit and should endeavor to unite our Japanese societies in this country * * *" {New World Sun, January 7, 1941: 5:6.}

Evidence of the regular occurrence of Emperor worshiping ceremonies in almost every Japanese populated community in the United States had been discovered.

A few examples of the many Japanese associations extant along the Pacific Coast are described in the following passages:

The Hokubei Butoku Kai. The Hokubei Butoku Kai or Military Virtue Society of North America was organized in 1931 with headquarters at Alvarado, Alameda County, California, and a branch office in Tokyo. One of the purposes of the organization was to instill the Japanese military code of Bushido among the Japanese throughout North America. This highly nationalistic and militaristic organization was formed primarily to teach Japanese boys "military virtues" through Kendo (fencing). Judo (Jiujitsu), and Sumo (wrestling). The manner in which this society became closely integrated with many other Japanese organizations, both business and social, is well illustrated by the postal address of some of these branches.

{For example, in Alvarado, Alameda County, Post Office Box 213 was the address of the following:
(1) Headquarters' Military Virtue Society of North America
(2) Kinyai Kumia [Kumiai] Finance Association
(3) Japanese-American News Correspondent
(4) New World Sun Correspondent
(5) Hochi Shimbun Correspondent
(6) Alvarado Japanese School
(7) Takichi Nakamura (President) Military Virtue Society of North America
In Sebastopol, Post Office Box 57 was the address of the following:
(1) Military Virtue Society of North America
(2) Japanese Sunday School
(3) Hiroshima Prefectural Society
(4) Sabura Baseball Team
In Suisun, Post Office Box 252 was the address of:
(1) Military Virtue Society of North America
(2) Mint Grill
(3) Suisun Fishing Club
In Auburn, Post Office Box 57 was the address of:
(1) Military Virtue Society of North America
(2) Japanese School
(3) Young Men's Buddhist Association
(4) Young Women's Buddhist Association
(5) Buddhist Church
In Lindsay, 157 Mount Vernon Avenue was the address of:
(1) Military Virtue Society of North America
(2) Japanese School
(3) Lindsay Women's Association}
The Heimusha Kai. The Heimusha Kai was organized for the sole purpose of furthering the Japanese war effort. The intelligences services (including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Military Intelligence Service and the Office of Naval Intelligence) had reached the conclusion that this organization was engaged in espionage. Its membership contained highly militaristic males eligible for compulsory military service in Japan. Its prime function was the collection of war funds for the Japanese army and navy. In more than 1,000 translated articles in which Heimusha Kai was mentioned, there was no evidence of any function save the collection of war relief funds.

A prospectus was issued to all Japanese in the United States by the Sponsor Committee for Heimusha Kai in America. That prospectus is quoted as follows:
"The world should realize that our military action in China is based upon the significant fact that we are forced to fight under realistic circumstances. As a matter of historical fact, whenever the Japanese government begins a military campaign, we, Japanese, must be united and everyone of us must do his part.

"As far as our patriotism is concerned, the world knows that we are superior to any other nation. However, as long as we are staying on foreign soil, what can we do for our mother country? All our courageous fighters are fighting at the front today, forgetting their parents, wives and children in their homes! It is beyond our imagination, the manner in which our imperial soldiers are sacrificing their lives at the front line, bomb after bomb, deaths after deaths! Whenever we read and hear this sad news, who can keep from crying in sympathy? Therefore, we, the Japanese in the United States, have been contributing a huge amount of money for war relief funds and numerous comforting bags for our imperial soldiers.

"Today, we, Japanese in the United States, who are not able to sacrifice our lives for our National cause are now firmly resolved to stand by to settle the present war as early as possible. We are proud to say that our daily happy life in America is dependent upon the protective power of Great Japan. We are facing a critical emergency, and we will take strong action as planned. We do hope and beg you all to cooperate with us for our National cause." {New World Sun, August 28, 1937: 4:6 10.} (Italics supplied.)
The Heimusha Kai was organized on October 24, 1937, in San Francisco. The meeting took place at the Golden Gate Hall, and there were more than 200 members present. The following resolution was passed:
"We, the members of the Japanese Reserve Army Corps in America are resolved to do our best in support of the Japanese campaign in China and to set up an Army Relief Department For Our Mother Country." {Excerpt from Zaibei Nippon Zin [Zen] Shi, published in Japan, 1940.}
According to reliable sources there were more than 10,000 members of Heimusha Kai in 1940.

Additional illustrations of pro-Japanese societies are found in footnotes.

{The Togo Kai. The Togo Kai was organized in 1905 in memory of Admiral Togo, the hero of the Japanese Russian Naval Battle. (Ref. Japanese Directory of Political and Religious Organizations.) The purposes of this organization were to promote a greater Imperial Japanese Navy, and to collect and transmit funds for the Japanese Navy.

It was revealed that there were three Togo Kai branches in the United States: One in Sacramento, one in Sonoma County, and one in San Francisco. All of these branches worked industriously to raise money for the Japanese Navy War Relief Fund. The Togo Kai branches in America were controlled by the parent Togo Kai headquarters in Japan. This fact is substantiated by reference to telegraphic bank transfers from the various branches of the United States to headquarters in Japan.

The Kanjo Kai. "Due to the critical situation that has developed in the Orient," the Zaigo Gunjin Dan (Retired Army Men's Corps) of Sacramento organized the Kanjo Kai (Society for Defending the Country by Swords, or the Sword Society) in July, 1937. (Ref. New World Sun, July 18, 1937; 3:1.) It was the first militant Japanese organization that was established in the United States by Japanese ex-service men to support military action taken by the Japanese government in the Orient.

The following telegram from the Japanese Army Department was received by the Kanjo Kai just after the organization of that Society, and was read at the first executive board meeting:
"During this emergency, you officials are doing your utmost for the Country and the Army Department is very grateful. For the establishment of peace in the Orient, it is necessary for us to adopt positive steps in China." (Ref. New World Sun, July 18, 1937: 3:1.)
In September, 1940, the Kanjo Kai, together with other organizations in Sacramento, gave a farewell banquet for three representatives who were sent to the Empire Jubilee Conference in Tokyo. (Ref. New World Sun, September 19, 1940: 5:1.)

Members of the Kanjo Kai made monthly contributions of $1.00 or more to Imperial Japanese Army War Relief Fund. This proposal was initiated by Consul-General Shiosaki during his visit to Sacramento in 1938.

The Nipponjin Kai. The Japanese Association of America (Nipponjin Kai) was the principal controlling organization in the United States. It operated in close cooperation with the consulate and carried out the directives of that office. Article 3 of its by-laws provides:
"Article 3. This association is organized by the local Japanese association under the jurisdiction of the Japanese Consulate General of San Francisco." (Italics supplied.)
The Japanese Association acted as intermediary between the Japanese people in the United States and the Japanese government. It aided the collection of war relief funds and poll taxes, sponsored organization of corps of visitors from the United States to Japan, founded Japanese language schools, disseminated propaganda, welcomed dignitaries and visiting military and naval officers, encouraged emperor worship, stimulated the establishment of subsidiaries and other organizations, and participated in a multitude of other pro-Japanese activities. Branches of the Japanese Association were established in every community where the Japanese population was such as to warrant such an organization.

Other outstanding Japanese organizations were known to exist in the United States. Some of the more prominent ones are listed below. The translation of the names of these organizations is indicative of their objects.
Kaigun Kyokai (Navy Association);
Aikoku Fujin Kai (Patriotic Women's Society);
Jugo Sekisei Kai (Behind the Gun Society or Red Heart Society);
Hokoku Kai (Society for Service to the Country);
Aikokuki Kenno Kisei Domei (Patriotic League for Contribution to the Airplane Fund);
Jugo Kai (Behind the Gun Society);
Ko-A-Sokushin Kai (Society for the Promotion of Asiatic Co-Prosperity);
Kokuryu Kai (Black Dragon Society);
Kibei Shimin Kai (Kibei Society);
Hokyoku Kai (Rising Sun Society);
Zaibei Nipponjin Kai (Japanese Association of America);
Zaibei Nipponjin Kai Renraku Nikkai Kanji Kai (United Councilor's Convention for Japanese Associations in North America);
Nanka Teikoku Gunjin Dan (Japanese Imperial Army Men's Corps of Southern California);
Jugo Haibutsu Riyodan (Behind the Gun Waste Utilization Society);
Josho Kai (Ever-Victorious or Invincible Society);
Hinode Kai (Imperial Japanese Reservists);
Hokubei Zaigo Shokuin Dan (North American Reserve Officers' Association);
Sokoku Kai (Fatherland Society);
Suiko Kai (Los Angeles Reserve Officers' Association);
Zaibei Ikuei Kai (Society of Educating the Second Generation in America).}
One extremely important obstacle in the path of Americanization of the second-generation Japanese was the widespread formation, and increasing importance, of the Japanese language schools in the United States. The purposes and functions of these Japanese language schools are well known. They employed only those textbooks which had been edited by the Department of Education of the Japanese Imperial Government.

In order to assist the Japanization of the second generation, the Zaibei Ikuei Kai (Society for Education of the Second Generation in America) was organized in Los Angeles in April, 1940. "With the grace of the Emperor, the ZAIBEI IKUEI KAI is being organized in commemoration of the 2,600th Anniversary of the Founding of the Japanese Empire to Japanize the second and third generations in this country for the accomplishment of establishing a greater Asia in the future * * *.'" {New World Sun, April 13, 1940: 4:1.}

In California alone there were over 248 schools with an aggregate faculty of 454 and a student body of 17,800.

The number of American-born Japanese who had been sent to Japan for education and who were now in the United States could not be overlooked. For more than twenty-five years American-born progeny of alien Japanese had been sent to Japan by their parents for education and indoctrination. There they remained for extended periods, following which they ordinarily returned to the United States. The extent of their influence upon other Nisei Japanese could not be accurately calculated. But it could not be disregarded.

The Kibei Shimin movement was sponsored by the Japanese Association of America. Its objective for many years had been to encourage the return to America from Japan of American-born Japanese. When the movement started it was ascertained that there were about 20,000 American-born Japanese in Japan. The Japanese Association of America sent representatives to Japan to confer with Prefectural officials on the problems of financing and transportation. The Association also arranged with steamship companies for special rates for groups of ten or more so returning, and requested all Japanese associations to secure employment for returning American-born Japanese.

During 1941 alone more than 1,573 American-born Japanese entered West Coast ports from Japan. Over 1,147 Issei, or alien Japanese, re-entered the United States from Japan during that year.

The 557 male Japanese less than twenty-five years of age who entered West Coast ports from Japan during 1941 had an average age of 18.2 years and had spent an average of 5.2 years in Japan. Of these, 239 had spent more than three years there. This latter group had spent an average of 10.2 years in Japan.

Of the 239 males who spent three years or more abroad, 180 were in the age group 15 to 19 (with an assumed average age of 17.5 years) and had spent 10.7 years abroad. In other words, these 180 Kibei lived, on the average, 6.8 years at the beginning of their life in the United States and the next 10.7 years in Japan. Forty of the 239 who had spent three or more years abroad were in the age group 20 to 24, with an assumed average age 22.5. These were returning to the United States after having lived here, on the average, for their first 13 years and having spent the last 9.5 years in Japan, including one or more years when they were of compulsory (Japanese) military age.

The table below indicates the nearest relative in Japan for the age groups 15 to 19, and 20 to 24 years of age.

Nearest Relative in JapanAGE GROUP
15 to 19 years20 to 24 years
NumberPercentNumberPercent
All
272100.0163100.0
Father or mother11542.36640.5
   Father6724.64628.2
     Mother4817.72012.3
Grandparent3613.21811.0
Uncle or aunt9534.94225.8
Other relative165.93018.4
No relative indicated103.7  7  4.3
     Non-relative  41.5  7  4.3
     Unknown  62.2- -- - -

It will be noted that 42.3 per cent of those in the 15 to 19 year group lived with a father or mother in Japan, and that 13.2 lived with a grandparent. In other words, more than 5 per cent of this group of Kibei had a parent or grandparent in Japan, and it is reasonable to assume that in most instances these Kibei lived with this nearest relative.

Combining this information with that from the preceding table, it is seen that in a group with an average age of 17.5 years who were returning to the United States after having spent an average of 7.4 years abroad continuously (in other words, from the time they were ten years of age) one-half had lived with their parent or grandparent in Japan. Yet, this group consists entirely of American citizens.

Of the Kibei in Hawaii, Andrew W. Lind, Professor of Sociology, University of Hawaii, says: "Finally, there is the rather large Kibei group of the second generation who, although citizens of the United States by virtue of birth within the Territory, are frequently more fanatically Japanese in their disposition than their own parents. Many of these individuals have returned from Japan so recently as to be unable to speak the English language and some are unquestionably disappointed by the lack of appreciation manifested for their Japanese education." (American Council Paper No. 5, page 187, American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 129 East 52nd Street, New York.)

It was, perforce, a combination of factors and circumstances with which the Commanding General had to deal. Here was a relatively homogenous, unassimilated element bearing a close relationship through ties of race, religion, language, custom, and indoctrination to the enemy.

The mission of the Commanding General was to defend the West Coast from enemy attack, both from within and without. The Japanese were concentrated along the coastal strip. The nature of this area and its relation to the national war effort had to be carefully considered.

The areas ultimately evacuated of all persons of Japanese ancestry embraced the coastal area of the Pacific slope. In the States of Washington and Oregon to the north. Military Area No. 1 contains all that portion lying westerly of the eastern bases of the Cascade Mountains. In other words, the coastal plain, the forests, and the mountain barrier. In California the evacuation program encompassed the entire State—that is to say, not only Military Area No. 1 but also Military Area No. 2. Military Area No. 2 in California was evacuated because (1) geographically and strategically the eastern boundary of the State of California approximates the easterly limit of Military Area No. 1 in Washington and Oregon (Figure 1 shows the boundaries of these two Military Areas), and because (2) the natural forests and mountain barriers, from which it was determined to exclude all Japanese, lie in Military Area No. 2 in California, although these lie in Military Area No. 1 of Washington and Oregon. A brief reference to the relationship of the coastal states to the national war effort is here pertinent.

FIGURE 1



That part of the States of Washington, Oregon, and California which lies west of the Cascade and Sierra Nevada Ranges, is dominated by many waterways, forests, and vital industrial installations. Throughout the Puget Sound area there are many military and naval establishments as well as shipyards, airplane factories and other industries essential to total war. In the vicinity of Whidby Island, Island County, Washington, at the north end of the Island, is the important Deception Pass bridge. This bridge provides the only means of transit by land from important naval installations, facilities and properties in the vicinity of Whidby Island. This island afforded an ideal rendezvous from which enemy agents might communicate with enemy submarines in the Strait of Juan de Fuca or with other agents on the Olympic Peninsula. From Whidby and Camano Islands, comprising Island County, the passages through Admiralty Inlet, Skagit Bay and Saratoga Passage from Juan de Fuca Strait to the vital areas of the Bremerton Navy Yard and Bainbridge Island can be watched. The important city of Seattle with its airplane plants, airports, waterfront facilities, Army and Navy transport establishments and supply terminals required that an unassimilated group of doubtful loyalty be removed a safe distance from these critical areas. A reference to the spot map (published in Chapter VIII), Figure 6, showing the distribution of Japanese population along the frontier, discloses a high concentration of persons of Japanese ancestry in the Puget Sound area. Seattle is the principal port in the Northwest; it is the port from which troops in Alaska are supplied; its inland water route to Alaska passes the north coast of Washington into the Straits of Georgia on its way to Alaska.

The lumber industry is of vital importance to the war effort. The State of Washington, with Oregon and California close seconds, produces the bulk of sawed lumber in the United States. The large area devoted to this industry afforded saboteurs unlimited freedom of action. The danger from forest fires involved not only the destruction of valuable timber but also threatened cities, towns and other installations in the affected area. The entire coastal strip from Cape Flattery south to Lower California is particularly important from a protective viewpoint. There are numerous naval installations with such facilities constantly under augmentation. The coast line is particularly vulnerable. Distances between inhabited areas are great and enemy activities might be carried on without interference.

The petroleum industry of California, and its great centers of production for aircraft and shipbuilding, are a vital part of the life blood of d nation at war. The crippling of any part of this would seriously impede the war effort. Through the ports of Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego, flow the sinews of war -- the men, equipment and supplies for carrying the battle against the enemy in the Pacific. A further reference to the spot map, Figure 6, in Chapter VIII, reveals the high concentration of this segment of the population surrounding nearly all these key installations.

In his estimate of the situation, then, the Commanding General found a tightly-knit, unassimilated racial group, substantial numbers of whom were engaged in pro-Japanese activities. He found them concentrated in great numbers along the Pacific Coast, an area of the utmost importance to the national war effort. These considerations were weighed against the progress of the Emperor's Imperial Japanese forces in the Pacific. This chapter would be incomplete without a brief reference to the gravity of the external situation obtaining in the Pacific theater. It is necessary only to state the chronology of war in the Pacific to show this.

At 8:05 A.M., the 7th of December, the Japanese attacked the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor without warning. Simultaneously they struck against Malaysia, Hong Kong, the Philippines, and Wake and Midway Islands.

On the day following, the Japanese Army invaded Thailand. Two days later the British battleships "H.M.S. Wales" and "H.M.S. Repulse" were sunk off the Malay Peninsula. The enemy's successes continued without interruption. On the 13th of December, Guam was captured and on successive days the Japanese captured Wake Island and occupied Hong Kong, December 24th and 25th, respectively. On January 2nd Manila fell and on the 27th of February the battle of the Java Sea resulted in a crushing naval defeat to the United Nations. Thirteen United Nations' warships were sunk and one damaged. Japanese losses were limited to two warships sunk and five damaged.

On the 9th of March the Japanese Imperial forces established full control of the Netherlands East Indies; Rangoon and Burma were occupied. Continuing during the course of evacuation, on the 9th of April, Bataan was occupied by the Japanese and on May 6th Corregidor surrendered.

On June 3rd, Dutch Harbor, Alaska, was attacked by Japanese carrier-based aircraft and, with the occupation by the Japanese on June 7th of Attu and Kiska Islands, United States territory in continental Northern America had been invaded.

As already stated, there were many evidences of the successful communication of information to the enemy, information regarding positive knowledge on his part of our installations. The most striking illustrations of this are found in three of the several incidents of enemy attacks on West Coast points.

On February 23, 1942, a hostile submarine shelled Goleta, near Santa Barbara, California, in an attempt to destroy vital oil installations there. On the preceding day the shore battery in position at this point had been withdrawn to be replaced by another. On the succeeding day, when the shelling occurred, it was the only point along the coast where an enemy submarine could have successfully surfaced and fired on a vital installation without coming within the range of coast defense guns.

In the vicinity of Brookings (Mt. Emily), Oregon, an enemy submarine-based plane dropped incendiary bombs in an effort to start forest fires. At that time it was the only section of the Pacific Coast which could have been approached by enemy aircraft without interception by aircraft warning devices.

Similarly, a precise knowledge of the range of coast defense guns at Astoria, Oregon, was in the possession of the enemy. A hostile submarine surfaced and shelled shore batteries there from the only position at which a surfaced submarine could have approached the coast line close enough to shell a part of its coast defenses without being within range of the coastal batteries.

In summary, the Commanding General was confronted with the Pearl Harbor experience, which involved a positive enemy knowledge of our patrols, our naval dispositions, etc., on the morning of December 7th; with the fact that ships leaving West Coast ports were being intercepted regularly by enemy submarines; and with the fact that an enemy element was in a position to do great damage and substantially to aid the enemy nation. Time was of the essence.

The Commanding General, charged as he was with the mission of providing for the defense of the West Coast, had to take into account these and other military considerations. He had no alternative but to conclude that the Japanese constituted a potentially dangerous element from the viewpoint of military security -- that military necessity required their immediate evacuation to the interior. The impelling military necessity had become such that any measures other than those pursued along the Pacific Coast might have been "too little and too late".

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II

Memorandum from the Commanding General, Western Defense Command, to the Assistant Attorney General, Mr. James Rowe, Jr.


"January 5, 1942

"Memorandum for: Assistant Attorney General Rowe.
Subject: Alien Enemy Control Requirements.

"1. Reference is made to the summary of report of the Assistant Attorney General Rowe to General DeWitt on Sunday, January 4, 1942, at 6:30 P.M. (TAB. 'A.')

"2. It should be stated at the outset that the Army has no wish to undertake the conduct and control of alien enemies anywhere within continental United States. Impressions to the contrary notwithstanding, the Army would accept transfer of such responsibility and authority with the greatest reluctance. Its desire is only that the Department of Justice act with expedition and effectiveness in the discharge of its responsibilities under the Presidential Proclamations of December 7th and 8th. The developments which have resulted in the current conferences between the Attorney General's representative, and General DeWitt and his staff, have been occasioned by the almost complete absence of action on the part of the Department of Justice over a period of nearly four weeks since promulgation of the mentioned proclamations, toward implementing sections 5 and 9.

"3. To the extent that an estimate can now be made, in the absence of actual demonstration, the courses of action proposed to be taken by the Department of Justice, as set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Tab. 'A', appear to constitute a great step forward.

"4. While some amendment, clarification and implementation may be necessary, it appears that section 5 of the proclamation relative to prohibited articles will have been fully implemented when the measures detailed in Tab. 'A' have been taken. The means of determining whether all alien enemies are complying with the proscriptions of the Proclamations, as repeated in the contraband regulations promulgated by the Attorney General, may have to be further clarified. This phase of the problem, however, is closely associated with warrant issuance aspect of the alien enemy program.

"5. As agreed in the conference referred to in paragraph 1 hereof, the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command has initiated action within the California, Oregon and Washington portions of his command (as augmented by the inclusion of the Air Corps installations throughout his command), to furnish U. S. Attorneys not later than January 9, 1942, a list of the areas which are regarded by Army authorities as falling within section 9 of the regulations relative to restricted areas. This report will include definite descriptions of such areas and will divide them into two categories as follows:

"Category A: Those areas within, or through which no alien enemy may be permitted, under any circumstances.

"Category B: Those areas through, or within which alien enemies may be permitted on pass or permit.

"In this connection attention is invited to the concluding paragraph of Section 9 of the regulations which provides in substance that any alien enemy found within any restricted area contrary to the regulations shall be subject to summary apprehension. The military authorities desire to be advised whether, in the opinion of the Attorney General, apprehension of alien enemies under such circumstances may be without warrant and, if so, whether the military authorities are empowered to enforce.

"In order to avoid absolute confusion in the matter, Army authorities strongly urge that the Department of Justice undertake to establish immediate liaison and coordination with all appropriate relief agencies prepared to alleviate hardship resulting from compulsory change of residence on the part of alien enemies residing in Category A, restricted areas. As the Department of Justice has requested permission to announce that the establishment of restricted areas has been made by the Attorney General only because the Commanding General of this theatre has so requested, military authorities desire it to be unequivocally clear that they desire that everything possible be done to eliminate unnecessary hardship and the need for planning and coordination along this line is strongly emphasized.

"Depending upon the manner in which compulsory eviction from Category A restricted areas is handled and upon how the pass and permit system respecting Category B restricted areas is developed, the action proposed in paragraph 2 of Tab. 'A' appears presently to provide for full implementation of Section 9.

"6. Comments relative to paragraph 3 of Tab 'A' entitled 'Search Warrants' will be deferred for inclusion in the portion of this memorandum relative to particular problems.

"7. As already noted, neither the War Department nor the Army desire to undertake responsibility for the alien enemy program in Continental United States. In view of this, the comment in paragraph 4 of Tab. 'A' to the effect that the Department of Justice is of the view that it is better qualified to conduct an alien enemy registration than is the Army, and in view of the expressed intention of that Department to act without delay, it would appear that the action proposed in paragraph 4, Tab. 'A', if speedily accomplished will satisfy the need for immediate registration of alien enemies.

"8. Reference is made to paragraph 5 of Tab. 'A' relative to 'spot raids' and 'mass raids.' The military authorities in this theatre are of the view that counter espionage measures require that the Department of Justice take whatever steps are necessary, effectively to provide for simultaneous 'mass raids' without warning to determine the presence of prohibited articles which may be in possession or under the control of alien enemies, or to which such persons may have access. By this type of raid is meant 'coordinated action' in several areas at the same moment and on successive occasions providing for the search of a given number of alien enemy premises in each area. Under such circumstances the premises to be searched during any such 'mass raid' would be only those in which it is known that an alien enemy may be found or in which there is cause to believe that an alien enemy may be found. It does not mean the 'willy-nilly' raiding of all premises within a prescribed area. The number of premises to be searched during any given 'mass raid' will depend upon the circumstances and the means at hand. This type of sampling or cross-sectional raiding is regarded as vitally important. While such raids may not be successful from the viewpoint of rounding up great quantities of contraband, they will have the important effect of driving contraband more deeply underground with the result that its illicit use becomes increasingly difficult.

"The military authorities request that they be advised by the Department of Justice of its position in this matter. If it is inclined to provide for this type of search, advice is requested as to the steps proposed by this Department.

"9. The courses of action proposed in Tab. 'A', when accomplished, will not solve a number of pressing problems. It is neither possible nor practicable to undertake or attempt to illustrate all of the problems which may arise in connection with the alien enemy program. As limited in the foregoing sentence, some of the problems and some of the questions remaining unsolved are:
"(a). A fix is established on a radio transmitter. Transmission of unlawful radio signals is established but the location is determined only within a defined area such as a city block. Manifestly an accurate description of the premises, the operator's name and a description of equipment can not be furnished. The operation of such a transmitter is equally unlawful on the part of a citizen, alien or an alien enemy. Unless a 'John Doe' search warrant can be obtained and obtained immediately, the consequences may be grave and the transmitter may be moved without trace. What action can be taken?

"(b). The facts are sufficient to support the issuance of an alien enemy warrant or a contraband search warrant, but the responsible law enforcement officer on the ground is unable to communicate with the issuing authority due to the lack of means or because of the time element. What action can he take?

"(c). A known alien enemy is observed, in transit, in the possession of contraband or in the possession of articles believed, for good cause, to be contraband. If a warrant is procured under present as well as proposed machinery, the quarry will be lost. What action can be taken?

"(d). The unlawful transmission of radio signals has been established through interception. A series of fixes determines the location of the transmitter within a general area, such as Monterey County. Further, there is convincing evidence of shore to enemy submarine communication. What action can be taken to isolate the area and conduct an effective search to locate the mobile unit?

"(e). An alien enemy is resident with a citizen, perhaps a relative such as a wife. While it cannot be proven that he owns or actually controls contraband it can be proven that he has unlimited access to such. The situation is as potentially dangerous as if it could be proven that he owned or actually controlled the contraband. What action can be taken?

"(f). Question arises whether access of the character description in (e) above is unlawful under the Proclamations. Assuming that it is unlawful, to what extent may the search, under a contraband search warrant, of a mixed occupancy dwelling or other premises be carried to determine access to contraband?

"(g). The dual citizen problem is perplexing. Self-serving declarations of an election are of little meaning, particularly where conduct is incompatible with the so-called election. What methods exist or what steps are in contemplation looking toward the control of
1. Dual citizens.
2. Disloyal, subversive citizens (where there has been no overt act detected).
"(h). In the opinion of the Attorney General, to what extent may the responsible Military Commander in a theatre of operations, contravene normal processes to take necessary action in an emergency in order to provide for the internal as well as the external security of his theatre -- to what extent is the Department of Justice able to take similar measures?

"(i). Military authorities are convinced of the desirability of close cooperation and collaboration between the War Department and the Department of Justice in connection with the instant subject. However, it is considered desirable to request advice as to the extent to which the Department of Justice is prepared to assume and to discharge the responsibility of taking whatever steps are necessary for the prevention of sabotage, espionage, and other fifth column activities from enemy alien courses, and the extent to which the Department of Justice will expect the military authorities to continue the outline of the necessary steps for progressive implementation of the enemy alien program.
"10. The foregoing represents the consensus of those concerned as understood by the undersigned. It does not necessarily reflect the official opinions of anyone concerned. It is intended primarily as exploratory of the problem.
J. L. DeWITT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army."
Incl. 1.

TAB "A"

Summary of Communication -- January 4, 1942


"This is the summary by Assistant Attorney General Rowe to the Commanding General of a conversation with the Attorney General of the United States, and Mr. Rowe's understanding of what the Department of Justice is prepared to do on questions of Alien Enemy Control referred to him by the Commanding General and his staff.

"1. PROHIBITED ARTICLES.

Besides cameras, radios and firearms, the articles prohibited by the President's proclamation are to be deposited by all alien enemies with local police authorities by Monday night, January 5, 1942, at 11 p. m. Because sufficient publicity was not given to the requirement that all prohibited articles be so deposited, the Department of Justice will, by release for Tuesday morning, allow all alien enemies at least two more days, say, 11 p. m., January 7, to dispose of the articles. An effort will be made to obtain sufficient publicity by radio and in the press.

"2. RESTRICTED AREAS.

The Department of Justice tonight will by wire direct the United States Attorneys in the Western Theatre of Operations, with particular emphasis on Washington, Oregon, and California, to telephone Major General Benedict for recommendations as to what areas should be regarded as restricted. The United States Attorney will automatically accept the General's recommendations, and these areas will immediately become restricted areas pending confirmation by the Attorney General. As soon as possible, a press release ordering all enemy aliens to evacuate restricted areas by a certain date and hour will be issued. Any release by the Department of Justice will specifically state that the Attorney General has designated these restricted areas at the specific and urgent request of the Commanding General. The Army will request the Navy to submit its recommendations through the Commanding General. It is believed several days will elapse before the Army will be ready to submit its recommendations.

"3. SEARCH WARRANTS.

New forms for search and seizure of prohibited articles in homes controlled by, or inhabited by, alien enemies, are to be received tomorrow morning by Federal Bureau of Investigation teletype. The question of probable cause will be met only by the statement that an alien enemy is resident in such premises. It is Mr. Rowe's understanding that the local United States Attorney's interpretation that more information is necessary to show probable cause is incorrect. The United States Attorney will issue a search warrant upon a statement by a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent that an alien enemy is resident at certain premises. It is not necessary that the Department in Washington be consulted.

"4. ALIEN ENEMY REGISTRATION.

The Department feels it can conduct an alien enemy registration in the Western Theatre of Operations within a week or ten days. Tomorrow morning by Federal Bureau of Investigation teletype a statement will be sent from Washington outlining a procedure of what the Department is prepared to do. The Department feels it can conduct such a registration, through the local police authorities, much faster than the Army itself. The Department also feels that the existing list from the previous alien registration, now in Washington, is in better shape than is the impression in San Francisco, and every effort will be made to have such lists available in the Western Theatre of Operations.

"5. The Department is willing to make spot-raids on alien enemies tomorrow or at any time after the registration, anywhere within the Western Theatre of Operations. Mr. Rowe emphasized that such raids must be confined to premises controlled by enemy aliens, or where enemy aliens are resident. In other words, the Department cannot raid a specific locality, covering every house in that locality, irrespective of whether such houses are inhabited by enemy aliens or citizens. The Attorney General requested Mr. Rowe to make clear to the Commanding General that under no circumstances will the Department of Justice conduct mass raids on alien enemies. It is understood that the term "mass raids" means, eventually a raid on every alien enemy within the Western Theatre of Operations. The Attorney General will oppose such raids and, if overruled by the President, will request the Army to supersede the Department of Justice in the Western Theatre of Operations.

"6. It was agreed by the Commanding General and his staff and Mr. Rowe that certain questions pertaining to raids on localities and the issuance of search warrants, particularly referring to raids on localities in which radio transmitters are probably to be found, will be transmitted to the Department, also for an indication as to how far the Department would proceed, as a matter of law and policy."

CHAPTER III

Establishment of Military Control -- Executive Order No. 9066

After a series of conferences between War and Justice Department representatives, in Washington, D. C, the Secretary of War ordered a representative of the Department personally to survey the situation along the Pacific Coast. The War Department representative carried back to the Secretary the recommendation of the Commanding General that some method be developed empowering the Federal Government to provide for the evacuation from sensitive areas of all persons of Japanese ancestry, and any other persons individually or collectively regarded as potentially dangerous. The Commanding General's proposal was reduced to writing in a memorandum for the Secretary of War, dated February 14, 1942. It is reproduced in full at the end of this chapter. This recommendation was presented to the Secretary of War on or about February 16th. After consultation between War and Justice Department representatives, it was determined that a Presidential executive order should be sought authorizing the Secretary of War to institute civil control measures. A proposed order was drafted in the War Department. With the concurrence of the Department of Justice it was presented to the President.

Executive Order No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942, was the direct result of these steps. On the day following its signature by the President, the Secretary of War designated the Commanding General, Western Defense Command, as a Military Commander within the meaning of the Executive Order. This meant that the power and authority granted by the Order had been delegated to the Commanding General. The letter of authority, enclosing a copy of the Order, from the Secretary of War was as follows:
"February 20, 1942
"COMMANDING GENERAL,
Western Defense Command and Fourth Army,
Presidio of San Francisco, California.

"Dear General DeWitt:

"By Executive Order, dated February 19, 1942, copy inclosed, the President authorized and directed me, through the Military Commander whom I designate, to prescribe military areas for the protection of vital installations against sabotage and espionage. The cited Executive Order also authorized and directed the administering authority to impose such restrictions upon the right to enter, remain in, or leave any such areas as may be appropriate to the requirements in each instance. Accordingly, I designate you as the Military Commander to carry out the duties and responsibilities imposed by said Executive Order for that portion of the United States embraced in the Western Defense Command, including such changes in the prohibited and restricted areas heretofore designated by the Attorney General as you deem proper to prescribe.

"In carrying out your duties under this delegation, I desire, so far as military requirements permit, that you do not disturb, for the time being at least, Italian aliens and persons of Italian lineage except where they are, in your judgment, undesirable or constitute a definite danger to the performance of your mission to defend the West Coast. I ask that you take this action in respect to Italians for the reason that I consider such persons to be potentially less dangerous, as a whole, than those of other enemy nationalities. Because of the size of the Italian population and the number of troops and facilities which would have to be employed to deal with them, their inclusion in the general plan would greatly overtax our strength. In this connection it may be necessary for you to relieve Italian aliens from the necessity for compliance with the Attorney General's order respecting the California prohibited areas 1 to 88 (Category A). This may appropriately be done by designating, sufficiently in advance of February 24, the said areas as military areas and by excepting Italian aliens from the classes excluded.

"With due regard to your other missions you may use the troops you can now make available from your general command, but for this purpose the 27th Division and the 3rd Division reinforced are not to be considered as part of your general command as such troops are assigned to your command only for specific training.

"Your attention is invited to those provisions of the Executive Order under which you are authorized to call for assistance, supplies, and services from all Government agencies. It is desired that you take full advantage of that authority.

"Removal of individuals from areas in which they are domiciled should be accomplished gradually so as to avoid, so far as it is consistent with national safety and the performance of your mission, unnecessary hardship and dislocation of business and industry. In order to permit the War Department to make plans for the proper disposition of individuals whom you contemplate moving outside of your jurisdiction, it is desired that you make known to me your detailed plans for evacuation. Individuals will not be entrained until such plans are furnished and you are informed that accommodations have been prepared at the point of detraining.

"So far as practicable, fullest advantage should be taken of voluntary exodus of individuals and of the facilities afforded by other Government and private agencies in assisting evacuees to resettle. Where evacuees are unable to effect resettlement of their own volition, or with the assistance of other agencies, proper provision for housing, feeding, transportation and medical care must be provided.

"I desire that from time to time you make report direct to me of important actions and events, particularly with respect to the extent and location of military areas, and the restrictions applicable thereto.
"Sincerely yours,
"/s/ Henry L. Stimson,
"Secretary of War.
"Incl.
Executive Order.

Executive Order No. 9066
AUTHORIZING THE SECRETARY OF WAR TO PRESCRIBE
MILITARY AREAS

"Whereas, The successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense material, national-defense premises and national-defense utilities as defined in Section 4, Act of April 20, 1918, 40 Stat. 533, as amended by the Act of November 30, 1940, 54 Stat. 1220, and the Act of August 21, 1941, 55 Stat. 655 (U.S.C, Title 50, Sec. 104):

"Now THEREFORE, By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders whom he may from time to time designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such action necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restriction the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion. The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to provide for residents of any such area who are excluded therefrom, such transportation, food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessary, in the judgment of the Secretary of War or the said Military Commander, and until other arrangements are made, to accomplish the purpose of this order. The designation of military areas in any region or locality shall supersede designations of prohibited and restricted areas by the Attorney General under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, and shall supersede the responsibility and authority of the Attorney General under the said Proclamations in respect of such prohibited and restricted areas.

"I hereby further authorize and direct the Secretary of War and the said Military Commanders to take such other steps as he or the appropriate Military Commander may deem advisable to enforce compliance with the restrictions applicable to each Military area hereinabove authorized to be designated, including the use of Federal troops and other Federal Agencies, with authority to accept assistance of state and local agencies.

"I hereby further authorize and direct all Executive Departments, independent establishments and other Federal Agencies, to assist the Secretary of War or the said Military Commanders in carrying out this Executive Order, including the furnishing of medical aid, hospitalization, food, clothing, transportation, use of land, shelter, and other supplies, equipment, utilities, facilities, and services.

"This order shall not be construed as modifying or limiting in any way the authority heretofore granted under Executive Order No. 8972, dated December 12, 1941, nor shall it be construed as limiting or modifying the duty and responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with respect to the investigations of alleged acts of sabotage or the duty and responsibility of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, prescribing regulations for the conduct and control of alien enemies, except as such duty and responsibility is superseded by the designation of military areas hereunder."
Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House, February 19, 1942.
On the same date, the Assistant Secretary of War forwarded a memorandum to the Commanding General which contained an outline of a suggested method of procedure which might be followed in carrying out an evacuation program. This memorandum had been developed by the War Department representative at the West Coast conferences, and was based upon his survey of the situation there obtained. He drafted the Executive Order on his return. It is pertinent to quote portions of the memorandum here.

"February 20, 1942
"My dear General DeWitt:

"In accordance with my telephone conversation with you today I am enclosing a memorandum which was prepared in the War Department relating to the effect of the new Executive Order. It represents, as I said, some of our thinking on the subject and I think it may be helpful to you as a guide in the determination of the steps that you will want to take under the authority of the Directive which the Secretary of War has sent you today.
"Very truly yours,
"(Signed) John J. McCloy
"John J. McCloy,
"Assistant Secretary of War."

"Lt. Gen. J. L. DeWitt
Commanding General
Western Defense Command and Fourth Army
Presidio of San Francisco, California."

OUTLINE MEMORANDUM
"February 20, 1942

"... For the purpose of these instructions, persons resident in the Western Defense Command will be classified as follows:
"Class 1 Japanese Aliens
"Class 2 American citizens of Japanese Lineage
"Class 3 German Aliens
"Class 4 Italian Aliens
"Class 5 Any persons, whether citizens or aliens, who are suspected for any reason by you or your responsible subordinates, of being actually or potentially dangerous either as saboteurs, espionage agents, fifth-columnists or subversive persons.
"Class 6 All other persons who are, or who may be within the Western Defense Command."
"I suggest the advisability of the following course of action:

"7. The progressive designation by you of military areas throughout the Western Defense Command of such extent and in such places as you deem necessary to provide the maximum protection from sabotage and espionage of installations vital to the war effort consistent with the means available for evacuation and the military responsibilities attendant upon evacuation of large numbers of persons.

"8. Where necessary, in your judgment, the designation of protective zones within the military areas referred to in 7 above, in which you will provide (a) for the exclusion of all persons in Classes 1, 2 and 5, and where in your judgment it is essential, and (b) for the exclusion of persons in Class 3, so as to afford the maximum protection from espionage and sabotage to installations vital to the war effort, consistent with the military responsibilities attendant upon such an evacuation, viz., the number of troops which will be diverted from training for combat and from other missions, the fulfillment of which is your responsibility.

"9. The promulgation of appropriate restrictive regulations governing the exercise by any person of the right to enter, remain in or leave such military areas and any zones within such military areas. In connection with the initiation, development and accomplishment of the program outlined above, you will initiate and carry to completion, without delay, the preparation of detailed plans for the evacuation of those classes of persons and individuals who will be excluded from military areas prescribed by you. In so doing it is desired that you take full advantage of the provisions of the Executive Order whereby you are authorized to call upon the other executive departments and federal agencies for assistance, not only in the furnishing of services, but also of supplies, equipment and land. It is the intention that the heads of the several executive departments, independent establishments, and other federal agencies will be required and will have full authority to respond to such requests as you may make upon them in carrying out the provisions of the executive order.

"10. In this connection so far as consistent with safety the development of your program should be by stages. In the most critical areas you may consider it necessary to bring about an almost immediate evacuation of certain classes, particularly classes 1 and 2. However, in order to take full advantage of voluntary exodus and of re-settlement facilities arranged by other agencies, both public and private, the timing of your program should be most carefully conceived and coordinated. Representatives of the Departments of Justice and Agriculture advise that in those instances where it is consistent with the safety to afford evacuees reasonable advance notice that they will be able greatly to decrease the numbers of evacuees to be cared for by the Army, and thereby greatly decrease the drain on our military resources; thus avoiding the diversion of troops from their primary mission, the defense of the West Coast.

"11. In providing for the exclusion of classes of persons and individuals from military areas prescribed by you, you will make appropriate exception in favor of the aged, infirm, and the sick. Persons above the age of 70 years should not be disturbed unless for sufficient reason, you consider them suspect. Unless you find that the national safety will not so permit, bona fide refugees in Class 3 should be afforded special consideration, either through the development of suitable means to acquire permits to return to prohibited zones or to remain therein.

"12. I desire that you make known to me your detailed plans for evacuation as soon as practicable in order to enable the War Department to coordinate with the Corps Area Commanders concerned any movement you propose to undertake of evacuees outside of your command to places of temporary shelter. You will not entrain any evacuees for transportation beyond your command until you have been informed by the War Department that accommodations are prepared to receive them at the places of destination.

"13. Yours will be the military responsibility for processing, evacuation, supplying, rationing and transportation to the points of shelter. This, of course, applies only to those evacuees who are unable to re-settle themselves on their own resources or for whom public and private agencies have been unable to arrange re-settlement. For persons in this class, the Army will provide shelter, food and other accommodations, including medical aid and hospitalization in selected places in the interior until civil authorities can make other arrangements.

"14. It will, of course, be necessary that your plans include provision for protection of the property, particularly the physical property, of evacuees. All reasonable measures should be taken through publicity and other means, to encourage evacuees to take steps to protect their own property. Where evacuees are unable to do this prior to the time when it is necessary for them to comply with the exclusion orders, there is always danger that unscrupulous persons will take undue advantage or that physical property unavoidably left behind will be pillaged by lawless elements. The protection of physical property from theft or other harm is primarily the responsibility of state and local law-enforcement agencies, and you will doubtless call upon them for the maximum assistance in this connection. Where they are unable to protect physical property left behind in military areas, the responsibility will be yours, to provide reasonable protection, either through the use of troops or through other appropriate measures. The appointment by you of a property custodian and the creation by him of an organization to deal with such property in military areas may become necessary. The provisions of the Executive Order and the necessity in each given instance are such that you have authority to take such action, either directly or through another federal agency. In the development of your program, it is desired that you accomplish it with the minimum of individual hardship and dislocation of business and industries consistent with safety. Report to me from time to time by telephone, with confirmation in writing, of important action and events, indicating particularly the location and extent of military areas prescribed by you and the character of the restrictions promulgated."
Immediately upon the promulgation of Executive Order No. 9066, the War Department, with the approval of the President, requested the Congress to enact legislation to provide sanctions for the enforcement of directives issued under the authority of the Executive Order. A draft of proposed legislation for this purpose was transmitted by the Secretary of War simultaneously to the Chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The concurrence of the Department of Justice as to the form and substance of the bill had been obtained.

The body of each letter of transmittal from the Secretary of War to the Congress read as follows:
"There is enclosed herewith draft of a bill entitled 'A bill to provide a penalty for violation of restrictions or orders with respect to persons entering, remaining in, or leaving military areas or zones,' which the War Department recommends to be enacted into law.

"The purpose of the proposed legislation is to provide for enforcement in the Federal criminal courts of orders issued under the authority of Executive order of the President No, 9066, dated February 19, 1942. This Executive order authorizes the Secretary of War to prescribe military areas from which any and all persons may be excluded for purposes of national defense.

"It is impossible to estimate the probable cost to the Government consequent upon the enactment of such legislation.

"The Bureau of the Budget has advised that there is no objection to the submission of this proposed legislation for the consideration of the Congress, as the enactment thereof would not be in conflict with the program of the President."
While the legislation was under consideration, the Secretary of War, on March 14, 1942, transmitted another letter to the Congress suggesting an amendment and urging immediate enactment. The letter of March 14th is as follows:
"Hon. Andrew J. May,
Chairman, Committee on Military Affairs,
House of Representatives.

"Dear Mr. May:

"By telephone on Thursday, March 12, 1942, Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, commanding the Western Defense Command, requested that action be taken to expedite passage of S. 2352 and H. R. 6758, bills to provide penalties for violation of restrictions or orders with respect to persons entering, remaining in, or leaving military areas or zones.

"General DeWitt is strongly of the opinion that the bill, when enacted, should be broad enough to enable the Secretary of War or the appropriate military commander to enforce curfews and other restrictions within military areas and zones. To that end, it is suggested that in line 3, page 1, of H. R. 6758 the word "or' be stricken and that after the word 'leave' there be inserted the words, 'or commit any act in.'

"General DeWitt indicated that he was prepared to enforce certain restrictions at once for the purpose of protecting certain vital national defense interests but did not desire to proceed until enforcement machinery had been set up.

"The War Department recommends immediate passage of the proposed law.
"Sincerely yours,
"Henry L. Stimson,
"Secretary of War."
This bill became the vehicle for enactment of Public Law No. 503, 77th Congress, approved March 21, 1942. The Department of Justice was consulted in the drafting of this litigation as well as in the drafting, processing and presentation of Executive Order 9066.

Public Law No. 503 follows:
"To provide a penalty for violation of restrictions or orders with respect to persons entering, remaining in, leaving, or committing any act in military areas or zones.

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. That whoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in any military area or military zone prescribed, under the authority of an Executive order of the President, by the Secretary of War, or by any military commander designated by the Secretary of War, contrary to the restrictions applicable to any such area or zone or contrary to the order of the Secretary of War or any such military commander, shall, if it appears that he knew or should have known of the existence and extent of the restrictions or order and that his act was in violation thereof, be guilty of misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be liable to a fine of not to exceed $5,000 or to imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, for each offense."
Previous to that time, on February 14, 1942, the Commanding General had forwarded his recommendations to the Chief of Staff, United States Army, as to the necessary measures to be taken. (See Appendix to this chapter, Memorandum for The Secretary of War from the Commanding General, February 14, 1942.) Included in these proposals were provisions for property protection and the rendering of necessary social service. It will be noted that the military authorities contemplated appropriate provision against undue economic and social dislocation from the beginning. This did not emerge as an underlying policy after the program had been initiated but, on the contrary, constituted an essential feature during all of the pre-evacuation discussions.

On February 23, the Secretary of War again dispatched a War Department representative to San Francisco to act as liaison officer between the Department and the Commanding General and to be of any possible assistance. Acting upon recommendations of the Western Defense Command, the Assistant Secretary of War called upon certain federal agencies to designate personnel to participate in developing the evacuation program. Prompt responses followed, and by February 27th the first of these representatives arrived in San Francisco. Dr. C. L. Dedrick of the Census Bureau, Department of Commerce, reported at San Francisco. He was shortly followed by representatives of the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve System, the Department of Agriculture, the Federal Security Agency, the Department of Justice, the Alien Property Custodian, and the Office of Price Administration.

In a subsequent communication dated March 2, 1942, the Secretary of War broadened the authority of the Commanding General which had been granted him under the previous delegation of February 20, 1942 (see p. 2, chapter III, supra). Full freedom of action was granted to obligate funds, to enter into contracts and to acquire the services of any persons, firms or corporations in accomplishing the evacuation. The letter was as follows:
"March 2, 1942
"Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt,
Commander, Western Defense Command,
San Francisco, California.

"Dear General DeWitt:

"By letter dated February 20, 1942, 1 designated you as one of the appropriate Military Commanders to exercise the powers vested in me under Executive Order No. 9066, February 19, 1942, and I delegated to you such powers as are necessary to carry out the purposes of that Executive Order. Incident to the exercise of those powers, you are authorized to employ without regard to Civil Service or Classification laws or regulations, all persons or agencies necessary to carry out your duties. You are also authorized to employ the service of any association, firm, company, or corporation in furtherance of your mission. You will fix the rates of compensation so as to correspond as nearly as possible to the rate prevailing for similar service in the community in which the services are to be rendered.

"Under the terms of Executive Order No. 9001, dated December 27, 1941, and subject to the limitations thereof and of the Act of December 18, 1941 (First War Powers Act, 1941, Public Law 354 -- 77th Congress), I am expressly authorized to delegate further the powers therein delegated to me. Pursuant thereto, I delegate to you, within the limits of the amounts appropriated by the Congress, the power to enter into contracts and into amendments or modifications of contracts heretofore or hereafter made, and to make advance, progress, and other payments thereon, without regard to the provisions of law relating to the making, performance, amendment, or modification of contracts.

"In order to remove any doubt as to your authority to obligate funds, I specifically authorize you to obligate funds in such amounts as you deem necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Executive Order, and of your instructions, from any funds in an allotted status available to you, or to incur obligations in excess of such funds, reporting deficiencies to the appropriate chief of supply arm or service.
"Sincerely yours,
"Henry L. Stimson,
"Secretary of War."
On March 2nd, the Commanding General issued Public Proclamation No. 1, establishing the westerly half of Washington, Oregon, and California and the southerly half of Arizona as Military Area No. 1. Certain prohibited and restricted zones were also established within Military Area No, 1. The boundary of Military Area No. 1 had been selected on the basis of previous study and the recommendations made by subordinate commanders. Highways were used to designate the boundaries in order that they would be plainly denoted on the ground and that all concerned could be placed on proper notice.

The boundaries of Military Areas Nos. 1 and 2, established by Public Proclamation No. 1, were also designated on the ground by the erection of appropriate signs. Similarly, each prohibited zone created by the Proclamation was marked. Later, when additional military areas in the zones were established by Public Proclamation No. 2 on March 14, 1942, the same action was taken. In order to insure proper public notice of the location and extent of each area, zone signs were posted at every entrance to each of them. The Commanding General, Ninth Service Command (then the Ninth Corps Area), and the Commanding Generals of the Northwest, Northern California, Southern California and Southern Land Frontier Sectors, Western Defense Command, were directed by the Commanding General, Western Defense Command, to erect suitable signs. The Commanding General, Ninth Service Command, posted the east boundary of Military Area No. 1 and all of the other zone and area boundaries lying to the east. The Commanding Generals of the Sectors posted the prohibited zones within Military Area No. 1. The task, particularly that required of the Ninth Service Command, was one of unusual magnitude.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III

Final Recommendation of the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, Submitted to The Secretary of War.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Presidio of San Francisco, California
Office of the Commanding General

February 14, 1942
014.31 (DCS)

Memorandum For: The Secretary of War, (Thru: The Commanding General, Field Forces, Washington, D. C.)

Subject: Evacuation of Japanese and other Subversive Persons from the Pacific Coast.

1. In presenting a recommendation for the evacuation of Japanese and other subversive persons from the Pacific Coast, the following facts have been considered:
a. Mission of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army.
(1) Defense of the Pacific Coast of the Western Defense Command, as extended, against attacks by sea, land or air;

(2) Local protection of establishments and communications vital to the National Defense for which adequate defense cannot be provided by local civilian authorities.
b. Brief Estimate of the Situation.
(1) Any estimate of the situation indicates that the following are possible and probable enemy activities:
(a) Naval attack on shipping in coastal waters;
(b) Naval attack on coastal cities and vital installations;
(c) Air raids on vital installations, particularly within two hundred miles of the coast;
(d) Sabotage of vital installations throughout the Western Defense Command.

Hostile Naval and air raids will be assisted by enemy agents signaling from the coastline and the vicinity thereof; and by supplying and otherwise assisting enemy vessels and by sabotage.

Sabotage, (for example, of airplane factories), may be effected not only by destruction within plants and establishments, but by destroying power, light, water, sewer and other utility and other facilities in the immediate vicinity thereof or at a distance. Serious damage or destruction in congested areas may readily be caused by incendiarism.
(2) The area lying to the west of the Cascade and Sierra Nevada Mountains in Washington, Oregon and California, is highly critical not only because the lines of communication and supply to the Pacific theater pass through it, but also because of the vital industrial production therein, particularly aircraft. In the war in which we are now engaged racial affinities are not severed by migration. The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have become "Americanized", the racial strains are undiluted. To conclude otherwise is to expect that children born of white parents on Japanese soil sever all racial affinity and become loyal Japanese subjects, ready to fight and, if necessary, to die for Japan in a war against the nation of their parents. That Japan is allied with Germany and Italy in this struggle is no ground for assuming that any Japanese, barred from assimilation by convention as he is, though born and raised in the United States, will not turn against this nation when the final test of loyalty comes. It, therefore, follows that along the vital Pacific Coast over 112,000 potential enemies, of Japanese extraction, are at large today. There are indications that these are organized and ready for concerted action at a favorable opportunity. The very fact that no sabotage has taken place to date is a disturbing and confirming indication that such action will be taken.
c. Disposition of the Japanese.
(1) Washington. As the term is used herein, the word "Japanese" includes alien Japanese and American citizens of Japanese ancestry. In the State of Washington the Japanese population, aggregating over 14,500, is disposed largely in the area lying west of the Cascade Mountains and south of an east-west line passing through Bellingham, Washington, about 70 miles north of Seattle and some 15 miles south of the Canadian border. The largest concentration of Japanese is in the area, the axis of which is along the line Seattle, Tacoma, Olympia, Willapa Bay and the mouth of the Columbia River, with the heaviest concentration in the agricultural valleys between Seattle and Tacoma, viz., the Green River and the Puyallup Valleys. The Boeing Aircraft factory is in the Green River Valley. The lines of communication and supply including power and water which feed this vital industrial installation, radiate from this plant for many miles through areas heavily populated by Japanese. Large numbers of Japanese also operate vegetable markets along the Seattle and Tacoma water fronts, in Bremerton, near the Bremerton Navy Yard, and inhabit islands in Puget Sound opposite vital naval ship building installations. Still others are engaged in fishing along the southwest Washington Pacific Coast and along the Columbia River. Many of these Japanese are within easy reach of the forests of Washington State, the stock piles of seasoning lumber and the many sawmills of southwest Washington. During the dry season these forests, mills and stock piles are easily fired. (See inclosed map.)

(2) Oregon. There are approximately 4,000 Japanese in the State of Oregon, of which the substantial majority reside in the area in the vicinity of Portland along the south bank of the Columbia River, following the general line Bonneville, Oregon City, Astoria, Tillamook. Many of these are in the northern reaches of the Willamette Valley and are engaged in agricultural and fishing pursuits. Others operate vegetable markets in the Portland metropolitan area and still others reside along the northern Oregon sea coast. Their disposition is in intimate relationship with the northwest Oregon sawmills and lumber industry, near and around the vital electric power development at Bonneville and the pulp and paper installations at Camas (on the Washington State side of the Columbia River) and Oregon City, directly south of Portland. (See inclosed map.)

(3) California. The Japanese population in California aggregates approximately 93,500 people. Its disposition is so widespread and so well known that little would be gained by setting it forth in detail here. They live in great numbers along the coastal strip, in and around San Francisco and the Bay Area, the Salinas Valley, Los Angeles and San Diego. Their truck farms are contiguous to the vital aircraft industry concentration in and around Los Angeles. They live in large numbers in and about San Francisco, now a vast staging area for the war in the Pacific, a point at which the nation's lines of communication and supply converge. Inland they are disposed in the Sacramento, San Joaquin and Imperial Valleys. They are engaged in the production of approximately 38% of the vegetable produce of California. Many of them are engaged in the distribution of such produce in and along the water fronts at San Francisco and Los Angeles. Of the 93,500 in California, about 25,000 reside inland in the mentioned valleys where they are largely engaged in vegetable production cited above, and 54,600 reside along the coastal strip, that is to say, a strip of coast line varying from eight miles in the north to twenty miles in width in and around the San Francisco bay area, including San Francisco, in Los Angeles and its environs, and in San Diego. Approximately 13,900 are dispersed throughout the remaining portion of the state. In Los Angeles City the disposition of vital aircraft industrial plants covers the entire city. Large numbers of Japanese live and operate markets and truck farms adjacent to or near these installations. (See inclosed map.)
d. Disposition of Other Subversive Persons.

Disposed within the vital coastal strip already mentioned are large numbers of Italians and Germans, foreign and native born, among whom are many individuals who constitute an actual or potential menace to the safety of the nation.
2. Action recommended.
a. Recommendations for the designation of prohibited areas, described as "Category A" areas in California, Oregon and Washington, from which are to be excluded by order of the Attorney General all alien enemies, have gone forward from this headquarters to the Attorney General through the Provost Marshal General and the Secretary of War. These recommendations were made in order to aid the Attorney General in the implementation of the Presidential Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, imposing responsibility on him for the control of alien enemies as such. These recommendations were for the exclusion of all alien enemies from Category "A." The Attorney General has adopted these recommendations in part, and has the balance under consideration. Similarly, recommendations were made by this headquarters, and adopted by the Attorney General, for the designation of certain areas as Category "B" areas, within which alien enemies may be permitted on pass or permit.

b. I now recommend the following:
(1) That the Secretary of War procure from the President direction and authority to designate military areas in the combat zone of the Western Theater of Operations, (if necessary to include the entire combat zone), from which, in his discretion, he may exclude all Japanese, all alien enemies, and all other persons suspected for any reason by the administering military authorities of being actual or potential saboteurs, espionage agents, or fifth columnists. Such executive order should empower the Secretary of War to requisition the services of any and all other agencies of the Federal Government, with express direction to such agencies to respond to such requisition, and further empowering the Secretary of War to use any and all federal facilities and equipment, including Civilian Conservation Corps Camps, and to accept the use of State facilities for the purpose of providing shelter and equipment for evacuees. Such executive order to provide further for the administration of military areas for the purposes of this plan by appropriate military authorities acting with the requisitioned assistance of the other federal agencies and the cooperation of State and local agencies. The executive order should further provide that by reason of military necessity the right of all persons, whether citizens or aliens, to reside, enter, cross or be within any military areas shall be subject to revocation and shall exist on a pass and permit basis at the discretion of the Secretary of War and implemented by the necessary legislation imposing penalties for violation.

(2) That, pursuant to such executive order, there be designated as military areas all areas in Washington, Oregon and California, recommended by me to date for designation by the Attorney General as Category "A" areas and such additional areas as it may be found necessary to designate hereafter.

(3) That the Secretary of War provide for the exclusion from such military areas, in his discretion, of the following classes of persons, viz:
(a) Japanese aliens.
(b) Japanese-American citizens.
(c) Alien enemies other than Japanese aliens.
(d) Any and all other persons who are suspected for any reason by the administering military authorities to be actual or potential saboteurs, espionage agents, fifth columnists, or subversive persons.
(4) That the evacuation of classes (a), (b), and (c) from such military areas be initiated on a designated evacuation day and carried to completion as rapidly as practicable.

That prior to evacuation day all plans be complete for the establishment of initial concentration points, reception centers, registration, rationing, guarding, transportation to internment points, and the selection and establishment of internment facilities in the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Corps Areas.

That persons in class (a) and (c) above be evacuated and interned at such selected places of internment, under guard.

That persons in class (b) above, at the time of evacuation, be offered an opportunity to accept voluntary internment, under guard, at the place of internment above mentioned.

That persons in class (b) who decline to accept voluntary internment, be excluded from all military areas, and left to their own resources, or, in the alternative, be encouraged to accept resettlement outside of such military areas with such assistance as the State governments concerned or the Federal Security Agency may be by that time prepared to offer.

That the evacuation of persons in class (d) be progressive and continuing, and that upon their evacuation persons in class (d) be excluded from all military areas and left in their own resources outside of such military areas, or, in the alternative, be offered voluntary internment or encouraged to accept voluntary resettlement as above outlined, unless the facts in a particular case shall warrant other action.

(5) The Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, to be responsible for the evacuation, administration, supply and guard, to the place of internment; the Commanding Generals of the Corps Areas concerned to be responsible for guard, supply and administration at the places of internment.

(6) That direct communication between the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army and the Corps Area Commanders concerned for the purpose of making necessary arrangements be authorized.

(7) That the Provost Marshal General coordinate all phases of the plan between the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, on the one hand, and the Corps Area Commanders on the other hand.

(8) That all arrangements be accomplished with the utmost secrecy.

(9) That adult males (above the age of 14 years) be interned separately from all women and children until the establishment of family units can be accomplished.

(10) No change is contemplated in Category "B" areas.
3. Although so far as the Army is concerned, such action is not an essential feature of the plan, but merely incidental thereto, I, nevertheless, recommend that mass internment be considered as largely a temporary expedient pending selective resettlement, to be accomplished by the various Security Agencies of the Federal and State Governments.

4. The number of persons involved in the recommended evacuation will be approximately 133,000. (This total represents all enemy aliens and Japanese-American citizens in Category "A" areas recommended to date.)

5. If these recommendations are approved detailed plans will be made by this headquarters for the proposed evacuation. The number evacuated to be apportioned by the Provost Marshal General among the Corps Area Commanders concerned as the basis for formulating their respective plans. It is possible that the State of California, and perhaps the State of Washington, will be able to offer resettlement facilities for a given number of evacuees who may be willing to accept resettlement.

6. Pending further and detailed study of the problem, it is further recommended: (1) That the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, coordinate with the local and State authorities, in order to facilitate the temporary physical protection by them of the property of evacuees not taken with them; (2) That the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, determine the quantity and character of property which the adult males, referred to in paragraph 2b (9), may be permitted to take with them; and (3) That the Treasury Department or other proper Federal agency be responsible for the conservation, liquidation, and proper disposition of the property of evacuees if it cannot be cared for through the usual and normal channels.
J. L. DeWITT,
Lieutenant General,
U.S. Army, Commanding.
1 Incl: Map (in dup.).


PART II

EVACUATION -- ITS DEVELOPMENT IN SUMMARY


FOREWORD
Part II (Chapters IV, V and VI) contains a summary of the
evacuation program. The detailed chronology and analysis
of the operations appear in the succeeding chapters.



CHAPTER IV

The Emergence of Controlled Evacuation

The voluntary migration phase of evacuation was initiated by the promulgation of Public Proclamation No. 1, designating Military Area No. 1 as the zone from which persons of Japanese ancestry were to be required to leave during the first phase of evacuation. Between March 2 and March 10, 1942, the discussions as to evacuation procedures were general in nature and specific planning had not emerged. The voluntary movement did not gain momentum because means had not been provided on the ground for aiding evacuees in the solution of personal problems incident to their voluntary exodus.

Prior to March 10 the General Staff of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army had not engaged in any extensive planning or preparation for the program. The tactical duties imposed upon it were such that it was unable to do so and at the same time meet the responsibilities imposed on the Headquarters by the essentially military aspects of its mission. Accordingly, on March 10, by General Order No. 34, the Commanding General established the Civil Affairs Division as an addition to his general staff. On the day following by General Order No. 35 he created the Wartime Civil Control Administration as an operating agency of his Command to carry out assigned missions involving civil control.

With the creation of these agencies specific plans for the evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry from Military Area No. 1, and the California portion of Military Area No. 2 were immediately initiated. The War Department liaison representative was designated as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs, General Staff, and also as the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration. The offices of Civil Affairs Division, General Staff, and of the Wartime Civil Control Administration were established in the Whitcomb Hotel, San Francisco. The Wartime Civil Control Administration initiated its operations with a brief, but none the less all-inclusive, directive from the Commanding General:
"To provide for the evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry from Military Area No. 1 and the California portion of Military Area No. 2 of the Pacific Coast with a minimum of economic and social dislocation, a minimum use of military personnel and maximum speed; and initially to employ all appropriate means to encourage voluntary migration."
To facilitate the organization of the Wartime Civil Control Administration, and to streamline the procurement of personnel, office equipment, personal services and supplies, the Division of Central Administrative Services of the Office for Emergency Management responded to a request to extend its services to the Wartime Civil Control Administration. Almost overnight the Office for Emergency Management acquired office space in the Whitcomb Hotel, supplied and equipped these offices, and engaged qualified personnel to meet the requirements of the Director. Mr. Ralph B. Thompson, Regional Director of the Division of Central Administrative Services, personally supervised these activities. Funds were transferred to the Office for Emergency Management from appropriations available to the military establishment. This arrangement, which continued throughout the program with highly satisfactory results, was confirmed by letters of the Commanding General dated March 12, 1942. One of these letters was addressed to Mr. Dallas Dort, Director of that agency, and the other to Mr. Thompson, the Regional Director. These letters follow:
(File No. 323.3 WCCA)
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Office of the Commanding General
Presidio of San Francisco, California
March 12, 1942
"Mr. Dallas Dort
Director, Central Administrative Services
Office for Emergency Management
101 Indiana Avenue, Washington, D. C.

"Please arrange to provide the disbursing account assigned to Mr. Ralph B. Thompson, Director of Administrative Services, Merchandise Mart, San Francisco, with funds necessary to service the Wartime Civilian Control Administration under my command.

"His account will be reimbursed currently from funds under my direct control.

"Funds to protect obligations up to sixty days should be provided. It is estimated that $500,000.00 will be sufficient for the time being.
/s/ J. L. DeWitt
J. L. DeWitt,
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.,
Commanding."

(File No. 323.3 WCCA)
HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
Office of the Commanding General
Presidio of San Francisco, California
12 March 1942
"Mr. Ralph B. Thompson, Regional Director
Division of Central Administrative Services
1355 Market Street, San Francisco, California

"Dear Mr. Thompson:

"You are hereby authorized to commence immediately to render the administrative services, as outlined in your letter of March 11, 1942, to the Wartime Civilian Control Administration (under the direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army) under my command.

"Such services are to be rendered only upon order of Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen or his designated representative.

"You may utilize the procedure and necessary forms now used by you in servicing other emergency agencies.

"You will be reimbursed from appropriations available to the military establishment upon receipt of Standard Government Form 1080, "Voucher Adjustment" between appropriations and/or funds, properly supported by requisitions and vouchers.

"You will receive your orders and requests for service from only one source in each city or location serviced, that source to be designated in writing by Colonel Bendetsen or his successor.

"In performing this service you will not be subjected to jurisdiction or clearance with any department of the Army except upon my specific order.

"You are not authorized or expected to pay any obligations incurred by officers or civilian officials of the Wartime Civilian Control Administration which have not been ordered through your office under your regular procedures.

"By authority of the Secretary of War, acting under Executive Order No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942, I advise that you are authorized to contract for printing and binding ordered by the designated officer of the Wartime Civilian Control Administration without prior approval of the Government printing office.

"All special services rendered to date, namely the establishment of executive offices and the teletype services in the Whitcomb Hotel Building at the request of Colonel W. Fulton Magill are hereby approved.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ J. L. DeWitt
J. L. DeWitt,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
JLD/tgb Commanding."
As an initial step in the facilitation of voluntary emigration, 48 Wartime Civil Control Administration offices were established, one in each important center of Japanese population in the affected area. These offices were staffed by representatives of the cooperating Federal agencies which had agreed to undertake certain specific responsibilities in the program. The Federal Reserve Bank and the Farm Security Administration had undertaken to provide property protection, under the direction of the Wartime Civil Control Administration -- the former, primarily as to business and personal property; the latter primarily respecting agricultural property. The Federal Security Agency, through its various associated agencies, had agreed to provide necessary social services. The 48 Wartime Civil Control Administration offices (which became known as "Wartime Civil Control Administration Service Centers") were staffed by a team with one or more representatives from each of these agencies.

Through every available public information channel prospective evacuees were urged to prepare for evacuation, and to go to these offices for assistance in the solution of their personal problems. It was stated that they would receive aid in their actual migration to the interior. These offices were empowered -- among other things -- to pay the cost of transportation of evacuees to points in the interior. They undertook to locate specific employment opportunities for prospective evacuees.

This program met with measurable success in that approximately 9,000 persons of Japanese ancestry voluntarily emigrated from Military Area No. 1 to interior points. However, the attitude of the interior states was hostile. This group considered too dangerous to remain on the West Coast, was similarly regarded by State and local authorities, and by the population of the interior. The evacuees were not welcome. Incidents developed with increasing intensity, with the result that the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs, on March 21, recommended to the Commanding General that evacuation be placed on the basis of complete Federal supervision and control. By Proclamation No. 4, dated March 27, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry were required to remain within Military Area No. 1 and were not permitted to change their places of residence.

Essentially, military necessity required only that the Japanese population be removed from the coastal area and dispersed in the interior, where the danger of action in concert during any attempted enemy raids along the coast, or in advance thereof as preparation for a full scale attack, would be eliminated. That the evacuation program necessarily and ultimately developed into one of complete Federal supervision, was due primarily to the fact that the interior states would not accept an uncontrolled Japanese migration. Although the initial recommendation of February 14, 1942 (appendix to chapter 3, page 33, supra) contemplated the internment of alien Japanese, this was abandoned as a method of operation. Once authority had been granted to set the program in motion, the Commanding General encouraged and facilitated a voluntary exodus with free choice of destination in the interior of persons of Japanese ancestry.

Voluntary evacuation was Phase I of the program. Through the Federal Security Agency initially and, after March 12, 1942, when the Wartime Civil Control Administration was established, in cooperation with the other participating Federal agencies, the means were provided for assisting Japanese in undertaking a free exodus from the West Coast. The accompanying functional chart, Figure 2, is illustrative of the phases through which the evacuation process progressed. Chapter IX of this report presents in greater detail the history of the first phase.

FIGURE 2

Figure 2

During the period between March 12, the establishment of the Civil Affairs Division, General Staff, and the Wartime Civil Control Administration, and the announcement of Proclamation No. 4 on March 27, 1942, plans were going forward for the specific kind of evacuation that Proclamation No. 4 contemplated. Prior to March 12, when it was hoped that the evacuation would be characterized primarily by a voluntary exodus, the Commanding General had directed the acquisition and establishment of two "Reception Centers." These two Centers were to be developed at Manzanar and Parker. The "Reception Center" at Manzanar, California, is located in Owens Valley, Inyo County, at the easterly base of the Sierra. The Parker "Reception Center," now known as the Colorado River War Relocation Center, is located in Arizona on the Colorado River Indian Reservation along the Arizona-California boundary, south of Parker Dam. Originally, it was intended that each would have a capacity of 10,000 persons and that they would be used to provide temporary housing for those who were either unable to undertake their own evacuation, or who declined to leave until forced so to do.

As soon as specific evacuation plans had been initiated, it was foreseen that relocation facilities would have to be developed for virtually all evacuees. Accordingly, within a few days following March 12, site-selection parties were formed and dispatched to the interior states in the Western Defense Command to seek sites for the development of Relocation Centers. The Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, called a meeting of representatives of the Bureau of Reclamation, Department of Interior, the National Resources Planning Board, the Soil Conservation Service, the Farm Security Administration of the Department of Agriculture, the Work Projects Administration, and the Corps of Engineers, South Pacific Division. The object of this conference was to sift available data as to the location of potential Relocation Center sites and to organize site-selection parties. Two such parties were formed and each was assigned a military transport aircraft. One party was dispatched to cover the area lying north of the California-Oregon boundary and west of the Rocky Mountains. This party was joined by a representative of the North Pacific Division of the United States Engineer Corps. A second party was assigned to reconnoiter the area lying south of the Oregon-California boundary and west of the Rocky Mountains. These groups initiated their survey on March 16, 1942.

Following its establishment, the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, on March 12, 1942, requested that Mr. R. L. Nicholson, then Regional Director of the Work Projects Administration for the eleven Western States, come to San Francisco for a conference. He had participated in several informal pre-evacuation conferences at the request of Mr. Tom C. Clark, then the West Coast representative of the Anti-Trust Division of the Department of Justice. The Director requested him to join the staff of Wartime Civil Control Administration as Chief of the Assembly Center Branch of the Temporary Settlement Operations Division. In the course of the discussion, Mr. Nicholson stated that substantial numbers of Work Projects Administration field staff personnel would be available to Wartime Civil Control Administration as that agency's operations were rapidly diminishing in scope. The Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration asked that such personnel be recruited from Work Projects Administration offices to provide Wartime Civil Control Administration administrative staffs for assembly centers and for any reception centers that might be established. The understanding was that all such personnel would join the Wartime Civil Control Administration to be administratively responsible to the Director. It was further understood that, in accordance with the policy of the Commanding General to limit the use of military personnel, all center staff operations would be supervised by civilians. It was agreed that any personnel not available from among Work Projects Administration staff offices would be recruited independently. As internal security and police functions were not to be under the control of the Assembly Center Managers, the recruitment of police staffs, to be administratively responsible to the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, was not included in the arrangement.

Later, Mr. Nicholson advised that Work Projects Administration personnel, including himself, desired to retain their status with that agency without prejudice and that the Federal Works Agency (Work Projects Administration) would give its consent to an arrangement whereby such personnel would remain on the rolls of Work Projects Administration at Army expense subject, however, to the complete direction and administrative control of the Army. Accordingly, in order to preserve the status of such personnel, a letter of request from the Commanding General to Mr. Nicholson, dated March 28, 1942, was drafted in such manner as to call upon the Work Projects Administration, as an agency, to provide Assembly and Reception Center managerial personnel. The actual arrangement remained as initially agreed, however, viz., that the Commanding General, through Wartime Civil Control Administration as an agency would retain complete responsibility for the establishment, administration, and operation of Assembly Centers. All such personnel were administratively responsible to the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, and became a part of that organization. It is necessary, therefore, to bear the foregoing in mind in order fully to understand the letter of March 28, 1942, which, on its face, does not fully reflect the actuality. All plans, policies, and directives were developed by Wartime Civil Control Administration, and the manual of Assembly Center operations was issued by the Director. The letter of March 28, 1942, reads as follows:
March 28, 1942
"Mr. Rex L. Nicholson, Regional WPA Supervisor
W.C.C.A.
Whitcomb Hotel, San Francisco, California

"My dear Mr. Nicholson:

"Under authority granted to me by executive order of the President No. 9066 dated February 19, 1942, it is requested that the Work Projects Administration assume the responsibility for the direction and management of such assembly points and reception centers as may be assigned in connection with the program of evacuation of German, Italian and Japanese enemy aliens and persons of Japanese ancestry from restricted zones within the military areas established by my Military Proclamation No. 1 dated March 2, 1942, and by my Military Proclamation No. 2 dated March 16, 1942.

"Subject to general direction from my Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division, and in accordance with policies approved by him as the officer responsible for the execution of the Wartime Civil Control Administration, your agency is authorized to incur obligations and make expenditures from any funds available to it or made available to it by the War Department, in carrying out the duties and functions assigned. In this connection it is desired that you submit to the Asst. Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division, for approval, at the earliest possible date, a Budget Estimate of your fiscal requirements up to May 1, 1942 broken down in such detail as is immediately practicable. Reimbursement to the Work Projects Administration for expenditures made from any funds appropriated to the WPA will be from available funds subject to my control and allocation, appropriate orders having been issued in respect thereto.

"General plans and policies for the operation of Reception Centers and Assembly points will be worked out by you with my Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division, and subject to his final approval. The actual administration and management of the Assembly Points and Reception Centers will be the responsibility of your agency.

"After general plans and policies have been agreed upon, your general operation will be subject to inspection by my Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division, and his Deputy for Temporary Settlement Operations to insure conformance with the general plans and policies described. In the event that the operation of the Reception Centers or Assembly Points does not appear to be satisfactory, upon inspection, it is understood that determinations will be made as to necessary adjustments and revisions of policy and that such changes will be communicated to you by my Assistant Chief of Staff, Civil Affairs Division.
"Yours very truly,
/s/ J. L. DeWitt
J. L. DeWitt,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding."
Mr. Nicholson was succeeded as Chief of the Assembly Center Branch, Wartime Civil Control Administration, on June 30, 1942, by Mr. Emil Sandquist, who remained as Chief of that branch until completion of the program.

Meanwhile, the construction of the Manzanar and Parker Projects was being pushed. Forty-eight Wartime Civil Control Administration Service Centers were in operation for the encouragement of voluntary migration and, at the same time, site-selection parties were in the interior seeking sites for Relocation Centers.

The initiation of detailed evacuation planning established the impracticability of undertaking evacuation and relocation in the same operation. It became evident that the establishment of intermediate assembly facilities would be a prime essential to the accomplishment of a rapid, compulsory evacuation. The separation of these phases is best illustrated by a reference to the Wartime Civil Control Administration Functional Distribution Chart. (Figure 2, supra.) Accordingly, the selection of sites within the zone to be evacuated, near each evacuee community, for the establishment of Assembly Centers (initially called "Induction Centers") was undertaken at the same time when these other activities mentioned above were under way, viz., interior relocation site selection, the encouragement of voluntary migration and the operation of the Wartime Civil Control Administration Service Centers. The detailed plan called for the acquisition of Assembly Center sites where existing installations and facilities could be used to the maximum. Fairgrounds and race tracks were the primary source of such locations.

The Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, instituted a survey of all available Assembly Center locations with a view to the selection of places near to each center of evacuee population and susceptible of rapid adaptation to the purpose. The Commanding Generals of the Northwest Sector, the Northern and Southern California Sectors, and the Southern Land Frontier Sector, were also directed by the Commanding General to make recommendations as to suitable sites for this purpose. Seventeen such sites were selected, fifteen of which were ultimately used for evacuee housing, in addition to Manzanar and Parker. Twelve of these Centers, exclusive of Manzanar, were developed in California, one in Washington, one in Oregon, and one in Arizona, exclusive of Parker. The names and locations of these Centers are detailed in Chapter XIII.

The North and South Pacific Divisions of the United States Engineer Corps were requested to provide for the construction of suitable facilities at each of these sites, making maximum use of existing structures. The contemplated aggregate capacity (exclusive of Manzanar and Parker) was set at 100,000. The housing was to be suitable for family units, and central messing facilities were to be provided. A maximum of four weeks was allotted for completion of the projects. Thirteen of the fifteen Assembly Centers established were within the South Pacific Division of the United States Engineer Corps and, notwithstanding this unprecedented assignment, the schedule was substantially met. The Division Engineers received their requests for action on March 20, 1942, and the deadline was established for April 21. Specifications were provided by Wartime Civil Control Administration only in essential outline. One requirement was that construction be planned so that the reception of evacuees could be initiated in advance of completion of the entire Center.

While Assembly Center site selection was under way, and before construction was started, the pressure for the initiation of a definite evacuation movement reached the point where there was grave danger of serious incidents.

On March 21, 1942, the Wartime Civil Control Administration organized a voluntary evacuation of some 2,100 persons from Los Angeles, California, to Manzanar which was then, of course, still undergoing construction at a rapid rate. The Commanding General, Southern California Sector, Western Defense Command, provided escort for the convoy of cars and a collateral train movement. The Quartermaster, Western Defense Command, obtained the necessary transportation and subsistence, and the United States Public Health Service provided medical care. An advance party of voluntary evacuees had preceded the main party to assist the Manzanar Administrative Staff in preparing for the reception of the main party of 2,100. Local Los Angeles agencies aided, particularly the Maryknoll Mission. (See Chapters VII and VIII for division of responsibilities.)

On March 29, 1942, the first compulsory evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry from Bainbridge Island in Puget Sound, Washington, to Manzanar was executed pursuant to Exclusion Order No. 1, dated March 24, 1942.

When Proclamation No. 4 was announced, the construction of Assembly Centers on sites already selected was under way. The Work Projects Administration had provided a staff at Manzanar and was assembling personnel to administer other Assembly Centers as they were developed. Detailed plans were being formulated by Wartime Civil Control Administration to solve a variety of problems such as those of determining the supply and equipment requirements for each Assembly Center, for transportation of evacuees, for health, sanitation and education, and for all other Assembly Center operation requirements. Also, advanced planning for the designation of Exclusion Areas, for their orderly evacuation, for the designation of each evacuee group, for the maintenance of family units and of community balance within Centers had to be considered. As Wartime Civil Control Administration was being organized and a new staff recruited and trained, it was necessary to consider and solve these problems and at the same time place the program in execution.

With the initiation of the Assembly Center construction, initial supply requirements for Manzanar had been determined by the Wartime Civil Control Administration and requisitioned. These supplies were rapidly started toward destination by the Quartermaster, Western Defense Command. Plans had to be developed for internal security -- the policing of Assembly Centers. The question of evacuee employment, of their compensation, of the establishment of many social services such as barber shops, beauty shops, shoe repair facilities, clothing stores, hospital, optical and dental services, the warehousing of evacuee goods and chattels, all had to be considered and met. For none was there either precedent or pattern.

Complex as these operational aspects were, the problem was further compounded by the public relations aspect of the program. Rumors were rampant, public feeling ran high, the affected groups were in a state of confusion, and unscrupulous interests were seeking to take advantage of misfortune. There was, therefore, an impelling necessity for the formulation of a definitive public information and public relations program. This was immediately undertaken. A more detailed account of all these aspects of the program will appear in ensuing chapters.



CHAPTER V

Separation of Jurisdiction Over Evacuation and Relocation

When it became finally evident toward the end of February that a complete evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry from Military Area No. 1, and ultimately from the California portion of Military Area No. 2, would be ordered, discussions were initiated in Washington as to whether a separate agency should be created to undertake evacuee supervision and relocation after the Army had attained its objective. The primary basis for these discussions was that Army resources should not be expended in any direction not essential to the military aspects of the successful prosecution of the war. The Attorney General and other representatives of the Justice Department were also concerned with several post-evacuation considerations, particularly those revolving around the civil rights of American-born Japanese. Justice Department officials therefore urged the establishment of a separate civilian agency to undertake the post-evacuation phases of relocation. The Assistant Secretary of War, the Director of the Bureau of Budget and the Attorney General all participated in the consideration of this problem.

The desirability of establishing such an operating agency was generally agreed to when the Assistant Secretary of War came to the West Coast for a survey of the situation. He arrived at San Francisco on March 7, 1942, and brought with him representatives of the Treasury Department and of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The Treasury Department had accepted the responsibility of providing means for evacuee property protection under the direction of the Commanding General and had selected the Federal Reserve System, long its fiscal agent, as the instrumentality through which it would discharge this mission. The Assistant Secretary of War's party included Messrs. John Pehle, John Lawlor, and Ansel F. Luxford of the Treasury Department, and Governor M. S. Szymczak and Mr. W. B. Pollard of the Federal Reserve System. Mr. Milton S. Eisenhower, then Assistant to the Secretary of Agriculture, joined the party as he had participated in the Washington discussions concerning the proposed relocation agency. Mr. Eisenhower returned to Washington after having engaged in discussions with the Commanding General, the Assistant Secretary of War and other officials about March 11, 1942. Following his return, Executive Order of the President No. 9102 was published on March 18th. Under its terms, War Relocation Authority was established in the Office for Emergency Management in the Executive Office of the President. Mr. Eisenhower was named as its first Director. Broad powers were accorded. Primarily, however, the new agency became responsible for "the relocation (of evacuees) in appropriate places, providing for their needs in such manner as may be appropriate, and supervising their activities." Its power, authority and responsibility are clearly expressed in the order. {See Inclosure to letter of transmittal #7.}

Liaison was established between the Director, War Relocation Authority, and the Commanding General. Mr. Eisenhower returned to the Pacific Coast about the end of March and established temporary offices on the third floor of the Whitcomb Hotel building, San Francisco, adjacent to the office of the Wartime Civil Control Administration. Because of the primary interest of War Relocation Authority in the relocation aspects of evacuation, it was agreed that the selection of Relocation Center sites by the Army would be suspended, and that all data collected would be made available to War Relocation Authority for its use.

The Director of War Relocation Authority determined that the characteristics for each site should be such that all lands included were to be a part of the public domain; that each site have an optimum potential for the employment of all employables among evacuees there resident; and that there be sufficient water and suitable soil for agricultural development. It was further agreed that War Relocation Authority would make the selections subject to the approval of military authorities as to military security features. Also, it was agreed that the acquisition of sites would be through military channels, and that the Commanding General, Western Defense Command, would notify the Governor of each State concerned, prior to acquisition, of the military necessity for the construction of a Relocation Center on the chosen area. Some time later a formal agreement was executed between the War Department and War Relocation Authority, reflecting this understanding and providing for the construction of Centers on behalf of War Relocation Authority by the Army. This agreement, executed April 17, 1942, is found in Chapter XX.

The Western Defense Command, therefore, abandoned Relocation Center site selection and concentrated its efforts on controlled evacuation. Emphasis was placed by Wartime Civil Control Administration on evacuee property protection, provision for necessary social services, establishment of Assembly Centers, the evacuation of Japanese to Assembly Centers, operation of Assembly Centers, the construction and equipment of Relocation Centers and the transfer of evacuees from Assembly to Relocation Centers. It was difficult to locate suitable sites which met the standards prescribed. This, in combination with construction delays due to the scarcity of building materials, delayed the ultimate transfer from Assembly Centers to completed Relocation Centers for approximately four months.

Assembly Centers were originally conceived and established as a transitory facility and their adaptation to longer evacuee residence became essential. Bearing in mind the seriousness of the results which might ensue from over-long residence in facilities intended only to provide temporary shelter, the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, on April 22, 1942, emphasized these considerations to the Director, War Relocation Authority, in a memorandum to the following effect:
"1. The tempo of evacuation is under acceleration. Its accomplishment will place approximately 85,000 evacuees in assembly centers in the next six weeks. Assembly centers are not designed to provide suitable semi-permanent housing and other facilities. They are temporary in nature. Their facilities are transitory only. They are made necessary because of the time required to select relocation sites. Their objective is to meet the demand of military necessity and to avoid any retarding effect caused by relocation site selection.

"2. Assembly centers are not and cannot, without the expenditure of tremendous sums of money for space and facilities in duplication of those which will be provided on relocation sites, be designed to permit the development and maintenance of a vocational, educational, recreational and social program. Long residence in an assembly center is bound to have a demoralizing effect.

"3. The grave responsibility for the most rapid selection of relocation sites and the compilation of all necessary data to permit speedy acquisition and construction of relocation centers thereon cannot be overemphasized in view of the essential characteristics of assembly centers.

"4. In this connection, it is suggested that a representative of the office of the appropriate United States Army Division Engineer be included in War Relocation Authority site selection parties. This will produce a two-fold effect. (1) It will facilitate acquisition once a site is selected and the data compiled because the real estate section of the Division Engineer's Office will have been accorded the maximum advance notice. (2) It will facilitate the initiation of construction for manifest reasons in that advance information on the characteristics of a site will have been insured.

"5. From the long range point of view and the self-evident desirability of maintaining sound public relations, the suggestion is made that all personnel of both WCCA and WRA, and the associated cooperating federal agencies, bear in mind the necessity for and objective of assembly centers. Thus, their essential characteristics will be more readily understood. The attainment of any social ideal therein is beyond possibility for manifest reasons and the responsibility is grave to avoid misinterpretations. Failure to avoid it may initiate a chain of circumstances resulting in reprisals against our nationals in enemy hands."



CHAPTER VI

The Evacuation Method

With the formal organization of an Army agency charged with the general supervision of all evacuation activities, rather definite property protection and social service policies and practices emerged with a specific evacuation technique. The central theory of evacuation, upon which the method and technique was developed, was essentially the block system. The coastal strip was ultimately subdivided into 108 exclusion areas. Comprehensive statistical studies of the size and composition of the Japanese population in each of the areas were made. As a particular exclusion area became readied for evacuation, an Exclusion Order with specific Exclusion Instructions was promulgated.

A Civil Control Station was established immediately in the exclusion area concerned. This Control Station was staffed with a team of experts. On definite dates following the posting of an Exclusion Order in an "exclusion area", the heads of families, and each individual living alone, were required to report to the Civil Control Station in that area for instructions and registration. Representatives of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, of the Farm Security Administration, and the associated agencies of the Federal Security Agency, comprised the Control Station staff. The Commanding General of each Sector provided a military officer with several military police to act as a security group. Applications for exemption from evacuation were referred to Control Station Provosts. Normally, a representative of the United States Employment Service acted as the Station Manager for administrative purposes.

As many as 43 Civil Control Stations operated simultaneously at the peak of evacuation. At this time an average of 3,750 evacuees per day were being moved from their homes to Assembly Centers, or, in some cases, direct to Manzanar or Colorado River Relocation Centers.

The Department of Agriculture had designated the Farm Security Administration as its representative to undertake the responsibility for agricultural property protection. Mr. Laurence I. Hewes, the Pacific Coast Regional Director of the Farm Security Administration, supervised these activities. At conferences between the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, and Mr. Hewes, the details of the arrangements between the Farm Security Administration and Wartime Civil Control Administration were developed. These understandings were confirmed by correspondence dated March 15, 1942, and March 27, 1942, addressed to the Pacific Coast Regional Director of the Farm Security Administration. (Appendix (1) to Chapter VI, infra.)

In respect to a telegram dated March 14, 1942 (Appendix (2) to Chapter VI) from the Commanding General, the sum of $1,000,000 was made available from War Department appropriations for the purpose of making loans against evacuee crops and farm implements. The Farm Security Administration representatives, forming a part of Wartime Civil Control Administration, were entrusted with authority for making loans from this sum. The objective was to facilitate the procurement of substitute farm operators who would take over evacuated farms and other agricultural property, particularly where the financial condition of a given evacuee, or of a specific agricultural property, was such that sufficient moneys to continue operations could not be obtained through commercial sources.

Later this was augmented by an additional $4,000,000, obtained from funds available to the President. Both the evacuees and their communities of residence derived much benefit from these loans because many properties otherwise would have remained idle, and growing crops left unharvested. The Farm Security Administration organized for the task with great facility and soon developed a complete inventory of evacuee agricultural interests. Ultimately satisfactory arrangements were made for over 99 per cent of all this property. Arrangements were successfully accomplished to keep these properties in production without shrinkage in aggregate crop output.

Measures for evacuee property protection were rapidly developed following the arrival of the Assistant Secretary of War and of the representatives of the Treasury Department and Federal Reserve System who accompanied him. When the Wartime Civil Control Administration was organized the Director called upon the cooperating agencies to organize 48 Service Center teams. They complied rapidly. Under the immediate direction of Mr. William H. Hale, Vice-President of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, the bank's phase of evacuee property protection activities was rapidly developed. The arrangement between Western Defense Command and the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco was formally confirmed in letters from the Commanding General to the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, dated March 11th and April 5, 1942. (Appendix (3) to Chapter VI.)

Service center offices were established in downtown San Francisco, Los Angeles, Portland, and Seattle. These were staffed by personnel specially selected to aid evacuees with their problems.

At the request of the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, the Federal Reserve Bank also undertook responsibility for the storage of evacuee household goods. This included the acquisition of suitable warehouses, the employment of guards, and the installation of suitable means and methods to ensure a control and inventory of the stored property. As will be outlined in greater detail later in this report, the Wartime Civil Control Administration formulated definite policies, implemented with detailed instructions and forms, in the matter of household goods storage. Any type of personal property was accepted for storage, including business property and automobiles. Farm implements were warehoused, through the Farm Security Administration's organization. As for automobiles and trucks, the Army offered to purchase any automobile or truck at Blue Book value, through the Federal Reserve Bank, if an evacuee desired to sell. Evacuee response to the property protection services was most gratifying, and clearly indicated their effectiveness.

As already noted, the associated agencies of the Federal Security Agency accepted responsibility for providing all necessary social and public health services. These allied agencies included the United States Employment Service, the Bureau of Public Assistance, Social Security Board, and the United States Public Health Service. The scope and magnitude of the functions performed by these allied agencies will be described in detail in subsequent chapters. Mr. Richard M. Neustadt, Regional Director of the Federal Security Agency, agreed to place all of the facilities of the organizations under his direction at the disposal of the Wartime Civil Control Administration. The closest liaison was constantly maintained. A letter in confirmation of the arrangement made between the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, and Mr. Neustadt was forwarded by the Commanding General on March 31, 1942. (Appendix (4) to Chapter VI.)

Among the manifold services provided by these agencies, the United States Public Health Service undertook to examine each evacuee for contagious diseases prior to his entry into an Assembly Center. It also undertook the acquisition of infirmary and hospital equipment, and medical supplies for Assembly Centers, and to make suitable auxiliary arrangements for hospitalization of evacuees in private and public hospitals adjacent to Assembly Centers. Further, it supervised the entire medical program within the Centers.

The United States Employment Service provided the Manager for each Civil Control Station and Wartime Civil Control Administration Service Center. The Bureau of Public Assistance, Social Security Board, in collaboration with the United States Employment Service, undertook the initial interview of each evacuee to determine his individual problems and the social and property protection services he would require. These two agencies also undertook the recruitment of advanced parties of evacuee workers for each Assembly Center. These parties were recruited, organized and transported to each Assembly Center well in advance of the induction of the first groups of evacuees. Thus the Assembly Center staffs were able to organize a skeleton force for the reception of the new Center residents.

At the request of the Director, Wartime Civil Control Administration, the Office of Price Administration sent a liaison representative to be available for consultation, advice, and the initiation of any necessary action. He established a liaison section at Wartime Civil Control Administration, and remained during the initial phases of evacuation. This relationship was established because it was foreseen that some control might have to be applied to arrest widespread deflation of values. This in turn might have adversely affected the economic structure of the West Coast. This did not prove to be the case. No price control measures were applied.

The Post Office Department effectively cooperated throughout the entire operation. When it became essential to devise means for maintaining an account of the progress of voluntary migration, postmasters throughout the Western Defense Command administered the change of address reporting system. Later, during Assembly Center operations, branch post offices were promptly established in each Center. The Inspectors in charge of the San Francisco and Seattle Divisions promptly responded to all Wartime Civil Control Administration requirements.

By arrangement with the Attorney General, the Department of Justice, through the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the United States Attorneys, acted as the enforcing agency for all of the Proclamations and Exclusion Orders of the Commanding General, promulgated under Executive Order No. 9066. Although prosecutions in connection with the Japanese evacuation were few, the number of cases of violation of the Commanding General's Curfew and Travel restrictions, applicable to alien enemies, were many. Through the agency of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, State and local law-enforcement agencies cooperated and assisted in enforcement of the evacuation program primarily by reporting promptly any and all cases of failure to comply with Exclusion Orders. To insure the closest working relationship between Western Defense Command and the enforcement agencies of the Department of Justice, preliminary understandings for collaboration were embodied in a memorandum from the Commanding General to the Assistant Secretary of War dated April 20, 1942. (Appendix (5) to Chapter VI.)

The cooperation of the participating Federal agencies, and the high devotion to duty displayed by all of their personnel was outstanding. The willingness of all concerned to apply themselves to the task without regard to personal convenience, or to the hours of duty, cannot be left unmentioned.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VI

Appendix 1

"15 March 1942
"Mr. Laurence I. Hewes, Jr., Regional Director
Farm Security Administration
30 Van Ness Avenue
San Francisco, California

"Dear Mr. Hewes:

"By virtue of and pursuant to the authority vested in me as Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, and in order to effectuate the removal of any enemy aliens and other persons designated by me, engaged in farming operations who evacuate from restricted and prohibited areas lying within my command, you are hereby ordered and authorized as follows:

"1. To institute and administer a program which will insure continuation of the proper use of agricultural lands voluntarily vacated by enemy aliens and other persons designated by me, and which will insure fair and equitable arrangements between the evacuees and the operators of their property.

"2. To incur the necessary administrative expenses, including the payment of personnel and necessary traveling expenses to be reimbursed by me upon presentation of reimbursement vouchers.

"3. From funds made available or to be made available by me, to make, service and collect loans, including the provision of necessary farm management advice and guidance.

"4. To redelegate to such officers and employees of the Farm Security Administration as you may designate, any part of the authority herein contained.
"Sincerely yours,
/s/ J. L. DeWitt
J. L. DeWitt,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding."

March 27, 1942

MEMORANDUM For Mr. Larry I. Hewes, Farm Security Administration Subject: Exercise of freezing power of agricultural property.

1. I have been directed by the Commanding General to advise you as follows:

2. After extended consideration of your mission and the problems attendant upon its accomplishment, it has been concluded that there is necessity for a revision in the method and circumstances wherein the freezing power is now exercised.

3. In your relationship with the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, you are regarded as a representative of the Department of Agriculture, and I understand from my conversations with you that, in the accomplishment of the mission assigned the Department, you, as its representative, are employing all of the available departmental agencies. In this connection, I further understand that the Agricultural War Boards established in each county by order of the Secretary of Agriculture, have a membership comprising a representative of every agency of the Department of Agriculture.

4. The primary mission imposed upon the Commanding General is accomplishment of the evacuation in satisfaction of military necessity. In the accomplishment of his mission, he has prescribed that it shall be carried out (a) with a minimum loss in agricultural production consistent with prompt execution, and (b) with a maximum of fair dealing to all concerned. In the latter case, protection of the property interests of evacuees and avoidance, so far as practicable, of economic dislocation are major phases of the prescribed method.

5. In responding to the request of the Commanding General to the Secretary of War, the Agriculture Department has therefore accepted the mission of performing the following:
(a) To do everything reasonably necessary to prevent any crop loss subsequent upon evacuation and to reduce to a minimum the spoilage or loss of growing crops;
(b) To assist the evacuee in providing a substitute tenant or operator and at the same time to preserve the evacuee's equity to the fullest practicable extent consistent with the circumstances in each case;
(c) If necessary to take over and operate property where, in the absence of such action, growing crops would be neglected or abandoned or where the evacuee's equity, though of reasonable substance, would otherwise deteriorate.
6. In order to accomplish these objectives it is essential that the power to "freeze" agricultural property, crops, farm implements and. agricultural equipment, lease-hold interests, be readily available for application in cases of necessity.

7. As the Agricultural War Boards have been organized in each county, it must follow that such Boards are familiar with local problems and conditions. They also have the personnel available to make prompt investigation and recommendation upon the recommendation of the Farm Security field agent. I therefore propose that the "freezing" powers necessary to the accomplishment of the objectives stated be applied only upon the recommendation of the appropriate county War Board; that such boards be the final arbiter as to whether or not the power to freeze be exercised in any given case.

8. In this way, the action taken to "freeze" in any instance will represent the considered judgment of all agricultural agencies. It is immaterial to me whether the agency empowered to "freeze" on such recommendation is the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, one of its member banks or agencies, or whether it is the field agent of the Farm Security Administration.

9. I am furnishing a copy of this memorandum to Mr. William H. Hale, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco; Mr. Milton Eisenhower, War Relocation Authority; Mr. Ed Dodd, Director, Western Division, Department of Agriculture; and Mr. Dave Davidson, chairman, California War Board. Concurrently I am recommending to the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, that he approve the program outlined and that in furtherance of your mission, where property is "frozen" and operated by your Agency, funds be made available for such operation, as for the hiring of operators and for the purchase of feed and seed, etc.
Karl R. Bendetsen, Colonel, G. S. C,
Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Affairs, Directing, WCCA.

Copies to:
Mr. Wm. H. Hale
Mr. Milton Eisenhower
Mr. Ed Dodd
Mr. Dave Davidson

Appendix 2

"14 MARCH 1942
"CHIEF OF STAFF
"WAR DEPARTMENT
"WASHINGTON, D. C.

"ORDERLY ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE MISSION ASSIGNED ME UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER NINE NAUGHT SDC SIX DATED FEBRUARY NINETEEN COMMA NINETEEN FORTY TWO BY LETTER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR DATED FEBRUARY TWENTY COMMA NINETEEN FORTY TWO RENDERS IMPERATIVE THE AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR THE MAKING OF CROP LOANS IN ORDER TO AVOID THE LOSS OF GROWING CROPS PLANTED BY JAPANESE FARMS WHO WILL BE EXCLUDED FROM THE PACIFIC COASTAL FRONTIER STOP SUCH FUNDS ARE NEEDED FOR SPRAYING AND FOR FINANCING OPERATIONS BY PERSONS PROCURED TO SUBSTITUTE AS FARM OPERATORS IN THE PLACE OF EVACUEES STOP THE STIMULUS OF VOLUNTARY EVACUATION ON THE PART OF AFFECTED GROUPS WILL BE GREATLY ENHANCED IF AN ALLOTMENT OF FUNDS FROM THE CHIEF OF STAFFS CONTINGENT FUND OR THE PRESIDENTS EMERGENCY FUND IS MADE FOR THIS PURPOSE STOP OFFICERS OF THE FARM CREDIT AND FARM SECURITY ADMINISTRATION COMMA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE COMMA WORKING IN COLLABORATION WITH THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM ARE UNDERTAKING TO MAKE LOANS IN PROPER CASES AND TO ESTABLISH A MEANS FOR SECURITY AND REPAYMENT ON A SUITABLE BASIS STOP THIS MATTER HAS ALREADY BEEN REFERRED INFORMALLY TO GENERAL BROWN COMMA BUDGET OFFICER FOR THE WAR DEPARTMENT STOP PRIORITY ACTION IS URGENTLY REQUESTED.
"DeWITT
"COMDG WDC AND FOURTH ARMY"

Appendix 3

"March 11, 1942
"Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,
"San Francisco, California.

"Sirs:

"By virtue of orders issued by the War Department on December 11, 1941, the entire Pacific Coast of the United States was established as the Western Defense Command and designated as a theatre of operations under my command.

"By Executive Order No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942, the President of the United States authorized and directed the Secretary of War and the military commanders whom he may from time to time designate to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate military commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave, shall be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate military commander may impose in his discretion.

"The Secretary of War, on February 20, 1942, designated the undersigned as the military commander to carry out the duties and responsibilities imposed by said Executive Order for that portion of the United States embraced in the Western Defense Command.

"On March 2, 1942, pursuant to authority vested in me, I issued Public Proclamation No. 1, under which I designated and established certain military areas and zones. It is my intention, by subsequent proclamations, to exclude certain persons and classes of persons from all of Military Area No. 1, and also from such of those zones described in said Public Proclamation No. 1 as Zones A-2 to A-99 inclusive as are within Military Area No. 2. The evacuees will include Japanese, German and Italian aliens and persons of Japanese ancestry now resident in Military Area No. 1. I am familiar with the contemplated program dealing with the problem of evacuees and I find that the prompt execution of such a program is essential to the successful prosecution of the war and the performance of my duty under Executive Order No. 9066. Accordingly, I hereby authorize and direct you to take all steps which in your judgment are necessary or desirable in order to carry out the objective of the program.

"You are authorized and requested to employ such personnel and set up such offices within the Western Defense Command as you may consider advisable, necessary or expedient for the purpose of carrying out the program of dealing with the property interests of said evacuees. You are further authorized to employ such personnel and appoint such sub-agents as you may see fit in connection therewith.

"You will be reimbursed for all necessary and proper expenses incurred in connection with the carrying out of this program. Furthermore, you are directed to perform any and all acts incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of this program, and as such you are, of course, entitled to be reimbursed for all necessary and proper expenses and obligations arising out of such agency, for which under law such an agent would be entitled to reimbursement.

"It is understood that in executing the foregoing no warranty of my authority is included nor is any personal liability imposed upon or assumed by the undersigned.
"Very truly yours,
"J. L. DeWitt,
"Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding."

"Apr 5, 1942
"Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,
"San Francisco, California.

"Sirs:

"Reference is made to my letter dated March 11, 1942, addressed to you, in which I authorize and direct you to take all steps which in your judgment are necessary or desirable in order to carry out the objective of the program dealing with the problem of evacuees from Military Area No. 1, as designated and established in my Public Proclamation No. 1, dated March 2, 1942.

"Last week the Congress of the United States enacted and on March 21, 1942, the President of the United States approved Public Law, No. 503, 77th Congress, under the terms of which whomsoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in any military area or any military zone prescribed, under the authority of an executive order of the President, by the Secretary of War, or by any military commander designated by the Secretary of War, contrary to the restrictions applicable to any such area or zone or contrary to the order of the Secretary of War or any such military commander, shall, if it appears that he knew or should have known of the existence and extent of the restrictions or order and that this act was in violation thereof, be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be subject to certain penalties stated therein.

"Accordingly, by virtue of the additional authority vested in me by said Public Law, No. 503, 77th Congress, approved by the President of the United States on March 21, 1942, as well as by virtue of all other authority vested in me by Executive Order No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942, the orders and designation issued by the Secretary of War on February 20, 1942, designating the undersigned as a Military Commander to carry out the duties and responsibilities embodied by said Executive Order No. 9066 for that portion of the United States embraced within the Western Defense Command, and pursuant to all other authority vested in me, I hereby authorize and direct you to continue to take all steps which in your judgment are necessary or desirable in order to carry out the objectives of the program dealing with the problem of evacuees from the Western Defense Command and particularly Military Area No. 1, embraced therein.
"Very truly yours,
"J. L. DeWitt,
"Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding."

Appendix 4

"March 31, 1942
"Federal Security Agency,
"785 Market Street,
"San Francisco, California.

"Attention: Mr. Richard M. Neustadt:

"Dear Mr. Neustadt:

"Under authority of the Executive Order of the President, No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942, your Agency has been assigned certain functions and duties by me, to be performed in aid of the program for evacuation of German, Italian and Japanese enemy aliens and persons of Japanese ancestry, from strategic zones within the military areas established by my Public Proclamation No. 1, dated March 2, 1942, and Public Proclamation No. 2, dated March 16, 1942.

"Subject to my directions and instructions and in accordance with approved policies, your Agency is authorized and directed to incur obligations and make expenditures from any funds available to it in carrying out the duties and functions assigned. In this connection it is desired that you submit, for approval, without delay, a budget estimate of your funds requirements to May 1, 1942, broken down in such detail as is practicable at the present time.

"Payment for obligations incurred or funds expended under the approved budget estimate will be made from funds subject to my control and allocation.
"Yours very truly,
"J. L. DeWitt,
"Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding."

Appendix 5

"At a conference in my office during the afternoon of April 20, 1942, attended by Mr. Tom C. Clark, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, Mr. Nat L. Pieper, Special Agent in Charge, San Francisco office. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Brigadier-General J. L. Bradley, Chief of Staff, Colonel Joel F. Watson, Judge Advocate, Colonel Karl R. Bendetsen, Assistant Chief of Staff, the following procedure, predicated upon correspondence exchanged between your office and the Assistant to the Attorney General, governing procedure and liaison between the War Department, the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, and the Department of Justice, was agreed upon:

"1. (a) All orders and proclamations issued by me pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order of the President, No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942, as the Military Commander designated by the Secretary of War by letter dated March 20, 1942, to carry out the provisions of the cited Executive Order, involving enforcement of the penalties provided by Public Law No. 503, 77th Congress, approved March 20, 1942, will be transmitted to the Assistant Secretary of War by telephone or telegraph for clearance with the Assistant to the Attorney General, Mr. James Rowe, Jr. The Department of Justice has indicated that it will respond with all practicable dispatch and that upon clearance of such orders and proclamations it will undertake enforcement of the penalties provided by the cited law. Thereafter, in the case of any such approved proclamation or order, direct communication between the local Department of Justice representative, viz., Mr. Tom C. Clark (or whomever may be so designated by the Justice Department) for the several United States District Attorneys, will be authorized.

"(b) The present form of general exclusion order and general supporting instructions employed in effectuating the evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry having been approved will not be so submitted. Any necessary enforcement of the penalties provided by the cited Statute in connection with evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry under such exclusion orders and supporting instructions will be undertaken by the Department of Justice. For local operational purposes, Sector Commanders are authorized to communicate directly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Special Agent in Charge, for the District in which evacuation projects are entrained. Similar direct communication with the appropriate District Attorney is also authorized. Warning notices of impending exclusion orders and copies of the exclusion order will, in each case, be transmitted to Mr. Nat L. Pieper, Special Agent in Charge, San Francisco office, for communication to other Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agents in Charge and to local police. Similar material will be furnished Mr. Tom C. Clark for transmission by his office to the appropriate District Attorneys and the United States Marshals. Mr. Clark will also continue to undertake to keep the Department of Justice fully informed as to progress of evacuation as reflected by the copies of warning memoranda and exclusion orders furnished him.

"(c) The form of individual exclusion order is currently being submitted to your office for transmission to Mr. Rose in accordance with the arrangement. Upon approval of the form and substance of the individual exclusion order, it is the understanding that the Department of Justice will undertake any necessary enforcement of the penalties provided by Public Law No. 503, supra. Once the form and substance of the individual exclusion order has been approved it is understood that no further clearance with the Department of Justice will be necessary, and that individual exclusion orders may be issued without further reference to the Department of Justice. Communication to arrange the necessary enforcement of such individual exclusion orders, as presently understood, will be through Mr. Nat L. Pieper, Special Agent in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, but should any Court proceedings develop, local liaison will be through Mr. Tom C. Clark, Special Assistant to the Attorney General.

"2. On the basis of current understandings the procedure outlined above will be followed. It is requested, however, that confirmation of the Department of Justice be obtained as soon as practicable.
"/s/ J. L. DeWitt,
"J. L. DeWitt,
"Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding."


PART III

EVACUATION -- THE MECHANICS FOR ITS ACCOMPLISHMENT


CHAPTER VII

Organization and Functions of Civil Affairs Division, General Staff, and Wartime Civil Control Administration and Other Agencies







Preservation of a People - Table of Contents