JAPANESE-AMERICAN AND ALEUTIAN WARTIME
RELOCATION
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
H.R. 3387, H.R. 4110, and H.R. 4322
JAPANESE-AMERICAN AND ALEUTIAN WARTIME
RELOCATION
JUNE 20, 21, 27, AND SEPTEMBER 12,
1984
Serial No. 90
Printed for the use of the Committee on Judiciary
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1985
40-176 O
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402
64-273 O-86--1
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
| PETER W. RODINO,
JR., New Jersey, Chairman |
| JACK BROOKS, Texas |
|
HAMILTON FISH, JR., Missouri |
| ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, Wisconsin |
|
CARLOS J. MOORHEAD, Florida |
| DON EDWARDS, California |
|
HENRY J. HYDE, Georgia |
| JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan |
|
THOMAS N. KINDNESS, Ohio |
| JOHN F. SEIBERLING, Ohio |
|
HAROLD S. SAWYER, Tennessee |
| ROMANO L. MAZZOLI, Kentucky |
|
DAN LUNGREN, Michigan |
WILLIAM J. HUGHES, New Jersey
|
|
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., New Mexico |
| SAM B. HALL, Texas |
|
BILL McCOLLUM, Arkansas |
| MIKE SYNAR, Oklahoma |
|
E. CLAY SHAW, JR., Florida |
PATRICIA SCHROEDER, Colorado
|
|
GEORGE W. GEKAS,
|
DAN GLICKMAN, Kansas
|
|
MICHAEL DeWINE, Ohio
|
BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
|
|
|
GEO. W. CROCKETT, JR., Michigan
|
|
|
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
|
|
|
BRUCE A. MORRISON, Connecticut
|
|
|
EDWARD F. FEIGHAN, Ohio
|
|
|
LAWRENCE J. SMITH, Florida
|
|
|
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
|
|
|
FREDERICK C. BOUCHER, Virginia
|
|
|
| M. ELAINE MIELKE, General
Counsel |
GARNER J. CLINE, Staff
Director
|
| ALAN F. COFFEY,
JR., Associate Counsel |
|
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
|
| SAM B. HALL, JR.,
Texas, Chairman |
ROMANO L. MAZZOLI, Kentucky
|
|
THOMAS N. KINDNESS, Ohio
|
BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
|
|
BILL McCOLLUM, Florida |
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
|
|
E. CLAY SHAW, JR., Florida
|
FREDERICK C. BOUCHER, Virginia
|
|
|
| WILLIAM P.
SHATTUCK, Counsel |
| JANE S. POTTS, Assistant
Counsel |
| STEVEN N. DOUGLAS,
Assistant Counsel |
DAVID L. KARMOL, Associate
Counsel
|
NOTE: [Bracketed] text in original. This excerpt starts from
page 412 of the record.
TESTIMONY OF KARL R. BENDETSEN,
FORMER PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL'S CHIEF OF ALIENS DIVISION; ASSISTANT
CHIEF OF STAFF FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS, WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND 4TH ARMY,
IN CHARGE OF WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION OF WESTERN DEFENSE
COMMAND/4A
Mr. BENDETSEN. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, the Supreme Court upheld
Executive Order 9066 in Korematsu v. United States.
I quote, "Korematsu was not excluded because of hostility to him or his
race; he was because we are at war with the Japanese Empire and
there is evidence of disloyalty." That is what the Supreme Court
said, and it has never been overruled. So I think the committee should
pay close attention to that.
Now to say that MAGIC was unknown to General DeWitt by my friend, Mr.
Ennis -- we have known each other for 45 years, I guess.
Mr. HALL. You have both aged gracefully.
Mr. BENDETSEN. Thank you, sir. He does. I am just trying to emulate
him, except in what he thinks about this case.
This is not something new at all. The most comprehensive study of this
situation was made of events leading to Pearl Harbor were the hearings
of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl
Harbor Attack. It is in your records, and you should refer to it. No
one has since. There are 39 volumes. MAGIC was prominent in this
considerations.
To say that General DeWitt did not know about MAGIC by my
friend is a false statement, totally false. I know that it was. He
didn't have the MAGIC translation because only a handful of people, the
President of the United States, the Secretaries of War and Navy, Chief
of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations -- no intelligence
officer had it because the Japanese Government would somehow find out
that the code had been broken by the most unusual services of the
intelligence officers of the Army and Navy in 1940. That was protected
necessarily.
The MAGIC intelligence revealed that there were espionage nests
among the persons of Japanese ancestry on the west coast, hundreds
of them. The FBI didn't know that. The intelligence officers of the
Army and Navy didn't know it. But that was the basis finally of
General DeWitt's recommendation.
But the only man who could make this decision -- Mr. Ennis hasn't been
an officer in the military. He says that the President of the United
States would have no alternative. He would have a full alternative. He
wasn't the kind of man who could be, as this Commission report and the
bill says, a racist. That is slander and libel of the memory of
President Roosevelt.
He had no alternative. There was an attack intended by the Japanese.
They had wonderful military organizations. They intended to. We knew
it. There was an attack on the way in the Battle of Midway, and
we lost almost everything we had left and, by the narrowest of margin,
intercepted that attempt.
Now, a member of the Commission, Justice Goldberg, said, "Now after
all of these years, wouldn't you say that that was a mistake?" I
said, "Justice Goldberg, if the President and the Secretaries of War
and Navy, the Chiefs of Staff of the military services had known what
you know now, yes, it would have been a hell of a mistake." But they
didn't. There was no way you could concede that there would not be an
attack upon the United States, and we had lost all our defenses. This
committee should remember that. To say it was a mistake now is not
doing justice to the facts.
That is the first part of my testimony.
I would have to add that when a nation defends itself in war, it is
never possible to equate the various sacrifices its citizens and
residents are compelled to suffer, willingly or otherwise. You
gentlemen know that full well. There never has been a way in which
thereafter all persons, all citizens and noncitizens are compensated
for what they went through. It is regrettable, though that is the case.
I would like to read the order I had from General DeWitt. On a
very memorable and uncomfortable moment, I was returning to the War
Department in San Francisco and General DeWitt's aide ran up the steps
and said "you have to come back." I was ushered into General DeWitt's
office. In his presence were the Assistant Secretary of War, the Chief
Staff of the Army, General Marshall. I will read this. He told me that
"we have decided that you are to undertake what is necessary." I was
informed by General DeWitt that General Marshall had promoted me to
Colonel. I was then a Major.
Here is the order. This was made on the basis of Executive Order 9066.
President Roosevelt delegated to the Secretary of War, to the Chief of
Staff of the Army, and General DeWitt, Commanding General of the 4th
Army and Western Defense Command, and I was just a little Major, then
promoted.
I hereby delegate to you, Karl. R. Bendetsen, all and
in full my powers and authority under Executive Order 9066 which, in
turn, have been delegated by the President to the Secretary of War, the
Chief of Staff, the Commanding General, and now to you. All rules and
regulations of the 4th Army over which I have any control or authority,
you have authority to suspend if, in your judgment, it is necessary.
You will take this action and you will establish separate headquarters.
You will have full authority to call on all civilian agencies that was
designated by the President. You will do this with a minimum of
disruption of logistics, military training, operations and
preparedness, and with a minimum of military personnel.
I had three military persons in my office. All the rest of them were
civilians.
It has been alleged falsely that there were guards of military men
inside the assembly centers and the relocation centers. That is
totally false. I will come to that later.
You will use all your powers and facilities to
encourage these people to exclude themselves from the sea frontier. You
will take measures to induce voluntary evacuation and provide
assistance.
During my first 4 weeks, 4,000 families left voluntarily. They were
not detained, and there was no detention ever authorized by Executive
Order 9066. If any detention was authorized by the War Relocation
Authority, I never heard of it before until today. I don't believe it.
But if it was, it was never authorized by Executive Order 9066, which
is what we are dealing with.
For those who do not relocate themselves, comfortable
transportation will be provided to temporary shelters. Families will
not be separated.
We never separated a single family.
Medical care, nutrition for the children and food for
the adults will be provided. If it is necessary to provide such
facilities, you will see that the Japanese themselves administer all
functions within them.
And they did, not only in the assembly centers, but in the relocation
centers. It turned out that I had to build as -- before the Army turned
it over to the War Relocation Authority -- because many of them
couldn't handle their own evacuation. That is all they were provided
for. Before I left, these centers were furnished and filled. There were
10 of them. Thousands left during that time. I cannot understand
testimony that says they couldn't leave after that.
I was ordered back from Europe when I was finished with this. I was
assigned to the combined staff planning the Overlord Invasion in
London, the British and American Army there and the Navy. There were
some problems. There were a large number of persons of Japanese
ancestry who were very hostile to the United States, and they were causing
great difficulties within the relocation centers on their own fellow
persons of Japanese ancestry. They brought me back. I had to sort
them out, move them carefully, and they were put in Tule Lake, CA,
which was a relocation center to accommodate persons hostile to the
United States. People who were in the Tule Lake Center were moved to
the others, no families were separated, and I never had a complaint
from any one of them that they were not given immediate access to leave
if they wanted to. Many of them had jobs on the outside, thousands
of them.
Something else that has not been testified. Earlier in this game, the
Congress and our recommendation authorized an appropriation of $4
million to provide these people who wanted to start their own business
outside of the relocation centers. You want to consider that in looking
at this.
Now, H.R. 4110 and the report of the Commission is false, and
it is about time this Congress had an introspection into this without
basing it on the Commission's report. There are many Japanese on
the
west coast who wanted to testify before the Commission that they were
not interned, that there was no internment. The Commission didn't
keep order in these hearings. Those who were the proponents of it booed
and hissed. When I testified in the caucus room of the Russell Senate
Office Building, many of the proponents were there and they booed
and hissed me. It wasn't very well run, not as legislative hearings
are supposed to be run.
But all that is said in the initial recital of H.R. 4110 I deal with in
my testimony. You have 60 copies. If you want me to testify with it for
you, I would be delighted to do so. I don't want to impose on your time.
But this is not as it has been presented by my friend, Mr. Ennis. DeWitt
did have MAGIC. He did know about these very dangerous overlapping
espionage nests. All other allegations are totally false, gentlemen.
Now he didn't have the MAGIC intelligence, he had the conclusions of
the MAGIC intelligence given to him by the Chief of Staff of the Army.
I was the only other officer that I know of who knew about it. I didn't
testify to it in front of the Commission because I knew it would be
fruitless. Every Commissioner had made up his mind before he was
appointed -- I know most of them -- except the Congressman from
California who goes along with the Commission's conclusions, but not,
so far as I know yet, with a monetary compensation.
This is a very serious matter to say, as Mr. Frank said, that it was a
mistake. How could that judgment be made today in any fairness or
frankness when the United States was open to attack by a major
military power and when it knew they had espionage nests on the coast?
It would be something very worthwhile to look at carefully, whether
today it would be fair to say that compensation should be paid.
Now it must be remembered also, gentlemen, that on August 16, 1940, the
draft reinstatement, and the President of the United States was given
authority to order all Reserve Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines to
extended active duty and to federalize the National Guard of the
several States. The National Guard of the several States in the
West, Oregon,Washington, California, Arizona, Nevada, Utah, and Idaho
were ordered to active duty and they were all sent to the
Philippines.
When the Japanese attacked, they so brutally treated them and
murdered most of them, this got back to the relatives of these
people in those States. They knew this wasn't something that could be
held secret. Many U.S. citizens conducted themselves in a way I would
never approve of, but this was for a limited period of time. If my
friend, Tom Clark, was still living, the former Chief Justice
-- he was the Department of Justice west coast representative. He
saw it, and he knew that it would be difficult to stop.
But when you are told that the household goods of the evacuees
after I took over were dissipated, that is totally false. The
truth is that all of the household goods of those who were evacuated or
who left voluntarily were indexed, stored, and warehouse receipts were
given. And those who settle in the interior on their own told us, and
we shipped it to them free of charge.
As far as their crops are concerned, the allegations are totally
false. I used the Agriculture Department to arrange harvesting
after they left and to sell the crops at auction, and the Federal
Reserve System, at my request, handled the proceeds. The proceeds were
carefully deposited in their bank accounts in the West to each
individual owner. And many of these farms were farmed for the whole
time -- not sold at bargain prices, but leased -- and the proceeds were
based upon the market value of the harvest. You should know that.
Mr. HALL. Colonel, let me interrupt here. I have received letters from
people who counteract what you are saying now completely.
Mr. BENDETSEN. I know you have. There was testimony totally to
that effect to this Commission.
Mr. HALL. We are going to have a witness here today who is going to
testify about her father writing a letter. She has the letter that he
wrote when they were separated.
Is it possible that maybe some of these people were separated, families
were separated, that you had no knowledge of? Is it possible that some
of the merchandise and goods and wares that these people has possibly
was sold at a distress sale that you didn't know about? We have
received much, much -- not testimony because it had been in the areas
of letters that have been written to us -- to me, and I suppose
everybody else has, too -- which just indicate with what you are saying
now that there are possibly two sides to this thing.
Mr. BENDETSEN. There were many, prior to the time the Army took over I
have testified to, who were taken advantage of.
Mr. HALL. Your testimony is dealing from the time that General DeWitt
put you in charge, that nothing like that took place after that time?
Mr. BENDETSEN. I feel---
Mr. HALL. What was the date you were put in charge? I don't believe it
says that on the information you gave us.
Mr. BENDETSEN. It was, I think, February 18.
Mr. HALL. 1942?
Mr. BENDETSEN. Yes, sir.
Mr. HALL. All right, go ahead.
Mr. BENDETSEN. I would not be in a position to deny that there were
not very regrettable advantages taken of persons of Japanese ancestry
between December 7 and March 1942. It is certainly regrettable if
it happened. I couldn't take over in a moment. As a matter of fact, I
was a Reserve officer, a captain in the field artillery, ordered to
active duty on the day after March 16, 1940. I lived in Washington
State and I know many people of Japanese ancestry. They were my
friends. I went to school with them, I went to Stanford with them.
I know people in Japan, and I have friendly relations with all of them,
and not one of them has ever criticized what we did on the basis of
military necessity.
But I went to Washington to lobby the Congress about the draft law. I
didn't think we were prepared. I met a number of people. I didn't know
anybody but our Congressman Russell Mack. Very few people knew him. But
I met two War Department liaison officers. When President Roosevelt on
that date signed the bill to be passed by the House in the morning,
they invited me to lunch, and they both said to me, "Bendetsen, after
all the hell you've raised along here, don't you think you ought to
come on active duty?"
So I was ordered to active duty on the 17th. I didn't {word omitted}
the War Department for some time, against my will, but I had many
tasks. I didn't want this one.
Mr. HALL. Did you ever have knowledge of the MAGIC cables
before December 7, 1941?
Mr. BENDETSEN. Before?
Mr. HALL. Yes, sir.
Mr. BENDETSEN. No, sir.
Mr. HALL. Did General DeWitt, so far as you know?
Mr. BENDETSEN. I don't really know, but I would doubt that he had any
knowledge of them whatsoever. No one else did but the persons I have
named.
Mr. HALL. When did you first learn of the MAGIC cables?
Mr. BENDETSEN. When did I first learn of them?
Mr. HALL. Yes, sir, if you know.
Mr. BENDETSEN. After the Battle of Europe, which I went through.
Mr. HALL. Does that conclude your testimony, sir? I didn't mean to
interrupt you.
Mr. BENDETSEN. No; I might testify, if you would wish it, to the
summary.
Mr. HALL. To the what, sir?
Mr. BENDETSEN. To my summary.
Mr. HALL. All right, go ahead. I am not trying to interrupt you, I just
didn't know whether you were finished or not.
Mr. BENDETSEN. Executive Order 9066 authorized establishment of
military areas from which "any and all persons may be excluded." That
is the language. Western Arizona and the States of California, Oregon,
Washington, and Alaska were established as military areas. All persons
were excluded from entering Alaska without a permit. Persons of
Japanese ancestry were excluded from the other four areas above named.
Executive Order 9066 did not authorize internment. The report of the
Commission on Wartime Relocation and H.R. 4110 are both totally
false in this respect. Excludees and evacuees were not
interned. Persons of Japanese ancestry were free to go anywhere else in
the United States except the areas designated above. Over 4,000
families, greatly assisted by my outfit, moved themselves to the
interior by mid-April 1942. After that, many other thousands left the
relocation centers in 1942 and 1943. I didn't leave until 1943.
The Commission's report and sections 2(a) (2) and (3) are in this
respect totally false. There are false statements in
the legislation based on the conclusions of the Commission. The
Japanese diplomatic and military codes had been broken in secret during
1941. This intelligence named MAGIC conclusively established
the clear military necessity for President Roosevelt's act. It
revealed the existence on the Pacific coast of massive espionage nests
utilizing Japanese residents, citizens and noncitizens.
The hearings of the Relocation Commission are a clear indication of its
unreliability and total bias. The omission of MAGIC
intelligence from its report, mentioned only in a late supplement by
the chairman saying that MAGIC had no relevance -- you know that it had
because you have had testimony very clearly about MAGIC. The
omission of MAGIC intelligence is shocking evidence that the
Commission, while aware of it, did not say it. The chairman said it
was irrelevant, later after their report had been filed. Evacuees now
residing on the Pacific coast have telephoned me that, during the west
coast hearings of the Commission, they were intimidated from
testifying that there was no internment. You can find them if you
wish, and they are very reliable persons.
Internment was a very special Justice Department
procedure. To supplement what my friend, Mr. Ennis, said, each
individual German, Italian, or Japanese alien was brought up before a
hearing individually with counsel of his own before he was interned.
They they were interned in very special Justice Department facilities.
Not one of them ever came into the temporary facilities. It became
necessary to help the evacuees. As I said before, many thousands left
assembly centers and the relocation centers before I was assigned to
the staff planning the Overlord invasion.
I knew and still know many Japanese and have many friends in Japan. All
of the many I know fully understand the necessity for the evacuation
in World War II. They are fully familiar with MAGIC, which has been a
public reference since the citation made earlier of the congressional
investigation. It would be very useful for this committee to tell its
staff to have reference to it. When a nation defends itself in war, I
repeat, it is never possible to equate the various sacrifices its
citizens and residents are compelled to suffer.
That is my summary, sir.
[The statement of Mr. Bendetsen follows:]
HEARINGS ON H.R. 4110 - SEPTEMBER 12,
1984
SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY OF KARL R. BENDETSEN
- Executive Order 9066 authorized establishment of military
areas from which "any and all persons my be excluded." Western Arizona
and the States of California, Oregon, Washington, and Alaska were
established as military areas. All persons were excluded from
entering Alaska without a permit. Persons of Japanese ancestry were
excluded from the other four areas above named.
- Executive Order 9066 did not authorize internment.
The Report of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and H.R. 4110 are
both totally false in this respect. Excludees and evacuees were not
interned. Persons of Japanese ancestry were free to go anywhere
else in the United States except the areas designated in Paragraph 1
above. Over 4,000 families greatly assisted by the WCCA (The Wartime
Civil Control Administration of the 4th Army) moved themselves to the
interior by mid-April 1942. Many other thousands left the relocation
centers during 1942-43.
- The Commission's Report and Sections 2(a) (2) and (3) are
both totally false. The Japanese Diplomatic and Military Codes had been
broken in secret during 1941. This intelligence named "MAGIC"
conclusively established the clear military necessity for President
Roosevelt's Act. It revealed the existence on the Pacific coast of
massive espionage nests utilizing residents of Japanese ancestry.
- The hearings of the Relocation Commission are a clear
indication of its unreliability and total bias. The omission of
MAGIC intelligence is further shocking evidence of this. Evacuees
now residing on the Pacific coast have telephoned me that, during the
West Coast hearings of the Commission, they were intimidated from
testifying that there was no internment.
- Internment was a very special Justice Department procedure.
Aliens of enemy nationality separately went before a judge with
personal counsel. If the judge held adversely, the individual was
interned in special Justice Department facilities.
- I knew and still know many Japanese and have many friends
in Japan. They all fully understand the necessity for the evacuation of
World War II. When a nation defends itself in war, it is never
possible to equate the various sacrifices its citizens and residents
are compelled to suffer.
- The Supreme Court upheld E.O. 9066 in Korematsu vs.
United States. It held, "Korematsu was not excluded *
* * because of hostility to him or his race. He was * * * because we
are at war with the Japanese Empire * * *. There was evidence of
disloyalty on the part of some * * *."
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HEARINGS ON H.R. 4110
TESTIMONY OF KARL R. BENDETSEN
{Original in all capital letters; placed into lowercase for
ease of readability.}
The title of H.R. 4110 is "To Accept the Findings and to Implement the
Recommendations of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment
of Civilians."
In Sec. 2(a) (2), (3) it is stated in support of the findings and
purposes of H.R. 4110:
"(2) The evacuation, relocation and internment of
individuals of Japanese ancestry was carried out without any documented
acts of espionage or sabotage or other acts of disloyalty by any
citizens or permanent resident aliens of Japanese ancestry on the West
Coast;
"(3) There were no military or security reasons for the evacuation,
relocation and internment."
The use of the word "internment" in the title of the
Commission's Report and in the Bill are each totally false usages.
Executive Order 9066 did not direct or authorize internment of those
excluded from a military area, viz. the Pacific Coast states and
Western Arizona. All were free to go anywhere else they wished.
Many thousands did. Internment in World War II (as in the case of
World War I) refers exclusively to individual cases of enemy aliens,
German, Italian and Japanese, who after a hearing in each individual
case with that individual, represented by counsel of his own choosing,
was found by the hearing judge individually to be a dangerous alien
enemy. There were completely separate internment facilities for these
people operated by the Department of Justice.
Persons of Japanese ancestry resident in military areas, viz. the
Pacific Coast and Western Arizona, were excluded from such residence by
Executive Order 9066. None of the persons of such ancestry residing
elsewhere in the United States were affected.
When the Pacific Coast states and Western Arizona were declared to be
military areas from which persons of Japanese ancestry were excluded
under E.O. 9066, there was no intention in the first instance of
providing any housing facilities for the excludees until it became
absolutely clear that substantial numbers of such residents were unable
to relocated themselves.
The Commission states that there was absolutely no military necessity
underlying the decision of President Franklin Roosevelt to issue
Executive Order 9066. The Commission slanders and libels the
character of President Roosevelt by stating that his decision to
issue Executive Order 9066 was based on racial prejudice. Mrs.
Bernstein, the Chairman of the Commission, who testified before this
Subcommittee, stated that the Commission did examine World War II
intelligence, including MAGIC, and found no trace whatever of a
military or security threat from resident Japanese Americans.
This Subcommittee is knowledgeable of the revelations of MAGIC
intelligence. MAGIC totally refutes the irresponsible statements
and findings of the Commission. MAGIC intelligence conclusively
establishes that there was a major military necessity for the
President's decision to issue E.O. 9066 as Commander in Chief.
The Commission members, prior to accepting their appointments, had each
already decided what the Commission should conclude. The Commission was
and is utterly biased. Most of their hearings were a disgrace
to the good traditions of legislative investigative procedures. Why so?
Those who lobbied for the creation of the Commission through an Act of
Congress attended every Commission hearing. Whenever any attempt was
made by a witness to give testimony that would justify the President's
action, or testimony that excludees were NOT interned, it was uniformly
greeted with boos and hisses. There were evacuees who approached a
Commission hearing prepared to testify adversely to the falsehoods
employed in lobbying for the Act to create the Commission and for H.R.
4110. They were intimidated. There are still on the Pacific
Coast evacuees who would so testify before this Commission if they
were protected.
Many of our Japanese residents, both citizens and aliens, were and are
loyal. But MAGIC clearly and conclusively establishes that there
were many who were actively disloyal and that the loyalty of others
would necessarily be uncertain if a Japanese attack on the Pacific
Coast would have been made. Despite the Commission's Report, this
Subcommittee should know, as a fact, that countless Japanese moved
out of Assembly
Centers to the interior with the assistance of the Wartime
Civil Control Administration and many, many others moved at will
from the relocation centers. They were encouraged to do so. They were NOT
interned. Executive Order 9066 did not authorize internment of
excludees. None were interned.
I made seven visits calling on the Governors and the Mayors of the
principal cities and towns in the interior states of Idaho, Nevada,
Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, Colorado and Wyoming to urge them to
encourage Japanese who had been excluded from the West Coast to leave
the centers and to help them find employment and residences.
Many elected to stay in the relocation centers. They had jobs on the
outside at full wages. They had free room and board. No families were
ever separated. Education and medical care was provided. The Japanese
themselves administered the relocation centers (as well as the
temporary Assembly Centers).
President Roosevelt, Secretary of War Stimson,
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox were each and all statesmen of
great stature, among the finest men who have ever served our nation.
The time is long overdue for the Government of the United States,
including its Congress, the House and the Senate, to make its own
unprejudiced investigation and defend the government against the grotesque
charges stated in Sec. 2(a) (1), (2), (3) and (4) of H.R. 4110 that
it was race prejudice and not realistic security precautions which
induced President Roosevelt's Order. The decision was not made by
military men; it was made by the only man in the United States who
could make it, that is to say, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the
United States and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.
When President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, the accumulative
effect of MAGIC intelligence from broken Japanese codes presented a frightening
specter of massive espionage nests on the West Coast of the United
States, established and controlled by the Japanese government and
utilizing large numbers of resident Japanese. To conclude, as has
the Commission on Wartime Relocation and as stated in H.R. 4110 that
President Roosevelt was motivated solely by political and racial
considerations is irresponsible and libelous.
The most comprehensive study ever made of events leading to
Pearl Harbor "Hearings before the Joint Congressional Committee on the
Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack," 39 volumes published in
1946, examined every aspect of MAGIC in excruciating detail.
The Congressional Committee concluded that MAGIC contributed enormously
to the defeat of the enemy, greatly shortened the war and saved many
thousands of lives. Few Army and Navy officers had any knowledge of
MAGIC intelligence. To prevent any leakage to the Japanese that their
codes had been broken, MAGIC was restricted to the Secretary of War,
the Army Chief of Staff, the Chief of Army War Plans, the Director of
Military Intelligence, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval
Operations, the Chief of the Navy's War Plans Division and the Director
of Navy Intelligence, the Secretary of State and the President of the
United States.
I turn now to another relevant aspect.
The Wartime Civil Control Administration was established by
General DeWitt. As one of his General Staff Officers, he directed that
I exercise his authority over WCCA. The WCCA had several functions.
Among these were the administration of wartime blackout regulations and
the establishment and operation of Alaska Travel Control.
Following Pearl Harbor, under the authority of E.O. 9066, no
individual could enter Alaska without a permit. There was major
military construction urgently needed in Alaska. This required a large
work force. Alaska Travel Control established several offices in the
U.S. and three in Canada. Entry to Alaska was solely through the Port
of Seattle, Washington. Intending employees for the work force had to
be screened in order to be issued permits to pass through Seattle. As a
matter of fact, the Committee will be interested to know that my
assigned mission turned out to require three crews: one on the job, one
leaving and one entering.
Entirely opposite from the false statements of the Commission's
Report, the Wartime Civil Control Administration carefully and
separately stored the household goods of all evacuees. In each
case, a detailed inventory was taken and each family was issued
warehouse receipts. For those who evacuated themselves and took up
residence elsewhere, the WCCA arranged the shipment of their
possessions in each case at no cost to the family. As soon as the
relocation centers had been built and furnished and the remaining
evacuees were moved into them, the War Relocation Administration {Authority}
(WRA) took over and it continued these arrangements.
The statements in the Commission's Report are totally false
that action under E.O 9066 caused the pillage and destruction of the
household goods and furnishings of the evacuees. When the relocation
centers were emptied, each evacuee obtained his household goods at
no cost.
E.O 9066 delegated authority through the Secretary of War to General
DeWitt and, in turn, he delegated it to me to call on any and every
agency of the Federal Government to assist in making the evacuation as
painless as possible. I did so and received full cooperation and
indispensable services which greatly benefited evacuees. Many evacuees
owned very excellent truck gardens and truck farms. I arranged with the
Agriculture Department to bring about the harvesting of all crops.
Sales were made by the Department at auction. The cash payments were
handled at my request by the Federal Reserve District and their funds
were deposited int he bank accounts of each evacuee -- no exceptions.
There is much more to say. I am ready and willing to respond to
questions and to whatever the Committee later decides to request.
I know evacuees of senior age who intensely wished to testify before
the Commission during its West Coast hearings. They wished to say that they
were free to be anywhere in the United States except the West Coast.
Others who were first in an assembly center and then in a relocation
center wished to tell that they were free to leave; that there was
NO internment. The Commission did not maintain orderly hearings.
Those who wished to testify adversely to the falsehoods of the
proponents were not protected by the Commission. They were
physically intimidated by the proponents of the Commission, some of
whom were not even born until after World War II. These proponents
always booed and hissed if a witness was deemed adverse to
their false positions. They booed and hissed me.
Japanese are not mentioned in E.O 9066. It applied to any and all
residents, not just to those of Japanese ancestry. All U.S. citizens
and others were excluded from entering Alaska without a permit.
The Supreme Court of the United States in an opinion upholding E.O 9066
held: "Korematsu was not excluded from the military area because of
hostility to him or his race. He was * * * because we are at war with
the Japanese Empire * * *. The military authorities feared an
invasion of our west coast."
On December 7, 1941, we lost our Pacific fleet. The U.S. could not
bring to bear defenses against a Japanese attack on the Pacific Coast.
One was under way in May of 1942. It was deterred by a slim margin in
the Battle of Midway. Japanese forces did seize and occupy the Aleutian
Islands of Attu and Kiska, until they were dislodged from Kiska by our
military forces. This brought about their evacuation of Attu.
On all citizens and noncitizens, war imposes hardships which
cannot be compensated by the Government. Servicemen are separated from
their families, families are broken. The consequences of wartime are
cruel when a nation must defend itself.
Mr. HALL. Thank you very much, Mr. Bendetsen. We appreciate that.
I will yield to the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Kindness.
Mr. KINDNESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bendetsen, we appreciate your testimony very much.
The years that intervene as to when the events about which your
testimony has been presented and today make it a little difficult for
the members of the subcommittee to put things in context, so it is very
helpful to have those who participated in the events present their
recollections to us directly.
I am particularly interested in that part of your testimony today
describing the environment in which the Commission hearings were held.
There have been other indications that this subcommittee has received
that those who were in opposition to the Commission's seemingly
predetermined findings were greeted with boos and hisses, and that the
Commission's hearings were not conducted in a manner that really
maintained order or gave any credibility to the hearings. Once it is
know{n} that the atmosphere of that sort exists, anyone familiar with
such hearings would decrease his regard for the reliability of the
hearing record and the content of the testimony.
Can you tell the subcommittee your own experience in testifying before
the Commission and the surrounding environment a little bit more for
the record? You mentioned the booing and hissing, but as to the
Commission members themselves, did the nature of the questioning help
to understand their positions, or, as is true with our subcommittee,
was it pretty clear what our biases were?
Mr. BENDETSEN. Well, my experience was I testified for 8 hours without
recess, and I found that all of them were in a position of having
decided everything. As a matter of fact, I would testify to you under
oath -- I think I am and, if I am not, I wish to be. I think I did. Each
member of the Commission, all but three of them I knew, had made up
their minds before they were appointed, except for the Congressman
from California who was a member.
As I think I said, Justice Goldberg said: "Don't you think this was a
mistake?" I said:
Justice Goldberg, if you are asking me to make a
decision today about doing something like that, I would never approach
it. But certainly no one can say now that the President of the United
States and the elevated statesmen such as Stimson serving under him
would give him advice that would be a mistake such as you are
characterizing it.
Mr. KINDNESS. In time of war, I believe the principle might very well
be that, if you are to make an error, it should be on the side of
safety. That is, if a mistake is going to be made, wouldn't it rather
consistently be the judgment of those with responsibility for such
decisions that they would make the most cautious, the most safe
position, if there was a choice to be made between positions?
Mr. BENDETSEN. I would say, sir, that in the face of MAGIC
intelligence which the top people had -- if you haven't had a
chance to read it, I urge you each to do so -- I would find it hard
to see how anyone could reach any other conclusion. Our fleet had
been destroyed. We had a very untrained Army. We had no naval forces to
amount to anything in the Battle of Midway. Whatever else we had, the
carrier -- we had one left, and those aircraft were gone. We were
defenseless on the west coast. The MAGIC intelligence was very, very
powerful for those who made the decisions. Those who say that the
President of the United States was obligated to approve this decision,
I would differ with substantially. He made the decision based on MAGIC
intelligence.
I urge the committee, if it hasn't done so, to get the benefit of the
hearings I cited in my testimony, when an exhaustive inquiry was made
into Pearl Harbor by a joint committee of the Congress in 1946. There
are 39 volumes.
Of course, these people, many of whom I have known -- I have had very
good relationships with the Japanese for many, many years. I know some
of the younger ones who developed the Commission. Some weren't born
then, a few, and others were very, very young, 3, 4, 5, or 11. There
were some, of course, who were older. I certainly understand why they
don't like what I say. They really weren't around when all this
happened in a way to form an intelligent decision the way many other
Japanese residents in the United States did. You can find them. If
you would like to have help, I would be willing to volunteer. I think
it is a proposal which is based upon representations in the statute
that have no foundation.
Mr. KINDNESS. I thank you, sir, for your testimony.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HALL. Thank you.
Mr. McCollum.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to explore for a few moments with you the distinction that
you have drawn between the relocation centers, the relocation camps,
and internment. I wish to do that simply for my own education about
this period.
I gather from your testimony that there were some Japanese Americans
who were interned that, in fact, were given hearings and they
were taken to a separate camp, or prison, or whatever.
Mr. BENDETSEN. No, not Japanese Americans. They were Japanese
aliens only.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Japanese aliens?
Mr. BENDETSEN. Yes; the German, Italian, and Japanese aliens had
individual hearings, based upon what we did in World War II. There were
German, Italians, and others. It was the same procedure, Justice
Department procedure, with personal counsel assigned to each individual
before some sort of judge.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Did they go to prison camps if they were aliens then, as
opposed to the relocation centers?
Mr. BENDETSEN. The Justice Department had internment facilities, very
separate, having nothing to do with the shelter of assembly centers and
relocation centers. They were simply built to
accommodate them in a transition from residence within the military
zones of the west coast and elsewhere.
Mr. McCOLLUM. OK.
Let me ask this question of you. Some of the witnesses have and will be
testifying -- and have before the Commission -- that the relocation
centers were enclosed with barbed wire, had watchtowers,
and armed guards, and so on. Is that an accurate description of
the relocation centers?
Mr. BENDETSEN. That is 100 percent totally false. There is no
basis for the testimony under oath before the Commission, and I know
this.
In General DeWitt's orders to me --
Mr. HALL. The committee will come to order.
Mr. BENDETSEN. Now because of the actions of outraged U.S. citizens, of
which I do not approve, it was necessary in some of the assembly
centers, particularly Santa Anita which was converted into an assembly
center in southern California. It had the facilities for sanitation,
showers, and so on, and it was used temporarily.
It was necessary to protect the evacuees in the assembly
centers from disgruntled American citizens, and that is the only
place where guards were used. Relocation centers, barbed wire, and
guards, there was not a guard at all at any of them. That would
not be true of Tule Lake when it became a center similar to the
internment centers of the Justice Department. They were guarded.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Is that because there were aliens in that camp, or was it
still a relocation center converted for some other purpose?
Mr. BENDETSEN. These individuals had declared themselves to be Japanese
citizens. You know, when they are born here, they have dual
citizenship if they wish. Being a citizen of the United States
doesn't cut them off from being a Japanese citizen.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Yes, sir.
Mr. BENDETSEN. Many of them were. Many of them were educated there,
born in America, and so on.
In the relocation centers, many of them didn't want to leave so
they got jobs close by, left the center every day and worked for
employers paying current wages. They had free board, and room, and
medical care. They had education. There were teachers for
their children at all levels. And some of their children went to
universities and graduated while their parents -- that was their home. After
the university, they would come back there.
Mr. McCOLLUM. But those who exercised the choice of Japanese
citizenship over American, who had the dual citizenship, were put into
a camp that was different ultimately; is that what you are telling us?
Mr. BENDETSEN. Those who declared themselves, yes.
Mr. McCOLLUM. How many would of that---
Mr. BENDETSEN. I didn't put them there. The War Relocation Authority---
Mr. McCOLLUM. I understand that, but could you give us an estimate of
how many we are talking about?
Mr. BENDETSEN. I think about 5,000. I could get an accurate number for
you. I think it is approximately that.
Mr. McCOLLUM. By the end of the war, what percentage of those in the
relocation camps had in fact evacuated -- or relocated I should say --
into the eastern or other places outside of the camps? What percentage
had gone and what percentage were left in the camps?
Mr. BENDETSEN. I am not a firsthand knowledgeable witness.
Mr. McCOLLUM. You weren't there then?
Mr. BENDETSEN. By that time, I had gone over the Omaha Beach on H hour
of D-day, so I don't really know.
Mr. McCOLLUM. I shouldn't have asked you the question. I will withdraw
the question and seek that information somewhere else.
I have one other question about the conditions in the camps. There were
complaints that have been issued to us that the barracks they
lived in were constructed very hastily and sloppily, that there
were large cracks in them, that they were extremely cold in the winter
and extremely hot in summer, and that living conditions generally
were harsh. is that the description that would be accurate of one
or more of those camps, or all of them, or is that just a relative
thing? Could you tell us more about that aspect?
Mr. BENDETSEN. It is not a fair description of any of them. They
were not that way.
Of course, at an elevation in the winter you have cold weather, but
they had heat provided. They had family quarters. They were not
luxurious, but they certainly accommodated them.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Some of them said they were crowded into horse stalls and
things of that nature.
Mr. BENDETSEN. The assembly center at Santa Anita was a racetrack. You
know about Santa Anita, CA. It was the largest assembly center
temporarily used. Nobody was put in an unclean horse stall, but
maybe some of them have told you so. I can testify because I knew that
they weren't. They had sanitation and medical care. They
administered the place. There were no guards on the inside.
There were only a very few on the outside to protect them because
they needed it from U.S. citizens who were misbehaving.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Thank you very much for your testimony. I appreciate your
answering my questions.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HALL. Thank you very much, Mr. Bendetsen. We thank you for your
testimony. We appreciate your being here.
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