

ASO Tatsuo (also N.M.) PHS
② MEIDORUJAP
② PAI Ching-ju
SALAD (LF) - BRANT (TL) (Formerly TYEE, YPX 136)
(IN 34059, 20 July 1950)
Project BEATRICE (Formerly BAROMETER, formerly MYADAM)
(Formerly TAOS #2, YCX 22) (Project PROXY)
See ZCS-009/14-412 (Project DAMON)
YEX/A-179 (Misc. Sources) YEX-22
Y-009/10-1210 (Misc. Sources)
Pos. Intel. Report for March 1948 (OSOTS 884), p.19
ZCSA 990 (Kapok-Misc. File)
ZCSA-11 (Project BAROMETER)
Control 1173, with comments by Nishida (MUKDEN AFFAIR)
ZJLA 132 (Div. A of ID) (States that subject uses
alias PAI Ching-i in Shanghai where he is working
for U.S. Naval Intelligence.

ASO Tatsuo (Cont'd)

For transmittal of Okinawan support of subject, See FGMA-996 dtd 30 June 1954 in RI (16-6-29-1395).

For meeting of subject with [] See Encl. to FJBA-1485 (KAPOK) in LFBEATRICE dossier.

Subject is to be LCFLUTTERED. Subject is also to terminate
[]. See FJBA-2261 (KAPOK) dtd 15 Oct 54 in
[] ~~Project File~~ FE/2/EG.

See FJBA-1872 (KAPOK) dtd 13 September 54 in FE/2/EG.

See FJBA-2722 dtd 4 March 54 in FE/2/EG.

(OVER)

2. ASO Tatsuo (cont'd)

Subject born 5 June 1910 at 6 Chome, Nagarekwa-dori
Beppu-shi, Oita-ken. Address as of May 1953, Yokosuka,
Japan.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

3. ASO Tatsuo (cont'd)

For transmittal of results of LCFLUTTER examination of
subject, See FJBA-3517 dtd 25 Jan 55 in NOMI/EG (KAPOK).

For possible entry of subject into the U. S., See FJW-2280 dtd 1 Feb 54 in [] Corresp. (6).

See FJBA-3084 (KAPOK) dtd 21 December 54 in FE/2/EG.

FJBA-4578, 11 Apr 55, RI 16-6-29-4306, states subject
not being used by []; that he will
be terminated unless [] has need of him.

FJBA-4902, 5 May 55, RI 16-6-29-6012, forwards memorandum
in lieu of contract.

Continued

ASO Tatsuo (Con't)

Debriefing of subject conducted by [] 1-7 December 55. Subject stated that until the Kaji Incident he had believed that he was working for a PBPRIME "General Staff Organization"; however after the Kaji Incident was aired in the local press he came to realize that his sponsor was KUBARK. See FJBA 5928, 22 Jul 55 (KAPOK) in FE/2/RO.

Future disposition of STBRANT-1. See FCSA-791, 18 Oct '55 in RI (16-6-28-3867)

14 Nov 55 memo to CI/OA from FE/2/EG requests cancellation approval 60 days after 30 Nov, which is termination date of project. OC#7433 (superseded OC#704).

31 Jan 56 memo to CI/OA from FE/2/CE (in DOSS SECTION CORRE EXTERNAL) requests extension OA for 90 days to permit

ASO Tatsuo

[] comes an ESD staff translator. He will maintain Mongolian contacts and develop a satisfactory meeting place in Shanghai which will be free of Chinese or Soviet personnel (ESD mthly report dtd 15 Apr 1948). Taken from ESD notebook which was destroyed in October 1957.)

[] contacted the subject in Shanghai in May and delivered a small pouch. (ESD rpt dtd 12 June 48 - destroyed in Oct. 57, that is the notebook which contained this information.)

Subject is Chief agent for MYADAM. He met MYADAM leaders in Shanghai and debriefed them, after they had met the CO once. He worked about sixteen hours a day. Subject was to continue to work as long as present CO wanted him

g. ASO Tatsuo

b. subject's use in defection attempt against Mongolian commie in []

Field notified of extension in FJEW 4298, 13 Feb 56

Notice of cancellation of clearance from CI/OA 29 Oct. 56.

(According to [] FE/2/RO, agent has been terminated and file has been retired. 16 Nov. 1956)
Subject's PJY/PRQ/1364 sent to HI/Files on 31 December 1956 for inclusion in subject's [] file.

Subj. directs the Damon mission, but Peipin controls is being transferred to [] Subject will move to Shanghai when the [] closes, and be-

g. ASO Tatsuo

g. to continue, his only requirement being that his family be kept from starvation in Japan. (EXXIE ESD Monthly rpt dtd 1 Sept. 1948 taken fr Notebook which was destroyed in October 1957.)

PAI Ching-ju

□ □

Translator, LF-ABEL Translation Section. For copy of subject's affidavit in lieu of passport, see PRQ file. See ZJYA-3152, 18 Sept. 1951, in Doss.: KAPOK/MISC.

Male, born 5 June 1910, Tungliao, Manchuria; translator

Affidavit in lieu of passport sent RI/CF 16 Feb. 1957

Form 831 dtd 8 Aug 62-- □ □ closed into □ □

□ □

ASO Tatsuo

For op info see rpt.

CONTROLLED

CHINA-CIA-OP-1

U-U-1
FJBA 7236
26 Nov 55

0-12-462
FJBA 7752
2 Dec 55

0-12-462
FJBA 8032
29 Dec 55

0-12-12
FCTA-9296
7 Nov 55

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SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION 382B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

) ASC Tatsuo (continued)

CHINA-CIA-OP-1
CONTROLLED

for op info see rpts filed in 0-12-462

0-12-462

- 77054, 13 Feb 1956
- 774744, 15 Feb 1956
- DIR 48394, 17 Feb 1956
- 774802, 23 Feb 1956
- 774963, 15 Mar 1956

For op info see rpt.

0-12-461
L 774441
15 May 56

For op info see rpts filed in 0-12-461

0-12-461

- FJBA 7022, 11 Oct 55
- FJBA 6976, 7 Oct 55

For op info see rpt.

0-12-462
FJBA 7024
11 Oct. 55

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ASO, TATSUO see MEIDORUJAP

C 9-11-258 4/5/47 p.3
C 9-11A
C 9-11-365 8/12/47

SHANGHAI-OSS-INT-1

CONTROLLED

NO DISSEM ASO fmu REFERENCES AS UNDOUBTEDLY SAME AS SUBJECT.

Special agent LF-BEATRICE

COPY NOT RETAINED

ZJYA-2806
LF-BEATRICE
Monthly report
Feb-June 1951
No dissem S/KAPOK

COPY NOT RETAINED
LF-BEATRICE
PRQ of 1949

Re L v).

CHINA-CIA-OP-1

1-96-18
ZJYA-2696
LF-BEATRICE
21 June 1951
No dissem S/KAPOK

Member Mongolian Affairs Group of NECC, Former TKK.

See X-2 files; L v

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2. ASO, Tatsuo (c^nt'd)

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CHINA-CIA-OP-1

Subject met IDEMJAB (qv) father about 20 yrs ago when IDEMJAB was about 10 yrs old. 8-51-4
C F-8249 to WASH F
8 Aug 1951

Subject and conjecture that and might have defected. See report. LF-BEATRICE Monthly report for Aug 1951
COPY NOT RETAINED ZJYA-3047
SECRET/KAPOK No disseminate

Subject's interpretation of the letter sent URGUNGGE by CH'IEN Chih-kuo (qv).

LF BEATRICE
ZJYA-3320
COPY NOT RETAINED S/KAPOK
12 Oct. 51

VALLAIRO (qv) is no longer available, so subject has become more of a translator than adviser and commentator. See report for movement and plans of subject. LF BEATRICE
ZJYA-3308
COPY NOT RETAINED Monthly Rpt. for Sept. 51 S/KAPOK

See rpt for subject's connection with and LF BERENICE. LF BERENICE Monthly Rpt for April 1952
COPY NOT RETAINED ZJYA-4573
S/KAPOK No disseminate

3. ASO Tatsuo

(MEIDORUJAP)

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SEE: ASO, fmu @ ME To Ru Jappu NO DISSEM. fmu references
as indications same as subject.

For subject's relations with OHASHI Chuichi (qv) see report.

Chief agent. For activities of subject see report. Subject
to handle the current op affairs.

66

Subject's tutoring of the student agents; see rpt.

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COPY NOT RETAINED

LF BEATRICE Monthly
Rpt. for Oct. 51
✓ZJYA-3452
6 Nov. 51
S/KAPOK No dissem

COPY NOT RETAINED
LF BEATRICE Monthly
Rpt. for Nov. 51
✓ZJYA-3614
S/KAPOK No dissem

COPY NOT RETAINED
LF BEATRICE Monthly
Rpt for Dec. 51
✓ZJYA-3811
S/KAPOK No dissem

4. ASO Tatsuo

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Special and chief agent. For subject's activities and plans
see rpt. Subject may be relieved by C

Connection with C and LF BERENICE; radio monitored
reports.

Co-worker of TANIGUCHI, Morio (qv) during his service with the US.
Changchun Navy Foreign Affairs office. See rpt. re U.S. Intelligence
organization at Changchun stealing a large batch of natural resources
info on the northeast.

Acting chief agent of students ; see rpt.

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CHINA-CIA-OP-1

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LF BEATRICE Monthly
Rpt for Jan 1952
✓ ZJYA-3963
S/KAPOK Not for diss

00-10-319
✓ ZJYA-3885
14 Jan 1952

AMOY Daily News
22 April 1951
1-95-60

COPY NOT RETAINED

LF BEATRICE Monthly
Rpt for March 1952
✓ ZJYA-4369
S/KAPOK No disse

5. ASO Tatsuo
(MEIDORUJAP)

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SEE ASO, fnu @ ME To Ru Jappu NO DISSEM, fnu reference as
indications same as subject.

See rpt. re the termination of 5 of the LF BEATRICE agents.

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LF BEATRICE
ZJYA-5259
24 July 52
S/KAPOK No dissem

Connection with **C**

LF BERENICE Monthly Rpt
COPY NOT RETAINED May, June, July 52
ZJYA-5258
S/KAPOK No dissem

See ref. to subject in report.

LF BEATRICE Monthly Rpt.
COPY NOT RETAINED 18 Oct. 1952
ZJYA-6074

See ref. to subject in report. Aug-Sept.

LF BERENICE Monthly Rpt.
COPY NOT RETAINED 18 Oct. 1952
ZJYA-6069

6. ASO Tatsue

CONTROLLED

CONTROLLED
[CHINA-UN-UR-1]

Transmittal of LF BEATRICE pouch. Letter from subject to []

✓ JTF-220
13 Nov. 52
00-10-1010

See rpt for connection with []

[] (qv)

00-10-3614
✓ DIR 11496
11 Jul 53

See rpt pertaining to above cables.

00-10-3658
✓ [] 2914
22 July 53

Monthly reports for June and May 1953

[REDACTED]
✓ FJYA 2103-5 Jun 53
✓ FJYA 2565-23 Jul 53
LF BEATRICE

COPY NOT RETAINED

CONTROLLED

(Mongolian)

8: ASO (fnu) Tatsuo

UNDOUBTEDLY SAME AS ASO Tatsuo (qv) NO DISSEM THESE REFERENCES

8-17 Cable from [] #163 17 Oct 46

C 2-23-22	11/4/46	
C 5-198-1	10/8/46	SHANGHAI-OSS-INT-1
C 5-4-403	2/21/47	

UNDOUBTEDLY SAME AS ASO Tatsuo. NO DISSEM THIS REFERENCE
C9-11-354 p.2 1 Apr 47 SHANGHAI-OSS-INT-1

Captain, also ME TO RU JAPPU (Mongolian name)

SHANGHAI-OSS-INT-1

C 5-193-22 3 Oct. 46. ABSOLUTELY NO DISSEM ABOVE REFERENCES.

Transmittal of Part 1 PRQ w/file check results.

0-01

✓ FJY/PRQ/1364 Rev.

FJYA-2118

9 June 1953

9. ASO Tatsuo

CONTROLLED

LFBEATRICE MOR Dec. 52

LFBEATRICE MOR Feb. 53

LFBEATRICE MOR Mar 53

LFBERNICE FPOP, revised Aug 53.

CONTROLLED

~~RET'D~~
COPY NOT RETAINED FJYA 1442
2 Jan 53
EYES ALONE

~~RET'D~~
COPY NOT RETAINED FJYA 1009
5 Mar 53
EYES ALONE

~~RET'D~~
COPY NOT RETAINED FJYA 1312
1 Apr 53
EYES ALONE

~~RET'D~~
COPY NOT RETAINED FJYA 3058
C 4937
17 Sept 53
KAPOK

8. ASO Tatsuo

CONTROLLED

See rpt re 5th Cav Brig from NW China.

CHINA-CIA-OP-CONTROLLED

COPY NOT RETAINED [REDACTED] 3118
28 Jul 53

See rpt for FPOP, revised May 53

REF DEM
FJYA 1907
COPY NOT RETAINED 1 May 53

re [REDACTED] (qv) (controlled) See rpt for subject's connection

00-10-3800
[REDACTED] 3707
✓ 13 Aug 53

re [REDACTED] (qv)

00-10-3802
✓ [REDACTED] 3705
& 3706
13 Aug 53

LFBEATRICE MCR Nov 52

COPY NOT RETAINED [REDACTED] 6430
5 Dec. 52
EYES ALONE

11) ASO Tatsuo

- CONTINUED:

CONTROLED
CHINA-CIA-OP-1

Re subject's legal entry to USA and utilization of subj during and after his period of study in U.S. - see rpt.

✓00-10-7366
FJYA-8973
03 Sept 54

Request for LCFLUTTER

✓00-10-7382
FJBA-1869
13 Sept 54

See rpt., re future plans of subj.

✓00-10-7382
FJBA-1912
14 Sept 54

For op'l info see STB RANT MO Rpt. Sept 1954

0-16.1-1022
FJBA-2261
15 Oct 1954
S/KAPOK

CONTROLED

10. ASO Tatsuo

SP. BRANCH A/

continued

CONTROLLED

Possible entry of subject into the U.S.

Special Agent, Project, LF-BERENICE

Special Agent, Project LF BERENICE

Special and Chief Agent, Project LF BEATRICE

See following LF BERENICE MOR's (EYES ALONE):

FJYA-1268

FJYA-1710

%

Opl iden, Project LF BEATRICE.

CONTROLLED CHINA-CIA-OP-1

00-10-4724

✓FJYW 2280

1 Feb 54

FJYA-143

COPY NOT RETAINED 2 Jan. 1953

EYES ALONE

FJYA-106

COPY NOT RETAINED 5 Dec. 1952

EYES ALONE

ZJYA-6256

10 Nov. 1952

COPY NOT RETAINED EYES ALONE

00-10-10624

✓FJYA-2163

10 Jun 53

- OVER -

12) ASO Tatsuo

For op'l info see STBRANT Mo²pt Oct 1954

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CHINA-CIA-OP-1

0-16.1-1023
FJBA 2655
15 Nov 1954
S/KAPOK

Results of LCFLUTTER Examination

✓ 0-01
FJBA-3517, S/KAPOK
25 Jan 55

Request extent to which subject affected by debriefing.

✓ 0-12-12
DIR 36740
5 Feb 1955

FRU file check on revised PRQ completed 04 June 1953
(consolidated from another card)

00-14-92

For op'l info, see rpt.

✓ 0-12-12
FJBA-4617
15 April 1955

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

B) ASO Tatsuo

CONTROLLED

aka: TAKAHASHI Minoru (7559/2890/1395) (FJBA-486)

See STBRANT MORQ Apr 1954

Documentation of subj

[] can & will assist in the procurement of subject's documentation. See rpt.

Request info on present status of subj documentation.

Re possible contact of subj with []

Suggest subj be picked-up on contract basis - see rpt.

- OVER -

CONTROLLED
CHINA-CIA-OP-1

0-12-461
FJBA-486, S/KAPOK
17 May 54

0-12-461
FJYA-9980
13 Oct 54

0-12-461
FCMA-1166
18 Oct 54

0-12-461
FJBA-2698
23 Nov 54

0-12-461
FJBA-2907
10 Dec 54

0-12-461
[] 1210
15 Dec 54

14) ASO Tatsuo

- CONTINUED:

CONTROLLED

FPOP required for subj is used as indigenous case officer. See rpt.

CONTROLLED

CHINA-CIA-OP-1

0-12-461

✓ DIR-30496
24 Dec 54

For op'l info, see rpt.

0-12-461

✓ DIR-31878
06 Jan 55

Re subject's LCFLUTTER.

0-12-461

✓ FJBA*3591
03 Feb 55

15 ASO Tatsuo

contd

BRANT (TL)

CONTROLLED

CONTROLLED CHINA-CIA-OP-1

re future use of subj and problems concerning obtaining visa. see rpt. 00-10-6696

✓ FJY 3812

3 Aug 54

Special agent, Proj. LF BERENICE, Feb. 1953.

FJYA-1010

COPY NOT RETAINED 3 Mar 53
EYES ALONE

LF BERENICE MOR for Jan 53.

FJYA-628
COPY NOT RETAINED 29 Jan 53
EYES ALONE

Opl info on TAMAKI, Yoshiaki (qv).

FJYA-6337
COPY NOT RETAINED 28 Nov 52
EYES ALONE

Transmittal of FPOP. Change crypto TLBRANT to STERANT-1.

FJYA-1861
COPY NOT RETAINED 19 May 53
KAPOK

See also the following LF BEATRICE Opl Rpts (KAPOK):

FJYA-1414, 1711 and 1566.

COPY NOT RETAINED

(OVER)

15 ASO Tatauo

- CONTINUED:

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For op info, see LF BEATRICE MOR for May 1954.

For op info, see subjects MOR for July 1954.

For op info, see LF BEATRIC MOR for Aug. 1954.

For subject's MOR for August 1954, see ref.

CONTROLLED

CHINA-CIA OP 1

FJBA-730

✓ 08 Jun 54

S/KAPOK

0-16.1-1006

FJBA-1486

✓ 09 Aug 54

S/KAPOK

0-16.1-1003

FJBA-1872

✓ 13 Sept 54

S/KAPOK

0-16.1-1006

FJBA-1879

✓ 13 Sept 54

S/KAPOK

(100-2) - CONTINUED)

17) ASO Tatsuo

- CONTINUED:

CONTROLLED

For op'l info, see rpt.

For info, see rpt

See rpt for planned use of subj ~~on~~ contract basis.

See rpt for info

See rpt re future use of subj

Financial agreement w/agt in lieu of contract

CONTROLLED
CHINA-CIA-OP-1

0-12-462

✓ FJBA 2734
26 Nov 54

0-12-549

✓ FJYA-10137
01 Nov 54

0-12-549x 461

✓ 19463
21 Dec 54

0-12-12

✓ DIR 36740
05 Feb 55

0-12-461

✓ FJBA 4578
13 Apr 55

0-01
AKIMOTO Otetsu
FJYA-14129
16 May 55

180 ASO Tatsuo 7802-3932-6671-3948

- CONTINUED:

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CHINA-CIA-OP-1
CONTINUED

- ⑥ PAI Ching-ju (4701/3237/0320) - Used in Japan, also Peiping & Shanghai
- ⑥ Fuzzy
- ⑥ TOKUMUKIKEN (TKK) Name
- ⑥ MAIDARJAB
- ⑥ MAIDERJAB

DOB: 05 June 1910 - POB: Beppu, Oita-ken, Japan. Re debriefing of subj -

0-01

FJBA-5928, S/KAROK
22 Jul 55

See rpt re future disposition of subj

0-12-46
FJBA 5788
22 JU 55

Re termination of subject.

DIR-27084
5 October 1955
0-01

Info ref surveillance reports on C

0-12-462
FJBA 6593
9 Sept 1955

19)

ASO Tatsuo

(Continued)

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CHINA-CIA-OP-1

For op info re plan for the recruitment of

✓ 0-12-462
FJBA 7661
28 Nov 1955

For op info see rpt

✓ 0-12-462
 4125
22 Nov 1955

Op info see rpt

✓ 0-12-462
 4416
6 Dec 1955

For Subj. contact with

✓ 0-12-462
 4599
30 Jan 1955

STHELGA MOR for Sept 1955, see later MOR's.

✓ 0-12-460
FJBA-7462
9 Nov 55

20 ASO Tatsuo

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CHINA-CIA-OP-1

0-12-462
FJBA 8284
17 Jan 56

For op info see progress report

Synopsis of Activity re STRESIDENT

0-12-462
FJBA 9215
2 Apr 56

For op info re termination of

0-01
FJBA 9505
18 April 56

48 New Mexico
Code List No. _____ State _____

Name: ASO, Tetsuo #2 Characters () Age _____

Address: see Damon Mission Plan, letters dated 2 April and 12 April 1947 to []

Race and/or Ethnic Group _____ Citizenship _____

Occupation _____

Political bent and Organizational Affiliations _____

Languages _____

Source Evaluation and Comment _____

Contact - by whom made: _____

who is handling at present _____ Salary _____

How is agent contacted _____

Motivation _____

Productivity: (Type of info furnished) _____

General Comment (background, education, religion, special qualifications, history of past use, possible future use, etc.):

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 382B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

Source of this info: _____ Date _____

TOP SECRET

TSR 0930

PERSONAL RECORD FORM

REF ID: A65425
SECRET

1. SURNAME. In the case of Spanish or Portuguese, and other double names add the mother's name in parenthesis.

CLASSIFICATION

ASO, TATSUO (

Cancelled

Changed to

SECRET

2. FULL CHRISTIAN NAME. None

BY AUTHORITY OF

Name

3. NAME AT BIRTH, IF DIFFERENT, OR ALIASES. Other aliases are listed, a brief statement of time and place of use.

Date

MEIDORUJAP (

This name used in Inner Mongolia 1932-1945 and is the name ASO is known by among all Mongolians who know him

4. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH. 5 June 1910, Beppu City, Oita Prefecture, Japan

5. NATIONALITY. Japanese

6. NATIONALITY AT BIRTH, if different from Number 5. Include all nationalities held.

Japanese

7. OFFICIAL IDENTITY PAPERS, such as passport number, allied registration number, identity card number, etc.

Conscriptee passport issued by NECC at Changchun, China

8. FATHER. Full name, nationality at birth, place of birth.

ASO, Shizuyuki, Japanese, Wassada Village, Oita Prefecture, 10 March 1877

9. MOTHER. Full name, nationality at birth, place of birth.

ASO, Hatsume, Beppu City, Oita Prefecture, 14 March 1877, Japanese

10. HUSBAND/WIFE Full name (including maiden name of wife), nationality at birth, place of birth.

YUKO, Tanaka (maiden name) () Changchun, China 14 March 1928

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3020
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

11. RELATIVES. Include names, nationalities, addresses of brothers and sisters, children, in-laws, with ages, wherever located.

ASO, Akie, younger sister, Japanese, Kumamoto Girls High School, teacher

ASO, Eikizo, younger brother, Japanese, last heard of in Dairen (1945)

~~was in the working for a newspaper company~~

ASO, Eiji, younger brother, Japanese, last heard of when he was a student
~~at the Tokyo Engineering College (1945).~~

12. IF SUBJECT, PARENTS, OR HUSBAND/WIFE NATURALIZED, state date, name in which certificate was granted, and what U.S. Court.

Not applicable

13. PRESENT ADDRESS. 222 Shinwa ro, Kako ku, Changchun, China

14. PERMANENT ADDRESS. 3529 Yahata ku, Beppu City, Oita Prefecture, Japan

15. EMPLOYMENT HISTORY. State type of work done, firms employing, business addresses.

1932-1934, Mongolian Army, interpreter

1934-1941, Mongolian Cadet Officers School, Instructor of languages

1941-1944, Kwantung Army Intelligence Section (part time)

1944-1945, Lama Head Bureau Advisor, Wangheymiao.

16. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION.

Height 5'9" Weight 121 lbs Posture slight, good

Eyes brown Hair black Face-shape angular, thin

Complexion dark General appearance good

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

17. SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS.

Scars None

Disfigurements None

Prominent features mole on forehead between the eyes
mole on right side of right eye

Personal habits Blinks eyes frequently

Any traits which distinguish from others having similar physical
descriptions.

Has bushy hair, wheezes through nostrils as though he had obstruction in
his nose.

18. EDUCATION. State names of schools attended, dates, whether graduated, what degrees received.

Grammar school, Beppu City, Oita Prefecture, Japan

High School, Oita Prefecture, Japan

Osaka Foreign Language College, graduated 1932 with degree in languages.

19. TRAVEL. State names of countries visited, dates, purpose of trips.

Inner Mongolia, June 1932 to present time. Purpose study and research.

20. MEMBERSHIP IN POLITICAL PARTIES, RELIGIOUS ORDERS, PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES, CHARITABLE SOCIETIES, etc.

Lama (Buddhist)

Mongolian Religious Group

21. FOREIGN LANGUAGES AND DIALECTS.

Language (Specify)	Read	Speak	Auditory Comprehension
Japanese	X	X	X
Mongolian	X	X	X
Russian	X	X	X
English	X	X	X

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

NOTE: The first 21 questions may be filled in by the operational personnel. The following questions should be filled in only by personnel of this organization.

22. HOW WAS HE CONTACTED ORIGINALLY, AND BY WHOM? Give details, including the date of the first contact.

Brought in by Japanese refugee from Wangheymiao during the first part of September 1946.

23. HOW AND BY WHOM ARE CONTACTS PRESENTLY MADE? Presently he is in daily contact with me as a language tutor.

24. CAN HE BE CONTACTED BY ANY MEMBER OF THIS ORGANIZATION, OR ONLY THROUGH THE OFFICER PRESENTLY HANDLING HIM?

Subsequent contacts should be made only by myself or by [] under my specific instructions.

25. WHAT PROVISION HAS BEEN MADE TO INSURE CONTINUANCE OF THIS CONTACT FOR THE ORGANIZATION IN THE EVENT THE OFFICER PRESENTLY HANDLING HIM IS TRANSFERRED?

It has been fully explained that I may leave here one day and that someone else would take over. That is okay with me if the new man has my okay.

26. WHAT ARE HIS QUALIFICATIONS, INCLUDING TECHNICAL OR SPECIAL SKILLS, FOR USE AS AN AGENT?

Subject has had considerable experience as an intelligence agent for the Japanese. On top of that he is well qualified as an expert on Mongolian affairs in what he calls a patriotic way.

27. WHAT ARE HIS AFFILIATIONS WITH POLITICAL GROUPS? Only political affiliation is with the Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Group, neither Communist or Nationalist.

28. WHAT ARE HIS AFFILIATIONS WITH INTELLIGENCE AGENTS OR GROUPS? No affiliation at the present time.

9. HAS HE EVER BEEN CONSIDERED A PROFESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENT? If so, give details.

Yes, he was head of the Tokomo Kikan at Wangheymiao from the beginning of the war until October of 1944.

10. WITH WHAT PERSONS OR GROUPS DOES HE MOST OFTEN ASSOCIATE?

Mongolians, he is more Mongolian than Japanese.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

31. IN WHAT CAPACITY HAS HE BEEN USED IN THE PAST? As an informant on Mongolian personalities and as a Mongolian language tutor.

32. GIVE YOUR EVALUATION OF INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM HIM IN THE PAST. Most of his information has been reliable.

33. WHAT TYPE OF INFORMATION DOES HE PRESENTLY FURNISH? Information on Mongolian personalities, general background material on Inner Mongolia and acts as leg man between myself and the head of the Mongolian community in Changchun

34. GIVE YOUR EVALUATION OF INFORMATION PRESENTLY BEING RECEIVED FROM HIM. Reliable

35. IN WHAT MANNER AND BY WHAT MEANS DOES HE OBTAIN INFORMATION? What he doesn't already know he can get from head Mongolian in Changchun.

36. DOES HE POSSESS GENERAL, OR NATIVE, INTELLIGENCE? Yes.

37. DOES HE OBSERVE SECURITY AND USE DISCRETION? Yes, very much

38. HOW DO YOU EVALUATE HIS CHARACTER RELIABILITY? He seems honest, sincere and reliable.

39. REMUNERATION. Is he paid a regular salary or on a piece-work basis for information furnished? At present he receives a nominal salary in NEB.
Is he given gifts from time to time? Yes, cigarettes, candy or cigars.

40. REMARKS. This man has a genuine desire to work for the Mongols in Manchuria as he likes the people and the way they live. He does not want to return to Japan and will go to Inner Mongolia when he has the chance. At present he is afraid to go as the Chinese Communists have a price on his head. The Chinese Nationalists would like to get a hold of him too, as a possible war criminal suspect. He commands high respect among the Mongols as a real friend.


SUBMITTED BY:

DATE: 31 October 1946

~~TOP SECRET~~

12Surname: Aso, Tatsuo ()

RECORD COPY

Name at birth: Meiderujap () This name used in Inner Mongolia 1932-1946 and is the name Aso is known by among all Mongolians who know him.

Date and place of birth: 5 June 1910, Beppu City, Oita Prefecture, Japan.

Nationality: Japanese

Nationality at birth: Japanese

Official identity papers: Conscription passport issued by MECC at Changchun, China.

Father: Aso, Shizuyuki, Japanese, born Wasada Village, Oita Prefecture, 10 March 1877

Mother: Aso, Matsume, Beppu City, Oita Prefecture, 14 March 1877, Japanese

Wife: Yoko, Tanaka (maiden name) () Changchun, China 14 March 1926.

Relatives: Aso, Akie, younger sister, Japanese, Kumamoto Girls High School, teacher

Aso, Eikizo, younger brother, Japanese, last heard of in Dairen (1945)

Aso, Eiji, younger brother, Japanese, last heard of when he was a student
at the Tokyo Engineering College (1945)

Present Address: 222 Shinwa ro, Kako ku, Changchun, China

Permanent address: 3259 Yahata ku, Beppu City, Oita Prefecture, Japan

Employment history: 1932-1934, Mongolian Army, interpreter

1934-1941, Mongolian Cadet Officers School, Instructor of language

1941-1944, Kwantung Army Intelligence Section (part time)

1944-1945, Lama Head Bureau Advisor, Wangheymiao.

Physical description: Height - 5'3"; weight 121 lbs; posture - slight, good;
eyes - brown; hair - black; face-shape - angular, thin; complexion - dark;
general appearance - good.

scars

Special characteristics -/none; disfigurements - none; prominent features - mole on
forehead between the eyes; mole on right side of right eye; personal habits -
blinks eyes frequently; has bushy hair, wheezes through nostrils as though
he had obstruction in his nose.Education: Grammer school, Beppu City, Oita Prefecture, Japan; High School, Oita
Prefecture, Japan; Osaka Foreign Language College, graduated 1932 with
degree in languages.

Travel: Inner Mongolia, June 1932 to present time, Purpose study and research.

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SOURCES/METHODS/EXEMPTION 382B

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

DATE 2006

RECORD

RECORD COPY

12

Membership in political parties, religious orders, professional societies etc; Lama (Buddhist) Mongolian Religious Group.

Foreign languages: Japanese, Mongolian and Russian reads and speaks excellently; English reads and speaks fairly well.

Contacted: Brought in by Japanese refugees from Wanghoyinao during the first part of September 1940. At present he is daily contact of [] who uses him as a language tutor. Subsequent contacts should be made only by [] or by [] under [] specific instructions. [] as explained that he expects to leave Changchun in the near future, but source is agreeable to give information to [] replacement.

Qualifications for use as an agent: Subject has had considerable experience as an intelligence agent for the Japanese. On top of that he is well qualified as an expert on Mongolian affairs in what he calls a patriotic way.

Affiliations with political groups: Only political affiliation is with the Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Group, neither Communist or Nationalist.

Affiliations with intelligence agents or groups: No affiliation at the present time.

Professional Intelligence agent: He was head of the Tokono Kikan at Wanghoyinao from the beginning of the war until October of 1944.

Persons on groups associates with: Mongolians, he is more Mongolian than Japanese.

Type info furnishes: informant on Mongolian personalities and as a Mongolian language tutor. Info on Mongolian personalities, general background material on Inner Mongolia and acts as leg man between Richardson and the head of the Mongolian community in Changchun.

Evaluation: Reliable.

Manner he obtains info: What he doesn't already know he can get from head Mongolians in Changchun.

Remuneration: At present he receives a nominal salary in NEC is also given gifts of cigarettes, candy and cigars.

Remarks: This man has a genuine desire to work for the Mongols in Manchuria, as he likes the people and the way they live. He does not want to return to Japan and will go to Inner Mongolia when he has the chance. At present he is afraid to go as the Chinese Communists have a price on his head. The Chinese

RECORD COPY

[REDACTED]

-3-

RECORD DEPT

Nationalists would like to get a hold of him too, as a possible war criminal suspect. He commands high respect among the Mongols as a real friend.

Date of info: 31 October 1946.

RECORD CONT

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SECRET

XAR2-2946

5 April 47

SS - ABO, Tatsoe (alias MEIDORUWAP in Inner Mongolia, 1932-47).
Personal history submitted by [redacted] 31 October 1946.
to SI. Japanese, formerly with TOKUMU KIKAN. Speaks
Mongolian, Chinese, Japanese, Russian and understands
a little English. Independently recommended as source
on Mongolia by YGX-4, and by MIDAKA, Kunio, Mukden
informant. Handled by [redacted] and [redacted] So far has
proved very reliable. (Refer MEMO, 4 November 1946 from
BM/1 to BM/86, re ABO.) (Refer ZCM-293, report from
Mukden, 1 April 1947, POSSIBLE INTELLIGENCE CONTACTS.
info, BM/30.)

Code List No. 18 State Max Mexican
now 4/37 Oregon Characters _____ Age _____
Name: ABO, Tatsoe 42
Address: See Damon Mission Plan, letters dated 2 April and 12 April 1947 to [redacted]
Race and/or Ethnic Group _____ Citizenship _____
Occupation _____
Political bent and Organizational Affiliations _____

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SOURCES METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

ASO Tatsuo

YEX/A 179 (5 April 1947)

Alias MEIDORUJAP in Inner Mongolia, 1932-47

Personal history submitted by [redacted] 31 October 1946, to SI Japanese, formerly with TOKUMU KIKAN. Speaks Mongolian, Chinese, Japanese, Russian and understands a little English. Independently recommended as source on Mongolia by YCX-4, and by HIDAKA, Kunio, Mukden informant. Handled by [redacted] and [redacted] So far has proved very reliable. (Refer MEMO, 4 November 1946 from BH/1 to BH/86, re ASO.) (Refer ZCM-293, report from Mukden, 1 April 1947, POSSIBLE INTELLIGENCE CONTACTS, info, BH/30.)

ASO Tatsuo

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SOURCES/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

SECRET
G-2, GHQ

Info ESD-44
0826.1.2

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

CIS OD WSC/vj

RECORD COPY

File No:

Check of Individuals
(ASO, Tatsuo)

Date: 12Aug 47

FROM: CIS Ops

TO: Lt Col Delaney

PHONE: 26-5427

Comment
Number

NAME: W. S. Codd

1

1. Reference your request dated 5 June 1947, subj as above. The following information received from 441st CIC Det., Area 3:

ASO, Tatsuo (麻生 勝男) age 23
Address: Oita-ken, Oita-gun, Minami, Shonai-mura, Oaza Fuchi,
Aza Otaru
Father: ASO, Kikuma (麻生菊馬) age 60
Mother: ASO, Setsu (麻生 雪) age 48
Brothers: ASO, Juei (麻生 重義) age 28
ASO, Hiromi (麻生 弘巳) age 15
Sisters: ASO, Shinae (麻生 真江) age 31
ASO, Nobuyo (麻生 信由) age 25
ASO, Chikako (麻生 千佳子) age 18

Educated at: Minami Shonai-mura Primary School and Oita Commercial School.

Presently employed as a clerk for the Insurance Section of the Oita Prefectural office since 5 May 1947. Is a member of Ken Employees' Union. (Ken Shokunin Kumiai)

2. Military record:-

Employed at the Kokuza Naval Arsenal (1942-1944). Inducted in, the Japanese Army on 15 October 1944. The following day sent to Hailar, Manchuria for training. Was in Manchuria until November 1945 when taken a prisoner of war to Baranau (phonetic) Siberia. In Siberia did manual labor. On 5 June 1946 subject was sent to Komozan, Northern Korea and worked then as a prisoner until 31 December 1946. Repatriated to Japan 6 January 1947.

3. Investigation on Yoshida still pending.

FOR COORDINATION WITH Army

W.E.H.

Hailar?

?Baranau? 83-40, 53-10

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

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Permanent Record—Do not Detach

RECORD COPY

XAR2 29446

[]

From OSOTS 462, 1 February 1948 (SI Monthly Report for January 1948):

Subject is working in Peiping as an ESD translator and directing the work of other Mongols who are not connected with Damon.

OSOTS 619, 1 March 1948 (SI Monthly Report for February 1948):

Reports were brought from Changchun by [] and subject when they made a trip there in early February. The courier has not been able to get through to Peiping, but is expected before 10 March 1948. Subject continues to work in Peiping as a staff translator and concurrently the cut-out for other Mongolians in Peiping.

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

SECRET

TO : Operational Clearance Officer
FROM : Chief, FDZ
SUBJECT: Request for Operational Clearance

18 August 1950

✓ 1. Subject of above titled memorandum, dated 18 August 1950, is ASO
TATSUO.

2. Attached is Part I of subject's PRQ for your information.

Chief, FDZ

Originators

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

S A L A D

PRQ

PART I - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

1. Full Name ASO, TATSUO
First Middle Last

2. Name in native script _____

3. Name at birth (if different from 1.) Meidorev, Ira

4. Aliases, nicknames, legal changes (State briefly time, reason and

place of use.) MEIDORUJAR (used in Inner Mongolia 1932-1946) - known by this name among Mongols // PAI (Chinese name) FLUZZY (nickname)

5. a. Date of birth 5 June 1910 b. Place of birth Beppu City
Oita Prefecture, Japan

6. Present citizenship, race if appropriate. Japanese

7. Nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities (if different from 6.) French

8. Present residence (Owner, tenant, sub-tenant.) 222 Shinwa Ro. Koko
Ku, Chongshen, China

9. Permanent address (if different from 8.) 3529 Yabata Ku, Bgapu City See 8.5
N. 2.5

10. Present occupation (full title, salary etc.)

11. Naturalization of subject or of close relatives in the United States

(Give date and name in which certificate granted.)

Not applicable

12. Relatives, friends, correspondents in United States. (Explain relationship) *None*

13. Father - full name, occupation, present residence, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and subsequent nationalities.

ASO, Shizuyuki, Japanese, Waseda Village, Oita Prefecture, 10 Mar. 1877

14. Mother - same information as 13.

ASO, Matsue, Beppu City, Oita Prefecture - Japanese - 14 Mar. 1877

15. Wife (or husband) - full name, maiden name, date and place of birth, date and place of marriage, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence, divorce, annulment. (Give data for all previous marriages.)

YUKO, Tanaka - Changchun, China, 4 March 1928 (born)

16. Children - full names, sex, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence.

17. Brothers and sisters - Same information as 16.

ASO, Akie, younger sister, Japanese, Kuromoto Girls High School, teacher

ASO, Ekiyo, " brother, " , last heard of in Dairen (1945) - nsp. company

ASO, Eiji, " , " , last heard of while student at Tokyo Engineering College (1945).

18. Relatives in service of any government, names and positions held.

19. List all official identity papers held with dates, numbers, place of issue and duration of validity.

Conscriptee passport issued by NECC at Changchun, China

20. Religion - degree practiced, membership in religious orders

Buddhist

21. Present and past political affiliations

Lama (Buddhist)

Mongolian Religious Group

Eastern Mongolian Autonomous Group - neither Commie
or Nationalist

22. Travel outside country of present residence - country, dates,

purpose, people and firms visited

Inner Mongolia - June 1932 to 1946 (2+10+1) - purpose study
+ research

23. Education - school, location, course, degree, dates

Grammar School - Beppu City - Oita Prefecture, Japan

" "

High School

Osaka Foreign Language College - grad. 1932 w/ degree in languages

24. Languages and dialects (Indicate proficiency as good, fair, poor.)

Language Japanese Speak Excellent Read Excellent Understand Excellent

Language Mongolian Speak " Read " Understand "

Language Russian Speak " Read " Understand "

English Good Good Good

Chinese

25. Military service - dates, country, unit, rank, duty, where services performed, decorations, when discharged, why. Give details if ever prisoner of war

26. Present and past membership in organizations (professional, social, political, etc.)

East Mongolian Autonomous Group.

27. Special skills, abilities, hobbies (radio, photography, etc.)

Intelligence agent - expert on Mongolian affairs

28. Financial status - earnings, bank deposits, securities, property

*Receives nominal salary in NCC.
given gifts*

29. Employment history - type of work, salary, dates, employers, addresses, reasons for leaving. Include employment by any government.

1932-1934 .. Mongolian Army, Translator

1934-1941 .. Mongolian Cadet Officers School, Instructor of Languages

1941-1944 .. Kuangtung Army Intel. Section (part time)

1944-1945 .. Lema Head Bureau Advisor, Wangyehmiao

1948 .. working in Peiping as ESO translator

29. (Continued)

30. Has subject done any writing? Give details including titles of books, articles, publishers, dates.

31. List persons living at same address, close associates, (individuals or groups,) correspondents at home and abroad.

32. List five character references.

33. Court record - court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals, denazification, etc.

34. Description (Use American standards of measurement, if possible.)

Age 40 (1950)

SQUAT

Posture straight - good

Apparent age _____

Weight 121 lbs

Height 5' - 9"

Teeth _____

Eyes Brown

Hair Black - bushy

Face - shape Angular - thin

Scars None

Complexion Dark

Build Slight

Sex Male

General appearance Good

Prominent features Mole on forehead between eyes + on right side of right eye.

Other identifying features Blinks eyes frequently

35. Other miscellaneous biographical data and comments.

SECRET

TO : Operational Clearance Officer

18 August 1980

FROM : Chief, FDC

SUBJECT: Request for Operational Clearance

1. Operational Clearance is requested for LP-SALAD.
2. LP-SALAD is old-time agent now in field.

[]
Chief, FDC

Originator: []

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE: METHODS EXEMPTION 3020
NAI: WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE: 2000

SECRET

SECRET

PERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIRE

/PRQ/

Part II - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER:

1. If feasible, subject should fill in Part I of PRQ in his own hand.
2. Part II of PRQ is classified, must be filled in by the Case Officer and is not to be shown to subject.
3. Headquarters will not be able to provide an Operational Clearance unless it receives answers to all questions on page 1 of Part I (Items 1 to 12), and to all questions of Part II (Items 36 to 58).
4. In emergency these answers, keyed to Items 1 to 12 by number, and with summary of Part II, may be cabled to Headquarters, followed promptly by pouch with complete data.
5. Fully completed PRQ must be sent to Headquarters as soon as possible, two copies of Part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and one copy of Part II.
6. Data acquired later must be sent to Headquarters in PRQ format on a continuing basis.
7. All pages of both parts will bear the PRQ number, composed of (a) station symbol (b) PRQ (c) number assigned consecutively by the field station; e.g. PGA/PRQ/10.

36. Cryptonym 17 - SALAD

37. How, when and where was subject first contacted or developed?
Brought in by Japanese refugee from Wangyehmiao during 1st. part of Sept. 1946.

38. Could subject be turned over quickly and in a secure manner to someone else for handling? *Yes* To whom? *Whomever I O.K. is alright with A.S.O.*

39. Best estimate of subject's motivation

SECRET

/PRQ/

40. With what agencies and files has subject's name been checked? When? Result? What else has been done to verify biographical information furnished by subject?

41. What control exists over subject at present? How can it be increased?

42. For what service does he think he is working? What does he think becomes of his information?

43. Explain fully subject's past or present connection with any intelligence service.

Was head of Tokomo Kiton at Wangyehmiao Fr.
beginning of war till Oct. 1944

44. What type of information has subject furnished? What type is he best qualified by education and experience to furnish? Give evaluation of information received.

Reliable - info on Mongolian personalities, general background info on I.M. - Leg man between Richardson & head of Mongol community in Changchun.

Was an informant on Personalities - a Mongolian language tutor.

45. If subject's duties are to be other than intelligence gathering, explain.

46. Has he been given special training as an agent? Explain.

47. How and from whom does he obtain information? *Info he doesn't already know, he can get from head Mongolian in Changchun.*

48. Is it proposed to pay subject a regular salary? If so, amount per week, month, etc. Explain any other methods of payment, such as exchange commodities. *Given nominal salary in nec. - cigarettes + candy*

49. Have any promises or commitments whatsoever (not covered elsewhere in this form) been made to subject? Explain.

50. Are subject's language abilities and other characteristics such that he could pass as a native of a country or region other than his own? Explain.

51. What is subject's social standing? Aristocracy, upper middle class, lower middle class, peasantry, etc.?

52. What are subject's personal habits? Liquor, drugs, gambling, mistresses or lovers?

53. Evaluation of subject's character, reliability, security.

He seems honest, sincere & reliable

54. With what other foreign power would subject be most likely to collaborate because of his ideology, obligation, etc.? Explain.

55. What special abilities, talents, or qualifications are possessed by subject which would conceivably be of value for other operations in the future? *had considerable experience as an intelligence agent for the Japanese. Well-qualified as expert on Mongolian affairs in what he calls a patriotic way.*

56. Attach samples of subject's signature and handwriting in all languages known to him, also a recent, dated photograph, and fingerprints.

57. How was information in Part I obtained?

SECRET

/PRQ/

58. Other miscellaneous operational data and comments.

Case officer

SECRET

SECRET

No. 704

OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

To: FDZ []

Operational Clearance is granted for the use of LF-SALAD. ↴

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SOURCES/METHODS/EXEMPTION 3B2D
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

Limitations: To be used as stated in PRQ-II.

STAFF C []
Operational Clearance Officer for
ADSO

Date OCT 8 1950 []

Copy 1 of 2 copies []

SECRET

STATE OF AFFIDAVIT IN LIEU OF PASSPORT
IN THE MATTER OF PASSPORT FACILITIES
AND IDENTIFICATION.

I, PAI Ching-ju 白清居, whose occupation or profession is that of Translator being first duly sworn, depose and say:

1. I was born in Tungliao, Manchuria on 5 June 1910.
2. I am unable to obtain a regular national passport readily due to the exigencies of war and resulting dislocation.
3. I attach hereto my photograph and personal description as evidence of my identity.

PAI, Ching-ju
(Signature of Applicant)

Subscribed and sworn before me this 29 day of June 1951.

Howard J. Olson
Howard J. Olson, Maj., Sig. Corps U.S.A.

PHOTOGRAPH



DESCRIPTION

Height: 5' 3"
Weight: 121 lbs.
Eyes: Brown
Hair: Black
Teeth: Even
Sex: Male
Scars: None

Other Identifying Features:

Mole in mid-forehead and at outside corner of right eye.

Entered Japan AUG 2 1951
TACHIKAWA AIR BASE
R. C. Anderson
Adm. Officer

SUBJECT AUTHORIZED TO REMAIN
JAPAN AS PERMANENT RESIDENT.
REFERENCE LETTER DATED 28 AUG 51.
FROM S-2 A.P.

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SOURCES METHOD/SEXEMPTION 3D2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008



OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL

U. S. FLEET ACTIVITIES

U.S. NAVY
NAVY NO. 3923, YOKOSUKA, JAPAN

TEMPORARY IDENTIFICATION CERTIFICATE 17 February 1953
NOT A PASS. FOR IDENTIFICATION ONLY: Date

This is to certify that the below named applicant has applied for an Armed Forces Pacific Identification Card. This certificate will serve as temporary identification until the permanent card is issued.

Name PAI, Ching - ju

~~Employed by:~~ FRU/FEC

Relationship: _____ Dept: _____

Relationship: _____
Address in Japan: Bx 25 Navy 3923 c/o EPO San Fran.,
Calif.

See Reverse Side

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SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2000

447

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

DATA 2118

Po

Chief, TM

Chief of Mission, C]

Operational

Transmittal of Part I Form

Carried st

1. Transmitted herewith are Part I Forms on the following individuals:
ASO Tatars

- a. TATSUO Aso (7022/3938/6472/3908), ZJT/ZHQ/1364 - Revised May 1953.
- b. [] ZJT/ZHQ/58 - Revised May 1953.
- c. [] ZJT/ZHQ/51 - Revised May 1953.
- d. E [] ZJT/ZHQ/60 - Revised May 1953.

2. Operational identities follow in separate annexes.

Enclosures:

- 1. ZJT/ZHQ/1364, two copies
- 2. ZJT/ZHQ/58 two copies
- 3. ZJT/ZHQ/51 two copies
- 4. ZJT/ZHQ/60 two copies

1 June 1953

Distribution:

- 3 - Chief, TM w/encl as noted
- 1 - [] w/encl 1 copy
- 1 - Registry, w/encl 1 copy
- 1 - Chrono, w/c encl

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

SECRET

ATION

13. Father - full name, occupation, present residence, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and subsequent nationalities.

Aso, Shigemuki: (Deceased in 1936) Formerly an official in the City Hall of Beppu-shi, Born 1880 in Wasada-mura, Oita-gun, Oita-ken.

14. Mother - same information as 13.

Aso, Hatsume (Deceased in 1944) Born 1880 in Honmachi, Beppu-shi, Oita-ken.

15. Wife (or husband) - full name, maiden name, date and place of birth, date and place of marriage, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence, divorce, annulment. (Give data for all previous marriages.)

Aso, Yuko: Tanaka, Yuko: Born Mar. 14, 1928 in Changchun Manchuria married at Changchun in Nov. 3 1946:
c/o Tanaka, Sueo, 4/6 Tsukimi-cho, Tentoku, Keisen-cho, Kaho-gun, Fukuoka-ken.

16. Children - full names, sex, year and place of birth, nationality at birth and any subsequent nationalities, present residence.

Aso, Hiroko: (Daughter) born Apr 17, 1947 in Changchun, Manchuria:

Living together with Aso, Yuko:

Aso, Shizuhiko: (son) born Oct 20, 1951 at Mother's present address:
living together with Aso, Yuko.

17. Brothers and sisters - Same information as 16.

Nishihira, Fumi: elder sister: Born 1899 at Beppu-shi, Oita-ken: c/o Nishihira, Hiroshi, No. 231, Odakshin-machi, Hirakata-shi, Osaka-fu

Maruta, Takayo: younger sister: Born 1916 at Beppu-shi, Oita-ken:
Yamasaki, Toyonomura, Shimomasuki-gun, Kumamoto-ken.

Natsume, Eiji: younger brother born 1926 at Beppu-shi, Oita-ken No. 105 Furushiro-Moribata-cho, Kumamoto-shi, Kumamoto-ken.

18. Relatives in service of any government, names and positions held.

None

19. List all official identity papers held with dates, numbers, place of issue
and duration of validity. *Alien Registration: No. ¹²¹⁰¹ issued by Major of Yokosuka

Date issued, 20 Nov 1952: Validity until, 19 Nov. 1954.

*Armed Forces Pacific Identification card:

*Temporary Identification certificate, issued by office of the Provost Marshal,

20. Religion - degree practiced, membership in religious orders Yokosuka

Buddhist(The Zenshu Faction), Loyal and earnest to Buddhism.

21. Present and past political affiliations

please see item Nr. 26.

22. Travel outside country of present residence - country, dates,

purpose, people and firms visited

July 1931 North China, Manchuria and Inner Mongolia for the purpose of
Sept 1931 a Study tour.

May 1932 North China, Manchuria and Inner Mongolia for exercise of
Aug 1945 functions.

23. Education - school, location, course, degree, dates

Mar 1932 Graduated, Mongolian Dept. of the National Osaka Foreign Language
College.

24. Languages and dialects (Indicate proficiency as good, fair, poor.)

Language Japanese Speak good Read good Understand good

Language Mongolian Speak fair Read fair Understand fair

Language Chinese Speak fair Read fair Understand fair

English fair fair fair

25. Military service - dates, country, unit, rank, duty, where services performed, decorations, when discharged, why. Give details if ever prisoner of war

Please refer to the attached sheet.

26. Present and past membership in organizations (professional, social, political, etc.)

June, 1944, Joined a Secret Party named "Mongol Holba" as leading Member.

27. Special skills, abilities, hobbies (radio, photography, etc.)

Hobby: Music, been string orchestra conductor and contrabass player.

28. Financial status - earnings, bank deposits, securities, property earning

29. Employment history - type of work, salary, dates, employers, addresses, reasons for leaving. Include employment by any government.

Oct 1945 ** interpreter, at cabaret at Changchun, Manchuria,
Nov 1945

Dec. 1945 Interpreter, a conveyance unit of the USSR Army located at the South Mar. 1946 Changchun, Station.

Jun 1946 -- Consultant, The Changchun Branch office of the Gimo's North East Jul 1946 field Hq.

Jul 1946 -- cremater, at the South Changchun Hospital of Japanese Residence. Sept 1946

29. (Continued)

30. Has subject done any writing? Give details including titles of books, articles, publishers, dates.

None

31. List persons living at same address, close associates, (individuals or groups,) correspondents at home and abroad.

✓ NR Takahashi, Yasukata: 57 Landlord

✓ NR Takahashi, Hatsuko: 60, landlrd's wife

✓ NR Takahashi, Kazuo: 28, 1st son

✓ NR Takahashi, Minoru: 22, 2nd son

32. List five character references.

✓ NR Shinoda, Kenichi (4646/3944/6197/0001): No. 22, 2 chome, Kamiyama-cho.
Setagaya-ku, Tokyo.

✓ NR Abematsu, Genichi (2646/3293/001): Osaka Foreign Language College, Tenno-
jiku, Osaka.

✓ NR Imamura, Yutaka (0093/2625/6265): Hiroshima University, Hiroshima-shi, ~~Japan~~

FJY /PRQ/ 1364

33. Court record - court, date, arrests, charges, punishments, sentences, acquittals, denazification, etc.

None

34. Description (Use American standards of measurement, if possible.)

Age	44 oriental accent	Posture	erect
Apparent age	50	Weight	150 lbs
Height	5'4"	Teeth	poor
Eyes	brown	Hair	black
Face - shape	Oval	Scars	none
Complexion	dark	Build	stocky
Sex	male		
General appearance	strong-healthy		
Prominent features	hair stands up: large mole in center of forehead		
Other identifying features			

35. Other miscellaneous biographical data and comments.

May 1932- Member non-official staff of the Kuantung Army HQ. Dispatched to the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Army HQ as a member of the Advisory Office of the Army.

Aug 1932 - Member of the Hsingan Army Foundation Council. (served in Tungliao Hsien)

Sep 1932 - Appointed Cavalry Senior Lt, junior adjutant officer of the Hsingan South Provincial Garrison HQ. (served in Tungliao Hsien).

Mar 1933 - Promoted to Captain.

Sept 1933 - Retired from said position in order to ~~transferred~~ to a member of the Hsingan Military Academy Foundation Council. (Served at the office in Tungliao Hsien)

Jul 1934 - Instructor (civilian officer, honourable rank of captain) in the Hsingan Military Academy. (served at the school at Wangyehmiao).

Mar 1936 - Member of the Wangyehmiao TKK with a nominal position of administrative officer in the MND of Manchoukuo. (Served in Shilingol territory of inner Mongolia)

Jul 1937 - Chief of the Ujumuchin Branch TKK of the Wangyehmiao TKK. (served in Shilingo territory). ~~to~~

Sep 1938 - PRomoted to honourable rank of Major by MND of Manchoukuo.

Mar 1939 - Transferred to the Wangyehmiao TKK (served at Wangyehmiao) Chief of the Operational Section.

Sept 1942 - Promoted to honourable rank of Lt-Colonel by MND of Manchoukuo.

Dec 1943 - Chief Advisory Section, Wangyehmiao TKK. Treated with 6th rank of high grade civilian officer by Japanese Government.

Sep 4 1945 - Arrested by USSR Army in Horchin left Flank Center Banner during on duty of espionage activities, and was sent to Changch'un through T'aonan Hsien where subject was released after a short investigation by USSR authorities on 19th September 1945.

1st Mar. 1946 - Arrested by a USSR Garrison troup of Changchun, but after a short investigation, subject was released on 14th March 1946 with tied of string.

*6th order merit of Zuihoshō (Japanese). *5th order merit of Chu-kuo-chang (Manchukuo)

*6th Order merit of Ching-un-chang (Manchoukuo).

*War medal for Manchurian incident . *War medal for Chinese incident and

Nononhan incident (Japan).

*Medal of meritorious service for establishment of Manchoukuo (Manchoukuo).

*Medal of meritorious service for establishment of MFAG (MFAG).

*Memorial medal for Manchurian Emperor's arrival to Japan (Manchoukuo)

*Memorial medal for Accession Ceremony of Manchurian Emperor (manchoukuo)

**SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION**

MEMORANDUM

4 June 1953

SUBJECT: ASO, Tatsuo - FJY/PRQ/1364, Revised May 1953

1. Subject, also known as MEIDORUJAP and ME Te Ru Jappu, has been connected with LF BEATRICE since early 1951.

2. According to WASH-48180, 30 June 1951, [] listed as a friend of ASO's in Long Beach, California, was working as a shipping clerk for Montgomery Ward. ([] F-3330 to WASH F, 28 January 1952 ([] S/KAPOK), suggested that he be dispatched []. He, as well as ASO, is mentioned in an AMCY DAILY NEWS story of 22 April 1951 on the theft of natural resources information on northeast China by a U. S. intelligence organization at Changchun. The intelligence organization is identified as the U. S. Changchun Navy Foreign Affairs Office, also known as U. S. External Survey Detachment 44. The article states that in the summer of 1947 [] a Japanese agent of the organization, stole a large batch of material from the President of the Manchurian Heavy Industry Company. ASO Tatsuo is mentioned in the article as a co-worker of TANIGUCHI, Morio, another Japanese agent of the U. S. Changchun Navy Foreign Affairs Office.

3. FRU files contain no record of the other names in ASO's revised PRQ, with the exception of TAKAHASHI. There were sixteen TAKAHASHI Kasuo's, the name of ASO's landlord's first son, and eleven TAKAHASHI Minoru's, the second son's name, officially registered as members of the Communist Party as of February 1950. None of these persons, however, were living in Kanagawa-ken. (GHQ/FEC Publication, Volume 5) Other TAKAHASHI's referenced in FRU files include:

a. (fmu) a Japanese Consul in Shanghai during the occupation (source and date unknown);

b. (fmu) a Secretary at the Japanese Consulate, Shanghai, in 1945 (YEX-205, 20 October 1945);

c. (fmu) a Consul and Section Head, Japanese Consulate in Shanghai (YEX-105, 11 October 1945);

d. (fmu) a Vice-Consul in the Intelligence Department of the Japanese Shanghai Consulate about 1938 to 1941 (YEX-1656, 14 December 1945);

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DATE 2008

**SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION**

**SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION**

Memo: ASO, Tatsue
4 June 1953
Page: 2

e. (fmu) student leader of the Japanese Black Dragon or Shui Yao Society at the Manchurian Medical College. The Black Dragon Society in Manchuria was an intelligence organization with its headquarters at the Medical College (YEX-2308, 27 May 1946);

f. (fmu) a General, Chief of the Japanese General Staff, North China Army (YEX-269, 19 September 1945, F-2);

g. (fmu) a Lieutenant who translated books written by TANNER, a Russian General who was an instructor for many years at the Military College in Russia (YST-41, 7 May 1946);

h. (fmu) a Lieutenant Colonel who was a member of the Young Officers Alliance in Harbin, a rightist organization which proposed reconstruction of the Kwantung Army (YCX-22, 2 September 1946);

i. (fmu) A Major who, along with two Warrant Officers and twenty-eight soldiers went over to Pootung (across the river from Shanghai, East) to join Communist forces there (YEX-84, 11 October 1945);

j. (fmu) of the Changchun Advance Headquarters under NECC Headquarters, Mukden (ZCA-470, 25 February 1947); and

k. (fmu) at Fushun with about ten men working under the Northeast Political Affairs Bureau, Mukden, as of about July 1946 (ZCA-470, 25 February 1947).

By: []

[]

**SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION**

MEMORANDUM FOR: PI/STC/SPI

31 July 1953

SUBJECT : Operational Clearance, Request to Transfer to Different Project

It is requested that Operational Clearance be granted for use of the agent designated below in a project other than that originally planned. No duties will be undertaken other than those for which Operational Clearance was originally requested. *Granted*

<u>Operational Clearance No.</u>	<u>Former Projects</u>	<u>New Project</u>	<u>Details</u>
704	LP-BEATRICE and LP-BERENICE	ST-BRANT	See below

The chief agent of the new project, ST-BRANT-1 (formerly TLERANT), was the chief agent of Project LP-BEATRICE and the cut-out and analyst for Project LP-BERENICE. It is believed that by making ST-BRANT a single-agent support project, ST-BRANT-1 can service both LP-BEATRICE and LP-BERENICE Projects by devoting more of his time to producing plans, reports and analyses of agent reports.

Originator: [REDACTED]

Concurs: [REDACTED]
HG/714/00

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3D2B
KAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

Re: RE Notice 93

[REDACTED] ST-BRANT

OPERATIONAL CLEARANCE

No. 7433

TO: ChieFFE/FI/2404 J

Operational Clearance is granted for the use of ST BRANT.

This clearance supersedes OC 704.

LIMITATIONS: To be used as stated in FE memo dtd 31 July 1953. This clearance is based upon a (non-derogatory) check of (non-derogatory) (negative) files available to headquarters and (non-derogatory) (negative) results of field traces. It should be borne in mind that this clearance is in no way to be construed as a guarantee of subject's bona fides, but merely reflects that disqualifying derogatory information was not developed during the course of the inquiry outlined above. The extent of headquarters checking and the basis for this clearance should be conveyed to the field station concerned.

[]
FI/STC/SPF

Date 9 Dec 1953

Copy 1 of 2 copies

TC Jr/mc
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SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. FJW-2290

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

FEB 1 1954

TO : Chief, C DATE: _____

FROM : Chief, FE

SUBJECT: GENERAL

- Operational/STERANT

SPECIFIC - Possible Entry of STERANT into the United States

Ref. : ZACARIN Field Regulation #50-7, 1 Apr. 51; FJW-4183,
21 Dec. 53

1. Preliminary inquiries have been made to determine the means of effecting STERANT's entry into the United States. STERANT could enter by any one of four ways: as an immigrant on the Japanese quota, as a student, as a visitor, or as an alien sponsored by KURANE.
2. At the present time, the U.S. will permit 18% Japanese per year to enter this country. The quotas for 1954 and 1955 are already filled, so it would be impossible for all practical purposes to consider this channel.
3. To enter the U.S. with a student's visa would require STERANT to apply to, and be accepted by, a college or university. STERANT could then apply for a Japanese passport. The passport and the written acceptance by a college would permit an American Consul to issue a visa. The visa would be effective for the period of his academic enrollment. It would be almost impossible for STERANT to obtain a Japanese passport because he is documented as a Chinese alien. The only other alternative would be for STERANT to go to Taiwan to apply for a Chinese passport for which the American Consul in Taipei could issue a visa. This aspect should be investigated rather closely in order not to arouse Chinese suspicions.
4. A visitor's visa would entail the same problems with respect to STERANT's documentation as outlined in para. 3, above.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

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COORDINATING OFFICER

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CHIEF, FE/2

5. HUMARK's sponsorship of the entry of an alien into this country is outside normal channels. This procedure is closely administered and the alien's entry requires the approval of the Director, HUMARK, and the concurrence of Identities A and B. Detailed justification is required for the Director's approval. The following preliminary procedures are required prior to officially requesting an alien's entry:
 - a. Processing through LOFLYTER,
 - b. A medical and psychiatric examination,
 - c. Approval by HUBODA,
 - d. Sponsorship of the alien agreed to by HUJUMP.
6. Headquarters cannot foresee any great value to this organization if STURANT were brought to this country. He might possibly be of greater value if he were to go to India for study, which would give him personal cover and operational potential.

[]
[]
[]

Enclosure
Enc. 1 by separate cover

26 January 1954

Distribution:

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2 - FE/2

1 - Registry

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Enc. 1 to PJSR-2280

Separate Cover Enclosure

Identity A - The Attorney General

Identity B - The Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization

W.M.B.
42 15

EX-2 SEARCHED

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SAC ATT B FJW 2280

H-6-7-145

5

VIA:

(Specify air or sea pouch)
COURIER

Dispatch No.

FJW-5109

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

To :

Date

FROM Chief, []

Chief, []
SUBJECT: GENERAL

SPECIFIC-

INFO: Chief, FE []

Operational/STURANT

Possible entry of STURANT into the United States

1. The following quotes FJW-2280 dated 1 February 1954:

1. Preliminary inquiries have been made to determine the means of effecting STURANT's entry into the United States. STURANT could enter by any one of four ways: as an immigrant on the Japan country quota, as a student, as a visitor, or as an alien sponsored by KUMARK.
2. At the present time, the U. S. will permit 185 Japanese per year to enter this country. The quotas for 1954 and 1955 are already filled, so it would be impossible for all practical purposes to consider this channel.
3. To enter the U. S. with a student's visa would require STURANT to apply to, and be accepted by, a college or university. STURANT could then apply for a Japanese passport. The passport and the written acceptance by a college would permit an American Consul to issue a visa. The visa would be effective for the period of his academic enrollment. It would be almost impossible for STURANT to obtain a Japanese passport because he is documented as a Chinese alien. The only other alternative would be for STURANT to go to Taiwan to apply for a Chinese passport for which the American Consul in Taipei could issue a visa. This aspect should be investigated rather closely in order not to arouse Chinese suspicions.
4. A visitor's visa would entail the same problems with respect to STURANT's documentation as outlined in paragraph 3, above.
5. KUMARK's sponsorship of the entry of an alien into this country is outside normal channels. This procedure is closely administered and the alien entry requires the approval of the Director, KUMARK, and the Director of Personnel of Identities A and B. Detailed justification is required for the Director's approval. The following preliminary procedures are required prior to officially requesting an alien's entry:

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FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR 1949

16 Feb 54
16-63048-1 GPO

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16-63048-1 GPO

SECRET

PJYA-5109
Page - 2

- a. Processing through LOPLUTTER,
- b. A medical and psychiatric examination,
- c. Approval by KUSOM,
- d. Sponsorship of the alien agreed to by KUJUMP.

6. Headquarters cannot foresee any great value to this organization if STERANT were brought to this country. He might possibly be of greater value if he were to go to India for study, which would give him personnel cover and operational potential.

2. The problem appears to boil down to STERANT procuring a passport. It is requested that you investigate STERANT's capability to do so. It is further requested that you comment on paragraph 6 above; specifically, give reasons for STERANT to go to the U. S., or possibly to another area for study, training, or whatever you have in mind.

11 February 1954

Distribution:

2 - Chief,

1 - Chief, PI

1 - []

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OPTIONAL

Page 2935

23 MAR 1954

VIA

Chief,
Chief,
Chief,

INFO: Chief, PE


Operational/STRENT-1

Future Operational Use of STRENT-1

References: (a) PJW-2250, dated 1 February 1954
(b) PJA-4183, dated 21 December 1953
(c) DIB-19976, dated 19 September 1953
(d) PJA-1361, dated 19 May 1953

1. With the proposed termination of the Japan segments of Project LIBERATION and the transfer of the remainder to the and the termination of LIBERATIONICA, the reorientation of Project STRENT is required. STRENT was set up to support LIBERATION and LIBERATIONICA, and that task obviously ends with the above mentioned terminations. Therefore, it is requested that the second stage of Project STRENT, which calls for sending him to the United States for studies and training now be implemented. (See reference (d), paragraph 12) We cover with the advisability of sending STRENT-1 to India (PJW-2250, paragraph 6) at a later date, after his scholastic and technical skills have been sharpened through a year or two of study and he has been thoroughly trained and indoctrinated for his future assignment. The period in the states will provide him with excellent cover and enable him to move into India (or perhaps some other Asian country, except Japan) legally and convincingly.
2. In the PPOP, PJA-1361 approved by Headquarters in DIB-19976, dated 1 September 1953, paragraph 12 raises the possibility of sending him to the states, stating that a new PPOP will be submitted. We will do so in the near future. STRENT-1 is an accomplished linguist, speaking five tongues, and should specialize in teaching in this line.
3. PJW-2250, dated 1 February 1954, mentions some of the problems involved in sending STRENT-1 from Japan to the states. Technically, STRENT-1 is dead and is here under an alias and documented as a Chinese alien. The impossibility of his obtaining a Japanese passport is pointed out by Headquarters. Going through the Taiwan authorities entails a risk to STRENT-1 and LIBERATION which we prefer not to take. We suggest, as an alternate, that STRENT-1 be taken back from Japan to Shinkan or perhaps Okinawa where presumably we could provide documentation and a

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AB	✓
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DIS	✓
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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

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Page 2 of RJA-2935

visa to the states. If this is not possible, then we recommend KUBARK sponsorship in line with paragraph 5, RJA-2289. The problem there is only an internal KUBARK one, and if KUBARK decides to implement the plan as outlined in general above, we can see no difficulty.

4. In the interim, we request the [] to look into the Okinawa and Guam possibilities as soon as possible. Upon a favorable response from the [] on this general plan and some data on Okinawa and Guam entry-exit procedures, we will prepare an FPOP for the future use of STRIKE-1, calling for black infiltration into Guam or Okinawa first, or for KUBARK sponsorship.

[]

17 March 1954

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

FJJA-2935

23 MAR 1954

VIA

Chief,
Chief,
Chief,

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ENR : Chief, RE

0 operational/STRAIGHT-1

Future Operational Use of STRAIGHT-1

References: (a) FJYA-2200, dated 1 February 1954
(b) FJYA-4183, dated 21 December 1953
(c) DIA-1976, dated 19 September 1953
(d) FJYA-1061, dated 19 May 1953

A30 TA TSU 0

7

1. With the proposed termination of the Japan segments of Project STRAIGHT-1 and the transfer of the remainder to the [REDACTED], and the termination of Project STRAIGHT-1, the reorientation of Project STRAIGHT is required. STRAIGHT was set up to support INNAMERICA and CFB-EX-1, and that task obviously ends with the above mentioned terminations. Therefore, it is requested that the second stage of Project STRAIGHT, which calls for sending him to the United States for studies and training, now be implemented. (See reference (d), paragraph 14) We concur with the advisability of sending STRAIGHT-1 to India (FJYA-2200, paragraph 6) at a later date, after his scholastic and technical skills have been sharpened through a year or two of study and he has been thoroughly trained and indoctrinated for his future assignment. The period in the states will provide him with excellent cover and enable him to move into India (or perhaps some other Asian country, except Japan) equally and convincingly.
2. In the FJYA-1061 approved by Headquarters in DIA-1976, dated 19 September 1953, paragraph 12 raises the possibility of sending him to the states, stating that a new FAP will be submitted. He will do so in the near future. STRAIGHT-1 is an accomplished linguist, speaking five tongues, and should specialize in teaching in this line.
3. FJYA-2200, dated 1 February 1954, mentions some of the problems involved in sending STRAIGHT-1 from Japan to the states. Essentially, STRAIGHT-1 is dead and is here under an alias and documented as a Chinese alien. The impossibility of his obtaining a Japanese passport is pointed out by Headquarters. Going through the Taiwan authorities entails a risk to STRAIGHT-1 and INNAMERICA, which we prefer not to take. We suggest, as an alternate, that STRAIGHT-1 be taken back from Japan to Okinawa or perhaps Guam where presumably we could provide documentation and a

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DR RPT
13 MAR 54

16-6-29-815

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Page 2 of RUSA-2935

view to the states.] If this is not possible, then we recommend KUBARK sponsorship in line with paragraph 5, RUSA-2280. The problem there is only an internal KUBARK one, and if KUBARK decides to implement the plan as outlined in general above, we can see no difficulty.

b. In the interim, we request the [] to look into the Okinawa and Guam possibilities as soon as possible. Upon a favorable response from the [] on this general plan and some data on Okinawa and Guam entry-exit procedures, we will prepare an FPOP for the future use of STORM-1, calling for black infiltration into Guam or Okinawa first, or for KUBARK sponsorship.

17 March 1968

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X-6-29-815

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA AIR
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. WDW-3957

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

AUG 3 1954

TO : Chief, []

DATE _____

FROM : Chief, []

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational/STURMANT
SPECIFIC - Future Use of STURMANT-1

KEY : WDW-3957, 2 July 1954

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
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SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

1. In order that Headquarters may be in a position to offer more adequate and timely support to [] plans for STURMANT-1, it is requested that, pending submission of the JPOF, Headquarters be advised of the [] general thinking relative to the operational utilization of STURMANT-1 while in the United States and after completion of his period of study.
2. Has the [] considered attempting to obtain a visa for STURMANT-1 under the provisions of the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 (Public Law 203)? Pertinent extracts are included in the referenced dispatch. STURMANT-1 might be eligible under Section 4 (a) paragraphs (21) and (22). In any event, no matter what program or method is used, STURMANT-1 will still have difficulty in obtaining a visa. As we understand it, the Consul has full responsibility in the issuance of visas, and requires, usually, (a) a birth certificate for the individual making application for a visa, (b) a police certificate, certifying that the applicant has no criminal record; and in other cases where the applicant has a family, a marriage certificate and birth certificates for the applicant's spouse and children. Although the relationships may be such at times that the Consul may be prevailed upon to issue a visa with little or no documentation, such a development would seem to be highly improbable. It is possible that KUBARK could supply STURMANT-1 with the necessary documentation but in the event such authentication were successful he would still be obtaining the visa fraudulently, and if he were to come to this country, and the fraud later proven, then he would be deported forthwith.
3. There are only two possibilities that remain for STURMANT-1 to enter this country legally:
 - a. Under KUBARK sponsorship - this method requires extensive field justification and is closely administered.

[] (Coordinating officer) []

[] (Authenticating officer) []

CFE []

CFE/2 []

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b. STREANT-1 could go to the Japanese (after a thorough security briefing) and admit his true identity. He could explain his documentation by stating that he wanted to return to Japan immediately after World War II, but inasmuch as he was listed as a war criminal by the Chinese - and he was listed as such, he was afraid that on his return to Japan, during the occupation, he would be turned over to the Chinese and prosecuted for his alleged wartime activities. He could go further and state that OGIWAKI employed him because of his background and experience, brought him back to Japan and documented him as he was because of his fears of prosecution by the Chinese. It may be possible for the [] to request a letter from OGIWAKI stating that STREANT-1 performed valuable services for them during the post-war years and that they required his continued employment during the Korean War because of his highly specialized background in Inner Asian languages and culture. It is felt that within a short period of time STREANT-1 might be accepted by the Japanese and be able to operate under his true identity, albeit, not without intensive questioning by the Japanese Intelligence Service. After STREANT-1 admitted his true identity and had been accepted by the Japanese, PEPRIN could support him openly, e.g., a grant from a research foundation, under which he could perform research on a topic within his sphere of competence, which would be of benefit either to the Japanese government or to private Japanese organizations (universities, etc.). STREANT-1 could then apply for, and probably receive, further study in this country in a perfectly legal status with the backing of some Japanese research or scholarly group. Headquarters will investigate the requirements of the various foundations for research grants, if the [] expresses any interest in this type of a program.

c. As an alternative STREANT-1 could stay on in some capacity with the [] perhaps as an interpreter, although he probably would not be amenable to this suggestion. If he did decide to remain and were to admit his true identity to the Japanese, the latter, in all probability, would attempt to use him as a source of information regarding PEPRIN activities. If he did not admit his identity he would be faced with delaying a situation that must be faced sooner or later.

5. Your comments on the preceding paragraphs are requested.

29 July 1954

Distribution:

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1 - RI

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SOURCES/METHODS/EXEMPTION 3020
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

FJYR-8973

NR

SEP 3 19

COURIER

VIA

Chief, []
Chief, []
Chief, []

INFO: Chief, FE

Operational

Future Plans for STURANT-1

REF: FJYR-3612, 3 August 1954

6010-6696

1. Paragraphs 3 a and b of the reference dispatch explore possibilities for affecting STURANT-1's legal entry to the United States. In light of recent conversations with [] which indicate that little trouble is expected in documenting STURANT-1 on Okinawa as a stateless person, we do not contemplate further investigation of either suggestion. Details of the arrangement on Okinawa will be forwarded by []
2. As discussed with [] on 24 August 1954, we believe it is necessary for [] to present a complete plan for the utilization of STURANT-1 both during and after his period of study in the United States. Such a plan should clearly point out how STURANT-1's period of study in the United States will enhance his long range value to NUMARK
3. One copy of FJYR-3612 is enclosed for your information and retention.

Enclosure:
1 - FJYR-3612

31 August 1954

Distributions:

- 2 - [] w/c encl
- 1 - [] w/c encl
- 1 - Chief, FE w/c encl
- 2 - Chi/Ind w/c encl
- 1 - Registry w/c encl
- 1 - Chrono w/c encl

[]	[]
ABSTRACT	INDEX
FJYR	6973
DATE	3 Sept. 1954

SECRET

CS COPY

OO-10-786d

DISPATCH FJBA-1869

15 September 1954

TO - []

FROM - []

SUBJECT - Request for LCFLUTTER Service

The [] wishes to process two agents, STBRAINT-1 and
[] through LCFLUTTER. It is requested that the []
[] Security Officer make the necessary arrangements with []
[]

ORIGINAL IN LCFLUTTER FILE

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3D2D
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

[] []

COURIER

SECRET

URGENT

9634

Via:

Chief,
Chief,
Chief,

Date: 7/8

OCT 7 1954

Operational
Transmittal of STURMANT File

Transmitted herewith is the STURMANT file as per the request of

Enclosure One (1) STURMANT File

5 October 1954

Distributions:

2 - w/enclosure as noted

1 - b w/o encl

1 - w/o encl

CM, Rubat

1 - Registry, w/o encl

1 - Security, w/o encl

Summary - Registry

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCESMETHODS EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

DESENSITIZED

per CSN 43-26

RYBAT

SECRET

KAPOK
SECRET

Req

COURIER

FJBA- 3517

25 JAN 1955

VIA

Chief,
Chief,
Chief,

[]
[]
[]
[]

INFO: Chief, FE

Operational

Results of LCFLUTTER Examination of STERANT-1

REF : FJEW-675, dated 4 August 1954

1. Forwarded under separate cover are the results of the LCFLUTTER examination of STERANT-1 with comments made by [] and [] E, the two LCFLUTTER operators who conducted the subject examination. At the case officer's suggestion [], during his preliminary interviews with STERANT-1, covered the agent's past history in great detail, which brought to light new EI and clarified many aspects of STERANT-1's past, which heretofore have remained vague or unknown. This aspect of STERANT-1's examination will be forwarded as a separate dispatch as soon as it has been edited.
2. An examination of the LCFLUTTER results revealed that STERANT-1 reacted in two general areas of questioning. It is obvious that STERANT-1's wife suspects that he is employed by some PEPRIME intelligence organization, and that IDENTITY A is also aware of this connection. In the first case, that of the wife, the case officer feels that STERANT-1 can control the situation; in addition the wife is ignorant of the sponsor's true identity as well as STERANT-1's alias which he has registered with the Japanese Immigration officials; therefore, there is little security risk in what the wife might suspect or know about STERANT-1's present employment status. The case of IDENTITY A appears to be a little more serious. STERANT-1 denies that he has revealed the identity of his sponsor or the nature of his work to IDENTITY A; however, it must be assumed that IDENTITY A has pieced together enough information from his many contacts with STERANT-1 to know that the subject is an agent of some PEPRIME intelligence organization. The extent of STERANT-1's contacts with IDENTITY A are reported in detail in the general report referred to in paragraph one above.
3. STERANT-1 has been told to tighten up his personal security and specifically warned about his future contacts with IDENTITY A, which should, over a period of time, taper off and eventually discontinue altogether. The [] will closely monitor STERANT-1's relationship with IDENTITY A and require that STERANT-1 submit written reports covering any contact which

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Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act
DATE 2000

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KAPOK

SECRET

FORM 3517
Page 2.

he might have with IDENTITY A in the future.

4. Local file checks have been requested on all names appearing in the reports compiled from the examination of STERANT-1. The results of the checks will be forwarded to as soon as obtained.

Enclosures:

1. IDENTITY in dupl. - under separate cover
2. LGFLUTTER report dtd. 28 Sept 1954 in dupl. - under separate cover
3. LGFLUTTER report dtd. 15 Dec 1954 in dupl. - under separate cover

20 January 1955

Distributions:

3 - Chief, w/encls. as noted
3 - Chief, FE w/encls. as noted
1 - Chief, w/o encls.

DECLASSIFIED
per COM 43-26

KAPOK
SECRET

KAPOK
SECRET

Separate Cover
Encl #1 to PJM

IDENTITY

IDENTITY A is SHINODA Kenichi (4646/3944/6197/0001)

REF ID: A65760

PER

KAPOK
SECRET

Chiy, FE

SECRET

REF ID: A65424

5788

12 JUL 1955

VIA Chief of []
Chief of []
Chief of []

INFO: Chief, YK

Opportunities/STURANT
Future Disposition of STURANT-1

REFERENCE: PJD-4578, dated 11 April 1955

1. On 30 May STURANT-1 reported that his wife had, uninvited, arrived in Tokyo and contacted him through a mutual friend, one ~~COLONEL~~ ~~COLONEL~~ ~~COLONEL~~ (1614/384/6197/0002). STURANT-1 stated that his wife was anxious to rejoin him and to establish a home for their two small children. STURANT-1 explained to [] that he realized there might be some objections to having his wife and children join him, but he too wanted this reunion and pleaded with the case officer to allow him to have his wife and children at his side. When the case officer displayed some reluctance to grant this request, the agent asked if he could have the wife stay with him for a short period of time. The problem of the children would not have to be settled until the end of August when their school year ended.
2. [] told the agent that he could have his wife stay in Kanto on a temporary basis and that in the meantime the case officer would consider the problems involving the moving of the children to this area. In these discussions the case officer expressed grave doubt as to the wisdom of the agent having his family rejoin him at this time. STURANT-1 found a room for his wife in Ofuna and is currently living with her under an assumed name. In order to avoid registration with the local police STURANT-1 told the landlord that he and his wife were looking for a permanent residence in Tokyo and would not declare Ofuna as their residence. This satisfied the landlord and STURANT-1 was not required to register with the local authorities.
3. During the several meetings which [] had with STURANT-1 between 30 May and 28 June, the last contact with the agent, STURANT-1 has constantly mentioned how happy he would be if he could establish a home for his wife and children in the Kanto area. (STURANT-1 has not lived with his family since he left China in June 1949). During

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REF ID: A65424

510 ATT ATT'd

66-24-6804

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These meetings [] has used the security aspects involved as a further warning against STURANT-1's having his wife and children with him in this case. The main objection raised by the case officer was the fact that STURANT-1 is documented as a Chinese and is so registered with the Japanese immigration authorities.

4. On 26 June [] had a regular meeting with STURANT-1 during which the agent stated that he was tired of living in Japan as an alien and that he also felt that his present documentation would keep him apart from his family forever. STURANT-1 pointed out that if the organization granted him permission to have his family with him his wife would not suffer any great problem - even though she has been using the agent's true name while living in Kyushu, she could easily assume STURANT-1's current identity; however, the children, both of whom are old enough to be aware of names, etc., present another problem. The agent stated that it would be almost impossible for them to assume another identity, not only from their point of view, but also because of school records, birth certificates, etc.. STURANT-1 suggested that he be allowed to assume his true name and to fade back into Japanese society. The case officer raised the question of his present Chinese identity and documentation and asked what would happen if the agent were to change at this time. STURANT-1 replied that his current registration was valid for one year from date of issue (15 May 1970) and that the immigration authorities would not be concerned about IDENTITY A until the certificate of residence had expired and by that time, STURANT-1, felt that he would be so buried that there would be little or no danger that anyone could tie IDENTITY B, his true name, with that of IDENTITY A.
5. The case officer also pointed out that if STURANT-1 took up his true name this organization could no longer give him cover employment and that from an operational point of view the security risks in meeting the agent would be greatly increased. In reply to [] first statement the agent replied that he was aware that the organization could no longer sponsor him and that he would be forced to find other cover employment. In reply to [] second statement the agent said that he realized that the security risks would be increased and, in part, to minimize these risks he could remove himself from the Dantu even during the critical period of reestablishing himself under the name IDENTITY B.
6. After the above conversation [] told the agent that he would like to have some time to consider the many problems which his requests brought up before attempting to render a decision to the question, which stated in its simplest form is: Will this organization allow STURANT-1 to assume his true name and to consent to the agent's family regarding him? If it is considered that the granting of STURANT-1's requests is too risky the case officer could simply inform the agent of this decision and deny him the right of having his family with him at this time. It is our opinion

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that STIRANT-1 would accept this decision, send his wife back to Ryukin, and discontinue discussing the problem altogether. However, if we were to give STIRANT-1 our permission to put his plan into effect it would afford us an excellent opportunity to gracefully terminate this agent, thereby writing a finish to a problem which has been vexing the [] for over a year.

7. To implement such a termination would be fairly simple. The first step would be to have STIRANT-1 leave the Kanto area for, say, Kozu for a period of three or four months during which time he could resume his true identity, gather his family about him, and build a new cover. At the end of this period the same officer could recontact the agent and explain that the action, taken at the agent's own request, had created so many security problems that it had been decided to discontinue contacting the agent until he had "cooled off". A substantial sum could be given the agent to tide him over and a contact plan could be set up for a year or two hence. STIRANT-1 could be recontacted at the stipulated time and passed a termination payment.
8. There are several security risks apparent in the above course of action:
(a) STIRANT-1 in registering under his true name would immediately expose himself to local police checking, which could possibly reveal the subject's absence from Japan and his desertion from the Japanese army; thereby, reawakening an interest in the subject, (b) STIRANT-1 might willingly surrender himself to the Japanese authorities for the purpose of revealing his past KUMAK connection, or (c) through an overt act on the part of the agent or through (a) the subject might be brought before the Japanese authorities for questioning. In discussing this whole general problem STIRANT-1 expressed the belief that in the case of (a) any police check would be strictly local in scope, but if they did attempt to check old army records it would be a fruitless search in that all such records concerning with the subject were destroyed in China at the end of World War II. Point (b) is unlikely in that we are of the opinion that STIRANT-1 would never willingly surrender himself to the Japanese nor would he willingly reveal his past KUMAK connections; however, we are just as certain that if STIRANT-1 were to be interrogated by the Japanese authorities he would divulge part, if not all, of the information he has concerning KUMAK and its activities in China and Japan.
9. This detachment does not intend to take any action along the lines described in paragraph seven without instructions from or discussions with []. In view of [] current preoccupation with STIRANT-1's future, this circumstance may offer an opportunity for

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legal termination, with the agent resuming his old identity at his own request.

16. An early reply would be appreciated.

[] []

Enclosure:

Identities, in trip. - Under Separate Cover


8 July 1955

Distribution:

3 - [] w/encl. as noted

1 - [] w/1 cy encl.

3 - Chief, FE, w/encl. as noted



SECRET

16-6-29-6804

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED~~
SECRET

~~HEREIN~~ IS UNCLASSIFIED
5788

IDENTITY A: PAI Oh'ing-ju (4101/1906/0320)
IDENTITY B: ASO Tatsumi (7802/3932/6671/3948)

S/0 ATT TO
FJBA 5788 **SECRET** **CS COPY**

201-138827

JUL 13 1955

5788

VIA MAIL ~~MAIL~~
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. 5788

Dest.

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

DATE 13 JUL 1955

INFO: Officer, N

TO Officer or C
VIA Officer or C
FROM Officer or C

SUBJECT GENERAL
SPECIFIC
Operational/STRAYL
Future Disposition of STRAYL-1

REFERENCE:

PSMA-4578, dated 11 April 1955

AUG 18 1955
COPY
FILED

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3020
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

1. On 30 May STRAYL-1 reported that his wife had, uninvited, arrived in Tokyo and contacted him through a mutual friend, an Officer, United (USA/Army/6132/2000). STRAYL-1 stated that his wife was ~~wanting to~~ to join him and to establish a home for their two small children. STRAYL-1 explained to that he realized there might be some objections to having his wife and children join him, but he had invited this ~~woman~~ and placed with the case officer to allow him to have his wife and children at his side. When the case officer displayed some reluctance to grant this request the agent asked if he could have the wife stay with him for a short period of time. The problem of the children would not have to be settled until the end of August when their school year ended.
2. told the agent that he could have his wife stay in Tokyo on a temporary basis and that in the meantime the case officer would consider the problem of bringing the rest of the children to this area. In these discussions the case officer expressed grave doubts as to the wisdom of the agent having his family rejoin him at this time. STRAYL-1 found a room for his wife in Okura and is currently living with her under an assumed name. In order to avoid registration with the local police STRAYL-1 told the Landlord that he and his wife were looking for a permanent residence in Tokyo and would not declare Okura as their residence, this satisfied the Landlord and STRAYL-1 was not required to register with the local authorities.
3. During the several meetings which had with STRAYL-1 between 30 May and 26 June, the last contact with the agent, STRAYL-1 has constantly mentioned how happy he would be if he could establish a home for his wife and children in the Tokyo area. (STRAYL-1 has not lived with his family since he left China in June 1949). During

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these meetings [] has used the security aspects involved as a factor working against STERANT-1's having his wife and children with him in this area. The main objection raised by the case officer was the fact that STERANT-1 is documented as a Chinese and is so registered with the Japanese immigration authorities.

4. On 26 June [] had a regular meeting with STERANT-1 during which the agent stated that he was tired of living in Japan as an alien and that he also felt that his present documentation would keep him apart from his family forever. STERANT-1 pointed out that if the organization granted him permission to have his family with him his wife would not suffer any great problem - even though she has been using the agent's true name while living in Kyushu, she could easily assume STERANT-1's current identity; however, the children, both of whom are old enough to be aware of names, etc., present another problem. The agent stated that it would be almost impossible for them to assume another identity, not only from their point of view, but also because of school records, birth certificates, etc.. STERANT-1 suggested that he be allowed to resume his true name and to fade back into Japanese society. The case officer raised the question of his present Chinese identity and documentation and asked what would happen if the agent were to change at this time. STERANT-1 replied that his current registration was valid for one year from date of issue (15 May 1955) and that the immigration authorities would not be concerned about IDENTITY A until the certificate of residence had expired and by that time, STERANT-1, felt that he would be so buried that there would be little or no danger that anyone could tie IDENTITY B, his true name, with that of IDENTITY A.
5. The case officer also pointed out that if STERANT-1 took up his true name this organization could no longer give him cover employment and that from an operational point of view the security risks in meeting the agent would be greatly increased. In reply to [] first statement the agent replied that he was aware that the organization could no longer sponsor him and that he would be forced to find other cover employment. In reply to [] second statement the agent said that he realized that the security risks would be increased and, in part, to minimize these risks he could remove himself from the Kanto area during the critical period of reestablishing himself under the name IDENTITY B.
6. After the above conversation [] told the agent that he would like to have some time to consider the many problems which his requests brought up before attempting to render a decision to the question, which stated in its simplest form is: Will this organization allow STERANT-1 to resume his true name and to consent to the agent's family rejoining him? If it is considered that the granting of STERANT-1's requests is too risky the case officer could simply inform the agent of this decision and deny him the right of having his family with him at this time. It is our opinion

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that STERANT-1 would accept this decision, send his wife back to Kyushu, and discontinue discussing the problem altogether. However, if we were to give STERANT-1 our permission to put his plan into effect it would afford us an excellent opportunity to gracefully terminate this agent, thereby writing a finish to a problem which has been vexing the [] for over a year.

7. To implement such a termination would be fairly simple. The first step would be to have STERANT-1 leave the Kanto area for, say, Kansei for a period of three or four months during which time he could resume his true identity, gather his family about him, and build a new cover. At the end of this period the case officer could recontact the agent and explain that the action, taken at the agent's own request, had created so many security problems that it had been decided to discontinue contacting the agent until he had "cooled off". A substantial sum could be given the agent to tide him over and a contact plan could be set up for a year or two hence. STERANT-1 could be recontacted at the stipulated time and passed a termination payment.
8. There are several security risks apparent in the above course of action:
(a) STERANT-1 in registering under his true name would immediately expose himself to local police checking, which could possibly reveal the subject's absence from Japan and his desertion from the Japanese army; thereby, renewing an interest in the subject, (b) STERANT-1 might willingly surrender himself to the Japanese authorities for the purpose of revealing his past KUBARK connection, or (c) through an overt act on the part of the agent or through (a) the subject might be brought before the Japanese authorities for questioning. In discussing this whole general problem STERANT-1 expressed the belief that in the case of (a) any police check would be strictly local in scope, but if they did attempt to check old army records it would be a fruitless search in that all such records concerned with the subject were destroyed in China at the end of World War II. Point (b) is unlikely in that we are of the opinion that STERANT-1 would never willingly surrender himself to the Japanese nor would he willingly reveal his past KUBARK connections; however, we are just as certain that if STERANT-1 were to be interrogated by the Japanese authorities he would divulge part, if not all, of the information he has concerning KUBARK and its activities in China and Japan.
9. This detachment does not intend to take any action along the lines described in paragraph seven without instructions from or discussions with [] In view of [] current preoccupation with STERANT-1's future, this circumstance may offer an opportunity for

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local termination, with the agent resuming his old identity at his own request.

10. An early reply would be appreciated.

C D

Enclosure:

Identities, in trip. - Under Separate Cover

8 July 1955

Distribution:

3 - D, w/encl. as noted
1 - w/1 cy encl.
3 - Chief, FB, w/encl. as noted

SECRET

C D

REF ID: A6512

TO [REDACTED]

5788

SECRET

REF ID: A6512

IDENTITY A: PAI Ch'ing-ju (4101/1906/0320)

IDENTITY B: ASO Tatsuo (7802/3932/6671/3948)

SECRET

See 1st page FTBA-5788

C

D

VIA (Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

SECRET

DISPATCH NO. 5928

CLASSIFICATION

OK

22 JUL 1955

TO C
VIA C
FROM C

DATE

SUBJECT { GENERAL
SPECIFIC

Operational

Debriefing of STURM-1

INFO: Chief,

REFERENCE: 3517, dated 23 January 1955

Forwarded under separate cover are the results of a debriefing of STURM-1 conducted by during the period from 1 December 1954 through 7 December 1955. This is of no immediate operational interest, which is the reason for the delay in transmittal, but is of general background interest and for your files.

Enclosure:

Subject Debriefing, in trip - to be forwarded under separate cover

CARDED

AUG 11 1955

15 July 1955

Distribution:

3 - 3, w/enclos. in trip.
1 - 3, w/1 enclos.
3 - 3, w/3 enclos.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

DESENSITIZED

per CSN 43-28

CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR 1949

OK

ASO Tatsu

001

1. True name: ASO Tatsuo (7002/3932/6671/3048). Alias is YUAN RAI CHING-FA, (1101/3237/6548) also used in Peking and Shanghai. Name, alias used in Yenan with KWU personnel. Translation (YK) name, BATMARBATAN and MADIBRAYAD. DOB 5 June 1916 in Nagoya, Oita-ken, Japan.
2. After graduating from the Osaka National Language School in 1932 Subject was contacted by his brother-in-law, KISHIMURA Kazuo (6007/1627/6548/3112), who was living in Dairen. KISHIMURA told Subject that he could help him to find a job with the South Manchuria Railroad Corporation. In May 1932 Subject went to Mukden rather than Dairen in that he felt that he would rather try to find a job with the Japanese Kuangtung Army which was hiring a great number of translators and interpreters. Subject found a job with the Kuangtung Army through one SAITO Ryosai (7072/5671/1472/1487), who was an advisor to the Mongolian Army. Kuangtung Staff (the Mongolian Army was, at that time just being organized and SAITO was the Chairman of the Mongolian Army Establishment Preparatory Committee (MAEPC). SAITO was not a regular member of the Kuangtung Army, but merely on detached duty from Tokyo. Subject was accompanied to Mukden by a classmate, SUZUKI Toshio (6075/2606/1851/3616) who had an aunt living in Mukden. This aunt offered the two students free room and board for about one month. SUZUKI introduced the Subject to a Mr. HATTORI (2591/6732) (fka), also a member of the MAEPC. HATTORI heard that SUZUKI had graduated from the Osaka Language School (SUZUKI had also specialized in the Mongolian Language as well as Chinese) and offered him a job with the Mongolian Army. SUZUKI was shortly thereafter sent to the Tsofan Area to negotiate with the Chinese warlord CHANG Hui-p'eng (1728/3189/7729). HATTORI was killed while trying to purge the Chinese warlord SU Ping-ven (5625/3521/2429), who had started a rebellion against the Kuangtung Army. Subject also stated that at this time he met an old friend and classmate from the Osaka Language School TAKAMO MINORU (7459/6861/1325), who was helpful in getting both he and SUZUKI settled into their new jobs.
3. In May 1932 Subject was introduced to HATTORI by SUZUKI. HATTORI in turn introduced him to SAITO. In June 1932 Subject accompanied SAITO to the latter's headquarters at Chienchiatien (6929/1967/1648) (there were approximately twenty other Japanese serving at this Headquarters at that time). Subject was told that his job was to act as translator, interpreter and to assist in the recruiting of Mongolians into the Kuangtung Army (KA) (the Mongolians had for hundreds of years hated the Chinese and the Japanese found very little trouble recruiting them). Subject was appointed a Lieutenant in the Mongolian Army and sometimes wore a uniform --- he was concurrently a DAC with the KA; until September 1932 Subject worked directly for SAITO translating intelligence reports from SAITO's agents. Subject did no active intelligence work during this period. After September 1932 Subject was appointed as junior adjutant to the Commanding Officer of the Mongolian Army, Major General BATMARBATAN. Subject stated that the title "adjutant" was a fancy title for personal servant --- during this period he looked after BATMARBATAN's personal wishes and did his translation work. Subject was attached to BATMARBATAN's staff until July 1934 when he was transferred to the newly established Mongolian Military Academy as an instructor of Japanese language and was given the rank of captain in the Mongolian Army. While attached to BATMARBATAN's staff the subject engaged in no

intelligence activities except to report all of the general's activities to SAITO and to act as a sounding board among the Mongolians for the Japanese. SAITO had instructed the Subject to do everything he could to make the general pro-Japanese and to win his full support. Subject treated BATURAYAN with the upmost kindness and courtesy at all times and in fact acted more like a servant than anything else. Subject was assigned to the Mongolian Military Academy for the period from July 1934 through March 1936. The academy was first located at Changchien, but later moved to its permanent location at Wangchien. During this same period BATURAYAN was the director of the academy.

4. In August 1935 SAITO was replaced by a Major KANAGAWA (4005/1937) and man who was extremely pro-Mongolian. It is the subject's opinion that the KA Headquarters never really trusted KANAGAWA and the Subject knows from personal observation that KANAGAWA often ignored orders from KA Headquarters. Up until March 1936 the Japanese felt that intelligence activities were of no use and therefore unimportant to their effort in the area (also the Japanese were very poor in GS work). The Japanese command believed that the Russians were not a threat and that the Chinese were incapable of causing them any trouble (in an intelligence sense). The Japanese were that sure of themselves that they did not use code in transmitting command or tactical messages and often relied on commercial telegraph rather than radios.

5. In March 1936 Subject was transferred to the TEK Headquarters at Wangchien. There had been TEK units located in Mukden and Harbin prior to 1936 (only the two in all of Manchuria), but after 1936 the scope of the TEK was broadened and units were established in Hailar, Wangchien, Jihai, Muho and Chiaman. The TEK unit in Wangchien was headed by Major IZUMI TAKEMI (3123/6993/5000), concurrently KA adviser to the Military Academy. Subject intermittently worked for IZUMI as translator for some time but when IZUMI ordered him to TEK headquarters in Wangchien he was very upset in that he did not want to participate in TEK activities, but he did not resist the order. In the summer of 1937 Subject was offered the position of assistant professor of Japanese language at the Manchurian National University at Changchien. Subject asked IZUMI if he could make the transfer. IZUMI became infuriated and told the Subject that he was a selfish, evil man and that he had forgotten his "shokun" (sense of duty and responsibility) and threaten to have the Subject brought into a military court on charges of "shokun hoki" (abandonment of official responsibility) if the Subject insisted on making a transfer. Subject stated that IZUMI could have taken this course of action had he wanted to in that there was cause based in the fact that there was no ready replacement for the Subject. In the face of IZUMI's opposition the Subject agreed to remain with the TEK, yet resented IZUMI's refusal. (NOTE: Subject stated that TEK effort in Manchuria was insignificant until 1936, yet prior to 1936 the TEK chief in Harbin was a Major General, one ITAGAKI (2647/0997).

6. March, 1936 - Subject started working for Wangyehmiao TEK - Chief was Major KENJI Tetsuo (3123/6993/5040). Target of Wangyehmiao TEK was outer Mongolia - especially around Bayan Tumen (in E. Outer Mongolia) where eight of the twelve Mongol divisions, Russian controlled, were stationed. In June 1937 a branch of the Wangyehmiao TEK was established at Lusin Sume (Temple). Subject was appointed chief of 20 Japanese people. Just prior to this Subject's duties had been to prepare a base for gathering information on the North Eastern part of Silingol League (NE Mongkiang Territory), - about which Japanese were very ignorant. From March 1936 through June 1937 Subject made frequent trips into this area, "making friends" and gathering information.

7. Then in 1937 (June or July) Subject moved to this area to set up a branch of Wangyehmiao TEK office. Subject reported on people's customs, economic and political conditions, made topographic maps and took many pictures. After June 1937, subject continued same type of work but began concentrating on military, economic, and political situations in the Eastern part of Outer Mongolia - a far west as Ushurtcha - especially around Bayan Tumen a government military depot (1 Russian and 1 Mongol division there). It was not necessary to spend so much time making friends in 1937, although liaison was still very important. Most of subject's intelligence came from Mongol friends who voluntarily reported to him, rather than from reports of subject's Mongol agents. Subject ran only about five professional agents during 1937. In summer 1937 Chinese propagandists (KMT) aroused some Mongol princes, so Subject took these princes to Jalean ('gate to Manchuria' - just NW of Peking) and proved to them this important city was occupied by Japanese - also Subject showed them Peking was Japanese controlled. There was no threat of Mongol rebellion (too weak) but Japanese needed their sincere cooperation (to get information, etc.), so Subject carried favor by official and personal acts.

8. From 1936 through early 1939 Subject concentrated on psychological warfare aspects - keeping the princes in NE Silingol league pro-Japanese. During this period, very little intelligence work done - because subject had no experience or training in intelligence operations. What little intelligence work the Subject did was very poor. For instance, through his Mongol friends subject was able to apprehend about 50 (Subject said later maybe only 35 or 40) Outer Mongolian and Chinese Agents (few Chinese from slave camps in N. Siberia) - dispatched by Outer Mongol MWD - Internal Affairs Office, 3rd section and actually run by Russians from Moscow. Subject interrogation of these Outer Mongols was so poor that his reports to Wangyehmiao were much criticized. Later captured agents were sent to determine Japanese military conditions, Mongolian economic and political information; attitude of Inner Mongols toward Japanese, etc.

1 Got a 36 Chevy for living Buddha, and a Buick for a prince from KA funds. Showed prince Japanese progress - like bombers, etc.

2 Probably spent eight months out of the year there.

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However, most Outer Mongolian agents were easily detected because Outer and Inner Mongolian customs (especially greetings - like a courtesy) and dress were entirely different. So, when any Outer Mongolian penetrated subject's area, his Mongolian friends would either arrest (the agent) themselves or notify subject who'd dispatch a Japanese controlled group of Mongolians to make the arrest.

9. The agent policy of Russia was very unsuccessful. In 1931 Russia (they) began sending small groups of 4 or 5 armed agents who'd observe what they could and kill whoever they happened to meet while wandering around the country side. Russia very worried at this time, because where Germans focused on the Western front Russian troops were withdrawn from Western Mongolia and Siberia. Russia feared a Japanese attack on the unprotected Eastern front; so sent many Mongol agents to Inner Mongolia and Manchuria to watch Japanese troop movements. Also, some agents sent under deep cover to large Mongolian cities to conduct business (legitimately) and make reports by radio to Russia in West Outer Mongolia when possible.
10. In May 1939, the HOMILKHAN incident occurred. There the Japanese armies fought with Russian troops indecisively for four months over border disagreements. Great loss of life, and neither side made appreciable gain. Germans negotiated an armistice 10 September 1939. Some Inner Mongolian soldiers (Japanese controlled) captured at Homsilkhain (just W of Jilin) went between Wangyehmiao and Bayan Tumen where they were given a couple months intelligence training by the Soviets and then sent to penetrate Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. Other prisoners were trained at Bayan Tumen, then dispatched SW to Tumen Balaik where they were given missions to penetrate Manchuria. When these agents (captured Mongolian soldiers) passed through subject's territory (NE Kilingai League - 115-118°, 44-47° E), many came to the subject's office and gave themselves up. These were debriefed, and sent to Wangyehmiao (sometimes surveilled for a few days). All who surrendered, or were captured were sent to Wangyehmiao where they were interrogated and either set free, or sometimes put in labor camp in Wangyehmiao city. Some, from early 1940 (not before), were double as "pilot agents" and sent back to their Russian case officers. Some were sent back more than 3 times because Russia became suspicious. Some dropped from sight after being back to Russia and were never heard of again. The Mongolians who acted as Russian agents were put to work in TKE buildings - some doing menial jobs, some were given intelligence assignments (such as fingering undetected Russian penetration agents). Subject said TKE never executed captured Soviet Mongolians agents, but sometimes put them before phony firing squad to coerce them into cooperating with the TKE.
11. During the war (May - Sept. 1939) subject had only this CI function (brief interrogator or surrendered or captured Russian agents) - he had no positive intelligence operations. Also, subject did translation jobs for TKE at Wangyehmiao and other odd jobs.

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their targets were political intelligence and CI, write reports from these interviews; evaluate reports from other Mongolian TAK missions and analyze intelligence information generally. Subject also conducted interrogations of captured Outer Mongolian agents. In his contacts with Mongolian TAK agents, subject was only a debriefing officer - not a case officer, never assigned targets or told agents what to do. Japanese from Operations Group at Mongolian TAK acted as the case officers and had the responsibility for agent handling. During this period, Sept 1939 - July 1941, subject's knowledge of intelligence activities and techniques began to grow. Subject was trained at Manchurian Intelligence Training Group for one month in 1940; once again for a week in 1944.

16. July 1941, subject became advisor to the various operations sections in the Mongolian TAK (Intelligence, operations, CI, geography, etc.) Subject was not in any particular section but a free man. Also subject was liaison between Col. KANAGAWA and the four Mongolian TAK sub-branches:

1. Khoton Orshan (hot springs)
2. Ussuri River (Subject's former post)
3. On bank of Dabuzon Nor (Salt Lake)
4. W. Ujanchin

Subject would deliver Col. KANAGAWA's orders to these branches and explain latter's thinking on problems. In this, subject was KANAGAWA's personal representative. Also subject served as KANAGAWA's "stand-in" or substitute at certain social functions - formal meetings, attending important funerals, meetings VIPs, etc. After advisory section was created in December 1943 subject had many administrative tasks to perform not too significant.

17. From July, 1941 TAK had closed liaison with Kempetai (KFT). The Mongolian group was quite small. The Mongolian TAK Commanding Officer was a Colonel whereas Mongolian KFT Commanding Officer was a Captain, so subject was sent by Col. KANAGAWA to negotiate for necessary support. (because a Japanese Col. does not go to Captain's office):

1. protection of TAK agents - so not arrested for operational, illegal acts (such as opium trading)
2. Escort TAK agents, through Manchuria who had no documentation - conducted by plainclothes KFT. Otherwise, might be arrested by KFT.
3. If KFT suspected an enemy agent, subject would ask KFT for surveillance info.
4. TAK had no holding area - KFT jail used.
5. Regarding intelligence matters, TAK CO had power to demand KFT support.

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6. KMT gave no support to TKK in providing documentation for agents.

15. Between 1941 and August 1945 this liaison job was one of subject's most important duties. During his TKK career, subject acted as case officer for only two operations: (in which subject had full responsibility):

I At Tung-Lien TKK (Job 1940 - July 1941) - "DAMRA" (most of TKK operations named after flowers) said he'd lived in safe house with three Russians case officers (1st of Infantry, Senior Lt of mechanized infantry and non-com Interpreter - a KASAK Mongolian from Sinkiang Prov). Subject intended DAMRA for one week on his mission to obtain Soviet military info - weapons, troop movements, military facilities etc. In July 1940 DAMRA went back to Japan Town where he stayed for 2 months. In fall, DAMRA returned to subject with valuable military information. However, DAMRA's attitude changed - becoming pro-Russian. DAMRA talked about the good independent nation Russia had established for Outer Mongolia, said Russian equipment and soldiers better than the Japanese. DAMRA's Inner Mongolian accent had completely changed to Outer Mongolia; also he'd learned much Russian. No subject knew he'd been practically a free man - probably had had temporary wife - had not stayed with only three Russian soldiers as he said. So subject decided DAMRA not reliable and did not send him back to Japan Town again. DAMRA was given menial labor in TKK office and watched closely (prevented from returning to Outer Mongolia). Later he was allowed to marry, and when he had a child, subject felt it was safe not to watch him. DAMRA worked as a laborer at the Mongolian TKK until surrender. The reason DAMRA was given only menial work in TKK office was his secret association with the Janggit Group - secret group dedicated to an independent Inner Mongolia, but actually controlled by the Communists. After surrender, this group (Janggit) cooperated openly with Soviets and group members became prominent Russian puppets in this area.

Subject's second operation (and last):

II December 1942 - Violet Operations: A laborer, (Tumer), from the Manchurian army was captured by Russians at Manchuria, and taken to Shantung where he was trained for 1 year. Tumer had no previous formal education, but very clever. Tumer was sent to Mongolia in late 1940, where one of subject's GI contacts (Former Soviet prisoner who'd also been taken to Shantung) put the finger on Tumer. In August 1942 Tumer was secretly arrested by the subject and told he'd not be punished and would be given financial aid (house, land, money) if he cooperated with TKK. On the surface, Tumer seemed to cooperate. He was briefed for one week and in March 1942 was sent back to Shantung. His loyalty remains unknown.

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because he was never heard of again. For 1 year \$ 100 (\$50) was paid to his family (TKK had got \$ 250 per month, so agent was pretty well paid). While functioning as Russian agent Tumar said he made two reports to Russian agents he met in Mongolia.

19. Why TKK Controlled Agents:

- a. Ideological - not too common - difficult to use because Inner Mongolian soldiers captured at Hsankouhien and taken to Ulanbatare were very successfully brainwashed; some check saying Outer Mongolia was free country.
- b. Financial - Money for horses, land for farming.
- c. Threat of criminal prosecution
- d. Opium - Used for operations in place of paper currency (in ops and in case of war, because Manchurian currency would be no good) Opium was called "Black Gold" (good opium is dark brown - poor is black). At Mengyehuihien there was over 1000 lbs of raw opium (70% pure). TKK used from 5 - 10 lbs per month in operations. Opium was very difficult for Manchurians to get - TKK got it from Russia through EA.

20. With Russian invasion on 9 August 1945, Mengyehuihien TKK burned all classified papers. On August 11 TKK moved out of office carrying most of the remaining important documents, and started south to Tung-lian, (later that day, TKK office blown up by Russian bombers). never got there, because of invading Russian troops intervened at Chengchihien, and most TKK personnel captured just North of Hsankou at Hu-hu (9187/1655). Subject was ordered by NANAGAWA to remain in Mengyehuihien area as head of Mongolian guerrilla troops. Unfortunately, 300 rifles were blown up Mengyehuihien building, so subject's intention was crushed. Subject was supposed to have collected intelligence in the area after Russians moved in. But radio equipment was also blown up. Other mission was to guide provincial governor, BOYAMANDUO, to safety.

21. Subject stated that Japan had no intention of starting a war with Russia at anytime during 1941. Any anticipated war would be with US.

22. In July 1941, a "KAI-TOKU-EN" (Kuangtung Army Special Maneuver) occurred. For three days, the EA was engaged in giant troop movements. On the surface, it appeared that the EA was being mobilized at the Manchuria - Russian border. (Hsankouhien area). Late summer 1941 EA was ordered to repel any Russian invasion of Manchuria, but not to provoke any "incident". War with Russia was to be avoided. Note: From a Japanese (TKK) penetration in Soviet General General's office, subject found out Russians knew that their July 1941 "special maneuver" was only a front and they (Russians) did not fear a Japanese invasion in Manchuria.

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22. Subject meets Sorge:

March 1931, Richard Sorge visited Manchuria and spent about 3 days at Tung-liao (subject then with Manchuria TKK which was stationed at Tung-liao).

a. Letter from German Ambassador to Japan Lt. Gen OTTO stated that Sorge was an "adviser" (later subject heard Sorge was political and intelligence adviser to German ambassador) on his staff and had asked the Army department in Tokyo to arrange a tour of Manchuria. KA was told "to show Sorge around, and fulfill his requests". At a party given by Col. KAJIKAWA's, the Colonel offered a "Hail Hitler" toast. Sorge joined in but with no enthusiasm; he was very cold and disinterested. Sorge stressing his correspondent status (Frankfurt Zeitung writer) asked for an interview with the Mongolian Major Gen KISHIMOTO. Subject's friend, SHIBATA (666/754), sat in on this interview and became very suspicious of SORGE who asked questions like, "How many Japanese on your advisory staff here?" etc. SHIBATA contacted Dairen TKK (this office concentrated on Shanghai, Tientsin, Canton, etc.), and requested information on Sorge who had said he'd been in China. Dairen TKK replied, "should be treated with suspicion, known in Shanghai as the "spy doctor". Dairen TKK didn't say whether German or Russian spy. While at Tung-liao, Sorge wanted to visit Khalar Arshan (Stones mineral spring) - said he wanted material for newspaper article because German people had become very interested in hot springs lately. Actually, Khalar Arshan was terminus of newly built Japanese railroad which part of line of fortification facing the Russian border. So from here, an observer could determine if Japan offensive or defensive (war or peace) tactics with Russia. Col. IZUMI refused Sorge's request (said, that there were no proper hotel accommodations) even after Sorge offered to sleep in a tent. Sorge accompanied to Tung-liao by (half f'10') thin American woman (then between 35 and 40) whom he introduced as an American Shanghai correspondent. Subject thinks that she was Agnes SMEDLEY. Tung-liao TKK made detailed report of Sorge's suspicious behavior to Manchuria TKK headquarters at Harbin. Only reply was "Thanks for your deep consideration". No one at Tung-liao TKK knew how to interpret this.

b. Subject believes it very strange that KA should advise field stations to cooperate with Sorge, when Dairen TKK suspected him of espionage. Subject does not understand this to this day. Also when finally arrested Sorge (Hot Police Bureau which later became part of Kwantung, had been collecting evidence for about one year - KLAUSER was first tipped) 1930 (first referred to

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allow arrest, later executed when overwhelming circumstantial evidence presented) said if you can't get a confession in one week you must let him go free. George condemned on the 7th day. Subject thinks no doubt that George was executed. Subject says his friend, OKIKAWA (International News, Mit, Minato-ku, Tokyo) has more information on George, wrote article in Yomiuri.

24. Outline of Commanding Officers:

Date	Name	Off.
June 32 - Sept 32	Chien Chia Tien	Maj. Saito Kyoshi
Sept 32 - July 34	Chien Chia Tien	Maj. Gen BATHMORGAN & SAITO & KANAGAWA, KOBANU
July 34 - Aug 35 July 34 - Mar 36	Chien Chia Tien Mongyehmiao (Mongolian Military Academy)	Maj. Gen BATHMORGAN was principal of Military Academy
June 37 - Sept 39	Louisa Suno	Subject chief of branch still IZUMI as C.O.
Sept 39 - Feb 40	Mongyehmiao	Chief, Info group, C.O. still IZUMI
Feb. 40 - July 41	Tung-lier	Suno job C.O. is Lt. Col. KANAGAWA.
July 41 - Dec 43	Mongyehmiao	Advisor to various branches KANAGAWA is C.O.
Dec 43 - Aug - 45	Mongyehmiao	Chief, advisor Section, KANAGAWA is C.O.
SAITO	died in hotel fire at Chang-chia-tien	
BATHMORGAN	in 1951 still in Soviet POW camp #45 (Khabarovsk) been there since August 1945	
KANAGAWA	was criminal repatriate from Russia this year reported that KANAGAWA died in prison camp - no date given	
IZUMI	now living in Kameoto-cho, Kameoto-ku. A washing machine breaker, not very well off financially, and sickly.	

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25. On 13 August 1945 subject was given first two missions: (a) regarding provincial government - he fled, (b) organize guerrillas - no response. Third mission (gather information on Russian troops and report to TEK at Tang-shan, intended 1000 Miles. for provincial government of four Manchurian provinces, and Manchukuo TEK) could still be accomplished. So with \$4,000 (Manchukuo dollars worth \$100 US) & one box of opium (100 lbs) subject started wandering around the Manchurian area, dispensing opium to friends he could stay with for a day or two, and thinking he might ask more favors of these people in the future. Subject's friends told him that the Russians in Manchuria were looking for only three people, Japanese vice provincial governor, MITSUAKA Norimasa (AL08/1945/2530/2007), TEK head Col. KAHAGAWA, and the subject.

26. At Banpo Somo (a temple 20 miles S.E. of Manchuria) subject disguised himself as a Buddhist priest. With this disguise and a donkey subject wandered until 9 August to 2 September. On 2 September a farmer living near Tu-chuan turned the subject in (wanted subject's opium and donkey) to the "Peace Maintenance" group at the small village near Tu-chuan (no formal police force there). This group turned subject over to a Russian Air Force supply group who were travelling on the main road in trucks. Subject was taken to Tso-hua. The villagers had told the Russians only the subject was a Japanese, nothing about TEK or even subject's name.

27. After one night in Tu-chuan (with Russian Air Force Supply Unit) subject was sent to Tso-hua where he spent 10 days. Then subject was sent back by truck to An-hsiang where subject spent 1 night, then R.R. by truck to Fu-lai (1129/6336) for one night then 24 hours train trip to Cheng-chun where he was delivered to Cheng-chun SP Miles. In Cheng-chun subject was interrogated twice, but only for about ten minutes each time. Being very depressed (was lost, wife dead) subject told a Russian infantry Captain his true name, that he was a civilian officer assigned as interpreter for TEK headquarters, and participated in conference with TEK head and Provincial Government. Subject said was ready to tell anything and everything (and stated TEK was a group that did everything - including intell and protocol arrangements, etc.)

28. Strangely Russia didn't know what TEK was, and didn't know enough about Manchuria, to even question subject. (Russians were alerted only for interest in the Kuomintang, a political party in Manchuria and not important but apparently Russians didn't know this). So after two days (20 minutes questioning) subject was released. Subject believes he was released only because of discord and turbulence of the time. Subject was asked (by U) 1 how it was that the Russian troops invading Manchuria had been targeted to arrest only three people, two of whom were TEK members and U the two Russian Captains at Cheng-chun knew nothing about TEK and U even interested. Subject said: a. Confusion of the times - many confused Japanese on hand for interrogation. b. No lateral coordination among groups in different areas.

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28. In March 1946, subject again arrested in Chang-chun and was interrogated by a Russian MP Captain for about 20 hours. Later questioned by a Major for 2 hours and finally by a Lt. Col. for 10 minutes. This time subject gave his true name, said had worked for Manchurian TEK, and told the MP Captain he could check this with Russian troops at Manchuria. Subject gave many details concerning TEK to this Russian Captain - falsified only his own position. Subject was shortly released.

29. Brief outline of subject's assignments with KUBARK.

Subject was recruited in September 1946 in Chang-chun. He remained (a Japanese national) in November 1946. Subject remained in Chang-chun until late November 1947 (wife left China for Ryukin in October 1947) when left for Peiping. Cover organization was the Internal Survey Detachment (ISD) #44. In April 1948 he left Peiping for Shanghai. In February 1949 he left Shanghai for Canton and in June 1949 left Canton for Tsinan, Taiwan. In August 1949 left Taiwan for Yokosuka, Japan. Subject stated that until the Kaji Incident he had believed that he was working for a PWD/ME "General Staff Organization"; however, after the Kaji case was aired in the local press he came to realize that his sponsor was KUBARK.

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 316
2 September 1955

SEP 1 1955

TO : Case of []]
FROM : Case of []]
SUBJECT: Future Disposition of STRAUMAL

1. At the suggestion of China Base, [] discussed with STRAUMAL the possibility of the latter and his family being sent to the United States for a period of study and training. STRAUMAL's initial reaction was one of mixed acceptance; however, when the agent was told that he might have to retain his Chinese identity in order to qualify as a stateless person under the terms of the Refugee Relief Act (Public Law 203) STRAUMAL's attitude underwent an immediate change. STRAUMAL stated that he would like to drop his present Chinese identity and to resume his true Japanese name. STRAUMAL declared that he wanted to go to the United States very much and he would be willing to do almost anything to see his dream fulfilled; however, the agent made it clear that he was not anxious to continue living his present Chinese identity. The case officer explained the many reasons why it would be necessary for the agent to be documented as a Chinese but all to no avail. STRAUMAL countered the case officer's arguments by explaining how impossible it was for him to force a Chinese name onto his wife and children and how he personally wished to again live under a Japanese name. The case officer had the opinion that the agent is determined to resume his Japanese identity whenever he might end up, either in Japan or the United States.

2. At a second meeting with the agent STRAUMAL asked the case officer if he had considered his position regarding his desire to regain his former identity. The case officer stated that he could not see any way to avoid the necessity of STRAUMAL keeping his Chinese identity. STRAUMAL then proposed a very complicated plan involving his being purchased under true name in Japan. There is no need to review STRAUMAL's suggested plan in this paper in that the plan itself and the manner of implementation are shot through with security risks. This plan of STRAUMAL's did bring several questions to the case officer's mind. Mainly, would it be possible to have STRAUMAL surfaced in China and documented as an citizen of Japanese ancestry after which he could be sent to the United States under the sponsorship of some US citizen or educational institution? This plan was discussed to some extent in FOIA-996, dated 1 July 1954, paragraph five, and at that time the [] seemed to think that such a plan could be implemented.

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This suggested plan is herein revived in that it is this detachment's opinion that STURANT-1 will not agree to being sent to the United States as evidence, and if the [] could see its way clear to reconsider this plan it would allow STURANT-1 to regain his long lost Japanese identity and still have the basic objective of sending the agent to United States accomplished. It is also our opinion that allowing STURANT-1 to regain his true identity will make the future handling of the case much easier, this obstacle having been removed.

3. It is requested that this detachment be advised of [] decision in order that that decision can be used as guidance in the future handling of STURANT-1.

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VIA SAFE-PAK
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. 1000

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CLASSIFICATION

19 SEP 1955

TO Chief of
VIA Chief of
FROM Chief of

DATE

INFO: Chief, FE

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational/STERANT
 SPECIFIC - Additional Biographic Information on STERANT-1

REFERENCE: FJBA-5928, dated 22 July 1955

1. Forwarded under separate cover as Enclosure 1 are the results of an interview which had with STERANT-1 on 23 August 1955 in response to a verbal request from for additional biographic information on the subject, and answers to specific questions which the wished answered. In addition one sealed envelope containing a rough draft of a dispatch which had been hand carried to the is herewith forwarded as Enclosure 2.
2. In connection with request for additional biographic information on STERANT-1 it was suggested that an evaluation by of the subject's present and future capabilities would be of value. As a preface to that evaluation the case officer wishes to state that since November 1952 he has been in constant contact with the subject and has come to appreciate his loyal and devoted service to KUBARK. It is further stated that the following evaluation is not in anyway tainted by emotional considerations, the relationship between this agent and has always been on the strictest professional level. The following is evaluation of STERANT-1:
 - a. Ability: The subject has a wide knowledge of operational tradecraft and can apply the theory and experience he has gained from almost twenty-three years of intelligence activity to any given assignment. Over and above a comprehensive understanding of and ability to use the tools of clandestine operations, the subject commands a vast store of area knowledge, which has been of great assistance to KUBARK in the planning and implementation of projects designed to operate in Manchuria, and Japan. Language-wise the subject can be rated as a native speaker in both Japanese and

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Mongolian. His knowledge of Mandarin is far above the average, his Tungusic and Russian are far from being polished; however, he has a very good working knowledge of these two languages. In English the subject has a good understanding of the written language, but needs improvement in audio-comprehension and oral expression.

b. Reliability: During the case officer's association with the subject there has been only one incident to mar an otherwise perfect record for reliability. (See g. below.) The subject has been most reliable in the transmission of the case officer's instructions to sub-agents and in the day-to-day training of those individuals. The agent's contact reports, financial records, and operational reports have always been on time and in good order. The agent has missed but one contact in the past two and one-half years.

c. Enthusiasm: is certain that he has asked the agent to perform tasks which STURANT-1 did not want to do; however, the case officer has never been able to detect anything in the agent's conduct, conversation, or actions which would indicate anything but whole-hearted, enthusiastic cooperation. If the case officer has called upon the agent to give an opinion on a specific operational problem the agent makes his feelings known; however, if the case officer's decision runs counter to the agent's preference or advice he would none-the-less give the problem his cooperation in an enthusiastic manner.

d. Security: There have been occasions when the case officer has had the task of calling STURANT-1 on a point or two re his personal and operational security. Usually when these cases have come up STURANT-1's attitude has always been that of a person who knows the area and the reaction of the people better than the case officer (often very true); however, the case officer has insisted on a more secure approach on several occasions. In every case the agent has faithfully carried out instructions. An INVICTUS examination of STURANT-1 (see PJM-3517, dated 25 January 1955) indicated that the agent has been and is now 'clean' in a security sense. True, STURANT-1 has on occasion been a little naive in the choice of his personal friends and in the case of his wife and children did put himself in a position where his personal security might be in danger (see PJM-3786, dated 12 July 1955). The case officer would give this agent an over-all rating of 'good' security-wise.

e. Intelligence: STURANT-1 has never been given a mental or physical aptitude test by this organization, but from the case officer's

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observation of the man and his work he would rate the subject as "more average" in intelligence. STRAIN-1 tends to be rather belligerish with little displayed mechanical ability; however, the subject has mastered this organization's radio procedures and is a fair man on the job. The subject is over forty-five years of age but has not reached the plateau in learning.

2. Adaptability: STRAIN-1 does not adapt himself quickly to a new situation. This statement is meant to be understood in the broadest interpretation — the agent is ill at ease with strangers. He will not give an opinion on any subject or question until he has given it hours, and sometimes days, of consideration and thought. In groups as well as with individuals STRAIN-1 finds it hard to be at ease (this applies to his association with Orientals as well as with Occidentals). Operationally STRAIN-1 can and has adapted himself to new assignments, but here again the case officer would say that it takes time for the agent to "adjusted" the change of direction or pace. STRAIN-1 has confidence in himself as long as he feels familiar with the new activity from the well-known he tends to falter and is rather timid until he has carefully explored the new surroundings.

3. Independence: The case officer has never known STRAIN-1 to be timid in his reporting abilities, or operational mobility. In fact no one has the agent ever attempted to decide the case except. This one case involved an extra-written train which he could not catch for about a year without the case officer's knowledge. The subject has a great deal of personal pride in himself and this which is reflected in the manner in which he conducts his personal and professional life.

4. Health: As mentioned above STRAIN-1 is forty-five years old, perhaps just a bit past his physical prime; however, during the past two and one-half years the agent has never had any illness more serious than a mild winter cold. While STRAIN-1 was in China in 1953 helping with the training of the Indonesian agents, he participated in all the strenuous activities expected of the foreign man and that any harm to himself, generally, STRAIN-1 is strong of body and has good morale too. The agent is only 6' 1" in height which amounts to about thirty-five inches per day. No one at least has never known the agent to drink intoxicating beverages.

5. Personal Stability: STRAIN-1 has been placed in several strenuous situations and has displayed his coolness and stability. The agent is very rational in all of his thinking and in his actions.

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REF ID: A677
Page 4

The only weakness, if it can be called a weakness the case officer can point to, is the agent's fear almost, of being wrong. The agent has never displayed any emotion to the extent that it would distort his reason or cause him to lose control of himself. STERANT-1 is always pleasant and congenial with all of his co-workers, who all seem to like the agent very much. For operational reasons STERANT-1 was denied the company of his wife and children for almost six years, but even this personal denial did not influence the agent's emotional stability.

- j. Judgments: STERANT-1, being human, has never been one hundred percent correct in all of his value or operational judgments; however, errors made by the agent have usually been based in lack of knowledge rather than in poor judgment. The agent's judgment of people has been far above average and the case officer has come to trust the agent in such judgments. STERANT-1 has many likes and dislikes which sometimes are thrown into the balance of his judgments, but here again the agent is displaying a very basic human trait, which if understood, does not do harm to the evaluation of the man.
- k. Motivations: So old and so often used is the statement that an agent's motivation is based in his anti-Communist attitude that it has almost become a KUBARK joke and in regulations we have been all but forbidden to use it; however, this case officer shall. STERANT-1 is strongly anti-Communist in all of his thinking. If a tag must be put to STERANT-1, then let us call him an old-style Japanese Rightist. This orientation is but part, and perhaps a small part, of the subject's motivation. STERANT-1 has an emotional love for Mongolia, KUBARK has made some effort to help Mongolia and STERANT-1 appreciates this fact. A large factor in the agent's motivation is the financial security which this organization has given to both he and his family. STERANT-1 likes to putter around in research and study in his chosen field, which is Mongolia and Manchuria. KUBARK has encouraged this activity and the case officer is certain that STERANT-1 feels that he would not have such a well fed opportunity under different circumstances. STERANT-1 is a Japanese national by birth; he has strong physical and emotional ties with Japan which will perhaps never be broken, yet, these very ties and his inherited and learned Yamato spirit have been exploited to our ends in the past and can continue to be of service in the future. The above are STERANT-1's basic motivations to know them and to understand them is to control the agent.
3. This detachment was also asked by [] to make some statement as to what STERANT-1 could do for KUBARK or for himself. It is this detachment's opinion that the agent could perform tasks within certain fields of study limited to Japan, North China, Manchuria, and Mongolia.

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Page 5

The subject has more-or-less specialized in the study of the people, language, history, and political developments of these countries. STERANT-1's understanding of these areas and the people therein makes it possible for him to handle operational assignments which necessitates the use of agents in the areas described. Other than operational work STERANT-1 could do very well as a researcher or a writer dealing with subjects related to Japan, North China, Manchuria, and Mongolia. Operational-wise STERANT-1 could successfully compete with other agents in a like category as long as he is allowed to function within the *Areas* described above, and with a minimum of training and orientation STERANT-1 could be readied for an operational assignment in South East Asia or India. With a year or two of study STERANT-1 could probably handle a teaching assignment on the university level, and without any additional study the agent could render valuable service as an advisor on matters concerning these four areas.

4. It is most gratifying to this detachment to learn that at long last there is a possibility that a solution will be found to the vexing problem of STERANT-1's future.

Enclosures:

1. Results of an interview with STERANT-1 in dup - under S/C
2. One sealed envelope
3. Identities in dup. - under separate cover

6 September 1955

Distributions:

3 - w/encls, as noted
1 - w/o encls.
3 - Chief, VE, w/2 cys Encl #1 & #3, w/o Encl #2.

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Joint Cover Mail #1
to FBI - 6596

SEP 14 1955

RESULTS OF AN INTERVIEW WITH STURANT-1 CONDUCTED BY [REDACTED]

1. Agent's formal education:

Q. What courses of instruction did you receive while you were attending the Osaka National Language School?

A. The school was basically a language school; however, the student's time was split fifty-fifty between language and liberal arts. I studied Mongolian, Chinese Mandarin, Manchurian (Tungusic) and Russian. In addition I was instructed in Japanese history, culture, law, and political theory. Later (during my last two years at the school), I specialized in Mongolian area studies.

Q. What was your class standing?

A. I was either first or second in every subject except Russian. I was never too interested in this subject and did not give it my best effort.

Q. Why did you decide to attend the Osaka National Language School?

A. Actually it was just a young man's whim coupled with a lot of romantic notions about North China and Mongolia.

Q. Did your formal education stop with your graduation from the Osaka Language School?

A. In the sense that I never returned to school, yes. However, all the time I was in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia I spent a portion of each day studying the language and culture of the area in which I was living. You must understand that I soon developed a deep emotional feeling for the Mongolian people and I did everything within my power to learn as much as I could about these people.

Q. How did you go about gathering this knowledge?

A. Well, I always had a room in a dormitory or a small house yet I never lived in my quarters but preferred to live among the Mongolians — I lived in their yurts or houses, ate their food, and absorbed their culture.

Q. Was this sort of activity done at the suggestion of your superiors?

A. No. In fact there were several occasions when one or more of my superiors objected to my attitude toward the Mongolians. I continued to study the area and the people on my own because it satisfied me to do so. The happiest time of my life was spent in Wangyehmiao (1935-1936) where I was a teacher at the military school.

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There I taught young Mongolians Japanese language and Japanese history, at the same time I found that I had an abundance of time which I devoted myself to the study of Mongolian. It was at this time I developed an interest in the political history of Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. I spend many hours studying in this field and discussing both current and past political events with some of the leading Mongolian personalities of the time. After I was transferred to Lushun June 1937 as Chief of that branch of the Manchukuo (TNA) I was fairly busy with my work; however, I found more time to study the country and the people. I believe that I learned more about Manchuria and the Mongolian people during this time than ever before.

Q. After the war did you continue studying in this field?

A. No. After the war my interest was diverted and I did not make much effort to continue studying until I came to Japan in August 1949. After I arrived in Japan I began collecting material on Mongolia and tried to improve my English. In 1954 I attended an English Language school in Yokohama for six months. The course offered four hours of instruction per week in spoken English.

2. SYDNEY's connection with the Chinese Nationalists:

Q. According to your personal history statement you were employed by the Chinese Nationalists in 1946. Would you give me a complete statement regarding this period of your life in China.

A. After I was released for the second time by the Russians in March 1946, I hung around Chang-chun until the end of April. During this period I was not employed, but managed to live off the kindness of several Japanese friends in the area. Around the first of June I was approached by a Mr. WU (fan) (one) who asked if I wanted to work with the Chinese Nationalists? I said that I would be glad to help them if I was capable of doing the work. I was assigned to a unit known as the North East Generalissimo Field Staff, Chang-chun branch. I was puzzled as why the Chinese approached me with an offer of a job in that I had not had any contact with them in the past. Later I learned that a Japanese whom I had met and conversed in, MIAMOTO (fan) (one) an ex-policeman, had recommended me to the organization. I worked for the Chinese Nationalist Generalissimo background material on the Japanese occupation of Manchuria and Mongolia, Mongolian personalities, Mongolian political situation, etc. until the end of July 1946 when I quit. The reason why I quit was two-fold. One, I did not like the Chinese officers I worked with, and two, my salary was cut in the month of July. All in all I did not like working for the Chinese.

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3. STERANT-1's introduction to KUWIN.

Q. How did you first make contact with this organization?

A. After I quit the Chinese I got a job as an undertaker handling bodies of Japanese who had died in the POW and detention camps located in and around Chang-chun. On 16 September 1946 a man introduced himself to me as IDENTITY A and asked me if I would be interested in teaching him Mongolian. I stated that I would be glad to help. In a matter of a few days I met IDENTITY B and started to teach him Mongolian too. IDENTITY B asked me if I would write a Mongolian Who's Who. I agreed and on 30 September submitted my first draft. IDENTITY B seemed pleased with my work and offered me regular employment with IDENTITY C at a monthly salary of US\$75.00. I accepted this offer and was given a regular assignment of supplying information on Mongolia, Mongolia, and the general political situation in Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. Later I learned that IDENTITY A heard of my past connections in Mongolia from refugees from Wangyehmiao whom IDENTITY A had been interviewing.

Q. Did the Chinese Nationalists know that you had accepted employment with KUWIN?

A. While IDENTITY C was in Chang-chun I am sure that the Chinese Nationalists knew that I was working for the unit, but after we left Chang-chun I do not think that they knew.

4. STERANT-1's assignments with KUWIN and KUBARK.

Q. While in Chang-chun did you have any other assignments other than working on background material?

A. Yes. I worked on two intelligence operations. The first was DAMON. I was not the chief agent for this operation, but rather a handy man. DAMON operation was set up to handle a Mongolian (TOKTO) who was sent back to Wangyehmiao to gather information on the Chinese Communists. In February 1947 TOKTO was arrested by the Communists in Wangyehmiao which put an end to operation DAMON. Next I worked on an operation which involved sending a Japanese, MURAKA (fmu) (cna) to Kuirin to gather information on the Chinese Communists in that area. Somewhere along the line MURAKA was robbed of all of his money which put an end to this operation.

Q. How long were you in Chang-chun?

A. The IDENTITY C left Chang-chun for Peiping in November 1947. IDENTITY D was merged with the Peiping unit under control of IDENTITY D. IDENTITY B was my case officer.

Later IDENTITY B was my case officer. While I was

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in Peiping I worked with IDENTITY B and IDENTITY E on a stay-behind operation with a Chinese agent. I have forgotten the agent's name. I really was not too active in Peiping.

Q. When did you leave Peiping and what were your next assignments?

A. The entire unit withdrew from Peiping for Shanghai April 1948. While in Shanghai I was not working on any specific operation, but did continue compiling biographic information on mongolians, reading information reports submitted by other agents and commenting on the information which they supplied. In February 1949 we left Shanghai for Canton. In Canton IDENTITY F took over as my case officer. While in Canton I helped with the training of Mongolians who were being prepared as penetration agents, the plan called for sending them back to Inner Mongolia. In June 1949 I left Canton for Tukao. I stayed in Tukao until August 1949. While in Tukao about all I did was baby set with TOBI. On 21 August 1949 I arrived in Yokosuka.

5. STERANT-1's work with KUBARK, since he arrived in Japan, has been well documented in the files of Projects LFBEATRICE, LFBERNICE, STERANT, and STERIMENT.

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Parole Cover Seal #2
to FJRA 6596

~~IDENTITIES~~

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IDENTITY A is

IDENTITY B is

IDENTITY C is BSD #44 (Agent identified this unit)

IDENTITY D is (phonetic)

IDENTITY E is

IDENTITY F is

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ASO Tatsuo
0-01

SEP 12 1955

6596

VIA _____
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. _____

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

9 SEP 1955

TO Chief of []
VIA Chief of []
FROM Chief of []

DATE _____

INFO: Chief, PG

SUBJECT { GENERAL - Operational/STURANT
SPECIFIC - Additional Biographic Information on STURANT-1

REFERENCE: PJA-5928, dated 22 July 1955

1. Enclosed under separate cover as Enclosure 1 are the results of an interview which [] had with STURANT-1 on 23 August 1955 in response to a verbal request from [] for additional biographic information on the subject, and answers to specific questions which the [] wished answered. In addition one padded envelope containing a rough draft of a dispatch which had been hand carried to the [] is herewith forwarded as Enclosure 2.
2. In connection with [] request for additional biographic information on STURANT-1 it was suggested that an evaluation by [] of the subject's present and future capabilities would be of value. As a preface to that evaluation the case officer wishes to state that since November 1952 he has been in constant contact with the subject and has come to appreciate his loyal and devoted service to KUMAK. It is further stated that the following evaluation is not in any way tainted by emotional considerations, the relationship between this agent and [] has always been on the strictest professional level. The following is [] evaluation of STURANT-1:
 - a. Ability: The subject has a wide knowledge of operational techniques and can apply the theory and experience he has gained from almost twenty-three years of intelligence activity to any given assignment. Over and above a comprehensive understanding of and ability to use the tools of clandestine operations, the subject commands a vast store of area knowledge, which has been of great assistance to KUMAK in the planning and implementation of operations designed to operate in Manchuria, and Japan. In particular the subject can be rated as a native speaker in both Japanese and

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 302B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

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8/1 ASO Tateno
J-01

PROPERTY
NUMBER

INCOMING MESSAGE FORM

Copy: *J* of 10 copiesTo: *[]*

S E C R E T

Classification

Info: *[]*

Proc: ROUTINE

From: DIR

Date: 05 OCT 58

27084

Info: 07944

In reply refer

ACTION:

IND 12

INFO:

CB3 CORC 441 PP 5 NAE 310 1000 06 0000

C/ADMIN 7 PER 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

INTEL STBRANT *[]* 3REF: *[]* 5788 0-10.001

1. WITHHOLDING SUBMISSION STREGIMENT FPOP PENDING QUOTER COMMENTS PARA 9 AND 10, REF DISP.

2. HQS AGREES IN PRINCIPLE TERMINATION ~~STBRANT~~. DETAILS TERMINATION SHOULD BE SUBMITTED FOR HQS APPROVAL PRIOR IMPLEMENTATION. IDEAL SOLUTION WOULD BE FOR STERANT ASSUME TRUE IDEN AND FADE INTO JAP SOCIETY, PER PARA 7 REF, WITH REFERENCES PROPERLY BACKSTOPPED *[]* SUCH A COURSE WOULD REQUIRE DETAILED COVER STORY FOR RESIDENCE, JOB, ETC.

3. PLS REPLY ASAP.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006*1st carded
JAN 30 1956*

SER

S E C R E T

REGISTRY FILE NUMBER	
819 ASO Tatsuo 0-01	

OUTGOING MESSAGE FORM

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Copy.....of.....copies**SECRET**

Classification

To: **DIR**Prec: **ROUTINE**Info: **[]**Date: **6 OCTOBER 1955**From: **[]****4852**Ref Nr: **.....****CHIBA/STBRANT***b7g*RE A) DIR-27084
 B) PJBA-5786

1. WEEK 3 OCT [] DISPATCHING PCSA-781, ENBODYING ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS/
RECOMMENDATIONS STBRANT DISPOSITION TO [] DIR, AND NA.

2. FOR [] REGARDLESS HOW OR WHERE SUBJECT WILL BE USED OR TERMINATED,
REQUEST [] FORWARD [] AND HQS SUCH REALIGNMENTS (OMITTING STBRANT)
STRENGTH PLAN AS WILL ENABLE HQS DESK OFFICER REWRITE PROJECT FOR
SUBMISSION.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION 382D
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

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classification

Releasing Officer

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*JAN 30 1956**IND 34
C6-25**CE 10
Maj 1
1/1/56***REGISTRY
FILE***ASO Tates**O-O/*

53-153-Army-AG Admin Cen-AFFE-450

IP
OCT 14 1955

6976

NR

VIA: **AIR**

(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. **FJBA-5928**

SECRET

15 OCT 1955

TO : Chief of []
VIA : Chief of []
FROM : Chief of []

DATE _____

WFO: Chief, FE

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/STERANT
SPECIFIC— STERANT-1 Contacts

REFERENCE: FJBA-5928, dated 22 July 1955



STERANT-1's debriefing, which was conducted in connection with his INFLUENCE examination (see Reference), revealed that three of STERANT-1 former contacts in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia are now living in Japan, and STERANT-1 has been contacting two of these individuals. [] interviewed STERANT-1 in an effort to determine the extent of these contacts. The enclosure contains STERANT-1's statement outlining his relationship with these individuals.

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SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008



Enclosure:

As stated above - in trip, under S/G

30 September 1955

Distribution:

3 - [] w/encl. as noted
1 - [] w/o encl.
3 - Chief, FE, w/encl. as noted



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FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR 1949

Dated
21-6-56
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f. 1 Case

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Enc to
FJBA 6976

STRANT-1's Close Friends in Japan

1. SHINODA Kenichi (46b6/3944/0001)¹

a. Physical Description:

40 years old.
Height 5'4".
No outstanding features.

Weight 128 lbs.
Heavy black hair. WAT 1 1964

DOC. MICRO. SER.

b. Employment History:

1934-1936, mail clerk at the Mongolian Military Academy at Wangyehmiao.
1936-1937, code clerk for the Wangyehmiao Tolkuu Kikan (TKK) group.
January 1937-1938, subject was assigned as a clerk in the Wangyehmiao group.

November 1938-January 1939, subject was made chief of the Khalar Arshan TKK Branch and although a civilian held the rank of a sergeant.

January 1939-February 1940, subject was the chief of the Lusin Dorn TKK Branch.

February 1940-July 1941, subject was chief Tung-Liao TKK group.

July 1941-December 1943, subject was assigned as assistant chief of the information group, TKK located at Wangyehmiao.

December 1943 until end of the war SHINODA was an adviser to Col. KANAGAWA (6855/1557), chief of the Wangyehmiao TKK group.

c. Post War History:

SHINODA was captured with KANAGAWA at Fa-ku and in September 1945 was sent to the Russian POW camp at Raichikinsk (phonetic) near the Siberian border where he remained as a TB patient until repatriated to Japan in January 1948. SHINODA was in a Tokyo hospital from the time of his return to Japan until June or July 1948 at which time he was discharged and went to his father-in-law's home in Tokyo (KANAGAWA's wife killed herself at the end of WW II in Wangyehmiao). SHINODA's father-in-law gave the subject employment in his furniture factory where he worked until the middle of 1949 when he got a job as an advertising man on the Japan Fibre News, a small paper published by the textile industry. SHINODA kept this job with the Japan Fibre News until the beginning of 1953 when he again changed jobs. This time he found employment as a reporter on the Current News (Jiji Tsushin) (2514/0057/6639/0207), a newspaper devoted to the report-

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Enc 1 to FJBA - 6976

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ing of political events and government affairs. This newspaper is still being published in Tokyo. About October 1953 SHINODA again changed jobs and found employment with the International News as a staff writer dealing with Chinese and China. He has a very good position but the salary is very small, about 39,000 per month.

d. STERANT-1's Connection with SHINODA:

STERANT-1 met SHINODA sometime in 1933 at Wangyehmiao when the subject was a mail clerk at the Mongolian Military Academy. STERANT-1 developed a liking for SHINODA and began spending a lot of his free time with the subject. SHINODA more-or-less adopted STERANT-1 as his big brother and came to depend on STERANT-1 as his adviser and sponsor. STERANT-1 did not see the subject from 11 August 1945 until March 1948. Since that time STERANT-1 has been seeing the subject on the average of twice a month. SHINODA has visited STERANT-1 at the latter's home in Yokosuka about five times. STERANT-1 stated that he believes that SHINODA is of the opinion that STERANT-1 is working for some U.S. Intelligence organization; however, STERANT-1 has never discussed his job with the subject other than to say that he was working as a translator at the Yokosuka Naval Base. STERANT-1 further claims that he has never identified the group currently employing him. SHINODA is aware that STERANT-1 is in Japan illegally and is using a Chinese alias. According to STERANT-1, SHINODA has never shown any particular interest in his job with the U.S.

e. STERANT-1's Evaluation of SHINODA's Present Position:

STERANT-1 is of the opinion that SHINODA does not have any connection with Japanese intelligence services (STERANT-1 bases this assumption on the slim fact that SHINODA has never told the subject that he has such connections); however, SHINODA has a friend, YUJI Tsuchiya (6390/2535/2979/2468), who is working for the Japanese Public Safety Investigation Agency (PSIA) in Tokyo.

✓ 2. KATO Kiyenari (0502/5671/3237/2468)⁴

a. STERANT-1's Initial Contact with Subject:

Subject was a Buddhist monk studying at Gengen Temple (just a few miles south of Wangyehmiao) where STERANT-1 met him in 1935. KATO remained at this temple until the end of WW II when he fled to China. KATO refused to repatriate to Japan in that he hoped to return to Gengen Temple to finish his study of the Mongolian

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Enc. to
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[redacted]

Page 3

and Tibetan languages. Sometime in 1948 KATO did return to Japan and STERANT-1 received a letter from him while the latter was in Shanghai. STERANT-1 stated that KATO learned of his presence in Shanghai from STERANT-1's wife.

b. Post WW II History:

After KATO's return to Japan in 1948 he worked in Shizuoka as a fisherman for about one year, after which he entered the textile business, in a small way, in Tokyo. Since its beginning KATO's firm has enjoyed only a limited success, but the company does afford him a comfortable living.

c. STERANT-1's Present Connection with KATO:

Between the subject's return to Japan in 1948 and 1952 STERANT-1 used to see him about two times a month, but since KATO's marriage in 1951 the meetings have been very infrequent. STERANT-1 told KATO that he is a translator at the Yokosuka Naval Base and that he was brought into Japan by the Americans illegally and that he is using a Chinese alias. STERANT-1 stated that KATO has never asked him about his work.

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GUNSHI Niki (67b6/0674/1750)⁵

STERANT-1 met this individual in Inner Mongolia while the latter was serving as a Japanese civil administrator. GUNSHI knows STERANT-1 is MAIDARJAB, the agent's alias used in Mongolia. STERANT-1 has seen the subject in Tokyo twice since his return to Japan; however, GUNSHI did not see or did not recognize STERANT-1.

1. Field Comment:

File check request on the subject returned from base marked "no record"; however, [] files revealed the following references to the subject: "Possibly identical with subject (nra) --- Employee International Affairs Institute; former member of the Harbin Takumi Kikan (TKE). Source: KUFIKE [] 31 March 1954." "Important member of Takumi Kikan. Source: KFD-4b, 28 October 1950."

2. Field Comment:

The International News referred to herein should not be confused with the Keizai Shinbun the Communist-controlled newspaper published in Osaka. The subject International News is a newspaper published monthly in Tokyo, Minato-ku, Nita, and is

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Encl. to
PJBA

Page 4

devoted to commenting on international political news. According to STERN-1, International News's orientation is right of center.

4. Field Comments: No record in Japan Detachment files. Local file checks have been requested.

5. Field Comment: There are numerous references to the subject contained in the ~~SYNTHETIC~~ operational reports. In addition the following information was supplied by [] on 15 July 1964: "Subject is a director of the Nissoi (2480/6134) Construction Company. He was a counsellor of the ~~Morin~~ ~~Beibei~~ Group, East Heilong Prov. He is currently living at 407, Kami-nakasato-machi, Kita-ku, Tokyo. Telephone number (relay) 91-4687. He is a promoter of the Japan-Mongolian Friendship Association."

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OCT 18 1955

Chief, PR

INFO: Chief of []
Chief, []

Chief of []

Operational

Biographical Sketch of STBANT-1

1. Transmitted herewith is a biographical sketch of STBANT-1 as compiled from material available to [] and to []. The purpose of presenting such information at this time is to provide the reader with a handy reference to STBANT-1's operational history without having to review numerous documents which might not be readily available. A dispatch concerning the future plans for STBANT-1 is currently being prepared and will be forwarded to Headquarters shortly.

2. Upon graduation in 1932 from the Osaka National Language School where he studied Mongolian, Chinese (Mandarin), Manchurian (Tungus), Russian and Japanese history, culture, law and political theory (specializing in Mongolian area studies during his last two years in school), STBANT-1 obtained a position as translator/interpreter/recruiter with the fledgling Mongolian Army at Chien-chia-tien, Manchuria. The Japanese Kwangtung Army at this time was busily engaged in establishing a Mongolian army friendly to Japan and under the control of Japanese puppets. In addition to his translating, interpreting and recruiting duties, STBANT-1 was employed as a Japanese Department of the Army civilian. His job was to translate intelligence reports for IDENTITY 4, a Japanese advisor to the Mongolian Army.

3. In July 1934 STBANT-1 was transferred to the newly established Mongolian Military Academy located at Hanyehmien to teach Japanese language and history. It was while he was in Hanyehmien that STBANT-1 devoted a portion of each day to the study of the Mongolian language and culture. Subject soon developed an emotional feeling for the Mongolians which stimulated his desire to learn everything possible about them. This feeling towards the Mongolian people enabled Subject to mingle with leading Mongolian personalities and discuss both current and past political events. This sympathy for the Mongolians has carried through in Subject's thinking to the present time. At the end of March 1936 Subject was transferred to Lhain Fene where, as head of a 10-man Tokusei Kikai (TKK) group, he was targeted at Outer Mongolia. Although he was given military education in the intelligence field, he was directed to gather military, economic and political information on the eastern part of Outer Mongolia.

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SOURCES/METHOD/DOSE/EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

817

ASO TATSUO

J-01

FILE NUMBER
ASO TATSUO
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Dated:

Page 2

through 1939 Subject concentrated on maintaining friendly relations with Mongolian princes in the Northeast Silingol League and was instrumental in the apprehension of some 40-50 Outer Mongolian and Chinese agents dispatched by the Outer Mongol NVD, Internal Affairs Ofice, 3rd Section, and actually run by the Soviets from Moscow. From late 1939 through 1941 Subject debriefed Mongolian agents who had returned from assignments in Outer and Inner Mongolia. This work led naturally to his next assignment as a liaison official between the TEK and the Kungtai (KFT) while acting as a case officer for the low level intelligence operations directed against Outer Mongolia. Subject performed in this capacity from 1941 to 1945.

4. At the conclusion of World War II, Subject wandered about the outskirts of Changchun until 2 September 1945 when he was arrested by a "Peace Maintenance" group and turned over to a Soviet Air Force component which had moved into Manchuria sometime after 9 August. This group transported Subject to Changchun where he was put to work in the Changchun Supply Depot under the command of a Soviet Junior Lieutenant. In March 1946 a former TEK subordinate of Subject revealed to the Soviets the latter's previous associations with the TEK. STURM-1 was imprisoned for ten days and upon release agreed to gather information for the Soviets on the Chinese Nationalist organizations in the area. Subject stated that he submitted two reports to an unknown Soviet case officer at Changchun and that after the Soviets left in April 1946, he had no further contact with them. The LOVETTA examination (see FD-3517) conducted in January 1955 bears out Subject's statement that he has had no further contact with the Soviets.

5. Later in 1946 STURM-1 was employed by a Lieutenant Colonel of the Chinese Nationalist army and a Mr. Wu (fam), also associated with the Chinese Nationalist army who asked him to report on Mongolian activities. Subject was assigned to the North East Generalissimo Field Staff unit, Changchun Branch. He later learned that a Japanese, whom he had met previously, had recommended him to the Chinese Nationalists. Subject compiled background information on the Japanese occupation of Manchuria and Mongolia, Mongolian personalities and the general Mongolian political situation. He quit working for the Chinese Nationalists at the end of July 1946 due to his dislike for the Chinese officers with whom he worked and because he received a cut in salary.

6. In September 1946 IDENTITY B approached the head of a Mongolian refugee organization and requested aid in obtaining information regarding Mongolian affairs. STURM-1 was recommended by the refugee organization to IDENTITY B who in turn introduced Subject to IDENTITY C. IDENTITY C utilized

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him to: (A) act as a Mongolian language teacher; (B) provide information on Mongolian personalities; (C) supply information on Inner Mongolia; and (D) act as a liaison between IDENTITY C and the head of the Mongolian community in Changchun until late November 1947. At this time Subject sent his wife and children to Nynash and then moved with IDENTITY D to Peiping when the Changchun unit of IDENTITY D was merged with the Peiping unit under the control of IDENTITY E. In Peiping, STRENT-1 worked with IDENTITIES C and F on a stay-behind operation involving a Chinese agent. In April 1948 STRENT-1 moved on to Shanghai where he continued the compilation of biographic information on Mongolians (later published in the Mongolian Who's Who, FJL-6820) and also read information reports prepared by other agents and commented on information which they supplied. In February 1949 STRENT-1 moved from Shanghai to Canton where IDENTITY G became his case officer; here he helped with the training of Mongolians who were being prepared as penetration agents to be sent to Inner Mongolia. In June 1949 he left Canton for Taku, Taiwan where he remained until August 1949.

7. On 21 August 1949 Subject was brought back into Japan via KUBARK channels and commenced work in Project STRENT-2, an operation targeted against Inner Mongolia and allied areas, such as Tsinghai and Kinchiang; and the Mongolian People's Republic and Tibet. This project never reached fruition and was terminated in 1952. Subject, however, was directed to maintain contact with [] (formerly encrypted as []). In the case of [], the contact was continued in order to monitor [] penetration of the Chinese Nationalist Ministry of the Interior Investigation Bureau. In January 1955 [] was given an LCFLUTTER examination when it was discovered that he had leaked information to his KIDS case officer concerning the plans of Project STRENT-2. Among other things he had given a description of STRENT-1. Approval to terminate this agent was granted by Headquarters in FJN-6615 dated 19 July 1955.

8. Coincident with his handling of the STRENT-2 complex STRENT-1 had been incorporated into Project STRENT-3, set up to collect background and operational information on the Mongolian People's Republic by monitoring the daily evening radio broadcasts from Ulan Bator. [] (formerly []) was the chief agent of the project. His duties consisted of recording the broadcasts and submitting reports of these broadcasts to STRENT-1 for comment before submission to the project case officer. This activity was terminated in October 1951, after it was determined that the Foreign Broadcast Information Service had better facilities for monitoring the Ulan Bator radio.

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9. Concurrent with STRENT-1's participation in Projects STRATEGIC and STRATEGIC, he was written into Project STRENT which was designed to lend support and advice to the [] Ethic Group activities which included STRATEGIC and STRATEGIC. The project was approved in 1953 and expired 31 December 1954. Since that date STRENT-1 has been used in the developmental STRENT activity as a cut-out between the case officer [] and []. In addition STRENT-1 has been given non-operational transmission tasks by his case officer. In recent months STRENT-1 has introduced [] to the case officer who now feels that he would prefer to handle [] directly instead of through STRENT-1. Inasmuch as STRENT-1 is currently involved with only the STRENT activity, the case officer considers that now is an opportune time to implement the termination of Subject.

10. In this dispatch [] has summed up the pertinent points in STRENT-1's history principally as it has related to his employment by KUBAK during the past years. Recent dispatches (FRA-5748, FRA-5928, FRA-6596) from the [] have covered STRENT-1's services for KUBAK in more specific detail and have elaborated on his loyalty to this organization. [] is currently preparing a dispatch for Headquarters, [] and [] concurrence which embodies recommendations for the future utilization and/or termination of Subject.

TDN

[]

[]

Enclosure:

Identities (under separate cover)

7 October 1955

Distribution:

3 - Chief, FE, w/3 cys encl
 1 - Chief, [] w/1 cy encl
 2 - Chief, [] w/2 cys encl
 1 - Chi/Ind, w/1 cys encl, cy encl
 1 - Registry, w/1 cy encl

Originated by: []

SECRET

DR. REFER TO 709-762

Dated:

SECRET

Under separate cover

IDENTITY A - SAITO Kyobai (7072/5672/1872/1627)

IDENTITY B -

IDENTITY C -

IDENTITY D - 550 #44

IDENTITY E -

IDENTITY F -

IDENTITY G -

SECRET

AM

ET

PSA-702

Key
OCT 18 1955

Chief, []

Chief of []

Operational/STBAAFT-1

INFO: Chief of []
Chief, []

Chief of []

Future Disposition of STBAAFT-1

1. For over a year now the [] and our [] have been concerned with the problem of reaching a sound decision in regard to the future utilization of and/or the termination of STBAAFT-1. For one reason or another a firm decision on what we should do has been repeatedly postponed. The purpose of this dispatch is to outline the history of STBAAFT-1's operational odyssey with this organization, set down the alternative solutions relating to the Subject's future disposition, and give [] recommendations as to the solution most in order under the circumstances.

2. Listing of references pertinent to the Subject's future utilization/termination:

- a. RJA-2200, 1 February 1954 - Outlines research done at Headquarters relative to sending STBAAFT-1 to the U. S.
- b. RJA-5109, 16 February 1954 - Transmitted item "a" (with comments) to the []
- c. RJA-7662, 15 June 1954 }
- d. RJA-996, 1 July 1954 }
- e. RJA-8973, 3 September 1954 } All references concern explorations relative to documenting STBAAFT-1 on Okinawa for later shipment to the U. S.
- f. RJA-1912, 14 September 1954 }
- g. RJA-9790, 13 October 1954 }
- h. RJA-1164, 16 October 1954 }
- i. RJA-3512, 25 January 1955 - wherein Headquarters discusses possibilities open to the Subject in various ways and means of accomplishing the job.

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DATE 2006

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FILE NUMBER
ASO TA1500
001

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j. FJA-3517, 25 January 1955 - Results of DIAFFTA pointing up that 1007 A and Subject's wife suspect Subject's affiliation with a U. S. intelligence arm.

k. FJA-5700, 12 July 1955 - wherein [] a. Reveals agent's plan to be reuniting with his family; b. Offers termination in Japan as a solution to the ATBANT-1 problem, reviewing the security aspects of such a move in paragraph 8 of his dispatch.

l. FJA-6996, 12 September 1955 - Transmits supplementary material on ATBANT verbally requested by []; serves in this dispatch as the basic paper from which [] will proceed below to set forth the alternatives as they relate to the future disposition of Subject.

m. FJA-762, 10 October 1955 - Short #1 sketch composed by [] outlining for the next part Subject's history with FJAUSA.

3. We invite the addressee's attention at this time to separate enclosure #1 of FJA-6996 in which [] has surfaced certain issues which, combined with factors cited in previous correspondence, should be pointed up prior to a discussion of the alternative courses of action we have in mind. First, the impressions received here with regard to paragraph 1 are that Subject, despite his assertion "...that he wanted to go to the U. S. very much and that he would do anything to see his dream fulfilled...", is still not willing to adopt an identity which in all likelihood would enable us to effect such fulfillment. We submit in light of the evidence that his dream is but a side issue of a much greater desire to reassume his old identity, disentangle himself completely from any further participation in clandestine activity, and "once out of the business", to settle down to a normal existence in Japan with his wife and children. This argument gains added substance from paragraph #2 of the same enclosure where, seemingly on his own initiative, Subject composed a plan whereby he would be surfaced under true name in Japan. If we may judge from (a) ATBANT-1's indication that he would be unwilling to accept the terms for state-side study, (b) the case officer's opinion that he is determined to reassume his Japanese identity either in Japan or the U. S., and (c) Subject's plan (entailing what to us appears to involve significant risk to himself) for being surfaced under true name in Japan,

Dated:

Page 3

we conclude at this juncture that Subject's primary allegiance (whether it be attributed to a desire to be quit of further clandestine activity, a wish to spend a normal existence with his family, a normal desire to reassume his original identity which enables him as authority on Mongolian affairs to sell his services to a Japanese college or university, or just a natural compulsion to be among people of his own heritage and culture) should out of logical necessity be to Japan. In coming to any decision, then, it is important that we keep the foregoing in mind; secondly, to prevent blowback at some later date, that we approve a solution which is in the closest possible harmony with the Subject's wishes.

4. Alternative solutions:

a. Presupposing (for the sake of stating the alternative) that STBART-1, due to his more than nine years of clandestine experience coupled with a wide knowledge of Mongolia and its political and operational climate, can be of further use to us in either a research/advisory or an operational capacity, to continue on a unilateral basis to work him as we may desire. Keeping paragraph 43 above in mind then, we must remove Subject and his family from Japan, restore his old identity, and begin building him an adequate cover which will hold up from 1946 until that day in the future when we must terminate him, fully expecting that, regardless of where he may be located at the time of termination, he will attempt to secure re-entry to Japan.

In consideration of whether or not the Subject can be of further use to this organization, a review of the references will show that although a great deal has been said about moving Subject to the U. S., no clear cut statement as to what he would do there, including a plausible consideration of termination and disposal, has been made. Headquarters, [] and field bases concerned with the STBART-1 problem seem to have been motivated more out of a desire to get him out of Japan than for any other reason. This naturally contributes to the general feeling that all we have here is a disposal problem.

Secondly, and still assuming he can be of use to us, we are faced with the problem of placing him somewhere in the Far East where his area knowledge can be of use. [] knows of no such place at this time; and since there is small possibility that a field base will require his services in the near future, it is not logical that we should send him to the U. S.—unless Headquarters and the [] are willing to subscribe to alternative b. below.

b. That Headquarters, for the lack of a current STBART need for the Subject's services, make contact with OSEN-7, state that we have an individual who, having made a life study of Mongolia, its people, politics, economy, and geography, has become what we consider an expert on the area--so much so, in fact, that we

SAC, (b) (1)

dated:

Page 4

believe that he would be a valuable asset to COMINT for as long a time as they might desire to use him (reference is made at this point to discussions held between COMINT officers and representatives of this organization during the autumn of 1954 when COMINT desired information basic to the creation of intelligence in Mongolia which would service their members in the event of a third world war). It might also be pointed out that once COMINT finished its state-side work with Subject and the latter has returned to Japan, COMINT in Japan might possibly, with Japanese permission, have access to him on a consultative basis.

To wit, should it be agreed that COMINT could use the Subject for a year or so and would be willing to underwrite his expenses and his salary while he is in the U. S., we suggest that an attempt be made through [] Division to make the following case to the Japanese:

"We have had working with us over the past nine years a Japanese national whom we contacted in Chengtu, China in 1946. This individual was in fact a member of your Kuangtung Army. We employed him at that time principally because we learned that he was an able interpreter, but partly because we found that he was destitute and in dire need of work. Later we learned that he had been branded as a war criminal by the Chinese Nationalists, and since he was a likeable fellow and a competent worker, we wished to save him from any harm. So we took him wherever we went. The longer he worked for us the more we grew to like him, respect his judgment, and call him in on important decisions concerning Mongolia.

"For his own part, he has always been obliged to us and, although a loyal Japanese who time and again has expressed a fervent desire to return to Japan, he has always deferred to our requests to stay with us and work. Now the time has come after long years of self denial that we feel he has more than paid whatever debt he may have owed us. We are honor-bound to acknowledge and do everything in our power to fulfill his request to assume an identity in Japan which will enable him to retain his place in your society and give your country the benefit of his acquired knowledge on Mongolia. We do not wish to stop here, however; we wish to go further and offer him some form of reward while at the same time making a valuable contribution to Japan's and the United States' body of tactical and strategic knowledge on Mongolia. Specifically, we are willing to pay all his expenses to the U. S. here, in cooperation with our COMINT officials, he can compile pertinent data available on Mongolia which would be to our mutual defense interests should the Soviets or the Chinese launch

COMINT

1. *Constituents of the *Leptospiral* complex* (1970) 10: 1-10.

“*He is the King of the world, and he is the King of the universe, and he is the King of the angels, and he is the King of the devils, and he is the King of the dead, and he is the King of the living, and he is the King of the抓紧了，*”

“proposed adding other measures, it being at the same time proposed that the
prosecution of the case should be suspended, pending the trial of the
case in the criminal court, so that the criminal trial could be conducted
without the risk of the criminal trial being delayed by the civil trial.”

卷之三

Subject: []

dated:

Page 6

now bears, it neither precludes his divulging it for a price to the authorities of the host country in which he will reside nor a last ditch attempt to "tell all" to the local Japanese embassy in hopes that they shall suspend his exile.

If we were to effect such a termination it would be costly and require sanction by the host country. Thirdly, Subject, if he runs true to form, would most certainly object out of considerations for his family alone.

4. To terminate Subject in Japan, thereby running the ultimate risk of his divulging to the Japanese authorities wherein details of his past and current operational affiliations with DIA/INTL intelligence.

To calculate the risks involved in a Japan termination it is necessary only to review the operational files since his recruitment by DIA/INTL in Cheng-shan in 1946. His years of operational and social contact with members of our organization and their families afford him a respectable knowledge of our P/T complement of staff officers and their operational techniques. He is aware of practically all our past attempts to place operatives in Manchuria. Of current operations he is aware only of our attempts to defect [] but is not cognizant of the part currently being played by [] in this regard. All he really knows is that through [] we are keeping an eye on [] . It is probably safe to assume, however, that we shall not be successful in effecting a defection through [] .

5. In giving consideration to all options open to us, [] recommends that Headquarters (if this organization's need for Subject is definitely lacking) contact DIA/INTL to determine if their requirement expressed a year ago is still outstanding. If not, Headquarters is requested (a) to inform our [] by cable and (b) either approve Subject's termination as recommended by [] in paragraph 6 below or give a Headquarters alternative for disposal.

On the other hand, if DIA/INTL agrees and is willing to underwrite the costs as outlined generally above, Headquarters is requested to cable [] to determine if they, through their liaison facility, can approach the Japanese along the lines given in paragraph 4 b. Should [] be unable to make such an approach, it is then suggested that all parties give their approval to the alternative cited in paragraph 6 below as the best means of termination. If, however, [] is able to fulfill our request and the Japanese accept, the [] is requested to set in motion the machinery described in 4 b.

6. Alternative 4 b, failing, [] recommends an appeal of alternative d, for the following reasons:

a. The agent has pleaded to be terminated. To go against his wishes would only compound the difficulties of eventual termination.

Dated:

Page 7

SECRET

b. The one fact that he wishes to gain back his original identity even though it means foregoing a STRAW-1 study tour, indicates that his desire to remain in Japan is paramount. We reason further that eventually (if not now) his primary allegiance must be to Japan. To wit, it would add to our security problems were we to use him in the future with or without Japanese knowledge.

c. As there has been no statement tendered over the past year and one half relative to what services he might perform for us in the future, we would only be postponing the inevitable in prolonging our present association.

d. The "calculated risk" has been made. We recognize the subject is a repository of such HI data on our FB staff officer complement as will enable him to divulge to the Japanese data that will permit them to check our people more closely. If our current operations he could reveal no more than [] interest in defecting []. He knows that we have attempted to use []

[] in this regard and probably believes that we, having failed, are at a loss to know what to do next. He is not willing of the present [] relationship. Therefore, we could still defect [] without the Japanese becoming knowledgeable, STRAW-1's information notwithstanding. The extent to which it is possible that he will divulge any or all of his information to the Japanese is dealt with in paragraph #8 of FD-36-5780.

7. Carrying all addressees' capabilities to execute alternative 4 b., [] requests:

a. Headquarters and [] endorsement of our recommended solution cited in paragraph #6 above;

b. That Headquarters notify the field by cable if approval as outlined in [] is granted for STRAW-1's termination in Japan; in principle Headquarters has already agreed to termination in Japan in FD-37084;

c. In the event such approval is denied, that Headquarters approve one of the other solutions cited or submit one of its own.

In any event, prompt action will be appreciated.

[] []

Enclosure:

Identities, under separate cover

10 October 1959

Distribution:

2 - Chief, PH. w/3 cys encl
 1 - Chief, [] 3/1 cy encl
 2 - Chief, [] 1, w/2 cys encl
 1 - OSS, RA, w/1 cy encl
 1 - Vital Materials, w/1 cy encl

✓ 2 - Chi/Ind, w/2 cys encl
 ✓ 1 - Registry, w/1 cy encl
 Originated by: []

UNDER SEPARATE COVER

Enclosure to FOIA-701

Classified

Dated:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1000 A - MURDOCK Redacted

1000 B - 333 222

SECRET

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. 7236

KAPOK

CLASSIFICATION

26 OCT 1955

TO : Chief of E 3
VIA : Chief of E 3
FROM : Chief of E 3

DATE

INFO: Chief, FE
Chief of C 7

SUBJECT: GENERAL Operational

SPECIFIC

Amendments to IDENTITY A X

REFERENCES: A. SUBI-4852, dated 6 October 1955
B. PJBA-5271, dated 6 June 1955

1. Enclosed herewith, per request Reference A, paragraph 2, are this detachment's recommended amendments to IDENTITY A, Reference B. The identities noted in Enclosure (1) of this dispatch are keyed to Enclosure (3) of Reference B. IDENTITY N is an addition to the identities given in Reference B.
2. It is requested that Headquarters grant a new OA in the case of IDENTITY C for the activity described in Reference B. Revised PRQ, Part I was forwarded under PJBA-5736, dated 11 June 1955. There are no changes in the subject's original PRQ, Part II.

Enclosures:

(1) Subject Amendments - in trip.
(2) IDENTITY - in trip. - under separate cover

16 October 1955

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

Distribution:

3 - E 3, w/encls. as noted per CSM 43-28
1 - E 3, w/1 cy encls.
3 - Chief, FE. w/2 cys encls.
1 - Chief of E 3, w/1 cy encls.

SECRET

FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR 1949

KAPOK

CLASSIFICATION

REGISTRY
FILE NUMBER

0-01
As. *Takano* ⁰⁰⁰

CRYPTONIM: IDENTITY A

PART I

1. Area of Operations

No change.

2. Purpose

No change.

3. Background

No change.

4. References

No change.

5. Objectives

No change.

6. Targets

No change.

7. Tasks

No change.

8. Coordination

No change.

9. Personnel

a. Pseudonyms and Cryptonyms

IDENTITY C, agent.

IDENTITY N, case officer.

Delete IDENTITY C.

b. Personal Data

Delete all information on IDENTITY C.

IDENTITY C

No change.

SECRET

SECRET

Attachment #1 to
FJBA- 7236

Page 2

e. Operational or Security Clearance

No changes.

10. Genre

Delete paragraphs (a) and (b). Paragraph (c) remains unchanged.

11. Contact and Communications

- a. Contact between IDENTITY N and IDENTITY C will be maintained through weekly scheduled clandestine meetings in the Tokyo area.
- b. Communications between the case officer and agent are diamonded with both alternate and emergency channels. Communication is one way from case officer to agent.
- c. In order to save case officer time, IDENTITY C will be handled by IDENTITY G until the latter is removed from this operation either through transfer or termination.

12. Central and Motivation

Delete paragraph (b), no change in paragraph (a).

13. Equipment and other Support

No change.

14. Timetable

No change.

DECLASSIFIED

per DOD 43-26

SECRET

KAPOK

~~SECRET~~~~PROJECT OUTLINE~~

7236

Page 3

CRYPTONIM

IDENTITY A

PART II

15. Estimated Cost

	<u>First Quarter</u>	<u>Subsequent Quarters</u>	<u>Total</u>
Agent Compensation			
IDENTITY C	U.S. \$150.00	U.S. \$540.00	U.S. \$720.00
Travel and Communications ..	30.00	90.00	120.00
Year-end bonus	100.00	NONE	100.00
Misc. supplies; paper, envelopes, stamps, cards, etc.	9.00	27.00	36.00
 TOTAL	 U.S. \$319.00	 U.S. \$657.00	 U.S. \$976.00

16. Special Problems and Commitments

No change.

KAPOK
STORY

Separate cover Enclosure (2)
to FJBA. 1236

SECRET
KAPOK

IDENTITY

X IDENTITY N is

SECRET

SECRET
KAPOK

INCOMING MESSAGE FORM

Copy of copies

For 1000 g water

SECRET

Project **ROUTINE**

Info:

Date: 17 NOV 55

From:..... DIR

10497

In reply refer 33999...

ACTION, IND 12

INFO: 00 300PS 4 FT PP 5 FT ~~100~~ FT 11 FT 6 FT 7 FT

CHART 8 ~~100~~ 100 ~~100~~ 100 100 FIG 4 ~~100~~ 100 100 100

STBRANT

1. HAVE THOROUGHLY CONSIDERED ALTERNATIVES FOR FUTURE DISPOSITION STBRANT-1. APPROVAL GRANTED TERMINATE STBRANT-1 IN JAPAN AS OUTLINED PARA 6, FCSA 781, SUBJECT JAPA CONCURRENCE.
2. AS REWARD AGENT'S 9 YEARS VALUABLE SERVICE DESIRE HE BE OFFERED GENEROUS BONUS. UP TO \$3,000 SEEMS APPROPRIATE TO HQS, SUBJECT TO FIELD NEGOTIATION WITH AGENT. PROJECT STBRANT BEING SUBMITTED FOR EXTENSION FROM 1 JAN 55 AND TERMINATION EFFECTIVE 30 NOV 55 TO COVER BONUS. ADVISE FINAL TERMS AND TIMETABLE.
3. URGE SOONEST PRACTICABLE ACTION, FULFILLING ALL NORMAL TERMINATION REQUIREMENTS WITH EMPHASIS ON SECURITY BRIEFING, AND SPECIAL ATTENTION TO SECURITY IMPLICATIONS WHICH LUMP SUM

PAYMENT RAISES.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

EDJ

SECRET

ASO Tatsuo

0.01

jsd EDJ
FEB 09 1968

INCOMING MESSAGE FORM

P
Copy of copies

To: []

SECRET

ROUTINE

Classification

Info: []

Date: 29 DEC 55

From: DIR

Innr: 12620

'n reply refer 40311

ACTION: IND 12

INFO: CB 3 COPS 4 FL PP 5 MAT IND INTEL 6 CE 7 TSS
C/ADMIN & PER ECG SEC MED FIN 9 REG 10 COM 11 ESEC

LCHARVEST STRESIDENT STBRANT

REF A. [] 4125

B. [] 7661

REQUESTS COMMENTS AND DECISION. HAVE EXTENDED STBRANT-1 CLEARANCE
THROUGH JAN FOR PURPOSES TERMINATION. WILL AMEND OR EXTEND AS NECESS-
ARY BUT NEED ADVANCE NOTICE.DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

jed

FEB 02 1956

ASO Tatsuo
0-01

✓
31 January 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, CI/OA

SUBJECT : STERANT-1
OC#7433 (superseding OC#704)

1. Reference is made to our 14 November 1955 memo, subject, cancellation of Operational Clearance of STERANT-1.
2. It is requested that CI/OA extend the operational approval of STERANT-1 for an additional 90 days. This extension is requested in order to permit his use in a recruitment attempt targeted against a Mongolian Communist in Japan.

[]
Chief, FE

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 302B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

[]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVAL

[Signature] No. C-23177

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, ~~EE/2~~ Lineback *[Signature]* EE/2

Provisional Operational Approval is granted for STBRAINT/1

as requested in your memorandum dated 31 January 1956.

Limitations:

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
COURSES/METHODS/EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

A Provisional Operational Approval is temporary in nature and expires in ninety days unless it is cancelled, extended or superseded by a full Operational Approval.

[] CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION

Date: 3 February 1956

SECRET

FORM NO. 125 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
1 JUN 55

STBRAINT - "A"

(9)

[]

SECRET

MAR 6 1956

AIR

7454-4298

24 FEB 1956

: Chief of []

* Chief, IX

- Operational/STURANT

- Extension of STURANT-1's Clearance

INFO:

Chief, []

817*

STURANT-1's operational clearance has been extended for an additional 90 days, through 30 April 1956.

8 February 1956

Distribution:

3 []
2 []

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION 3828
KAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SECRET

ASO Tatsuo

NC

SECRET

11633

AGENT SERVICE RECORD

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCESMETHODS EXEMPTION 302B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

1. AGENT CRYPTONIM: STERANT-1

2. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION: STERANT

3. AGENT RECRUITED BY: Subject was originally contacted and developed by IDENTITY A, and later recruited by IDENTITY B. The initial contacts and recruitment took place in September 1946.

4. CAPACITY IN WHICH THE AGENT SERVED: During the nearly ten years of association with KUBARK STERANT-1 has served in almost every phase of agent activity. This has included: radio operator, intelligence collection, translation, research, advisor, spotter, recruiter, agent instructor, and chief agent.

5. RATE OF PAY: At the time the subject was terminated he was receiving a monthly salary of US\$230.00, all of which was paid in the field, part in Japanese yen and part in Military Payment Certificates (MPC). STERANT-1 was given a one-time termination bonus of US\$3,000.00 per instructions from Headquarters. This sum as well as the agent's accumulated savings of U.S.\$2,300.00 was paid in the field in Japanese yen. There is no outstanding financial obligation owed to this agent.

6. OTHER COMMITMENTS: None.

7. AGENT DISMISSED BY: [] on 8 June 1956

8. REASONS FOR DISMISSAL: With the exception of the STRESENT operation STERANT-1's entire time with KUBARK had been spent in dealing with Mongolian operations and other related activity. With the termination of the last Mongolian operation this unit found itself hard put to keep the agent occupied. Repeated requests to Headquarters and other KUBARK units did not bring forth an offer of employment elsewhere within KUBARK. In addition STERANT-1 had never been directed to build access in other fields, so the agent, in time, became excess baggage, an agent who had to be terminated because he was no longer in a position to further our efforts against our assigned targets.

9. SECURITY RISKS: Over the years of very close association with our operations STERANT-1 has acquired considerable knowledge of our objectives, techniques, and personnel. The subject's knowledge of our operations is somewhat limited, yet that which he does possess is in great detail. A redeeming factor here is that in the past four years

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11633

STERANT-1 has been working on operations which are now dead through abortion or termination - in addition, most of the operations are probably already known to the opposition. STERANT-1 is aware of the true name and nature of KUBARK. All of which means is that if STERANT-1 were to go to the Japanese, the Chinese Nationalists, or to the Chinese Communists the most he could do would be to report on operations which are already known to them, however, he could identify the sponsor and many of its staff personnel. STERANT-1 knows many KUBARK case officers by true name and has probably collected considerable BI on these individuals. Headquarters is in the best position to prepare a roster of personnel whom he can identify, if such a listing is thought necessary. It is the case officer's opinion that STERANT-1 will not reveal his past KUBARK connection to either the Chinese Nationalists or to the Chinese Communists. However, there is a very real possibility that the agent will reestablish his former JIS connections, and in so doing he would be forced to reveal in part or in toto his past KUBARK activities. The possibility that STERANT-1 will go to the Japanese is made more real by the fact that the subject is not equipped nor is he capable of supporting himself in any other manner than by working in the field of intelligence - the JIS is the only service readily available to him.

10. IS THIS AGENT RECOMMENDED FOR REUSE: Yes. In the case of a shooting war on the mainland STERANT-1, if still available, would be of value in recontacting Mongolian agents and friends who in turn might be of benefit to KUBARK. It is very doubtful that the agent will ever build any access here in Japan which could be exploited by KUBARK. If the agent does recontact JIS it would probably be on a very low level and uninteresting to us as a possible penetration.
11. MANNER OF DISMISSAL: Since the termination of [] in February 1956 STERANT-1 has been aware that he would be terminated. The agent and case officer have discussed this termination many times and the agent was prepared for eventual termination, yet on the day that the subject was informed of the actual termination it came as a shock. STERANT-1 did not want to be terminated, however, he was professional enough to realize that once the decision was made there was little or nothing he could do about it. STERANT-1 was told that his services were no longer needed for reason that the type of operations in which he could assist had all dried up. The agent was told that it was hoped that sometime in the future we could recontact and rehire him, but for now the agent was to consider himself terminated. STERANT-1 accepted this, but he has high hopes that he will be recontacted in the near future. STERANT-1's attitude toward the case officer and to KUBARK was not

SECRET

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Page 3

11633

the very best, but in view of the fact that the agent was being terminated after almost ten years of employment through no fault of his own a little bitterness could be expected. STURANT-1 did not threaten the organization, nor did he plead for any special consideration. The actual termination took place during two personal meetings between the subject and the case officer.

12. LETTER OF TERMINATION SIGNED: No letter of termination was signed, nor was there an I&GFLUTTER examination given.

SECRET

~~REF ID: A6512~~

(2) to 702- , dated

SECRET

11633

~~REF ID: A6512~~

IDENTITY A:

[

]

IDENTITY B:

[

]

IDENTITY C:

PAI Ching-ju

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET

(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY] FILE REQUEST

TO RI/ANALYSIS SECTION	DATE 26 NOV 56	ACTION OPEN AMEND CLOSE		
FROM CI/OA	ROOM NO.		TELEPHONE	

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I				
SENSITIVE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NOT	SOURCE DOCUMENT	
NON-SENSITIVE				
NAME (Last)	(Middle)	(First)	(Title)	3.
ASO Tatsuo				
NAME VARIANT				
TYPE NAME 2. (Last)	(Middle)	(First)	(Title)	
PHOTO	4. BIRTH DATE	5. COUNTRY OF BIRTH	6. CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH	7. OTHER IDENTIFICATION
YES	NO	05 M 10 JAP	Kyoto City	1. 2. 3.
OCCUPATION/POSITION				OCC/POS. CODE

RECORD COPY

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SOURCES/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

SECTION II				
CRYPTONYM		PSEUDONYM		
C-23177				
SECTION III				
COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE	10. ACTION DESK	11.	2ND COUNTRY INTEREST	12. 3RD COUNTRY INTEREST
	fs/1			12A.

COMMENTS:

RESTRICTED CI OA FOLDER IN RI AR

PERMANENT CHARGE		RESTRICTED FILE		SIGNATURE
YES	NO	YES	NO	

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET

(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY [] FILE REQUEST

TO	RI/ANALYSIS SECTION	DATE	ACTION	
		15 June 1957	OPEN	X AMEND
FROM	RI/CO []	ROOM NO.	CLOSE	
		2301 L	TELEPHONE	
3127				

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

SENSITIVE	10.	1.	SOURCE DOCUMENT
X NON-SENSITIVE			
NAME (Last)	(Middle)	(First)	3.
NAME VARIANT			
TYPE NAME 2. (Last)	(Middle)	(First)	(Title)
RECEIPT			
PHOTO	4. BIRTH DATE	5. COUNTRY OF BIRTH	6. CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH
YES	NO	D M Y	7. OTHER IDENTIFICATION
8.			
1. 2. 3.			
OCC/POS. CODE 9.			
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2008			

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM	PSEUDONYM
TL-BRANT	

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE	10. ACTION DESK	11. 2ND COUNTRY INTEREST	12. 3RD COUNTRY INTEREST	12A.
	FE/2/EOCE			

COMMENTS:

amend to include crypt

PERMANENT CHARGE	RESTRICTED FILE	SIGNATURE
YES	NO	X

PUNCHED

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
SECRET

(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY **FILE REQUEST**

TO	RI/ANALYSIS SECTION	DATE	22 July 57	ACTION		
FROM	RI/CF	X	OPEN	AMEND	CLOSE	
		ROOM NO.	TELEPHONE			

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List the number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
LAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

PHOTO	4.	BIRTH DATE	5.	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	6.	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH	7.	OTHER IDENTIFICATION	8.
YES	X	NO	D 5 M 6 Y 10	JAPAN	BEPPU CITY	1.	2.	3.	
OCCUPATION/POSITION					OCC/POS. CODE				

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM	PSEUDONYM

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10. ACTION DESK 11. SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST 12. THIRD COUNTRY INTEREST 12a.

COMMENTS.

PERMANENT CHARGE	RESTRICTED FILE	SIGNATURE	
YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	YES <input type="checkbox"/>	NO <input type="checkbox"/>

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

PROCESSING

PROPOSED	ACTION	ACCOMPLISHED
	MARKED FOR INDEXING	
X	NO INDEXING REQUIRED	
	ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING	
	ABSTRACT	
	MICROFILM	

TO

CHIEF []

FROM

Chief, FE

SUBJECT

LCHARVEST/STERANT/ACSI Request for Operational Interest Check

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

ACTION REQUIRED: As indicated

REFERENCE: None

1. In June 1962, ACSI requested that Headquarters run an operational interest check on STERANT/1. We do not know whether the matter has been discussed in the field, although we assume it will be handled by the 500th MIQ. In any event, Headquarters feels that the most efficient and expeditious way of handling any discussions regarding STERANT/1 would be to have the responsible CHIEF Agency in the field contact the appropriate LCHARVEST officials at []

2. Headquarters is advising ACSI that STERANT/1 has had a long and close operational relationship with KUBARK. This, coupled with what was a rather difficult termination in 1956, could place KUBARK in a rather embarrassing position should STERANT/1 find difficulty in operating with a new CHIEF officer. Furthermore, STERANT/1's past operational activities have compromised him to the Chinese Communist Intelligence services, to the Japanese services, and maybe other services we are not aware of. KUBARK would be much more receptive to relinquishing operational interest in the matter if we could be assured that STERANT/1 was going to be handled on an unwitting basis, or possibly through another agent.

3. In conjunction with the foregoing, we have requested that ACSI discuss the matter with [] prior to [] departure in September 1962, since [] is quite knowledgeable and personally familiar with the case.

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SOURCES/METHOD/SEXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Distribution:

DATE 2008

2.

DATE TYPED

DATE DISPATCHED

20 July 1961

DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

25 JUL 1962

FJTW 20783

HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

ORIGINATING

OFFICE
FE/CH/IQ

OFFICER

TYPIST

pd

EXT.
6088

COORDINATING

OFFICE SYMBOL

DATE

OFFICER'S NAME

DCFE(C)

23 JUL 1962

FE/JAO

RELEASING

OFFICE SYMBOL

DATE

C/FE

[ISR 4C-24]

x 5045

PLS HOLD FOR REQUESTOR IF NPII

FE
ISRM-8265

Name: ASO, Tatsuo 7802/3932/6671/3948

12 June 62

Aliases: None

DOB: Approx 1917

POB: Unk

Citizenship: Unk

Pres add: c/o Asia University, Tokyo, Japan

Occ: Professor

Pres empl: Asia Univ

SD 6973

aka: Meidoujap cross ref only (listed)
 aka Mandoujap (listed)
 @ Meidoujap @ Meidoujap (listed)
 @ Pai Ching I (listed)
 @ Pai Ching-Ju (listed)
 @ Fuzzy - listed
 @ API, Ching - ju - listed

MEMORANDUM COORDINATION

Date 20/6/62	INITIALS
RI ANALYST	
DIV. FE	BRANCH CIA O.
RI EDITOR	DETLISR
RI TYPIST	

ASO, Tatsuo

11/16/62 - Nal Meled.

FILE IN
20 JUN 196216/6/62
R2

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 382B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SECRET

NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL

20 July 1962

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Army
Attn: []

FROM: []

SUBJECT: ASO Tatsuo (7802/3932/6671/3948) (SD-6973)

1. Reference is made to the request dated 12 June 1962, subject as above, whose name you desired checked against the files of this office. The files contain the following information concerning the subject of the request.

2. Subject had a very long active association with this Agency and its predecessor organizations. This relationship was officially and amicably terminated in 1956. In the course of his work with this Agency, Subject was completely blown to the Chinese Communists as an American Intelligence agent. His association with this Agency was probably well known to the Japanese Intelligence and Security Services. Subject had been a staff employee of Japanese Army Intelligence for many years, both before and during World War II, prior to his recruitment by this Agency.

3. Before further action is taken in regard to Subject by your Department, it is strongly suggested that your field representative contact [] for a full briefing. This Agency is advising [] of your Department's interest in Subject. It is also suggested that this contact be made as soon as possible since the officer of the Agency who is most knowledgeable of Subject will be leaving [] in September 1962.

4. The [] has no record of a current operational interest in Subject.

[] 6265

FILE IN []

RID/CE: JMA/WB/ljy

Based On: Information and Instructions received from FE/CH and concurred with by FI/[]

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SOURCES/METHODS/EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

SECRET
NOFORN CONTINUED CONTROL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE FILE NO. 7

DATE : 235
27 JUL 62

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4
2		5
3		6

JUL 27 1055Z 62

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : []

ACTION: FE 8

INFO : CI, CI/OPS, FI, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):

No CS Record Value. Destroy. RI file this copy as indicated Branch copy filed as indicated

Indexing (check one):

Marked None recd.

Signature: []

ROUTINE

IN 35521

DIR CITE [] 1177

PBRAMPART

1. 500TH ICG RECEIVED CABLE FROM ACSI RE ASO TATSUO (7802/3932/6671/3948) BORN APPROX 1917 PROFESSOR ASIA UNIVERSITY TOKYO. ACSI CABLE STATES KUBARK HQS TOLD ACSI KUBARK HAS OVER 400 FILE REFERENCES TO ASO AND REQUESTS 500TH QUERY [] FOR RESUME AVAILABLE INFO. HOWEVER [] FILES CONTAIN ONLY 500TH OPS INTEREST CARD DATED 24 MAY 62.
2. SUGGEST POUCH AVAILABLE INFO ASO TO [] FOR PASSAGE 500TH.

END OF MESSAGE

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	[]
RID/MIS	[]
RID/PS	[]
RID/FI	[]
DESTROY	[]

SECRET

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

FORM 1389 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No. []

ORIG: **FE/CH/IO**
UNIT: **5671**
EXT: **1544**
DATE: **30 JULY 1962**

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

FILE N

5-62

ROUTING

1		4
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TO: **FE**
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: FE 8
INFO: CI, CI/OPS, FI, S/C 2

RE Filing (check one):
No C8 Record Value. Destroy.

RI file this copy as indicated

Branch copy filed as indicated

RE Indexing (check one):

Marked None required

Signature: **C**

30 JUL 66 18 29z

S10 CEN

DEFERRED

X ROUTINE

OUT 60166
OUT 60166

TO **FE** INFO CITE DIR **26430**
LCCHARVEST PBRAMPART **26430**

RE **FE** 1177 (IN 35521)*

SUBJECT REF IS STBRANT. SEE FJTW 20783 FOR BACKGROUND
AND ACTION REQUESTED **FE** PRIOR PASSAGE ANY INFO.

END OF MESSAGE

* **FE** requested summary background information STBRANT for passage to 500th MIG.

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 382B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	<i>Kel</i>
RID/MIS	
RID/PS	
RID/FI	
DESTROY	

File in **FE**

FE/JAO: **FE**

FI/DC/ICR: **FE** in draft

C/FE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

DCFE(C)

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING
OFFICER

FILE
Ex. 5045
4 C 24

TRACE REQUEST

PLEASE HOLD FOR REQUESTOR IF NPII

DATE 21 Sept 1962

NAME

ASO, Tatsuo

ALIASES AND/OR SPELLING VARIATIONS

DATE OF BIRTH Aprx 1917	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP
----------------------------	----------------	-------------

PRESENT ADDRESS c/o Asia University, Tokyo, Japan	OCCUPATION Professor
--	-------------------------

PRESENT EMPLOYMENT Asia University

TRAVEL

ADDITIONAL PERTINENT IDENTIFYING DATA

Request reinstatement of above subject.

25 September 1962
SD 6973

Reinstated. dated 20 July 1962 is referenced.

eo

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SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B
KAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(When Filled In)

DO NOT USE THIS SPACE

TRACE REQUEST

[]	[]
DATE	NO.
1	

NAME

ASO, Tatsuo

ALIASES AND/OR SPELLING VARIATIONS

DATE OF BIRTH Approx 1917	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP
PRESENT ADDRESS c/o Asia University, Tokyo, Japan	OCCUPATION Professor	
PRESENT EMPLOYMENT Asia University		
TRAVEL		

ADDITIONAL PERTINENT IDENTIFYING DATA

Subject has been dropped as a result of coord with CAG in the field.

Reinstated per tel. Con w/ []

25 Sept. 62?

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION 382B
KAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION 382B
KAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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[] LOG

FROM	DA	SERVICE NO. SD 6973
INDEX	SECURITY	DATE 17 Aug 62
TO:	FROM:	DO NOT USE THIS SPACE
0 00:	RESULTS	ISRM NO. DATE
REA DESK	OTHER	201+
COMMENTS		

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION				
		2. RI FILE NO.				
		3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.			4. DATE	
		7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM		8. DATE OF INFO.	9. EVALUATION	
5. ANALYST		6. DATE PROCESSED		10. DISSEMINATED IN		11. DATE
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION						
12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE			13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.			

180 TATSUO 7802/3932/6671/3948/
044-002-023
SEY-M-DOS ? FJTA-41473
20 MAY 63

CIT ?
OCC ?
KAPOK:

023
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3 320
FAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.



SECRET

(When Filled In)

REGISTRATION REQUEST

EE 7
DATE
EE NO
EE J

NAME

ASO, Tatsuo

ALIASES AND/OR SPELLING VARIATIONS

DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	CITIZENSHIP
PRESENT ADDRESS	OCCUPATION	

PRESENT EMPLOYMENT

TRAVEL

ADDITIONAL PERTINENT IDENTIFYING DATA

SD 6973 is terminated without prejudice by the Department of the Army.

For additional information, you are referred to the Army Source Registry.

DATE: 1 October 1968

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

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(When Filled In)

GROUP - 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION