

SECRET

PERSONALITY INFORMATION DATA

Address and Tel. No.	Name HATTORI Takushiro (Ex-Colonel)
Permanent Address	
Present Position (Date of Info)	Cryptonym
	201 Number []
Physical Description	
DOB & POB 2 January 1904, Tokyo	
Family	
Education	
Languages	
Previous Career	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 1922 - Graduated Military Academy. 2. 1930 - Graduated from War College, and in 1934 was sent to France to study; he was an observer in Ethiopia during Italian invasion. 3. After return to Japan in 1936, he was assigned to Mobilisation and Organization Section of JIGS. 4. 1939 - operations officer with Kwantung Army Hqs, participated in Nomonhan Incident. 5. - For a time was instructor in Infantry School. 6. 1940 - For several months, was member Army Education Section, then moved to Operations Section, but he resigned when his immediate superior, Lt. Col. TANAKA Shinichi, resigned because of difference opinion with War Minister TOJO over Guadalcanal operations. 7. Dec 42 - Jul 44 - Secretary for TOJO, under whom he had worked in 32-33 when latter was chief of JIGS Mobilisation and Organization Section. 8. Jul 44 - Recalled to JIGS at request of chief, Gen UMEZU, as chief of operations. 9. - Head of HATTORI Kiken 10. - Head, Historical Data Research Institute (Shijitsu Kenkyu Sho), which used various former Army officers to conduct historical and other types of research on military matters and from time to time published books and pamphlets. 	

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... of money, hobbies, literature, vices, etc.

AIS Contacts

Other IS Contacts

Miscellaneous

1. Founded "HATTORI GROUP" - a group of ex-mil personnel (Japanese) who worked for US Forces during Occupation, helping compile History of WWII, attached to Mil. Historical Section.
2. HATTORI established SHUJITSU KENKYU JO (Statistical Facts Research Institute) after separating from Occupation Forces. Has an office in Ichigaya, Tokyo, behind Pershing Heights. Has at least 30 ex-Army personnel assigned to projected work.

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HATTORI Takushiro

Subject is among former officers who are the current Japanese authorities on Soviet intelligence and anti-Soviet operations. (Ref. ZJL-609-A, 4 May 51, [] GE File Japanese Rearmament) Is providing the Japanese Underground Government with a large amount of information on the Soviets. He is with the Data Compilation Dept., Administrative Sec, Demobilization Bureau.

The Japanese Underground Government, considering it inevitable that Japan will be given permission to rearm, is conducting research on rearmament. Among others, subject is doing research on this problem.

8 Feb 51

34th Class of the Military Academy; 42nd Class of the General Staff College. Formerly Chief of the 2nd Operations Section of the General Staff. Contacts the SHIMOMURA (Sadamu) group two or three times a month. (ZJL-614, 8 May 51,

Former expert on strategy and Operations Staff officer, Army, working in Historical Section, helping to prepare a history of the Occupation. Actually his job is that of a contact to anti-Communist espionage groups in Japan and research worker concerning military potential of Korea, China, and a re-armed Japan. He had consulted with Gen. KAWABE Torashiro, Lt. Gen. SAKUMA Ryozo, and Lt. Gen. SAKURAI Tokutaro. Subject was originally recruited by Lt. Gen. ARISUE Seizo, but intensely dislikes ARISUE.

HATTORI, TSUJI Masanobu, and TANAKA Shinichi are considered the foremost military strategists in Japan today. (ZJL-604, p.9, 19 April 1951)

In rearmament circles, the TAIHEIYO SENSEI HENSAN LINKAI, led by HATTORI, is actively supporting UGAKI Kasuhige. (ZJL-699B, 24 Aug 51)

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HATTORI Takushiro

Former aide to TOJO, was chief of the Historical Material Section, group included HASHIMOTO, Masakatsu/ TSUJI Masanobu was connected unofficially. SO-88025

The Historical Material Section aka "the HATTORI group" ~~was~~ Willoughby's staff openly opposed the NPR (NSF) and contended that new group should be set up as the cadre for the future Japanese Army. YOSHIDA reacted to this stand by forbidding contact with the group by "his" men. The HATTORI group has lost considerable influence as result of YOSHIDA's strong stand and by the loss of operational funds and direct contact with FECOM following Gen. Willoughby's departure. SO- 87778 May, 1952.

Following the advice of TSUKAMOTO Makoto, former Kempei officer, the NPR is carrying on rigorous interrogation of officer applicants to determine that they are not members of the HATTORI group or in sympathy with it. SO-71354

Possible member of Ajia Mondai Chosa Kai (Asia Problems Investigating Assoc.) He is known to have frequented the offices of the Asia Problems Investigating Assoc. (Source: CIA Information Report No. SO DB 59222, dtd 21 Oct 52)

HATTORI, Takushiro

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HATTORI Takushiro

1951 - Former Imperial Headquarters Colonel now Section Chief,
First Demobilization Bureau; prominent in one of
organized drives to rush rearmament. Heading group
of members of 34th graduating class of Military
Academy. (FEO/MIB #2025; 25 Dec 51)

1 Apr 1952 - Head of Historic Records Department, Demobilization
Board; Subject and TSUJI Masanobu, prominent rightist,
invited to dinner by CHANG Po-chin of Chinese mission.
At dinner, met former General OKAMURA Neiji (Yasutsugu)
and former Lt. Generals IMAI Takeo and DOI Akio.
This social meeting seemed to alleviate bad feelings
Subject and TSUJI had toward OKAMURA and DOI.
(SO 88679, 27 May 52)

HATTORI Takushiro

Heads the Historical Research Section of the Demobilization Bureau. Is a former member of the Operations Section, General Staff, and is assisted by NISHIURA Susumu (qv) and HORIBA Kazuo (qv). In the NYK Bldg, subject's subordinates in their capacity of officials of the 1st Demobilization Bureau are: HABA Shiro, MIZUMACHI Katsushiro and AKIYAMA Monjiro. Subject is among certain former Japanese Army officers reported to have been working the past five years for the creation of a Japanese Army. (ZJL-626, 21 May 51.)

HATTORI Takushiro

Col.

CO, 65 IR, 13 Division (S. China)

2/45

Above is wartime O/B information - card only

HATTORI Takushiro

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GENDAI NIHCN JIBU. 1

RON KAWADE SHOGO

Tokyo Apr 1953

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PERSONALITY DATA EXTRACT

Name : HATTORI Takushiro

Agency : C4 - Colonel

Miscellaneous Intelligence Type

Founded "HATTORI GROUP" -- a group of ex-military personnel (Japanese) who worked for US Forces during Occupation, helping to compile History of World War II, attached to Military Historical Section.

Col. HATTORI established the SHIJITSU KENKYU JO (Historical Facts Research Institute) after separating from the Occupation Forces. Has an office in Ichigaya, Tokyo, behind Pershing Heights. Has at least 30 ex-Army personnel assigned to projected works.

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HATTORI Takushiro

An article in the Yukan Asahi of 21 October 1951, called "The Clattering of Military Boots," named as supporters of HATTORI Takushiro a group of persons who had been observed at the Demobilization Bureau conferring with HATTORI by TAKAKURA, a contact of TSUKAMOTO Makoto. Since some of the persons listed were not members of the HATTORI group, HATTORI concluded that TAKAKURA had identified the group as his supporters from seeing them in his office and had passed the information on to TSUKAMOTO, who has written the Asahi article. TSUKAMOTO denied that he had had anything to do with the article, and MASUGA Hisao, deputy chief of the Asahi Press Editorial Bureau, told a friend of HATTORI's that the article was actually based on information supplied by former Japanese naval officers. The feeling against TSUKAMOTO in the HATTORI group, however, was already firmly established. One group member even proposed some punitive measure against TSUKAMOTO, but this proposal the group let drop. TSUKAMOTO's relations with HATTORI were mentioned in another newspaper article, in the Yomiuri Shinbun, in early 1952. TSUKAMOTO gave an interview to a reporter but claimed the reporter did not quote him correctly. He denied the statement in the article that he was inimical to HATTORI, claiming that he had no feeling for HATTORI one way or the other but that he did feel Japanese military officers, who were directly involved with the conduct of the war in which Japan was defeated, should have no direct part in the nation's rearmament, but should make their contributions to it indirectly. HATTORI has shown considerable interest in TSUKAMOTO and receives reports on his activities from mutual friends. Some of HATTORI's entourage feel that he regards TSUKAMOTO as a political opponent. HATTORI refused an offer to meet State Minister OKAZAKI Katsuo because TSUKAMOTO's presence was made a condition of the introduction. (ZJJ-79, [] 11 Apr. 52, [] Dossier.)

Subject is rep'd by HAYASHI Saburo to be in contact with OGATA Taketora. (ZJJ-113, 16 May 52, OGATA Taketora Dossier)- [] []

The YOSHIDA government, it is reported, had instructed TATSUMI Eiichi, gov., to have nothing to do with the HATTORI Organization. (ZJJ-90, 18 Apr 52, [] [] [] Dossier, SO-87778). The HATTORI group openly opposed the government policy of NFR rearmament. The government attitude toward the HATTORI group had been increasingly antagonistic, and the group has lost influence since the departure of General WILLOUGHBY. Some of the group members are beginning to waver in their allegiance, as they fear to be ignored in the rearmament program. The group is especially suffering since its operational funds have been completely cut off. Within the faction there was some disagreement between HATTORI and his superior in the Demobilization Bureau, MIYAMA Yozo, over the use of Japanese government "war termination appropriations to finance the Hattori Organization throughout Japan, and HATTORI was not given any funds from this source. (ZJJ-90, 18 Apr 52, [] [] [] Dossier, SO-87778).

Graduates of the Military Academy between 1922-1927 have been trying to form an organization centered on Subject. Their efforts have produced little result, however, because the nucleus of such an organization must be the HATTORI Organization, which is already well-settled but has obtained too much and too unfavorable publicity to attract additional members. [] [] ZJJ-106, 9 May 52, SO-89912, III-48.3).

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HATTORI Takushiro:

When the NPR was organized by General MacArthur's order 1950, General Willoughby made recommendations to Chief Cabinet Secretary OKAZAKI Katsuo on principal headquarters personnel. OKAZAKI met with eight of those recommended and heard their very clever views, but subsequent investigation showed that the eight had all been key personell in the old War Ministry, and heading the list were three of TOJO Hideki's confidential secretaries, NISHIURA Susumu, HATTORI Takushiro and IDE, fm. Surprised, OKAZAKI reported the situation to Prime Minister YOSHIDA. The latter was put in a difficult position by Willoughby's special recommendations, but, being strongly anti-TOJO, he felt he could not receive TOJO's ex-secretaries in top and key headquarters positions in the important NPR, and secretly reported the situation to General Whitney, who in turn reported it to MacArthur. MacArthur of course agreed with YOSHIDA, and after a time the plan to revive the core of the War Ministry in the NPR was halted.

Mrs ARAKI Mitsuko was of course a great power behind this affair, and she and HATTORI Takushiro, with Willoughby as their puppet, were not to be shaken off by such rebuff. When they saw that they had no chance for success with YOSHIDA, they turned their activities to HATOYAMA Iohiro, the next in line (for the Premiership?); and Ambassador Dulles, who visited Japan in February, is being made to play into their hands. HATTORI had his group, who had used Willoughby's mistress, Mrs ARAKI, to bore into YOSHIDA but had been frustrated by Whitney's interference, decided to approach HATOYAMA, who had more interest in rearmament than did YOSHIDA. At the same time, Dulles, toward the end of February, noting that YOSHIDA had little enthusiasm for rearmament, began casting around for a successor to the latter. A certain Englishman arranged a meeting between HATOYAMA and Dulles through Ambassador William J. Sebald, and it was in general decided that HATOYAMA should be YOSHIDA's successor.

It is believed that Mrs ARAKI played an important part in bringing things to this point. The focal point of the activities of the ARAKI-HATTORI crowd is now HATOYAMA. YOSHIDA detests the old Army group as worms; HATOYAMA, on the other hand, without openly expressing himself, is cleverly and circumspectly trying to use them to his own ends. HATOYAMA is accordingly in much better repute.

Now that they have lost Willoughby, the HATTORI-ARAKI clique must seek out a new patron. Whom will they catch, and where? Where will Mrs ARAKI's sexual charms next display themselves? ARAKI Kotaro is at present suffering from asthma (since the end of June),* and Mrs ARAKI is becoming more and more replete with matters sexual. Where will the political woman go? Politically, she will probably annex HATOYAMA, and militarily she may aim at MONURA Kichisaburo or KOBAYASHI Seizo; both of the latter are ex-Armirals.

*Field Comment: ARAKI Kotaro died on 29 Sept. 1951, according to the Nippon Times of 2 Oct. 1951.

(ZJL-734A, [] from [] 12 Oct 1951, CE File "Japanese Rearmament".)

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HATTORI Takushiro

IWAKURO Hideo sentiments towards HATTORI Takushiro. IWAKURO has a vigorous antipathy not only toward HATTORI, but toward all other officers of the former Japanese Army working for G-2 at NYK and GHQ as well. IWAKURO has stated that the former Japanese officers now working at NYK and GHQ are serving as spies in the interest of America and are selling out Japan. These characters should naturally be executed in the name of the Japanese people when full sovereignty is restored to Japan. This is not an original belief of IWAKURO himself. Such a belief might have been formed as a result of hearing a lot of things from those former underground leaders and intelligence men surrounding IWAKURO. Anyhow, his hatred against HATTORI and his group is most serious. Consequently, who ever may try to mediate between them, it will not prove an easy task for the time being to establish any compromise between HATTORI and IWAKURO. (ZJL-773, [] 18 Dec. 51, [] Dossier.)

HATTORI Takushiro commenting on 2 Jan 1952 on the information obtained by his own group concerning Sakhalin and the Kuriles, said: "I am dispatching not one intelligence agent to Sakhalin or the Kuriles. (ZJL-4863, [] 19 Jan 52, [] Dossier.)

TATSUMI Eiichi and HATTORI Takushiro are not on bad terms, necessarily, but no operational connection exists between them at present insofar as rearmament is concerned. Prominent figures in the present government, particularly in the Attorney General's office and in the National Rural Police, have a very strong antipathy for HATTORI. As a result, TATSUMI has lately adopted a very reserved attitude in dealing with HATTORI. Furthermore, he hesitates to approach HATTORI at all on the subject of rearmament, apparently because of the hostility of Cabinet leaders and others to HATTORI.

HATTORI told [] on 26 Nov. that MATSUTANI Makoto may be foolish enough to help TATSUMI and of his work for him but I (HATTORI) am not". He indicated that during the month of Nov, TATSUMI had contacted him several times concerning the rearmament issue and had asked HATTORI many questions about the latter's studies on rearmament and opinions of what government policy should be. At first HATTORI, encouraged by reports of TATSUMI's warm feeling toward him and high respect for HATTORI's ability, gave our information and advice in general. However, two things annoyed him extremely: (a) TATSUMI, when HATTORI queried him directly concerning what the government hoped or planned to do about rearmament and how they would use his planning information, became first vague and non-committal and then supercilious; (b) HATTORI had confirmed very definitely the general report that all recent candidates for posts in the National Police Reserve are queried very closely on past relationship with HATTORI and if any connection to HATTORI is proven, or even suspected, of any such candidates, they are rejected by the police officials in charge; HATTORI asked TATSUMI to do something about correcting this extremely unfair attitude and practice, not for his own sake but because many very able Police Reserve candidates were being rejected for service on the basis of that discrimination; TATSUMI made only vague and listless promises and showed his impatience with the topic being presented to him that he intended to do nothing in HATTORI's defense at all. As a result, HATTORI who is patriotic enough to want very much at the present time to make his planning ability and the research experience of his group available to the Japanese Government, decided that under those circumstances TATSUMI was not a desirable channel of approach. As a result, HATTORI seems to have re-established a fairly close connection to his predecessor as chief of Strategy, G-1, former Lt. Gen INADA Seijun. HATTORI and his Demobilization Board associates have again become very busily engaged in what are obviously detailed strategic researches, but are being very

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HATTORI Takushiro, con't

secretive about them. At the same time HATTORI has claimed at other times that the U. S. Army has given him no new directives on rearmament study: yet he has consulted quite frequently with INADA Swijun lately. (ZJL-771, 1 [] 18 Dec. 51, [] Dossier.)

HATTORI Takushiro

服部卓四郎

Early in May 52 HATTORI Takushiro sent a letter to MATSUDAIRA Teigyo asking the latter to visit LIU Chih-chao. Shortly after 28 Apr 52, according to MATSUDAIRA Teigyo, HATTORI, TSUJI Masanobu, KAMURA Neiji, DOI Akio, and KASAHARA Yukio were present at a dinner at the Chinese Nationalist Embassy, by invitation of Lt.Col. LIU Chih-chao of the Embassy. [] ZJJ-132, 13 Jun 52, SOEB-84851, IV-1.

Through IMOTO Kuna DOI Akio sent a request to Subject for informations and personnel to carry on the work of the Continental Affairs Research Institute. HATTORI had given no evidence of supplying aid by the end of February. [] ZJJ-67, 4 Apr 52, CE File III-48-1.

Subject is one of the persons reported as acting as advisers on military affairs to HATOYAMA Ichiro. ZJJ-225, 10 Oct 52, [] Dossier.

Born 2 January 1904, TOKYO. (Army Officers' Register, Oct 1944)

See FJJA01028, 17 Jul 53, []

HATTORI Takushiro (2501/6752/0587/0934/6745), former Colonel, headed the HATTORI Kikan which became virtually inactive in 52 due to shortage of funds. Rumors in 52 that relations were strained between HATTORI and TATSUNO Ichid, but the two men actually cooperated closely in choosing former military personnel for positions in NSF. (T.C. Strained relations prob stemmed from fact that in 52 HATTORI opposed YOSHIDA govt plan of using NPR as nucleus for new army. HATTORI believed army should be built around entirely new org. YOSHIDA ordered TATSUNO to have nothing to do with HATTORI). HATTORI was overtly employed in 52 and early 53 as chief of Materials Regulation Sec of Demobilization Bur. Resigned from this position Mar-Apr 53 and org the Historical Facts Research Institute. (T.C. HATTORI was replaced in Dem Bur by HARA Shiro). The Institute plans to study the rearmament problem and submit findings and conclusions to NSF & CRC. (T.C. Institute may receive financial assis from CRC). HATTORI says he finances institute with money from sale of his writings and money donated by his brother. Friendly relations with many former military men. (See reference) [] FJJ-446, 10 Dec 53, CE III, 32.7)

HATTORI Takushiro is the leader of a group who, since the beginning of July 1952, have been initiating plans for a coup d'etat. The original plan of the group was to engineer a coup d'etat, including the assassination of PM YOSHIDA on account of his hostile attitude toward depurgees and nationalists. They planned to replace YOSHIDA with HATOYAMA Ichiro. TSUJI Masanobu has persuaded the group that now is not the time for a coup d'etat. He maintains that it is not YOSHIDA who is the prime adversary of the group, and of rightists in general, but rather the Socialist Party. The group is amenable to postponing the coup as long as the Liberal Party remains in power. Ultimately they hope to succeed in having OGATA Taketora made PM once the rightists get into power again. For further info see (ZJJ-239, 31 Oct 52, CE III, 31)

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HATTORI Takushiro

The rearmament group headed by HATTORI drew up a draft rearmament plan for submission to John Foster DULLES on his most recent trip to Japan...The HATTORI group is made up of former staff supply officers of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (DAITOKI HOKIYU BAKURYO)...Younger members of the HATTORI group claim that the ex-officers who are pushing rearmament are almost all from the old Imperial Guard Headquarters (DAIHONEI), and that the main faction of the group consists of about twenty men of lieutenant-colonel rank... Such organs as the HATTORI KIKAN are furthering their work for the sake of the revival of the old Army and Navy. (Source Comment: Ever since February 1951, when HATTORI released his rearmament plan to the Americans, three proposals have been constantly under discussion: a) centered on the NPR; b) a compromise incorporating large numbers of ex-military men in the NPR; and c) advocacy of organizing a completely separate Army. (ZJL-769, 3 Jan 52, [] "Japanese Rearmament" folder)

HATTORI appointed HARUKE Yoshitane to the chiefship of the HATTORI Hokkaido organization in mid October of 1951. See [] Dossier, ZJL-752, 22 Nov 51, for details of HATTORI's briefing of HARUKE.

HARUKE Yoshitane, qv., visited Subject 26 Nov 51, 2 Jan 52, and 8 Jan 52. (ZJL-792, 29 Jan 52, [] Dossier).

SUBJECT was contacted by IWADA Seijun, and asked for assistance in the latter's study of rearmament. Although there had been differences between the two in the past they had never been on bad terms. SUBJECT accepted the job, but sent IMOTO (fnu) as deputy since SUBJECT believed that his connection with a member of the WATANABE Group would cause too many adverse comments in the press. ZJL-786, 22 Jan 52, [] Dossier).

When HATTORI Takushiro refused GHQ's request to send agents into Sakhalin and the Kuriles on the grounds that the project was too difficult and dangerous, KAWABE Torashiro attempted to do so, buying a 15-ton ship with ¥ 500,000 from a fund supplied by GHQ, and sending the ship out sometime in the fall of 1950. Nothing has been heard of the ship or its personnel since then. Information procured by both HATTORI and KAWABE is processed by the same G-2 officer, Major Rinalducci. This officer told HATTORI that KAWABE's information is not worth very much. (ZJL-788, [] 22 Jan 52, KAWABE Torashiro Dossier.)

ZJJ-36 lists HATTORI Takushiro, former colonel as acquaintance of HARUKE Yoshitane [] 7 March 52, [] Dossier.)

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HATTORI Takushiro

ASAHI SHIMBUN ran an article on 8 Jan 1952 entitled: "Former military men consisting of four generals and one field-officer assist TATSUMI Eiichi". HATTORI believes the four generals to be SHIMOMURA Sadamu, former Major General TAKASHIMA, Iru, an intimate friend of SAKURAI Tokutaro; former Major General YAMASAKI Masao and TANIDA Isamu. TATSUMI is friendly with HATTORI Takushiro, but again, does not discuss with HATTORI the conversations he holds with Government officials on the subject of rearmament. HATTORI believes that TATSUMI is working out his program with very little help. (ZJL-787, ☐ 22 Jan 52 ☐ Dossier.)

On 24 Feb. 1952 HARUKE Yoshitane held an informal conference with TATSUMI Eiichi at the latter's home. In regard to rearmament matters generally, TATSUMI made the following remark: Although he would like to use HATTORI Takushiro in working out a rearmament program, the many unfavorable comments on him received in letters, apparently from former officers, made it difficult. (ZJJ-75, ☐ 28 Mar. 52, ☐ Dossier.)

ASAHI Shimbun, See ZJJ-76 ☐ 11 Apr 52. See ☐ 15 Mar 50, p.20, 21.
☐ #62109, 17 Jul 50, vol. 1, ☐ 1 Nov 50.

See ☐ ZJJA-231, 28 May 52.

Former General TANAKA Shinichi has a strong desire to participate in rearmament planning. About March 1951, TANAKA took HATTORI Takushiro to an Akasaka restaurant where they met former Lt. General WACHI Takaji, MANAKI Keishin, AKIBA Saburo, IWAKURO Hideo, and others. Although rearmament was not discussed in concrete terms, HATTORI feels sure that the purpose of the meeting was to bring together those interested in furthering the cause of rearmament.

Financial support for the TANAKA Shinichi - OGOSHI Kenji rearmament movement comes from former Col. SHIHO Kenkichi, who is operating a trucking business. SHIHO came to HATTORI asking advice on continuation or discontinuation of support of the TANAKA-OGOSHI group. HATTORI convinced SHIHO to stop the aid. In HATTORI's opinion TANAKA and OGOSHI are probably approaching rearmament exponents within the Democratic Party. Their contact being with Chairman of the Executive Board MIKI Takeo. (ZJL-789, ☐ 23 Jan 52, ☐ Dossier.)

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HATTORI Takashiro

See: FJTA-12569, C/R 25 July 56, ☐ ☐

See: FJT 9, 18 Apr 56, Filed GC file A-10,29

HATTORI Takashiro, Col.

Former strategist, Imperial GS; G-2 GHQ Hist Sec; POPOV rightist contact; research specialist on Korea, China; commentator on Japanese rearmament. Close personal friend of ☐ whom he suggested to POPOV as logical person for SE Asia, but idea rejected. Of great integrity & character, able ops officer. Recruited for POPOV by ARISUE, of whom he disapproves. Cutout for TSUJI Masanobu, with whom he was involved in security breach vis-avis Mac's plans in SEA. PD-175 3 Mar 51 about 48 yrs of age; 2 years ahead of ☐ at the academy

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Subject: The HATTORI Nets in Hokkaido

Report No: ZJL-774 (PD-345)

Date of Information: As stated

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Date Acquired: As stated

Evaluation: C-3 except as stated

Date of Report: 2 January, 1951

Source: []

1. A series of briefings were given to HARUKE Yoshitane by the various members of the HATTORI Takushiro Group in mid-October, 1951, previous to HARUKE's trip to Hokkaido which was to be for the purpose of taking over charge of both the intelligence nets and the rearmament planning activities of HATTORI's colleagues there. When HATTORI Takushiro definitely decided in mid-October that HARUKE should take over leadership of both the Hokkaido colleagues ("dashu") and the Hokkaido intelligence nets as well, he called HARUKE and Source to his home. HATTORI intended to have former (Lt. Colonel) YIZURACHI Katsugi, whose duty is to check, confirm, edit, and process various information reports brought to HATTORI from Hokkaido, brief HARUKE on the situation in Hokkaido. At that time, however, YIZURACHI was bed-ridden with a cold, so (Lt. Colonel) HASHIDATO Shokatsu, who had formerly handled such duties for HATTORI's organization, gave the first briefing instead. This was followed by a general briefing by HATTORI himself on the Hokkaido situation and the JCP in general. These two briefings have been previously reported. Although it was completely unnecessary for Source, who is not part of the organization but had merely recommended HARUKE for the post, to be present at the first two briefings, HATTORI, for some unknown reason, included him on both occasions. It seemed to be because HATTORI and Source are intimate friends and the latter had established the original professional contact between HATTORI and HARUKE Yoshitane, or it may have been a matter of the degree of trust placed by HATTORI in Source. However, both HATTORI and HASHIDATO appeared to be lacking in memory of necessary details concerning the most recent information on Hokkaido and JCP-Soviet activities regarding that area. HATTORI promised HARUKE the night of the second briefing that he would have YIZURACHI give a detailed explanation of the situation as soon as the latter had recovered. Several days later, YIZURACHI did brief HARUKE, without either HATTORI or Source present. HASHIDATO was also present at this third briefing.

2. Then, just before HARUKE left at the end of October, 1951, former (Lt. Colonel) FUJIMURA Isachi, another member of the HATTORI Intelligence Organization who temporarily assumed charge of making contact between Source and HATTORI on his own initiative, gave HARUKE a separate briefing. FUJIMURA was on duty in the India Theater during the war, and was a high-ranking operations officer of the HIKARI Kikan at that time. During part of his career there, he was therefore under the command of FUKURO Hideo @ Oog, then chief of the HIKARI Kikan (1941-1943), and later under KAKURO's trusted deputy, KAGAWA Yoshio. From March to May, 1946, during the same time that KAGAWA and Source were confined together in a British prison at Singapore, FUJIMURA was in the same compound.

Classification

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy ☐

(2)(B) Methods and Sources ☐

(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency

Date: 2005

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Security Information (ZNL-774; PM-315)
-2-

Source has a low estimate of FUJIMURA's character despite the latter's fine mind and operational ability, and also doubts whether FUJIMURA really intends to cooperate with MATSURI, or not. Although MATSURI claims that he is not completely satisfied himself with the character of FUJIMURA Iwachi, MATSURI highly praises the latter's intelligence ability and activities on their behalf. MATSURI told Source that he has given FUJIMURA specific directives on what information he wants gathered concerning Hokkaido, from that source. FUJIMURA gets the raw intelligence to fulfill those directives MATSURI claims he does not know, but they are in any event separate from the main MATSURI sources in Hokkaido, which had been described by HASEGAWA, MIYAGUCHI, and MATSURI.

3. FUJIMURA is fairly closely related to a certain OGAKI (小滝), who is chief of the General Affairs Section of the Hokkaido Government, and FUJIMURA gave HASEGAWA an introduction to OGAKI and to OGAKI's secretary, the Governor of Hokkaido, who has organized the Hokkaido Defense Research Committee for investigative and research purposes. FUJIMURA had a great interest in HASEGAWA's trip and claimed to welcome him eagerly as "another real professional". HASEGAWA was asked to keep details of this fourth explanation even from MATSURI, and there seemed to be no knowledge nor desire on MATSURI's part that the briefing by FUJIMURA was given to HASEGAWA at all. (Sub-source for para. 3: [])

4. HASEGAWA was apparently not very interested nor concerned with details of the third briefing from HASEGAWA and MIYAGUCHI. Since both had formerly been his subordinates, MIYAGUCHI for quite some time directly under him, HASEGAWA took considerable time during the proceedings in airing his own opinions. These opinions were on world conditions, Japanese rearmament, and the MATSURI Group itself; HASEGAWA gave them some very frank and direct criticisms and advice concerning the last point in particular, and asked them to reflect a bit on the degree of professionalism which the group possessed in its intelligence-gathering activities. Therefore, although HASEGAWA was given the "Chart of the Military Situation of Soviet Russia" (Of Attachment A) at this time and MIYAGUCHI intended to elaborate upon it in his briefing, HASEGAWA gave him very little chance to do so. (Sub-source: [])

5. Source Comment concerning the third briefing and Attachment A. Because of HASEGAWA's lovely attitude towards his former subordinates apparently, details of the third briefing were not divulged. It is possible but unlikely that HASEGAWA did get more details but concealed them from Source; the account was too much in keeping with his attitude toward the MATSURI Kikan and his future duties as well. If MATSURI's usual practice regarding such information has been followed, the chart (given in Attachment A) was prepared by the MATSURI Kikan on the basis of their Hokkaido information and then presented by MATSURI to G-2 GNR. There is no confirmation of this, however, and it is quite possible that the chart has not yet been presented to GNR by MATSURI. Nor is there any definite proof that the chart was actually prepared by the MATSURI Kikan itself, although it seems most likely that the information for its preparation came from the main segment of MATSURI's Hokkaido sources, under IJRI and TAGUCHI, and that it was prepared by the desk officers for such information gleaned from another "Kikan", or actually prepared by another "Kikan" or an information broker and obtained from those sources by the MATSURI Kikan. Consequently, the first point of check is thorough investigation of whether

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Security Information (ZFL-774; PD-345)

KATSUMI actually has submitted these charts in his various reports to G-2 GDR and whether he describes the source of the information and charts and if so, how.

6. According to the outline of the topics of the fourth briefing, which is given below, FUJIMURA apparently went into considerable detail in his explanation of JCP and Soviet activity in Hokkaido, and supplied considerable information additional to what KATSUMI and KISHIMOTO had given. However, KATSUMI expressed very little interest in what FUJIMURA had to offer, and was apparently quite inattentive according to his own admission, because he has a very low opinion of and aversion to FUJIMURA's personality. As a result, he was unable to reproduce FUJIMURA's verbal briefing given on the basis of the written outline. The written outline, which was handed to KATSUMI by FUJIMURA for his convenience, was as follows:

OUTLINE OF BRIEFING EXPLANATION ON THE JCP

a. Outline Points

1) Regional Units

The North District, one of the five major operational districts of Japan, is divided into three areas (or sub-districts):

Geographical:

Area #1. Hokkaido—(HQ at) Sapporo

Area #2. Aomori, Iwate, Akita, Yamagata—(HQ at) Akita City

Area #3. Miyagi, Fukushima, Ibaragi—Saitama City

Military: In the event of war, the Hokkaido and entire Tohoku District is to be turned into Soviet territory for purposes of the Soviet's military operations for Japan.

2) Leaders

KATSUMI Kiyomasa (松本 三雄)

SUGIYAMA Etsuo (杉本 文夫)

RI Kiyomasa (李 治 彦 然 Korean?)

Present lists:

YAMAGATA Jiro, 山 岡 仁

AKIYAMA (Gm), ideological leaders, assisted by nineteen committee members of whom half are now in hiding or are missing, plus

SEKIGUCHI (Gm), connected with the National Railways Union clique in the Obihiro area.

3) Membership

The JCP membership in Hokkaido is 8,700, including official, overt, and covert members. Follow-travellers recognized as such number about 10,000; workers and groups adhering to farming area agitators and propagandists susceptible to the influence of the JCP however total about 200,000.

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Security Information (271-774, FD-305)

4) Areas Where JCP Activity is Intense.

The KAMIKAWA Area, centering around ISABIRAKA (旭川),
The SORACHI Area (空知), chiefly IMAIZUMI (岩見沢),
for the coal-mining districts.
The ISHIMARI (石狩) Area, centering around Sapporo, for the
agricultural districts.

5) General

As a whole, there exists no cross-sectional contact and coordinated
collaboration between each area and district. As slogans and catch
propaganda of the JCP in Hokkaido, emphasis is brought to bear upon
the cultivation of lands belonging to absentee landlords and upon the
monopoly of capitalistic firms there. Twenty families of farmers at
Arashio and Hokuto villages are Communist. However, if their living
standards were raised a bit, they would be freed from Communist influence.

b. Special Intelligence Operations of the JCP, Communist China, and Russia
for an Attack.

1) Raid Zones (for quick-landing attacks) in Hokkaido

Six major districts:

- 1) Ishigari-Kamikawa District
- 2) Hakodate District
- 3) Ashibori District
- 4) Nemuro District
- 5) Kushiro District
- 6) Oshima District

Four Specific Points or Areas of Attacks:

Otaru, Muroran, Asahikawa, and Wakkanai.

2) Raiding Spots in the Middle Area of Hokkaido. (paratroop)?

- a. MIYTA (宮田), KASHIMAI (歌志内), for raids on a full
scale; (Utashiro).
- b. IMAIZUMI (岩見沢) and YUBARI (夕張) for raids on
a small scale;
- c. TSUKIDATA (月形), SHINJOSEI (新井澤), and KAWAKUBO (川口)
(中ノ沢): Spots where "DESANTO" (デサント "Sea")
are expected to land.

① 3) Wartime Riot and Sabotage Program. (Formed at Iwamizawa and Sugimoto,
in February, 1951)

Security Information

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44-5-3-15

Security Information (ZYL-774 PD-345)

Creation of riots simultaneous to landing of Soviet paratroopers.
Destruction of important facilities.
Establishment of Administrative, Defense, Transportation, and Communication Means, including Seizure of Hydro-electric sources.
(The names, places, and other necessary matters in this connection are under investigation.)

INITIALS _____

Nakodate District	
Ihoran	■
Kushiro	■
Sapporo	■
Ashibari	■
Wakkanai	■
Otaru	■

- Commander: MA. (依田)
Officers in charge of Intelligence Operations and Propaganda:
ARAKI (fmd) and three other men.

A hand-drawn map of the Kushiro area in Hokkaido, Japan. The map shows a network of roads connecting several towns. At the top, SAPPORO, KESHU, SUKAKA, and TAKIGAWA are marked. Below them, KESHU, SUKAKA, and KASHIKI are marked. In the center, KEMEI, TOSUZAKA, and HOTA are marked. Below these, OTI Machi, CHITOSE, and OTAKE are marked. At the bottom, TORAKGHI is marked. The map is drawn with simple lines and dots representing towns.

Security Information

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
(ZLT-74, FD-245)

SECURITY INFORMATION Operations in the Ishigari District:

SAWAH Area



MIYU Area



YUBARI Area



6) Electric Sources: Zonal Destruction Operations.

(AISUTA: 熱田, a Korean from Nagoya City.)

DOYA (洞爺), SHIGEMORI Lake, KIKUGIWA, OYUBARI, Lake MIYU (阿蘇), Lake KUSUGAWA, the ASASHIO River, the ISHIGARI River, Plants: KIKUGIWA (coal power), AKATE Machi (coalpower in the vicinity of ASAHIMAWA.)

c. Intelligence Operation, Directives, and Organization.

- 1) Investigation of Plantations on the Ishigari Plain.
- 2) JUBSU Hot Springs (KAI: ra-a-ou)
- 3) Aita Operation (KAI: A-1-ta)
- 4) Seamen's Groups and Local Groups
- 5) Submarine Cable (reportedly from Oka; KAI: A Islands; two Dances; KAI: A)

Security Information

(S-TH; 1-1-1)

SANSHU (S. South of HONSHU), HONSHU, JAPAN - SAKURAI.

6) Establishment of Far East Cominform at Nombetsu.

7) Cominform Intelligence Operations Units HQ in Hokkaido:

Nemuro, Ishikari, Nombetsu, Hakodate, Otaru, Muroran, Sapporo, Kushiro.

8) Investigation of Hydro-electric supply plant at lake Saitama and of Communist influence there.

9) The Hokkaido Line: (Hokkaido Water Routes: "ark of the artists organization ships" ("orgs"))

Aomori-Hakodate Ferry Steamers: Doya Maru and Yoki Maru

Muroran - Tokyo (Osaka Commercial Steamship Co.: OSAKA SHOSSEN K.K.)

Kushiro - Tokyo (Japan Steamship Co.: NIPPON SHOSSEN K.K.)

Otaru - Tokyo - Osaka (same company)

Otaru - Fushiki (伏木) - Karao (七尾) (Japan Sea Steamship Co. NIEO KAI KISEN K.K.)

KUSHIRO - NIKKATA - Fushiki (San-A Company: 三井)

10) Maritime Organizational Ships ("orgs")

Tomakomai (Ish, KURIHARA, KURO - coal fields, all for investigation and intelligence-gathering activities.)

Muroran (same)

Hakodate (Hakodate, Tanaka (七尾), Mori, Eze, and Inaguno.

Otaru (Sapporo, Kitchan, entire coal fields)

Tomarijuku (Nagase, Fukagawa, Arakawa, Miei, Torano)

Hakodate (unknown)

Ashibari (Kagawa, Ryubeshibe, Iatsute, Mihoro, Shari.)

Nemuro

Kushiro (Atsukashi, Shibeche, Ochihiro, Shimizu, Nombetsu.)

(P)

d. Conclusion

1) The support for the JCP has been reduced and will not be Security Information

44-583-1502

POOR QUALITY REPRODUCTION
"UNAVOIDABLE"

Security Information
(SIL-776, FD-315)

of public opinion favoring restoration, build-up of military power, etc., after signing of the Peace Treaty in September 1945, with the general tendency towards restoration of the Japanese national race.

- 2) Investigations by means of suppressive control on several occasions have had a heavy effect - as a result of these operations, the police force has been strengthened several times.
- 3) Gradual improvement of the food conditions and other aspects of livelihood.
- 4) A large portion of farmer, agricultural villagers, and others can be freed from the domination of Communist or only government-aided persons to them. Since only 500 officers of the National Rural Police are to them, only three companies of the National Police Reserve are stationed in the eastern section of Hokkaido at present, propaganda operations have been undertaken for the strengthening of the police force as much as possible.

In addition, a civilian defense program is contemplated for Hokkaido.

(Date of info for paras. 1-6: as of mid-October, 1951; Date Acquired: 27 Nov 1951)

7. HANJUKI Yoshitane returned from Hokkaido by plane on November 26, 1951, and then engaged in conversations with the various personages who went to Hokkaido. It became evident that although he had given some time to discussion of the intelligence operations in Hokkaido of MATSURI's group, he had spent most of his thirty days in Hokkaido merely gathering information on the situation, most of which he hoped to publish in a book in lobbying through ASHIDA Hitoshi, Democratic Party leader, in the for purposes of strengthening Hokkaido defenses and calling attention to defense problems there. He went back to Hokkaido at MATSURI's invitation on 1 December, 1951.

(Date of info: para. 7: 26-30 Nov 1951; Date Acquired: 15 Dec 1951)

NOTES

1. Field Comments: Cf. SIL-752. In the light of later developments, it is more likely that MATSURI was endeavoring to be polite with his friend, by inviting him to some of the briefings, but definitely hoped thereby to win him from the more detailed discussions. Cf. 2 & 3 below.
2. Field Comments: It was concerning these documents copied by [] body employed the operational strategy outlined in SIL-752 & FD-315, to have been then already from a non-MATSURI source in order to gain an excuse for investigating further the MATSURI Hokkaido network, to ensure to borrow said document copies for photostats, and to see what would say about this later. Please note that the next page in the did not develop, but that it also shows faintly that [] of this [] would be [] of it [] it can be used []

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SECURITY

INFORMATION

(ZJL-774, PD-345)

quite likely that although HARUKI gave this briefing sheet to Source, he may have been instructed to keep verbal details to himself.

3. **Field Comments:** It is a pity that we do not possess FUJIMURA's detailed verbal briefing from this outline, because it shows the framework of some interesting reportable material. Because we do not have the additional facts around the outline, we have not separated this off. Whether HARUKI's account is valid, whether HARUKI was holding out on Source or even whether Source is holding out on us, in any event, there is enough for comparison purposes. This has been copied from Source's copy as closely as practical.

4. HARUKI's interesting whirlwind trip to Tokyo at the end of November will be described in a separate report since it was concerned with a variety of other matters as well. That was true chiefly because HARUKI did not limit himself to assigned tasks which we felt worth noting here.

SECURITY INFORMATION

44-5-3-1

SECRET

From: Tokyo, Japan Report No: ZJL-551 Local File No:
No. of Pages: 4 No. of Enclosures:
Report Made By: Approved By:
Distribution: Orally to:
By copy to: Wash - 2
Files - 3
Source Cryptonym: References:

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

1. Attached are four reports from [] on Japanese rearmament and covert right-wing interest in it. Report C is of interest, we feel, only in that it supplies a few more names of former military leaders who are again active behind the scenes; that they all are doing "research" on rearmament is, we feel, doubtful. On the other hand, SAKURA Ryoso, you will note, does not appear.

2. The statement in Report A on Japanese rearmament was obtained directly from OKADA Keisuke in an interview at his Tokyo home by [] He has been linked in previous [] reports with the UOAKI faction of the JIA.

3. In submitting this report, [] shed a little more light on the mystery of his entree to such formidably inaccessible people as OKADA, discussed previously in ZJLA-1273-A. He attached two cards which he had used in introducing himself to OKADA. One, a thin, ladies'-style calling card, bore the name of [] grandmother; on the face of it she had written OKADA's name and mixed her han. The other described her as the widow of [] distinguished grandfather; on it she had written in Japanese: "I am praying for your health." In Japan, this technique seems to oil the rustiest of hinges.

8 February 1951

Esc.

Classification

SECRET

FORM NO. 10-50
FEB 1944

44-3-50

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy ☐

(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency

Date: 2005

SECRET

REPORT A

Subject: OGATA Keisuke's Views on Japanese Rearmament

Report No: 214551

Date of Information: 19 Jan 51

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Date Acquired: 20 Jan 51

Evaluation: C-2

Date of Report: 8 Feb 51

Source:

The following is the substance of proposals made by OGATA Keisuke (OGATA Keisuke), Elder Statesman, former Admiral and former Prime Minister, regarding the rearmament of Japan:

1. In recognition of the fact that armament is necessary for the defense of Japan, the article in the present Japanese constitution prohibiting the arming of Japan must be amended.
2. In order to provide for the self-defense of Japan, a Japanese-American Joint Defense Pact should be concluded.
3. The participation (in such a pact) of the Emperor and the Imperial Household should be strictly forbidden.
4. It is essential that land, air and sea bases be offered to the United States for a specified period of time.
5. In so far as possible, Japan should maintain sea and air forces.
6. Japan should work toward lasting friendship with America.
7. The person who should be entrusted with the rearmament of Japan is former General OGATA Keisuke.
8. Members of the Japan Sea-Defense Army (NIHON JIEIKUN) should not be sent overseas.
9. The rearmament of Japan should be based on the strengthening of the present National Police Reserve.

Classification

SECRET

FORM 101 11-50
700 10-50

SECRET

Subject: Japanese Underground Interest
in Rearmament

Report No: ZUL-531

Date of Information: See Below

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Date Acquired:

See Below

Evaluation: C-6

Date of Report:

6 Feb 51

Source:

E J

1. (Date of info: December 1950 dates rec'd: 2 Jan and 24 Jan 1951)

Secret conferences have been held by Premier ISHIDA, YAMATO Minister of Education and former Premier OKADA Keisuke, to discuss the rearmament of Japan. OKADA presented a document entitled "Rearmament of Japan after the Peace Treaty," setting forth his own desires in the matter. The

conferences were advocated by former Major General OGA Ichiro (1893-1947).

2. (Date of info: 25 Aug 1951 date rec'd: 16 Jan 52)

Former General OGA is expediting the establishment of weapons and ammunition factories, at the request of the Japanese Underground government. These plants are scheduled to be constructed in Yabashiri, Tokyo-10.

Classification

SECRET

FORM 10-1

SECRET

REPORT D

Subject: Kyushu Japan Underground Govern-ment Rearmament Activities Report No: ZJL-551

Date of Information: 31 Dec 50

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Date Acquired: 2 Jan 51

Evaluation: C-5

Date of Report: 8 Feb 51

Source: []

Former Baron AKAISHI Motomasa (明石元良), of the Japanese Underground Government, is active in the rearmament of Japan. His activities center around Fukuoka, Kyushu.

Classification

SECRET

FORM NO. 1
FEB 1950

11-5-1-50

SECRET

From: Tokyo, Japan Report No: 7H-571 Local File No: PD-175

No. of Pages: 5 No. of Enclosures: 0

Report Made By: ☐ Approved By: ☐

Distribution:
By copy to: ☐ 2
Files: ☐ 3
☐ 1

Orally to: 4 March 51

Source Cryptonym: ☐ References: 27-436, 442, 444, 445, 453, 537, 538, 561-4, 5, 6, 562, 568, 231-2769; PD-137, 144.

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

1. The interesting CE information of this report concerning top-level J.I.S. figures maintaining liaison with POPOV and PO-ERPLANT agencies is completely tangential and incidental to the main topics of discussion between ☐ and ☐ at this time. Moreover, the operational circumstances surrounding the procurement of this information are of more vital significance than the information itself. However, those circumstances are primarily concerned with the successful establishment of an officer-agent relationship with ☐, and the connection therefore is primarily to Project ☐ along with other important operational details discussed at the 3 March, 1951 interview with ☐.
2. For those reasons, the general background of the operational circumstances involved in procurement of this information from ☐ will be given in detail in a forthcoming operational report to be submitted to Chief of Mission, FMU, using this report as an attachment thereto. It suffices to say in this covering letter that both the nature of this CE information, the manner in which much of it was spontaneously given, and the operational developments leading to and following its procurement combine to present a highly credible impression that we shall have ☐ services available on a far better working basis than we had anticipated. Your attention is further invited to the above-mentioned forthcoming report for details.
3. Only because this material is almost exclusively concerned with local CE matters and is closely tied in with problems we have been studying closely through other operations do we report it through this channel, in order that it will reach the proper ☐ desk expeditiously. As above-mentioned, it will also be submitted as an attachment to the operational report through FMU.
4. Reference para. 1 (a) and 1 (b). Please see PD-137 and PD-144 for further details concerning both this particular section under POPOV, projects concerning Japanese Army re-establishment, and particularly concerning General SAKUMA's part in them.
5. Reference para. 1 (c). This was undoubtedly part of POPOV's routine check in classification.

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FORM NO. 1
FEB 1946

44-5-3-49

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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- EXEMPTIONS
- (2)(A) Privacy ☐
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

2005

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connection with clearance of [] It is gratifying to note that [] explained this within POPOV Agency cover to [] on the basis that POPOV did not want HATTORI to know that [] was to run any operations into that area for any agency here, since it was secret; he was therefore expected to maintain security accordingly.

6. Reference 1 (d). It is quite possible that the same officer who personally represented POPOV in the occasion described in PD-147 is the one referred to here.
7. Reference 1 (f) and 2 (a) and (b). A "Major HATTORI Tetsu, former Army staff officer" is mentioned in para. F, Section 5 of ZJL-483 as a subordinate of Maj. General MATANABE Jataru at the NISSAN Building, Karunouchi, and ZJL-444, para. 3 (c) mentions TSUJI as planning to work with MATANABE Jataru on Korean operations. However, there is no reason for assuming the two HATTORI's to be identical, and the quoted paragraph in ZJL-444 concerning TSUJI further mentions previous independent American connections on his part. Para. 1 of ZJL-444 gives a discussion a-propos of this problem which might serve to explain how several liaisons and cooperative efforts by TSUJI or any other underground JIS figure might be maintained at one time. There is no particular reason, other than information on the June, 1950 Kagoshima Conference (ZJL-444, para. 5) and the general connection of MATANABE Jataru to ARISUE (HATTORI's and ergo TSUJI's former superior) as a sort of semi-autonomous subordinate, to consider that HATTORI Jakushiro and TSUJI worked closely or steadily with or under MATANABE; on the other hand, there are adequate indications of the probability of some sort of working relationship in the recent past. ZJL-483 and ZJL-444 describe TSUJI as a protégé of ARISUE, which does not confirm but at least supplements the information in this report of HATTORI's subordination until the fall of 1950 to ARISUE. This may have also applied to TSUJI, now apparently directly under HATTORI alone.
8. Re paragraph 2 (e). We concur in Source's opinion as to the reasons behind the anxiety of his friends; POPOV was undoubtedly furious, and the vibrations would certainly emanate beyond HATTORI. The topic, when discussed with these Japanese strategists, became an extremely delicate security matter.
9. Re para. 2(f) and (g). Please see ZJL-444, 483, 539, and other [] reports for confirmatory data regarding this observation of TSUJI's character and personality. It is an interesting commentary on [] professional approach that he describes a man he avers to be a very close friend in such objective fashion.
10. Re para. 3. Other than TATSUNO and AOKI, all of these individuals (or in MIYOSHI's case, General ABE Sadamu) is close to both MIYOSHI and SATOMI. [] have been mentioned by [] reports as liaising with POPOV or [] and in pretty much the alignments herein described [] reports have described the [] connection.
11. Re para. 4. The mystery of "IMAAZE" is at last solved in part at least. It appears probable that the supposition given in ZJL-483 that IMAAZE was identical with YABUCHI Itsuo is incorrect. There is no reasonable doubt, however, that the IMAAZE described with various aliases in al. [] reports to date is identical with IAKURO herein mentioned. Note carefully that the first name

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given by [] (and also by [] reports) for IAKURO is "Takeo", whereas the Japan Army Officers' Guide and other authorities, including POCOR Report on the Nakano Intelligence School list him correctly as IAKURO Hideo. The explanation for this baffling mistake in the reading of the calligraph is involved, but absolutely valid. ARISUE himself is listed in many sources including the Army Officers' Roster of 1943 as "ARISUE", to give another example. The reading "EUR" is quite unusual but legitimate; we have the same sort of thing in reverse in [] and []. It would seem that the POCOR Report (Source: [] on Nakano (in contrast to both [] and [] information) is at odds also with the Japan Army Officers' Guide for 1943 concerning IAKURO's rank and tour of duty at Nakano; that volume lists IAKURO as a Colonel, Infantry, date of rank March, 1931, and on duty "attached to the Southern Army (HUBOGUN) as of February, 1941." This, according to both [] and [] was after his command over the Special Services Training course at the Nakano Training Area, i.e., the TRUK School, not the entire Nakano Intelligence School. KAJIMATA (reference the POCOR Report) is listed by SEATIC (British) Interrogation Reports as the commandant in 1944 of the entire Nakano School, which would of course include the TRUK, Camp Intelligence, General Staff, etc., as well as the TRUK Course. It is worth noting that the description of IAKURO's character, ability, and position vis a vis KAJIMATA and cooperation with other JIS leaders fits quite well into that given for [] in [] reports, particularly ZJL-42, 445 para c., and 483.

12. Re para. 5. The description of ARISUE and his present status vis a vis other JIS leaders constitutes a summarized confirmation of information on ARISUE given by [] in [] 444, 483, 538, 539, and 568. Although there is no mention made by [] of the "UGAKI Federation of Groups" nor of the "Merger and Great Compromise Plan" of October, 1950, described at length by POCOR (ZJL-42, 444, 483), this does not invalidate the latter reports at all. Note that the isolation of ARISUE from the KAJIMATA-supervised groups is described by SALICRAN as occurring during the fall of 1950, the same time at which [] dates the failure of the merger and the beginnings of ARISUE's abandonment of KAJIMATA and IAKURO.
13. Re paragraph 9. [] reports mentioned "YOSHIMI as a friend of SAWAT" (Yosaki (cf. ZJL-483, 538, 561-4, and 568) of the JOMAN Combine. [] description of "YOSHIMI's underground connections as 'basically quite anti-American' would certainly jibe with [] descriptions of the JOMAN Group's personnel.
14. Re para. 6. Please note that ZJL-561-C, para. h, advances the same belief that KAJIMATA will be top man in a re-constituted Japanese Army. Para. 8 of the cover letter to ZJL-561-C comments on it.
15. Circumstances did not permit probing for too many additional details at this time. On the other hand, the value of even these items of information as a check on material from other operations can readily be seen from the large number of references given above. Although the material by no means confirms the vast detail of [] reporting, in spots it has confirmed, corrected, or supplemented it. In the future we may find that more confirmation and/or correction of [] information will be forthcoming. It is highly probable that the volume or detail will ever match the [] information, because the approach is entirely different, and the procurement of this information merely a by-product in this case.

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6. KABE Torashiro is the chief figure among the contacts of POPOV. He is not an intelligence man, and makes no pretension of being one; he is a contact or "front" man for anti-Communist intelligence activities and for strategic research studies, in which latter capacity he has a direct interest and ability. He is, however, a man of fine character and moderate views, and can be trusted. He reputedly has great trust and increasingly good reputation among the Japanese Rightist leaders, and also has the confidence of POPOV in his work and in intelligence activities directed and ordered by him. For these reasons, it is rumored that either KABE or someone hand-picked by him (in case politics dictate that he should not be used) would be head of a re-constituted Japanese Army.
7. SAKURAI Tokutaro is a man of reasonably trustworthy character, but he is fitted neither by personality, aptitude, nor experience to have anything to do with intelligence matters. He never handled such affairs until the end of the war, and although he now operates an intelligence group, its quality, like that of its chief, is poor because it is made up of men who are ideologically "safe" but who have little other qualification for any sort of intelligence work. SAKURAI does not even enjoy a good reputation among Japanese Army men as a strategist.
8. TATSUJI is not too well known, and is a person of high intelligence, considerable experience in foreign countries, and good character. He does not have any previous direct connections with intelligence work, although he served as an attache in England at one time.
9. MIYOSHI is neither competent nor trustworthy. He is rumored to be associated with underground groups which are basically quite anti-American and he is, like ARISUE, a grafter and an opportunist. His reasons for cooperation with Americans are stated to be purely economic.
10. ROKI is of the same sort as MIYOSHI.

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Subject: Japanese I.S. Personalities

Report No: ZJI-571
(FD-177)

Date of Information: Up to 3 March, 1951

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Date Acquired: 3 March, 1951

Evaluation: C-2

Date of Report: 6 March, 1951

Source: []

1. (a) Colonel MATSURI Takushiro, former expert in strategy and operations Staff Officer, Army, has been working in POPOV's Historical Section supposedly assisting officers of that section in the preparation of a history of the Occupation. His actual functions are those of a high-level contact of POPOV regarding anti-Communist espionage in Japan and long-range research concerning military potential and logistics regarding Korea and China and also in view of a possible Japanese rearmament.
- (b) Although the former topic is the chief duty and function of MATSURI, research papers have been written concerning the latter problem and consultations held with General KAAMI Torashiro, Lt. General SAKURA Taro, and Lt. General SAKURAI Taro. It is believed that research studies have also been received from these other sources independently.
- (c) In December, 1950, POPOV asked MATSURI if the latter knew Source. MATSURI was asked what sort of person Source was, and how competent an individual he was. MATSURI described Source in glowing terms as an expert on Indochina and Southeast Asia in general, and one of Japan's best professional intelligence men. Shortly thereafter, MATSURI broached the subject to POPOV of utilizing Source to build an espionage net in Southeast Asia. POPOV rejected the idea, stating that although research on the area was all right, operating in that section of the world was beyond the authority of Tokyo and rested with the "State Department", under Mr. Acheson's authority. Then MATSURI suggested to Source, on his own initiative that the latter switch over and work with their group on anti-Communist activities within Japan. Source told him he was busily engaged in research studies on his chosen area. POPOV was discouragingly non-committal when MATSURI again mentioned Source and indicated a hope of persuading Source to work on JCP investigations.
- (d) Sometimes MATSURI sees POPOV, but more often works under orders transmitted through an unnamed subordinate of POPOV, or through an officer in the section where he works.
- (e) Colonel MATSURI is an extremely able Operations Staff Officer and a man of great integrity and character. For a person never previously connected to intelligence activities directly, he is reasonably competent and secure, but he lacks the professional experience and technique necessary for real operations, and tends to view intelligence problems from a military standpoint.
- (f) MATSURI was originally recruited by Lt. General ARIMURA Seizo, introduced

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by the latter to POPOV, and for quite some time served as a member of the ARISUE "Group". Since last year, however, he has had nothing to do with ARISUE. He dislikes ARISUE intensely and disapproves of the latter's ideas, working methods, and security.

2. (a) It is definitely felt that Colonel TSUJI Masanobu works for POPOV through HATTORI. Reasons for this opinion being strong enough to be considered fact by Source are personal.

(b) Source is a very close friend of Colonel HATTORI and also of Colonel TSUJI, and was a class behind HATTORI (who is about 42) at the Imperial Officers' School. TSUJI visits HATTORI regularly and frequently. Source keeps in fairly close contact with both. One time when visited, TSUJI was engaged in work concerning maps of Korea and North China which he covered hastily on Source's approach, claiming it was some work for Colonel HATTORI. Since TSUJI is well aware that Source is on excellent terms with HATTORI, he would probably not have kept this secret if only HATTORI were involved.

(c) In mid-January, 1951, TSUJI received a letter from a Chinese Nationalist leader at Taipei, Formosa asking him to do the CHIANG Government a favor. Approximately two divisions of Chinese Nationalist troops sought safe-haven in Indochina when the Communists swept into the south provinces of China in 1949. These troops were promptly interned by the French authorities in Indochina, and at first received very unkind treatment. However, since fortunes of war went against the French and Vietnamese in 1950, treatment of the interned troops improved, and there has even been some discussion of using them against the Vietnamese rebels and/or Chinese Communists. The Nationalist leader on Formosa, knowing TSUJI's great reputation among the Japanese troops, wanted TSUJI to write a letter to those Japanese serving with the Chinese Nationalist divisions in Indochina asking them not to desert the cause despite adversities, and to other Japanese in Indochina exhorting them to enlist with the Nationalists. TSUJI is deeply and sincerely anti-Communist, but he has no particular love for nor faith in the Chinese Nationalist regime. In addition, he has been in Indochina only twice and has no detailed knowledge of the area nor of the Japanese Army personnel there. He came to Source with the problem. Source advised him to present it to American authorities, to which TSUJI replied that he could easily do that, and probably should, but that still left him with the problem of how to answer this Chinese Nationalist general, who was a personal friend. Eventually, by the end of January, TSUJI's distrust of the CHIANG regime won out over his naive inability to refuse a friend's request, and he wrote back that he could not write such a letter because he had no knowledge of the Japanese in Indochina and did not wish any unprincipled individuals among the Japanese community there to make ill use of his name and reputation.

(d) TSUJI has many foreign visitors and many correspondents from countries all over East Asia because of the trek he made in Southeast Asia and South China and the book he wrote about it. Until recently, his work with HATTORI seems to have concerned mainly the Korean problem, but whether it involves the placement of agents in North Korea or not is not known.

(e) The last week of January, 1951, TSUJI visited Source and stated that he had been asked for an opinion, backed up by research, on the question of whether an invasion of South China by Chinese Nationalists, aided from within by

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Chinese anti-Communist guerrillas, stood good chances of success or not. Source professed his ignorance of such matters, but pointed out that, unaided from within, it would probably go as badly as did the Japanese invasion of the same area. TSUJI stated that it was a matter of great consequence and yet he felt that the Americans could not rely upon CHIANG Kai Shek and that the authorities in Tokyo should not consider backing such a venture. He appeared to be using Source as a sounding-board for his ideas concerning the problem. About a week later, TSUJI made an unexpected and hurried visit to Source. He asked the latter if he had talked about their conversation to anyone. Source said he had not. TSUJI then insisted that Source promise not to reveal the nature or subject of their earlier discussion to anyone because it was a stop secret matter. A few days later, Source was not too surprised to receive a much less naive warning by implication on the same topic from HATTORI, which topic HATTORI approached deviously but rather obviously from a discussion of TSUJI's danger from reputed assassination by fanatical ultra-Nationalists. POPOV had requested the original project of HATTORI and TSUJI, and then had heard from a Chinese source of a security leak on this highly secret topic; TSUJI probably told HATTORI that he had discussed the question with Source, and both became unduly concerned; without a warning from POPOV, it is unlikely that either one would worry at all about sharing secrets with Source.

(f) TSUJI has received warnings and threats several times from what appears to be a wide variety of ideological crackpots, but even his best friends doubt that he is in any real danger; it is merely that to some people he is sort of a symbol of old-style militarism, and to certain Rightist fanatics, he is a symbol of subservient cooperation with Americans, as opposed to the violently anti-white wing of Pan-Asianism. TSUJI himself is definitely Pan-Asian in his thinking, but along the lines of Japanese cooperation with the other Asian bloc nations PLUS extremely close and friendly cooperation with the Anglo-Saxon powers to stem Communism and develop Asia.

(g) Between the face of TSUJI as a patriotic and loyal Japanese soldier and old-style gentleman of the highest tradition and the almost equally widespread stories of his incompetency and childishness, it is difficult to find the true middle ground. Despite a certain naivete, he is considered to be a reasonably capable strategist and operations officer, and there is no question that for a Japanese officer, he is a kind, honest, and loyal gentleman to all. However, in either politics or intelligence work, he is hopelessly lost both by reason of personality and lack of experience.

There are several other formerly important Japanese military figures now maintaining top level liaisons with either POPOV or [] Intelligence Section; concerning intelligence and strategic research matters: Lt. General KAJIIE Toshiro is the chief figure among these, and liaises directly with POPOV; Lt. General TATSUNO Eiichi and Lt. General HIRASHI Yasuyuki are contacts of the Intelligence Section, [] although Lt. General YAKURO Takeo and KAKURAI Tokutaro occasionally are called in for direct consultations by POPOV's Section, they usually work through KAJIIE and subordinate to him; Lt. General ARISUE Seiso also is a contact of POPOV of long-standing, but does not work through anyone else at all now; Lt. General TAKIKI (fmu) liaises with the Intelligence Section of [] []

4. Of all of these men, the only one really competent in professional intelligence

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ALVIN Kaine is a German M-2 of Internal Security. He is a very good person, it would be reasonable to assume that he is a Christian, because of his religious and professional intelligence. He is a very intelligent person, but when it comes to internal security, he is not. He has a reputation for being a very valuable person in the field of internal security and enjoys considerable prestige. His character makes him extremely difficult to work with, and from a professional viewpoint, neither a good nor a bad choice of operating personnel is very good.

(b) A-111C is now virtually isolated except for his own subordinates and persons of similar opportunist inclinations. He has federized to himself the hatred felt toward him, and has therefore become more loudly and overtly provocative in the hope of retaining some measure of power and prestige in this manner. At this point, his current line cannot be trusted any more than his ability. He is an evil-tempered, short-sighted, conceited opportunist who often does not recognize the trend of events until it is too late.

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From: Tokyo, Japan Report No: LJL-608 Local File No: _____
 No. of Pages: 2 No. of Enclosures: _____
 Report Made By: [] Approved By: []
 Distribution: _____
 By copy to: Wash - 2 Orally to: _____
Files - 3

Source Cryptonym: [] and [] References: LJL-551 and LJL-571

Source, Operational Data, Agents:

1. Attached are two reports on the recruitment activities of TSUJI Masamichi MATSUOKA which, although from entirely independent sources, are striking in their confirmation of those men that we have included in our transmittal.

2. [] source is a former Navy Captain OI Atsushi (), who worked in the G-2, GHQ Military Historical Section until 31 March 1951. Previously he had been in the office of the Naval General Staff (GUMKIN SAKHO), chief of staff of the Marine Guard Headquarters (), and for two years around 1938 he was in the office of the Naval Attache at Washington. His report was rendered to [] just before he resigned his G-2 job with the request that it be handled confidentially and with the offer of further information if the investigation of MATSUKI's activities, which he recommends, were carried out.

3. [] quotes former Colonel FUJIMORI Masao and former Lt. Col. KIKUCHI Genji as the sub-sources for his report, which he claims came through their connections in the stock exchange. Again it must be remembered that [] has his own very definite ideas with regard to recruitment, which he appears to have sold very successfully to ASHIDA Hiroshi. Nevertheless, the unconditional indictment of MATSUKI and TSUJI by both these sources is felt to be worthy of serious consideration at this time when Japanese recruitment is approaching the action stage. Furthermore, its implications in the current PCPOV- [] negotiations add to our already serious reservations with regard to the utilization of PCPOV's sources.

3 May 1951

Classification

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy ☐
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

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2005

REPORT 1

Subject: Japanese Government—Attempts
by former Japanese Army officers
to gain control

Report No: LIT-408

Date of Information: March 1951

Date Acquired: 5 April 1951

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Date of Report: 3 May 1951

Evaluation: D-4

Source: MURKIN/2, from
sub-source (see above)

1. When the Japanese National Police Bureau was formed in 1950, a group of former Japanese military personnel attempted to obtain high office positions in it by negotiating with the Japanese Government through OKAWA, the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, and asking it soon as though they were under orders from Maj. Gen. KILLINGBY of GRC. This attempt failed. However, JOSHIDA Nakagawa, and the project was finally decided (formed) by General Nakagawa, bringing endorsement to Gen. KILLINGBY, Gen. Nakagawa and others.

2. After that incident, the group resumed attack, but the recent disclosure of payment have found them again engaged in aggressive activity. The leader of the group is former Colonel MATSUDA Shirohito (), the two of them are also confidential secretary to TOJO Hideki, another, the 1st of the same group is TRIT member, an employee of that society, ABATE Kojiro (), a former private at Army Imperial in (), appears to be acting as a figure-head for MATSUDA and others. In (), KILLINGBY, as former Vice-Minister TOJO (), now in office, of former members of the Japanese Army General Staff (SAITO KENJI) in attempting to "get around" American military personnel in GRC. The group includes, French and German elements, and has used her facility in dealing with foreigners to become close to General KILLINGBY, Nakagawa and Nakagawa.

3. MATSUDA is of the opinion that Japan's movement cannot be controlled through democratic methods, and advocates the reestablishment of the old Japanese way, it will be explained to be Chief of Staff. However, he and his group take this opinion from their American colleagues, suggesting that they represent old and preventing to cooperate fully. There is a serious danger that the American military personnel in GRC, GRC, will be taken in by this group. For this reason, a project must be conducted as quickly as possible so as to have Japan free from GRC's involvement.

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REPORT 2

Subject: Japanese Rearmament—Danger of
Control by Former Militarists

Report No: LIL-608

Date of Information: April 1951

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Date Acquired: 23 April 1951

Evaluation: C-2

Date of Report: 3 May 1951

Source:

1. Two former Colonels of the Japanese Army General Staff, MATSUKI (Ltn) and TSUJI Masamichi, are directly connected with GHQ authorities in conducting research on rearmament. They are an inseparable pair, with TSUJI dominating the more docile MATSUKI.

2. It is a known fact among former General Staff officers that MATSUKI and TSUJI planned and urged the hostilities which brought about World War II. They were the prime movers whose tireless efforts of convincing the General Staff finally brought the opening of hostilities.

3. Both MATSUKI and TSUJI are extremely irresponsible, and will not take the consequences for their actions. They have cleverly avoided all responsibility for the Nanshan Incident, letting their superiors or other staff officers bear the consequences. TSUJI is the type of man who, given the chance, would start World War III without any misgivings.

4. There is sufficient feeling among former General Staff officers unfavorable to MATSUKI and TSUJI that, if the latter were to be given a voice in Japan's rearmament, these General Staff officers would refuse their cooperation, knowing that they would again be led down the wrong road. These facts are being discreetly circulated among stock exchange circles, who anticipate an effect on the market when MATSUKI's and TSUJI's rearmament activities become known to the general public.

Classification

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Subject: Rearrangement - Former Army Officers' Contacting C-2

Report No: 2JL-6

Date of Information: 15 Apr 51

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Date Acquired: 25 Apr 51

Evaluation: C-3

Date of Report: 8 May 51

Source: []

1. The basic point in operations to revive the Japanese Army is found in the meetings between Maj. Gen. Willoughby and the following ex-Army Generals and Field Grade Officers. The meetings are held at SHAN House, located near Ueno, which Willoughby uses to entertain guests.

* General SHIMOMURA Sadamu (下村 大蔵) - Ex-Minister of War. He has a fine mind, freely handling advanced mathematics. He invented a coastal anti-aircraft gun and an electric calculating machine (DEKKA SAKUJI GU). He is a man of mild character respected by the younger officers.

* KUSHIROUCHI Benichi (坪内 文一) - Military Academy, 21st Class. Accompanied Prince CHICHIBU to America. Is an acquaintance of Gen. Willoughby.

* KUMAKI Yasuoka (or Keichi) (葛 田 康一) - Military Academy, 21st Class. Has apparently been acquainted with Willoughby ever since he was a Japanese Military Attache in France. Converses with Willoughby in French.

* ARISUE Seizo (有 泉 精一) - Military Academy, 29th Class.

* KANDA Benichi (鎌 田 金一) - Military Academy, 29th Class.

* AOKI Takashi (角 本 孝) - Military Academy, 31st Class Graduate. Former Military Attache in America, Instructor of Military Science at the General Staff College and connected with the Air Force.

* KANAME Jorashiro (河 辺 虎 四郎) - Deputy Chief of the General Staff.

A certain KAKAMURA is said to be meeting with Willoughby as a representative of the Navy. KAKAMURA is reportedly engaged in information gathering activities under Willoughby. ARISUE and SHIMOMURA are in the same group.

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(2)(C) Foreign Relations ☐

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2. Another person who irregularly contacts General Willoughby is:

Major General INAKUBO Goro (中久保 五郎).⁶ Military Attache in America when KIMURA Kichisaburo was Ambassador. At the end of the war was Chief of the Military Service Bureau (GUNSEI KYOKU). It appears likely that INAKUBO is connected with YAMAKA Shinichi (山崎 新一) who was a graduate of the 25th class of the Military Academy. YAMAKA Shinichi was Military Operations Chief of Imperial GHQ and Chief of the Military Affairs Section (GUNJI KA). He liked politics and deliberately sought a political position. He has few friends today. HATTORI Takashiro and IMOTO Kameo, who were working in the Military Operations Section No. 1 when YAMAKA was Chief, have come to distrust him.

3. The following persons belong to HATTORI Takashiro's group, working in ATIS in the KIK Building:

Colonel HATTORI Takashiro (中堀 孝雄).⁹ 34th Class of the Military Academy; 42nd Class of the General Staff College. Formerly Chief of the 2nd Operations Section of the General Staff. HATTORI contacts the SHIMAMURA Group (para 1) two or three times a month.

* KORTA Eino (小田 栄男).¹⁰ 34th Class of the Military College and 42nd Class of the General Staff College. An intimate friend of HATTORI's.

* KIMURA Eiji (木村 英二).¹¹ 34th Class of the Military Academy and 42nd Class of the General Staff College. Formerly in charge of budgetary matters at the Military Affairs Section of the War Department.

* IMOTO Kameo (伊藤 亀雄). Formerly a Colonel. 37th Class of the Military Academy and 46th Class of the General Staff College. Now working at the Military Career Investigation of the First Repatriation Bureau. He belongs to HATTORI's group and is respected by his classmates.

* Colonel SHIMAMURA Takashiro (志村 孝雄).¹² 42nd Class. Appears to be controlling his classmates under HATTORI's direction.

4. Connected with the Demobilisation Bureau are:

* KOTSUKI Yoshio (小塚 義雄).¹² 21st Class, Military Academy.

* YOSHIZUMI Masao (吉住 正雄). 26th Class, Military Academy.

Both of the above are working for General Willoughby.

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5. Other persons concerned with rearmament are:

* TSUJI Masamichi (辻 政 信). 36th Class of the Military Academy and 13rd Class of the General Staff College.

* KITA Ryuu (甲 谷 龍 雄). 36th Class of the Military Academy and 13rd Class of the General Staff College.

* Major General TSUBADA. Probably id/w TSUBADA Tetsuo (塚田 実 雄). 31st Class of the Military Academy and 12nd Class of the General Staff College; formerly Chief of the General Affairs Section of Air Force Headquarters.

* Col. TAKAHARA Makoto (中原 健). About the 50th Class of the General Staff College. Former engineer of the 10th Division and Chief of its Military Affairs Section.

* Major General SATSUMI Eiichi (辰巳 栄 一). Personally liked by other officers but his influence in military circles is weak. Formerly worked at the Liaison Bureau (RENGANU KIYU). Has reportedly been associated with Premier YOSHIDA since the latter was Ambassador to Great Britain.

* Colonel ONISHI Akira (大 木 規 章). 35th Class of the Military Academy and 15th Class of the General Staff College.

* Colonel SHIMIZU. Possibly id/w SHIMIZU Tatsu (清水 武 雄). 36th Class of the Military Academy and 16th Class of the General Staff College.

6. There is considerable friction between former members of the Military Operations Section (SAKUSEN BU) of Imperial General Headquarters (DAIHON KI) and the Military Affairs Section (GUNJI KA) of the War Department (RIKUGUN SHO).

Field Comments:

1. SHIMOMURA Sadamu. See ZJIA-841, also ZJL-596 which states that the Japanese Government is using SHIMOMURA to conduct research on rearmament and that he is advisor to the Liberal Party on rearmament problems.
2. KUSHIBUCHI Senichi. Lt. General. Army CO in North Korea. In Special PW Camp #45, Khabarovsk. Speaks fluent English. Had studied in London. Source: ATIS Interrogation Report #21547. Landed at Masuren on 17 Apr 50 in repatriation of large group of General Officer PW's. Source: CIG Spot Rpt.
3. KOMEDA Yasukazu or Koichi. Military Attache in France 1923-1926. Lt. General as of 1939. 1940-42 CO, 10th Div., Canton, China. Aug 1942 General Staff Hdq. Supt 1942 Chief, Defense Bureau, Tokyo (Reserve) Municipal Office. 1944-45 Military Governor, Seoul, Korea. Fluent in French. Fairly reliable informant. Claims to have access to info from friends and connections mostly in Tokyo. Source: MIB, FBO, Summary of Information, dated 6 September 1949.

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Field Comments (Cont'd)

4. YAMADA Genichi. Lt. General. Former Japanese Army Engineer and Transportation expert. Has close association with U.S. Army Engineers. Requested name of CIC officers in Nagano City where he is going at request of Governor of NAGANO Prefecture to investigate communist activity. Source: Frigand, 30 August 1950. Possibly id/w/ YAMADA Kengo, latest reference in ZJL-551, Report C.

5. AKI Takashi. Possibly id/w/ Lt. General AKI (Gen) who liaises with the Intelligence Section of Far East Air Force. (See ZJL-571, p. 3)

6. IMAKURO Goro, aka IMAZEN Goro or Takao

17. TANAKA Shinichi. See: ZJL-483, p. 4; ZJL-561, Report C.

8. See: ZJL-604, p. 8, for an account of TANAKA's fall from grace.

9. HATTORI Takashiro. See: ZJL-571.

10. NOHARA Kazuo. One-time Assistant Military Attache, Moscow.

11. NIEMURA Summa. See: ZJL-551, Report C.

12. KOTSUKI Yoshio & KOTSUKI Yoshio. See: ZJL-551, Report C, and ZJL-596, Report B, where he is listed as Chief of the Demobilization Board.

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TO : Chief, FDZ

DATE: 11 May 1951

FROM : Chief of Station, []

SUBJECT: GENERAL: Japanese Intelligence Service
SPECIFIC: Transmittal of [] Report

We are pleased to forward herewith copies of the report on the Japanese Intelligence Service prepared by [] This report was promised to you by 5 May 1951 but, in view of the great deal of research necessary, it has taken longer than we anticipated. Since [] will be arriving about the same time as this report reaches you, we feel that any comment will be superfluous.

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J.I.S. GROUPS AND JAPANESE NATIONAL REVIVAL (ZJLA-1473)

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THE J.I.S. GROUPS AND JAPANESE NATIONAL REVIVAL - PRESENT AND FUTURE

I. The General Thesis - Introduction.

The purpose of this study is to give a comprehensive description of the nature, strength, extent, and probable future of those groups and agencies in Japan which are engaged in, or closely connected to, the rebirth and activities of a Japanese Intelligence Service. It will attempt to present the political and economic conditions, the nationalist and professional traditions, and the operating conditions and organizational structure, past and present, which have made the former J.I.S. and the present intelligence groups what they were and are, and which have a direct bearing on our predictions of what the future of Japanese Intelligence will be. This study will attempt to evaluate the more important facts and predict the trends, on the basis of the information amassed and reported to date.

From the evaluation of this information and from a collation of it with background studies on Japan, we can already formulate certain general theses concerning the Japanese Intelligence Services, post-war J.I.S. splinter groups, and the closely related movements for nationalistic revival. These conclusions may be summarized as follows:

A. The major activity of the leading so-called J.I.S. Groups during most of the post-war period, and more particularly during the past six months since a peace treaty has become imminent, has been not only intelligence operations but independent and often conflicting clandestine operations which are chiefly concerned with plans for a nationalist (Rightist) resurgence. In fact, the emphasis first was upon ideological propaganda and underground political operations, then, lately, and even more strongly, upon military renaissance. To the leaders of the Rightist underground the rebirth of the J.I.S. was a

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secondary objective, the conduct of pure intelligence operations a subordinate activity except for when such operations have served since 1946 as a natural outlet for clandestine activity and a valuable means of livelihood.

B. To explain the present political, ideological, and military aspects of clandestine operations by so-called J.I.S. groups, and to provide a guide to the future J.I.S., a review of the past record of Japanese secret intelligence organs is useful. It indicates that there has been no complete break with tradition or method. In the past, the various agencies of the J.I.S. in general showed the following weaknesses: the techniques, training, choice of personnel, and security were poor; other types of clandestine operations were often confused with positive or counter-intelligence operations; military or political authorities often interfered and sometimes there was even subversion by underground secret societies. The latter was particularly true in the field of secret operations, among the SSO (Tokumu Kikan) units and the Special Operations Sections (TKK) of the Kempeitai.

C. Post-war conditions have hastened the disorganization and deterioration of professional J.I.S. groups and efforts. They have caused I.S. personnel to increase their activity in other clandestine fields and have induced non-professional personnel to engage temporarily in intelligence activities. Thus the planning for a J.I.S. revival and even current intelligence operations has been mixed and confused as never before with every other kind of clandestine activity.

D. There is no clear-cut J.I.S. organization today, even clandestine. In the field of secret intelligence there exist a few, large, well-organized, predominantly professional intelligence groups either directly or indirectly

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supported and directed by American agencies. Generally, these have little chance of assuming full control in a future J.I.S. and have lost prestige in the Rightist underground because of their reliance on American support. The Foreign Office has cautiously and unofficially sponsored political and economic research societies and information agencies, working in collusion with sections of their authorized Research Bureau, but at present these draw mainly upon semi-overt and overt sources and are primarily political and economic reporting and/or evaluation agencies. The really powerful groups in 1951 are those engaged in all forms of clandestine operations - political underground organization and lobbying, plans and preparations for rearmament, Army and Navy reconstruction, subversion of police and maritime police agencies, ideological propaganda - in addition to a sideline of intelligence activities and sometimes black market activities for self-support. Within these major power blocs are professional intelligence operators and even sections planning for a renaissance of the J.I.S. as merely one aspect of a Nationalist revival. In the field of police intelligence and internal CI there are several extensive police investigative agencies but the coordination and streamlining of the special operations sections has not gone beyond the planning stage.

E. Control of the future J.I.S., dependent as it is upon control of the future government and its defense agencies, will reside in a merger of the strongest pressure groups. Politicians and diplomats of the WATSON Clique, the Army General Staff Clique (WATSON), and certain figures in the JOMAN (Self Defense League) underground lobby combine seem to be the most likely power groups to emerge probably in close but uncertain alliance, to control the new J.I.S. in addition to other branches of government, politics, army,

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police, etc. However, in keeping with past tradition and in order to preserve the harmony between groups, probably there will not be one centralized J.I.S. but rather several powerful services of the following types:

1. Official Services

- a. Army
- b. Foreign Office
- c. Maritime Safety Agency, maybe Navy
- d. Internal CI Police, probably organized into a sort of "FBI"-style CI Control Agency under an expanded Special Investigations Bureau of the Attorney General's Office, controlling special operational units of the National Police Reserve, the Rural Police, and local police. If not, the special investigations units of the latter organs will act independently.

2. There will also continue to be powerful unofficial groups mostly unfriendly to us, to be tapped and used by Operational Sections of the various J.I.S.'s:

- a. Nationalist Underground Groups
- b. Pan-Asian Groups
- c. Information broker groups
- d. Independent Investigative and Research Societies (Rightist)
- e. Propaganda Units

F. The resultant official Japanese Intelligence Agencies will be better in technique in many ways than before the war, will be particularly good at internal counter-intelligence, but will be plagued by lack of funds and by the traditional conflicts, weaknesses and organizational faults of pre-war Japanese agencies, and will be more vulnerable to penetration and subversion.

The above, in summary form, are the points which we consider significant concerning the J.I.S. and its future. The following deductions and explanations will clarify and support the above general theses.

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II. Evaluation of the Past Performance of the Japanese Intelligence Services.

The record of the Japanese Intelligence Services up to 1945 has been previously studied from a historical as well as CE viewpoint. However, certain features of the organization and methods, often reflective of typically Japanese traits and thinking, merit further attention since they provide the background pattern for the present and even more for the future. This is particularly true in view of the Japanese tendency towards traditionalism and the assimilation and superimposition of foreign ideas and methods into or upon their own culture, and in view of the natural swing of the pendulum back to pre-war concepts after the peace treaty.

A. Personnel Differences in the Former J.I.S.

The outstanding facts about the former Japanese Intelligence Services are the amazing paradoxes so typical of Japanese manners and thought: flagrant insubordination and disregard for advice within a highly regimented system operated on an essentially military basis; de-centralization and disunity, often approaching disorganization, of intelligence and other secret operations units within a supposedly highly centralized, totalitarian state; vicious feuds between individuals, cliques, groups and policy-setting agencies, often to the point of destroying both operating efficiency and security; the frequent placement of personal and group loyalties above patriotic duty in a country renowned for its national solidarity and for the subservience of the individual to the imperial state; the emotional and often biased approach and reaction to intelligence work and personnel by men schooled to be objective and logical; the lack of thoroughness, particularly in reports and plans, in a nation where avid study of all topics is common and there is great respect for the written word of experts. Most defects in the Services

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arose out of these factors and out of resultant personnel clashes, never from the lack of authority, training, or system. In fact, these paradoxical qualities and violent personnel differences led to the sabotaging of authority, system, and technique.

1. The Special Operations Units. The clash of individual with individual, unit with unit, and service with service in the highly specialized field of secret operations is almost generic to that field; however, the Japanese carried it to extremes undreamed of in Western nations. The above-cited factors, most evident in the special operations field, made the so-called Japanese Intelligence Service a hodge-podge of separate military, naval, civilian, cover company, Foreign Office, and police UNITS, often in complete conflict with each other. Some examples are pertinent, since they might recur in the future: the two most noted Tokumu Kikan (Special Operations) Schools, the Harbin School and the Nakano School, were continually in almost complete disagreement, and the graduates of the one had no more regard for the other than did their respective sponsoring agencies, the Kwantung Army G-2 and G-2 Imperial General Staff; the mutual contempt of primarily military TEKK units and the essentially civilian kikans (such as those from the SAHO Intelligence School, the South Manchurian Railway Intelligence Section, the KODAMA and SAKATA kikans, etc.) was well known; the intelligence personnel within the Foreign Service and the research groups backed by the Foreign Office (particularly Cultural and Exchange Societies) were in trouble with Japanese Army units wherever their paths crossed; Navy TEKK units completely disregarded the fact that their work and coverage duplicated that of Army units, and Army Staff seldom consulted Navy units for information at the area level; often there were conflicts if not duplications of effort by TEKK units in the same area,

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as for example the IATSU, UME and RAN Kikans working unilaterally toward the same end in Central China. Furthermore, the overlapping of functions and jurisdiction in addition to a mutual lack of cooperation overseas between the following agencies was axiomatic: the Tokumu Kikans (SO or Secret Political Agencies), the Joho Kikans (SI Agencies), the Boryakutai and Bocho han (Subversive counter-espionage units and Counter-Intelligence Sections), and particularly the Tokkoku (Special Operations Section) of the Kempei. Within Japan, the regular police hated the Political Control Section of the Kempeitai, which in turn was jealous of the greater CI authority of the TOKYO Kempeitai. All special operations units in the field - ^{Tokumu Kikan} TOKK, ^{Joho Kikan} JHK, and ^{and Police} KEMPEI - resisted as much as possible direct control by local G-2s and cooperation with the External Affairs Sections of local commands. All in turn, particularly Kwantung Army G-2, resisted and often disregarded direct control and orders from Imperial GHQ (home office).

2. Staff-Level and Intra-Service Feuds. Above the I.S. units, even the commands and services supposedly controlling them were constantly feuding and wrestling for control. The quarrels between TOJO's Army Department and the Imperial General Staff, between the Army and the usually subversive Foreign Office, and particularly between the Army and the Navy are famous. These conflicts at control levels still have an influence, and will carry over into the nascent J.I.S.

3. Subversive Control by Outside Agencies. The jealousy with which various units and missions guarded their prerogatives and freedom of action did not always signify strong unit loyalty and solidarity. The political views and affiliations, usually secret, of I.S. Kikan members often conflicted with their sense of duty and resulted in ridiculously insecure conduct. Most of these outside agencies and societies were secret and depended upon

the ideological loyalty of their members. Some good examples of these, primarily Pan-Asian or Ultra-Nationalist, are: the DAI TOA RESHET (P-A); The Manchurian KYOKAKAI (Concordia) (P-A); the TOYAMA-Mitsuru-led secret societies (P-A and U-H); the "Young Turks" and "2.26" Cliques (U-H); various graduating class clubs at both Army and Navy Officers' School (U-N).

A. Unofficial Agencies gathering intelligence. The fanatically Pan-Asian groups such as DAI TOA RESHET and Concordia which were finally outlawed during the war had their own systems, operations and secret channels. One might also list the intelligence sections and individual operatives of such government-related "zaibatsu" holding companies as NITSU Bussan, Japan Steel and Pipe, and others. These would cooperate with military intelligence units in the area and often lent personnel to Kempei and TANK units. Nevertheless, they were usually privately financed, had their own directives and targets, and often had ideological or financial control over individuals within I.S. kikans as well as over their own personnel. There was similar interference by other government related agencies such as the Nippon Newsreel Co., Domei News, and the Greater East Asia Bureau, both as independent information-gathering agencies and as control agents of personnel in I.S. units.

B. Lack of Unity and Organization within Units.

The internal weaknesses of most kikans and units is frequently overlooked. A feudal outlook and personality problems often disrupted order and a careful delineation of duties. A kikan chief of a field unit, usually a colonel or above, generally chose his immediate subordinate personnel. This not only reinforced the "clique" tendency, but also led to favoritism, poor selection, and graft. A unit's potential depended upon the capability of its chief. The

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thuggery, graft and false reporting of the SANATA and KODAMA Kikans for instance merely mirrored the character of their respective leaders. When as frequently happened, the home office assigned noted and high-ranking subordinates or large numbers of new Nakano-trained junior officers or civilians to a Kikan, rivalry and clique warfare within the unit increased. The Kampei possessed a better delineation of duties and more rigid organization, but the caliber of its personnel and their training often did not allow them to take advantage of this. The TMKK units often had reporting sections, special equipment sections, commo technicians, etc., but only on paper; frequently, the passion of certain personnel, regardless of his assigned functions, to operate, to be a "prima donna", destroyed the efficiency of such support functions.

C. Deficiency in Training and Planning.

It must be emphasized that personnel attitudes and clashes greatly diminished the value of training in every branch of I.S. work. Likewise it prevented the coordination of the two best schools in Special Operations, Nakano and Harbin, whose best points might have been combined to produce really well-trained personnel. Some of the top-notch J.I.S. operators in Europe in 1940-45 were Nakano graduates who had later served with the Harbin School. The Nakano TMKK Course was strong in the philosophy and logic of operations, but often too theoretical and dogmatic; in addition, there was little coordination with the excellent Nakano Secret Communications Course, which produced not only monitoring experts but also many fine censorship and technical support units for the overseas commands. Harbin School had a narrow scope limited primarily to Manchuria and concentrated on rough-and-ready trial-and-error methods, but its method of drill in high-level operational techniques was excellent. The

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Kempei training specialized in "toughness" of outlook, and included considerable extraneous police and control training; nevertheless, its schooling in low-level informant operations and use of CI techniques was quite good. Training of Foreign Office representatives in the collection of overt information was good. A glaring defect in all courses was the failure to instill sound security and cover principles, and the failure to counteract Japanese aversion to careful planning and checking. The lack of discrimination between intelligence-gathering and other types of clandestine operations can not be blamed upon the training schools, but their own courses did little to keep the distinction clear in most operatives' minds.

D. Failure to Separate I.S. Functions from Other Types of Clandestine Activity.

Both in organizational structure and training programs, attempts were made to delineate functions and keep information-gathering activities separate from other clandestine organs and activities. However, in the TENK units, the constant combination of intelligence operations, secret political and propaganda operations, sabotage, military operations and economic support operations for either unit or personal profit was the rule rather than the exception. Separation of Kempei special intelligence-gathering operations from normal Kempei and police control functions failed as often as it succeeded. This fact is very important because it means that the vast majority of J.I.S. personnel is incapable either by tradition or experience of recognizing these differentiations in practice even though they are familiar with them in theory.

E. Poor Reports Technique and Poor Evaluation.

The quality of reporting was generally low and poor in detail. For some reason, the deeper the covert nature of an operation, the poorer and scantier the reporting tended to be. Important factors were the pre-occupation with

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operating techniques combined with an exaggerated secrecy complex, the shocking personal relations between units and their higher echelons, and lack of confidence by operating units in the evaluating agencies. Higher echelons, particularly in the Army, were often arrogant, dogmatic, and poorly qualified for either evaluation or briefing and direction. Other factors which encouraged "padding", false reporting, or even withholding of information in the Army were the desire of commanders to receive only information they wanted to hear or had decided was correct, the allocation of more funds either to units producing reams of information or to those which used "security" as an excuse for producing practically nothing.

F. Poor Operational and Personal Security.

Poor protection of communications, use of vulnerable communications methods, hasty and insecure planning, virtually no vetting and security investigation, and rapid recruitment and operation on the basis of hunches or emotional fancies are but a few of the well-known deficiencies in J.I.S. general operating security. Personal security was even worse. Operatives were often secretive with superiors and associates with whom they should have discussed operations and, simultaneously, very indiscreet with subordinates, and even completely unauthorized personnel. The factors described in para. A. above were those most responsible for the very poor security which was general throughout the services.

G. Poor Records and Filing Systems.

The lack of system and the failure to comprehend the purpose of proper, well-kept and secure files were almost universal, and even to be found at Imperial General Staff Headquarters. Most agencies had either vast amounts of disorganized material which they hardly knew how to use or classify, or

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they had very sketchy coverage. Coordination of the files of one headquarters with those of another was virtually non-existent.

H. Strong Points of the Former Services.

- (1) Both training and practice in the use of police-type investigative and CI techniques, and the amassing of counter-intelligence information were good.
- (2) Use of low-level informants, particularly for penetration of target installations or for check on travel and movements, was excellent.
- (3) The thoroughness of political and military control in Japan and its occupied areas gave the I.S. forces a great advantage; fair use was made of Japanese minorities in other countries.
- (4) The patriotic loyalty of most I.S. personnel, strongly ultra-Nationalist in nature, was until 1945 rarely endangered by any tendencies toward defection or betrayal of national interests to a foreign power. This was reflected in the over-confidence, still demonstrated by many Japanese overseas, when dealing with another Japanese quickly and on a basis of trust simply because he is a fellow-Japanese.
- (5) A few far-sighted experts in intelligence direction labored against time and tradition to streamline and strengthen the services. The few individual operatives, particularly in the European theater, who were experts in technique were on a par with any in the world. Unfortunately, because of their exploits, the J.I.S. has come to be vastly overrated.
- (6) The Army JIS was afforded excellent technical support. Crypto intelligence and radio monitoring were fine; the Army's documentation and laboratory research section was unsurpassed. Unfortunately, the J.I.S. in general had neither the capabilities nor opportunities to make maximum use of these. This discrepancy was so great that many technicians want nothing to do with the future operational J.I.S.

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III. Disintegration, Deterioration, and Extraneous Influences in Japanese Post-War Intelligence Activities.

Granted that disorganization and personality conflicts were plaguing the Japanese Intelligence Services before the Surrender, when these Services ceased the disintegration was almost complete. The pre-war services at least maintained some cohesion and controlled their personnel through loyalty; the disappearance of military sponsors and the strict limitations of Foreign Office and law enforcement agency activities had a more shattering effect upon clandestine operations than in any other field of endeavor. Then changing conditions produced new impacts and confusions in the field of covert activity.

A. The Necessity for Conducting Nationalist Revival Activities Covertly.

After the Surrender, the Allied Nations together struck at the Japanese Right, particularly at the Army, with a five-fold program: war crimes trials, abolition of the Japanese armed forces, purge procedures, breakup of industrial combines and monopolies (formerly economic bulwarks of Japanese aggression) and investigation and control of secret attempts at a Nationalistic revival. The last three measures were primarily the responsibility of the American Occupation authorities. For about a year after the Surrender, Japanese Rightist activity was the prime target of American investigative agencies, despite the fact that many former Japanese military and intelligence leaders were interrogated, called upon for assistance in the repatriation programs, or asked to explain material in files. Even after the threat was recognized first of Soviet aggressive intentions, then of the Japanese Communist Party as a tool of those intentions, Rightist resurgence remained a definite intelligence target for America and her allies. This continues to be true despite the recognized need for assistance by former Japanese military, Foreign Office, police and, particularly, intelli-

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gence services personnel in the procurement of information concerning the JCP and in supplying valuable background material on the Soviets and the Chinese Communists. From the very beginning, therefore, it was necessary for the Japanese program for national resurgence to be carried out clandestinely. At first, this took the form of a virtual cessation of all such activity, overt or covert, until American intentions, watchfulness, and investigative thoroughness might be estimated. A subsequent result, however, has been the participation of vast numbers of purged Rightist politicians, businessmen, former Army and Navy leaders, ex-diplomats, secret society members, political propagandists and lobbyists, as well as many Liberal Party and government officials in clandestine groups and activities best described by the term "underground" operations. They mingled with former Intelligence professionals, with gangsters, and with persons engaged for personal profit in other types of clandestine and illegal activities. Many points in their program and future plans they can now pursue openly because of changed world conditions and a corresponding change in American attitude and policy. Nevertheless, many objectives and the methods of achieving them remain covert. This factor not only has widened but also confused the field of covert activities in post-war Japan.

B. ReGrouping of Pre-war I.S. Personnel and Cliques.

Initially, few groups were as hard hit by the reversal of fortunes in 1945 as the intelligence services. Many professionals overseas were able to struggle along by aiding in the investigation and processing of repatriates or even, as in China, by carrying out intelligence activities on behalf of their conquerors. The fear of prosecution for war crimes hung over many of them, notably the Kempei, because of their brutal methods and atrocities; many were either imprisoned or held in Japan and abroad for close interrogation; but more chose to hide, taking any kind of menial work. Many of them were career men, not only in the Army or

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Navy, but in special operations with TANKY, Kempei, or another intelligence agency. Even when qualified for other types of work, they hated making the adjustments to ordinary occupations. By mid-1947, however, two significant developments had occurred: first, their services were sought, directly or through some front man, to assist in the procurement of information on the Soviets and the JCP for the Americans; secondly, many of them were able to become key figures in the Japanese Rightist Underground because of their earning power and because of the professional touches they could provide to the wide range of clandestine activities planned and carried out by political and military leaders in the Underground. These developments, coming at a time when the danger of apprehension for war crimes and the chances of using war crimes charges as control was rapidly diminishing, encouraged many former I.S. personnel not only to come out from "retirement" but also to get into the thick of underground power politics and extend their influence in clandestine fields other than those of straight intelligence procurement. In this fashion, the confusion of intelligence-gathering with other covert activities became even more prevalent for the I.S. professionals than in wartime. There were additional impacts, however, connected with this re-grouping of I.S. personnel. In groups working with or for American or Chinese agencies, expediency and opportunity were often the governing factors: an "expert", contacted by an American agency, would form a group out of personnel known to him who happened to be available and willing. Often such groups would include non-professionals. Associations in the underground became fluid, as they received the backing of first one prominent political or military figure and then another. Most former I.S. personnel were Nationalists of one shade or another. Many began by working with specific leader who happened to share their particular opinions. On the other hand, others preferred to organize new groups out of inexperienced personnel; in the post-war heyday of wide-

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spread use of informants and agents by American agencies, particularly CIC, this was often more profitable. Many found the livelihood provided by Japanese agencies too meager, the professional requirements of the Americans too exacting. Many of these found that their experience in clandestine operations fitted them well for the pursuit of smuggling, black market and other illegal but profitable activities. In addition to these factors, the revival of old school ties and officers' school connections, and the breakdown of the barriers between personnel of the Army, Navy, Foreign Office, and other departments, played their part in the constantly shifting allegiances of post-war groups engaged in covert operations. Pre-war organizations were largely destroyed and old service loyalties and prejudices broken down to a considerable extent in the process. Nevertheless, the pre-surrender loyalties and cliques by no means entirely disappeared. Their recurrence not only caused shifts in the alignment of operative groups but they also provided one of the most damaging factors in the operational security of post-war groupings.

C. Non-Professionals in Intelligence Activities and the Temporary Nature of this Association.

The years 1947-1951 saw the involvement in intelligence activities of larger numbers than ever before of personnel virtually unqualified by reason of training, background, or experience. There is a fine point of distinction to be made between this and the development discussed in para. A. above, even though the two occurred almost simultaneously and often involved many of the same personnel. The present heading refers to the temporary entry into the intelligence-gathering category of clandestine activity, considered apart from secret plans, political lobbying, secret propaganda and ideological movements, agitation for military revival, etc., of former leaders in other fields, especially those of military

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strategy. There are two prime reasons for this. Firstly, mainly because of American need for information which the Japanese police and other post-war government agencies were neither equipped nor trained to supply, intelligence operations were one of the first activities permitted. This not only provided a means of livelihood but also an outlet for the activity, skill and experience of former Army generals, Navy admirals, purged diplomats and politicians. Secondly, by engaging in such activities, these categories of personnel found a cover for their plans and activities (discussed in para. A. above) on behalf of future Nationalist resurgence, means of fortifying their own positions in the increasingly important Japanese underground, and a way to secure substantial means of support for other activities. Other elements, desirous of resuming some sort of foreign trade semi-legally or even illegally, found that the ability to supply intelligence information sometimes decreased the chances of apprehension. The result of all this has been that many of the present so-called intelligence kikan leaders are actually men with no direct pre-war association with either the J.I.S. or intelligence activities. Furthermore, the vast majority of these high-ranking officers, businessmen, well-known diplomats, etc., have no intention of remaining in the limited field of intelligence procurement or of limiting the scope of their authority solely to a future J.I.S. if they can return to power in their chosen fields. This does not imply that lack of previous experience made these men incompetent to procure intelligence. Some of them have done quite well, and others have been at least wise in the selection of former I.S. professionals to work for them. Nevertheless, for them all it is a temporary sideline undertaken for reasons of necessity and convenience.

D. Lack of Sanction or Hope for an Official J.I.S.

The confusing and rapidly changing position of the Japanese Rightist underground, particularly in the years 1948-1950, has been in general complicated by a

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lack of official sanction and a necessity to operate on a day-to-day opportunistic basis in order to take advantage of every favorable political eventuality. This drawback was definitely felt in the phase of Rightist underground activity devoted to planning the J.I.S. revival. Long before it became certain that there would be a Police Reserve and over two years before America indicated that it favored rearmament for Japan, the Japanese expected to receive tacit approval to revive some sort of intelligence service. Differences of opinion arose, however, concerning the proper sponsoring agency - Foreign Office, Attorney General's Office, Police, more recently the Police Reserve, possibly the Army if and when revived - and the degree of control to be exerted by the sponsoring agency caused new rifts and realignments in the underground. Until mid-1950, the Army's determination to keep a new J.I.S. out of complete Foreign Office control, and the political lobbying going on to advance all phases of Rightist resurgence, raised the question by Army men of whether official sanction was desirable at all for the time being. The degree of cooperation with American intelligence agencies considered desirable became an increasingly hot point of debate. From 1950 to the present, the degree of speed with which a J.I.S. could be safely reconstituted, depending as it does upon the length of the Occupation, the peace treaty, America's friendliness but watchfulness, became another issue. In the past three years there has been no lack of detailed plans and compromise arrangements regarding the establishment of a future J.I.S. and regarding other phases of Nationalist revival. Unfortunately, these plans have been quickly invalidated by changing circumstances and resultant re-alignments. Former Navy I.S. men are still uncertain whether or not there will be a new Navy within which an intelligence organ could be established and in which they can find positions independent of Army control. Rightist groups and former J.I.S. personnel watched closely the developments in the Chinese political scene. There were varying

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opinions and conflicting pressures on the question of relations with Nationalist China and this led to constant shifts in underground groupings.

E. Increased Number of Worthless Information Brokers.

Some of the pre-war kikans, particularly in the China theater, and many unofficial Japanese organizations were little better than information-brokering agencies. Frequently they resorted to padding or outright fabrication of information for purposes of prestige or profit. The post-war era in Japan, however, produced a phenomenal increase in the number of these worthless information brokers, intelligence informants and agents. The main reasons for this prevalence are as follows:

- (1) The need for money and the desire for past advantages. The pressure of increased competition and the continued low standard of living caused deterioration of many individuals who had done good intelligence work in the past. Persons engaged formerly in clandestine work not only had had great advantages but today they were the least adaptable to other occupations.
- (2) The disorganized and fluid state of underground Rightist groups in the information business often meant that worthless agents of the information-broker type were included along with competent professionals who were still sincerely trying to produce good intelligence.
- (3) The large numbers of non-professionals in the major kikans, especially at the top, and the far too wide scope of the clandestine objectives of such groups afforded excellent protective coloring for charlatans and information and/or idea salesmen.
- (4) The general deterioration of Japanese character and standards in all walks of life in the post-war period.
- (5) American need for information and American gullibility. The lack of familiarity of most Americans with Japanese language, traditions, psychology,

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and internal affairs made them easy to fool for a time. Moreover, the need for information was great, and evaluation of the vast quantity of information pouring in was a monumental task which could not be performed properly and quickly.

(6) Identification of many Rightist and former J.I.S. personnel by the Japanese Communists. This factor has made it extremely difficult for many Rightists to operate successfully against JCP targets in anything but a semi-overt and peripheral manner.

(7) The restrictions on overseas travel for Japanese. Even in semi-legal trade and outright smuggling, the presence of identifiable former I.S. personnel is viewed askance by Japanese businessmen. Surveillance of Japanese in most Asiatic areas is automatic. With entry difficult and operations almost impossible, the tendency to magnify possibilities and product is natural.

These tendencies are discussed in detail because there is every reason to believe that they will continue, both among individuals and groups peddling information outside of the future Japanese services and also as factors affecting the disseminated product of the various Services themselves.

F. The Importance of Tokyo Bureaucratically.

Although Tokyo, as the center of Japanese government activity, is bound to be very important, the current necessity for being located in or near the Tokyo area in order to succeed in the coming struggle for power within the Japanese underground is highly exaggerated. Until this jockeying for power resolves itself into official establishments and individual duty assignments after the peace treaty, no big-time operator angling for a high and comfortable niche in the future Army, Foreign Service, OR intelligence agencies set-up can feel secure away from

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Tokyo very long. Conversely, it is difficult to evaluate the future importance of individuals formerly of great prominence in these fields (particularly Navy I.S. men) who have not yet come out of retirement in the provinces and made their bid for the future spoils, or to judge the national importance of a man like Major General HAGI, for example, who has maintained a fairly firm hold on operations in Hokkaido.

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IV. Post-War Intelligence Activity to Date.

The discussion of this vast topic must obviously be limited to those larger, more powerful groups which operated in the past and present, with the emphasis placed upon the possibilities of existence, the organization and structure of a centralized J.I.S. The informality and unofficial character of the relations between individuals and groups must be kept in mind. Even the major cliques constantly change; accurate charting of the entire picture is almost impossible, and the attempt would be misleading.

A. The Main Kikans to Date.

This section is limited to those groups and agencies dealing in the procurement of information, regardless of the other activities they undertake simultaneously, including lobbying and other efforts toward J.I.S. re-establishment. The stronger and better-organized groups in the field of secret operations have been until quite recently those which enjoyed the favors and financial support of American agencies; the semi-overt agencies, having greater permanence but less power, have belonged to one department or another of the Japanese government.

(1) *ARISUE Seizo

ARISUE is important for three main reasons: his former position as G-2, Imperial General Staff, the supposed overall director of Japanese Army Intelligence; the tremendous extent and power of the ARISUE Kikan, its subordinate entities, and ARISUE's personal power over intelligence service circles and other clandestine activities of the Japanese Underground until the fall of 1950; the unique nature of his present isolated position vis-a-vis other major kikan leaders. Section II reviewed the circumstances whereby the chief of Army Intelligence actually possessed considerably less control

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over and knowledge of Army J.I.S. activities abroad than might appear on paper; nevertheless, the position was extremely significant, and ARISUE's association with intelligence work was long standing. He was interrogated, then called in for consultation very early in the Occupation by American G-2. A working relationship apparently developed. By the beginning of 1949, the ARISUE Kikan was flourishing on a large scale. ARISUE not only seems to have operated his own group gathering information for American G-2, but either influenced or directed, in conjunction with KAWABE Torashiro and other former general officers, the cooperation in Hokkaido of General IRIGI's men with American agencies there. In addition, throughout 1949 and 1950 ARISUE supervised the work of Major General WATANABE Ataru against overseas and internal targets for American G-2 units, and was getting information from if not actually directing the KAWAMOTO Kikan (Lt. General KAWAMOTO Yoshitaro). ARISUE was responsible for the introduction of Colonel TSUJI Masanobu, OKADA Yoshimasa (or Isao), and HATTORI Takushiro to American G-2. A former major general from Burma, KIDURA, was one of his later proteges. During 1950, apparently, either he began to use and direct the two separate organizations of KODAMA Yoshio and the Foreign Office's SONO Akira or else they, separately, began to funnel information through him. He appears to have maintained his contact with Lt. General NEKOTO Hiroshi on Formosa apart from his operations with American G-2. In the fall of 1950 ARISUE was at the zenith of his power, though supposedly still nominally subordinate to KAWABE Torashiro. Then suddenly, about November, 1950, KAWABE not only broke with ARISUE but almost every other Kikan chief did also except ARISUE's immediate subordinates in the underground, KODAMA, WATANABE and KIDURA. ARISUE has been described as a vain, arrogant and boastful person; he is reputed to have become quite power-mad and self-seeking in an opportunistic effort to strengthen his position and to maintain a

post-war standard of living which was becoming ostentatious for a former Japanese officer. Furthermore, he apparently had used the prestige and power of his American connections to advance his position, even to the point of undercutting KAWABE, feeling certain that the Americans would not only supervise an Army revival but probably choose the leaders of it themselves. This aroused rather general hatred in the underground. In any event, although the ARISUE Kikan and subordinate units continue to carry out intelligence operations, ARISUE is at present virtually excluded from the revival plans of the principal underground leaders for a future J.I.S., Army, or any other service. This has forced ARISUE to take a position favoring close American supervision of the future Japanese military defense forces and of Japanese I.S. activities within those forces. Whether ARISUE will continue to be isolated and shunned is questionable; he may be able to climb back on the bandwagon later. However, the failure of his strong personal bid for power seems to indicate that if he does get back in the good graces of KAWABE and other Army leaders after the treaty, it will probably be on their terms, not as the #1 intelligence chief for the KAWABE Clique but in a more subordinate role. He has lost both position and face.

(2)* KAWABE Torashiro and the Imperial General Staff Clique.

KAWABE represented the Japanese Army and General Staff on the trip to Manila in August 1945 to discuss surrender terms. He has since abided by those surrender terms in making available to the American Occupation, particularly to American G-2, the services of Japanese Army personnel and the fund of background knowledge possessed by the Japanese not merely on intelligence matters but on other topics as well. The KAWABE Kikan, however, as an information-gathering agency, is included in those services. KAWABE, as a former Air Force Lt. General, later Deputy Chief of Staff. GHQ. had no ex-

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perience and little direct connection with professional intelligence work. However, as the last active representative of the Japanese General Staff free to act upon behalf of the Army, he has the authority to order cooperation from such Japanese as he might choose, and he has apparently chosen well. KAWABE's group, known for a time in 1948-49 as the "K.A.T.O. Kikan" (KAWABE, ARISUE, TANAKA Ryukichi and OKAWA Genshichi) consists primarily of a collection of the top brass of the former Army General Staff and their close associates among the ranks of former Japanese generals. From below these individuals, in subordinate kikan, stem the actual operative lines. Some groups have worked on the preparation of strategic studies and the compilation of background data, in part for American consumption; many of the others, especially the ARISUE, KAWAMOTO and IMAKURO (Takeo) Hideo groups, have been concerned mainly with active procurement of secret intelligence. Two former special intelligence experts IMAKURO (Takano School founder) and KAGESA Sadaaki (of USS Kikan), SAKURAI Tokutaro, TANAKA Ryukichi, KAWATA Senzo and OKAWA Genshichi, and their groups, are reported to have been most closely associated with KAWABE over the longest period of time. Elimination of ARISUE from these ranks has been discussed above, but whether SAGI is under KAWABE's overall supervision since the November 1950 break or whether he still takes orders from ARISUE is not clear. (X) DOI Akio (of Akira), TANAKA Shinichi, SHIMOMURA Sada, TATSURI Eiichi, and KAWAMOTO Yoshitaro are among the other general officers who have either reportedly worked for or been consulted by KAWABE in the past. The last three, along with SAKURAI, IMAKURO, KAGESA, both TANAKAs, and KAWATA, are the ones closest to KAWABE at present.) With the exception of IMAKURO, KAGESA and formerly ARISUE, the KAWABE Kikan past and present does not represent the nucleus of a former J.I.S. that is still functioning, but rather the hard core of the Japanese Army Staff leadership, augmented by hand-picked subordinates, converted temporarily to in-

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telligence and research duties for reasons stated in Section III above. Its present importance in the Nationalist Revival is a matter for subsequent discussion. However, nearly a year and a half ago, KAMABE and his associates are reported to have established the line of cooperation with American G-2 for intelligence operations by Japanese Army personnel: the "LARSU" and "TARSU" program. In brief, that policy was to be not only cooperation with American agencies against Soviet, Chinese Communist, and JAP targets, but the revival of Nationalism, a Japanese Army and I.J., and penetration of American agencies wherever feasible.

(3) *KODAMA Yoshio.

This notorious information salesman, one step removed from a gangster, built up in the post-war days the remnants of his old KODAMA Kikan, augmented it with personnel from former Kempeitai units, and once again launched into the black market, smuggling, and intelligence business simultaneously. His past record and reputation, even among the Japanese armed forces, is that of a swindler, an information broker, and a dangerously powerful gangster-type operator. During late 1949 and early 1950, KODAMA and his henchmen were associated with the Far East Affairs Research Society operated covertly by AKUTOMI Ganjo, then Counsellor of the Foreign Office, and several of the latter's former zaibatsu and political friends; earlier, the KODAMA Kikan (if not KODAMA himself) is known to have supplied ARISUE's men with information. In mid-1950, relations with ARISUE were reportedly resumed, the information and services for sale consisting of the results of KODAMA's widespread smuggling interests. How much information his contact men have sold directly to Americans is a good question. Despite his dubious prestige as a dangerous man, KODAMA's fame as a fabricator of information and a swindler and the presence of similar types in his Kikan tend to bar

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him from serious consideration for use by future Japanese intelligence agencies.

(4) HABEYAMA Sadachika

HABEYAMA is primarily a propagandist, and his wide-spread rightist organizations and secret societies are mainly designed for re-awakening ultra-Nationalist sentiment, but they spread out all over Japan, insuring a wide area coverage. A former Communist, HABEYAMA is still distrusted as a secret Communist by many Japanese military leaders. During 1949 and 1950, he was associated with HORIOUCHI Ganjo and the F.B.I.R.S., while simultaneously trying to sell his ideas and information to American agencies. He was later connected informally to the KA AGUCHI Kikan. At present he is reported to be channeling information into both the Attorney General's Special Investigations Bureau and the Foreign Office Research Section. The quality of his information is said to be poor.

(5) Commercial Cover Intelligence Kikans: KATAMURA ataru, SAKATA Sadamasa (sometimes given "Saigohori") and KA AMOTO Yoshitaro.

Although KIYOSHI, KAJIRO, KA AGUCHI Tadatsu and other Kikan chiefs have frequently used commercial "signboard" companies for cover purposes, KATAMURA, SAKATA, and KA AMOTO were most successful in building up thriving commercial companies to deal with semi-legal or clandestine economic operations while the personnel of these companies, almost all former I.S. personnel, at the same time carried out intelligence activities. KATAMURA built up the MITSUBOSHI (Three Star) Trading Company, staffed it with some of his former subordinates and various Army THK and Air Force officers, and in 1948 and 1949 began illegal trading operations with Korea, Formosa, and North China. He maintained liaison with both HORIOUCHI Ganjo and ARISUE. Then, from late '49 onward, he worked under ARISUE, more or less steadily, only recently increasing his cooperation with KODAMA as well. At the same

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time, WATANABE Wataru is said to have maintained his own connections with American "CIC" as another market for his information. His kikan and cover company are quite openly known, and the quality of his overseas information is no longer believed to be very good.

SAYATA, like RODAMA Yoshio, had a past reputation even among the Japanese for double-dealing, graft, and information fabrication. He was the civilian deputy chief under Colonel OKADA Yoshimasa (aka Naomasa C Isao) of the WATSU Kikan but built himself a greater empire based upon the corruption of his superiors and his close connections to the Shanghai underworld. He re-activated his kikan about 1948 for the express purpose of participating in overseas clandestine intelligence operations and smuggling. He is said to have contacted American CIC and received backing for his operations. In the early fall of 1949, during an attempt to recover assets in China amounting to about \$1,500,000, he was apprehended and he and Navy Lt. MIKAMI were jailed as the ringleaders.

KAWAMOTO Yoshitaro, along with his chief deputy former Col. KADOYA Hiroshi, has been involved in the organization of two cover companies, the Sun Oil Company franchise which he sought to maintain unsuccessfully, and the NIPPON TSUHO Trading Company. The personnel of both, including KADOYA, were primarily former I.S. men, selected by KAWAMOTO. KAWAMOTO has a long record of association with intelligence direction, but has had no experience in direct supervision or actual operations. He is looked upon by Japanese as more or less of a professional, however, and has been associated off and on with the former KAWABE-ARISUE combine, and has maintained especially close connections with subordinate entities of the KAWABE Kikan engaged in actual intelligence-gathering - YAMAKURO, KAGESA and YANAKA Ryukichi. The intelligence produced by the KAWAMOTO Kikan is reputed to be fairly good; individuals within the kikan are excellent professionals, but many grafters and incompetents.

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outside of the Foreign Office itself were not subject to the official direction of the Foreign Minister nor even of HORIUCHI in his Foreign Office capacity but came under HORIUCHI's personal leadership and manipulation and that of certain former zaibatsu financiers, industrialists, purged diplomats and politicians, the latter primarily adherents of former Foreign Minister MATSUOKA or of MATOYAMA Ichiro. HORIUCHI had the additional plan, stimulated by a critique of the former J.I.S. and a blueprint for a new, centralized J.I.S. under Foreign Office sponsorship given to him by one of our agents, for an amalgamation of all intelligence-gathering agencies under the Foreign Office - ergo, his direction. In the spring of 1950 he began to form a secret group within the Foreign Office Research Bureau composed of section heads and officers there who were earmarked for future intelligence organization headquarters duties. He then attempted to use his prestige and friendly relations with Army, Navy, Rightist politicians, and other clandestine groups in the Japanese Underground to unify them and bring them into line with this organ. In the latter project he failed completely, and after his own unsuccessful bid for political power in the June 1950 elections, he and his henchmen in and out of the Foreign Office lost control of the Research Bureau secret organization as well. Before his fall, however, he had utilized the Far East Affairs Research Society, the Far East Economic Research Society, and the Chinese Affairs Research Society, all built up by him and his purgee friends, to get information, and he had secured the cooperation in this effort of KODAMA Yoshio, WATANABE Wataru, NABEYAMA Sadachika, DOI Akiro, SANO Akira, the SANO brothers (of SANO Civilian Tank School fame), the kikan of KAWAGUCHI Tadaatsu, the Kyushuan section of the Chrysanthemum Water Society, and others. Reasons for his failure may be conjectured as follows:

(a) HORIUCHI was high-handed, arrogant, and hasty in his attitude, particu-

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larly toward former Army I.S. men, underground societies and individuals, to whom he emphasized the fact that they had little hope of official recognition except by cooperating with each other under the Foreign Office aegis; (b) the really powerful figures in former Army intelligence, then represented by the KATE-ARISUE organization, had no desire to centralize under Foreign Office supervision; they were well-situated by reason of their work for G-2, GHQ; (c) the Korean War in 1950 raised in one form or another the hope of Japanese military revival and of future power for the Army men themselves; (d) a central intelligence agency depended upon the virtually impossible centralization of the Japanese rightist underground itself.

Within the Foreign Office, SONO Akira, head of Section Three of the Research Bureau, YOSHIKAWA Shinsuke, head of Section One (Asian Affairs) and others carried on the policies which HOJUCHI began but in a far less grandiose manner. To what extent the SONO organization's secret structure goes beyond its overt designation is not known. However, there are indications that: (a) SONO's activities, authority, and information are not limited to Russia and Eastern Europe, nor even to exclusively external targets; (b) personnel of the secret organization within the Foreign Office are not known to their office supervisors, nor are their secret activities necessarily directed by their known superiors; (c) SONO Akira has kept close connections with ARISUE, the Attorney General's Special Investigation Bureau, and with MAHEYAMA Sadachika's organization, presumably upon UCP matters; (d) the number of unofficial "research" societies has increased; i.e., undercover agencies from which will come personnel for the Foreign Office-controlled segments of the J.I.S. The Southeast Asia Economic Research Association under MIZUNO Itaro, former Ambassador to Siam, is one of the more recent.

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(7) Various former Air Force figures associated with OSI, PRAP.

(Whether as a group or as individuals, the following former Air Force general officers have worked for American OSI, PRAP during the past year:)

~~Asi~~ Edam, former head of the Military Mission to Berlin; ~~Asi~~ Yasunuki, part-owner of the famous "CAJON" in Peking; ~~Asi~~ Yoshi, former Military Attache in England, good friend of Prime Minister YOSHIDA then assigned there as ~~Asi~~ Asador, today a confidential source of the Premier's and close collaborator of the KA ABE Organization and, indirectly, of the American G-2;)

~~Asi~~ Kyo (or Takashi), connected with the DAI NIPPON Commercial Company, a Hongkong-directed agency. MIYOSHI was formerly an agent for Kyoto CIC. Both ABE and MIYOSHI have had close connections to YATANI Naime & Kyosaku of the JOMMEI Group; this tends to lower the evaluation of their reliability. Asi has been reported to be interested primarily in his commercial enterprise. None of these men are former I.S. operators. Beyond that, we have no valid indications as to their proficiency and reliability nor do we know the extent of their networks.

(8) Navy Groups.

There is not to our knowledge any highly organized group of ex-Navy I.S. professionals at present concentrating upon the procurement of information. There are several prominent individuals and groups, either working in conjunction with ~~Asi~~ KA ABE Torashiro and his subordinates or independently, which have figured very prominently in clandestine operations concerning Nationalist revival: notably, ~~Asi~~ KOBAYASHI Shosaburo, ~~Asi~~ KA MIURA Yoshiro, ~~Asi~~ KA DA Minoru, and ~~Asi~~ MIURA Kichisaburo, and their subordinates. Their chief activities have been directed at the manipulation and subversion of the Maritime Safety Agency, maintenance of liaisons to ~~Asi~~ MIYOTO Hiroshi and the Chinese Nationalist leaders in Formosa, MIURA's high-level negotiations for revival

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of a Navy and work with GHQ, and KAWAMURA's plans for a revival of Naval Intelligence. KOBAYASHI Shozaburo maintains a general supervisory position over KAWAGUCHI Tadaatsu's kikan including Vice Admiral SUGATA Jiro's group, the "REISHISHA" Organization (now closely affiliated with NABEYAMA's World Democracy Research Association), the Heiwa (Peace) Trust Company, and KAWAGUCHI's vague directional duties with the KIKUSUI KAI (Chrysanthemum Water League) and the Japan Anti-Communist League. At the same time, KOBAYASHI vaguely superintends and sponsors the JONAN-Japan Peoples Independence and Self-Defense League (now under the banner of "GENYOSHA") of KURIHARA Sho and SATOMI Ryosaku. MAEDA, KAWAGUCHI, KAWAMURA, former (Captain) FUKUSHIMA (son-in-law of the late Admiral YAMAMOTO), and several former Navy officers and Navy I.S. subordinates such as FURUYA Tatsuo and YOSHITA Kozemon are members of that group. It is not, however, an exclusively Navy organization nor is it designed to carry out intelligence activities. (Cf. below)

Because of his former connections with the Repatriates Board of the Welfare Ministry, his fine prestige at Navy Command HQ, and his past A.N.A. experiences in Washington, D.C., Commander TERAI Yoshinori was suspected of engaging in intelligence work. This would involve his good friend and collaborator, Captain WACHI Tsunezo, former Navy code expert who once served in Mexico. Nothing has yet been determined on this score.

(9) Secret Societies and Information Brokers.

In a nation where underground societies and secret fanatical groups have always been very prevalent and more influential than their actual significance merited, a detailed listing of all those engaged in the boom of secret activity that followed the occupation of Japan would be misleading as well as impossible. In addition to JONAN, the NABEYAMA, KODAMA and KAWAGUCHI Kikans, the following have been selected for special mention because they perform some sort of intelligence procurement function as well as almost

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every other type of clandestine activity:

The YURINSHA of IMATA Ainosuke, because it serves as a meeting place and club for former military officers, naval officers and diplomats of almost all the major underground pressure groups;

The TOA RENKEI (East Asia League) and other Pan Asian organizations with which TOYAMA Hidezo, the son of TOYAMA Mitsuru, is affiliated, because it is suspected that they are penetrated by the Chinese Communists and supply information to agents of the "Third Force" Chinese;

The Reborn Japan People's League (SHINSEI NIPPON KOKUMIN DOMEI) of MITAMURA Shiro (sometimes called Teishiro), because MITAMURA is a post-war high-level defector from the JCP, still considered by many Rightists to be a secret Communist agent, whereas HOMMA Rentaro, #2 man of the League, is not; he is reported to be a former political expert;

The Democratic League for Japanese Self-Defense (NIPPON MINSHU JIEI DOMEI) because of the connections of its leader, TSURUMI Yusuke, both to CHIBA Saburo, the chairman of the Democratic Party and through him to CHIBA's relative, (Major General) SHIBI Masami, and also to the Special Investigations Bureau of the Attorney General's office;

The Sino-Japanese Cultural Research Society (CHUNICHI BUNKA KENKYU KAI) and the remnants of the Sino-Japanese Collaboration Movement (CHUNICHI GASSAKU UNDO-KAI) and similar groups because of their connection to YAMADA Junzaburo and his lieutenants who are paid agents of the Chinese Mission and the Chinese Kuomintang;

The underground Nationalist Party (KOKUMINTO) and the related BOKYO TAI (Defense Training Group) because they have continually served as information-broker headquarters;

The YOMMO KENKYU RENKEI (Manchurian-Mongolian Research League) of TOHATA

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Chiba and ~~NOGUCHI~~ Jiro because they are information brokers as well as black-marketeers;

The ~~KIKUSUI KAI~~ (Chrysanthemum Water League), the ~~KIMOTO~~ (Death for the Emperor Society) and affiliated groups because of their prevalence and strength in Kyushu;

The ~~SAKURADA Club~~ (SAKURA KAI), because it is a gathering point for ARISUE's contacts.

Many of the societies naturally supply both the major conservative parties, the police, the Attorney General's Special Investigations Bureau, and most of the above-listed major kikan with a nationwide information coverage which can be considered but little better than outright propaganda.

(10) The New Field Officers' Clique.

This is a new group within the ranks of the former militarists working for G-2, GHQ. Three former ARISUE proteges, ~~Captains~~ ~~HATTORI Takushiro~~, ~~TSUJI Masanobu~~, and ~~KOTANI~~ ^{STAN O} (Hiroshi??) who comes from Yamaguchi Ken, are its principal figures. In addition to work on the rearmament question and strategy research, they are engaged in operations against JCP targets. Neither ~~HATTORI~~ nor ~~TSUJI~~ is a former intelligence officer. The group evolved because of the objections on the part of certain Army field officers to the top-heavy numbers of general officers in the ~~KAMABE~~ Kikan, which did not give the rising field officers the opportunities the future Japanese Army should have. Mutual recriminations between this group and the "Generals' Clique" (the ~~KAMABE~~ Kikan) have increased with the rapid rise in importance of ~~HATTORI~~ and ~~TSUJI~~ since the beginning of the year.

(11) Police Agencies.

There are three principal police organizations which already possess

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special investigation sections which deal in counter-intelligence directed at the JCP, the Chinese Communist agents within Japan, and Korean residents and Korean Communists in Japan. These are the National Rural Police, the Metropolitan Police in the major cities, especially Tokyo, Osaka, and Kobe, and the Special Investigations Bureau of the Attorney General's Office. Lobbying by the underground is presently directed at the establishment of a fourth major agency within the Japanese National Police Reserves. Two years ago there was a bill before the Diet to amalgamate these special police services into a nationwide Bureau for Special Investigation to handle both criminal and national security problems. It was modeled closely upon the American Federal Bureau of Investigation. Although the bill was tabled because too many Japanese and Americans feared creation of a Keisei-like organization, the purge and later the disappearance of the JCP Central Committee members in June, 1950 showed the lack of coordination among the Japanese police investigations agencies and the resultant inability to cope with more complex counter-intelligence problems. Since that time, effort has been directed at closer coordination and there has been more thorough training of members of special sections in investigative techniques and counter-intelligence problems. The AG's Special Investigations Bureau received a housecleaning in the fall of 1950, and subsequently launched into active counter-intelligence operations (as opposed to mere investigation, surveillance, and control) against Communist elements. The Tokyo Police Board reviewed carefully the records of many policemen considered ideologically unsafe, tightened up security measures, and increased the size of their special investigations section. The National Rural Police attempted, though rather unsuccessfully, to improve the accuracy, speed, and efficiency of their reporting and evaluating sections at headquarters. Then, in December 1950,

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the first steps were taken towards actual unification of the various special sections. Selected representatives from the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board, the Osaka Board, and the National Rural Police were all put to work together with a special unit from the AG's S.I.B. on the problems of JCP underground subversion activities and the whereabouts and activities of missing JCP and Korean CP leaders. Organizationally this was a major step forward which provided not only coordination but, for the units less experienced in counter-intelligence work, better direction. The S.I.B. is by no means a polished, competent counter-intelligence agency nor will this expanded nucleus of a national CI Unit become one very rapidly. Most of the personnel are inexperienced at anything but straight police investigation; before the war, the Kempeitai took over most important cases. Operationally, they are relying heavily for the time being upon some rather notorious information-brokers and secret groups like NAKAYAMA's which produce quantity but little quality. They have run down many baffling rumors about the whereabouts of the nine JCP leaders but caught only one to date, although they are reported to be surveilling two more. Yet their coverage is far better than they have been given credit for; they have the advantages of official recognition and they are also comparatively free from the sins of the pre-war police, thanks to American reorganization and training.

(12) Other Japanese Government Investigative Agencies.

The Maritime Safety Agency, handling maritime police duties in addition to ship inspection and maritime and harbor engineering inspection, is understaffed and poorly equipped to handle the tasks of controlling smuggling, illegal entry, of coast patrol, and coping with counter-intelligence duties involving maritime activity. Moreover, it is split by a feud between pre-war Navy Academy personnel and pre-war Maritime Commission personnel within its

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ranks, and has the constant problems of bribery of officials by smuggling rings and of subversion by Rightist underground groups seeking control to contend with.

The Repatriates Bureau of the Welfare Ministry and the Foreign Office Commission (?) on Repatriation Matters were agencies which, in the past few years have been able to supply the Japanese Government, specifically the Foreign Office's Research Bureau, with considerable information on Soviet Russia, and probably on Communist repatriates as well.

The Investigation Section of the Japanese Economic Stabilization Board (NIPPON KEIZAI ANTEI KYOKU: KOKSA HAN) has been used for investigation of JCP targets by the present government. YAMAMOTO Masao, one of the chief inspectors of that section, is a member of the JOWAN Group and also maintains liaison with G-2 Towns and Plans Section. FURUYA Tatsuo was also a former inspector there.

(13) Prime Minister YOSHIDA and the Liberal Party.

On a "high-level informant" basis, YOSHIDA and many of his Liberal Party associates in or outside the government supply information to individuals in G-2, GHQ, or point out leads and personalities of interest to American agencies. This is admittedly part of their duties as government officials of an occupied nation, but the cooperation extended has reportedly gone beyond that. In turn, not merely the Liberal Party but also the Democratic Party and those purges centering around both ATOYAMA Ichiro and NARAHASHI Nataru engage in the collection of political and economic information on their own which, although it has little to do with future intelligence service activity, at present fills unofficially a need in the information-procurement business and in their own political plans. (Some of YOSHIDA's closest contacts include Lt. General SHIMIZU Sada, FATSUBI Eiichi.)

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(Maj. Generals) YADA (TANIDA) Haruyoshi and ISHII Masami. HATOYAMA has connections with most of the existing Mikans listed above and with UGAKI Issei as well.

(14) Individual Agents and Groups.

There is the need to consider the large numbers of former I.S. personnel and others engaged in intelligence procurement at present on behalf of American agencies, who have no definite nor permanent connections with any of the above agencies or groups. In most cases, they are probably on friendly terms with some person connected to one of the above agencies or Mikans at least, although this may have no significance at all regarding their loyalty to their present employers. The gravitational force of these groups, even the best organized of them, is not equal to the centrifugal force of disintegration in the old services, post-war instability, and the effect of the Occupation.

B. Is There an Organized J.I.S. or GMS Organized Underground Force?

We frequently speak of "running a joint operation with the J.I.S.", or refer to an agent with a long I.S. background as "probably reporting on us to the J.I.S." We have also given attention to the possibility that there might be one gigantic federation of Rightist groups embracing such diverse nationalist elements as MABAYAMA, UGAKI Issei, KAWADA, HATOYAMA and purgee politicians, the Foreign Office and purgee diplomats, and even the younger KONOYE, Prince FUKASHIMUNRI, and the Empress Dowager. For want of a better term, this was called the Japanese Underground Government. We are now in a fair position to answer two prime questions quite definitely: "Is there an organized J.I.S.?", and "Is there an Underground Government or Federation?" The answer in both cases is, "NO".

Nothing could show up the post-war disunity of the Japanese intelligence-gathering agencies and groups as clearly as the failure and eclipse of the two "strong men" who tried to unite the largest number of groups under their respective lead-

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ership: ~~HORIUCHI~~ Genjo and ~~ARISUE~~ Seizo. Admittedly, the circumstances were not yet ripe nor did either man have the personality, experience and authority necessary for the task. No one yet has possessed the lofty position required to do it, and conditions changing from day to day break and re-make allegiances just as rapidly even within separate Kikans. As for the "Underground Government", it is ridiculous to assume that any one politician or ex-general is going to chain himself irrevocably to the wagon of another under present unsettled conditions which might open up for him golden opportunities in the future. On a larger scale, there are few reasons why the more powerful groups now in existence should do anything more than bargain and trade with each other; as yet, none can be absolutely sure but that some dark horse or some new group might not suddenly enter the picture and steal the lion's share of the future power.

1. To what extent is there close collaboration among J.I.S. Groups?

We may not be running joint operations "with the J.I.S.", and our new agent may not be reporting back "to the J.I.S.", yet we must bear in mind that the Japanese Underground, consisting of groups doing intelligence work temporarily and those in it with the future in mind, is insecure and that it is composed largely of individuals who have known each other well for quite a long time. In what is turning into a feverish scramble for future power, a kikan chief has to know the intentions and assets of the others in order to arrive at temporary bargains and alliances and to play successfully the never-ending political game. In most cases, groups are separated only by shades of opinion or personal ambitions; therefore, when circumstances favor a merger, the differences are forgotten and the assets of both sides are reviewed. Often, at such times security is ignored and the discussion of the assets might include the description of an intelligence target or a connection with American G-2 or CIC.

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try to "sell" the kikan chief on his merits; a kikan chief might find it advisable to let his subordinates realize his importance, to assure their loyalty on a continuing basis. By the same token, an agent of ours trying to advance in the political underground game may reveal that he is connected with us. If he does so, it will soon be known throughout the underground. No one, even in his own group, may try to exploit the connection, and little may ever be formally reported to his associates concerning his work with us; yet the chances are good that the general outlines of his activity for us will soon become common gossip in the underground. The important point to remember is that in the future, many of these underground leaders will be in the J.I.S. Then there will be files, security, and perhaps some sort of a directed attempt to play their operation back into us. For the time being, however, it is probably just a question of security leaks.

2. Since we have submitted quite a few reports in the past which discussed the Japanese Underground and the secret intelligence groups in broad, rather inclusive organizational terms, it might be well to pause for an evaluation of these reputedly important federations.

a. The K.A.T.O. Kikan.

Both as a ^{SNP} federation of former Army Staff generals engaged in intelligence activities and research on behalf of G-2, GHQ, and also as a powerful and rather solid force in the Japanese underground, there seems to be little doubt that a group more or less under KAWABE Torashiro and ARISUE Seizo, working in loose cooperation with others, existed from about 1948 to 1950. It would be a mistake to assume that the four generals indicated were always working closely together or that they were the only generals involved. KAWABE is still working closely with TANAKA and IKAKURO; the senior Lt. General of the group YOKAWA Genshichi, was at that time fronting for the IKAKURO.

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Kikan. At best, the organization seems to have been a loose federation of general officers who sometimes worked together and often dropped out to pursue independent activities, when they would be replaced by others. The K.A.T.O. title seems to be little more than a convenient catch-word. There is little doubt that all of the generals thus working together for G-2 were in touch with old General UGAKI Issei (or Kazunari) and probably with Admirals YAMAZAKI and OKADA Keisuke as well, and were quite well aware of the political ideas of all concerned. However, it is extremely doubtful whether any of the latter were giving orders to the younger generals as chiefs of a higher echelon underground government. ARISUE was operating fairly independently of KAMABE most of the time, within the loose federation.

b. The Japan Underground Government (JUG) 1948-1950.

Referring to POYAMA and the early FODIUM reports, in particular to ZJL-215 and ZJL-266-I, it seems fairly safe to discount about 70% of the information we received concerning the "Underground Government" and its intelligence operations. Friendly relations and occasional meetings between important military, political, and diplomatic personages in the Underground, or even an occasional plan for the Grand Unification of all groups and lobbyists, hardly constitute a basis for assuming that a definite and all-powerful GOVERNMENT existed or even that the factions were as large and well-knit as described. It should be pointed out that (in 1949) Admiral OKADA Keisuke was 82, UGAKI was 83, YAKATSUKI Reijiro was 83, OKADA Keisuke was 80, and the politician OKAWA Shumei was just recovering from a genuine case of mental derangement. Nevertheless, several reports of that period described them as the chief figures vying actively for full control of JUG. The fact that reports from the same source frequently were completely contradictory and that mass listings of names, companies, and contacts would result each time

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in a different line-up is additional reason for scepticism. There appears to be little solid ground on which to base the assumption that this entire disorganized group constituted an underground government, or even several strong and unified factions competing to create one. Yet the term "chika seifu" was not merely a catch-word; nor was it "the J.I.S. (Cf. ZJL-215). It seems to have been less of a solid fact and more of a hopeful plan, an ideal, a wish on the part of Rightists who were trying during this period to exert individually and collectively as much pressure as possible upon the Liberal Party government and the Occupation. It was "the Underground", but the structural organization of it defies charting because we believe there never was a set structural organization nor an all-inclusive unity. Those reports are nevertheless valuable in providing a full cast of the characters engaged in underground political manoeuvres and indicating possible relationships and temporary alliances of interests. However, we must discount many of the rather sensational statements and, above all, desist from pinning a "J.I.S." label on the entire underground and the characters within it. (Cf. Section III above).

c. The UGAKI Federation.

In general, the above remarks may also be applied to what we called "the UGAKI Federation" as reported in most detail in early [] Reports, notably ZJL-442 and ZJL-444. In the former report, the agent himself hedged on the definiteness of the "Federation", its "board of advisors" and its chains of command, and offered (cf. para. 2 and 3) some very pertinent reasons why the information regarding definite groups which he reported should be considered with reservations. The chief mistake was to have considered it the "J.I.S.". Undoubtedly, since the reports from several independent

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sources discussed some sort of consolidation of two underground groups, principally Army ones, under UGAMI and MATSUMURA, there must have been a plan to that effect, possibly even an attempt, using these venerable figures as rallying points above the inter-group political strife. This probably did not last very long. In any case, regardless of their pursuit of certain strictly intelligence objectives, the main activities of all groups and individuals concerned in such a merger would have been directed at National resurgence, and therefore part of the broader struggle for political power.

d. The "Centralization" of Underground Groups (Cf. TUL-483)

If we discount the maintenance of the group lines and certain items of information since been corrected, this is probably a valid attempt at unification and centralization. Its failure and the detail, however inaccurate in spots, with which it is described, has the appearance for the first time of an inside viewpoint. Herein is shown the virtual impossibility of centralizing even the military underground pressure groups. Shortly after this attempt, the possibility of rearmament focussed the attention of all groups upon a field of clandestine activity distinct from mere intelligence. This makes it clear that earlier insistence upon I.S. unity in the Underground was designed primarily to attain political power.

C. 1951: The Change in the Character of Leading Organizations.

The beginning of 1951 brought a definite change in the nature and objectives of the leading groups because for the first time they were able to consider, optimistically and practically, the means to attain their real objective - not intelligence operations nor even the establishment of a Japanese Intelligence Service, but a build-up of political power and re-creation of the Japanese armed forces. Powerful groups at present are concentrated on these broader aims.

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The earlier visit of Mr. Dulles had awakened hopes of an early peace treaty, the probability of rearmament and the possibility that after the peace treaty the Rightist political objectives might be gradually achieved. Subsequently, the hope that the purge might be lifted for many more former diplomats and politicians had added to the feverish planning. The JONAN Enterprises Company - People's Independence and Self-Defense League Group is an excellent example of the new type of underground group which emerged. It is not a cover company, nor is it merely a lobby group, and it is definitely not an intelligence-gathering agency although some of its members occasionally peddle information to get personal or organizational funds and it includes a secret planning staff for the re-creation of the Army and possibly Navy Intelligence Services. All of these functions are provided for, but the major purpose is infiltration of the Japanese government executive agencies, particularly the "stop-gap army" (National Police Reserves), the Maritime Safety Agency, the Foreign Office, and, presumably in the future, the Army itself and the entire political structure. The membership represents every field and service, and its liaison connections to other powerful groups, particularly the RE's, are good. The RE's connections are strong, especially to "Third Force" groups. The new, broad objectives of clandestine operations by underground groups since it is organized to fulfill all of them. The JONAN Group contains former politicians like BABA Yusuke and TAKASE Den with connections to OKAWA Shunoi and HATOYAMA Ichiro; former diplomats KURIHARA Sho, TSUCHIDA Yutaka, and KATAI Tatsuo; ex-Army leaders TANAKA Shinichi, ORA @ SAKURABA Shiro, and, lately, OKAWA Gen-shichi; former Navy leaders MAEDA Minoru, ABAYASHI Shozaburo, KATAYURA Yoshiro, and Admiral YAMAMOTO's son-in-law Genetsu FUKUSHIMA, in addition to officials in the MSA who are former Navy men; former I.S. and Tokumu Kikan figures like NISHIHARA Masao, Deputy G-2, Kwantung Army, and WACHI Tatsaji of RAN Kikan;

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last but hardly least, it includes SATOH Ryosaku @ Hajime, onetime associate of KODAMA's in China and supporter of the Army Intelligence Units in China by virtue of his vast economic operations, legal or otherwise - a shadowy "friend" of the great in every field.

The other powerful groups? They are those which could adapt and already have adapted themselves to clandestine activity designed to advance them in the military or political field: the General Staff Clique under KAIJIN's general supervision, working and speculating on the problems and outcome of Army reconstruction, with intelligence-gathering objectives now properly made a subordinate duty and re-creation of the Army Intelligence of secondary interest; the Foreign Office group under SONO Akira, because of its already strong political and professional position; the "HATOYAMA Line" politicians, mostly purges, because HATOYAMA Ichiro will probably take over from Prime Minister YOSHIDA after the peace treaty is signed. There is one more possibly strong element: the new Field Officers' Clique of MATSURI Takushiro and TSUJI.

These groups are now concentrated upon the main phases of Japanese Nationalist resurgence - Army revival and the future political triumph of HATOYAMA and other Rightist leaders, including control over the Foreign Office. In order to understand the forces which are apt to control the various Japanese Intelligence Services in the future, we must have a general idea of the secret objectives of the present powerful pressure groups, objectives for the attainment of which they are at present launching vigorous clandestine operations. These objectives have a direct bearing on the nature of the J.I.S. agencies.

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V. The Probable Future of Nationalist Resurgence and its Influence upon

J.I.S. Activity.

Japan is certain to re-assume a predominant position in the Far East. Barring actual conquest or occupation by Communist armies, political forces ranging from ultra-conservative to moderately militarist will dominate the Japanese government, either overtly or covertly. So long as Soviet Russia remains a potent threat to world peace, Rightist governments will not be a danger to the United States; they will probably be an ally. We must recognize that this will happen as a result of Japan's natural security interests, her economic and technological potential, and the trend of her political ideology. Therefore, there is little we can actually do to prevent it, even if we so desired. However, the extent to which Japan's future Rightist trend will destroy or circumvent post-war democratic institutions, the extent to which Nationalist resurgence will develop militarism and lead to aggressive Japanese influence in the Far East, will be largely dependent upon the limitations set by the Western allies. Permitting national resurgence to a certain extent or countenancing the return to power of the Japanese Rightists are calculated risks we must take in view of Soviet and Chinese Communist ascendancy in the East. These are policy matters, however, and are not our subject. We give in this section a general view of the aims and potentialities of the Rightist underground which is seeking to dominate the reorganization of Japan. We do so because we believe it will attain that domination. Also, the degree and political nature of this Nationalist resurgence will indicate not only the probable forces within Japan which will control the future J.I.S. but also the national policy and thus, indirectly, the targets and objectives for the Intelligence Services.

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A. Ideology and Aims.

1. The differences in ideology and overall objectives of the present Rightist Underground and of the pre-war Japanese Ultra-Nationalists are very slight. Present-day underground leaders are merely more cautious, astute, well-informed, and realistic. They have a far clearer idea of the limitations of their own military and political capacity, and they have a wiser understanding of what they can get away with as far as other nations are concerned. For example, there are Rightists who speculate occasionally on the possibilities of a "deal" or a bargain with the Soviets or more particularly with Communist China; the majority, thinking realistically, know this to be virtually impossible and a losing game in the long run. Many persons in the Underground are basically anti-American; yet no sane Rightist talks of war with America. Any attempt on our part to describe these men as "pro-American" or as "ultra-conservatives" would be most unrealistic in view of their past records and current clandestine activities. Nevertheless, the fears that after the peace treaty Japan will resume a policy of military aggression or even that, in the absence of controls, the pre-war type of police state would be re-established are almost groundless. Most of these men have learned their lesson; not the lesson in democracy we have given them but the lesson in how to play international politics successfully. There are clear indications that next in line after the JCP and Soviet Russia, American policies and agencies will be the #3 target of the reconstituted intelligence agencies of this newest ally.

2. Significant Differences of Opinion among Rightist Groups.

a. In Japan, racial consciousness is not as strong as it used to be, but traces will always remain in the Oriental mind. There are two important types of Pan-Asian influence upon Nationalist thinking which might have a bearing

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on future government policy. One grew out of the peaceful wing of the pro-war DAI TOA KEMMEI, embodies the ideas of the late ISHIMURA Kanji, and is close to the aims and sentiments of the present Pan-Asian groups themselves. It calls for a real "co-prosperity sphere" in Asia, centering around a Japanese-Chinese Nationalist-Indian bloc to serve as a balancing third force in world affairs, although closer to the West than to Russia. A few Japanese Nationalists subscribe to this concept as a long-range ideal. The second influence of Pan-Asianism is less theoretical and more nationalistic: it calls for Japanese Nationalist backing of those Chinese Nationalist elements capable of achieving a counter-revolution in China, with or without American help, presumably to culminate in a Sino-Japanese alliance with Japan as senior partner. In view of the importance of China to Japan this idea is almost universally held in the underground. The question of whether or not CHIANG Kai-shek is the man to back is a hotly debated one. YAMAGUCHI Ganjo and OKAMURA Neiji were two of his strongest supporters; but most Japanese Rightists now view CHIANG as a "has-been" and hope to be able to deal with those Chinese leaders known as the "Third Force". This idea is strongest among diplomats, politicians, and Army men who formerly served in China.

b. Most of the differences of opinion in current Rightist circles are concerned merely with methods and the speed with which objectives are to be achieved. For example, the KATASE Clique is now inclined to abandon its attempts to infiltrate and control the National Police Reserve and to avoid any incident which might arouse American suspicion. YAMAKA Shinichi and the JONAN Group feel that control of NPR is essential for purposes of future internal control and since America will have to authorize a Japanese Defense Army anyway, waiting is not necessary. The amount of American supervision over the new Japanese Army is a hotly debated point. Every policy issue involving

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Japanese independence from American or other controls causes similar disputes. There is little disagreement on overall policy, and the ideology of all is limited to one or another shade of Nationalism.

c. The major cleavage in the Underground is due not so much to ideology as to traditional mutual distrust and division of interests. That split, between politicians and Foreign Office dignitaries on the one hand and Army men on the other, is the most significant for the future. The former group realizes that the peace treaty and the question of post-treaty controls over Japan are matters requiring possibly more concessions than any Nationalist really desires to make. Yet they feel that the mere avoidance of suspicion and untoward incidents will not be sufficient. Sacrifice of certain territorial and policy aims must be made with apparent willingness and docility in order to restore trust in Japan; the latter point is the key to success. Many fear that too many Army leaders will revert to the hasty, ill-considered pre-war type of Army planning and action once they get a free hand. Army men, however, feel that they have demonstrated their ability to be patient and moderate; they are traditionally opposed to any civilian control, and distrust most of the politicians and diplomats, particularly those in the present government actually enjoying a direct voice in the negotiation of currently vital issues. They fear that these diplomats will make far more concessions than are necessary.

3. The sharp lines of conflict within the underground which result from such relatively minor points of disagreement are difficult to understand, especially in view of the need at this time for unified action and policy. They can be comprehended only in the light of traditional prejudices. Regarding the paradox of Rightist desires for very close ties with America superimposed upon basic anti-Americanism, if we disregard World War II it ceases to be paradoxical. That is what most Rightists do: they try to disregard the unpleasant reality of World

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War II and its influence on Japanese-American relations. Furthermore, the self-abasement of the average Japanese in shame over the aggression Japan committed was never really shared by the Rightists. Today, even the average citizen has rationalized Japan completely out of the position of a conquered aggressor nation which, therefore, deserves punishment, deprivations, or at least continued surveillance.

B. Political and Foreign Aims.

The general aims of most Rightists in regard to foreign territory include the Ryukyus, the Bonins, South Sakhalin, the Chishima Islands, and Formosa. With the exception of territory taken by Soviet Russia, they feel there are good chances that Japan will regain the territories soon. In addition, certain more ambitious military men, envisioning the fall of Communist China with Japanese assistance, demand at least a joint Sino-Japanese protectorate over Manchuria, regardless of Korean opposition. Military men generally want the removal of American troops, just as soon as the Japanese Army can be rebuilt with American financial and logistic aid. Until the Soviet threat is overcome, they want a military alliance with America. A future alliance with Third Force Chinese is gaining favor, and already secret collaboration is being widely discussed.

Internally, the three immediate aims are: de-purging of the remainder of the Japanese Rightists and military men; removal as soon as it is politic of those democratic innovations restricting strong Nationalist policies; the discreet use of the police against the JCP or any other opposition. Rightist confidence in their ability to gain the support (or at least obedience) of the majority of Japanese without having to re-establish an outright police state is significant and probably justified. By the strict use of anti-treason and anti-sedition laws to stifle any dangerous opposition, vestiges of the new "nationalistic democracy" can be retained without danger to Rightist supremacy. This naturally implies

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establishment of a fair degree of behind-the-scenes control over educational and informational agencies, some economic controls, and the need for a strong nationwide counter-intelligence and police force. Some Rightist Army men would prefer more direct and forceful methods, but the majority appears to favor retaining the outward trappings of democracy and constitutionality, again for the purpose of retaining international trust of Japan.

C. Strong Points of the Ultra-Nationalist Position.

- (1) American credulity, too well-demonstrated already in Japan, and American political appeasement of the Japanese Rightists in view of the current world situation. The Rightists feel they are in a position to bargain for American non-interference in domestic policy in return for aid to America against Russia.
- (2) Lack of time for Japanese democratic institutions, education reforms and popular comprehension of liberal education, financial and industrial new-style leadership, individual sense of responsibility, and a liberal SPIRIT of democracy to develop to the point where they could stand up under the strain of the post-treaty reaction.
- (3) A natural trend of public opinion toward the Right, in view of Soviet and Communist dangers; the starting position was ultra-conservative.
- (4) Careful underground preparations and cautious limitation of operations to date, which has built up foreign trust and complacency.
- (5) The necessity for re-armament before even those Japanese who would like to remain more or less democratic have a clear idea of why or how to subordinate military authority to civilian control.

D. Weak Points of the Ultra-Nationalist Position.

- (1) The really weak bargaining position they hold vis-a-vis Russia. Most realistic Japanese Rightists recognize that in the long run they could not

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hope to get very much of a bargain from the Soviets. They could remain neutral if America did not meet their demands; but in case of war, they could not do so in view of Japanese security interests. Actually, they have no choice but to support American policy.

(2) American surveillance and supervision, and the definite suspicion and hostility of other "allies", notably the Philippine Republic, Korea, Australia.

(3) The widespread internal dissensions already rife within their own ranks as to methods, degree of speed, and division of future "spoils".

(4) Lack of money and the economic wherewithal in every field of activity.

This makes them further dependent on American aid.

(5) Lack of Opposition, but also lack of real popular support for their aggressive ideology. The average Japanese may have little clear idea of the spirit of democracy, but he knows he has some privileges he did not have before; under ultra-nationalism, he will be apathetic and resentful of the tighter police controls. If the Ultra-Nationalists use harsh pre-war "police state" methods, there will be strong opposition for a time, then the elimination of it by the CI and Police Force. If war should come before the Rightists can gain control of government agencies, the strong pacifist and pseudo-liberal trend in Japanese thought today, especially among youth of military age, will arouse fairly strong resistance for a time. The nation may go along with the program, but quite reluctantly. This is significant because it casts doubt on the morale, fighting spirit and overall value of the new Japanese military forces. The Japanese people have changed, even if the men able to control the government have not. Many fanatic soldiers will be found, but they will be only a fraction of what they were in the past. Especially with the sudden destruction of the unquestioning devotion to the Imperial Way, there are good indications that the reputation for ability, discipline, and fighting zeal of the Japanese Army will be found today in little more than one-quarter of the potential military manpower of the nation.

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VI. Present Combines which will probably have a Strong Voice in the Government and will therefore control the Future Intelligence Agencies.

There are still politicians, diplomats, industrial and financial moguls, and Army and Navy leaders who have not emerged from retirement or who have shown little inclination to compete in the underground struggle for future political power. There are many more subordinate figures, who would hardly be in a position to gain leadership and power in any event, who have yet to indicate to whom they will throw their support. Then there is the all-important matter of receiving the blessing of certain top-level personages which, even in 1951, has considerable bearing on the stability of a regime. The deep concern of the Emperor in the choice, policy, and stability of a regime, of a Prime Minister, of the future Army Chief of Staff, or even of a chief of intelligence carries very great influence. De-deification of the Emperor has not obliged him to participate in the actual political struggle for power; however, it has removed very little of the fealty shown him and yet has permitted him a new freedom to make his wishes and opinions known. His present middle position provides him with precisely the basis for real influence on events and choice of leadership which he lacked before the war. Within the major departments of government, the aged leaders of pre-war days, by their approval or disapproval of current political choices, still retain strong influence. If KAWABE does not have the blessing of the aged UGAKI or of OKAMURA Naiji (or Yasu-tegu), the ailing China Expeditionary Forces commander, it will not destroy his chances for becoming #1 man in the future Army, but it will diminish them. The tremendous potential power of an all-purpose underground organization like the JOMAN-Self Defense League (Genyosha) Group might be a controlling factor in advancing the fortunes of its favored candidates in the Army, Foreign Office, National Police, possible Navy, and political dominance of the Prime Ministry if not achievement of the position itself. Yet it is quite possible that some unforeseen development or internal quarrel might blast the tenuous unity of the

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so-called JONAN Group into violently warring factions or drive personnel essential to successful infiltration of a given department of government to work for a different pressure group. This could happen at any time, and to any group within the Rightist underground. As political deals and chances for future advancement increase, so will defections and betrayals. The coming maneuvers for power within the Rightist camp are going to make the "smoke-filled room" gatherings at American political conventions look like Sunday School picnics. Considering all of the above factors, it is impossible to venture more than very shaky guesses, based solely upon developments and maneuvers studied in the underground to date, as to the figures who will control the future Japanese government, its departments, and their subordinate intelligence agencies.

A. Control of the Army.

Despite the fact that KAWABE Torashiro is from the Air Force Branch, and although there is resentment and suspicion in underground circles, particularly among the army and navy figures in JONAN, concerning his close collaboration with American G-2, KAWABE is the most likely candidate for the post of future Chief of Staff. If he is named, KAWABE Kikan members will fill many of the top positions within the new Army command. In particular, KAWABE would probably want INAKURO Takeo as either Deputy Chief of Staff or as G-2, to direct all the nascent Army Intelligence organs. Either KAGESA Sadaaki or KATAMOTO Yoshitaro or both are likely deputies in the Intelligence Section, if not alternate choices for the top post, in view of INAKURO's other qualifications. If the present alignment of the JONAN Group is maintained and friendly relations with KAWABE and his subordinates continue, inclusion of Assistant Kwantung Army G-2 WISHIHARA, SAKURABA Shiro, and WACHI Takaji on top subordinate levels in that section will probably result. Inclusion of ARISUE Seizo is highly questionable, and KAWABE would not push ARISUE's inclusion against Underground opposition. In the field of strategy, if KAWABE is chief,

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SAKURAI Tokutaro and TANAKA Shinichi are likely candidates as Staff Strategy Officers. However, one of the main reasons why KAWABE is a likely choice is his reputation for securing the cooperation of diverse cliques and personalities; therefore, there are good indications that high positions on the staff will be offered to the new "Field Officers' Clique", specifically to HATTORI Takushiro and TSUJI Haganobu. KAWABE has the backing of retired high-ranking generals, such as FUSHIO Junzo, KOBAYASHI Saizo, and probably OGUNI Kazunari. He is on friendly terms with HATOTATE Line politicians and diplomats and is acceptable to the controlling figures (non-Army) in JONAN, SATCHEI, KURIHARA, and KOBAYASHI Shozaburo, because his cooperation with Americans on intelligence matters did not impede his secret efforts to establish a future independent Japanese Army nor has it made him a puppet. Yet, because of his collaborative efforts to date, he would probably be acceptable to American supervisory agencies also. ARISUE Seizo is virtually out of the running for the top post, once the Army is free from American control, and his chances under KAWABE or any other Army Chief of becoming G-2 again are slight, because of widespread Rightist enmity. ITAKURO is a possible "dark horse" alternate to KAWABE as Chief of Staff because of his recognized talent and moderate views. Furthermore, although from the same clique, he is not so closely identified as KAWABE with the Americans. In other words, for reasons of "face" he might become KAWABE's replacement to indicate a break with subservience to foreign control. If he were Chief, the line-up of subordinates would be about the same. OEKAWA Genshichi is a possibility by reason of seniority and possible JONAN backing, but he has more enemies than KAWABE. SHIMIZU Sada, last Minister of War, is a very likely possibility because of his close friendship with YOSHIDA Shigeru, but he would be less acceptable to other general officers, unless, of course, KAWABE, ITAKURO, or possibly TATSUMI Eiichi were retained as deputy. Thus, we see that future control of the Army and its subordinate intelligence

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agency will probably rest within the loosely organized group of General Staff officers affiliated with KAWABE, but with considerable concessions probably being made to rising field grade officers such as HATTORI, TSUJI, and others, and certain high posts being controlled by compromise with the Army generals within the JOHAN Group. The rumor has been circulated by his former subordinates that Lt. Gen. YANAGIDA, former Kwantung Army G-2, is alive and has escaped in disguise from Siberia. Little credence is placed in this report; however, if YANAGIDA should appear on the scene, there would definitely be some top-level re-alignments in Army Intelligence in favor of the Kwantung Army and Harbin School men.

B. Control of the Foreign Office.

Even at present, the working levels in the Foreign Office bureaus are well-staffed with men from either the HATOYAMA Clique or members of the old "Axis" or MATSUOKA Clique who escaped the purge. The HATOYAMA Clique, with its closer identification with the policy of Japanese-American cooperation, would seem the stronger. Moreover, HATOYAMA Ichiro appears the best long-range political prospect. Although the former diplomats in JOHAN ranks are mostly purgees, their future chances, especially since the fall of HONEGUCHI, are quite good. Most of them are veterans of the China service and their connections at present with Third Force Chinese leaders offer a valuable future asset. Moreover, close collaboration with the HATOYAMA Line Clique in both politics and foreign affairs has been a primary policy of the JOHAN Group's former diplomats. There should not be much friction between YOSHIDA Shigeru and HATOYAMA nor between their subordinates; it is expected that YOSHIDA will bow out gracefully as soon as HATOYAMA is free to take over. If he should not, and Rightist opinion of YOSHIDA's reliability is not high, it would not take the more Rightist HATOYAMA

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Clique very long to push him out. HATOYAMA is well entrenched in the underground. In particular, he reportedly has the backing of two notorious but still influential pre-war political leaders, OKAWA Shumei and YOKOYAMA Yui. They are both released war criminals well advanced in years with almost no chance of regaining political office themselves. Because a Foreign Office quasi-intelligence agency possessing some definite organization and stability already exists, and because it is staffed with "ideologically suitable" professionals, top-level changes in the control of the Foreign Office should not affect it very much. There is reason to assume that SONO Akira's actual power in the covert organization is already far greater than appears in the official roster; his authority will probably increase. There will be a great influx of new personnel and an increase in the number of secret outside groups affiliated with what may come to be "Foreign Office Intelligence", and certainly better opportunities in the future for overseas operations, but control on the actual operational direction level should remain about the same. The Foreign Office will probably have almost complete control over the overt and semi-overt fields of overseas intelligence, and the best chances for covert use of Japanese business men and cultural cover overseas.

Q. The Navy Problem.

If a Navy is re-established, the most likely figure to front for it is NOMURA Kichisaburo. If there is no Navy, the Maritime Safety Agency will probably be greatly expanded for coastal patrol and defensive purposes. It will be manipulated and infiltrated by subordinates of HOBAYASHI Shozaburo and MAEDA Minoru of JONAN, possibly under NOMURA's top-level advisory authority. If a Navy is authorized, the personnel controlling its subordinate intelligence service cannot possibly be determined at this stage. Other than the non-professionals mentioned above and KAWAJURA Yoshio, also of the JONAN Group, we know of

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no possibilities. In the event a Navy I.S. is re-established its leaders would probably be selected from among former experts now engaged in other occupations. If limited to an expanded ISA, the JONAN Navy wing is almost certain to dominate it and any minor intelligence agency it may possess. However, many former Navy I.S. personnel will continue in their other employment or will attempt to establish themselves within the Foreign Office agency or even the Army agencies, relying upon the close post-war relationships they enjoyed with Army kikan leaders.

D. The Internal Police and CI Agencies.

In the current plan advanced by (Attorney General) ~~MAKINO~~ ^{YASUHI} succeeds, autonomous police forces even for many towns and cities with populations over 5,000 will gradually disappear, the National Rural Police will assume more complete control over nationwide police activities, and the three major national police entities - NRP, NRP, and SIS- will be more thoroughly integrated under the direction of the Attorney General. It looks as though centralization to this extent and gradual take-over of local police powers may take place even before the peace treaty. We are not sufficiently familiar with the direction of these police agencies to be able to indicate who will later control the increasingly important special sections which deal with high-level counter-intelligence. However, infiltration and outside manipulation of the National Police Reserve and the National Rural Police by powerful underground lobbyists in the JONAN Group, and by military figures closely associated with the KATASE Clique, give some indication of the political forces which will exercise control. The contention of SATOMI and others that control of these expanding police agencies is important even though the JNPR does not become nucleus for the revived Army is believed to be valid; combined in some future plan, they will be the agencies or component parts of one agency which will handle internal counter-intelligence.

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E. Overall Political Control.

Politically, the chances of the HATOYAMA Clique appear to be the best.

NARAHASHI Wataru may have considerable chance of rising to power, but most indications point to HATOYAMA as the automatic successor to YOSHIDA Shigeru.

His control of the right wing of the Liberal Party is almost a certainty, and the Liberals are too strong to be shaken from their present leadership. However, the political forces exerting real control in the future are not apt to be solely the designated leaders of the political world any more than they will be those men chosen as Diet members by the electorate. The Diet may not sink to the "rubber stamp" level of inconsequence it occupied before the war, but as the bureaucratic entrenchment of the Rightist party increases, the legislative arm will be increasingly impotent to check dictation of policy by the top-heavy executive branches. This strengthening of the executive bureaus of government has begun under YOSHIDA. Its significance to our study is that actions taken or policies formulated by agencies in the executive arm of government can be countermanded only by a slow and complicated machinery.

Control of government bureaucracy, including nominal control of the Foreign Office and of any internal CI agency, will rest with the HATOYAMA Clique, but only insofar as its general political chances and specific control of these two particular agencies is maintained in conjunction with and by cooperative compromise with the Army General Staff Clique and Rightist business elements. Cementing this shaky combination will be either the JONAN Group or some similar underground pressure group with influence in all camps. If these links between Rightist politics, diplomatic bureaucracy and Army leadership are not strong enough to overcome policy differences and mutual distrust, and if both sides do not make reasonable concessions and above all clearcut declarations of their aims, there is an excellent chance of two separate policies resulting

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with no mutual dependence nor real control. Neither group is strong enough to control the other fully; any attempt in that direction will fail because the Foreign Office and the Cabinet can fall back upon the Constitution for support if threatened, while the Army could launch into underground operations and subversion if threatened by Cabinet or Foreign Office dictation. Should their mutual dependency end in a stalemate, there still remain those unofficial forces outside of the government to persuade or force both official power groups to work together.

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VII. What will the Future J.I.S. be like?

We are able to predict with greater certainty the nature, organization, and capabilities of the future Japanese Intelligence Services than their probable leaders and control agencies.

A. Ideology and Political Control will range from Ultra-Right to New-Style Militarist and, in general, the personnel will be more reactionary in their political views than the Japanese government itself or even than their sponsoring departmental agencies. The lines of political control should turn out to be fairly similar to the speculations made in Section VI.

B. Organization.

1. Centralization?

The creation of a centralized intelligence service is an ideal which leaders may discuss at great length in the future, but it is almost an impossibility. Neither the Army nor the Foreign Office intends to limit themselves to foreign intelligence targets; neither appears to be strong enough to dictate to the other; neither has the authority nor the organization capable of putting the rapidly strengthening police intelligence agencies on a completely subordinate level in the internal field. Centralization implies self-limitation to assigned areas of jurisdiction on the part of all components of the integrated unit: that will probably never happen in Japan. In the common interest of Nationalist revival and elimination of political opposition, coordination between the main agencies and between their sponsoring departments will be better than before the war. Moreover, the principal intelligence figures in all the agencies are better acquainted with each other than before the war. The principal intelligence agencies will be those of the Foreign Office, the Army, the Internal CI

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and Police Agencies, probably united under the Attorney General's Special Investigations Bureau, and possibly of the Maritime Safety Agency or Navy, if there is a Navy. These will by no means constitute the limit of information-gathering agencies, but they will be official and will utilize all other groups and agencies. Some of the latter which will be tapped by the official services are: Nationalist underground pressure groups and Pan-Asian groups seeking to subvert, infiltrate, or influence branches of the Japanese government and the intelligence agencies in particular; information-brokering groups; independent and semi-overt investigative and research agencies and societies, chiefly rightist and usually established for commercial or cultural reasons; propaganda units of the Japanese government and non-official political propagandists and societies.

2. Internal Organization.

Structurally, the organization and system of every major agency should be immeasurably better than before the war. The internal agencies, once Occupation controls are lifted and real power is placed in their hands, will be able to combine the Japanese tradition for detailed low-level coverage with the systematic and efficient processing which they have learned to some extent from the Americans. Their internal organization and efficiency should become the best. Even in the more specialized fields of foreign intelligence and special operations, organization and clear-cut lines of authority and responsibility should improve. There will be less insubordination and less waste of personnel because there will be fewer slots available in services cramped by insufficient budgetary appropriations.

On this point hangs the crucial test of their organizational stability and freedom. Because of the financial pinch, it will be easy to become dependent upon amateur and volunteer assistants. Such a system may work

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well in Britain, but in Japan it is certain to mean the subversion and manipulation of an agency by outside interests and pressure groups. The interplay of politics to determine who shall get the choice slots will not cease with the acquisition of official status. This inevitably means graft, corruption, political influence, hampering organizational efficiency and cutting across channels of authority.

C. Finances

This will be the big problem. The Japanese government cannot afford to pay its personnel adequately, much less make available confidential funds in sufficient amounts to operate properly. This places the various services - not to mention the individual officers and agents within them - in a dangerous position: they are tempted to look to other sources of income or operating funds. There will undoubtedly be many high-minded and patriotic individuals in the services who will do everything possible to prevent graft and waste. There will be less money to spend, therefore more careful operating and more economical planning may result. However, most of the non-professionals on a directional level and many of the professional unit or operations chiefs have served for some time at least with American agencies. Many of the salaries and advantages they received in the heyday of 1948-1951 will be far beyond what their own government can afford to give them. This means that despite the best of intentions, graft and misuse of authority will be more common than before; penetration and subversion will be constant dangers. Rather than risk subversion by foreign governments, the Japanese may well prefer the subversion and infiltration of their agencies by Rightist groups and wealthy commercial interests outside the government. It would be a lesser evil. Another solution would be to offer official cooperation to American Intelligence in return for financial aid. If we strike a hard enough bargain,

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insisting upon professional standards of quality without interfering too brashly or overtly in the politics within the agencies, we might find this very worthwhile. Certain Japanese personnel who are obvious choices for positions in the future Japanese agencies may decline such posts or be forced to resign because of the good living they made while working for American agencies. This should not apply to individuals at the top, since most former high-ranking personnel managed to maintain themselves quite comfortably with or without American aid, through service club contributions, patriotic donations, etc. It does apply very definitely, however, to the next level - the expert operators and the professionals, chiefly of former field grade rank.

D. Security.

Most Japanese involved in intelligence work have come to realize that a former friend who is a Communist is probably more of a Communist than a friend. This observation, elementary to us, is in itself a major improvement in Japanese ideas on security. Largely due to American indoctrination and influence, concepts of operational security are better than they were, and the personal security of individual agents has improved to some extent. Indiscreet discussion of operational matters and exaggerated ideas regarding cover have decreased. Nevertheless, there are still gaps in the Japanese sense of security, particularly in the use of open communication methods and in matters of personal conduct. The use of files and investigations for security purposes is better in the police and A.G. agencies than before, thanks to American training in the importance of system and checks. However, it is still fairly elementary, and in the other agencies, security investigation will probably remain a haphazard affair. This is particularly dangerous today because Japanese organizational security has become extremely hazardous. There is above-mentioned financial motivation for subversion and penetration; there is also

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the problem, intensified since the war, of dubious political loyalties. Many patriotic and anti-Communist Japanese are violently opposed to the Rightist program and will attempt to work against it; Communists and their fellow-travellers also will make every effort to penetrate and expose Rightist-controlled agencies, including intelligence. Large numbers of Japanese have begun to think in international terms and to scorn narrow national loyalties. One more hazard, this one in our favor, will be the strong pull of personal loyalties felt by many Japanese towards individual Americans with whom they have worked in the past five years. The majority of these former agents may not be subject to subversion by their former American contacts, but, induced by other motivations, they might at least be inclined to share information in a field where Japanese national interests were not the target. The possibility that even men like KAWANE and IMAHURO, although holding leading positions in the Japanese Army and Army I.S. respectively, might continue to cooperate with American agencies and even to work FOR them clandestinely, directly or through subordinate personnel, is not entirely fantastic. However, they could not be expected to do so for very long because of strenuous opposition on the part of other Rightists. The Japanese would not permit such an arrangement for very long after the treaty, not for reasons of its national security hazard but because they would be infuriated by the national servility and humiliation it implies. Persons in less important positions, however, may be able to maintain the role of dual agents for quite some time. These factors are of vital significance in determining the future value and method of handling of certain current operations.

B. Improvement in Techniques.

1. Largely due to American influence, the J.I.S. agencies will be better in planning, reporting, psychology of operating and agent handling, compilation of operational data, files, coordination of secret and overt data.

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and in most other techniques as well. In these techniques, however, they will still be inferior to the services of other major powers. The greatest change may well be an increased appreciation of the concept of secret operations as a specialized business requiring considerable work, training, and professional application of standard but flexible methods rather than a sort of highly exciting hobby. Methods of selecting and recruiting personnel are better but are still inclined to be impulsive and insecure.

2. There will be fewer physical and technological facilities in the future because of limited budgets. In a sense, this may be advantageous; the duplication and waste in pre-war Japanese administration as well as misuse of professional personnel may be reduced as a result. What technical equipment the future services do possess will be put to far better and more economical use, especially if they are paying for it themselves. If it is American-provided equipment, that may be another matter again. In any event, technical equipment, though limited in supply, will be better in quality than before the war because of the marked improvement in Japanese manufacturing of photographic, radio, electronic, and other special equipment and devices.

3. As mentioned above, CI and low-level investigative techniques, traditionally good, will be better than ever. After the treaty, the CI agencies will be free to run the traditional type of low-level penetration of hotels, foreign installations, public buildings, and even homes of foreigners. They have always been competent and thorough at this; now, by reason of their post-war training and thanks to the large numbers of English-speaking Japanese available for use at low cost, both their coverage and their ability to get maximum use operationally out of their personnel will be improved.

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They will probably continue to overlook foreign operations officers who possess inconspicuous cover and the protective coloration of their non-professional contacts. They may also waste considerable time on foreigners who have no connection at all to intelligence work. However, their methods of selecting targets will be greatly improved. Furthermore, we must remember that they are no longer unfamiliar with the American pattern of organization. This means that they know the important standard agencies and where to find them: e.g., C-2, CIO, JSC, Diplomatic Corps, etc. It also means that they will be quick to recognize deviations from the normal pattern. Since they are trying definitely to spot CIA representation in this area, they tend to identify any organization such as FRU as a "Chuo Tokumu Kikan" (Central Special Operations Unit), because it does not fit into the normal pattern. Surveillance and penetration of such obvious targets and all personnel connected to them will be priority missions. Soviet installations will be the #1 target, but it is foolhardy to assume that we will not get the same treatment.

F. Weak Spots will be the Traditional Ones.

- (1) Confusion of targets and quarrels over jurisdiction between the various agencies;
- (2) Hasty planning and insufficient research before beginning and implementing high-level operations, particularly those directed at foreign countries;
- (3) Vulnerability to penetration, subversion, and use by political leaders, secret societies, and commercial interests;
- (4) Insubordination and neglect of assigned duties;
- (5) Craft, lobbying, and combining intelligence functions with every other sort of clandestine activity;

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- (6) Feuds and personality clashes often influencing policy; personal loyalties conflicting with duty, operating efficiency, and even security;
- (7) Insufficient indoctrination in classic theories and methods of higher-level operations;
- (8) Incomplete and unobjective written reporting.

When the Japanese have had time to correct many of the initial defects and much of the initial disorganization in their nascent intelligence agencies, they may have several highly competent and professional services. In addition, the Japanese Foreign Service and Japanese commercial and cultural representatives overseas will have opportunities to engage in operations. Considerable success of the Nationalist revival within Japan, relative freedom from post-treaty supervision, and the reestablishment of an Army will bring about stricter internal control, coverage and access through police and CI agencies. We should be able to achieve a high degree of cooperation with the various Japanese intelligence agencies against Soviet intelligence targets. We will find them easier targets for subversion and possible defection than before World War II. And until they overcome their financial and security weaknesses, their organizational security will be constantly low. Nevertheless, they will make strong efforts to protect themselves from foreign control. Although we are closest to them as a nation and as a service and they may sincerely welcome our aid and cooperation, they will spare no effort to uncover our intentions and our operations, because they fear that these may be designed to curtail the Rightist trend of their renaissance or to exert supervisory pressure upon them.

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- (6) Feudalistic mentality, absence of a guiding policy; personal loyalties conflicting with operating efficiency, and even security;
- (7) Insufficient indoctrination in classic theories and methods of higher-level operations;
- (8) Incomplete and unobjective written reporting.

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Statements by ISHIOI Takashiro
regarding His Activities and Relationships

ZAL-689 (PB-253)

July, 1951.

Tokyo, Japan

18 July, 1951.

6-3 except as stated.

20 August, 1951.

1. I have met with Major General C. A. Willoughby several times, but the number of meetings which I have had with him is by no means unduly great. I cannot help but pay the highest respect to his personality and I feel completely grateful to the deepness of his consideration for me. He was indeed a great general and superior. It is entirely attributable to the assistance of Maj. Gen. Willoughby that I have come to win the understanding and trust of the United States Army. To my satisfaction, I was really able to work well.
2. Regardless of the articles which may have been provided for in the Potsdam Declaration, ever since the surrender of Japan I have been resolutely of the belief that the future world situation would not leave Japan defenseless. Therefore, even since the end of the war, I have been a firm advocate for the rearmament of Japan. I am not a man who availed himself of changing times in which everyone has begun to talk considerably in public about rearmament; ever since the surrender I have been holding firm to the opinion that Japan should be rearmed, and believe that is an absolute necessity. When it occurred last year that a plan was to be drawn up for the formation of a National Police Reserve, I was asked by Maj. Gen. Willoughby to formulate such a program and plan. I took it over. At that time, Colonel TSUJI Nishinaka advised me: "Don't accept such a task. It is not the right time to be doing that now." However, I did not conform to TSUJI's suggestion and proceeded with the plan for the formation of a National Police Reserve to the best of my ability, always with the aim in mind of the rearmament of Japan. In TSUJI's opinion, it was very difficult to recruit capable men under the circumstances then prevailing (August-September, 1950), even if the Police Reserve were to be organized. Consequently, TSUJI believed that no useful and competent Police Reserve would be formed. He argued with me that if I brought such a makeshift organization into being despite the attendant circumstances at the time, dishonor might be brought upon me and he told me that I should not make a laughing-stock of myself over such an issue as a Police Reserve force. Thus, his advice was in that way full of favorable and kind considerations for my personal position. Since I was aware of the great trust accorded to me by General Willoughby, however, and since I had been

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(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒

(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

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Date:

2005

advocating the cause of rearmament for a long time, I accepted Maj. Gen. Willoughby's request with willingness. I did not give in to TSUJI's kind and thoughtful warnings, as I considered that this project was my destiny, and believed that it should be the way of the Japanese people to go along with such directions and to perform the assigned mission, even though it would mean a dishonor to me personally.

However, as it happened, I was not permitted to take the initiative in establishing the Police Reserve and leading it myself, in spite of my efforts. I do not know whether that was good for me or not.

3. Since then, the report and resultant rumors that I was concerned with the National Police Reserve issue have gradually come to spread among the people. As an echo to the public advocacy of Japanese rearmament which became intensified since the end of 1950, voices of accusation and recrimination have been raised against me, becoming more and more intense. My name has appeared in both the TASS News Agency press and in newspapers following the Chinese "communist line. They alleged that my group was unilaterally plotting the remilitarization of Japan. They slandered me quite maliciously, saying, "This man is one who was a great wartime anti-American leader and was Prime Minister TOJO's protégé; he has now turned into a spy and tool of America since the termination of the war. This man, moreover, is plotting the rearmament of Japan! If Japan is to be rearmed by a man like him, we cannot stand silently by. In the event that Russia should come into Japan, he would probably cooperate with the Soviets too." Quite recently, again, another baseless and slanderous rumor is being spread about, that "General OKAMURA (Hajji or Kasutsumi) and SHIMOMURA (Sadamu) are using me to make preparations for rearmament, and are thus dangerous militarists. Both General OKAMURA and General SHIMOMURA are men of fine character. I have had almost no chance to meet with General OKAMURA. However, I sometimes do pay a visit to General SHIMOMURA, who is my senior officer and my former operational strategy chief under whom I once served. None among the former military men of Japan could equal him in the performance and observation of justice. It is indeed regrettable that I am at present in circumstances which do harm to the name of such a fine and noble superior.
4. I have never thought in terms of effecting the rearmament of Japan by the efforts of my group alone, nor have I advocated excluding other groups. I believe that it is wise policy to rear Japan; but I know full well how difficult a process those persons responsible for rearmament will be obliged to undertake before it can be realized. I did not undertake the project of the National Police Reserve of my own volition, but rather did it because of the instruction of Maj. Gen. Willoughby. Subsequently, I have entertained no political ambitions whatsoever. I do not have any demands as to my future position either. My current desire is merely to recruit and weld together fine men who are eligible and to see them from a point of view and to create an army of Japan really capable of contributing to world peace. It is extremely difficult to understand the reasoning of those former Japanese Army men, fortunate enough to enjoy considerable confidence and trust of the U.S. Army and contact with the latter, who not only do not try to aid me but who even denounce and exclude me.
(Evaluation for paras. 3 and 4, excepting new quotes: C-4-propaganda.)
5. As is known to you (Source), TSUJI Masanobu and I have long been intimately

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acquainted with each other. TSUJI has for many long years maintained a never-changing friendship towards me. In work, however, there exists no relationship at all between him and myself. (EVALUATION of last sentence: C-4; MATSURI above indicated that TSUJI knew of his projected task, among other things.) I am not planning Japanese rearmament in cooperation with him. I associate with him at the present time merely as an intimate friend. TSUJI often airs his opinions to me and often brings me information, but he is not doing so at my request. As far as my work is concerned, I have neither requested anything of him nor have I consulted with him. (Evaluation: C-5; Cf. above.) My relationship with him is extremely close personally and privately, but is completely non-existent officially.

The rumor is rampant among the people, nevertheless, that he and I are cooperating closely in working out a plan for Japanese rearmament. TSUJI is a very naive person and he is greatly concerned about me. Therefore, if he hears any malicious slander concerning me, he would investigate and confirm its source and then directly accuse the person who blurted it out of his irresponsibility. The other day, when MATSURO (Hideo) spoke ill of me, TSUJI went to MATSURO and stormed at him. I am indeed grateful for TSUJI's devoted friendship to me. However, when TSUJI castigates other persons in the cause of friendship, the people around the person attacked misunderstand me and speak as if I am urging TSUJI to make such charges. From this they derive more propaganda. Therefore, some day in the not too distant future, I intend to ask TSUJI kindly for my own benefit not to operate in such a radical and heated fashion.

6. I was several times invited by Mr. MATSUHARA (Ichiro) to visit him, and I met him. I went to see him because he indicated that he was anxious to hear my opinions. I certainly never asked him to undertake any activities for me. When I saw him, I was impressed with his fine character. He was a very gentle and courteous man. Concerning the problem of rearmament, he regarded me, his petty junior and subordinate figure, as if I were an expert, and he showed a serious and respectful interest in my opinions from beginning to end. Although I have no idea as to how much he appreciated my viewpoint, I am definitely looking forward to the day when Mr. MATSUHARA leads the cabinet.
7. Judging from the recent activities of the YOSHIDA (Shigami) Cabinet, it does not seem that the present cabinet members are even dreaming of the possible emergence of a MATSUHARA Cabinet. The present cabinet appears to be making every attempt to hold down the influence of the powerful MATSUHARA Clique.
8. With the replacement of General MacArthur and the return to America of General Willoughby, the attitude of the U.S. military authorities towards the Japanese Government has relaxed to a certain extent. At the same time, however, the force of recrimination against me appears merely to have become stronger. I feel that even the existing YOSHIDA Cabinet is attempting to get rid of me. (In that connection,) my acceptance of the invitation of MATSUHARA Ichiro is said to be cunningly used against me.
9. As I stated above, I am at present in a tough spot. Some people urge me to take resolute and vigorous counter-measures towards the malicious propaganda and slander (directed at me.) Other people say that TSUJI's close connection personally to me is not doing my reputation any good, and they warn me against any further association with him. I do not have the slightest intention of bowing to these suggestions. If I were to try to make any excuse or to take

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207-689 (A-253)

any public counter-measures, it would only become. My enemies who are blinded with self-interest and service would certainly help and make ill use of my excuses and would surely fire back another blast of slander.

I have no desire at all to see old soldiers quarrel and split up on such a pitiful matter. However much I may be rebuked and slandered, I should like to keep silent and non-resistant and to bear it. Reflecting back upon my past actions, I have done nothing of which I should be ashamed, though there are some who are casting slurs at me. That is all that consoles and relieves my mind. Nor do I intend now even dream of breaking up with ISRAEL.

10. In my judgment, there seem to be two different groups of former soldiers who are now concerned with recruitment and which are also entertaining animosity towards me. One of these groups is headed by former Lt. General TAKEMO (Hideo) and the other is a group primarily formed and directed by Lt. General TAKEDA Isamu.

a. Lt. TAKEMO seems to be operating on an extremely large scale in political, economic, and news publication circles. He also appears to be making a plan for the creation of a new political party. The general nature of this new group will probably be reinforced by the group of former soldiers (B) and others who are right-wing leaders of the Imperial Army, including Lt. General (A) and others (C); former Finance Minister and present president of the Japan Steel Works Inc. (KAWANO). Lt. TAKEMO seems to be utilizing the argument for recruitment just as a tool for political purposes. In his group, there appears to be no one who is seriously planning the expansion of recruitment. The principal auxiliary man of TAKEMO's group are Lt. General (D) and Lt. General (E), a former lieutenant colonel, a certain group (F), Lt. General (G) and Lt. General (H), a former lieutenant colonel, Lt. General (I) and Lt. General (J), a former lieutenant colonel, and a few others. These persons are by no means acting in a staff officer capacity to Lt. TAKEMO, but Lt. TAKEMO, who is so gifted with abundant talents, advises, directs, efficient, and also de-camps the not necessary for consultation. All these persons, therefore, are operating at the crack of his orders and under his dictation. For this reason, very few mature and experienced persons come under TAKEMO; in the ranks of those who are gathered together around TAKEMO, an extremely large number are not yet forty years of age.

- b. Lt. General TAKEDA is considerably trusted by Prime Minister TOJO. TAKEDA claims that he is formulating a plan for recruitment in cooperation with Lt. General TAKEMO (A). However, in reality there seems to be no relationship nor cooperation between the two. It is reported, nevertheless, that many persons who do not know the truth and who believe in Lt. General TAKEDA's statement come to rally about him.

11-11

44-7-9-23

From: Tokyo, Japan / Report No: ZJL-713 Local File No: PD-268
 No. of Pages: 9 No. of Enclosures: 0 12 8/25/51
 Report Made By: [] Approved By: []
 Distribution:
 By copy to: Wash Post - 2 Orally to: []
 [] - 1
 Files - 3
 Source Cryptonym: [] References: ZJL-689; 685; PD-226.

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

1. In between the receipt of the 10 August report and that of the 25 August report, a rather snide note (which was returned by courier, sealed) was sent to [] on the subject of the 10 August report concerning TSUJI's remarks and was report used for ZJL-689 concerning MATSURI Takushiro's remarks. The note paralleled the attitude expressed in PD-226 by [] concerning what to do about []
2. Apparently the rasp contained in that note had some effect, because [] promptly compiled the 25 August report which contains the real meat of this report, and has not stopped yet. His subsequent reports have not been processed fully as yet, but are uniformly good in quality and detail. Even this report, though it gives us details on TSUJI's tribulations rather than his activities, concerning which we get mainly hints, certainly gives us a close-up of TSUJI. Furthermore, it is followed up by another recent report which gives more details on the items discussed in paras. 4p and in 6 of this report and on SATO Katsuro's alleged "mis-use" of TSUJI.
3. Re para. 3: A [] report of this week, not yet processed, identifies the NIPPON YUKAN SHA as a subsidiary interest of the prominent Rightist, MATSURA Gishiki, who is a good friend and recent collaborator of SATOMI Hajime and who is the backer of the NIPPON KOKUMIN MINSHUSHOJI DANPAI of HANDA Biji, HONDA Kenichiro, SASAKI Takeo, OYAMA Ryoshi and others of the SHUPPETAI Incident fame. NIPPON YUKAN SHA is one of the sources of funds for the former God's Troopers.
4. Re para. 10: This is the most clear of many references throughout the report as to TSUJI's actual picture of himself as a spiritual descendant of the Army and Navy mutineers of the pre-war "Incident" days - his firm desire, not to evade arrest or trial, but rather to use it, whether obviously guilty or obviously not (we choose the former obviously), to broadcast his political views and play the party. TSUJI's application of this time-honored Japanese Rightist device for gaining public sympathy is not quite so comic-operative as it appears at first glance to the untrained Western view; in fact, we can be very grateful, as probably the prosecuting attorney was also, that his illness prevented it.

FORM NO. 10-10
 FEB 1946

LR 601

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
 Privacy []
 (c) Methods/Sources []
 (4)(G) Foreign Relations []

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 Date: 2005

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(SCL-75) COVER LETTER, P-366

5. This memo-on-duty form of account on the "views of his good friends MITCHELL and ISHUR has been mentioned E and will appear in later reports. Details on MITCHELL's organization are not appearing.

6. In C just say, he appears to be trying (a) to serve his job by presenting desired information on his friends (b) to vindicate or at least allay the suspicion concerning his friends and (c) to show that he recognizes the need his friends have for help and to heed them - simultaneously. E EXHIBIT that ISHUR was guilty of violating the above guidelines, and no report ISHUR is vacillating about it; however, E put up a good red-herring case for ISHUR, MITCHELL, MITCHELL and E that just was the intended basis for his defense in court. For E will be definitely from the "harpy"-style defense of himself in court which would have any indications but also effective propaganda too. He feels certain that E is being about at least in saying that he did not and does not want to see the ISHUR case (from which he nevertheless tries to absolve ISHUR of direct blame by claiming it is ISHUR's AND Publishing Office subordination who are the real villain(s) used for political purposes. RA does he agree with ISHUR's political views as ISHUR has himself stated them (but E states those views if irresponsible are due to bad influences around ISHUR and in a later report there are details on this.) There is something akin to a conflict of ideologies - personal and ideological - in which the ideological view out a bit, unfortunately for us. A thorough study of this report will reveal many more interesting personal angles which we do not feel need to be pointed out to you here.

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Subject: Activities of Former Colonel TSUJI Masanobu Report No: 271-713 (25-268)
Date of Information: 3 Mar - 21 Aug 51
Background Info: As stated
Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan Date Acquired: 10 and 25 Aug 51
Evaluation: C-2, except as stated Date of Report: 10 September 51
Source: []

(Field Note: This report is based upon two reports received from Source. The first, received on 10 August, purported to give the main points of TSUJI Masanobu's alleged account on 25 July of his activities and attitudes (para. 1-4 below); the second, written by [] in the first person, was rec'd on 25 August and consisted of a running account of daily developments in the TSUJI Case plus operational data concerning background of the case. Since the developments in the TSUJI Case are almost inseparably connected with Source's own part in it and his relations with MATSURI Takashiro and TSUJI, and since the pertinent operational details are therefore in themselves intelligence information to us, we have preserved in the following report []'s own account in the first person, with a minimum of editing. Our comments appear in the cover letter.)

1. Very few persons in Japan knew of the intimate relationship between TSUJI Masanobu and myself, which began when I was an Army Engineer captain (about 1939). We seldom met in pre-war days, but we trusted and liked each other very much nevertheless. Our longtime intimacy was publicized through inclusion of brief anecdotes concerning me in TSUJI's two books, "Three Thousand Leagues (XI) of Secret Escapes" and "One to Fifteen". Shortly after my return to Japan last year, an article in the left-wing magazine "SHINSHO", in the August 1950 issue, I believe, stated that TSUJI and I were plotting the rearmament of Japan. That article was later reprinted in the Chinese Hongkong weekly, "Newspaperman" (XINWEN JIAO). According to TSUJI himself, even then the Attorney General's Special Investigations Bureau had begun to investigate him, was putting a surveillance around his own house. Not wishing to be caught in the surveillance nor to draw public notice, I tried to minimize my contacts to TSUJI. From late March until 25 July 1951, I did not meet him directly anywhere. (Last sentence: O-k.)
2. The lecture that TSUJI delivered before members of the Liberalists Club (JIYUJIN KUBAN) on 3 March 1951 attracted public attention in early April 1951. At that time, some of my friends told me they hoped I would caution TSUJI. Others asked me if TSUJI would be arrested or not on the charge of violating the Purge Ordinance. Although I was not fully familiar with the contents of his lecture, I personally entertained little anxiety, because TSUJI had once told me that he checked closely in advance with officials of the Special Investigations Bureau to insure approval of his actions by

Classification

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Form 88 8-1-51
7-10 4-10

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy ☐

(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒

(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency's

Date: 2005

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that agency. (C-3) When I heard that the Communist Party was making ill use of TSUJI's remarks, I relaxed even more, feeling certain that TSUJI, an ardent anti-Communist, could hardly say anything which would be favorable to the JCP. I concluded, therefore, that TSUJI's lecture was merely being misquoted and a grossly distorted version of it being publicized. (C-3)

3. The rumors and opinions concerning TSUJI's lecture are still rampant, and in fact, the voices in opposition to TSUJI in July 1951 seem to be stronger. In its 22 July 1951 issue, the NIPPON YOMEI (Japan Evening News) boldly attacked TSUJI's speech with a strong rebuttal against it. Until that time, I had been very reticent concerning my own attitude and non-committal concerning the comments of friends on the TSUJI question. But I began to wonder if those persons who have long held strong dislikes for TSUJI might not be working out a malicious plot against him purposely, using TSUJI's indiscreet speech as a basis.
4. (Date of Info: 25 July 1951). When I had met TSUJI in March 1951 he told me to phone him at the ATO (Army & Air Force) Publishing Office if contact were desired, since he was usually there during the daytime. Therefore, on 25 July 1951, I made a phone call to that office, for the first time (last phrase: C-4), and asked if TSUJI were there. The person answering the phone demanded my name and address and then attempted to brush me off, telling me TSUJI was not there and was expected to be hospitalized for an ulcer that day. I felt certain that TSUJI was at the ATO Publishing Company office and the receptionist of the phone call did not want me to see TSUJI without knowing my connections to TSUJI. I immediately went to TSUJI's home, and his wife told me that he was at the ATO office, which I then visited for the first time (C-3). The man who answered the phone earlier, SATO Katsuro (佐藤 勝郎), excused his previous lie by saying that TSUJI had just returned, even before I introduced myself. TSUJI was in a drawing room at the rear. At first glance, I could see that he was greatly debilitated and urged him to go to bed immediately. Afterwards I talked with him for about four hours as he rested. The main points of TSUJI's remarks were as follows:

(Date of Info for the following: 25 July 1951; Sub-source: TSUJI Masamobu; Evaluation: C-3)

- a. The lecture which TSUJI delivered on 3 March 1951 to the Liberalists Club seems to have aroused undue criticism from various circles and to have been misused widely as a topic for fomenting social gossip.
- b. The purpose of the lecture which he made before the Liberalists Club has been variously interpreted and misunderstood by the public. Inasmuch as he had often been requested by the club chairman to give a lecture to its members, on the condition that it would be kept off-the-record and not publicized, TSUJI finally acceded to that request. He did not volunteer to make the speech nor solicit the opportunity for any purposes. There has never been any connection between TSUJI and

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the Liberalists Club except that its chief comes from TSUJI's native country. TSUJI prepared three alternative themes or topics, leaving the final choice up to the members. Consequently, he did not actually choose the lecture topic himself. (O-b)

- c. Since he balked at the constant close watch of the S.I.B., he usually contacted that Bureau in advance deliberately to tell them whenever he was making a trip, much less a speech. (O-b) He told the S.I.B. that he was going to make this speech too. (O-b) However, afterwards, TSUJI was approached by a man from the S.I.B. who told him that a certain NAOI fakeo (NAOI fakeo) had secretly informed the S.I.B. about his lecture, describing it as "outrageous" and urging the S.I.B. to definitely punish TSUJI. The S.I.B. investigator inquired and was furnished full details of the speech. After that, the investigator reassured TSUJI that if such were the contents of his lecture, there was no case to prosecute.
- d. Soon after this, the JCP and affiliated leftist organs began to draw public attention to TSUJI's speech, which was spot-quoted in pamphlets and JCP Wildcat newspapers.
- e. When the Club first asked TSUJI to make the speech, he declined it because of restrictions upon him as a purger and because he feared misinterpretation of the lecture, causing grave repercussions for the future. However, the Liberalists Club is a private group of persons who are all cultured, no one but club members could attend, and TSUJI had been promised that there would be no publicity of the speech. So he delivered it.
- f. NAOI fakeo proved to be a member of the Liberalists Club. TSUJI wrote NAOI a letter stating that he desired to take action against NAOI if the report were true that the latter had maliciously informed S.I.B. of TSUJI's lecture subject. NAOI replied that the report of his informing S.I.B. about details of the speech was completely groundless and false. Yet, TSUJI found out from S.I.B. contacts that NAOI had secretly brought them TSUJI's letter to NAOI, which the latter termed "a letter of intimidation."
- g. Unknown to TSUJI, his speech was apparently taken down in shorthand. Since the stenographic copy of his speech was later circulated among the members, it seems quite likely that some of the members are either Communists or are closely connected to the JCP, which later used excerpts of this text. (O-b; a wild counter-accusation at best.) The Liberalists Club seems to be absolving itself of blame for publicizing TSUJI's speech using the remark in the speech as an alibi: "Because what I am discussing is my own firm conviction, I would feel no shame wherever it might be presented." As a result, TSUJI was startled by the lowness of their intelligence and morality.
- h. Five months after the speech was given, TSUJI heard constantly the rumor that he will be arrested momentarily; in fact, on 24 July he was told

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that the National Rural Police would arrest him the next day, but his own query of the S.I.B. and the N.R.P. as to their plans proved this false. All sorts of rumors have been spreading concerning TSUJI's activities and ideas which annoyed him very much: rumors that he was engaged in secret political activities and building up an ultra-nationalist or Rightist group, or most typically, that he was planning formation of a nation-wide Armed Action Unit or other operations preparatory to "rearmament." At first TSUJI worried about these, fearful that persons ignorant of the true circumstances would misjudge him, but the situation had developed so badly to date that he was in a despairing mood, even unwilling to defend or explain himself. As a result, he would welcome arrest by the police or other (HQ) authorities and a conclusive interrogation so that the true facts might come to light and people could judge him by the facts and not by gossip. TSUJI's opinions are based, he states, upon the Japanese Constitution and General of the Army MacArthur's encouragement of Japan to become the "Switzerland of Asia." Since TSUJI was acting for no ulterior political purpose (C-4), a fair investigation would reveal his innocence. Also, because of a suspected ulcer of the stomach, he would welcome arrest as affording a bit of peace and quiet while awaiting trial. However, since S.I.B. stated it was not going to arrest him, TSUJI planned to consult in a few days with a noted doctor on the Izu Peninsula and undergo a dietary cure, both recommended to him by former Maj. Gen. MATSUSHI Yasuyuki (三好 隆二). (C-2)

3. TSUJI had already been asked for interviews by Mr. Joseph FROMM, American representative of U.S. Navy and World Report, Mr. Robert MARTIN, "CMA" (sic) special correspondent, and representatives of Canadian and Australian newspapers. With the permission of S.I.B., TSUJI aired his views and defense arguments to them. (C-4) The reporters all listened attentively and unanimously expressed their appreciation of his frankness, indicating to TSUJI that it was the first time they had heard such opinions (C-4) and that many Japanese might very naturally feel similarly but not be truthful in stating their view. (C-2) TSUJI felt that they might have been flattering him to some extent but that they genuinely appreciated his blunt truthfulness more than his own countrymen. The Canadian newspaperman happened to be a War Crimes Investigator who had worked on apprehension of TSUJI in 1945, but even he was impressed. (Cf. Cover letter)
4. TSUJI wants to clear up the case of his Liberalists Club speech and to vindicate himself and to obtain the opportunity to voice his opinions officially as well. Therefore he will never avoid arrest. (C-2)
5. Concerning SUGIYAMA Mitsuru, TSUJI did not even faintly recall such a person, though ~~admitting~~ that he might have met him a few times since they were both in the Burma Area during the war, but denied any current connection to him. Any rumor that TSUJI is using SUGIYAMA as an operative would be the result of false boasting on SUGIYAMA's part.
6. When TSUJI heard in mid-July that Lt. General IWAKURA Hideo had reproached MATSURI Takushiro and TSUJI, he visited IWAKURA to scold him about this.

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SPOTI does not feel that either the present Police Reserve nor any other retirement plan is due to significant adjustment. He feels that the removal of the liability and funding principles of this scheme is the main problem. Only when does need for defense of the country by the Japanese Government, in the form of a Japanese invasion of a KCP population, will time police gather and full retirement might be effected. (b-4) The removal of a military organization would be a waste unless there is actually danger to Japan herself. The police upon the National Police Reserve should be foolish. Retirement can only be seriously considered in the instance of an emergency.

Under present circumstances, the East Asia League (FOA LEAGUE) of General JIMRICK should be revived and reconstituted. It should not be left as it is now. The League must make a detailed and serious survey of Asia as it is advocated by the various present Asiatic countries and then establish a union and policy common and acceptable to all of the countries concerned. The reason the JIMRICK was that the League was not acceptable to the other countries of Asia was that it advocated it from the standpoint that Japan, as a nation superior to the others in Asia, should be the leader of Asia. (And of a union with ISUJI as sub-source).

As TSUI and I were talking, a Metropolitan Police man came to the bedroom and asked for an interview with TSUI. After a few minutes, the policeman left, talking with his several body men from the KPO Publishing Office compound. The policeman's visit seemed to be merely to confirm whether TSUI was at home or not.

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6. A man whom I thought I recognized in the ATO Office was described by TSUJI as TANABE Shinsai (or Arayuki; EN 12, 2). TANABE is in charge of editing the ATO Monthly Report (ATO SHOBO GEMPO). TSUJI gave no further explanation concerning this publication, but it seems that this monthly report is put out by SATO Katsuro and TANABE to publicize TSUJI and increase his following. The articles in it are written anonymously and propagandize and play up TSUJI's books and political articles and opinions. These are hardly the functions of a normal book store running a small publishing office on the side, and it seems obvious that the ATO SHOBO (Publishing Office) is involved in some kind of political operation or activity, using TSUJI's relationship to it to gain popular support. TSUJI's connection to it needs further scrutiny. (C-opinion)
7. (Date of Info: 27 July 1951). TSUJI went to the hospital on the Izu Peninsula specializing in a dietary cure which had been recommended by General MIYOSHI Yasuyuki. It did not seem to be a very modern medical treatment, but what could one expect from MIYOSHI? (NOTE: We admit that this last remark is "out-of-place" here, but it does show Source's persistency in applying personal prejudices any way he possibly can.)
8. (Date of Info: 28 July 1951). I called on SATO Katsuro at the ATO SHOBO (Publishing Office) in the afternoon and asked about his relationship with TSUJI in the course of talk. It was as follows: (Following, Sub-source: Evaluation: F-3)
 - a. In 1934, when SATO was attending Army Officers' School, TSUJI was his instructor and company commander. SATO's name appears in records of the so-called "October Incident," as "Cadet-Officer SATO". A group of these officers who later provoked the February 26 Incident in 1936 were working upon the Army Officers' School cadets already in 1934, in order to recruit fellow-conspirators. SATO was one of those approached. After many contacts and agreements with these officers, SATO came to perceive that they were plotting a conspiracy for armed revolution and to get the cadets involved in its execution. He then tried to warn his fellow-students not to participate in such a campaign, but did not succeed. Firm in his ideas, SATO related the whole affair to TSUJI, who immediately took counter-measures which resulted in a major re-shuffle of Army School personnel. However, SATO finally was subjected to dismissal from Cadet School himself. He joined the Manchurian Army later, and became an officer. SATO began the publishing business at ATO in 1950, and at first received considerable aid from TSUJI.
9. (Date of Info: 2 August 1951). The ASAHI Shinbun (Newspaper) reported that the S.I.B. had indicted TSUJI on the charge of violating the Purge Ordinance. TSUJI had returned to Tokyo on this very day. Reading about the indictment, I contacted a friend of mine, YOSHIE Chiyo (shi), a lawyer, and requested him to prepare the brief for defense of TSUJI in the indictment in case TSUJI would agree to retain him. YOSHIE agreed. YOSHIE Chiyo (shi) (名義) stated that TSUJI's case was supposed to be handled only by the Special Surveillance Section of the Tokyo District Attorney General's office.

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Moreover, it was originally planned that the case should be handled as a closely-guarded secret session. However, since the ASahi News had scooped the case, the authorities were in a quandary as to what to do. (Sub-source: YOSHIE; Evaluation: F-3). YOSHIE was formerly a criminal prosecutor who was sent to Shanghai in about 1940 by the pre-war Justice Ministry. My association with him started at that time. I could see that he was a man of fine intellect and character. After 1942, he served at the Tokyo Court of Appeals as prosecuting attorney for ideological cases. Our friendship grew very strong. In 1944, he was appointed the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Aomori District Court, and later transferred to Matsubashi District Court in the same capacity. Purged after the war, he set himself up in private law. He belongs to the Tokyo Dai Ichi Lawyers Association (TOKYO DAI ICCHI BENGOSHI KAI). His address is #703, 2-chome, Dananchofu Machi, Tamagawa, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo, phone number 02-3537.

10. (Date of Info: 3 August 1951). Early in the morning I called on TSUJI and urged him to hire a lawyer, but TSUJI appeared determined to fight the case all by himself. I advocated Mr. YOSHIE and tried to make TSUJI see common sense; TSUJI seemed more interested in Mr. YOSHIE's background than in hiring him as a lawyer. He stated he would visit the highly-recommended YOSHIE that afternoon. I advised YOSHIE of TSUJI's plans. In the evening I again visited TSUJI at his home to hear the outcome. TSUJI's statements to me were as follows: (Sub-source for the following (a & b): TSUJI Masanobu; Evaluation: C-3)

- a. TSUJI was not particularly desirous of being sentenced guilty, but neither had he been too anxious to claim his innocence. His chief desire had been to appear in court as soon as possible, namely, prior to opening of the peace treaty conference in early September, in order to give forth with his beliefs and opinions in full. (C-2) TSUJI felt that his bold statements in court would be of great help to deepening public attention and consideration to the articles of the peace treaty, and that he could make at least that meager contribution to the Japanese people. For that purpose, he could see no point in getting a lawyer to help him. (C-2)
- b. Until he had met Mr. YOSHIE, he had not any intention of asking for help in his defense, but merely wanted to know the man. TSUJI felt that YOSHIE was as great and fine a man as I had said, and was grateful for the recommendation. TSUJI had entrusted his defense to Mr. YOSHIE and asked him for the quickest possible opening of a trial.

11. (Date of Info: 4 August 1951). TSUJI met YOSHIE again and signed the documents making YOSHIE his attorney in the case. I asked YOSHIE privately for his version of the talk with TSUJI. YOSHIE indicated that he was basically opposed to defending individuals who are not resolutely determined to and prepared to defend their own innocence from the beginning but who have ulterior motives; nevertheless, he added, since he liked TSUJI's determination to face this charge and felt friendly toward TSUJI, he accepted the case. He planned to defend TSUJI by basing his plan upon the fundamental ideas advocated by TSUJI and proving the innocence of the ideas themselves. (C-2)

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271-713 (7D-268)

12. (Date of Info: 7 August 1951). I went to the ATO Publishing Office in the evening and met with SATO Tatsuro. TSUJI had told him that he was very grateful to me, and had also told him that I had secured YOSHIE's help for him and was handling the defense fee and bonus fee payments to that SATO should keep out of that entire affair. TSUJI had met with Mr. Joseph FROMM on 6 August at the Tokyo Correspondents Club. TSUJI was expected to have an examination that evening by a medical specialist at his own residence. TSUJI had been quite adamant in refusing medical treatment earlier, but SATO had arranged for a doctor to go there and examine him by force if necessary. SATO had had a sub-poena from the S.I.B. and had been interrogated as a witness in the TSUJI Case. (Sub-source for para. 12: [] Evaluation: F-3)
13. (Date of Info: 8 August 1951). I called on TSUJI and SATO at the ATO Publishing Office in the afternoon. When SATO had reported to the S.I.B. at 10:00 that morning, the prosecuting attorney for TSUJI's case, Mr. SAKUMA, had asked him about TSUJI's physical condition, which SATO described in detail as very grave. The prosecutor had then stated that no matter how anxious TSUJI might be to get the case straightened out, it would be absolutely out of the question for the procurator to deal with a sick person. He therefore asked SATO to advise TSUJI that the questioning would be postponed until TSUJI was completely recovered. TSUJI was then receiving treatment at the Tokyo Red Cross Hospital (SEKI JUJI KYOKU), where SATO informed him of this. Already the press was on to the news of TSUJI's hospitalization—a Mainichi Shinbun reporter there mistook SATO for TSUJI and was given the brush-off by the former without ever recognising TSUJI right there. SATO was again interanneted by the prosecutor's office that afternoon. (Sub-source: [] Evaluation: F-2). (Sub-source for the following: TSUJI Masanobu; evaluation: G-3). The diagnosis of the highly suspected case of ulcers revealed not only ulcers but also cancer of the stomach and on 9 August TSUJI was to be operated upon at the Red Cross Hospital. MATSURI wished to let me know that he was very grateful to me; (TSUJI did not state "why") TSUJI had met Joseph FROMM on the afternoon of 6 August. FROMM, scheduled to return to America shortly, had asked TSUJI to put his views on current affairs in writing, which TSUJI anxiously had completed before his operation, not knowing the outcome. The views were written on 150 pages, had been translated into English, and were given to FROMM on 6 August under the title of "Message to Those of the Ages of Twelve to Forty-Five" (the number "45" may be an error). FROMM was quite worried about the recent indictment case against TSUJI and offered to appear in court himself as a witness for TSUJI's defense. TSUJI merely answered that he would have to visit him the next time in jail and refused FROMM's offer with gratitude. FROMM again offered to help in any event in any way possible. A Canadian newsman was present during all of that interview.
14. (Date of Info: 9 August 1951). TSUJI was sent to the Japan Red Cross Hospital for his series of operations. SATO was again interrogated by the public prosecutor, SAKUMA, concerning his relations with TSUJI.

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LJL-713 (PD-266)

15. (Date of Info: 11 August 1951). TSUJI had his entire stomach removed. HATTORI asked me to have a talk with him on 13 August concerning the case and other matters.
16. (Date of Info: 12 August 1951). TSUJI had his appendix and his caecum removed in a double operation.
17. (Date of Info: 13 August 1951). I met with HATTORI Yakushiro at his home. We discussed the TSUJI Case and then talked about his permanent operations for about four hours.
18. (Date of Info: 15 August 1951). I visited the lawyer, YOSHIE, and presented him with \$30,000 which I furnished him for case expenses. YOSHIE did not want to accept the money but finally did so at my persuasion.
19. (Date of Info: 21 August 1951). TSUJI wanted to see me, and I visited him in his room at the hospital for the first time since he had been entered. He was very weak, though protesting his good health, and could eat nothing and had to be fed intravenously. The doctor stated that it may be a full year before they find out for certain if TSUJI will recover or not. TSUJI requested me to make arrangements for a place for him to stay at ATAMI at a resort hotel beginning a week from that date.

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From: Tokyo, Japan Report No: ZJL-724 Local File No:
 No. of Pages: 7 No. of Enclosures: 20 Sept 51
 Report Made By: C J3 Approved By: C J
 Distribution: Wash - 2 Opslly to: C J
 By copy to: C J - 1
 Film - 3
 Source: Cryptonyms: C J References: ZJL-689; ZJL-713

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

1. Ordinarily, the material in ZJL-724-A concerning MATSUI Tadao would be considered "source information." However, in a broad but thoroughly sensible interpretation, we feel that this addition to the cast of characters in the TSUJI-MATTORI complex as well as the type of information herein contained is personality intelligence under circumstances already outlined. Please note that MATSUI is apparently not without some intelligence experience in the past, and that his probable involvement in MATTORI's rearment lobby plans is again contemplated by the latter. (Cf. ZJL-689 for details of MATTORI's views on that; a later report will give more concrete and accurate data on MATTORI, his plans, and his group by C J). Again, (cf. para b) it is obvious that MATTORI's mission from G-2 to plan organization of a para-military Police Reserve was hardly kept secret; MATSUI and Source are now also indicated as definite confidants to the projected plan, as well as TSUJI.
2. Re ZJL-724-B, the most interesting points are as follows: (a) TSUJI's amazing financial ventures and apparent access to large sums of money, considered far greater than profits from his books would provide; (b) the unmistakable impression, from the wording of the original Japanese text of the report, that C J deliberately put MATSUI up to asking many of the questions herein answered in order to obtain desired information concerning TSUJI and the ATO Publishing Office on our behalf; (c) Source's continuing desire to attempt to place the blame for TSUJI's recent irresponsible actions upon bad influences close to him, principally SAITO and the ATO Publishing Office crowd, but Source's reluctant admission that TSUJI's connection to the ATO Publishing Office to political maneuvers and operations, and to the radically Pan-Asian views expounded by that crowd (and recently by TSUJI) is more definite than TSUJI admits; (d) C J definite attempts, both by his own efforts and by importation and clever use of MATSUI, to get TSUJI out of politics and to undercut the influence of TSUJI's ATO.

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FORM NO. 51-51
 FEB 1946

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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 Date: 2005

friends by isolating him from them—the long lectures and exhortations delivered to a man in ISHUI's condition and the rush to get him out of the hospital hardly leave us with the impression that ISHUI's personal comfort is the only objective of this.

3. It may well be that this lengthy close-up portrayal of the quixotic ISHUI Masabaru will be considered a waste of time and effort by some officers. However, somebody firmly believes that this almost tragicomic figure will be just as important to warning Japanese nationalist reactionaries dead or alive, to wit, he will become the martyr if he dies, which is probably, if he lives, he will be a hero who suffered through both physical torment and political persecution to fight back. The situation has all the potentiality of a Franky political melodrama in the best Japanese lightest tradition. Therefore, for the future, this present close insight into the man and his associates could be very worthwhile, we feel.

4. A forthcoming report gives further data on ISHUI's Pan-Asian associates and projects. In this later report, [] re-emphasizes clearly that he does not believe ISHUI's assertions or lack of connection to the LHO Publishing Office group and to underground Pan-Asian political circles.

5. Re 245-724-3, para. 12: It is interesting to note that ISHUI went home 7 September and was receiving callers, in view of a report from [] on 11 September that contacts by ISHUI with [] and [] in London to ISHUI were planned on 7 September for the following week. [] was anxious enough not aware of ISHUI's hospitalization, despite the write-up in local newspapers.

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Subject: Information on TSUJI Masamichi's Report No. ZJL-724-A (FD-302)
Friend, MATSUI Tadao

Date of Information: Up to 23 Aug 1951

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Date Acquired: 8 September 1951

Evaluation: C-2

Date of Report: 20 September 1951

Source: []

1. On 20 August 1951, MATSUI Tadao (ZJL # []), came up to Tokyo from his home at Mure to visit TSUJI Masamichi at the hospital. MATSUI stayed until the morning of 23 August, when he returned home. During this period, MATSUI had talks every day with TSUJI at the hospital, giving him advice and asking him to reflect upon the future.

2. MATSUI's Relation to TSUJI Masamichi and to Source.

a. MATSUI entered Army Officers' School one class ahead of Source and two classes ahead of TSUJI; he was initially a classmate of MATSUI Ichimichi. However, illness caused him to lose a year, so he graduated with the 35th Class (Source's class). He has always been a very studious person, gifted with sharp critical sense even in student days. He often aired extremely scathing opinions opposed to training methods and educational system of the various Army schools. Extra-curricularly, he studied all things in his spare time he believed to be essential for the preparation of an officer. He mastered German, and had done considerable research on the technique, training, and tactics of artillery in various and on military history written in German textbooks. He often devoted more time to his own study than attention to the Army examinations; for this reason, he failed to enter Army Staff College, which was based upon competitive examination.

b. Around 1927, TSUJI was a student of Army Staff College, and was assigned to the 4th Field Artillery Regiment for practical study of artillery tactics. MATSUI had been attached to that unit, and the two came into contact and became fast friends. TSUJI greatly admired MATSUI's personality and profound knowledge of military affairs; after graduation from Army Staff College, TSUJI was promptly promoted, all through his career, to ranks which were higher than MATSUI's, but he has always retained that attitude of a disciple towards MATSUI.

c. Source had never met MATSUI until about January 1933, even though they were known to each other at JAGC as classmates. In December 1932, they lived next door to each other in an apartment house at

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(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

Osaka, and their contact and mutual respect for each other's capabilities resulted. MATSUI aided unofficially in certain Kasei projects of Source's while at Osaka. Later, in 1939, the Japanese Defense Department of the War Office was attempting to establish a clandestine counter-espionage organization in Shanghai. They sought Source's opinion as to the appropriateness of the project and the possibilities for Kasei cooperation with the new organ. Source approved of the idea, and vouched for Kasei TOKUO (Special Operations), especially the "Thought Investigation Section" collaboration to the fullest. At the same time, Source suggested that since cooperation depended upon the Kasei TOKUO Chief and the chief of the new counter-espionage unit, appointment of MATSUI to be chief of the new organization would facilitate inter-organizational cooperation. MATSUI's ability and record, the War Office approved his appointment. He had been a commander of a mountain artillery battalion in the Hangchow area, northwest of Shanghai, but because of of this new "TOKUO Kasei", which was set up for security reasons in a small section of the Kasei Detachment camped at Shanghai, and of which Source was assigned temporary additional duty as a member. Friendly relations and cooperation between them continued from that time.

3. TSUJI had notified MATSUI by letter early in August of his indictment case. Source later notified MATSUI of TSUJI's physical condition and hospitalization. MATSUI lost no time in coming up to Tokyo.

4. About August 1950, TSUJI told MATSUI personally that it would be necessary for the latter to get cooperation of other field grade officers in order to effect rearmament properly. He called MATSUI to Tokyo, introduced him to MATSUI, and recommended him for MATSUI's assistance, even though he himself did not give direct support to MATSUI's program. MATSUI also declined to enter MATSUI's group, despite high esteem for MATSUI personally, because his opinions were widely divergent with those of MATSUI's group on various matters at the time. MATSUI felt that his opinions would be welcome in that group and that cooperation with MATSUI's group against his own better judgment would be futile. He believed that no effective rearmament would be possible in view of the situation of Japanese society in 1950, nor indeed in view of that in the world at large. He wrote for MATSUI an exposition of his views, with historical references to the rearmament of various countries in the past and to armament races, and warned MATSUI and the latter's group against taking an optimistic view of rearmament by means of establishment of a Police Reserve type of step towards rearmament as of little importance; he was just determined to exert himself to the best of his ability in utilizing any chance provided in order to effect rearmament, Source, in complete agreement with MATSUI, promised to cooperate in every way possible. The issue, of course, never came up, because it was later decided that former regular field officers would be banned from the Police Reserve, and in September 1950, Source severed his contact on that program with MATSUI. However, at MATSUI's request, Source

2JL-724-4

page a call upon TSUJI together with MATSUI on 22 August 1951, and the three discussed a wide variety of topics for several hours. On the following day, HATTORI inquired after TSUJI at the hospital, and visited the latter's bedside. He was deeply impressed by MATSUI's superb reasoning and ideas, and he reportedly told TSUJI that MATSUI's assistance in his (HATTORI's) rearmament program in the future would be essential.

5. MATSUI is now living at WARE CITY, c/o Mr. KIMURA (now), #16, Tegal Cho. He does not apparently have any fixed employment, but is chiefly absorbed in a study of military science and tactics.

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Subject: MATSUI Taduo's Advice to
TSUJI Masamoon and Related
Information on TSUJI

Report No.: 211-724-3 (PO-286)

Date of Information: Up to 7 Sept 1951

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Date Acquired: 8 September 1951

Evaluation: C-2

Date of Report: 20 September 1951

Source:

1. On 20 August 1951, MATSUI Taduo came up to Tokyo from his home at Nara in order to visit TSUJI Masamoon at the Tokyo Red Cross Hospital. He stayed until the morning of 23 August, and during this time, had talks every day with TSUJI, which included considerable advice as to TSUJI's future.
2. MATSUI urged TSUJI, after discovering some of the background of the situation from Source and from TSUJI's wife, to clarify his relationship with the ATO SHORO (ATO Publishing Office), to sever the relationship between himself and the publishing company which had existed until now, and if possible to dissolve the entire ATO Publishing Company and store. TSUJI maintained, in explaining the situation, that the ATO SHORO had been founded not by himself but by ATO Entomo (1/2 M. E.), without any collaboration on TSUJI's part to ATO to do so. ATO Entomo had initially made a request, in 1950, for investment by TSUJI in the foundation fund for the company. This request from his former subordinate TSUJI did not dare to turn down. Consequently, TSUJI informed MATSUI and Source, he loaned ATO \$100,000 on the condition that it would be promptly returned as soon as profits were shown. TSUJI stated that since his life at home was interrupted by large numbers of callers every day, he was finally put in a state of complete fatigue from receiving guests all day long. Therefore, he thought it would be a convenient alternative to occupy the room next to the main office of the ATO SHORO staff during the daytime and avoid going home until evening. This routine brought him into daily contact with ATO. (Evaluation for TSUJI's remarks: C-4) Source shares in that evaluation.) In response to ATO Entomo's repeated requests, TSUJI decided to publish his two books from the ATO SHORO, which left the general impression with the public that the ATO SHORO was operated by TSUJI. Mrs. TSUJI told MATSUI that ATO has earned a considerable amount of profits from publication of TSUJI's books, and has built a new house from his earnings, but has not yet repaid the initial \$100,000. TSUJI still is very friendly with ATO, but Mrs. TSUJI's attitude towards ATO has rapidly deteriorated into complete enmity.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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(2)(C) Foreign Relations ☐

Date: 2 Oct 51

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27-724-3

3. The ATO SHIRO has been planning to publish a magazine called the ATO GEPPU (The ATO Monthly), and has put out a trial issue. (C-3) TSUJI claims he has nothing to do with this magazine himself. (C-4; Source's evaluation also C-4.) However, MATSUI nevertheless bitterly accosted TSUJI for the latter's passive attitude, and demanded that TSUJI should order suspension of the publication, for which TSUJI's protégé, SATO Katsuro, was responsible. MATSUI demanded that TSUJI either ban the publication of the ATO Monthly immediately or drastically revise the contents of its articles. MATSUI's charges were focused upon the following points:

- a. Since each article is run anonymously, without by-lines, the publication is a most irresponsible one, with considerable suspicion of its legality.
- b. Vast spaces are devoted to letters from readers which have congratulations or kind praises for TSUJI's efforts and publications.

MATSUI insisted that at a time when the general impression is that TSUJI is the man actually operating the ATO Monthly, such points will only deepen that belief. It is quite likely that people will merely consider that the articles of the Monthly have either been written or editorially advocated by TSUJI. They will further surmise that TSUJI has embarked upon political operations with the ATO Monthly as his organ. Particularly, with that impression existent, the articles and letters from readers appearing in the Monthly are not only foolish, but are harmful to the dignity and intelligent personality of TSUJI as well.

- b. TSUJI spoke not one word to refute MATSUI's warnings and apparently accepted them. He passed on this warning immediately to SATO Katsuro on the spot.

5. (Sub-source: Mrs. TSUJI to MATSUI Tadao; Evaluation: F-3) SATO's main accomplishment and method of business is to cater exclusively to TSUJI and win TSUJI's favor. SATO has, in the past year, attempted to monopolize TSUJI for his own business interests and he has tried to prevent TSUJI's intimate friends and even the latter's family from close approach to TSUJI. He has also filled TSUJI's untrained political mind with the dangerous ideas which TSUJI has come to expound publicly. Since they are both Pan-Asian ideologists, and since TSUJI is a good-natured man, he cannot see SATO's ulterior motives but rather estimates SATO highly and defends him strongly. Nevertheless, it is widely rumored that SATO is a Communist or at least a Communist sympathizer; the current indictment case came up entirely because of the radical views which SATO encouraged in TSUJI. For these and even more personal reasons, the TSUJI family hates SATO intensely. SATO is contemplating the publication of "A History of the Malay War" written by TSUJI. TSUJI's family opposes this idea too in the midst of all the present political squabble, and they feel that further association of TSUJI with SATO Katsuro, against whom they are now already very antagonistic, will only lead to TSUJI's and their complete downfall.

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6. MATSUI did not bear out Mrs. TSUJI's comments on SATO's political inclinations, nor was he familiar with the "History of the Malay War". However, he strongly opposed publication of that book or any book by TSUJI at the present, which he felt would only add more trouble and speculation to the dangerous situation at present regarding TSUJI. He therefore used these arguments also in demanding that TSUJI break up the ATO SHOBO immediately.
7. TSUJI, on the other hand, claimed that he could understand MATSUI's viewpoint very well, but denied that he had any intention of publishing the "Malay War History", no matter how often SATO might request him to print it. (Sub-source: TSUJI; Evaluation: C-4) The ATO SHOBO is now in such a difficult situation as a result of the indictment case, however, that its eventual dissolution is inevitable anyway. TSUJI's idea is to break it up at the end of this year completely, (C-4) but in order to insure a livelihood for present employees of the ATO SHOBO after its dissolution, TSUJI is planning to sell approximately 10,000 copies of his books returned from book stores which are now piled up in storage at the ATO offices. In principle, TSUJI therefore agreed to MATSUI's suggestion concerning ATO SHOBO.
8. Afterwards, TSUJI explained to SATO what he intended to do. SATO declared that even if it should be necessary to break with TSUJI in the future, and even if the ATO SHOBO is in very difficult circumstances, he would try to work out some means of continuing it without depending upon TSUJI for aid.
9. MATSUI feared that his friend TSUJI might very possibly die soon as a result of his various ailments. Therefore, in view of TSUJI's extensive financial commitments, he questioned TSUJI closely concerning the financial condition of the TSUJI family. TSUJI's reply to him was as follows: (Evaluation: C-3)
 - a. In addition to his own family, TSUJI is supporting temporarily the surviving members of the families of at least ten friends or former subordinates, either partially or in full. In the cases of five other families of deceased subordinates, he plans permanent support. He claimed that since money for expenses of these families has already been saved and put aside, it is no matter for concern.
 - b. He has loaned a total of approximately ¥140,000 to other individuals since 1950. However, since the income and living conditions of these individuals is quite unstable, early repayment of these loans cannot be and is not expected.
 - c. Since TSUJI has already deposited approximately ¥240,000 to ¥250,000 in the bank as a budget for this year, expenses for his recent operations and for medical treatment will be withdrawn from those funds.
 - d. Living expenses needed for his family are about ¥25,000 per month. He has saved enough money already to cover expenses for about three months.

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10. He intends to have his eldest son, Toru, emigrate to Argentina next year. His travel expenses would be debited by sale of TSUJI's present residence. Should TSUJI ever be hard pressed for money in the coming year, he will abandon the plan for his son's trip to Argentina and sell his house for living expenses.

11. MATSUI urged TSUJI strongly to leave Toru's emigration to Argentina till some later date and to bother himself less about trivial matters of society about him or with support of other individuals. He asked TSUJI to devote his entire strength to recuperation for at least a year and to abandon all other projects, living as secluded a life as possible, preferably in the mountains. TSUJI promised to do so.

12. When MATSUI left Tokyo, he observed to Source that it was quite unusual that TSUJI had accepted his advice completely this time. However, he indicated that in his opinion, TSUJI was a good-natured, rather easily influenced person whose decision is apt to change very easily and quickly, and he was quite worried that TSUJI would soon forget his promises. He implored Source to keep strong TSUJI's resolution to retire to seclusion and to give up political activity, noting that Source's influence with TSUJI was also great and that the latter shared MATSUI's opinions on what TSUJI should do.

12. TSUJI's Condition Subsequent to 23 August 1952.

The doctors still cannot diagnose accurately whether his case was ulcers or a cancer of the stomach. If it was cancer, the doctor in charge stated that TSUJI probably would not live more than another year. TSUJI does not know this, and judging from the doctor's attitude and conduct, Source conjectured that the doctor is more or less convinced that it was a cancer case. For the time being, however, TSUJI's condition after his several operations is relatively good. He can now eat anything he wants, but can eat only approximately one-third the amount of what he used to eat. As he began to recover his health towards the beginning of September, at least two persons called on him every day, gradually increasing. This meant that TSUJI was not even able to get a quiet rest. After consultation with the chief doctor on 1 September, Source got the hospital authorities to move TSUJI to another room the morning of 2 September, and to announce that TSUJI had left the hospital for home. However, this stratagem did not succeed, because the various people desiring to visit TSUJI refused to believe that he could leave the hospital in his condition that soon, and searched for his new room and found it. Finally, on 7 September, he was given permission to leave the hospital provided that both medical care and rest were to be continued. TSUJI planned to rest at the hot springs at Hakone for several days, which cheered his family and intimate friends who hoped he would thereby be free from many visitors. On 7 September, in the evening, TSUJI left the hospital for his home by car, but the journey was such a painful one that he canceled his plan for a trip to Hakone on 8 September because car travel was too painful. He will rest at his home for a time.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Subject: HATTORI Takushiro: Connections Report No: ZJL-736 C (PD-303)
to Outstanding Political Figures

Date of Information: As of September 1951

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Date Acquired: 27 September 1951

Evaluation: C-2

Date of Report: 16 October 1951

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1. Relationship with HATOYAMA Ichiro

- a. In the early spring of 1951, HATTORI Takushiro was unexpectedly invited to the residence of HATOYAMA Ichiro. He had had no previous close dealings with HATOYAMA or other Rightist politicians. HATOYAMA received him warmly and told HATTORI that he (HATOYAMA) had been solicited to secure an interview with President Truman's special envoy, Mr. John DULLES, upon the latter's arrival in Japan. HATOYAMA indicated that at the tentatively scheduled interview, he would like to express views on rearmament of Japan to Mr. DULLES at that time. The political leader stated that although he was definitely in favor of rearmament and believed it absolutely necessary, he was a rank amateur on the subject. Therefore, he was desirous of hearing HATTORI's opinions in detail as to what he should insist upon in military matters in his talk with Mr. DULLES. (Evaluation for the above: C-3.) HATTORI has stated before this that he was deeply impressed with HATOYAMA's studious and refined attitude. He unhesitatingly aired his views on rapid rebuilding of the Japanese Army to HATOYAMA. HATTORI believes very definitely that through HATOYAMA his ideas on rearmament were submitted to Mr. Dulles.
- b. Out of admiring respect and friendly goodwill (C-4) for HATOYAMA, HATTORI has reportedly been visiting the political leader frequently since then. When HATOYAMA suffered his apoplectic stroke in the late spring of 1951, Source advised HATTORI to send HATOYAMA an herb medicine prepared from a secret recipe discovered by Source in his duties in FIC. HATTORI has stated that he intends to call upon HATOYAMA in the company of NABU Kenichiro (J 45 C - 23), a friend of Source's who was able to recover his health thanks to this medicine, so that he can encourage HATOYAMA to combat the illness valiantly with hope.
- c. HATTORI is quite sympathetic to HATOYAMA's views, and does not approve very greatly of Prime Minister YOSHIDA. He would like to see the establishment of a HATOYAMA Cabinet. If HATTORI has any intentions of entering the political field at all, it will be subsequent to the formation of a HATOYAMA Cabinet.

2. Relationship with Prime Minister YOSHIDA.

In a sense, HATTORI has no relationship with YOSHIDA Shigeru. However, Classification

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HATTORI has been the target of considerable malicious gossip and libel as a "war monger" and "drop-hair militarist" on the part of his enemies, particularly TANIDA Isamu, and persons like HAYASHI Saburo and others affiliated with former Lt. General DOI Akio, and also former Major General IMAKURO Hideo and his new political cliques. This criticism has made the Prime Minister quite jittery about HATTORI, because YOSHIDA is extremely afraid of and opposed to unbridled militarism, and HATTORI has been represented as the epitome of examples of that by many politicians and by the above enemies in the military camp. The police officials in charge of the National Police Reserve at present and the Attorney General's Special Investigations Bureau are so opposed to him also that YOSHIDA is constantly told by officials of his own government that HATTORI is a trouble-maker. (General SHIMAZU Sadamu, however, is sympathetic to HATTORI, and Lt. General TATSUKI Riichi claims to be so. Both, particularly TATSUKI, are very close, because of past political connections, to YOSHIDA Shigeru, and both are apparently working at present to convince YOSHIDA that HATTORI has been unjustly maligned.

3. Relationship with MATSUDAIRA Yasumasa (松平康正)

- a. MATSUDAIRA Yasumasa was during the war the executive secretary to Interior Minister KIDO, who is now serving a sentence for an indefinite period in Sugamo Prison as a Class A War Criminal. At the present time, MATSUDAIRA is Grand Master of Ceremonies of the Imperial Household Ministry. He is not a very forward or active politician, but has always had a very deep and keen interest in politics. He is quite interested in the collection of political information. His personality is very meek and refined.
- b. According to the 23 September issue of Asahi Shinbun, MATSUDAIRA is expected to be dispatched to Europe shortly for a three-months observation tour to study the monarchical system and protocol in nations there.
- c. Colonel AKAMATSU Sadao (赤松清雄) was an executive secretary for Prime Minister TOJO Hideki at the time of the latter's tenure of office in wartime. This included the period when HATTORI was, as he says, "kicked upstairs" to become TOJO's aide. AKAMATSU was a classmate and good friend of HATTORI. Through AKAMATSU's introduction, HATTORI met MATSUDAIRA Yasumasa, and formed an intimate friendship with him.
- d. About once every week, MATSUDAIRA, HATTORI, and AKAMATSU get together for a meeting. The purposes of this meeting seem to be for MATSUDAIRA to get information on the political and underground political spheres, and for HATTORI and AKAMATSU to get some knowledge of the post-war conditions and attitudes of the Imperial Household. MATSUDAIRA is today considered to be the most richly blessed with political sagacity and judgment of all the present chamberlains of the Emperor. In former days, the Imperial side-de-camp, the Interior Minister, the Grand Chamberlain, and the Imperial Household Minister were all endowed with high degree of political wisdom and ample experience. Nowadays, however, practically all of these

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offices have been filled since the Surrender with mediocre non-entities lacking in political experience. Under the new constitution, the personal powers of the Emperor in politics and statecraft are extremely limited. However, when the Emperor wishes to seek an opinion on any political issue from one of his chamberlains, he turns to MATSUDAIRA for advice. (C-3) Although MATSUDAIRA is only the Grand Master of Ceremonies, he sometimes seems to be placed in a position similar to the one which he previously occupied in the Domestic Affairs at the Imperial Household.

- ②. It is not beyond the realms of logical presumption to conjecture that HATTORI and AKAMATSU may very well maintain strongly this close connection to MATSUDAIRA in due consideration of the latter's close relationship to the Emperor.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Subject: HATTORI Takushiro: Connection
to Major General Willoughby Publicized.

Report No: ZJL-736 B (PD-302)

Date of Information: August 1951

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Date Acquired: 18 September 1951

Evaluation: C-2

Date of Report: 16 October 1951

2. Just prior to the above date, HATTORI received a letter from a Japanese friend in America. The letter revealed that what TSUJI Masanobu had told to certain American newsmen had been made known in America, and also that TSUJI's notorious speech before the Liberalist Club had been publicized. Furthermore, TSUJI appears to have described to these newsmen the close relationship between HATTORI Takushiro and General Willoughby. As a result, it became common knowledge among American newspaper correspondents that HATTORI had been connected with Major General Willoughby. Newspaper correspondents rushed to Major General Willoughby upon the latter's return to America and among other questions asked him, "Do you know Colonel HATTORI?" In his reply, Willoughby said emphatically, "No I do NOT", according to the letter received.
3. HATTORI gave no explanation as to how he had interpreted Willoughby's answer, but he appeared to be quite satisfied with it and respected the motives behind it. And he was understandably exasperated over TSUJI's lack of security, but viewed it philosophically since similar incidents have occurred before.

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(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒

(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Subject: HATTORI Takushiro: Intelligence NETS under Direction of HATTORI

Report No: ZJL-736 A (PD-301)

Date of Information: As of 17 September or as stated.

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Date Acquired: 18 September 1951

Evaluation: G-2 except as stated

Date of Report: 16 October 1951

Source: []

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1. After Source's return to Japan in June, 1950, he met HATTORI Takushiro in early August for the first time after that repatriation. At that time, HATTORI asked Source to be on the lookout for suitable persons to be recruited into the National Police Reserve, which he indicated was about to be formed, as a prerequisite to rearmament. In addition, however, at the same time HATTORI made it known that he was involved in the collection of information concerning the Japan Communist Party on behalf of Major General Willoughby's G-2 Section. This was in connection with his work in the Demobilization Board, otherwise known as the Historical Records Section, and agency of the Japanese government but under authority of GHQ. HATTORI asked Source to aid him in the collection of information concerning the Japan Communist Party.
2. Source could understand how it was that HATTORI had this double interest of rearmament and also anti-Communist policy and operations. After he was discharged from his duties as an Assistant Military Attache at the Legation in France, in about 1936, HATTORI returned to Japan via the continental route. He stopped over to make a detailed inspection of conditions in Soviet Russia at that time. As a result of this inspection, HATTORI gained the conviction and made the prediction that the next great world war would break out before or just about 1940, and asserted the need for adequate mobilization and armament to meet this danger. His assertion was given superior approval and support by the then Colonel MASHIHARA Kanju, later the leader of the DAI TO A REMMEI (East Asia League), at that time chief of the Operational Plans Section, G-1 (NOTE: equivalent to our G-3), General Staff Office. HATTORI had the fear that the world would be dominated by Russia in the near future; therefore, Japan and all the other great powers should unite and exert every caution against that threat. Again, following the end of the last World War in 1945, HATTORI predicted that the entire Chinese mainland would be communized without a doubt and brought under Russian influence and Communist domination in the foreseeable future. HATTORI firmly believes that the only sure way to stave off Russia's plan for sovietization of the entire world is for each country to intensify its rearmament. Therefore, his assertions regarding rearmament are directed not merely at the establishment of a Japanese Defense Army, but at world rearmament capable and strong enough to stand against the armed might of the Communist bloc. For Japan, in concrete terms, this

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means that Japan should be rearmed strongly enough to stand against the Japanese Communists, Communist China, and Russia's Far Eastern forces. Public opinion in Japan has gradually veered toward renunciation of war and opposition of any plan for rearmament since the surrender. From the first, HATTORI regarded this as a fool's dream and mourned the ignorance of the people, and he has insisted all along upon the absolute necessity for rearmament. At the same time, however, he considered the Japan Communist Party as an alien and hostile element under full domination of Soviet Russia; for these reasons, since he was in a position at his officially assigned duties with the Demobilization Board (Historical Records Section) to organize active operations for detection of the treason of the JCP against the nation, despite his lack of experience, he devoted his energies freely to these tasks as well.

3. When HATTORI requested Source for aid, Source at first declined, pointing out that he had his own tasks to perform in connection with possible future operations to be mounted against Communist elements in South East Asia. He furthermore indicated that although the question of JCP investigation work interested him slightly, operations or plans for formation of a National Police Reserve were out of his field of interest. (Evaluation of paragraph 3 so far: C-4.) HATTORI persisted, and so Source secured the services of the scholar of Japanese Communist activities, YAMAMOTO Katsunosuke, to procure information and do research on the JCP for himself and HATTORI. However, Source was to a great extent dissatisfied with the information turned in by YAMAMOTO, and HATTORI described it as almost worthless to him. From HATTORI's remarks, Source deduced that HATTORI had highly authoritative information on the JCP from penetrations within it. Since he considered that there was little value in hanging on to YAMAMOTO any longer, Source discharged him in late September, 1950. After that time, Source attempted no new operational recruitments or leads on behalf of HATTORI. (Evaluation of last sentence: C-3.)
4. It was always a matter of great and serious interest to Source as to exactly how HATTORI Takushiro, former G-1 Strategic Plans officer, was gathering his intelligence information. However, he avoided at all times asking HATTORI directly about it. Since HATTORI has always been what is known as a "tight-lipped" man, he seldom ever revealed the details of his operations to any other person completely. Those who are working for HATTORI and cooperating with him too are also very strict in the safeguard of security. It has nevertheless been Source's opinion that some day HATTORI would discuss his intelligence networks with Source in detail.
5. When Source was talking with HATTORI at the latter's home last year, in September as it is recalled, a visitor appeared before them. HATTORI introduced the visitor to Source, stating, "This is Mr. UCHIYAMA Kamiya (X) (L) (S) (M) of Nagano, who is cooperating with me." At that time, it seemed to Source that UCHIYAMA was very familiar and acquainted with HATTORI's family. Then, when Source called at HATTORI's home on the night of 22 August, 1951, in answer to HATTORI's request for a meeting,

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HATTORI told him, "There is a man named UCHIYAMA who trusts and admires TSUJI (Masanobu) above all persons. He will soon come to Tokyo, because he is worrying about TSUJI's health. He is a very trustworthy and fine person. Since he will stay at my house, I do want to introduce him to you." Then again, a few days after that, HATTORI came to Source and again urged him to come to meet UCHIYAMA, who was in Tokyo a few days.

(For paragraphs 6 and 7: Date of information: 30 August, 1951 acquired by source; sub-source: elicited from HATTORI Takushiro; Evaluation: C-3)

6. HATTORI Takushiro has been keeping in contact with a certain Chinese Communist leader, (whose name was not divulged). This Chinese is at present on the executive level of the Peiping Communist government, but according to his appraisal of the intelligence situation he seems to have foreseen that Communist China would lose its power and influence. He sent word to HATTORI last fall 1950 asking for the latter's protection of his life and promised to work for someone whom HATTORI might be able to send to direct him. This Chinese last year sent a document entitled "Strategy Plan for Invasion of Japan" worked out by Soviet Russia and Communist China. Generally, the people speculate that Russia and Communist China would invade Japan from either Hokkaido or Kyushu. According to the outline plan sent by this Chinese, one part of the forces would land in Hokkaido and Kyushu respectively, organize and lead assisting Japanese (GP) forces in the interior, but the main body of invasion troops would then launch landing operations on the coastline running from Niigata to Ishikawa Prefecture. In the view of a professional expert, HATTORI evaluated this plan highly and felt it would be vastly superior. However, he still felt somewhat dubious as to the problem of whether or not the Communist bloc really had such a plan or not. After that was sent from the Chinese, would-be defector last year, other events confirmed this information. Upon the basis of documents of the Japan Communist Party recently seized, it has become evident that the JCP had quietly telephotographed the coastline of the Japan Sea running from Niigata all the way down to Yamaguchi Prefecture. Source Opinion: This fact is almost certain evidence that the Communist bloc is definitely contemplating landing operations on those districts along the Sea of Japan. This fact also indicates that the Strategy Plan for Invasion of Japan forwarded by this certain Chinese leader is close to the truth. (C-3).
7. Russia is openly shipping reinforcements to its troops stationed in the Kurile Islands via the Tsushima Straits (presumably from Deiren), and holding maneuvers quite brazenly in the Kuriles near Hokkaido; yet of more significance is the fact that Russian-made arms are being shipped secretly into the main Japanese islands through Sado Island (佐島) and the Noto Peninsula (能登半島) and into Hokkaido. Each member of the JCP is armed with a gun. And other such information has been received.
8. On about 1 September, HATTORI consulted with Source and asked if he thought that former Lt. Col. and KACESA Kikan member HARUKE Yoshitane would be satis-

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factory to head up a small organization which HATTORI maintained in HOKKAIDO, an organization which is patently an intelligence organ.

(Date of Information acquisition by Source for paras. 9-11: 8 September, 1951; Sub-source: Elicited from TSUJI Masanobu at his home; Evaluation: C-3)

9. UCHIYAMA Kasuya was a graduate of Army Officers' School in the 42nd graduating class, a former Major in the Army; he did not graduate from the Army War College, but he is indeed a very logical and capable officer. From the time that he was commander of his district unit and then a company commander respectively at Army Officer's School, UCHIYAMA gained a popularity and trust among his subordinates that was well deserved. (Sub-source supervised him there.) He is now living in Nagano Prefecture. He provides HATTORI Takushiro with information on the Japan Communist Party. UCHIYAMA is greatly revered by a JCP member in Nagano who is a former subordinate of his. Also, a former Thought Policeman (TOKKO KEI) who had previously served with that branch of the Nagano Prefectural Police is now operating as UCHIYAMA's right-hand man. Former members of the Retired Soldiers Association (ZAIGO GUNJIN KAI) are also assisting him. His information from these sources concerning the Communists is really authoritative since it is procured from within the JCP. Approximately eighty per cent of HATTORI's information on the JCP is provided to him by UCHIYAMA. The condition and process of the communisation of the All-Japan Seamen's Union was uncovered by penetration agents of UCHIYAMA's network. Information concerning progress and plans of the Communist movement and operations in Toyama, Niigata, and Ishikawa Prefectures also is being reported to HATTORI via the Nagano Prefectural JCP agents of UCHIYAMA Kasuya.
10. HATTORI may have intelligence networks in Hokkaido as well, but that is not known (to Sub-source). He undoubtedly maintains intelligence operations units in Fukushima and Miyagi Prefectures in the "of" sub-source has) no detailed knowledge of those nets. It is probable that former Wakamatsu Infantry Regiment men are being utilized by HATTORI for intelligence work in those areas. HATTORI once commanded the Wakamatsu City regiment and is very well liked there.)
11. TANAKA Tatsuo (田中 龍夫), governor at present of Yamaguchi Prefecture, is the son of the late General TANAKA Giichi (田中 義一), one-time president of the pre-war political party "SEIYUKAI" and Prime Minister from 1927-1929. TANAKA Tatsuo has an extremely avid interest in the investigation of Communist activity. He has two former Army officers working for him in his collection of information concerning the JCP. They are former (Colonel) KOTANI (or KOYA: 甲谷), a former section chief in the wartime Imperial General Staff office, a classmate of TSUJI Masanobu's, who has also been on duty in both Germany and Russia, and a former Lt. Colonel KUNABARA (熊原). The information KOTANI (or KOYA) is gathering mainly concerns the JCP, while KUNABARA has been collecting information on Communist China.

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and on Russia. KUWABARA is closely connected with the KIKUHATA KAI (Chrysanthemum Flag Association); the information he procures is accurate. However, neither KOTANI (KOYA) nor KUWABARA have intelligence connections within the JCP or its organizations. Inasmuch as they are making merely observations from outside of the JCP, their information is usually far from being as reliable as that of UCHIYAMA. KOTANI or KOYA was at one time in the past submitting information regularly to HATTORI, probably including some from his colleague, but it is not known whether he is now used by HATTORI or not. It appears most likely that he is not now employed by HATTORI. Sub-source Opinion: HATTORI's information on the JCP is one of the most valuable contributions that any Japanese have made to the United States Army.

12. HATTORI's intelligence organs for the gathering of information on the JCP are scattered around in various areas such as Hokkaido, Fukushima, Sendai, Niigata, Toyama, Ishikawa, Nagano, and Yamaguchi. Among them, the most active and authoritative one appears to be that located in the Nagano Prefectural area. JCP members are of direct service to the intelligence organization of HATTORI in the Nagano area, acting as information brokers. The JCP of Nagano is closely linked to that of the Niigata, Toyama, and Ishikawa Districts. Furthermore, since about 1920, Nagano Prefecture, though a backward and feudal area, has been noted as the traditional stronghold of the Japan Communist Party. A number of primary school teachers in Nagano were JCP members even then. Heads of many of the villages in Nagano Prefecture are at present members of the JCP. If HATTORI's intelligence unit in Nagano is strongly entrenched and has penetrations of the Party there, Source believes that HATTORI's information on the JCP is apt to be quite accurate and authoritative. Since the spring of 1951, HATTORI has often divulged some of the results of his investigations of the JCP to General SHIMOMURA Sadamu, his former superior, whom he sees quite regularly these days.

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