British Embassy here is communicating with London and shortly after return to Washington of JCS officers now at Potsdam Dept hopes to be able to prepare joint statement with British giving Salazar present status of planning.[2]

GREW
J[ohn] D H[ickerson]

[2] No communication was actually given to the Portuguese Government on this subject until after the conclusion of the Berlin Conference.

DOCUMENT 12

USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

No. 1303

Department of the Army Files: Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee[1] *(Harrison) to the Secretary of War (Stimson)*

TOP SECRET
URGENT

WASHINGTON, 16 July 1945.

WAR 32887. For Colonel Kyle's EYES ONLY from Harrison for Mr. Stimson.

Operated on this morning. Diagnosis not yet complete but results seem satisfactory and already exceed expectations. Local press release necessary as interest extends great distance. Dr. Groves pleased. He returns tomorrow. I will keep you posted.[2]

[1] Concerning the establishment and membership of this Committee, of which Stimson was Chairman, see Stimson and Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, p. 616.

[2] Stimson's diary entry for July 16 concludes: ". . . At 7:30 PM Harrison's first message concerning the test of the S–1 bomb arrived and I took it at once to the President's house and showed it to Truman and Byrnes who of course were greatly interested, although the information was still in very general terms." Concerning a further discussion of the message between Stimson and Byrnes, see document No. 1236, footnote 6.

No. 1304

Department of the Army Files: Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee (Harrison) to the Secretary of War (Stimson)

TOP SECRET
PRIORITY

WASHINGTON, 17 July [19]45.

WAR–33556. TopSec Secretary of War from Harrison.

Doctor has just returned most enthusiastic and confident that the LITTLE BOY is as husky as his big brother.[1] The light in his[1] eyes dis-

[1] i. e., FAT MAN.

cernible from here to Highhold [1a] and I could have heard his screams from here to my farm.[2]

[1a] Stimson's home on Long Island.

[2] At Upperville, Virginia.

Stimson's diary entry for July 18 includes the following: "Harrison's second message came, giving a few of the far reaching details of the test. I at once took it to the President who was highly delighted. . . . The President was evidently very greatly reenforced over the message from Harrison and said he was very glad I had come to the meeting. . . ."

No. 1305

Department of the Army Files

The Commanding General, MANHATTAN DISTRICT Project (Groves) to the Secretary of War (Stimson) [1]

TOP SECRET WASHINGTON, 18 July 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR

Subject: The Test.

1. This is not a concise, formal military report but an attempt to recite what I would have told you if you had been here on my return from New Mexico.

2. At 0530,[2] 16 July 1945, in a remote section of the Alamogordo Air Base, New Mexico, the first full scale test was made of the im-

[1] Stimson's diary entry for July 21 contains the following information relating to this document:

". . . At eleven thirty-five General Groves' special report was received by special courier. It was an immensely powerful document, clearly and well written and with supporting documents of the highest importance. It gave a pretty full and eloquent report of the tremendous success of the test and revealed far greater destructive power than we expected in S–1. . . .

"At three o'clock I found that Marshall had returned from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to save time I hurried to his house and had him read Groves' report and conferred with him about it.

"I then went to the 'Little White House' and saw President Truman. I asked him to call in Secretary Byrnes and then I read the report in its entirety and we then discussed it. They were immensely pleased. The President was tremendously pepped up by it and spoke to me of it again and again when I saw him. He said it gave him an entirely new feeling of confidence and he thanked me for having come to the Conference and being present to help him in this way."

Stimson showed Groves' report to Arnold on July 22 (see document No. 1310, footnote 3).

Concerning the discussion of the report with Churchill, see *ante*, pp. 203, 225.

Truman later stated that, following receipt of news that the Alamogordo test had been successful, he had called together Byrnes, Stimson, Leahy, Marshall, Arnold, Eisenhower, and King and had asked them for their opinions as to whether the bomb should be used, and the consensus had been that it should. See Hillman, *Mr. President*, p. 248. Truman apparently also received at this meeting an oral estimate of the casualties to be expected in the assault on Japan if the new weapon were not used. See *ibid.*, and Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., *The Army Air Forces in World War II* (Chicago, 1948–1958), vol. v, facsimile following p. 712 of a letter from Truman to Cate dated January 12, 1953.

[2] i. e., 5:30 a. m. All times in this memorandum are expressed in military style, i. e., from 0001 hours (12:01 a. m.) to 2400 hours (midnight).

plosion type atomic fission bomb. For the first time in history there was a nuclear explosion. And what an explosion! . . . The bomb was not dropped from an airplane but was exploded on a platform on top of a 100-foot high steel tower.

3. The test was successful beyond the most optimistic expectations of anyone. Based on the data which it has been possible to work up to date, I estimate the energy generated to be in excess of the equivalent of 15,000 to 20,000 tons of TNT; and this is a conservative estimate. Data based on measurements which we have not yet been able to reconcile would make the energy release several times the conservative figure. There were tremendous blast effects. For a brief period there was a lighting effect within a radius of 20 miles equal to several suns in midday; a huge ball of fire was formed which lasted for several seconds. This ball mushroomed and rose to a height of over ten thousand feet before it dimmed. The light from the explosion was seen clearly at Albuquerque, Santa Fe, Silver City, El Paso and other points generally to about 180 miles away. The sound was heard to the same distance in a few instances but generally to about 100 miles. Only a few windows were broken although one was some 125 miles away. A massive cloud was formed which surged and billowed upward with tremendous power, reaching the substratosphere at an elevation of 41,000 feet, 36,000 feet above the ground, in about five minutes, breaking without interruption through a temperature inversion at 17,000 feet which most of the scientists thought would stop it. Two supplementary explosions occurred in the cloud shortly after the main explosion. The cloud contained several thousand tons of dust picked up from the ground and a considerable amount of iron in the gaseous form. Our present thought is that this iron ignited when it mixed with the oxygen in the air to cause these supplementary explosions. Huge concentrations of highly radioactive materials resulted from the fission and were contained in this cloud.

4. A crater from which all vegetation had vanished, with a diameter of 1200 feet and a slight slope toward the center, was formed. In the center was a shallow bowl 130 feet in diameter and 6 feet in depth. The material within the crater was deeply pulverized dirt. The material within the outer circle is greenish and can be distinctly seen from as much as 5 miles away. The steel from the tower was evaporated. 1500 feet away there was a four-inch iron pipe 16 feet high set in concrete and strongly guyed. It disappeared completely.

5. One-half mile from the explosion there was a massive steel test cylinder weighing 220 tons. The base of the cylinder was solidly encased in concrete. Surrounding the cylinder was a strong steel tower 70 feet high, firmly anchored to concrete foundations. This

tower is comparable to a steel building bay that would be found in typical 15 or 20 story skyscraper or in warehouse construction. Forty tons of steel were used to fabricate the tower which was 70 feet high, the height of a six story building. The cross bracing was much stronger than that normally used in ordinary steel construction. The absence of the solid walls of a building gave the blast a much less effective surface to push against. The blast tore the tower from its foundations, twisted it, ripped it apart and left it flat on the ground. The effects on the tower indicate that, at that distance, unshielded permanent steel and masonry buildings would have been destroyed. I no longer consider the Pentagon a safe shelter from such a bomb. Enclosed are a sketch showing the tower before the explosion and a telephotograph showing what it looked like afterwards.[3] None of us had expected it to be damaged.

6. The cloud traveled to a great height first in the form of a ball, then mushroomed, then changed into a long trailing chimney-shaped column and finally was sent in several directions by the variable winds at the different elevations. It deposited its dust and radioactive materials over a wide area. It was followed and monitored by medical doctors and scientists with instruments to check its radioactive effects. While here and there the activity on the ground was fairly high, at no place did it reach a concentration which required evacuation of the population. Radioactive material in small quantities was located as much as 120 miles away. The measurements are being continued in order to have adequate data with which to protect the Government's interests in case of future claims. For a few hours I was none too comfortable about the situation.

7. For distances as much as 200 miles away, observers were stationed to check on blast effects, property damage, radioactivity and reactions of the population. While complete reports have not yet been received, I now know that no persons were injured nor was there any real property damage outside our Government area. As soon as all the voluminous data can be checked and correlated, full technical studies will be possible.

8. Our long range weather predictions had indicated that we could expect weather favorable for our tests beginning on the morning of the 17th and continuing for four days. This was almost a certainty if we were to believe our long range forecasters. The prediction for the morning of the 16th was not so certain but there was about an 80% chance of the conditions being suitable. During the night there were thunder storms with lightning flashes all over the area. The test had been originally set for 0400 hours and all the night through, because of the bad weather, there were urgings from many of the

[3] Neither reproduced.

scientists to postpone the test. Such a delay might well have had crippling results due to mechanical difficulties in our complicated test set-up. Fortunately, we disregarded the urgings. We held firm and waited the night through hoping for suitable weather. We had to delay an hour and a half, to 0530, before we could fire. This was 30 minutes before sunrise.

9. Because of bad weather, our two B–29 observation airplanes were unable to take off as scheduled from Kirtland Field at Albuquerque and when they finally did get off, they found it impossible to get over the target because of the heavy clouds and the thunder storms. Certain desired observations could not be made and while the people in the airplanes saw the explosion from a distance, they were not as close as they will be in action. We still have no reason to anticipate the loss of our plane in an actual operation although we cannot guarantee safety.

10. Just before 1100 the news stories from all over the state started to flow into the Albuquerque Associated Press. I then directed the issuance by the Commanding Officer, Alamogordo Air Base of a news release as shown on the inclosure. With the assistance of the Office of Censorship we were able to limit the news stories to the approved release supplemented in the local papers by brief stories from the many eyewitnesses not connected with our project. One of these was a blind woman who saw the light.

11. Brigadier General Thomas F. Farrell was at the control shelter located 10,000 yards south of the point of explosion. His impressions are given below:

"The scene inside the shelter was dramatic beyond words. In and around the shelter were some twenty-odd people concerned with last minute arrangements prior to firing the shot. Included were: Dr. Oppenheimer, the Director who had borne the great scientific burden of developing the weapon from the raw materials made in Tennessee and Washington and a dozen of his key assistants—Dr. Kistiakowsky, who developed the highly special explosives; Dr. Bainbridge, who supervised all the detailed arrangements for the test; Dr. Hubbard, the weather expert, and several others. Besides these, there were a handful of soldiers, two or three Army officers and one Naval officer. The shelter was cluttered with a great variety of instruments and radios.

"For some hectic two hours preceding the blast, General Groves stayed with the Director, walking with him and steadying his tense excitement. Every time the Director would be about to explode because of some untoward happening, General Groves would take him off and walk with him in the rain, counselling with him and reassuring him that everything would be all right. At twenty minutes before zero hour, General Groves left for his station at the base camp, first because it provided a better observation point and second,

because of our rule that he and I must not be together in situations where there is an element of danger, which existed at both points.

"Just after General Groves left, announcements began to be broadcast of the interval remaining before the blast. They were sent by radio to the other groups participating in and observing the test. As the time interval grew smaller and changed from minutes to seconds, the tension increased by leaps and bounds. Everyone in that room knew the awful potentialities of the thing that they thought was about to happen. The scientists felt that their figuring must be right and that the bomb had to go off but there was in everyone's mind a strong measure of doubt. The feeling of many could be expressed by 'Lord, I believe; help Thou mine unbelief.' We were reaching into the unknown and we did not know what might come of it. It can be safely said that most of those present—Christian, Jew and Atheist—were praying and praying harder than they had ever prayed before. If the shot were successful, it was a justification of the several years of intensive effort of tens of thousands of people—statesmen, scientists, engineers, manufacturers, soldiers, and many others in every walk of life.

"In that brief instant in the remote New Mexico desert the tremendous effort of the brains and brawn of all these people came suddenly and startlingly to the fullest fruition. Dr. Oppenheimer, on whom had rested a very heavy burden, grew tenser as the last seconds ticked off. He scarcely breathed. He held on to a post to steady himself. For the last few seconds, he stared directly ahead and then when the announcer shouted 'Now!' and there came this tremendous burst of light followed shortly thereafter by the deep growling roar of the explosion, his face relaxed into an expression of tremendous relief. Several of the observers standing back of the shelter to watch the lighting effects were knocked flat by the blast.

"The tension in the room let up and all started congratulating each other. Everyone sensed 'This is it!' No matter what might happen now all knew that the impossible scientific job had been done. Atomic fission would no longer be hidden in the cloisters of the theoretical physicists' dreams. It was almost full grown at birth. It was a great new force to be used for good or for evil. There was a feeling in that shelter that those concerned with its nativity should dedicate their lives to the mission that it would always be used for good and never for evil.

"Dr. Kistiakowsky, the impulsive Russian,[4] threw his arms around Dr. Oppenheimer and embraced him with shouts of glee. Others were equally enthusiastic. All the pent-up emotions were released in those few minutes and all seemed to sense immediately that the explosion had far exceeded the most optimistic expectations and wildest hopes of the scientists. All seemed to feel that they had been present at the birth of a new age—The Age of Atomic Energy—and felt their profound responsibility to help in guiding into right channels the tremendous forces which had been unlocked for the first time in history.

[4] At this point is the following manuscript interpolation by Groves: "an American and Harvard professor for many years".

"As to the present war, there was a feeling that no matter what else might happen, we now had the means to insure its speedy conclusion and save thousands of American lives. As to the future, there had been brought into being something big and something new that would prove to be immeasurably more important than the discovery of electricity or any of the other great discoveries which have so affected our existence.

"The effects could well be called unprecedented, magnificent, beautiful, stupendous and terrifying. No man-made phenomenon of such tremendous power had ever occurred before. The lighting effects beggared description. The whole country was lighted by a searing light with the intensity many times that of the midday sun. It was golden, purple, violet, gray and blue. It lighted every peak, crevasse and ridge of the nearby mountain range with a clarity and beauty that cannot be described but must be seen to be imagined. It was that beauty the great poets dream about but describe most poorly and inadequately. Thirty seconds after the explosion came first, the air blast pressing hard against the people and things, to be followed almost immediately by the strong, sustained, awesome roar which warned of doomsday and made us feel that we puny things were blasphemous to dare tamper with the forces heretofore reserved to The Almighty. Words are inadequate tools for the job of acquainting those not present with the physical, mental and psychological effects. It had to be witnessed to be realized."

12. My impressions of the night's high points follow:

After about an hour's sleep I got up at 0100 and from that time on until about five I was with Dr. Oppenheimer constantly. Naturally he was nervous, although his mind was working at its usual extraordinary efficiency. I devoted my entire attention to shielding him from the excited and generally faulty advice of his assistants who were more than disturbed by their excitement and the uncertain weather conditions. By 0330 we decided that we could probably fire at 0530. By 0400 the rain had stopped but the sky was heavily overcast. Our decision became firmer as time went on. During most of these hours the two of us journeyed from the control house out into the darkness to look at the stars and to assure each other that the one or two visible stars were becoming brighter. At 0510 I left Dr. Oppenheimer and returned to the main observation point which was 17,000 yards from the point of explosion. In accordance with our orders I found all personnel not otherwise occupied massed on a bit of high ground.

At about two minutes of the scheduled firing time all persons lay face down with their feet pointing towards the explosion. As the remaining time was called from the loud speaker from the 10,000 yard control station there was complete silence. Dr. Conant said he had

never imagined seconds could be so long. Most of the individuals in accordance with orders shielded their eyes in one way or another. There was then this burst of light of a brilliance beyond any comparison. We all rolled over and looked through dark glasses at the ball of fire. About forty seconds later came the shock wave followed by the sound, neither of which seemed startling after our complete astonishment at the extraordinary lighting intensity. Dr. Conant reached over and we shook hands in mutual congratulations. Dr. Bush, who was on the other side of me, did likewise. The feeling of the entire assembly was similar to that described by General Farrell, with even the uninitiated feeling profound awe. Drs. Conant and Bush and myself were struck by an even stronger feeling that the faith of those who had been responsible for the initiation and the carrying on of this Herculean project had been justified. I personally thought of Blondin crossing Niagara Falls on his tight rope, only to me this tight rope had lasted for almost three years and of my repeated confident-appearing assurances that such a thing was possible and that we would do it.

13. A large group of observers were stationed at a point about 27 miles north of the point of explosion. Attached is a memorandum written shortly after the explosion by Dr. E. O. Lawrence which may be of interest.

14. While General Farrell was waiting about midnight for a commercial airplane to Washington at Albuquerque—120 miles away from the site—he overheard several airport employees discussing their reaction to the blast. One said that he was out on the parking apron; it was quite dark; then the whole southern sky was lighted as though by a bright sun; the light lasted several seconds. Another remarked that if a few exploding bombs could have such an effect, it must be terrible to have them drop on a city.

15. My liaison officer at the Alamogordo Air Base, 60 miles away, made the following report:

"There was a blinding flash of light that lighted the entire northwestern sky. In the center of the flash, there appeared to be a huge billow of smoke. The original flash lasted approximately 10 to 15 seconds. As the first flash died down, there arose in the approximate center of where the original flash had occurred an enormous ball of what appeared to be fire and closely resembled a rising sun that was three-fourths above a mountain. The ball of fire lasted approximately 15 seconds, then died down and the sky resumed an almost normal appearance.

"Almost immediately, a third, but much smaller, flash and billow of smoke of a whitish-orange color appeared in the sky, again lighting

the sky for approximately 4 seconds. At the time of the original flash, the field was lighted well enough so that a newspaper could easily have been read. The second and third flashes were of much lesser intensity.

"We were in a glass-enclosed control tower some 70 feet above the ground and felt no concussion or air compression. There was no noticeable earth tremor although reports overheard at the Field during the following 24 hours indicated that some believed that they had both heard the explosion and felt some earth tremor."

16. I have not written a separate report for General Marshall as I feel you will want to show this to him. I have informed the necessary people here of our results. Lord Halifax after discussion with Mr. Harrison and myself stated that he was not sending a full report to his government at this time. I informed him that I was sending this to you and that you might wish to show it to the proper British representatives.

17. We are all fully conscious that our real goal is still before us. The battle test is what counts in the war with Japan.

18. May I express my deep personal appreciation for your congratulatory cable to us [5] and for the support and confidence which I have received from you ever since I have had this work under my charge.

19. I know that Colonel Kyle will guard these papers with his customary extraordinary care.

L R GROVES

[Enclosure 3]

BULLETIN [6]

Alamogordo, N. M., July 16—William O. Eareckson, commanding officer of the Alamogordo Army Air Base, made the following statement today:

"Several inquiries have been received concerning a heavy explosion which occurred on the Alamogordo Air Base reservation this morning.

"A remotely located ammunition magazine containing a considerable amount of high explosive and pyrotechnics exploded.

"There was no loss of life or injury to anyone, and the property damage outside of the explosives magazine itself was negligible.

"Weather conditions affecting the content of gas shells exploded by the blast may make it desirable for the Army to evacuate temporarily a few civilians from their homes."

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[5] Not printed.

[6] Identified in the source copy as a clipping from *The Albuquerque Tribune* for July 16, 1945.

[Enclosure 4]

TOP SECRET [NEAR ALAMOGORDO AIR BASE?], July 16, 1945.

THOUGHTS BY E. O. LAWRENCE[7]

Our group assembled at a point 27 miles from the bomb site about two in the morning. We were on a plain extending all the way to the bomb and although I did not notice carefully the mountains seemed to be some miles away. We could see in the distance lights defining the position of the bomb and at about four a. m. our radio picked up conversations between the B-29s and the ground organization.

We soon learned that zero hour was 5:30 a. m. which was just break of dawn. Naturally our tenseness grew as zero hour approached. We were warned of the probable brilliance of the explosion—so bright it would blind one looking directly at it for sometime and there was even danger of sunburn!

I decided the best place to view the flame would be through the window of the car I was sitting in, which would take out ultraviolet, but at the last minute decided to get out of the car (evidence indeed I was excited!) and just as I put my foot on the ground I was enveloped with a warm brilliant yellow white light—from darkness to brilliant sunshine in an instant and as I remember I momentarily was stunned by the surprise. It took me a second thought to tell myself, "this is indeed it!!" and then through my dark sun glasses there was a gigantic ball of fire rising rapidly from the earth—at first as brilliant as the sun, growing less brilliant as it grew boiling and swirling into the heavens. Ten or fifteen thousand feet above the ground it was orange in color and I judge a mile in diameter. At higher levels it became purple and this purple afterglow persisted for what seemed a long time (possibly it was only for a minute or two) at an elevation of 20-25,000 feet. This purple glow was due to the enormous radioactivity of the gases. (The light is in large part due to nitrogen of the air and in the laboratory we occasionally produce it in miniature with the cyclotron.)

In the earlier stages of rise of the flame the clouds above were illuminated and as the flame rose it was a grand spectacle also to see the great clouds immediately above melt away before our eyes.

The final phases was the column of hot gases smoke and dust funneling from the earth into the heavens to 40,000 feet. The column was to me surprisingly narrow until high elevations were reached when it foamed out considerably. The great funnel was visible a

[7] This memorandum, which bears an uncertified typed signature, has the following typed notation at the end: "This was written in an airplane and not corrected by the author."

DOCUMENT 13

C
O
P
Y

WAR DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
Washington 25, D. C.

25 July 1945

TO: General Carl Spaatz
Commanding General
United States Army Strategic Air Forces

1. The 509 Composite Group, 20th Air Force will deliver its first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945 on one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki. To carry military and civilian scientific personnel from the War Department to observe and record the effects of the explosion of the bomb, additional aircraft will accompany the airplane carrying the bomb. The observing planes will stay several miles distant from the point of impact of the bomb.

2. Additional bombs will be delivered on the above targets as soon as made ready by the project staff. Further instructions will be issued concerning targets other than those listed above.

3. Dissemination of any and all information concerning the use of the weapon against Japan is reserved to the Secretary of War and the President of the United States. No communiques on the subject or releases of information will be issued by Commanders in the field without specific prior authority. Any news stories will be sent to the War Department for special clearance.

4. The foregoing directive is issued to you by direction and with the approval of the Secretary of War and of the Chief of Staff, USA. It is desired that you personally deliver one copy of this directive to General MacArthur and one copy to Admiral Nimitz for their information.

/S/ Thos. T. Handy
THOS. T. HANDY
General, G.S.C.
Acting Chief of Staff

STIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF DIVISIONS
IN JAPAN
25 July 1945

rlined divisions are newly identified.

mated ground strength (Army, Navy, Air) for each sector shown in red.

h Div may be in West Honshu instead of oku; strength is carried in Shikoku.

AL ESTIMATED GROUND STRENGTH IN JAPAN:
2,110,000
Includes 10,000 for unlocated units)

1 DIVISION: 7.
1 DEPOT DIV: 7:

100,000

ELEVENTH AREA ARMY
3 DIVISIONS:
72, 142, 157.
2 DEPOT DIVS:
2, 57.

175,000

THIRTEENTH AREA ARMY
3 DIVISIONS:
73, 143, 153.
2 DEPOT DIVS:
3, 52.

FIFTEENTH AREA ARMY
3 DIVISIONS:
44, 144, 316.
2 DEPOT DIVS:
4, 53.

ENTIFIED ARMY
IVISIONS:
4, 224, 230.
EPOT DIV:

190,000

200,000

200,000

560,000

TWELFTH AREA ARMY
9 DIVISIONS:
1 Armd, 1 Gds,
3 Gds, 81, 93,
141, 147, 151,
152.
3 DEPOT DIVS:
2 Gds, 51, u/i.

150,000

UNIDENTIFIED AREA ARMY
4 DIVISIONS:
11, 155, 205*,
344.
1 DEPOT DIV:
55.

505,000

SIXTEENTH AREA ARMY
10 DIVISIONS:
25, 57, 77, 86,
145, 146, 154,
156, 206, 212.
2 DEPOT DIVS:
6, 56.

MILES
100 0 200

DOCUMENT 15

ESTIMATED
JAPANESE DISPOSITIONS
ON KYUSHU

26 July 1945
IMATED STRENGTH:

Ground	350,000
Ground	75,000
Ground	100,000
TOTAL:	525,000



DOCUMENT 15A

ESTIMATE OF JAPANESE AIR STRENGTH TOTALS AS OF 26 JULY 1945

(Figures in parentheses show changes from 19 July)

1. Combat Planes:

	Army		Navy		Total	
Fighters	1338	(+131)	1306	(+ 62)	3142	(+193)
Bombers	532	(+ 26)	280	(+ 17)	1412	(+ 43)
Recon planes	432	(+ 30)	175	(- 2)	606	(+ 28)
Floatplanes and flying boats			593	(+ 4)	593	(+ 4)
Total	2220	(+197)	2952	(+ 81)	5772	(+268)

2. Trainers:

Advanced	1545	(+200)			1545	(+200)
Utility	260	(+ 30)	400		660	(+ 30)
Elementary	1900	(--)	2200	(--)	4100	(--)
Total	3705	(+230)	2600	(--)	6305	(+230)

DOCUMENT 16

Document 25

Papers of George M. Elsey

HQ U/S FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER

STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL

INCOMING ~~SECRET~~ MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

URGENT

FROM: AGWAR Washington

TO : Tripartite Conference Babelsberg, Germany

NO : WAR 41011 30 July 1945.

To the President from the Secretary of War.

The time schedule on Groves' project is progressing so rapidly that it is now essential that statement for release by you be available not later than Wednesday, 1 August. I have revised draft of statement, which I previously presented to you in light of

(A) Your recent ultimatum,

(B) Dramatic results of test and

(C) Certain minor suggestions made by British of which Byrnes is aware.

While I am planning to start a copy by special courier tomorrow in the hope you can be reached, nevertheless in the event he does not reach you in time, I will appreciate having your authority to have White House release revised statement as soon as necessary.

Sorry circumstances seem to require this emergency action.

See Over

ACTION: Gen. Vaughan

VICTORY-IN-733 (31 July 1945) 3022172 EDP

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
CSD letter, May 3, 1972
By NARS, Date 5-17-79

Note time received in Potsdam
1

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

DOCUMENT 16 A

Sec War

Reply to your 4.10 11
suggestions approved
Release when ready
but not sooner than
August 2.

HST

ORIGNAL IN SECURITY CAGE - GEORGE M. ELSEY PAPERS - HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

TOP SECRET

DOCUMENT 17

COPY NO. _____

J.W.P.C. 397

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

4 August 1945

JOINT WAR PLANS COMMITTEE

ALTERNATES TO "OLYMPIC"

Note by the Secretaries

The Joint War Plans Committee recommends that the Joint Staff Planners approve the enclosure and forward to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their approval.

J.I.C. 311 as amended and approved by the Service Members, Joint Intelligence Committee, is attached hereto as Enclosure "B".

J. T. HILLIS,

D. M. GRIBBON,

Joint Secretariat.

DISTRIBUTION	Copy No.
Asst. Chief of Staff (Plans), COMINCH	1 - 2
Asst. Chief Air Staff/Plans	3 - 4
Chief, S & P Group, OPD, WDGS	5 - 6
Plans Div. COMINCH - Asst. Plans Officer	7
Secretary, J.P.S.	8
Secretary, J.W.P.C.	9 - 15

Say Told me
not concern

Enclosed
Indexed

ENCLOSURE "A"

ALTERNATES TO "OLYMPIC"

Report by the Joint Staff Planners

1. In Enclosure "B" (page 3) the Service Members of the Joint Intelligence Committee report a considerable strengthening of Japanese forces in southern Japan proper. Along with an increase in ground units deployed in southern Kyushu, a concentration of aircraft, including the bulk of Japanese suicide aircraft, and small suicide naval craft is reported in the area.

2. The possible effect upon OLYMPIC operations of this build-up and concentration is such that it is considered commanders in the field should review their estimates of the situation, reexamine objectives in Japan as possible alternates to OLYMPIC, and prepare plans for operations against such alternate objectives.

3. The Joint Staff Planners are preparing studies of alternate objectives in the light of current intelligence estimates These studies are to be made available to theater commanders upon completion.

4. It is recommended that the enclosed message (Appendix to Enclosure "A", page 2) be dispatched to CINCPAC and CINCAFPAC for action and to COMGENUSASTAF for information.

APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE "A"

D R A F T

MESSAGE TO CINCPAC AND CINCAFPAC
INFORMATION TO CG, USASTAF

Copies of highly secret reports by the Joint Intelligence Committee (J.I.C. 311, Defensive Preparations in Japan) have been furnished you. Report indicates strengthening of Japanese forces and defensive measures in southern Japan to an extent considerably in excess of that previously estimated as Japanese capability by OLYMPIC target date. While these measures on the part of the Japanese are not yet considered to require change to your current directive it is desired that you give continued consideration to the situation particularly as it affects the execution of OLYMPIC, make alternate plans and submit timely recommendations. Operations against extreme northern Honshu, against the Sendai area, and directly against the Kanto Plain are now under intensive study here.

ENCLOSURE "B"

DEFENSIVE PREPARATIONS IN JAPAN

Report by the Service Members, Joint Intelligence Committee

THE PROBLEM

1. To summarize Japanese defensive preparations in the following areas:

Southern Kyushu
Northern Kyushu
Shikoku
Kanto Plain

and to determine the priorities of defense accorded by the Japanese.

GENERAL SUMMARY

2. In anticipation of Allied invasion of the Home Islands, the Japanese are making a maximum effort to strengthen their defensive capabilities in Japan Proper and to redeploy their forces in accordance with their own estimate of areas most likely to be invaded. Preparations for defense are substantiated by the following evidence: (a) ground forces are being expanded at a greatly accelerated rate; (b) a policy of rigid conservation of aircraft has been adopted, new airfields constructed, and air strength is being deployed to permit the most effective utilization against an invading force; (c) stress is being laid upon the extensive defensive mining of approaches to threatened areas and the establishment of small craft suicide attack bases in these areas; (d) emphasis is being given to coordinated ground and air action to frustrate our landing operations supplemented by small craft and ingenious weapons to be employed in suicidal tactics. We believe that the Japanese have accorded priority for defensive preparations in the following order: (1) Southern Kyushu; (2) Shikoku; (3) Northern Kyushu; and (4) Kanto Plain. Apparently, the

Japanese anticipate heavy destruction of their communication lines and are now attempting to concentrate the greatest part of the forces to be used for the defense of these vital areas in close proximity to the most threatened points of probable Allied assault.

PARTICULAR AREAS

3. There is every indication that the Japanese have been giving the highest priority to the defense of Kyushu and particularly to Southern Kyushu.

Since early 1945, ground forces deployed in Kyushu have been increased from 1 active and 2 depot divisions (totaling with army troops some 150,000 men), to a present strength of 11 active and 2 depot divisions (totaling with army troops about 545,000 men). During recent months, 2 divisions were brought in from Manchuria, 1 from Hokkaido, 2 from Honshu, and 1 from an unknown location in Japan, while 4 active divisions were formed locally from depot divisions. In addition, 1 independent mixed brigade and 3 tank brigades have been recently identified in Kyushu and one amphibious brigade has been transferred from the Kuriles to Southern Kyushu. In early 1945, about 75% of all ground forces on this island were located in Northern Kyushu, whereas now 7 of the 11 active divisions and about 60% of the total strength are deployed in Southern Kyushu.

Recent trends in the deployment of elementary biplane trainer type aircraft for suicide operations likewise point to the defensive priority which is being given to the Kyushu area by the Japanese. A total of 50 special bases for suicide aircraft are thus far known to have been designated in Kyushu, Honshu, and Shikoku west of 133° longitude. The Japanese naval air forces alone have deployed in this area 1,200 biplane trainers designated for suicide missions at the time of invasion. In comparison, only 32 such fields, 400 navy

biplane trainers and 400 navy monoplane trainers have been so designated in the area between 133° and 138°, while only 22 suicide bases and 600 navy biplane trainers are thus far located in the remainder of Honshu, which includes the Tokyo Plain.

Due to their greater range and mobility, the deployment of combat aircraft is less indicative of defensive priorities than in the case of elementary biplane trainers, but it is significant that the major portion of combat aircraft in Japan Proper is deployed or scheduled to be deployed at bases west of 138° E., thus placing tactical emphasis on the Kyushu-Shikoku area.

The trend of aircraft fuel accumulations seems to be generally in line with the present and prospective deployment of combat and trainer type aircraft

The immobilization and destruction of practically all large combatant units of the Japanese Navy has permitted the release of personnel, possibly exceeding 100,000 men for other assignments. There is evidence that many of these men from the Kure and Sasebo area will be utilized for intensifying defensive preparations in Kyushu and nearby areas. Special naval landing forces are undergoing combat training to support army ground forces in defense against Allied landings. In addition, numerous suicide attack units are being formed and trained for employment in one-man torpedoes, midget submarines, small suicide boats, and as underwater swimming teams. There is also a strong possibility that a majority of Japan's remaining destroyers will be employed in suicidal missions against our surface forces

Many defensive mine fields have been laid and there is considerable evidence that new types of mines which might be effective against Allied landing craft are being set out in waters of less than 15 fathoms along prospective landing beaches. A very high priority has been given to the Kyushu area, the most extensive mining taking place south of 33° latitude. We believe that these mining and other naval defensive preparations in

Southern Kyushu will be completed by September. Already, it is believed, an extensive mine field has been completed along the east coast of Kyushu from Tomitaka to Miyazaki. In addition, other mine fields have been laid along the approaches to Ariake Wan, Kagoshima Wan, and Tachibana Wan.

4. Shikoku. Defensive preparations in Shikoku would seem to indicate that the Japanese estimate the probability of Allied landings on this island as being second only to invasion of Kyushu or Quelpart Island.

In early 1945 no active divisions were known to be located in Shikoku, the available ground troops at that time consisting of 1 depot division and miscellaneous units totaling some 50,000 men. In recent months, however, 1 division has been brought in from Manchuria and 2 from Central and Western Honshu, and 1 active division has been created locally. Present strength, including 4 active divisions, 1 depot division and miscellaneous units, totals about 150,000 men. Recent incorporation of the ground forces in Shikoku into an area Army headquarters indicates the importance which the Japanese attach to the defense of this island.

Present deployment of the Japanese air forces, as described in paragraph 3 above, afford the Japanese equal capability for the air defense of Shikoku as compared with Kyushu. From their present bases all of the aircraft based in Japan Proper west of 138° would be within range of our assault forces attacking Shikoku.

From the naval standpoint, the Japanese are believed to have established some bases for suicide attack units in the Kochi (Lat. 33° 33' N, Long. 133° 33' E) area. Mines have been laid in the waters along the south coast of Shikoku in the vicinity of Kochi and some of these mines may be of the shallow water type for defense against Allied landing craft approaching the beaches. Defensive minefields have also been laid in Bungo Suido between Kyushu and Shikoku.

5. Kanto Plain. While there is considerable evidence that the Japanese expect us to make initial landings in Kyushu, Shikoku or some other area of Japan Proper prior to an assault on the Kanto Plain, they do not exclude the possibility of amphibious operations against this latter area from our present positions.

In early 1945 there were only 4 active and 3 depot divisions, plus army troops totaling about 300,000 men, located in the vicinity of the Kanto Plain. Progressive reinforcement of the area has been carried out since March, 1 armored division having been brought in from Manchuria, 2 active divisions from other parts of Japan Proper, while at the same time 2 divisions were activated locally from depot divisions. Present strength in this area is estimated to be 9 active divisions, 3 depot divisions and army troops, totaling about 560,000 men. No information is available regarding any unusual recent activity in the strengthening of coastal defenses, although there is every reason to believe that here, as well as in other threatened areas of Japan Proper, fixed defenses are being constantly developed and improved.

From the air standpoint, while as stated in paragraph 3 above, there are at present only 22 special suicide bases known to be located east of 138°, it must be borne in mind that all trainer type aircraft as well as combat types based in Central Honshu would be within easy range of the Kanto Plain area. At least one large, specially concealed air base is being hastily constructed in the vicinity of Koriyama through which a large number of trainer-type aircraft could be staged, or at which 100 suicide trainers could be based. Thus, while tactical emphasis in aircraft deployment points towards the Kyushu-Shikoku area, it is obvious that large numbers of trainer-type as well as combat aircraft will be in a position to operate effectively in the defense of the Kanto Plain.

TOP SECRET

Although some naval small craft and other suicide units have been recently formed for the added defense of this area, we believe that much less emphasis is being currently given to such defensive preparation than is the case in the general area of Kyushu and Shikoku. There is no recent information regarding the laying of additional mine fields in the vicinity of the Kanto Plain.

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384 Kyushu (4 July 44)

Dec 1-80. DEC 15 19[illegible]

Abe - Admiral Carlson has shared this and I think we should get it out in a hurry. In view of your discussion of the matter with the Chief the other day, what do you think about it?

WLR

Col Bright (in Gen Cabell's office) dropped you and asked you to drop back. He wants to know what you plan to do with this paper.

T.

DOCUMENT 18

Document 54

Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Secretary's Files

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 23, 1952

MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL LANDRY:

Attached is a letter from Professor Cate of the University of Chicago asking clarification of the precise circumstances under which the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima.

If this letter is to be answered, it may take some research in official files and discussion with the President. Since this is an Air Force project, perhaps it would be more appropriate if you checked into this thing.

If, when the information is available, you wish us to write a reply, we will be glad to do so.

IRVING PERIMETER

Attachment

DOCUMENT 18 A

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
CHICAGO 37 · ILLINOIS
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
1126 EAST 59TH STREET

December 6, 1952

The President Truman
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

For several years it has been my privilege to serve as one of the editors and authors of The Army Air Forces in World War II, a history published on a non-profit basis under the joint sponsorship of the U.S. Air Force and the University of Chicago. One of my tasks for the fifth volume, now in press, was to write an account of the atomic bomb attacks against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In respect to the decision to use the bomb I have been faced with an apparent discrepancy in the evidence which I have been unable to resolve, and, in spite of a reluctance to intrude upon the time of the President, I am turning to you for information for which you are the best and perhaps the sole authority.

I have read with great interest your own statements - that released on 6 August 1945 and that contained in your letter to Dr. Karl T. Compton, dated 16 December 1946 and published in the Atlantic Monthly of February 1947. I have read also the late Mr. Stimson's more detailed account in Harper's Magazine of February 1947 which is in perfect accord with yours - the gist being that the dread decision for which you courageously assumed responsibility was made at Potsdam "in the face of" Premier Suzuki's rejection of the warning contained in the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July, and that the motive was to avoid the great loss of life that would have attended the invasion of Kyushu scheduled for November.

More recently I have seen a photostatic copy of the directive to Gen. Carl Spaatz ordering him to deliver the first atomic bomb against one of four designated targets; the document has been declassified and I am inclosing a true copy. The letter is dated at Washington on 25 July 1945 and bears the signature of Gen. Thomas T. Handy, Acting Chief of Staff during General Marshall's absence at Potsdam. According to General Arnold's statement elsewhere /H. H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York, 1949), p. 589/, this directive was based on a memorandum dispatched by courier to Washington after a conference on 22 July between himself, Secretary Stimson, and General Marshall.

The directive contains an unqualified order to launch the attack "as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945."

The President December 6, 1952

There is no reference to the Potsdam Declaration which was to be issued on the next day and no statement as to what should be done in the event of a Japanese offer to surrender before 3 August. It is possible that the written directive was qualified by oral instructions, or that it was intended that it be countermanded by a radio message if the Japanese did accept the Potsdam terms, or that the directive was an erroneous representation of Secretary Stimson's real intentions. Nevertheless, as it stands the directive seems to indicate that the decision to use the bomb had been made at least one day before the promulgation of the Potsdam Declaration and two days before Suzuki's rejection thereof on 28 July, Tokyo time. Such an interpretation is in flat contradiction to the explanation implicit in the published statements, that the final decision was made only after the Japanese refusal of the ultimatum.

Because of the extraordinary importance of this problem, I am appealing to you for more complete information as to the time and the circumstances under which you arrived at the final decision, and for permission to quote your reply in the volume of which I have spoken. Your well-known interest in history has encouraged me to seek my information at the source, as the historian should, without apology other than for having intruded on your crowded schedule with a letter made overly long by my desire to state the problem accurately.

Very truly yours,

James L. Cate
Professor of Medieval History

JLC:jm
Inclosure

DOCUMENT 18 B

C
O
P
Y

WAR DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
Washington 25, D. C.

25 July 1945

TO: General Carl Spaatz
Commanding General
United States Army Strategic Air Forces

1. The 509 Composite Group, 20th Air Force will deliver its first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945 on one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki. To carry military and civilian scientific personnel from the War Department to observe and record the effects of the explosion of the bomb, additional aircraft will accompany the airplane carrying the bomb. The observing planes will stay several miles distant from the point of impact of the bomb.

2. Additional bombs will be delivered on the above targets as soon as made ready by the project staff. Further instructions will be issued concerning targets other than those listed above.

3. Dissemination of any and all information concerning the use of the weapon against Japan is reserved to the Secretary of War and the President of the United States. No communiques on the subject or releases of information will be issued by Commanders in the field without specific prior authority. Any news stories will be sent to the War Department for special clearance.

4. The foregoing directive is issued to you by direction and with the approval of the Secretary of War and of the Chief of Staff, USA. It is desired that you personally deliver one copy of this directive to General MacArthur and one copy to Admiral Nimitz for their information.

/S/ Thos. T. Handy
THOS. T. HANDY
General, G.S.C.
Acting Chief of Staff

DOCUMENT 18 C

Document 55

Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Secretary's Files

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

30 December 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President, it would be very desirable, if you could do it, to let this historian have such information as could be used in the history that he is writing concerning the circumstances under which the first atomic bombs were dropped.

R. B. LANDRY
Major General, USAF

Incl

Document 24

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON Dec. 31, 1952

My dear Professor Cate:-

Your letter of Dec. 6th 1952 has just now been delivered to me.

When the message came to Potsdam that a successful atomic explosion had taken place in New Mexico, there was much excitement and conversation about the effect on the war then in progress with Japan.

The next day I told Prime Minister [redacted] of Great Britain and generalissimo Stalin that the explosion had been a success. The British Prime Minister understood and appreciated what I'd told him. Prime Minister Stalin smiled and thanked me

THE ORIGINAL OF THIS DOCUMENT
IS IN THE SECURITY FILE OF
THE HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

for reporting the explosion to him but Dr. was sure he did not understand its significance.

I called a meeting of the Sec. of State, Mr. Byrnes, the Sec of War, Mr. Stimson, Adm. Leahy, Gen. Marshall, Gen Eisenhower, the Sec of the Navy, Adm King and some others to discuss what should be done with this awful weapon.

I asked Gen. Marshall what it would cost in lives to land on the Tokio plane and other places in Japan [It was his opinion that 1/4 million casualties would be the minimum cost as well as an equal number of the enemy.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

the other military and naval men present agreed.

I asked Sec. Stimson which cities in Japan were devoted exclusively to war production. He promptly named Hiroshima and Nagasaki, [illegible].

We sent an ultimatum to Japan. It was ignored.

Our first atomic bombs dropped on the two cities named on the way back from Potsdam when we were in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. [illegible].

Dropping the bombs ended the war, saved lives and gave

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

the free nations a chance to face the facts.

When it looked as if Japan would quit, Russia hurried into the play (nine days) before the surrender so as to be in at the settlement. No military contribution was made by the Russians toward victory over Japan. Prisoners were surrendered and Manchuria occupied as was Korea north of the 38th parallel.

[Russia in Asia has been a great liability since]

DOCUMENT 18 E

Document 61

Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Secretary's Files

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 6, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

At your request I have reviewed your draft letter to Professor Cate, and I have made a few slight revisions after checking the details.

In your draft, you state that General Marshall told you that a landing in Japan would cost a quarter of a million casualties to the United States, and an equal number of the enemy. Mr. Stimson, in his book written by McGeorge Bundy, says that Marshall's estimate was over a million casualties. Your recollection sounds more reasonable than Stimson's, but in order to avoid a conflict, I have changed the wording to read that General Marshall expected a minimum of a quarter of a million casualties and possibly a much greater number -- as much as a million.

Secretary Forrestal does not appear to have been at the Potsdam meetings until July 28, and your conferences about the atom bomb appear to have taken place early in the meeting, on July 22, 23 and 24. Accordingly, I have deleted the Secretary of the Navy from the list of those with whom you conferred.

I have also inserted a paragraph explaining why the orders to General Spaatz were dated July 25 rather than after the ultimatum. This has been checked with the historian of the Department of Defense.

Russian entry into the war was less than a week before the surrender.

I have deleted the last sentence of your draft, since I think that it might be unfairly used by the propagandists of the political opposition. It states a fundamental truth, but in a very restrained way, and it seemed to me that it might raise more problems than it would help.

I attach various memoranda to me on this subject from Kenneth Hechler who did the research.

David D. Lloyd
DAVID D. LLOYD

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 12, 1953

My dear Professor Oates:

Your letter of December 6, 1952 has just now been delivered to me.

When the message came to Potsdam that a successful atomic explosion had taken place in New Mexico, there was much excitement and conversation about the effect on the war then in progress with Japan.

The next day I told the Prime Minister of Great Britain and Generalissimo Stalin that the explosion had been a success. The British Prime Minister understood and appreciated what I'd told him. Premier Stalin smiled and thanked me for reporting the explosion to him, but I'm sure he did not understand its significance.

I called a meeting of the Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, General Eisenhower, Admiral King and some others, to discuss what should be done with this awful weapon.

I asked General Marshall what it would cost in lives to land on the Tokio plain and other places in Japan. It was his opinion that such an invasion would cost at a minimum one quarter of a million casualties, and might cost as much as a million, on the American side alone, with an equal number of the enemy. The other military and naval men present agreed.

I asked Secretary Stimson which cities in Japan were devoted exclusively to war production. He promptly named Hiroshima and Nagasaki, among others.

We sent an ultimatum to Japan. It was rejected.

I ordered atomic bombs dropped on the two cities named on the way back from Potsdam, when we were in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean.

In your letter, you raise the fact that the directive

to General Spaatz to prepare for delivering the bomb is dated July twenty-fifth. It was, of course, necessary to set the military wheels in motion, as these orders did, but the final decision was in my hands, and was not made until we were returning from Potsdam.

Dropping the bombs ended the war, saved lives, and gave the free nations a chance to face the facts.

When it looked as if Japan would quit, Russia hurried into the fray less than a week before the surrender, so as to be in at the settlement. No military contribution was made by the Russians toward victory over Japan. Prisoners were surrendered and Manchuria occupied by the Soviets, as was Korea, north of the 38th parallel.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd) HARRY S. Truman

Professor James L. Cate,
Department of History,
The University of Chicago,
1126 East 59th Street,
Chicago 37,
Illinois.