|
-- Page 2 --
TESTIMONY OF DAVID LOWMAN Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Lowman. Your statement, I assume you wish it to be made a part of the record. Mr. LOWMAN. Yes, sir; I do. Mr. HALL. It will be made a part of the record, along with information about the author himself. I have a few questions that I would like to ask, please. Angus MacBeth, special counsel to the Commission, stated in testimony before this committee that MAGIC information played no role in the decisionmaking process of those who ordered the exclusion, because if it had, their memos, letters, diaries and phone calls would have referred to MAGIC. Do you have any comment on this statement? Second, do you have any comment on the Commission's analysis of the intelligence information that was available to the President at the time the decision regarding evacuation were being made? Mr. LOWMAN. Sir, on the first point, Gen. George Marshall was almost obsesses with the fact that the Japanese might learn that we had broken their codes. It was a very fragile kind of information and had to be protected with great zeal. The system for distributing MAGIC to the select group who received it was as follows. It was selected in the Navy by Commander Kramer, in the Army by Colonel Bratton, who delivered the message personally to the recipients. It was carried in a pouch which the recipients only had the key to. When the pouch was delivered to the recipients, they used their keys to unlock it. The read the messages, and gave the pouch back to Commander Kramer or Colonel Bratton. In some cases, they kept it overnight, particularly at the State Department, but it was kept in that locked pouch. It was common practice never to talk about MAGIC on the phone, and never to make memos where somebody not on the select list might find them. Every precaution was taken to not tip off that this kind of information was around. It was simply not available information except in very narrow and restricted channels. What was the other question, sir? Mr. HALL. The second question was, and I think you have answered that possibly in your testimony, as to what information that was available to the President at the time the decisions regarding evacuation were being made. Mr. LOWMAN. In summary, what was available to the President was information from Japanese broken codes which revealed the existence of Japanese espionage nets on the West Coast, controlled by the Japanese Government, and utilizing Japanese residents, first and second generation, apparently in large numbers. What was also available to the President and his advisers were intelligence bulletins put out by the Director of Military Intelligence for Army and by the Office of Naval Intelligence warning of the existence of these nets on the West Coast. Mr. HALL. What information--- Mr. LOWMAN. Excuse me, sir; there is one additional factor he was aware of. He was also aware of the fact that hundreds of messages were going back to Tokyo containing national defense information. Mr. HALL. What information did MAGIC reveal to the President and his advisers regarding the development or existence of Japanese-directed espionage on the West Coast? Mr. LOWMAN. Well, he had -- I repeat, sir; he had the messages that were intercepted which revealed the existence of these nets, which revealed the employment of Japanese nationals and second generation, he had intelligence reports from the intelligence services, and there were the messages going back with national defense information. Mr. HALL. Were these MAGIC cables going from consulate to consulate, from the Japanese consulate to the American consulate; and in reverse order, from the American consulate to the Japanese consulate? Mr. LOWMAN. Perhaps I should take a moment and give a little bit more background which will answer your question on these communications. MAGIC intelligence was that information which passed between Japanese diplomatic posts enciphered in cryptographic systems held by the Foreign Ministry. There were some 14 such systems. MAGIC applied to information all over the world, because the Japanese had diplomatic posts all over the world. But coming into the United States, it took usually two forms. The highest grade system, which was called Purple, a machine system, was held only at Embassy level. So messages enciphered in the Purple system would not go to Japanese consulates, but only go to the Embassy. Now the Embassy might retransmit that information in what was called the Consular Code, which all of the Japanese consuls used around the world. It was a relatively high-grade system, but it was a hand system as opposed to a machine system, which was what Purple was. So all of these organizations could communicate with each other and, in fact, did. There were some messages, but very few, between the consulates -- most of the communications were between Tokyo and the consulates or from the Embassy to the consulates -- some side communications, but not many. There were also what was called bulletins or circulars which went automatically to all diplomatic posts. Sometimes they would send something to one consulate on the West Coast, for example, and ask that he distribute this to other consulates on the West Coast. So there were a variety of ways. Mr. HALL. Did our people in Washington, prior to December 7, 1941, have access to all of those methods? Mr. LOWMAN. Yes, sir. Mr. HALL. Is that all a part of MAGIC that you referred to? Mr. LOWMAN. All of the MAGIC communications worldwide went to the group in Washington, the Army and the Navy group, who broke out the messages and distributed them as we have discussed. The volume on that was about 50 to 70 messages a day. About 25 messages a day were selected for distribution. Mr. HALL. The report of the Commission states that there was no espionage by persons of Japanese ancestry on the West Coast. Do you have any information on that, sir? Mr. LOWMAN. Yes, sir. I think the very existence of the MAGIC cables and the intelligence reports is evidence of that. Mr. HALL. But do we have any evidence of any particular incidents happening out there that were caused by the Japanese who were later relocated? Mr. LOWMAN. Well, we have this sequence. We have the order to hire Japanese first and second generation; we have messages going back from the consulate saying we have hired them, they are now working for us; then you have the messages themselves containing the requested information going back to Tokyo. In addition to that, you have the two reports which I introduced into the record here, the Office of Naval Intelligence report and the Army report. Do you have names in mind? Mr. HALL. No. I am just thinking of all of the accusations that have been made about matters occurring on the West Coast. I have no names in mind at all. Let me go one step further. After we had access to these MAGIC codes, but prior to Pearl Harbor, did our authorities ever seek to arrest anyone whom they thought might be responsible for providing this secret information that they had elicited from the MAGIC cables? Mr. LOWMAN. To my knowledge, there were no concerted actions in this direction. As you know, to make an accusation of espionage or treason stick requires a good deal of time and effort and evidence. That kind of approach was not made, to my knowledge. However, I might add that immediately after Pearl Harbor, some 2,000 Japanese were picked up by the FBI where there was information that they might have had some allegiance to Japan. These cases were never pursued after the evacuation issue came along. Everybody was interned and there was no effort made to prosecute these people. If we had tried to run down and lay the evidence necessary to make mass arrests, it would have absorbed all of the counterespionage sources that we possibly could muster together, it would have taken months, and it would have made practically no dent whatsoever. Moreover, MAGIC evidence could not have been used in evidence for security reasons. Mr. HALL. Are you aware of any approach other than exclusion that would have achieved the President's military security goals? Mr. LOWMAN. The Commission's witness, Commander Ringle, had proposed another solution. His proposal was that we could set up hearing boards. We pretty much knew, in his estimation, who were the potentially dangerous people. He thought these military hearings then could sort through all of the Japanese residents and pick out those who were potentially dangerous. May I read to you something from one of Ringle's reports? He felt, for example, that the Kibei could be readily identified and that they should be considered guilty until proven otherwise. Now Kibei were Japanese-Americans who had been sent to Japan for schooling during the formative years of their lives. There were a great many of these people. Let me read to you what Ringle said about them. "The most potentially dangerous element of all are those American citizens of Japanese ancestry who have spent the formative years of their lives, from 10 to 20, in Japan and have returned to the United States to claim their legal American citizenship within the last few years. These people are essentially and inherently Japanese, and may have been deliberately sent back to the United States by the Japanese Government as agents. In spite of their legal citizenship and the protection accorded them by the Bill of Rights, they should be looked upon as enemy aliens and many of them placed in custodial detention. This group numbers between 600 and 700 in the Los Angeles Metropolitan Area, and at least that many in other parts of southern California."Ringle's solution was to take all these people who had had this training in Japan, plus others who belonged to certain organizations -- for example, there were at least half a dozen organizations which many Japanese belonged to, which the Office of Naval Intelligence said all the people in these organizations would be given espionage and sabotage tasks in the event of war -- Ringle's solution was to incarcerate all these kinds of people and thus the most dangerous elements would have been removed. These people would be identified by individual hearings. But, obviously, the Government did not agree that at that crucial time we could sit back and hold hearings on that many people. Mr. HALL. In your statement, you have indicated footnote references and numbers. Are those references to the actual cable that was deciphered that you have referred to? Mr. LOWMAN. Yes, sir. Every cable I have referred to in my testimony has a cite number so that you can turn to that and go to a particular volume and message in the DOD publication. Mr. HALL. These volumes that you have on the table, what are those books? Mr. LOWMAN. The history of these books is as follows: After the Pearl Harbor attack--- Mr. HALL. Let me interrupt a minute because of the time limitations. Do those books contain the MAGIC cables? Mr. LOWMAN. Yes, sir. Mr. HALL. All right. Mr. LOWMAN. They contain most of the MAGIC cables intercepted in 1940 and 1941. All of the important ones are in there. Mr. HALL. I notice on page 11 of your statement, you said, "In April, Tokyo instructed all the consulates to wire home lists of first and second generation Japanese according to specified categories." You have that ticketed as number 28. Just for my own information, what does that mean, that number 28? Mr. LOWMAN. All right, we turn to the footnote number 28 in my report, and that says, "Go to MAGIC volume 1, No. 167." Mr. HALL. Just tracing this down, do you have that before you now? Mr. LOWMAN. Yes, sir, I do. No. 167. This is from Tokyo -- Konoye, who was the Deputy to the Foreign Minister -- to San Francisco. Mr. HALL. What is the date? Mr. LOWMAN. The date is April 19, 1941. The cable says as follows: Please wire immediately of the information you have based on the figures in your office taken at the time of the census in October of last year on the following points:Mr. HALL. Going throughout your testimony -- I am not going to go into any other details of it -- but all of the other statements that you make -- for instance, on page 14, "We shall maintain connection with our second generation who are at present in the Army to keep us informed on various developments in the Army," No. 38. Mr. LOWMAN. No. 38 identifies where the message can be found. Mr. HALL. I presume that is the same procedure that you have just given to us on this other one. Mr. LOWMAN. You would turn to MAGIC volume 1, message No. 174. Mr. HALL. So all of your quotes which you footnoted with a number are based on an actual MAGIC code as of the date that you specify in your statement? Mr. LOWMAN. That is correct, sir. Every reference I make to messages, you can find the message in these books. Mr. HALL. I yield to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. McCollum. Mr McCOLLUM. Thank you. You have presented some very fascinating testimony and history, and we certainly appreciate that fact. I would like to know something just for my information. You have related to us footnotes, and I have looked at some of them, references, sources, in addition, of course, to MAGIC. If, as you say, the details of the code, and so on, were kept as secret and as close to the vest as they were by the participants, how do you as a researcher, as a person who has been in the intelligence field and more or less the consultant historian on this, know so much now about those procedures like their codes being carried in a pouch with a key and all of that type of thing you described to us if it was not recorded by the participants? How do you know that now? Mr. LOWMAN. Most of the information containing detail, as you have just described, comes from the Joint Congressional Inquiry of the Pearl Harbor Attack. The Nation felt that somehow it had to find out how this happened to us. So altogether there were eight different hearings trying to determine what happened at Pearl Harbor. The eighth and the last, and probably the final, was the Joint Congressional Committee composed of people from the Senate and the House. They spent months on this investigation. President Truman declassified MAGIC for them so they could take that into consideration in their hearings. They interviewed everybody who had some possible information to contribute. They read everything that had some bearing on it. Their hearings are contained in 39 volumes. The kind of detail that we just discussed comes out of there, from testimony of people who were actually involved. Mr McCOLLUM. I thank you for giving us that, because that is one of our great problems, digesting tidbits of information, and then the sources for them are somewhat obscure sometimes. I have another question that is a little different. You have obviously been quite a historian of the intelligence period of World War II, and I assume just not the Japanese intelligence but the intelligence on Germany during that time. It has always been kind of an obscure question mark with me as to why we took these steps against Japanese -- and you have explained that rather well today -- and we didn't take the same type of action against German-Americans. Was there a reason for this? What was the difference as you see it? Could you tell us about that? Mr. LOWMAN. Sir, I can tell you very little about it because I have not researched that particular aspect of the question. I can tell you this, however, which might answer part of your question. In the summer of 1941, we closed the consulates of Italy and Germany in this country. The reasons given for closing those consulates were that they were involved in espionage. We did not close the consulates of the Japanese, who obviously were involved in espionage. It turns out that we were not reading at that time the diplomatic codes coming from the German consulates, and we didn't know what they were up to. So we figured we better get them out because we were blind. But we purposely kept open the Japanese consulates because we could keep our finger on the pulse of what was happening and what they were doing. That is only a partial answer. I am sorry, but I have not researched in detail the German situation. Mr McCOLLUM. I was just curious about that. In your testimony, you also indicated at one point that the Army had its own intelligence -- or at least I gather they did -- somewhat separate from MAGIC, or their recommendations came along that way. Is that correct? Were there other intelligence factors you have sort of alluded to besides MAGIC involved in the recommendations to the President, or did the Army rely on MAGIC through the chain that you described to us earlier? Mr. LOWMAN. Both the Army G2 and the Navy -- and there are many statements to this effect -- relied very heavily on MAGIC. It was their single most important input. In fact, some of the authors of this era have accused the Army and Navy intelligence offices of relying too much on MAGIC and, therefore, not developing other modes of intelligence. But the other modes of intelligence the Army and the Navy did have were primarily through informers who belonged to various groups and associations, that kind of thing, and it focused in largely on the organizations that the Japanese had in this country. But it was not extensive, by any means. Mr McCOLLUM. The bottom line you are giving us today is that, based on the research, the review of the hearings that the Congress held back there at the time of Pearl Harbor, based on MAGIC codes, based on all of the basic research evidence that existed, and quite a voluminous amount that you have been through, that the actions of the President and the Army and the officials at the time dealing with the Japanese-Americans and the threat of espionage was predicated on a reasonable fear that there would, in fact, be espionage that had been directed by the Japanese Government and carried on by an unidentifiable number of Japanese-Americans. Is that the bottom line of what you are saying? Mr. LOWMAN. That is the bottom line, sir. I think that the compelling reason for Roosevelt's actions was the intelligence he had before him, which presented to him a dangerous and perhaps unmanageable situation at a time when our military outlook was, to say the least, very bleak. Mr. McCOLLUM. And your conclusion, too, is that Ringle's idea of individually screening the Japanese-Americans who were most highly suspect was not a practical thing to do? Mr. LOWMAN. I would not assume that was the reason that his suggestion was not adopted. Mr. McCOLLUM. Do you have any knowledge from the historical perspective that it was considered, that it was, in fact, deliberated upon, as opposed to the exclusion process? Mr. LOWMAN. He proposed it to higher headquarters, but I have seen no mention that they did -- I am sure they looked at it, because he submitted it. But the extent to which it was considered, I have no information. Mr. McCOLLUM. Thank you. I appreciate it very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Mr. HALL. Thank you. Mr. Lowman, you made available to the committee a letter to Governor Dewey, dated September 27, 1944, from George Marshall. Do you ask that that letter be made a part of the record? If you would, I wish you would explain briefly the contents of that letter. Mr. LOWMAN. Yes, sir; I ask it be made part of the record. The background of that letter is as follows. Mr. HALL. This letter was written at the time when there was a presidential race going on between Governor Dewey of New York, and Franklin Roosevelt. Mr. LOWMAN. Yes, sir. The letter is dated September 27, 1944. At that time, Thomas E. Dewey was running for President against Franklin Delano Roosevelt. He threatened to make an issue of the Pearl Harbor attack theory that the Government was caught napping during this attack. Gen. George Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, was afraid that if this were to become a campaign issue, it might somehow reveal to the Japanese that we were reading their codes. This is 1944, but they were still using the same codes that they used in 1941. So under very dramatic circumstances, George Marshall sent a letter to Mr. Dewey. The understanding was that Dewey would not open and read that letter unless he agreed beforehand never to divulge the contents of that letter. After some negotiating back and forth, Mr. Dewey agreed to this. Incidentally, George Marshall stressed that his actions were done without the knowledge of President Roosevelt, but with the concurrence of Admiral King, who was the Chief of the Navy. This letter outlined to Governor Dewey what the current situation was insofar as MAGIC cables and other cables -- military, naval and Army, the whole works together -- what it was doing for this country. I would like to read just part of that, if I may. It says: Now the point to the present dilemma is that we have gone ahead with this business of deciphering their codes until we possess other codes, German as well as Japanese, but our main basis of information regarding Hitler's intentions in Europe is obtained from Baron Oshima's messages from Berlin reporting his interviews with Hitler and other officials to the Japanese Government. These are still in the codes involved in the Pearl Harbor events.Baron Oshima was the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin. To explain further the critical nature of this set-up which would be wiped out almost in an instant if the least suspicion were aroused regarding it, the battle of the Coral Sea was based on deciphered messages and therefore our few ships were in the right place at the right time. Further, we were able to concentrate our limited forces to meet their naval advance on Midway when otherwise we almost certainly would have been some 3,000 miles out of place. We had full information of the strength of their forces in that advance and also of the smaller force directed against the Aleutians which finally landed troops on Attu and Kiska.We fought this war in a large measure based upon Japanese and German intercepts. [The letter of George Marshall to Governor Dewey is as follows:] DECLASSIFIED per Sec. 5, E. O. 11652 by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS DL Date: 21 JUN 1978 FOR MR. DEWEY'S EYES ONLY 27 September 1944
My dear Governor, Colonel Clarke, my messenger to you of yesterday, September 26th, has reported the result of his delivery of my letter dated September 25th. As I understand him you (a) were unwilling to commit yourself to any agreement regarding "not communicating its contents to any other person" in view of the fact that you felt you already knew certain of the things probably referred to in the letter, as suggested to you by seeing the word "cryptograph," and (b) you could not feel that such a letter as this to a presidential candidate could have been addressed to you by an officer in my position without the knowledge of the President. As to (a) above I am quite willing to have you read what comes hereafter with the understanding that you are bound not to communicate to any other person any portions on which you do not now have or later receive factual knowledge from some other source than myself. As to (b) above you have my word that neither the Secretary of War nor the President has any intimation whatsoever that such a letter has been addressed to you or that the preparation or sending of such a communication was being considered. I assure you that the only persons who saw or know of the existence of either this letter or my letter to you dated September 25th are Admiral King, seven key officers responsible for security of military communications, and my secretary who typed these letters. I am trying my best to make plain to you that this letter is being addressed to you solely on my initiative, Admiral King having consulted only after the letter was drafted, and I am persisting in the matter because the military hazards involved are so serious that I feel some action is necessary to protect the interests of our armed forces. I should have much preferred to talk to you in person but I could not devise a method that would not be subject to press and radio reactions as to why the Chief of Staff of the Army would be seeking an interview with you at this particular moment. Therefore I have turned to the method of this letter, with which Admiral King concurs, to be delivered by hand to you by Colonel Clarke, who, incidentally, has charge of the most secret documents of the War and Navy Departments. In brief, the military dilemma is this: The most vital evidence in the Pearl Harbor matter consists of our intercepts of the Japanese diplomatic communications. OVER A PERIOD OF YEARS OUR CRYPTOGRAPH PEOPLE ANALYZED THE CHARACTER OF THE MACHINE THE JAPANESE WERE USING FOR ENCODING THEIR DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES. BASED ON THIS A CORRESPONDING MACHINE WAS BUILT BY US WHICH DECIPHERS THEIR MESSAGES. THEREFORE, we possessed a wealth of information regarding their moves in the Pacific, which in turn was furnished the State Department -- rather than as is popularly supposed, the State Department, providing us with the information -- but which unfortunately made no reference whatever to intentions towards Hawaii until the last message before December 7th, which did not reach our hands until the following day, December 8th.You will understand from the foregoing the utterly tragic consequences if the present political debates regarding Pearl Harbor disclose to the enemy, GERMAN OR JAP, any suspicion of the vital sources of information we possess. The Roberts' Report on Pearl Harbor had to have withdrawn from it all reference to this highly secret matter, therefore in portions it necessarily appeared incomplete. The same reason which dictated that course is even more important today because our sources have been greatly elaborated. As another example of the delicacy of the situation, some of Donovan's people (the OSS) without telling us, instituted a secret search of the Japanese Embassy offices in Portugal. As a result the entire military attache Japanese code all over the world was changed, and though this occurred over a year ago, we have not yet been able to break the new code and have thus lost this invaluable source of information, particularly regarding the European situation. A FURTHER MOST SERIOUS EMBARRASSMENT IS THE FACT THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS INVOLVED CONCERNING ITS MOST SECRET SOURCES OF INFORMATION, REGARDING WHICH ONLY THE PRIME MINISTER, THE CHIEFS OF STAFF AND A VERY LIMITED NUMBER OF OTHER OFFICIALS HAVE KNOWLEDGE. A recent speech in Congress by Representative Harness would clearly suggest to the Japanese that we have been reading their codes, though Mr. Harness and the American public would probably not draw any such conclusion. The conduct of General Eisenhower's campaign and of all operations in the Pacific are closely related in conception and timing to the information we secretly obtain through these intercepted codes. They contribute greatly to the victory and tremendously to the saving in American lives, both in the conduct of current operations and in looking towards the early termination of the war. I am presenting this matter to you in the hope that you will see your way clear to avoid the tragic results with which we are now threatened in the present political campaign. Please return this letter by bearer. I will hold it in my most secret file subject to your reference should you so desire. Faithfully yours, {handwritten} From the papers of ADM. W. D.
Leahy
Folder 125, Memos to & from President, 194? Mr. HALL. Along with that letter, you made available to the committee a memorandum to Mr. Seth Richardson, signed by A.D. Kramer. Could you explain briefly what that is? Mr. LOWMAN. Yes, sir. Mr. HALL. And do you wish that to be made a part of the record? Mr. LOWMAN. Yes, sir; I wish it be made a part of the record. During the summer of 1941, there was information that the Japanese may have learned that we were reading their codes. As a result, there was a good deal of tightening up of distribution of MAGIC information in Washington, D.C. The way MAGIC was delivered to the President was on an every-other-month basis, 1 month by the Army and 1 month by the Navy. In tightening up, the Army thought that maybe it should not drop off the messages with the President, but should send them through Secretary Cordell Hull, who would show the messages to the President. Navy continued on its every-other-month delivering as before. But there was a period of some disruption. However, as Roosevelt said, he was seeing the messages or getting the information all through this period, but he didn't like this disruption as it was going on and he said that, from now on -- that was in early November -- I don't want to see gists and I don't want to be briefed, I want to see the messages themselves. So there was this confusing period. In the addendum to the basic report, the Commission found an author who said that all through May and up to November the President never saw MAGIC messages, the implication being that the President had no MAGIC information during this period. I don't know the historian involved, but he was confused on this point. So I have submitted for the record Commander Kramer's detail on a month-by-month basis for this period of time how the President was serviced on MAGIC information. [The letter of Commander Kramer to Mr. Richardson follows:] Memorandum To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson. In response to the request of the first and second paragraph of your memorandum of 17 May 1948, a search has been made of the pertinent official files of the Navy without success to find the memorandum dated 12 November 1941, prepared by Captain A. D. Kramer, U. S. N., entitled "Dissemination to White House," which you state was referred to by Captain L. S. Safford in his testimony or digest in the so-called Clarke Investigation conducted by the Army of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. A copy of the paper obtained from Captain Safford is forwarded herewith, though because of the failure to find the original, it has not been possible to check its accuracy. The memorandum in question was a rough handwritten paper by Captain Kramer for his possible future reference and not an official document of the Navy of or concerning the events or conclusions referred to therein. (S) JOHN FORD BAECHER. [14523] Confidential DISSEMINATION TO WHITE HOUSE
7 Nov. '41 Gen. Sherman Miles (G2) at 1600 called Capt. Wilkinson (DNI). I was called in on the subject question. In reply to Miles' inquiry I explained as follows:
A. Through spring of '41 (G-2) (Bratton) and ONI had followed the signed agreement of Jan. '41. B. A combination of the following factors led to G-2 not sending anything to the White House after May '41: 1. Loss of memo #9 by State in March.4. The feeling of G-2 that almost without exception [14524] the subject of the Memos and traffic was State business anyway, and the matters should therefore be properly taken up with the White House by State, rather than being sent directly. C. During June, when the new Naval Aide to the President (Beardall) came, he had taken the O. N. I. memos over as per agreement. In July, I continued to show things to him in original form to keep him informed and also because he specifically requested this, since the President at times was asking him about points appearing in this material. D. Toward the end of September (G-2 having sent nothing to the White House), Beardall stated the President wanted to see the material I was showing him (Beardall). I informed DNI, explaining that G-2 permission must be obtained in accordance with the agreement. With DNI's permission I contacted Col. Bratton and got his O. K. E. During October (ONI dissemination duty), only the "memos" went. F. Several times between 1 Nov. and 7 Nov. (today) Capt. Beardall was shown original material. On Friday noon, 7 Nov., he asked to have a number of them to take. I reminded him that November was Army's month for dissemination. He acknowledged this and stated he had so informed Mr. Roosevelt, but Roosevelt had directed him to bring it anyway. I told him I would get DNI and G-2 permission. General Miles then said G-2 was beginning to disseminate to the White House. I indicated that my concern was to comply with the agreement, and particularly to avoid duplicating via the Naval Aide anything which G-2 might send. This could be done by keeping in daily touch with Col. Bratton on what he was sending to the White House. In fact, the Naval Aides could be entirely eliminated during G-2's months and adhere strictly to the agreement by having ONI request G-2 to send anything Captain Beardall felt should go. Gen Miles agreed and stated that [14526] would confer with Gen. Watson on the matter. 7 Nov. 1030 I saw Capt. Beardall, to show him today's material, and explain what had developed in the above talk. He elucidated further by saying that when he had informed the President, in reply to a request for material, that it was Army's month for dissemination, the President said he understood that, and was in fact either seeing or being told about the material through Hull. However, he desired to see the material via Beardall anyway. Beardall expressed the opinion to me that President grasps things more rapidly visually than orally, and therefore, wanted to see the material in addition to getting it from Hull. 7 Nov. 1700 I informed Capt. Wilkinson of the above. He indicated he was going to pass it on to Miles. 10 Nov. 1230 I saw Beardall with today's material. He informed me that a conference between him, Miles, Watson (and another?) had agreed to Beardall alone handling [14527] dissemination to the White House. 10 Nov. 1630 Saw DNI with today's material. He had already been informed of the above and directed that I comply therewith. 12 Nov. 1615 Started routine of giving Beardall the day's material for transmission to the President, in compliance with the above outlined modification to the signed agreement of Jan. '41 between G-2 and ONI. A. D. KRAMER
Mr. HALL. Mr. Lowman, my last question is this: The letter of General Marshall that you alluded to to Gov. Dewey, Thomas A. Dewey, indicated that the Coral Sea and the Midway battles were fought based upon the MAGIC cables. We have had previous testimony from Mr. McCloy who indicated that, after the battle of Midway, the people in Washington here felt that we were in good shape to win this war. At that time, we had 120,000 persons relocated in California, Washington, and Crystal City, TX, and other places. If we felt so good about the war effort, why weren't those people released at that time, although they were released way later on? Do you have any information in that regard? Mr. LOWMAN. No, sir; I have not researched out that era. I have only gone in the era here of pre-Pearl Harbor. I can tell you this, though. We did not have, to my knowledge, any information based upon MAGIC cables which would indicate there was some kind of an environment which would allow these people to leave the camps and go into an espionage situation. There is no information to that effect at all. We do have information that the Spanish consul in San Francisco, who was selected by the Japanese Government to investigate these camps, was in the employ of the Japanese Government as an agent, and presumably might have been an outlet. But, in brief, I have no information along the lines that you have suggested. Mr. HALL. We thank you very much. We appreciate your testimony. As Mr. McCollum said, it is fascinating to read and hear. We appreciate very much you being here. Thank you very much. Mr. LOWMAN. Thank you, sir. |