

A REVIEW OF JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES IN BURMA.

1942-43.

1. Early in the operations in BURMA, which lead to the 1942 evacuation, two intelligence organisations were reported to be operating in BURMA with HQs at Rangoon. These were the Hikari-Kikan (under one of its former names) and an Army Special Service Organisation.

The Hikari-Kikan.

2. The Hikari-Kikan set up HQ at Rangoon under Col. KITABE KUNIO. As the Kikan's activities increased during 1942-43 and the organisation expanded, agencies were set up at KALEWA, MAYMYO, NOMALIN, PYITKYINA and AKYAB. The total strength of the whole of the branch at the end of 1943 was about 100, composed of 40 military and 60 civilian personnel, the former providing the directing element. The charter of the Kikan was the conduct of intelligence warfare against India, Indian troops and Indians in the Far East. It was not responsible for conducting intelligence activities which affected BURMA or against Allied troops other than Indians in BURMA. On occasions, however, its activities coincided with and overlapped those of other intelligence organisations. Evidence of this is shown in subsequent paragraphs. The Japanese staffs of the forward agencies conducted their activities independently of military control, being directed by their main HQ at Rangoon. Close liaison with other "I" organisations was nevertheless maintained, and Hikari was kept informed of all intelligence and military plans.

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The Army Special Service Organisation.

3. This HQ was set up in Rangoon, but later moved to Magwe, then to Maymyo and finally returned to Rangoon. In the districts it was known as the KAWASHIMA FORCE, presumably after Capt. Kawashima known to be employed by the organisation. The HQ was divided into 8 sections. Nothing is known of the organisation of the branches in the field.

4. During 1942/43 the Army Special Service Organisation was being referred to as the MINAMI KIKAN. There is still some doubt as to the origin of this nomenclature. Minami may have been referred to a Lt. Col. Minami who was in Bangkok at the outbreak of war, and later became associated with the Burma Defence Army, or it may have referred simply to the geographical location. Minami means "southern" in Japanese.

5. Although security as affecting Indians has been concerned mainly with the Hikari Kikan in Burma, the importance of the original "Minami" Special Service Organisation should not be overlooked. This Kikan was undoubtedly the forerunner of the various minor Kikans and operative groups which were later to be set up on a local basis and it is these which are discussed in this review.

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Arakan.

6. Arakan has continually figured as a base for intelligence operations against eastern India and provides a good example of close liaison between the Hikari-Kikan and other intelligence organisations and military formations.

7. The Ake Operative Group. This group, commanded by Capt. TANAKA, was formed by 55 Div during 1943. In a directive dated Nov. 43 the group, described as a "Propaganda Organisation", was to be used in conjunction with the personnel of the Akyab agency of the Hikari-Kikan to carry out "military activities." This term included the organisation of security systems, employment of local natives for the assassination of important Allied persons, and sabotage. As elsewhere, this Special Service Organisation had as a preliminary to complete the "pacification" of the local population, secure their co-operation, establish operational bases and post its agents. The group was then to infiltrate static and mobile agents behind our lines, to assist in forwarding Hikari operatives who would then establish fixed intelligence posts, and finally to carry out counter intelligence against 'V' Force members through the latter's families. Operatives were to include women, Buddhist priests, traders and small boys.

8. The group, under command of 55 Div, comprised three detachments, each commanded by a Japanese NCO. Each detachment consisted of a small number of groups each headed either by a Japanese NCO or a locally recruited "Staff Operative." The controllers at Group HQ and lesser HQs were Japanese; the agents were enlisted locally. All the latter were armed, but they were given the absolute minimum of essential information necessary. A great number deserted either for family reasons, or because they disliked the Japanese and/or the work they were doing.

9. In Apr 44 the group's activities were extended to cover local defence and administration. This included the establishment of a local police force and the introduction of some sort of military training for local youths. The general plan was still carried out in strict conjunction with military formations, the local Kempei, Civil Administration, and a section known as the SHIKISHIMA KIKAN, as well as, presumably, with HIKARI. The Shikishima Kikan was a small section under Lt. TADOKORO, a Hikari-Kikan officer formerly second in command to HATTORI at Akyab, and was concerned with carrying out a deception plan against the Allies regarding the "imminent fall of Chittagong." TADOKORO was assisted by three Japanese equipped with one type -5 W/T set.

10. Little is known of the activities of the Ake group between April and August 1944, except that it, like Hikari, was finding difficulty in "obtaining safe infiltration routes" for its agents. Accordingly a patrol was sent out to open up a new route and was assisted by a man who had fled the area two years previously. Hikari was also finding difficulty in providing its strategic agents with safe infiltration routes at this time.

11. In August 1944 the group encountered considerable difficulty with deserters and shortage of funds. At the end of that month the morale of the agents was reported to be extremely low. About October, when Hikari-Kikan was scheduled to start "guerrilla operations", the Chief of the Ake Group believed that his group was to be incorporated into

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FIGURE.

the Eikari-Kikan. At this stage a new section was identified as the Ake Operative Group, commanded by Lt. TONOKA, described by one of the members of Ake as having "passed out in the same course" as himself. The duties of this Group, formed and controlled by a Military formation, were probably concerned with those of Ake. Nikari meanwhile pursued its activities alongside those of the Army Special Service and the like organisations.

12. Nishi (Western) Kikan. This organisation was first identified in September 1943 when working closely with Nikari in the Hmonlin area. Early in 1945 three separate groups were operating in BURMA; one in the Hukawng, Shaduzup, Tawngpwe and Kamaing area, the second in the Chin Hills and a third in the area east and north-east of Kalaw (the Hmonlin branch referred to above). These groups are here referred to as Nos. 1, 2 and 3 respectively.

13. Group No. 1 consisted of HQ and two sections comprising 3 officers, 14 NCOs and 31 ORs, all drawn from units in 18 Div. Desirable qualifications for candidates were an ability to endure physical hardships and privations, and a knowledge of Kachin, Burmese or English.

14. Group No. 2, which operated in the Chin Hills as early as September 1943, was commanded by Lt. INADA YOSHINOBU, also known as C.O. of the "Chin Defence Army". This officer, now a Captain, is identical with the commander of the new Nishi-Kikan, mentioned in paras 20 and 24 below.

15. Group No. 3 was operating in the Hmonlin and Taninthi area in 1943. During the Manipur operations it advanced with Japanese forces and by the beginning of 1944 its HQ and one section were located in Assam. Another section of the group was located at Layshi in Burma.

16. The tasks of all three groups are well known and do not require recapitulation. The Nishi-Kikan, although bearing a close similarity in the main to the Ake Operative Group, appears to have been more under central authority than Ake. Only one group of the Nishi was formed by a lower military formation, whereas the other two were believed to have been responsible to a central intelligence HQ under Major FUJIWARA IWAICHI (formerly head of the FUJIWARA KIKAN in Malaya, 1942) probably at HQ, 15 Army.

17. Captured documents confirm that the original Nishi-Kikan has disappeared. Care must be taken to distinguish it from the Kikan of the same name, and commanded by a former officer of the old Nishi-Kikan, referred to in paras 20 and 24 below.

18. HIGASHI (Eastern) KIKAN. This Kikan, forged in January 1944 under 18 DIV, operated in the area Myitkyina and North, i.e. on the eastern flank of No. 1 group of the Nishi-Kikan. The Kikan consisted of HQ and three sections comprising 2 officers, 8 NCOs, 13 ORs and 7 "others", presumably interpreters. The functions of the Kikan were similar to those of the Nishi. Identification was also received at the same time of a HASANUMA organisation. The Chiefs of the Higashi and the Hasanuma organisation were identical in name and Myitkyina was given as HQ location for both. It is therefore possible that these two organisations were identical. Higashi

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has now disappeared. Its duties may have been taken over by the MATSU (Pine) operative section under Capt. NAGAO, a former Hikari-Kikan officer referred to in paras 20 and 25 below.

SUMMARY.


19. Up to this time the following organisations, had therefore been identified:-

- (a) The Hikari-Kikan with branch agencies at focal points and conducting operations inside Burma, but aimed at India and Indians.
- (b) A Special Service Organisation of which only the HQ at Rangoon has been identified.
- (c) The Ake and Ama Operative Sections and the Shikishima Kikan operating in Arakan; Ake at least was about to be disbanded, or absorbed into another organisation.
- (d) The Nishi-Kikan consisting of three groups and responsible for frontier intelligence in the area Kalewa to Myitkyina. Like Ake, it was reported to be about to lose its identity.
- (e) The Higashi Kikan operating on the east flank of the Nishi-Kikan.

1944: Re-grouping of intelligence personnel in BURMA.

20. An indication of a re-grouping of intelligence personnel in BURMA was first seen in captured documents, which included references to the disbanding of Nishi, and to a remark by the Chief of the Ake Operative Group that his organisation was to be absorbed into Hikari which was to start "Guerilla operations." Subsequently a captured document gave the following family tree:-

Lt. Gen. Isoda Saburo



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21. Lt. General Isoda Saburo, whose official appointment is Chief of the Southern Area Guerilla Forces (Nampo Yugekitai), is also head of the Hikari-Kikan.

22. The "Indian Sector". Specific reference to an "Indian Sector" in the diagram above is significant in view of the fact that Hikari, as it was known, was responsible only for the "Indian Sector" although it operated of necessity in Burma and other countries. This distinction, therefore, indicates that, in addition to its accustomed responsibility for conducting intelligence against India, Indian troops and Indians in the Far East, the new Hikari is now to cover a wider field of intelligence activity. It must also be remembered that formerly Col. Kitabe controlled only the Burma branch from his HQ at Rangoon. Since no reference appears to be made to a Burma branch, it is possible that either this is included under Kitabe's personal command or that the various Operative sections shown under Maj. Gen. Yamamoto comprises the new Burma branch.

23. "HQ". Maj. Gen Yamamoto Toshio, formerly head of the Hikari Kikan, is now Chief of Staff to Isoda Saburo. The Kiri operative section under Capt. Hattori is the reorganised Hikari Akyab agency responsible for Southern Burma. It is not quite clear whether Ake, Ama and Shikishima have been absorbed into Hattori's new command. This is possible, since a former Ake officer was concerned with Sacadindu Rutt & Seal Babu's activities in Arakan. (W.S.I.S. No. 177, para 13-15), a responsibility which is still within the Hikari-Kikan charter.

24. The Nishi Operative section under Capt. Isada Yoshinobu is responsible for Western Burma and its personnel include some previously identified with Hikari. The Ume operative section under Capt. Yamada is responsible for intelligence in Central Burma. Yamada was the former head of the Kalewa agency of the Hikari-Kikan and in Feb. 45 despatched four Indian agents equipped with W/F to Kalewa. (W.S.I.S. No. 176, para 15). His work is carried on in close liaison with military formations and includes such activities as the despatch of raiding and reconnaissance parties behind our lines. In view of this officer's attempts to prepare an intelligence base in Manipur prior to the Japanese advance in the spring of 1944 and of his reported efficiency, he and his group merit close attention.

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SPECIAL REPORT NO. 1

SPECIAL SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS

(TOKUMU KIKAN)

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FOREWORD

The information contained in this report was compiled primarily from publications of the following agencies:

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SPECIAL SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS
(Tokumu Kikan)

INTRODUCTION

The Special Service Organization of the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy is said to be the supreme authority for all long-range intelligence activities of the Japanese government. Its mission includes espionage, sabotage, counter-espionage, intelligence and propaganda. This organization has always operated with great secrecy, and little was known of its activities until the Japanese were defeated in the Philippines and in Burma. Recent interrogations of Japanese prisoners and the capture of documents belonging to units of this organization have given us much more information as to their activities.

A document captured in the Philippines reveals to what great extent one of the units had gone to protect its identity. Extracts from the complete translation read as follows:

- a. It will be a general rule that no one except persons concerned will know the composition of the organizations. The commanding officers' residences, and names and appointments will not be disclosed. Assumed names will be employed. Offices will use secret names.
- b. Vehicles will not be marked with the insignia of the special organization. Plate numbers will be changed once a week or every 10 days.
- c. Matters of secrecy will not be communicated over the telephone.
- d. The knowledge of the whereabouts of special organizations will never be disclosed and telephone calls concerning their whereabouts will not be made.
- e. A responsible man will be selected for the custody and burning of secret documents, and he will be charged with managing these matters. Methods will be quickly devised for burning and disposition of documents of no further use.
- f. Telephone numbers will be given only to persons concerned.
- g. Important printed papers which are to be discarded will be disposed of by responsible persons. If important papers are lost, that fact will be reported to the responsible superior officer.

- h. Projected moves and the names of places will not be disclosed.
- i. Each organization will hold a meeting once a week to discuss counter-intelligence matters.

Few prisoners are able to discuss the Special Service Organization activities. One prisoner stated that "to speak of it in Japan was forbidden; and to be heard discussing it would lead to immediate arrest by the Kompoj, and to imprisonment on a diet of bread and water."

As reports have continued to come in from the various theaters, a study of each individual Special Service unit has revealed that a definite plan or procedure is not followed in intelligence activities. The organizations tend to be flexible, so they may readily adapt themselves to local conditions in their respective area. This undoubtedly accounts for the many contradictory statements given by captured prisoners, who were either agents, or who had worked in close liaison with the SSO's. For the purposes of this study, an analysis has been made of the information gained from captured agents and captured documents. Where several sources agree on an issue, it has been accepted as being true. Information on a certain phase of the organization that is slight, or highly contradictory, has been included with a notation to that effect.

Special Service Organizations may operate under different names for purposes of security. The most common name by which it is known is the "Tokumu Kikan", which when translated means Special Service Organization. The derivation of the term "Tokumu Kikan" is obtained by abbreviating the characters Tokubetsu (special), Nisshu (duties, mission, function or service) and adding Kikan (organization, agency, agent or operative). Thus, its translation may have several interpretations since the characters themselves are purposely vague in meaning. The organization has, and is, operating under such names as the Tokumu Bu (Special Service Department), Renraku Bu (Liaison Department). Units may be named after the person in charge of its activities at the time the unit was organized; for example, the Hikari Kikan and the Kami Kikan. In China, the organizations were often named for the locality in which they operated, such as the Swatow Kikan, Canton Kikan or the Hankow Kikan.

PART I: ACTIVITIES OF THE ORGANIZATION

For purposes of study and analysis, the functions of the organization may be best described in three phases: the period prior to 1937 (pre-war), the Japanese offensive (1937-1941), and finally in its present activities, primarily as a counter-intelligence and counter-espionage organization.

Pre-War (1903-1937)

The SSO (the commonly-used abbreviated term for Special Service Organization) has always operated as an independent unit within the Japanese Army and Navy. Interrogations of Japanese Prisoners of War reveal that the SSO was formed just prior to the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-05. General Gontaro KODAMA, the Vice Chief of the Army General Staff at that time, ordered 31 active service Japanese officers and NCO's to go to Peking under the command of Colonel HANADA. Before leaving for Peking, they discarded their uniforms and took on the disguise of the Chinese gangsters who were prevalent in the area at that time. Colonel HANADA was given the responsibility of contacting Chinese and Manchurian bandit leaders in Manchuria so that intelligence on the Russians could be gathered in preparation for the Russo-Japanese War. Colonel HANADA subsequently set up his secret headquarters at Peking and sent his 20 men into Manchuria to bribe these bandit leaders. Successful contacts were made, and a line of communication was established, using messengers to deliver the written reports to Peking. Colonel HANADA then forwarded any matters of intelligence value by courier to the Chief of the Army General Staff in Tokyo.

During the Russo-Japanese War, the bandits proved to be excellent fifth column workers within the Russian lines in Manchuria. Information on the strength and disposition of the Russian troops supplied by them proved to be accurate and valuable. The 20 Japanese officers and NCO's stayed inside the Russian lines supervising fifth-column and intelligence work. At the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, Colonel HANADA returned to Japan and retired, while the remaining officers and men became the nucleus for the Special Service Organization.

The SSO was relatively inactive during the 1905-1919 period because there was not a great need for its services at that time. Generally speaking, Japan's relations with England and America were quite good during this period. As an ally of Great Britain in World War I, she played a vital role in the Pacific Theater and routine information about the foreign countries was forwarded through diplomatic channels. In the 1919-34 period a conflict had arisen between the military and non-military government circles in Japan, with the military finally gaining the upper hand. Until 1929, the non-military ideology of a strong Japan through a liberal non-expansionist policy with the foreign powers predominated. Consequently, the Army's budgets were small and the appropriations for the SSO after 1922 prohibited any sort of espionage on an elaborate scale. However, with the Army in power in 1929, the materialization of an all-powerful Japan through an aggressive policy of expansion, both on the Asiatic continent and to the South, became a reality. The SSO was not financed by use of secret funds of the General Staff and was thus able to obtain thousands of yen for its use in Manchuria and North China.

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Japanese Offensive (1937-1941)

It was not until 1937, at the time of the "China Incident," that the Japanese militarists realized the full potentialities of the organization. They also knew that in order to secure any information of value for its use in future military purposes, it was necessary to expand their intelligence activities. It is now known that the SSO was the nucleus for the extensive, world-wide intelligence network that operated between 1937 and the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941. During this period, the SSO placed large numbers of agents in the United States, China, the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines and Europe. However, no area was overlooked, and agents are known to have operated wherever information of value might be gathered.

Captured Japanese documents and interrogations of Prisoners of War have revealed that the SSO used several methods of placing its agents. Some of the more common methods used were: sending of young agents into countries posing as students, placing of agents in the offices of various commercial firms, and placing of agents as assistants in the Japanese Consulate and Embassy offices. Many of the higher-ranking agents held positions as Assistant Military Attachés. In the United States, for example, it is now known that such Japanese-operated enterprises as the Yokohama Specie Bank, the Mitsubishi Company, and many others were focal points for the gathering of intelligence matters. The office of the Japanese Navy Inspector of Materiel, which was located on Madison Avenue in New York City, was the headquarters for the intelligence network in the eastern part of the United States. The Japanese Consulate and Mitsubishi Company in San Francisco were the clearing points for all Japanese intelligence activities on the west coast which were centered in the Southern California cities and the Puget Sound area.

During this period, agents were especially trained to secure information on military installations, production facilities, political trends, military preparedness and other related information that might influence Japan's planned conquests. In such areas where it was impossible for an agent to operate without causing undue suspicion, the organization would set up dummy commercial firms as a front to cloak the espionage activities. In many cases, no effort was put forth to make these "legitimate" enterprises profitable financially.

Because of the unswerving loyalty of the greater majority of the Japanese to their Emperor and to their homeland, Japanese living abroad were of great aid in procuring bits of information that would be of military interest. Captured Japanese documents have revealed that such information gathered by these various means was surprisingly accurate and complete.

Present Activities (1937-1945)

After Pearl Harbor, the SSO began a new phase in its intelligence activities. When an area such as the Philippines or the Netherlands East Indies came under the domination of the Japanese forces, the SSO would aid in the formation of a new government. The SSO continued its activities, operating through the Japanese Military Administration in the area. Such agents who had operated in the area prior to the Japanese invasion came to the front and directed much of the activities of the local government. The agents had so familiarized themselves with the local political and social conditions that it was a comparatively easy task to set up the various organizations, such as the Kalibapi or Neighborhood Association, with the aid of local civilians. These civilians were usually pro-Japs, but there were others of pro-Allied sympathies who "volunteered" their services for reasons of personal security, both economically and physically, or who felt they might be of aid to their own people and to the Allied cause.

The Kemps were usually responsible for the suppression of local "subversive" activities such as "saboteurs, pro-Americans, guerrillas and the like," but the SSO retained responsibility for the over-all economic and social conditions.

As the Japanese turned from offensive to defensive tactics, the SSO entered another phase in its activities ... primarily that of a counter-intelligence and counter-espionage organization. A captured Japanese document, belonging to the Namco Kikan of the Philippines, gives a detailed account of its activities in the Manila area between 20 January and 13 February 1945. Extracts of the document are reproduced here, as it gives a fairly complete picture of SSO operations when the Japanese forces withdraw from an area.

"NAMEI ORGANIZATION OPERATION ORDER NO. 1, 20 JANUARY AT MANILA."

1. The enemy has landed in the LINGAYEN Area and his movements can not be ignored. Enemy secret activities in MANILA are increasing. Major YAMAJI will command the present counter-intelligence unit and KOKUCHU Society, and will form the NAMEI Organization. This organization will engage in secret activities in the Manila area.
3. KIRISHIMA Organization will continue its present duties in addition to complying with separate instructions. It will remain in Manila and prepare one wireless set for intelligence work.
4. TAKESAKI Organization will dispose its main strength in the Angat area. It will be assigned to guerrilla activities and will also have a portion assigned to intelligence activities within Manila. It will cooperate closely with KIRISHIMA Organization. The counter-intelligence squad will maintain position from which it will be able to communicate immediately with the base wireless station in Manila.

5. 2nd Lt. HASEGAWA of the special intelligence unit, will have his main strength carry out secret activities within Manila, with elements operating in the environs of the city.
6. Administrator YOSHIDA will continue his former duties in addition to perfecting plans for the execution of this program.

"INSTRUCTIONS BASED ON NMHEI ORGANIZATION OPERATION ORDER NO. 1."

1. Before the penetration of the enemy, we must endeavor to thwart enemy plans and intentions. We must also endeavor to locate the enemy's nest of activity and at the same time see that there is no failure in establishing a communication network for relaying intelligence reports. After the enemy's penetration, emphasis must be placed on the military situation. We must endeavor to gather information in regard to enemy intentions so that fifth column activities can be carried out.
2. Before the penetration of the enemy, we must endeavor to exterminate extreme pro-Americans while carrying out political, economic and ideological fifth column activities. After the penetration of the enemy, we must endeavor to make it extremely difficult for the enemy to organize an administrative government. The remaining fifth columnists and the guerrilla units will disrupt and completely disorganize the enemy's rear.
3. Personnel appointed to intelligence and fifth column activities must be clearly classified by their respective organization commanders. Preparations must be made at once to train them to carry out their missions successfully. Each officer attached to an organization will assume strong internal leadership. In extreme instances (combat) he will take absolute command.
4. All organizations will work closely together and, at the same time, will keep the flow of materials running smoothly. They will also perfect their ability to remain self-sufficient and independent. Each organization will build a strong organization based on the cooperative Japanese spirit. All friction must be removed for the sake of unity.

The following translation of a document captured in the Philippines lists the methods to be used for the collection of intelligence information.

"COLLECTION OF INFORMATION: METHODS."

1. Collecting information before the enemy's penetration.
(Use of intelligence organizations (Kikan)).
 - a. Arrest of infiltration agents and fifth columnists.
(Sources of information -- dance halls and entertainers.)

[REDACTED]

- b. Interrogation of captured enemy air personnel (men will be instructed not to kill the prisoners of war).
- c. Capture of parachuted agents and confiscation of documents, especially maps, in their possession.
- d. Arrest and interrogation of persons with pro-American tendencies and persons caught eavesdropping (especially influential pro-Americans).
- e. Early measures to prevent riots, disorder and uprisings.
- f. Guerrilla activities in Manila and environs.

2. Collecting information after the enemy's penetration.

- a. Collection and transmission of information pertaining to the military and political situation, and the state of pacification within the city by means of "mobile wireless station" left behind.
- b. Collection and transmission of military information, listed on separate sheets, by intelligence network left behind (sketches preferable).
- c. Military situation, especially airfields, harbor area (including warships and merchant ships; location of headquarters, fuel and ammunition dumps; location of rear lines of communication, important signal installations, commanding officers' barracks; sketches showing location, number and types of motor parks and repair shops; gas, electric and water facilities).
- d. Members of the government and other important local administrative organizations.

Note: Care must be taken when communicating with the base. (Instruction to be given orally).

Another section of the same document lists the following targets of intelligence interest for investigation by the unit.

1. Airfields.

- a. Types of airplanes.
- b. Number of airplanes.
- c. Security: sentry posts, and strength and distribution of garrison (Keibi)

- d. Revetments.
- e. Runways.
- f. Installation sketches.
- g. Flights (time, course, number and types of airplanes).
- h. Location of fuel and ammunition dumps.
- i. Location and number of dummy airplanes.

2. Army Headquarters.

- a. Location. (Name of building)
- b. Commanding Officer (name and rank)
- c. Staff officers (Names and ranks).
- d. Other important officers (Names and ranks)
- e. Security.

3. Garrison Forces (Chuton Butai)

- a. Unit.
- b. Commanding Officer
- c. Strength
- d. Equipment
- e. Barracks
- f. Security

4. Force Movements.

- a. Intentions.
- b. Branch of Service.
- c. Strength.
- d. Equipment.
- e. Direction of march and destination.
- f. Time of Departure.

5. Anti-Aircraft Weapons.

- a. Location
- b. Strength
- c. Equipment
- d. Searchlights (number and location)
- e. Sound locators (number and location)

6. Lines of Communication.

- a. Ammunition Dumps. (Location, amount, and types)
- b. Food dumps. (Location, amount and types)
- c. Fuel dumps. (Location, amount and types)

7. Signals.

- a. Location of broadcasting stations.
- b. Location of propaganda headquarters.
- c. Location of power plants for wireless station.
- d. Sources and locations of power plants.
- e. Locations of air signal stations and intelligence signal stations; types and directivity of antenna.

8. Wharf Installations.

- a. Locations of various installations. (Fiers, warehouses, loading and unloading facilities).
- b. Number of laborers and their nationalities.
- c. Ships: Number, size and types; time of arrival and departure, destination and types of cargo.

9. Government.

- a. Organization.
- b. Cabinet members.
- c. Location.
- d. Trend of thought.
- e. Security.
- f. Location of secret organizations (Kikan) (Bi)(TN Sic) and their composition.

10. Military Administration.

- a. Organization
- b. Name and address of military administrator.
- c. Names and addresses of high officials.
- d. Location.

11. Economic Situation.

- a. Food price.
- b. General prices of commodities.
- c. Exchange market.
- d. Amount of commodities.

Remarks: All intelligence reports will be made in form of sketches.

Objectivos (Fifth Column Activities).

I. MILITARY

A. Airfields.

1. Setting hangars on fire and destruction of interior sections of airplanes.
2. Destruction of airfield signal facilities.
3. Demolition of fuel and ammunition warehouses.
4. Secret destruction of airplanes.
5. Destruction of barracks and personnel.
6. Harassing the garrison forces (Koibi) from the rear.
7. Assassination of commanding officers.
8. Theft of communication charts, route charts, weather charts and flight logs.
9. Destruction of anti-aircraft weapons and searchlights.

B. Wharf Installations.

1. Destruction of shipping signal stations.
2. Setting fire to fuel and ammunition dumps and warehouses.
3. Sabotaging anchored ships.
4. Elimination of persons responsible for recruiting labor (assassination; terrorism).
5. Setting fire to pier warehouses.
6. Theft of navigation charts, statistical charts on incoming and outgoing ships, and other important documents showing location of headquarters, etc.
7. Injuring, killing and agitating ship crews.
8. Destruction of cranes.

C. Installations and Other Important Facilities in the Rear.

1. Demolition of fuel and ammunition dumps.
2. Destruction of motor parks by explosives or fire.
3. Destruction of various munitions factories and equipment.
4. Destruction of various dispersed and concealed material.
5. Destruction of food warehouses.
6. Destruction of power plants, transformers, important signal facilities, communication wires, gas and water facilities.
7. Destruction and disruption of road traffic (bridges, railroads, and important sections of roads).
8. Disturbance of assembly halls and amusement centers.
9. Destruction of transportation facilities.
10. Obstruction of speech and press.
11. Evacuation from cities and farms.

12. Injury and absorption of laborers (assassination, confusion, and strikes).
13. Assassination and injury of signalers, and technicians.
14. Disturbance by prisoners freed by attacks on prisons.

II. OTHERS.

A. Political.

1. Distribution of seditious propaganda material.
2. Assassination and injury of key personnel.
3. Disturbance of all government offices.
4. Distributing threatening notes to key personnel.

B. Economic.

1. Destruction of economic sources and materials.
2. Disturbance of financial system and markets.


C. Psychological.

- 1.植立 defeatism by means of propaganda materials.
2. Circulation of false information and alarming rumors.
3. Implanting of anti-American feeling among members of the Ganap Party.
4. Terrorism directed at society women's groups.

PART III: ORGANIZATION

Chain of Command

The Japanese Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo is served by two independent Special Service Organizations - one under the supervision of the Japanese Army, the other the Japanese Navy. Although the functions of both are in most cases entirely the same, the two are referred to by different names. The Army organization is usually called the Rikugun Tokumu Kikan (Army Special Service Organization) and the Navy organization is usually referred to as the Kaigun Tokumu Bu (Navy Special Service Department). For purposes of study and analysis, it is more practical to treat each separately and to understand the organization and make-up of the Imperial Army and Navy. (See chart on following page).



CHAIN OF COMMAND TO OVERSEAS SSO's

Navy General Staff

Information from PsW and captured documents indicate that the Naval General Staff (Kaigun Gunreibus) in Tokyo contains the following known divisions and sections:

No. 1 Division: Intelligence

No. 1 Section:

No. 2 Section:

No. 2 Division: Supplies and Ordnance

No. 3 Section:

No. 4 Section:

No. 3 Division: Intelligence

No. 5 Section: American Branch

No. 6 Section: China Branch

No. 7 Section: European Branch

No. 8 Section: South Seas Branch (Malaya, Burma, NEI, SWPA)

No. 4 Division: Wire and Wireless

No. 9 Section:

No. 10 Section:

No. 11 Section:

It has been the custom to have a Rear Admiral in charge of the Intelligence Division of the Imperial Navy, the geographic sections being headed by Naval Captains. All such staff officers are graduates of the Naval War College. The various SSO's in the field, such as the South China SSO and the Burma SSO, are normally headed by a Rear Admiral or Captain.

All SSO's in the field answered directly to the Naval General Staff in Tokyo and the respective geographic section of the Intelligence Division. Because of the varied activities of the SSO's, close liaison is maintained with the other Divisions of the General Staff.

Army General Staff

The Army General Staff (Sambo Hombu) in Tokyo contains the following departments and sections:

No. 1 Department: Operations

No. 2 Section: Operations and Planning

No. 3 Section: Fortresses

No. 4 Section: Training and Manoeuvres

No. 2 Department: Intelligence

No. 5 Section: American and European

No. 6 Section: Asiatic Section

Special Service Organization

Special Wireless Intelligence Section

No. 3 Department: Transport and Communications

No. 7 Section: Communications (Wireless and Wire)

No. 8 Section: Transport (Land and Sea)

No. 4 Department: Historical

No. 9 Section: Wars in which Japan took part

No. 10 Section: Wars in which Japan did not take part

General Affairs Department

No. 1 Section: Organization and Mobilization

Secretariat: Personnel and Administration

Army War College

Army Land Survey Department

The Special Service Organization Staff Section was made up of five primary sub-sections:

Political/Economic

Military Geography and Topography

Foreign Affairs

Operational

Pacification

It is believed that the Army SSO's in the field differed from the Naval SSO's in that they answered to the Area Army Commander as well as to the Special Service Organization Section and the respective Geographic Section of the General Staff Hq in Tokyo. (See chart on following page). As of 1942, the Area or Overseas SSO's, although their functions are basically the same, may roughly be classified into two groups: (1) SSO's in occupied countries where puppet governments have been set up. These would include such countries as China, Burma, the Philippines, and Manchuria. SSO's in these countries come in the chain of command directly under Army Hq or Area Army Hq, and are in the War Establishments of such formations. (2) SSO's in occupied countries governed by Military Administrations, or by Japanese Colonial Governments. This would include such countries as Malaya, Dutch East Indies, Borneo, New Britain, and other islands in the Pacific.


There is a well-defined line of demarcation between the Area Kikan and a frontline, operative, pacification or guerrilla Kikan, or a Kikan formed for other specific functions. The Area Kikan's functions may be best described as strategic, those of the other Kikan as tactical. These so-called tactical Kikans usually operated in the scope of an Army organization and answered to the next higher echelon within its unit, whereas an Area Kikan answered directly to the Area Army Commander or the General Staff Section in Tokyo, depending upon the issue involved. In this respect, Area SSO agents would normally operate not forward of Army Hq; while front-line Kikan operatives would not operate to the rear of the Army Hq. These front-line Kikans could be disbanded at will when their missions had been completed. For such reasons the training of a front-line Kikan operative may take only a month or two, whereas the training of a BUNKAN (civil employee) of an Area SSO may take as long as 2 years.


SSO's maintained no continuous liaison with Army intelligence units; however, any special reports received that might affect a division were reported to division intelligence by military police courier, or a special service operative would phone division intelligence asking that the staff intelligence officer contact him. (See chart on following page). If Army echelon interrogators discovered a prisoner possessing information of long-range intelligence value, the prisoner would usually be passed on to the Area SSO for further interrogation.

Japan Proper

There is little information available regarding SSO activities in the Japanese homeland. One PW has revealed that the police department of each city maintains a Foreign Affairs Section. Its duties are:

- 1) Supervision of all foreigners in Japan for the purpose of detecting spies, and
- 2) Suppression of subversive elements among the Japanese.





— Chain of Command and Channels of Information

- - - Channels of Information

Foreign Sections are said to be headed by regular Naval officers, usually with the rank of Lt (jg) or Lt. All such officers wear civilian clothes, even in time of war.

It is said to be common knowledge among the Japanese people that the Foreign Affairs Section Chiefs are Naval officers, but the subordinate agents were not known to the average civilian.

Although the Section Chiefs work under their respective Police Chiefs, they are always under command of the Naval General Staff in Tokyo and can be detailed on any special assignment in Japan.

PART III: PERSONNEL

Japan's plan for military conquest had been developed over a period of years. In order for Japan to conquer an area, it was necessary for her to obtain information on the military and industrial power of that area. The Special Service Organizations were set up to procure this information. Up to the time of the China Incident, the selection of SSO personnel was made without regard to qualifications or aptitude. Too often personnel were recruited from Japanese of long residence in China, United States, and other areas, mainly on the assumption that since they knew the country and its people, they would be best fitted for the job. Officers of Army formations stationed in pertinent areas were appointed as SSO agents, little consideration being given to their aptitude and experience. Until this time no drastic changes were felt necessary in the selection of personnel, as the functions of many of the SSO's were mainly centered upon espionage. Following the China Incident, a period of Japanese exploitation in China, both political and economic, had begun on an unprecedented scale. This enormously increased the SSO's spheres of activity and experts in such branches as General Affairs, Political Affairs and Economics, were urgently required. The number of such specialists available, however, invariably fell short of the demand.

Bunkan

SSO military personnel are gradually being replaced by civilians who have received a considerable amount of specialized training. Such civilians are known as BUNKAN, or civil servants. To become eligible for appointment as a BUNKAN, a candidate must possess a University degree, have a Specialist Training College diploma, and must also undergo a stringent entrance examination.

All BUNKAN employees, for purposes of courtesy and convenience, hold honorary military titles of rank. Each Bunkan grade has an equivalent rank in the Japanese Army. The chart on the following page lists the various

Bunkan Status	Grade No.	Military Equivalent	Remarks
<u>Shinnin</u>		None	Are especially appointed by the Emperor and are eligible for the offices of Premier, Cabinet Ministers, Privy Councillors, and Governors General of Korea and Formosa, for the highest judicial offices and ambassadorships.
<u>Chokunin</u>	Grade No. 8	Lt General	Appointed by the Emperor, usually with the advice of the Premier. Eligible to serve as vice-ministers, judges, procurators, directors of bureaus and prefectural governors. Receive salaries of ¥4,650 and ¥5,350.
Chokunin	Grade No. 7	Major General	Same as for Grade No. 8.
<u>Sonin</u>	Grade No. 6	Colonel	Must pass examination. Usually are appointed by Agency and then meet approval of Emperor. Salaries range from ¥1,130 to ¥4,050.
<u>Sonin</u>	Grade No. 5	Lt. Colonel	Same as above
<u>Sonin</u>	Grade No. 4	Major	ditto
<u>Sonin</u>	Grade No. 3	Captain	"
<u>Sonin</u>	Grade No. 2	Lt.	"
<u>Sonin</u>	Grade No. 1	2nd Lt.	"
<u>Hannin</u>	Grade No. 4	Warrant Officer	Are appointed by the heads of departments in which they work. Receive salaries of ¥480 to ¥2,160
<u>Hannin</u>	Grade No. 3	Sgt. Major	Same as Above
<u>Hannin</u>	Grade No. 2	Sgt.	"
<u>Hannin</u>	Grade No. 1	Cpl	"
<u>Koin</u>		Superior Private	No special requirements
<u>Yonin</u>			Ditto

BUNKAN RANKS WITH THEIR MILITARY EQUIVALENTS

Bunkan grades with the equivalent military ranks. Bunkan receives considerably higher rates of pay, but are not provided with the amenities usually given to military personnel. However, such civilian personnel are subject to military law. In forward areas there is little difference between Bunkan and combatant arms, since both are required to bear weapons. In rear areas the Bunkan are excused from guard duties, parades, maneuvers, etc., so their life is somewhat easier than that of the regular troops. These privileges coupled with the fact that they receive higher rates of pay, cause considerable jealousy and criticism among the troops.

Many Japanese prisoners are of the opinion that Bunkan, although operating under military chiefs, form the bulk as well as the backbone of the Japanese SSO. As personnel with specialized training became available, the head of an Army SSO would rarely be chosen from among the commanders of large formations in the field. One PW thought that the age of adventurers like DOIHARA, who mingled both in SSO operations and straight forward military operations, had passed. However, there remained one department of the SSO in which there is still a strong military element, namely the BORYAKU Department, with espionage and counter-espionage being its main function. Experience in China had proven that civilians were apt to be less security-minded than the military, and it was therefore deemed necessary to place Army officers in almost exclusive charge of this type of work. It is presumed that this was one of the reasons why a great deal of the responsibility for BORYAKU duties had been shifted to other organizations within the Army.

Other Personnel

Exiled Officers: About half the members of the "Young Officers Clique," after having been court-martialed for their participation in the 22 Feb 41 and 15 May 36 "incidents," turned Special Service agents in Burma and the Southwest Pacific Area. The Japanese Military had considered them too valuable to execute and had sent them to an unidentified Manchurian Army border garrison unit along the Amur River on the Manchurian-Russian border.

Non-Japanese Agents: Such operatives were found in the U.S., Russia, Europe, etc., where a Japanese SS agent could not engage in espionage because of his racial characteristics.

Technical Civilian Employees: Attached to an SSO, these agents were experts in mining, petroleum, electrical engineering, etc.

Exiled Japanese PW: This small group of officers consisted of prisoners taken by the Russians and exchanged after the Russo-Japanese War and the Nomonhan Incident of 1939. For the most part, they had settled in North China and Manchuria.

Japanese Nationals: The Japanese Government counted on this group's high sense of patriotism to furnish information through its trained SS agents.

Natives in Occupied and Unoccupied Territory: Through bribery, bonuses, and promises, natives were used extensively wherever possible.

Uniform of Japanese Civilian Employees


Marked similarities between uniforms of civilian employees and those of the army itself frequently deter quick identifications in the field, especially since distinguishable insignia are often dispensed with in forward areas. Three kinds of insignia may be worn -- shoulder boards, breast badge and sleeve chevrons. (See sketch on following page). Shoulder boards worn by the Bunkan are brown. Gold stars indicate the three civil service grades of Chokunin, Sonin or Hannin. The breast badge of deep blue with yellow edging is worn by Chokunin rank. The badge has five overlapping stars of diminishing size, the largest star being centered with a cherry blossom design. The Hannin has yellow stars and silver edging. Sleeve chevrons indicate various classes within these grades. Temporary employees may be recognized by the single silver star on the shoulder boards, white stars on their breast badge, and the absence of any sleeve chevrons.

Breast badges are supposed to be worn on the right side of the overcoat, cap and blouse, but field reports indicate that more often they are found on the left of the blouse. Collar or lapel buttons denoting technician's specialties have been reported. Some agents are said to wear a small insignia that resembles a "T".


The uniform itself in some cases may be readily identified. Army caps (with glam), capes, overcoats and dress uniforms are prescribed. A field uniform is shown in the accompanying sketch. As an alternate, on which no insignia are worn, is a loose-fitting, single-breasted blouse with four black buttons, three pockets, belted back with pleat, and overlapping collar.

Recent regulations for theaters of operations have authorized a Norfolk jacket-type blouse with set-in belt, convertible neckline, and two patch pockets. This coat is worn with standard insignia. However, theater commanders apparently often authorize wearing of civilian attire. Shorts and a short-sleeved khaki shirt (with chevrons and breast badge attached) have been common in tropical areas of the Southwest Pacific.

The standard Army saber is authorized for those of ranks equivalent to Sergeant in the Army or above. Uniforms for Navy civilian employees differ considerably and may be identified by black cotton patches on their lapels bearing an anchor, cherry blossoms and stripes of rank.



Chokunin



Sonin



Hannin






Temporary

Shoulder Boards:

Colors: Brown background
with gold stars

(Note: Temporary BUNKAN
indicated by white star)





Chevrons:

Chokunin: Gold Stripes

Sonin : Gold Stripes

Hannin : Silver Stripes

Temporary: None



Breast Badges:

Chokunin : Deep blue w/yellow edging.
Large star has cherry blossom center

Sonin : Same as Chokunin, but has no cherry
blossom design in largest star

Hannin : Yellow Stars w/ Silver Edging.

Temporary: White Stars

UNIFORM INSIGNIA OF BUNKAN PERSONNEL

In addition to the special uniform worn by SSO civilian employees, SSO agents can sometimes be identified by unit identification cards that they sometimes carry. The attached sketch is a reproduction of the Identification card carried by members of the Iso Special Service Organization in the NEI.

PART IV: TRAINING OF PERSONNEL

Although all military schools under the Inspectorate General of Military Training were known, the very nature of a school for the training of SS agents and intelligence personnel under the Chief of Staff prohibited its public announcement. The term Yosuisho, meaning "training center" was consequently used instead of Gakko (school).

The Chief of No. 2 Department (Intelligence) was charged with all administrative details of the SSO Training Center. The position of the Center under the No. 4 Section (Information Section of Intelligence Department as of December 1941) was without any special significance. The school commandant, who was a Major General or higher, supervised the course of training, the selection and dismissal of the faculty and the assignment of the graduates. He was directly responsible to the Chief of General Staff.

Basic Training Center

Location: A large two-story, gray concrete building in Akasaka-ku, Tokyo, with classrooms, libraries, laboratories and offices on the ground floor and living quarters on the second floor.

Purpose: To train competent espionage agents for specific foreign geographical areas.

Candidates:

Selection: Admission to the Center was by order of the War Ministry only. Outstanding unmarried, active service officers and enlisted men were closely watched by their company, battalion and regimental officers during the training period. If the officers believed that these men possessed the necessary qualifications, recommendations were sent through channels to the Appointment Section, Personnel Bureau of the War Ministry. The Appointment Section, in turn, scrutinized the soldier's family background, civilian occupation and education. Those who were selected then received two certificates with the War Minister's stamp affixed to it. (Although the second certificate in the attached sketch is for the NCO Intelligence Training Camp, the wording for acceptance into the SSO Basic Training Center was similar to it).


ISO
A
No --

Personal Identification Card

Name _____

This certifies that above-named is an employee
of the ISO Special Service Organization.

Date _____ ISO Special Service CO
Seal




ISO
KU
(or SA
No _____

Personal Identification Card

Name _____

This certifies that above-named person is an
employee attached to ISO Special Service Branch


Date _____ ISO Special Service Branch
CO
Seal



EXAMPLES OF SSO IDENTIFICATION CARDS

INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL SERVICE ORGANIZATION TRAINING SYSTEM

(April 1941 to Dec 1941)



Strength: It has been estimated that over 1,000 candidates entered the Center every year.

Status: Upon entrance, the soldier became officially dead and was given another name. His next of kin was notified that he had been "killed in action" and that monthly checks would come from the government based on the accrued pay, decorations, and bonuses of the "deceased." In order to maintain the rigid spiritual discipline of the Center, the candidate was not allowed to leave the building during the three years course except on field problems. At such times he was prohibited from having any contacts with women.

Uniform: The regular Army uniform was prescribed during the candidate's tenure at the Center. Insignia of rank was not usually worn on the collar. Japanese and Occidental civilian clothes were worn only when the candidate went out on field problems. After graduation, either the regular Army uniform, special civilian employee uniform or civilian clothes were worn.

Promotions: Advancement in grade was rapid before and after graduation. A Pfc after entry was promoted in the following manner:

Corporal	:	1 year
Sergeant	:	6 months
Sergeant Major	:	6-8 months
Warrant Officer	:	4-6 months
2nd Lieutenant	:	on graduation

Depending upon his grade, an NCO was promoted proportionately slower so that he became a 2nd Lt. at the time of graduation. In both cases, the graduates received their appointment as 1st Lt. (regular or assimilated) six months after graduation.

An officer was promoted once or twice during his tenure at school, depending upon his length of time in grade at the time of his entry. It was thus common to see many SS agents who held field ranks (regular or assimilated).

Pay: Since the candidates could not be put on the regular Army payroll because of their "dead" status, pay was received from the secret funds of the General Staff.

Curriculum:

Area Assignment: Upon commencing his studies, the candidate was given one of the following geographical areas for extensive study and research:

China
Manchuria
Philippine Islands
Burma
India
French Indo-China
Southwest Pacific Area (New Guines, Solomons, Java, Sumatra, Celebes and Borneo)
Australia
Canada
North America (U.S., Mexico and Central America)
South America
Europe (including Russia)

Subjects: Seventy per cent of the students graduated after three years. The top thirty per cent stayed on for two years of additional study. The following subjects were studied in relation to the candidate's assigned geographical area:

Languages: A great deal of time was spent in gaining a proficiency in the spoken and written language. In case he was destined for the Philippines, a candidate was required to be well-versed in English, Spanish and the Tagalog and Visayan dialects.

History: Under this broad title were studied foreign and Japanese intelligence methods; traits of foreign populaces in the light of their historical experiences; Japan's mission in the world; and spiritual training.

Geography: A study of the country's terrain, vegetation, distribution of populations and location of industrial areas.

Intelligence: Methods and channels of gathering, evaluating and disseminating information.

Propaganda: Dissemination of pro-Japanese propaganda.

Pacification: Methods of keeping occupied populaces under control.

Code: Interception and jamming of enemy messages; encoding and decoding of ordinary and SSO messages and use of various radio sets.

Physics and Chemistry: Study of explosives and poisons in relation to sabotage.

Industrial and Military Espionage: (See "Field Problems" below)

Disguises: Dress, customs and manners of various classes of a country's society.

Military Sciences: High proficiency in Japanese fencing (Kendo), Judo, and the use of small arms.

Tumbling: Agility in jumping over walls and fences without injury.

Field Problems: Much time was spent in carrying out the practical applications of the theories learned in the classroom.

Example 1. The candidate and his instructor went out into the streets of Tokyo in disguise. It was the duty of the candidate to discover his instructor before being discovered by him.

Example 2. The candidate was required to submit a detailed report upon rates of production, sketches of buildings, most effective areas for sabotage, morale of employees, etc., in certain industrial areas, without being detected.

NCO Intelligence Training Center (Oct 1941 - Dec 1944)

Established in 1934.

Location: Five buildings formerly used by the students of the Nakano Military Police School, Nakano-ku, Tokyo.


Admission: Candidates were watched and recommended for the SSO NCO Training Center in the same manner as the original SSO candidates. As shown in attached sketches, two certificates of appointment were received prior to entrance.

Strength and Organization: 300 Pfc's entered every four months. Under the command of a Major General, candidates were divided into five classes with 60 students in each class. Pay was received from the Personnel Bureau, War Ministry.


Curriculum: The first three months were devoted to code and intelligence, and the last three months to propaganda and pacification. Courses were given by the lecture-examination method so that no particular textbooks were used.

Officer's Intelligence Training Center (Oct 1941 - Dec 1944)

Established in 1934.



Initial Certificate



Certificate of Appointment to NCO
Intelligence Training Center

Location: Formerly located at the Nakano Military Police School, the Center moved to the SSO Basic Training Center, Akasaka-ku, Tokyo, at some date prior to Jan 1941.

Admission: Same as for the NCO Intelligence Training Center except that all candidates were officers upon entry.

Strength and Organization: The Center was commanded by a Major General, or an officer of higher rank. It has been estimated that 150 officers entered the center each year. Pay was received from the Personnel Bureau, War Ministry.

Curriculum: The two-year course was devoted to detailed study of intelligence methodology and languages. It is believed that the course had been shortened because of a scarcity of intelligence in the field. A FW declares that the former one-year course has been shortened to 6 months.

PART V: GLOSSARY

The following is a list of familiar names and terms used in connection with SSO activities.

CHUZAI BUKAN

In China.

- (a) Resident Officer
- (b) Chief of Naval SSD (1929-37)
Chief of an Army SSD (1929-37)
Chief of Army SSD in Hankow and Canton until 1943.

CHUZAI BUKAN FU

Department headed by a CHUZAI BUKAN.

GUNREI

(lit. Army and Navy regulations, by command of the Emperor)

- (a) Military Command
- (b) Functions for which SSD answered to Imperial General Staff, (SAMBO) Tokyo

GUNSEI

(a) Military Administration

- (b) Functions for which SSD answered to:
 - (i) RIKUGUN SHO (War Office)
 - (ii) KAIGUN SHO (Admiralty)

KEMFEI TAI

Military Police

RENRAKU BU

Used only in connection with the Army.

In China.

(a) Liaison department.

(b) Army SSD, solely for work with the puppet government, in propaganda, economics, etc., for the whole of China, excluding Shanghai subsequent to 1943. Under local Army Hq.

RENRAKU BU CHO

Chief of a RENRAKU BU

RIKUGUN BU

In China.

(a) Army department.

(b) Functions identical with RENRAKU BU, but applying only to Shanghai subsequent to 1943.

RIKUGUN BU CHO

Chief of a RIKUGUN BU

TOKUMU BU
(RIKUGUN: Army)
(KAIGUN: Navy)

General term for Naval SSD

Naval SSD for the whole of China (1937-43)

Naval SSD for Hainan until the present time

Army SSD for the whole of China, excluding Nanking and Shanghai (1938-43)

TOKUMU BU CHO

Head of a TOKUMU BU

TOKUMU KIKAN

General term for Army SSD. In China covering (1929-37) the less important areas - exclusively of cities like Peking, Nanking, Tientsin, Shanghai, and Canton.

Army SSD for the whole of China (1937-38)

Army SSD solely for puppet government work, in Nanking and Shanghai only (1938-43)

TOKUMU KIKAN CHO

Chief of a TOKUMU KIKAN

ZAIGIN BUKAN

In China. Used only in connection with the Navy.

(a) Resident Officer

(b) Chief of a Naval SSD subsequent to 1943 (except in Hainan which is still under a Tokumu Bu Cho). Directly under Tokyo.

ZAIGIN BUKAN FU

Department headed by a ZAIGIN BUKAN

PART VI: PERSONALITIES

The following is a list of personalities derived from captured documents and Prisoners of War. These personalities have all been identified with SSO activities. It is realized that this list covers a very small percentage of personnel active in the SSO.

AKAO 1st Lt; Adj, Taiyuan Liaison Dept (SSD in Shansi Province, China); still there when PW left in Jul 42.

AOKI Army civilian employee, Taiyuan Liaison Dept, (SSD in Shansi Province, China). Head of Civil Govt. Dept, Investigation Group.

AOMORI Major; O/c Sabotage Sec, 14th Area Army, Tokumu Kikan Sec, as of Dec 44.

ASAOKA, Ikuko Lady translator; Portuguese; Japanese Eurasian aged 33; knew seven languages; often helped in W/T room of Canton SSD in 1943.

ASO, Moroharu 1st Lt; student of counter-intelligence at Manchuria 703 Force, 23rd Div, 19-21 Jan 44

DOI Japanese Naval civilian employee; attached South China Naval SSD, Canton, and still there Mar-Apr '41. Interpreter/translator of Chinese.

DOIHARA, Konji Lt. Gen.; Comdr 14th Div since Mar 37; born 1883, Okayama-ken; Career: Graduated Military Academy 1905; graduated Military Staff College; Staff, Gen. Staff Office; Comdr. Inf. 30th Regt; Comdr. Inf. 9th Brig.; Chief, Military Special Service Facilities, Mukden, 1935; att'd remaining 1st Div.; Address: c/o 14th Div Hq, Utsonomiya.

X

An apparently reliable source reports that Gen. Doihara has arrived at Canton to direct air attacks, paratroops, and sabotage in China. (Info as of 9 Feb 44) (Note: DOIHARA has been called the 'Lawrence of Manchuria', was Chief of the Jap secret service in N. China, commanded the Jap forces defeated by the Chinese at Talerchwang in 1938).

DOIHARA, Kenji (Cont'd)

"It is reported that General Keisuke FUMIYE replaced 61-year-old General Kenji DOIHARA, specialist in intelligence and propaganda, and for a brief time, commander-in-chief of the Japanese Air Force, who has been appointed to an unnamed 'certain important post', Tokyo said." (1944)

Member of the Supreme War Council as of July 1943. Born in August 1883 in Okayama Prefecture, DOIHARA has served as Military Attaché, member of the Army General Staff, Chief of the Army Special Service Organization in China prior and subsequent to the "China Incident" and is generally credited with being a top-notch intelligence officer. (Suginami-ku, Tokyo)

Member of the Japanese Supreme War Council

Inspector General of Military Education of the Japanese Military Education Department.

Chief of Army Special Services, Jul 33-Oct 40, when appointed Commandant of Military Academy.

FU

Formosan; in charge of the Economic Section of the Canton SSD in 1943.

FUKUTOE, Takao

1st Lt; will participate as special student in counter-intelligence training to be conducted by Manchuria 703 Force, 23rd Div, 19-21 Jan 44.

GODO

In charge of the General Affairs Section of the Swatow SSD in 1942-43.

GOTO

Civilian employee, Taiyuan Liaison Dept (SSD in Shansi Province, China)

GOTO

Lt; worked in South Seas Special Service Office Navy Dept, Tokyo, Feb 44.

HAMADA, Gichi

Cmdr; Reserve Officer when FJ knew him, but probably since recalled to Regular Service. Medium build, about 5' tall and about 50. Friendly but somewhat quick-tempered.

HAN Formosan; owned firm of Wang Fu Shih, dealing in cotton waste; brother of FU. Associated with Canton SSD (1942-43)

HANADA Naval Capt., CO of Soerabaja Tokumu Bu, Jan 44. The Soerabaja organization was known in Navy Tokumu Bu circles as Hana Kikan.

HANADA, Gichi Comdr. Reserve Officer, attached South China Naval SSD, Canton, until Sep/Oct 40 when he returned to Tokyo. Was not replaced. Ass't to HIGO and later KAWASE with duties concerned with diplomatic activities and liaison with Jap Army.

HANAYA Maj Gen; Head of Taiyuan Liaison Dept (SSD in Shensi Province, China) from 42 succeeding Col. INOUYE. Took a keen interest in Liaison Dept work and made a thorough examination of all reports submitted by PW.

HANEYA Communications Dept Chief, General Affairs Section; present at meeting of 26 Feb 45 to decide the policy of the West Coast Province Iso Kikan, Japan.

HATA Chinese Naval civilian employee; attached South China Naval SSD, Canton, and still there Mar/Apr 41. Interpreter/translator of Chinese.

HAYASHI Japanese Naval civilian employee. Attached South China Naval SSD, Canton. Duties concerned with development, peace preservation, economics and culture. Still there Mar/Apr 41.

HIGO Capt, Zaigun Bukan of Canton, China SSD in 1942-43. (TN: Head or chief of a Naval SSD term used prior to 1943).

HIGO, Ichiji Comdr. Regular Officer. Resident Naval Attache, Canton, until about Jul 40 when he returned to Tokyo. Replaced by Comdr KAWASE. While in Canton, duties were concerned with diplomatic activities and liaison with Jap Army.

Comdr and Regular Officer. Well-built, slightly over 5' tall, full in the face and wore a

HIGO, Ichiji

moustacho. About 40. Sympathetic towards subordinates. Prior to '39 resided at Resident Naval Officers' Quarters, Shanghai. Subsequently Resident Naval Officer in Canton from about Jan 39 to Jul 40 when he returned to Tokyo. Heard he had later been posted to Hankow. Duties in Canton were to contact newly-formed Chinese puppet government in matters of diplomatic activity and liaison with Jap Army. Received his instructions from Navy General Staff, probably through No. 3 (Intelligence) Department, No. 6 (China) Section and his immediate local superior Rear-Admiral UGAKI. Supervised Resident Naval Officers' and Harbour Masters at other coast and river ports under jurisdiction of South China Navy SSD. Replaced in Canton by Comdr KAWASE, Kaoru.

HIKICHI, Kichisaburo

Sgt; employed in the Boryaku Section of the Canton SSD in 1942-43.

HIRAIWA

Japanese Naval civilian employee. Attached South China Naval SSD, Canton. Driver of car which met PW on arrival at Hakun Airfield Aug 39.

HONDA

Lt. Comdr. and Regular Officer. Medium build, about 5'2" tall and about 39. Short-tempered and disagreeable. Served about 10 years with South China Navy SSD, prior to which he was believed to have been an instructor at Naval College. Was still in Canton, Apr 41. Was responsible for internal administration of South China Navy SSD and in charge of civilian employees.

Lt Comdr. Regular Officer; attached South China Naval SSD, Canton, as assistant to HIGO and later KAWASE. Was still there Mar/Apr 41. Duties were concerned with diplomatic activities, liaison with Jap Army, development, peace preservation, economics and culture.

Lt. Comdr., Staff officer in the Zaigin Bukan Fu of Canton SSD in 1942-43. (TN: Zaigun Bukan Fu - Dept headed by a Naval SSD)

HORI

Japanese Naval civilian employee. Attached South China Naval SSD, Canton. Duties concerned with development, peace preservation, economics and culture. Still there Mar/Apr 41.

HORIGUCHI, Komaichi

Official in Foreign Office, Tokyo, and a personal friend of PW's father. HORIGUCHI arranged PW's first visit to Brazil through the Overseas Emigration Coy (Kaigai Imin Kaisha). Latter concern engaged PW as an assistant in charge of emigrants, granting him free passage in exchange for services. HORIGUCHI also promised PW employment with the Nippaku newspaper.

IBARAKI, Seiichi

Capt; attached to the Canton SSD from Nanking; in charge of Boryaku and W/T; was continually travelling, but reported back to the Canton SSD at least once a month; worked in the Foochow SSD during its period of existence (Apr-Sep 41) and was head of the Amoy SSD (Sep-Oct 41). PW suspected that the name was an assumed one, and that he was in reality of a higher rank.

ICHITSUBO

Lt Comdr; Reserve Officer when PW knew him, but probably since recalled to regular service. Medium build, 5' tall and about 42; short-tempered. Originally at Tokyo, subsequently served about 18 months with South China Navy SSD, returning to Tokyo about the summer of 40. Duties in Canton were connected with Chinese puppet government's Canton Water Police.

Lt Comdr; Reserve Officer, attached South China Naval SSD, Canton, until about summer of 40 when he returned to Tokyo. Was not replaced. Duties in Canton were concerned with development, peace preservation, economics and culture.

IGUCHI, Hisashi

Lt Col, Chief of the Hong Kong SSD from its formation in Dec 41.

IKUTA, Mineo

Col; formerly CO, 3 Inf Regt (Azabu), 1 Div (Tokyo); Chief of the Foochow SSD during its existence; returned to General Staff, Tokyo.

IMAMURA Japanese Naval civilian employee; attached South China Naval SSD, Canton, and still there Mar/Apr 41. Interpreter/translator of Chinese.

INOUE Col, Head of Taiyuan Liaison Dept (SSD in Shansi Province, China) from '40 succeeding Col UEYAMA, until 42 when he was succeeded by Maj Gen HANAYA. Better man at the job than Col UEYAMA, but not up to calibre of Maj Gen HANAYA.

IO Chinese Naval civilian employee; attached South China Naval SSD, Canton, and still there Mar/Apr 41. Interpreter/translator of Chinese.

ISHIBASHI Naval Pay Lt.; worked under Capt TADANO in the 8 Naval Development Dept in New Guinea and was PW's immediate superior. SHIBASHI had worked his way up from an Ordinary Seaman and was about 48 years of age; Capt TADANO apparently took him under his wing and acted as his mentor.

ISHIKAWA, Mitsui Army civilian employee, Mining Squad Resources Dept, Investigation Group, Taiyuan Liaison Dept (SSD in Shansi Province, China). Had rank equivalent to officer (Koto-Kan Taigu)

IWAGOE, Kanki Rear Admiral; former Chief of the Canton, China Naval SSD; left in Feb 42 to assume new post.

Capt, later promoted Rear Admiral. Regular Officer; medium built, about 5'6" tall and about 40; full in the face, and wore glasses. Prior to Jan 40, probably in Tokyo. Subsequently was Head of South China Navy SSD, Canton, replacing Rear-Admiral UGAKI. From press reports, PW learned he had returned to Tokyo in Oct 41, was promoted to Rear Admiral and placed on Reserve.

IWAHASHI Name occurring in file of miscellaneous documents relating to Kuching Iso Kikan, Japan.

KAMIMIYA Administration Employee, General Affairs Section; present at meeting of 26 Feb 45 to decide the policy of the West Coast Province Iso Kikan.

KANAMORI Rear Admiral; Head of No. 3 Dept (Intelligence)
as of May 41.

KANEKO, Akira Sgt Maj, employed in Boryaku Section of the
Canton SSD, 1942-43.

KARAI Chief of Kuching Iso Kikan

KATO, Masayuki Army civilian employee, Mining Squad Resources
Dept, Investigation Group, Taiyuan Liaison
Dpt (SSD in Hansi Province, China). Had rank
equivalent to officer (Koto-Kan Taigu)

KAWADA Production Department Chief, General Affairs
Section; present at meeting of 26 Feb 45 to
decide the policy of the West Coast Province
Iso Kikan.

KAWAMOTO, Kunio Maj Gen, CG Nagano MP School, as of Sep 44.

KAWASE, Kaoru Comdr; Regular Officer; resident Naval Attaché
Canton from about Jul 40 when he arrived from
Tokyo to replace Comdr HIGO. Was still at
Canton Mar/Apr 41.

KAWASE Comdr and Regular Officer. Prior to Jul 40
was probably in Tokyo. In that month he
arrived in Canton to replace Comdr HIGO as
Resident Naval Officer, and was still there
in Apr 41. Thought that, despite the rumored
disbanding of South China Navy SSD in Oct 41,
KAWASE may have remained as a Resident Naval
Officer.

KAWATA Japanese Naval civilian employee. Attached
South China Naval SSD, Canton, as interpreter/
translator of English. Transferred to Japanese
Consulate some time before Mar/Apr 41.

KIMURA, Tokuichi Transmitting information by W/T to both the
Canton SSD and Macao SSD. Worked at night
and on short wave. Had belonged to General
Staff, Tokyo, and was formerly one of Gen.
DOIHARA's henchmen. Aged 58-59. Was operating
from Chungking, China in Apr 43.

KOBAYASHI Major; instructor of Espionage, Nagano MP
School as of Sep 44.

KOBAYASHI

Jap spy at NCO Club at Soerabaja; about 45 years old and single; came to Java many years before war and worked in every factory and oil refinery where he could get a job. Returned to Japan about beginning to 41 and came as interpreter with first landing on Java in Mar 41.

KOBAYASHI, Takashi

Employee of Nippaku newspaper with whom PW shared lodgings during his employment by that newspaper.

KODAMA, Kazuo

Army civilian employee; Mining Squad Resources Dept, Investigation Group, Taiyuan Liaison Dept (SSD in Shansi Province, China). Had rank equivalent to officer (Koto-Kan Taigu)

KOSHIBA

Comdr; Regular Officer; Ass't to Higo at Canton; Returned to Tokyo shortly before HIGO and was not replaced. Duties were concerned with diplomatic activities and liaison with Jap Army.

Comdr and Regular Officer; Medium build, about 5'5" tall, 38 or 39, good appearance. Fond of tennis and other sports. On staff of South China SSD. Prior to 39 was probably in Tokyo; subsequently attached South China Navy SSD until he returned to Tokyo shortly before Comdr HIGO, i.e., about Jun 40 in Canton, maintained personal liaison with Resident Naval Officers in otherports including Hong-kong and Shanghai, and contacted Chinese puppet government re Canton construction projects.

KOSUGI, Mineo

2nd Lt; student of counter-intelligence training conducted by Manchuria 703 Force, 23rd Div, 19-21 Jan 44.

KUMAGAWA, Manoru

Lt Col; Personnel Officer of Nagano MP School as of Sep 44.

MACHIDA

Japanese Naval Civilian Employee; attached South China Naval SSD, Canton. Duties concerned with general affairs.

MAEDA

Lt Comdr and Regular Officer. Stout build, slightly over 5', full face and wore glasses. About 38. Quick-tempered. Arrived Canton from Tokyo about Feb 40 to replace Lt NAKAMURA, with similar duties. Was still there in Apr 41.

Lt Comdr and Regular Officer; Attached to South China Naval SSD from about Feb 40 when he arrived from Tokyo to replace Lt. NAKAMURA. Was still there Mar/Apr 41. Duties were concerned with diplomatic activities and liaison with Jap Army.

MAEDA, Kiyoshi

1st Lt; participated as special student in the counter-intelligence training conducted by Manchuria 703 Force, 23rd Div, 19-21 Jan 44

MAEKAWA, Kiyoshi

Japanese Naval civilian employee; attached South China Naval SSD, Canton, and still there Mar/Apr 41. Interpreter and translator of English.

MATSUSHIMA

Lt; Adjutant to Maj Gen YASAKI, head of Canton SSD.

MITSUHASHI

Lt; worked in South Seas Special Service Office, Navy Dept, Tokyo, Feb 44.

MIYAMOTO

Lt Col; Chief of the General Affairs Section of the Canton SSD as of 1942-43.

MIYOSHI, Kiyoshi

1st Lt; participated as special student in the counter-intelligence training conducted by Manchuria 703 Force, 23rd Div, 19-21 Jan 44

MURANO

Name occurring in file of miscellaneous documents relating to Kuching Iso Kikan.

MURDOCH, Alexander (Ballantyne or Valentine) Manager, Winnipeg Office, Silks, Ltd, between years 24 and 28. (A concern owned by Jap agent of SSD)

NAKAGAMA, Yasumi

Maj; participated as special student in the counter-intelligence training conducted by Manchuria 703 Force, 23rd Div, 19-21 Jan 44.

NAKAHARA, Kiyoshi

Major; CO of PI Tokumu Kikan; also staff officer of 14th Area Army Intelligence Section as of Dec 44.

NAKAMURA

Lt; Regular Officer; Slim-build, about 5'7" and about 30; wore glasses; quick-tempered; Served about 14 months with South China Navy SSD prior to which was in Tokyo. Returned to Tokyo about Feb 40. In Canton, was concerned with finances, economics and reconstruction of the city. Replaced by Lt Comdr MAEDA.

Attached to South China Naval SSD, Canton, until about Feb 40 when he returned to Tokyo. Ass't to HIGO with duties concerned with diplomatic activities and liaison with Jap Army. Replaced by Lt. Comdr. MAEDA.

NIIHO

Army Capt; was CO of the Tokumu Kikan at Hollandia. This was known as "Kami Kikan." He came under the jurisdiction of the Army Tokumu Kikan organization in Java whose Hq were probably at Amboin or Batavia.

NISHITANI

Proprietor of Nis Hitani Shoten, Rio de Janeiro, where PW was employed as salesman for about 3 years from 32 to 35. The concern imported porcelain from Nagoya and Kobe and had an estimated monthly turn-over of Yen 20,000. PW's salary was Yen 100 per month.

NONAKA

Name occurring in file of miscellaneous documents relating to Kuching Iso Kikan.

OHASHI

Capt; Reserve Officer, attached South China Naval SSD, Canton, and still there Mar/Apr 41. Assistant to HIGO and later KIASHI with duties concerned with diplomatic activities and liaison with Jap Army.

Capt; Reserve Officer when PW knew him, but probably since recalled to Regular Service. Thin-featured, long-faced and wore glasses. About 52. Very gentle by nature.

OKABAYASHI

West Coast Province Planning Dept Chief,
General Affairs Section; Present at meeting
of 26 Feb 45 to decide the policy of the
West Coast Province Iso Kikan.

OKI

1st Lt; attached to Communications Sec, 14th Area Army Tokuru Kikan Sec as of Dec 44.

OTSUKA, Masao

Japanese Naval civilian employee; attached
South China Naval SSD, Canton; duties concerned
with economics and culture; still there Mar/
Apr 41.

SAWA, Saburo

Lt Col; Chief of the Macao SSD from its formation in Sep 41; aged 42-43, never wears Army uniform; speaks Cantonese like a Cantonese, and looks like one; jolly, hail-fellow-well-met, nevery known to lose his temper; clever, and a great authority on SSD matters in South Chinn; often referred to as the "Doihara of South Chinn."

SAWA YAMA

Capt; Instructor of Art of Disguise, Nagano
MP School, as of Sep 44.

SEKI

1st Lt; Instructor in Communications, Nagano
MP School, as of Sep 44.

SEKI

Administrative Officer, General Affairs Section, present at meeting of 26 Feb 45 to decide the policy of the West Coast Province Iso Kikan.

SEKI, Yoshihiko

Name occurring in file of miscellaneous documents relating to Kuching Iso Kikan

SHIMURA Takashi

Capt; O/c General Affairs, 14th Area Army,
Tokumu Kikan Soc, as of Dec 44.

SILVARDO

Portuguese collaborator with the Macao SSD; a rich and influential merchant dealing in general merchandise; tall with a mole on the cheek near the right ear.

SMITH DE VASCONCELOS

Baron; Brazilian engineer at Rio de Janeiro in whose employ FW worked for about 2 years between 30 and 32.

SUEHIRO

Civilian with rank of Hannin Zokkan, 1st class (equivalent to Army rank of Capt); successor to YAMADA, Kuranosuke as in charge of the General Affairs Section of the Canton SSD; previously of the General Staff, Tokyo; very fussy, a confirmed braggart, detested by all who worked under him; was well-known in Japn as an expert in flower arrangement, and in Canton gave lessons to women of the Japanese YWCA, with several of whom he entered into promiscuous relations; was imprisoned for three months in 1942 because of "careless talk."

SUTO, Sumao

In charge of the Pacification Section of the Canton SSD and concurrently held the post of Chief Rénrakkan and advisor to the Sui Ching Kung Su.

SUZUKI, Kenzo

Lt Col; Chief of the Economic and Boryaku Sections of the Canton SSD, aged 43; PW has since heard that he has died of cancer.

TADANO

Naval Capt; was Staff Officer of the General Affairs Sec of 8 Naval Development Dept. His history indicates that he was formerly connected with the Navy Tokumu Bu.

TAKAMATSU, Shigeru

Japanese Naval civilian employee; attached South China Naval SSD, Canton. Duties concerned with General Affairs.

TANIGUCHI, Minoru

Maj; Oi/c Counter-Espionage Section, 14th Area Army, Tokumu Kikan as of Dec 44.

TOKOMI

Administrative Officer, General Affairs Section; Present at meeting of 26 Feb 45 to decide the policy of the West Coast Province Iso Kikan.

TOKAKI

Lt Col; Instructor of Propaganda, Nagano MP School, as of Sep 44.

TOMITA

Japanese Naval civilian employee; attached South China Naval SSD, Canton. Duties concerned with economics; transferred to Bank of Formosa some time before Mar/Apr 41.

TSURU, Matsuzo

Lt Col; Head of the Swatow SSD; formerly Chief of the Pacification Section of the Canton SSD; aged about 45 in 1942-43.

TSUTSUI

Chief of Planning Department, General Affairs Section; present at meeting of 26 Feb 45 to decide the policy of the West Coast Province Iso Kikan

UBUKATA, Shigezaburo

Had married PW's sister and owned Silks, Ltd, a concern with Head office at Toronto and branches at Winnipeg, Ottawa, Edmonton and Vancouver. The concern imported silk from Japan. Spent most of his time in Japan, visiting Canada about once a year only. He was instrumental in securing PW's entry to St. John's College, and accompanied PW on the voyage over. He died in Japan in '37 while PW was in Brazil. His son, UBUKATA, Ontario, was born in Ontario, his given name being a combination of first syllable of Ontario and the Japanese name Taro. He married a Canadian girl and PW thought he was still in Toronto at outbreak of GEAI War, although a Japanese subject.

UEHARA, Urataro

Manager, Advertising and subscription Dept, Japan, Timor, Tokyo, Dec 37.

UEYAMA

Col; Regular Army Officer, Head of Taiyuan Liaison Dept (SSD in Shansi Province, China) when PW joined in May 39. Succeeded in '40 by Col. INOUYE. Subsequent history unknown to PW. PW submitted most of his reports to this officer but did not have a high opinion of him. Considered he performed his duties perfunctorily and relied too much on his Juniors.

UGAKI

Rear Admiral; PW thought given name was Matome; May since have been promoted. Regular Officer; Head of South China Naval SSD, Canton, until end Dec 39 when he returned to Tokyo. Replaced by Rear Admiral IWAGOE, Kanki.

Rear Admiral and Regular Officer; Thin, slightly built, 5'5" tall and about 53. Gentle by nature, but a man of strong personality

(Cont'd)

UGAKI (Cont'd)

and character. Did not know given name, but thought it was Kanji. Was probably in Tokyo prior to '39. Subsequently was Head of South China Navy Special Service Dept, Canton, until Dec '39 when he returned to Tokyo. Replaced by Rear Admiral IWAGOE, Kanki.

WATANABE

Army civilian employee, Mining Squad Resources Dept, Investigation Group, Taiyuan Liaison Dept (SSD in Shansi Province, China). Had rank equivalent to officer (Koto-Kan Taigu)

WATANABE, Toru

Japanese Naval civilian employee; attached South China Naval SSD, Canton. Duties concerned with General Affairs.

YAHAGI, Nakao

Major General, Regular Army officer; Made Head of Taiyuan Liaison Dept (SSD in Shansi Province, China) with rank of Lt Col at its inception in '33. At date unknown to PW, but prior to May '39 was transferred to Nanking Special Service Organization and succeeded to Taiyuan by Col. UYEYAMA. YAHAGI was considered an extremely able man and at a date unknown to PW was transferred from Nanking to Gen. Staff Hq, Japan, where he was appointed Head of Information Dept (Hodo Bu) within Intelligence Dept (Joho Bu); subsequent history unknown to PW.

YAMADA, Kuranosuke

Worked under Lt. Col MIYAMOTO in the General Affairs Section of the Canton SSD until relieved by SUEHIRO; had also worked in the General Affairs Section of the Foochow SSD; worked for a few months in the Economic Section of the Canton SSD before leaving for Soerabaya in April 1942 in company of a man from the Hong Kong Naval SSD; and looked upon as a "walking encyclopedia" on SSD matters; arrested and kept in close confinement for three months in 1941 because of "careless talk" among women; aged about 45, a graduate of the Chuo University, Tokyo; held rank of Hannin Zokkan 1st Class (equivalent to Army Captain) at the time of his departure.

YAMASAKI, Zensuke

Civilian employee of Nada General Affairs Department (Planning Section) who was given the additional duty of West Coast Province, Iso Organization. Was to depart on 28 Feb 45 for Weston, Borneo where the Litigation Office was to be established. Attended general meeting held for the establishment of Toyo Association.

YAMAZAKI

Jap spy at NCO Club at Soerabaja; about 45 years old and single; came to Java many years before beginning of war and worked in every factory and oil refinery where he could get a job. Returned to Japan about beginning of '41 and came as interpreter with first landing on Java in Mar 41.

YAMAZAKI, Yoshisuke

Name appearing in file of miscellaneous documents relating to Kuching Iso Kikan.

YANAGIDA

1st Lt; Instructor in Démolitions, Nagano MP School, as of Sep 44.

YASAKI, Kanju

Maj Gen; Head of the Canton SSD from its formation on 21 Oct 38; aged about 48 years.

YASUDA

Name occurring in file of miscellaneous documents relating to Kuching Iso Kikan.

YUNOKI

1st Lt; Oi/c Communications Sec, 14th Area Army, Tokum Kikan Sec, as of Dec 44.

Q. The Communications Dept. at OWADA performed statistical analyses of communications interceptions. Can you tell us how many people were assigned to this work?

A. I have been to OWADA only two or three times and have not seen it completely. I believe that the Statistics Section had quite a number of men.

Q. Can you tell us anything, in addition to what you have already described, about the methods of statistical analysis work done at OWADA?

A. I think it would be better if you asked directly at the 3rd Section for this information as I am not able to give you a great deal.

Q. Did the TENGOKU Plan, as originally written in January or February of this year, cover the estimate as to possible landings on the Japanese homeland?

A. The TENGOKU Plan covered only OKINAWA and the Southern Area, but the KETSUGO Plan covered the eventuality of any landings on the Japanese homeland, did not include KARAFUTO or the KOREAS.

Q. Was the TENGOKU Plan revised from time to time as further information was secured?

A. It did not change. It was a plan, was set up, and not changed.

Q. Was there a further estimate or plan made on 1 June regarding the estimates in connection with the defense of the Japanese mainland?

A. There was a plan made up at that time. However, I was not specifically concerned with it. I believe it was in June.

Q. Were you not in the 1st Section of the 1st Department in June of this year?

A. Yes. I was in the section at that time.

Q. What was your estimate then as to where and when the Allied landings would occur on the Japanese mainland?

A. Our estimates were always a little bit earlier than the actual facts, inasmuch as the decision as to when and where the American forces would land was a matter of higher authority, and my estimate was only an estimate. However, in my opinion, I thought that the American forces could make a landing possibly as early as the early part of August, that it depended upon the status of the weather as it pertained to the utilization of bombers. Actually, in my personal estimate, I expected landings in the first part of September. However, there were several opinions, and the opinion of certain members of the General Staff was that it would come in the first part of October. That pertained to KYUSHU. It was my opinion that landings would be carried out in the Southern part of KYUSHU on either the East or the West coast, in either the ARIAKE BAY or MIYAZAKI Areas. This opinion was also held by the Army.

Q. Upon what information was this opinion based?

A. This was a strategic decision. It depended, in the first instance, on air superiority being obtained in the OKINAWA Area. This was a judgment based upon no particular piece of information. I based my decision upon the past experiences of the war, particularly such a factor as the fact that as KYUSHU was an island, air superiority could be obtained over it. And it was almost without communications, particularly railroad communications with the rest of Japan. Moreover, it lay strategically between the main part of Japan and China.

Q. Based on this, how many divisions of Japanese troops were moved into KYUSHU?

A. I do not remember. I was not directly concerned. The operational information on the movement of our own troops, and similar matters, was not a matter within my province. My job was specifically that of estimating American intentions.

Q. Inasmuch as the communications were poor, especially railroad with regard to transportation had the estimate been wrong, the results would have been most serious for Japan. Isn't that so?

A. Yes.

Q. You must have been very sure of your estimate then.

A. It is true that the results would have been disastrous if my estimate had been wrong. However, based on my past experiences, I felt sure that the American army would land nowhere, in this initial operation, except on KYUSHU. I did not feel that it was at all likely that the Americans would land on HOKKAIDO, and the landing in the Tokyo area, I felt sure, would be subsequent to KYUSHU.

Q. In addition to what you have already told us, would you further elaborate on your reasoning and the information which brought you to this conclusion?

A. In addition to what I have already said, there was practically no other method of reasoning that I used, but my method of reasoning was surely a tactical judgment.

Q. Was it upon this judgment alone then that the deployment of Japan's forces was based for the defense of the home islands?

A. It was not my decision alone. As I have explained before, the final decision was arrived at by a comparison of the decisions of all of the officers working on this subject in the 1st Section - TOMIOKA, OHMAE, and others. The final decision was that believed by the group to be wisest by them after considerable discussion.

Q. Based upon this decision, was a plan for the defense of KYUSHU and Japan drawn up?

A. The plan for the defense of KYUSHU was an Army affair since, after all, they were the ones primarily concerned. However, inasmuch as we had practically no Navy left at that time, and inasmuch as our air force was greatly depleted, the ends of both the Army and Navy were practically identical. Consequently, all of the Naval Air, as well as the bulk of the Army Air, was concentrated, as a result of this estimate, in the Western part of the island, from the KYOTC Area West and South. The KETSUGO Operation Plan applied only to air operations inasmuch as outside of air operations against the fleet prior to its landing, there was very little we could successfully have done. The plan did not apply beyond such a time as the American forces might have secured a firm foothold.

Q. Was that plan drawn up by the 1st Department?

A. It was made up by the Combined Fleet.

Q. What was the date of that plan?

A. I do not remember.

~~RESTRICTED~~

Q. Was it about the first of June?

A. As this is a matter of aircraft, I do not recall.

Q. However, the estimates in the plan dealing with the time and place of the expected landing were furnished by you, were they not?

A. The Combined Fleet was of the same opinion as we were.

Q. Did the Combined Fleet go through the same procedure as the General Staff did?

A. The actual decision was worked out between the General Staff and the Combined Fleet. Inasmuch as I was not directly concerned with the conferences carried on between the Combined Fleet and the General Staff, I do not know where or when meetings were held, but conferences were carried on frequently between the two.

Q. What was the basis for your estimate that landings at KYUSHU might be made at ARIAKE?

A. On the basis of the opinion of the LEYTE landings, it was quite likely that landings would be made in this area. Another reason was that ARIAKE is the only place in KYUSHU where a fleet can go close to shore.

Q. In the plan that was developed, of which Capt. OHMAE gave me a copy, the numbers of ships in various classifications available for the landing was given. We would like to know upon what information these estimates were based.

A. This estimate came to us from the 5th Section which is the section in the 3rd Department concerned with American fleet strength, based upon their past information of the fleet, plus information gathered at OKINAWA. Such information was quite easy to gather inasmuch as we were able to observe landings there and to observe fleet units throughout the majority of the campaign.

Q. Are you familiar with a document produced by the 3rd Department of the Navy General Staff in March 1944 in which U.S. carriers are listed by name, together with the numbers of air groups assigned to these carriers? It must have been a well known document to everybody in Planning. It would have been basic.

A. I am familiar with the information obtained. I am not familiar with the document itself. This was made up by the 5th Section.

Q. Did captured documents provide the information given here, or was it some other method?

A. I do not know what information it was based upon.

Q. To what extent did aviators shot down over Japan provide useful information in making the estimates we have just discussed?

A. That was a matter of the 5th Section, and I have not heard of any particularly important information. Such persons shot down would not have had much information on future operations.

Q. What did you estimate the U.S. moves would be after the landings on KYUSHU?

A. The U.S. landings would be on the KANTO PLAIN.

Q. How long after the KYUSHU landings did you estimate it would be before that operation took place?

A. Three to four months after the end of the KYUSHU Operation.

Q. Were all members of the Japanese Merchant Marine members also of the Japanese Imperial Navy?

A. Those that had training in navigation and similar subjects entered the Japanese Navy after the war began. These personnel were very few in the Merchant Marine.

Q. Were not officers of the Merchant Marine also officers of the Imperial Japanese Navy?

A. Yes. All officers were reserve officers in the Japanese Navy.

Q. That was true prior to the war also?

A. Yes.

Q. Could you tell me what system the Navy employed for securing information from Merchant Marine officers? Were regular reports made (prior to the war)?

A. I have never heard of any being made inasmuch as I came into the section in October of last year.

Q. As Commanding Officer of a destroyer during the latter part of the war, what is your estimate of the adequacy of information furnished you which you required to do your work?

A. While I was captain of a destroyer, I received practically no intelligence information. Intelligence is, after all, more a function of the Fleet Headquarters. Furthermore, the only way to receive it at sea is by wireless, and my wireless was always full of operational reports. Such matters as American naval strength and movements of American vessels I did not receive information on. However, during the period of the GUADALCANAL Operations, we received a little information as to the sightings made by reconnaissance aircraft. Outside of that, practically nothing.

Q. Were your communications facilities satisfactory?

A. Communications were good until the time of the SOLOMONS Operations. After that, we found it progressively more difficult, due largely to enemy action. For example, in my destroyer squadron, the lead ship was sunk, another ship was sunk, and under such conditions, which were frequent, communications became very difficult as the war wore on.

Q. What was the date of your departure from Japan to participate in the occupation of WAKE?

A. The early part of November 1941.

Q. Did you know at the time of your departure what your destination and mission was?

A. No. I had no information.

Q. What did you think it was?

A. I felt sure that some sort of engagement was in the offing. I had no information, however, of the objective operations against PEARL HARBOR. All such matters were kept strictly secret. The first information I had at the beginning of the war was in the early part of December, the 7th or 8th. I did not participate in the GUAM operations. They kept such news very secret so I naturally had no information.

Q. Were there transports in the force which you accompanied?

A. There were neither transports nor troops in the convoy.

Q. What made up your force?

A. They were all combatant ships.

Q. Where and when did the troop ships join your force?

A. The troop ships did not meet our force.

Q. Did your force participate in the occupation of WAKE?

A. Our itinerary was from Japan past GUAM, TRUK, KWAJALEIN, and WAKE where we participated in the occupation. Because your force put up such a magnificent fight, we thought there were many more than there actually were. We left in the early part of November to participate in the WAKE Operation. At the time of the RABAUL occupation, in March of 1942, my force was in the BISMARCK Sea, but we did not actually participate in the occupation.

Q. Was your defense of OKINAWA upset by the fact that the assault was made on 1 April instead of the last part of March as you had expected?

A. We thought that you would land in the middle of March. Consequently, the fact that you delayed your landing by even such a small period helped us in our preparations somewhat. If you had come in March, we would not have been as nearly well prepared for you as we were. If you had delayed one more month, we would have been able to win.

Q. What made you so sure that the landing would be attempted on OKINAWA rather than other islands in the RYUKYU Group?

A. Because OKINAWA is an excellent place for airfields and fleet anchorage, and the others are not.

Q. To what extent was the TOKUMU BU helpful in furnishing useful information?

A. No such unit in the Japanese Navy that I know of. At the time of the CHINA incident, the Army had the TOKUMU KIKAN. During the war I believe this was disbanded even in the Army. There is no such organization in the Navy.

Q. Did you ever hear of Admiral CHUDO?

A. I have heard his name, but I do not know him.

Q. Do you know through what sources you got any specific details as to what air groups were aboard which carriers?

A. That was a job of the 5th Section. I do not know. I had no dealings with anything of that kind.

Q. Did you have in your section other people under you who helped you with the analysis of the great quantity of material flowing in to you?

A. The work in the section was done by a number of officers working together - Capt. OHMAE and other officers. The statistical work was done by Headquarters. We all worked together in the same room, OHMAE, TERAI, and a number of other officers. In writing my decisions, I found that I needed a certain piece of information, and I would say, "Let me have your data on this". I do not know where they got it. I was Capt. OHMAE's assistant in all these matters - air, army, navy.

Transcript of Interrogation (Comdr. I. MIYAZAKI, IJN) - RESTRICTED -

Q. Where was the organization that screened the great amount of information coming in from all sources? Who summarized all the information that Adm. TAKEUCHI received and passed on to you?

A. There is only the 5th Section. The 5th Section had charge of re-analysis, statistical work, etc. The Combined Fleet staff received the same information that we did directly from the 5th Section and OWADA.

Q. From the questions that have been asked today you have some idea of the purpose of our conversations, and what we are trying to put together concerning the relationship between source of information and planning. From your knowledge, what occurs to you that has further bearing on the subject?

A. I want to explain the setup of our physical communications which in many respects permitted a good deal of inefficiency in our operations. The 5th Section was at HIYOSHI. The Communications Section was at OWADA. The 1st Section was close by the Naval Department. Furthermore, the Army Intelligence Sections were similarly scattered out. All communications were dependent upon telephone. The Japanese telephone system is ordinarily bad. Furthermore, as a result of your bombings, oftentimes it was impossible to gain any sort of communication with these various outlying sections from which our information came. Consequently, it was very difficult to gather together information rapidly and completely.

Q. Where was the Grand Fleet Headquarters?

A. It was in the operations area, wherever that happened to be. In the latter part of the war, it was in KYUSHU.

Q. Where was Adm. OZAWA located in the latter part of the war?

A. In Tokyo.

Q. Was he Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet?

A. Yes. The Combined Fleet Headquarters moved to Tokyo in the latter part of the war.

Q. How were you listed? Under what title in the Table of Organization within the 1st Section?

A. I do not remember exactly where I was listed. I was actually Cnt. OHMAE's assistant. I was carried on the list under both the Administrative and Planning Sections of the 1st Department. My job was intelligence evaluation under Cnt. OHMAE.

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- R E S T R I C T E D -

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO: 372
(Jap Intell No 25)

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence ^{Section} G-2, USSBS.

Subject: Organization and Operation of TOKUMU KIKAN in MANCHURIA.

Person Interrogated and Background:

Lt. Col ASAII, Isamu, Japanese Army.

Army Academy: 1937

1938-1940: 4th Section North China Area Army Headquarters

1940-1943: 2d Department Army General Headquarters

1943-1945: Army Attaché in Moscow

1945 (May): 2d Department, Army General Headquarters

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. WILLIAM H. BOTZER, USNR
Lt. Comdr. F. SHACKELFORD, USNR.


Interpreter: Major J. C. PELZEL, USMCR

Allied Officers Present: None.

SUMMARY:

During the War Lt. Col ASAII, Isamu, was attached to Army General Headquarters in TOKYO and also served as Military Attaché in Moscow. Through his experience in Headquarters he became familiar with the organization and operation of TOKUMU KIKAN in MANCHURIA, although never a member of the organization himself. On the basis of his experience and information he estimated, after the Potsdam Conference, that RUSSIA would attack JAPAN early in November. TOKUMU KIKAN was the intelligence section of the Kwantung Army and obtained information on Soviet strength, movements and intentions through espionage, observation along the border, interrogation of Russian spies, communications interception, and analysis of news and captured documents. While there was no connection between this organization and Headquarters in TOKYO, Headquarters received from the Kwantung Army weekly and monthly reports of the organization and sent requests for information to the Army which were turned over to the organization for action when in its field.

Personnel for TOKUMU KIKAN were selected from young officers in the Academy and from units of the Kwantung Army.



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Interrogation of Lt. Col ASAI, Isamu, Japanese Army.

Q.1. You have been referred to us as one familiar with the organization and operation of the TOKUMU KIKAN (Special Service Organization).

A. Yes, I understand.

Q.2. In what way were you connected with TOKUMU KIKAN?

A. I was not in the organization at all, but I grew familiar with it through my position in the 2nd Section in the Army General Headquarters in TOKYO. While in the 2nd Section, I neither supervised the TOKUMU KIKAN nor worked with it, but indirectly I did learn of its organization and procedure in MANCHURIA.

Q.3. Tell us what you know about the organization in MANCHURIA.

A. The name, TOKUMU KIKAN, was the name of the organization about three years ago. Then the name was changed to JOCOBU. Its central office was in Harbin, with branch offices at CANTO, KEIMEI (BOTSURI), TOAN, JAMUS, KOKZA, HAIRAR (3 sub-divisions), KOAN, and APAKKA (across the border in MONGOLIA).

Q.4. I understand the organization you have just described was the intelligence unit for the Kwantung Army.

A. Yes.

Q.5. What was the connection between the organization in MANCHURIA and the Army General Headquarters in TOKYO?

A. None.

Q.6. Did the organization operate in areas other than MANCHURIA? South CHINA and The PHILIPPINES for instance?

A. I don't know. When I was in northern CHINA in 1938-40 there was an organization known as TOKUMU KIKAN, but I knew nothing about it.

Q.7. Who is familiar with the organization in the PHILIPPINES?

A. Lt. Col. OYA. I am familiar with the organization in MANCHURIA, Lt. Col. YAMAZAKI with it in CHINA and Lt. Col. OYA with its operation in the Southern Areas.

Q.8. How many people did the organization use in MANCHURIA?

A. Fifty Officers and non-commissioned officers and 150 civilians in the central office and 35 Officers and 30 civilians in the branch offices.

Q.9. What training have you had in intelligence?

A. As in the case of all members of my class at the Academy, I had 20 hours in intelligence indoctrination. However, I feel that my three years with Army General Headquarters in TOKYO from 1940 to 1943 and again from May 1945 to the end of the War qualified me for work in this field. I worked extensively with intelligence reports. My particular job during each period with Headquarters was intelligence, especially military intelligence, concerning the Soviet. During my second period with Headquarters beginning in May 1945 I was concerned with economic and political questions as well as military intelligence relating to the Soviet.

Q.10. Were any directives or orders given directly to TOKUMU KIKAN by the TOKYO Headquarters?

Interrogation of Lt. Col. ASAII, Isamu, Japanese Army (contd.).

A. Absolutely none. If I had a request for a certain type of information concerning RUSSIA, I would transmit it to the Kwantung Army. It, in turn would get the answer from the organization or any other unit that might have the particular information requested.

Q.11. What was the relation between the organization and the intelligence section of the Kwantung Army?

A. The organization was the intelligence section of the Kwantung Army. Special surveys might occasionally be made under G-2 by others regarding particular matters.

Q.12. What type of information did the organization send back to TOKYO?

A. The most important information was the order of battle, disposition of Soviet forces, and the strength of their forces. In addition it would supply intelligence on the internal situation in RUSSIA. Outside of these categories nothing else was sent.

Q.13. Was such information supplied on the basis of particular requests or on a continuing basis?

A. The reports supplied to Headquarters were of two types:

A. (1) Emergency radio reports from the Kwantung Army Headquarters in response to my directives or on the basis of information gathered independently by the organization itself.

(2) Printed reports - (a) weekly and (b) monthly. Prior to the worsening of relations with RUSSIA, there was no weekly report but instead a 10-day report.

Q.14. You say that from time to time you made requests to the Kwantung army. What was the nature of these requests?

A. Outside of the requests I've already mentioned, I know of none. For instance, I would ask for information of the situation in a particular area or for a general type of information regarding, say, the air force. I did not send out requests going into details.

Q.15. Was the information you received through the Kwantung Army from this organization satisfactory?

A. No, it was not nearly satisfactory. That was because the problem was extremely complicated, especially as conditions with RUSSIA grew worse. The information received was too incomplete on which to base plans.

Q.16. What system was used by the organization in collecting intelligence?

A. My knowledge is generally limited to the system used by the organization prior to the time I was sent to RUSSIA three years ago. However, the methods have remained pretty much the same. They may be summarized as follows:

(1) Espionage, (sending agents into the Soviet). The operations of our agents became restricted almost totally to areas on the MANCHURIAN side of the Border. We could not send agents into RUSSIA because of the dangers involved.

(2) Observation. At high points along the borders there was a series of observation posts. Since the railroad ran close to the border, we could easily determine the movements of the Soviet troops. We could also observe the

Interrogation of Lt. Col. ASAII, Isamu, Japanese Army (contd.).

harbor close to VLADIVOSTOK. Such sources of information were often considered sufficient on which to form a judgment as to Russian intentions.

(3) Interrogation of Captured Russian Spies. For instance, in the summer of 1941, one hundred were taken and from these and other spies captured from time to time it was possible to assess the situation of the Soviet Army pretty clearly.

(4) Communication Interception. This was the function of a special communication unit and not of the organization. It was the most reliable source of information. Garrisons along the border, particularly along the borders of the Maritime Province, were able to intercept almost all messages to Soviet units in their areas.

(5) Newspapers, Magazines, Captured Documents. The analysis of these was done at Headquarters in SHINKIO.

Q.17. Did the agents of this organization work in or out of uniform?

A. It varied according to the situation. Civilians never wore them. Military personnel did or did not depending on their job at the time.

Q.18. Tell us what you know of the BORYAKU.

A. There were none in MANCHURIA. Some were in CHINA. I have had no dealings with them. They were probably operatives for the NANKING Government doing special intelligence work. Both Chinese and Japanese operatives were attached to the Chinese Government. The agents attached to the NANKING Government were called SEIJIBO and ones attached since 1940 were called GUNJI BO.

Q.19. Are you familiar with the BUNKAN?

A. The BUNKAN were Japanese hired by the army and paid by the Army. They might or might not have officer ranks.

Q 20 On what basis were personnel chosen?

Two bases:

(1) Selection of young officers from the Academy.

(2) Selection of young officers, captain or below, from units of the Kwantung Army in response to directives. Qualifications were general intelligence and knowledge of Soviet affairs. Final selection was made by personnel officers at the Kwantung Army Headquarters, and the candidates were trained at SWINKIO (Headquarters of the Kwantung Army).

Q.21. Do you know that there was a school at AKASAKA KU (TOKYO) for training of Special Service Personnel?

A No.

Q. 22. Was there any organization similar to TOKUMU KIKAN in the Navy?

A. It is likely but I have never heard of it.

... if among your Naval Officer friends would know?

Q.23. Who among your Naval Officer friend
I don't know, but perhaps the Third Department could tell you.

Q. 24. When and on what sources did you estimate the Soviet would go to War against JAPAN?

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Interrogation of Lt. Col. ASAII, Isamu, Japanese Army (contd).

A. In the early part of November 1945, I reached this estimate right after the POTSDAM Conference on the basis of developments at that Conference and on the movements and disposition of Soviet troops along the border. I thought that a blow would come North of VLADIVOSTOK and that they had 5,800 aircraft available for use against us.

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HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO: 397
(Jap Intell No 36)

PLACE: TOKYO By TAG PER
DATE: 21 Nov 1945 Z 196



Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence, G-2, USSEBS.

Subject: Intelligence Activities of TOKUMU KIKAN.

Person Interrogated and Background:

Major General HARADA, Hisao, was chief of the Nanking Branch of TOKUMU KIKAN.

Previous to 1939: Had a normal Army career.

1939-1940: Head of Bampa Branch, TOKUMU KIKAN.

1940 (June) to 1944 (Mar): Head of Nanking Branch of TOKUMU KIKAN

1944 (Mar) to end of war: Head of Nanking Liaison Commission with Chinese (Successor to TOKUMU KIKAN)

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building.

Interrogator: Major R. S. SPILMAN, Jr., AC

Interpreter: Major JOHN C. PELZEL, USMCR

Allied Officers Present: None.

Note: It is the opinion of the interrogator that while the statements made by General HARADA as to the activities of TOKUMU KIKAN are correct as far as they go, its activities were much broader than indicated by HARADA. His professed ignorance as to the policy is hard to reconcile with his rank and position in the organization.

SUMMARY:

(1) TOKUMU KIKAN was organized by the Commanding General of the China Expeditionary Force and while General HARADA believed that general policies were probably fixed in TOKYO, he could not, or would not say what body in TOKYO fixed them. Military personnel were assigned by the Commanding General of the China Expeditionary Force and civilian personnel were recruited both in China and JAPAN by the Area Army Commander.

(2) In China, the TOKUMU KIKAN had no functions connected with military intelligence according to General HARADA. Its only duties were:

(a) Provide for the physical welfare of the Chinese.


(b) Conduct propaganda and education of the Chinese.

(3) General HARADA stated that all military intelligence was under the control of the Chinese and all counter intelligence was a Chinese responsibility.

Interrogation of Major General HARADA, Hisao

Q.1. Give the organization of the TOKUMU KIKAN in China.

A. The TOKUMU KIKAN was under the 13th Army which was directly under the China Expeditionary Force. The Nanking Division of TOKUMU KIKAN of which I was chief, reported directly to the 13th Army. The organization is shown below:



Note: The highest TOKUMU KIKAN representative was at 13th Army level. The 13th Army was under the China Expeditionary Army (HO MEN GUN).

Q.2. When was TOKUMU KIKAN established?

A. The various provincial sections were formed as each province was occupied. The TOKUMU KIKAN followed closely behind the Army.

Q.3. Upon whose orders were TOKUMU KIKAN units established?

A. Upon orders of the Central China Army Group. However, upon organization it reported to the 13th Army.

Q.4. Was there any coordinating body to which TOKUMU KIKAN from the various armies under the Central China Army Group reported?

A. Basic policy came from the Army Group Headquarters and directives from the Army Group through the Armies to the TOKUMU KIKAN head. The Chief of Staff of the Army Group issued orders to the Army TOKUMU KIKAN, but there was no real TOKUMU KIKAN at Army Group level.

The main functions of the TOKUMU KIKAN was government. This fell into the following divisions.

(1) Physical Welfare of the Chinese.

Interrogation of Major General MARADA, Hisao

(2) The education and indoctrination of the Chinese.

Most of the actual work was done by the Chinese police and the HOANTAI - a special organization for these purposes set up by the Chinese government. The HOANTAI wore uniforms and carried arms. It was organized in each province under the provincial government except that the Nanking organization reported direct to the Nanking government. It had two principal functions:

(1) Encouragement of industry and agriculture.

(2) Education, indoctrination, and public health of the people.

Q.5. On what basis were Army officers assigned to TOKUMU KIKAN?

A. Knowledge of China and general economic and political background.

Q.6. Who selected them?

A. The Commanding General of the Area Army. I don't know why I was selected.

Q.7. What training was given the Japanese civilians employed by TOKUMU KIKAN?

A. No training. They were selected on the same basis as the officers.

Q.8. Some civilians were sent from JAPAN. How did the field General get qualified men from JAPAN? Who in JAPAN selected them?

A. A representative was sent to JAPAN who selected men from universities and business. Many came from Japanese civilians in China.

Q.9. What is the relation between the Army Headquarters in TOKYO and TOKUMU KIKAN?

A. So far as I know, there was none. I don't know what went on above Army level. The general policy must have been settled in TOKYO, but I don't know how or by whom this was done.

Q.10. We know that TOKUMU KIKAN was in charge of undercover agents in Manchuria. Did the China Army have a similar organization?

A. No such thing was done in China. We did receive some information of possible military value from the prefectural branches, the police, Chinese people, etc., but we never used undercover agents. Some branch chiefs and the Chinese government may have had agents, but I never did. If any military information came to me, I reported it, but not much came to my attention. The type of information I got was the kind that General MCARTHUR is now getting; the attitude of the people, the cooperation of the leaders, the activity of our own army, etc.

Q.11. Did any information concerning our air activities around CHENGDU or KWEILIN come over your desk?

A. No. I saw no operational information.

Q.12. Did TOKUMU KIKAN have anything to do with air raid warning?

A. No.

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Interrogation of Major General HARADA, Hisao

Q.13. Do you know anything about the operation of TOKUMU KIKAN in the Philippines?

A. I don't even know whether there was an organization there.

Q.14. What was the relation between TOKUMU KIKAN and KEMPIE TAI in China?

A. The KEMPIE TAI were organized in China in about the same way as the TOKUMU KIKAN, but the chain of command ran direct to the Area Army. There was liaison between KEMPIE TAI and TOKUMU KIKAN at all levels, however.

Q.15. What part did TOKUMU KIKAN play in the apprehension of agents for the Chiang government?

A. None. If a spy came into the area it was up to the Chinese authorities to act. If I happened to get information I would pass it along to the Chinese governor for action.

Q.16. What, exactly, were the duties of your government Section?

A. The function was to provide advice to the Nanking government to see that the activities followed Japanese policy as to:

- (1) Improvement of living conditions of the Chinese.
- (2) Education and indoctrination. Purely military matters did not concern the TOKUMU KIKAN and apprehension of spies was purely the responsibility of the Chinese.

Q.17. Wasn't some Japanese agency vitally concerned with whether or not the Japanese army was being spied on?

A. This was purely a matter of the Chinese.

Q.18. What was the relation of TOKUMU KIKAN with the Chinese?

A. We worked only through the head men in the Chinese government; the mayors, the prefectoral governors, the heads of public safety bodies, etc. Our consultations were on purely civil matters.

Q.19. What changes were made when TAKUMU KIKAN was changed to a Liaison unit?

A. The change was made in March 1943. After that the TOKUMU KIKAN was a liaison section only, but the organization and internal command channels did not change. The main difference after the change that before, local TOKUMU KIKAN units could deal with local government officials while afterwards local TOKUMU KIKAN units had to come to me and I dealt with the Chinese. Also after the reorganization no Japanese body could deal with the Chinese except through TOKUMU KIKAN.

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HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO: 398
(Jap Intell No 26)

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 15 Nov 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS.

Subject: Intelligence Duties of TOKUMU KIKAN (Special Service Organization)

Person Interrogated and Background:

Lt. Col. YAMAZAKI, J. was second in command of the CHINA section of the second division of the Imperial General Staff and as such received all intelligence concerning CHINA, some of which came through TOKUMU KIKAN. His military background follows:

Graduated from military academy 1931
Routine assignments to 1937
1937-1938 War College
1938-1940 Supply division, 109th Division, Kwantung Army.
1940 Instructor at cavalry school
1941-1944 Intelligence section CHINA Armies
Aug 1944 to end of War: 7th Section, 2nd Division of Imperial General Staff.

Where Interviewed: Room 748, Meiji Building.

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. PAINE PAUL, USNR
Major R. S. SPILMAN, Jr., AC.

Interpreter: Lt. OTIS CAREY, USNR.

Allied Officers Present: None.



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Interrogation of Lt. Col. YAMAZAKI, J., Japanese Army.

SUMMARY

1. TOKUMU KIKAN (literal translation "Special Service Organization") is an organization set up under the Area Commanders in various theaters. The purposes of the organization in CHINA were stated by Lt. Col. YAMAZAKI to be to:
 - a. Assist the Area Army in governing the civil population.
 - b. Looking after the health and food for the civilian population.
 - c. Acquire food and supplies for the Japanese Army from local sources.
 - d. Check on the attitude of the civil population.
2. The organization and strength of the unit in CHINA is described (see attached table). According to YAMAZAKI, it was entirely under the control of the Area Army Commander and received no instructions from TOKYO. Reports from TOKUMU KIKAN were usually included in area army reports and details of its operation in the field were not known to Imperial Headquarters.
3. Units were attached to armies in MANCHURIA, CHINA and BURMA and in other areas this function was performed by Military Intelligence.
4. Selection of personnel was made by the Area Army. Training was done locally, no course being given in the Empire to provide special advance training.

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Interrogation of Lt. Col. YAMAZAKI, J., Japanese Army.

Q.1. In what capacity did you serve in TOKUMU KIKAN?

A. I was second in command of the CHINA section of the second Division of the Imperial General Staff, the Commanding Officer was Col. HARUKI, Yoshita. I have not served in TOKUMU KIKAN.

Q.2. Define TOKUMU KIKAN.

A. It is an agency which does several things. I don't know the details of any organization except in CHINA. There its functions were:


- a. Assist the Army in governing the population.
- b. See that the civilian population had food and medical care.
- c. Acquire food and other supplies for the Army from the local people.
- d. Get information as to the attitude of the people, etc.

Q.3. Is TOKUMU KIKAN an Army organization?

A. Yes. I don't know of any Navy branch.

Q.4. Give the organization of TOKUMU KIKAN.

A. It is an organization reporting only to the Commander of an Area Army (HOMENGUN) who reports directly to DAIHONRY (Imperial Headquarters). The organization varies with the Army to which it is attached. Since no two are alike no generalizations can be made, but the example below of the organization in the Northern Area Command in CHINA shows how one Army was organized.



There was no control of TOKUMU KIKAN from TOKYO. The Area Army Commander controlled the organization in MANCHURIA after the occupation. At first control of the civil population was handled by the Kwantung Army through the Division in charge of an area. The handling was not uniform and was unsatisfactory so the Commanding General set up the TOKUMU KIKAN to handle this phase of the occupation. It was organized in the field and controlled in the field. All instructions to and all reports from TOKUMU KIKAN were controlled by the Commanding General in the field. He reported to Imperial General Headquarters. From handling the civilian matters it grew into handling all intelligence not considered military intelligence. The present head Lt. Gen. DOIHARA, Kenji was chief of a Division at MUKDEN and did so well that he finally became head of the whole organization.

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Interrogation of Lt. Col. YAMAZAKI, J., Japanese Army (contd)

Q.5. Were units of TOKUMU KIKAN attached to all area Armies?


A. There was one attached to the Armies in MANCHURIA, CHINA and BURMA. I don't think there was one attached to Armies in NEW GUINEA or the PHILIPPINES. In the last two places, the work normally by TOKUMU KIKAN was performed by Military Intelligence.

In 1943 the job in CHINA was pretty well finished and the organization was disbanded. Its personnel became a sort of liaison pool between the Japanese and friendly (to Japanese) Chinese troops. It retained some of its intelligence functions, how much I don't know.

Q.6. Describe the organization of TOKUMU KIKAN below the Area Army level.

A. The chart which follows shows the organization from GUN (Army) down:

TOKUMU KIKAN Detachment at Division (or Independent Brigade) level



There was no organization below that shown on the table. The above men had all the contacts with natives. If an Army Unit needed help of TOKUMU KIKAN it applied to the nearest office and got the help.

Q.7. Were not the TOKUMU KIKAN units charged with some duties such as espionage, sabotage, organizing the natives, etc?

A. No directives calling for this kind of work were ever issued from my office in TOKYO and I don't know anything about it. I had no part of any kind in these activities and knew of no units which did this kind of thing. Individual units acting on their own responsibility may have done a good deal of this and done it well, but I know no details.

Q.8. Did DEIHONEI issue any orders to TOKUMU KIKAN?

A. No. We would ask the Commanding General for information and he furnished it from intelligence sources available to him.

Q.9. What kind of reports were made by TOKUMU KIKAN?

A. I don't know. Information came through Area Army and I did not know the source.

Q.10. Can you give us the name of a man who served with the organization in CHINA?

A. I can't but will furnish a name through Major HOTTA (Liaison Officer with Imperial Army and Navy).

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Interrogation of Lt. Col. YAMAZAKI, J., Japanese Army (contd)

Q.11. How were men selected for TOKUMU KIKAN?

A. The military personnel was selected by the Area Army Commander. He selected men with a China background and trained them at Headquarters. The civilians were either picked locally or sometimes sent from TOKYO. With regard to the question as to what reports were made, sometimes TOKUMU KIKAN reports were attached as appendices to reports from the Area Armies.

Q.12. What do you know about a school for training for TOKUMU KIKAN in AKASIKA-KU TOKYO?

A. I never heard of it.

Q.13. Where were men trained for this service?

A. All training was done locally.

Q.14. Was there a similar organization in the Navy?

A. I don't know.

Q.15. What is KAIGUN TOKUMU BU?

A. I never heard of it.

Q.16. Was there any connection between KEMPEI TAI and TOKUMU KIKAN?

A. No. KEMPEI TAI had the same kind of organization and there was some liaison between the two organizations. They both furnished intelligence information.

Q.17. What is the difference between the type of information furnished by the KEMPEI and TOKUMU KIKAN?

A. Both furnished the same kind of information and there was considerable overlap. The primary job of KEMPEI TAI in CHINA was to police the Japanese army and Japanese civilians there.

Q.18. Did TOKUMU KIKAN interrogate Prisoners of War?

A. Very little, so far as I know.

Q.19. Who did interrogate them?

A. This was the responsibility of the regular army intelligence section.

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