

ARISUE, Seizo

SF-5
CIRCLE

Report (OSS)

Boston Series 217

THE GERMAN MILITARY ATTACHE IN TOKYO SUMS UP THE
FAR EASTERN WAR SITUATION

The following info was secured by Major General Kretschmer, German Military Attache in Tokyo, the 3rd week in March 1944. A lengthy discussion with General Arisue was indicated. (Presumably General Seizo Arisue, V.P. of the House of Peers and Head of the Army Information Service.)

.....
as above

Boston Series 271 makes same statement/in regard to General Arisue.

Report (OSS)

Boston Series No. ~~271~~ 322

JAPANESE REPORT OF SOVIET-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS

Early June 1944: There is confusion in the reports about the Japanese-Soviet-German situation. From these reports OSS makes the following deductions:

The Japanese Army and Navy as well as the Foreign Office are still endeavoring to persuade Germany into a separate peace with the USSR. Early in June 1944, General Arisue, Head of the Japanese Army Information Service, recommended this move during a talk with Major General Kretschner, the German Military Attache in Tokyo. In the opinion of the Japanese, the center of gravity of the war has moved to the western front. For this reason Japan urges that Germany and the USSR should come to terms so that a common front can be made against the western nations.

.....

Report (OSS)

Boston Series No. 675

GERMAN DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY ACTION IN FAR EAST

Stahmer, German Ambassador in Tokyo, is said to have made following statements concerning prosecution of the war in the Far East:

.....

China:

In a recent conference Generals Sato and Arisue* had emphasized for the first time of late the possibility of political exploitation of the latest

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Japanese successes in China.

Economically and morally Chungking had reached its limit. American support was said to be strengthening the Yen-an government at cost of Chungking. If Japanese could effect a completely successful defense of the Philippines and of North Burma the re-orientation of Chiang Kai-shek toward Nanking and Japan was conceivable. The change of front would be facilitated by the death of Wang Ching-wei (former Jap Puppet President, Nanking regime; replaced by Ch'en-Kung-po.

* unidentified.

ARISUE (Name) (Name), Major General

Jap. J-1

(Formerly carried also as ARIMATSU. New card made, consolidating old ones, Aug. 1947.)

MIS, March 1944 - Head of Dept. 2, General Staff. This dept. corresponds to our G-2; receives military intelligence obtained abroad and is responsible for ensuring that other departments of the General Staff are supplied with the intelligence which they need for planning and for carrying out their various functions. afp/gac

A-45019, JR-1171, 6/11/44, C-0 -- 1939: ARISUE, then Colonel, was Jap. M.A. in Rome and approached the Italian Govt. on the subject of a joint Japanese-Italian Islamic policy. He was ready to dispatch agents into Egypt, Arabia and Persia to counter-balance the pro-Islamic policy already begun by China. The Italians were not interested. cdg

Diplomatic List, July 1944 - Member of War Ministry Staff.

DD-222, 6/3/45, p.2 - Subj. is Chief of the Investigations Section (Army Gen. Staff Military Information.) Speaks Italian admirably, knows French and German. Served in Italy twice: as A.M.A., then M.A. "An energetic, turbulent, active, capable very modern, very foxy diabolical general, with a vivacious inventive spirit, always on the watch and on the move, full of life and energy." cdg

CIRCLE, Boston 322-X - Head of Jap. Army Information Service as of June 1944. Recommended to Major Ge. KRETSCHMER that Germany seek a separate peace with the USSR. cdg

Washington Document Center Summary #2, 31 May 1946, p. 10 - Certain documents of the Japanese War Ministry, of a special nature, are not included in a listing of a catalog of Army Ministry files, having been left in the charge of ARISUE by authority of Col. WOOD, WDI.

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy ☐

(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒

(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

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Date: 2005

FBZ 64, Sept. 1947 - Subject isofficially at the Demobilization Bureau. He is employed in an ostensibly covert capacity -- actually in rather widely known fashion -- by Gen. Willoughby, SCAP G-2, for the purpose of getting information on the Russians by interrogation of Japanese repatriates, by digging up old files and documents buried by the Japanese just before the end of the war (the Japanese having felt that, being vis-a-vis one of the Allies, such documents would be incriminating), or by any other means. It is doubtful whether GEN. Willoughby's trust in ARISUE is justified; source feels that the latter has been responsible for the delivering of many documents to the Soviets (supposedly through his step-daughter, "a cute little number who may also be his mistress.") About June 1946 source was informed by HAMASHI Saburo (qv) that ARISUE had told him Soviet Major VOLKIN was looking for him, and had advised him (presumably as a means of support until better times, HAYASHI being at that moment undernourished and without income or employment) to get in touch with VOLKIN.

LWA-384-MIS(ETO) Final Interrogation Report of Joseph Albert MEISINGER, 25 May 1946:

Together with Gen. NAKAMURA (q.v.) and Field Marshalls HISAICHI and SUGIYAMA (q.v.) had close personal relations with German Ambassadors Ott and Stahmer.

FSRO-294, July 1946: ONODERA Interrogation Report.

ARISUE, Seizo, Maj. Gen.

(He served in the 42nd or 41st Div. 3)

- 1) Attached to IGH, FCC Whos Who, 23/2/45-
- 2) RB 6825 & 6934: Chief of the Investigations Section of the Army Staff is Maj. Gen. Akofkue or Arissbe (ARISUE, Seizo, Maj. Gen. Imperial Headquarters), who speaks perfect Italian and knows French and German. Formerly he served as Assistant Military Attache and later as Military Attach in Italy. He is very energetic and active, with ~~an~~ inventive spirit.
- 3) FCC WHO'S WHO 23/2/45 - Attached to I. H. Q. of the Army Section
- 4) FCC WHO'S WHO 25 May 45 - same info as item 3

ARISUE Seizo

See [] ZJJA-383

After the war KAWABE received financial support from ARISUE Seizo . KAWABE Torashiro ~~xxxxxxx~~ numbers ARISUE among his close friends from service together in JIGS and in Europe (ARISUE was military attache in Rome when KAWABE held the equivalent position in Berlin), with whom a stronger friendship developed after the war.

Subject attended the inaugural meeting of an organization of general officers from the Japanese Military Academy graduating classes between 1913-1921 was held on 8 May 52 at the Sakurada Kaikan. The organization tentatively known as the Sakurada Kai met from 4:00 to 6:30 p.m.

Lt. Gen., grad of the Mil Acad in 1917 and the War College about 1923, was successively a member of the Mil Affairs Section of the War Min, mil attache in Rome (Aug 1936- Mar 39, a member of Mil Affairs Bur of the War Min, 1939-40, active in bringing Japan into the tripartite pact with Germany and Italy, staff officer and later deputy chief of the staff of the No. China Army Area Command, 1941-1942, and chief of the Intelligence Section of JIGS, 1942-1945. After the war he headed a joint committee of army, navy, Foreign and Home Min personnel for liaison with the occupation forces, Aug to Sep 45, then set up an office in the Nippon Club in Yuraku-cho, Tokyo, to handle liaison between the American Forces and the First Demob Bur. By 1947 the liaison work had gone into other channels, and he closed the office and joined the newly formed KAWABE Organization of which he is still a member. He lives at 139 4-chome, Matsubata-cho, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo.

ARISUE Seizo

Honseki: Hokkaido, Sorachi-gun, Babii-machi, Chashiuchi 33. Summary History:

Born: 22 May 1895

2nd Lt: 1917

1st Lt: 1921

Graduated Military Staff College: 29 Nov 1924

Performed minor duties at GHQ: 1925

Sent to Italy for Military study in Italian Army War College: 1928

Major: 1931

Private Secretary to Army Minister: 1932

On duty, War Ministry: 1935

Lt. Colonel; Military Attache, Rome: 1936

Colonel: 1938

On North China Army Staff: 1939

Major General; Vice Chief, North China Army Staff: October 1941

G-2, JIGS: August 1942

Lt General, JIGS: March 1945

(Secy Div Files, 9 Oct 52, [])

Very clever turncoat. Turned out as part of welcoming committee for General MacArthur despite his bitter anti-Allied attitude prior to and during war. Rumors say he headed ARISUE KIKAN, an Army Secret Service organization during the war, and this organization had a fund of ¥100,000,000 which was []ed away to a secret hiding place just prior to Occupation. (CIC, 22 Apr 46)

Had long administrative career in Army. A certain boastful informant at present being interviewed states ARISUE was delegated to persuade him to approve TRI partite Alliance with Germany and Italy.

Working for American forces. His organization is Toyomae Club, meeting place for military men. From YEN CHING KUNG KUAN list of fascist elements in Japan. (ZJY-2769, 16 Feb 51, C-3)

Reported by Mar 52 Zenei as member of Kato Intelligence Agency. (ZJJ-277, 5 Dec 52, [] B-3)

SECRET

ARISUE Seizo

- Reported as a contact of Major General Makoto ONODERA while serving as Military Attache in Italy in November 1937.

* * * * *

Member of the JIS "underground government". Main field of endeavor: China, North Korea, Mongolia, Russia. Organization of his agency:

- A. Investigation Section: SONE Akira. Chief of the 3rd Section of the Foreign Office Investigation Department.
- B. Action Section: Responsible person, SUZUKI Gen. Former Army Colonel.
- C. Work Squad: KAMADA Senzo, Former Army Lt. General.
WATANABE Wataru, Former Army Maj. General.

Above extracted from ZJL-204, 15 Sept 49, CE File III - 33, IID File 44-6-2.

The Japan underground govt is planning the creation of a fascistic force composed of the constabulary and the fire brigades. It will be led by KAWABE Torashiro and ARISUE Seizo. It is clear that plans for its creation call for organization along the lines of a brigade (ryoden hensei). The rearming of Western Germany has a great influence upon the organizing of this force. The Japanese underground govt is carrying out this organization with great determination. (Ref. ZJL-236, Report H, 8 Dec 49, CE File III - 32.1).

SECRET

Ref. ZJL-222, Report E, 17 Nov 49, CE File III - 43; Following is the complete report:

"UGAKI Issei of the Japan underground government had directed former "SAKURA KAI member" Major General IWATOMO Takeo to put Lt. General ARISUE Seizo and others in charge of the direction of the activities of an elaborate international spy net. This net will include former affiliates of the Japanese Army espionage training center, the NAKANO SCHOOL."

ARISUE Seizo is one of the principal members of the UGAKI Issei faction of the Japanese underground government. (Ref. ZJL-229, Report L, 1 Dec 49, CE File III - 33).

The organization of the constabulary by ARISUE Seizo and KAWABE Torashiro, advisers to the General Headquarters' Second Staff Section (G-2), may well become a reality. American made revolvers have already been given to all policemen by the Americans. The fact is that the Constabulary will be organized under American guidance. It has also become clear that plans are being made to bring forward purgee UGAKI Issei and to allow great leeway to the activities of the Japan underground govt. It is evident that all of this is being done with the mutual consent of America. (Ref. ZJL-256, Report M, 24 Jan 50, CE File III - 32.1 - copied entire report).

ARISUE Seizo, KAWABE Torashiro, UGAKI Issei, etc. are acting as advisers to Japan's militarists. (Ref. ZJL-264, Report F, 7 Feb 50, CE File III - 33, copied all).

The group known as the Food and Livelihood Stabilization Assn. (SHOKU SEIKAT-SU ANTEI SYOKAI), Kandabashi, Tokyo, is carrying out underground activities aimed at overthrowing the ARISUE-KAWABE line realizing the creation of an independent army for Japan. The latter would have UGAKI Issei as its central figure. (Ref. ZJL-264, Report SS, 7 Feb 50, CE File III - 33, copied all).

SECRET

ARISUE Seizo

Heads an organ of the KATO KIKAN, an intelligence agency serving the Japanese "underground government". Concerned with American and Soviet Intelligence as well as domestic intelligence. (Ref. ZJL-215, Report A, 25 Oct 49, CE File III - 33).

Details on ARISUE Seizo's KIKAN activities in the NYK Building:

1. Gathering intelligence information pertaining to U.S.
2. " " " " " the Soviets.
3. Program for the restoration of UGAKI Issei.
4. Program for the establishment of a constabulary (police army).

(Ref. ZJL-215, Report F, 25 Oct 49, CE File III - 33).

The former Imperial Life Insurance Co. (TEIKOKU SEIMEI) became the Asahi Mutual Life Insurance Company ~~in~~ (ASAHI SEIMEI HOKEN SOGO KAISHA) in 1945. This company has served to bring together former naval aviation affiliates and graduates of the military academy and has its main connections with ARISUE Seizo, former Lt. General. The adviser (komon) for this group is Vice-Admiral TOZUKA Michitaro, former Commander in Chief, Yokosuka Naval Station. (Ref. ZJL-215, Report J, 25 Oct 49, CE File III - 36).

The Race Restoration Society (MINZOKU FUKKO KAI) of Osaka, Nagoya, Mito and MIKURA NO TOMO SHA of Yokohama, two organizations whose main strength derives from the Japan "underground government", are action corps directly dependent upon ARISUE Seizo and are terroristic organizations. (Ref. ZJL-215, Report L, 25 Oct 49, CE File III - 33).

Subject is reportedly an adviser (consultant) for the "G.S.O.", U.S. Dept. of the Army Special Intelligence Section. (Ref. ZJL-215, Report T, 25 Oct 49, CE File III - 30.1).

Subject and HASEGAWA Torashiro reportedly have the KATO KIKAN completely in their grasp. (Ref. ZJL-215, Report .., 25 Oct 49, CE File III - 33).

SECRET

ARISUE Seizo 2589 2608 4737 0005

J

A preparatory Committee for Japanese Rearmament has been organized by subject and ex-military leaders. This committee is controlled by the Japanese cabinet.

ZJY 6928

50 Nov 51

11 April 52

E-3 C

ARISUE Seizo

□ □

ZJJA-439J

ARISUE Seizo

Subject receives a copy of the Soviet Press at 139 4-chome Matsubara, Setagaya-ku. This is a publication of the Soviet Press News Agency. ZJJ-30, 29 Feb 52, CE File I-16.

ARISUE Seizo

(Major General)

ZJTA-461 Inter of Otaka Michio: chief of 2nd Section (intelligence) Army General Staff GHQ (1942-45).

1

ARISUE Seizo

□ □
(FJBA-2604)
16 Nov 54

ARISUE General

See: 202-575 D/31/142

ARISUE Seizo (Gen)

According to □ □ YOSHINO Matsue works for him, for the British, for Subject, for OSI, and for the Soviets. JAPA-0739, IN 41825; 2 Sep 54, 201-56821.

ARISUE Seizo

□ □
FJJA-2667
Encl. 1
25 Feb 54

ARISUE Seizo

The dispatching of Japanese volunteers and advisors to defend Taiwan is centered in G-2's Strategem Unit in the NYK Building. . . These activities are being carried out as anti-Soviet and anti-Communist operations by ARISUE Seizo, SONE Akira, the KATO KIKAN, Japanese Militarists, the former rightists, etc., in their capacity as advisors to the U.S. Army. (Ref. ZJL-273-A, 28 Feb 50, CE File III - 47; [] and []).

Is the responsible person (for the Japanese) in the Japan underground government's Operations Kikan concerned with Japan, the Chinese Nationalists and Korea. (Ref. ZJL-273-F, 28 Feb 50, CE File III - 47; [] and []).

Former Major Generals MATAYAMA and SANIMOTO, and former Lt. Generals KAWABE Torashiro and ARISUE Seizo are concerned with supervision of the organization of the Japanese Police Reserve Force (KEISATSU YOBITAI). (Ref. ZJL-410-G, 17 Aug 50, CE File III - 32.1; [] []).

High level information pertaining to the American military is flowing to the Japanese Underground Government through ARISUE Seizo, among others. (Ref. ZJL-390-C, 3 Aug 50, CE File III - 47; [] []).

The ARISUE Kikan, under the leadership of Lt. General ARISUE Seizo, with overall supervision from KAWABE Torashiro (qv) and TANAKA Ryukichi (qv), is a loose federation of gigantic proportions, within the UGAKI JIS Groups, roughly divisible into three separate agencies: The WATANABE Kikan, headed by Major Gen. WATANABE Wataru; the HAGI Kikan, headed by Major General HAGI; and recently, the KODAMA Kikan. In addition to these subordinate and sometimes autonomous agencies, ARISUE maintains close liaison with the top level of American intelligence in Tokyo, GHQ, and operates with considerable influence, through his position as adviser to TSUCHIDA Yutaka's (qv) Committee along with General TANAKA, in controlling Foreign Office and political connections of the UGAKI federation, and in the Formosan operations of NEMOTO Hiroshi (qv.). (Ref. ZJL-442, 8 Sept 50; [] [], CE File III - 33)

Also ARISUE is expanding his operations in cooperation with the IWAAZE Kikan to include Manchuria and Indo-China. The KAWAGUCHI Kikan has now taken over full responsibility for support of NEMOTO's Formosan operations from ARISUE.

Subject formulated original plan early this spring for operations into Indo-China which entailed the use of Col. TSUJI Masanobu (qv) as chief of operations. While at Imperial General Headquarters, TSUJI was the protege of subject, then staff intelligence as a Major General. At last minute central advisory group of the UGAKI JIS Group ordered replacement of TSUJI by Lt. Col. TOMITA. (Ref. ZJL-444, 13 Sept 50; [] [] CE File III - 43)

ARISUE Seizo

Subject is "surrender-time" lieutenant general; that is last-minute promotions. At the time of the Feb 26 Incident subject was involved along with others of the Young Turks then serving at Imperial General Headquarters as staff officers. (Ref. ZJL-445, 14 Sept 50; CE File III - 43)

For further details of activities and JIS operations see ZJL-483, 13 Nov 50; [] CE File III - 33.

New China News Agency dispatch released in Hong Kong on 13 Oct 50 re "American espionage" in China, reports that on MacArthur's order, the TYU KO SHA (revival group), a Japanese fascist organization, has been revived and war criminals such as subject, UGAKI Kamehige, and Yoshio KODAMA have been recruited for secret agents and traitors. (WDGS report #ID724564, 18 Oct 50, Filed JIS-Willoughby)

The JONAN Enterprises-National Peace and Independence Preparations Committee syndicate, a new JIS organization, has effected no liaison and does not desire any with subject and his kikan. (ZJL-539, 26 Jan 51; [] CE File III - 43)

See ZJL-404, 7 Aug 50, CE File III - 43, [] for subject's part in Rightist underground plans to dispatch ships to Formosa and Indo-China.

Subject and all others who advocate the re-armament of Japan only under careful American supervision will be eliminated from consideration when Japan rebuilds its power. Already subject stands alone within the underground on that problem; his reasons for desiring American supervision of the new army are merely that he is making one last attempt to salvage personal power which he knows will crumble rapidly as soon as the Americans are no longer in control. Feels certain that he would have a high post in such an American-controlled army, and is now fully aware that the rest of the Japanese JIS, Army and Navy figures hate him so bitterly that he has no chance for power with them. (Ref. ZJL-568, 1 Mar 51, [] CE File III - 43)

Chief Cabinet Secretary OKAZAKI Katsuo, in compliance with orders from Prime Minister YOSHIDA to accelerate the rearmament of Japan, is meeting with former generals ARISUE Seizo and KAMADA Senzo. (Ref. ZJL-596-A, Mar 51, [] CE File Japanese Rearmament)

A great split has developed within the Army faction of the Japanese Underground Government as the result of a difference of opinion over rearmament plans. IWAKURO Takeo and his faction advocate Japanese leadership in Japan's rearmament, while ARISUE Seizo leads a faction which feels that American leadership is "unavoidable." The IWAKURO faction, which favors complete independence in rearmament efforts, considers the ARISUE Faction "compradors". (Ref. ZJL-596-B, Jan 51, [] CE File Japanese Rearmament)

ARISUE Seizo

Subject among former high-ranking Army officers to whom the Japanese Underground Government has assigned operations for Europe and U.S.A. (Ref. ZJL-609-B, 4 May 51, [] CE File III - 33)

The Japanese Underground Government, considering it inevitable that Japan will be given permission to rearm, is conducting research on rearmament. Among others, subject is doing research on this problem. (Ref. ZJL-551-C, 8 Feb 51, [] CE File Japanese Rearmament)

See: ZJLA-1473, 11 May 1951, CE File III * I

Japanese Underground Gov't keeping pace with leftist China-Japan Joint Operations with its own parallel. Subject member of Underground Gov't's China - Japan Joint Operations Guidance Dept. (ZJL-466-A, 26 Oct. 50, [] CE File III - 30.3)

Will be named to participate in the Japan-American Joint Defense Committee. (Ref., ZJL-639, [] 5 June 1951, CE Japanese Rearmament)

Subject originally recruited HATTORI Takushiro to work for the POPOV organization. A former G-2 of the Imperial General Staff. (ZJL-571, 6 March 1951, [] CE III 30.1)

OKADA Yoshimasa (Naomasa) has engaged in operations for KAWABE Torashiro and ARISUE Seizo. He has been working as a member of the ARISUE Kikan. (ZJL-604, 19 April 51, [] CE III 33.)

Connected with rearmament & supporting UGAKI Kazushige's appointment as Peace Plenipotentiary. (ZJL-648A, 15 Jun 51, [] [] dossier)

THE following statement is from a study made by the 2nd Dept of the International Intelligence Bureau of the Military Council (Chinese Communists): ARISUE is already working for the American forces. We should concentrate attention on his organization, Toyomae Club, a meeting place for military men to carry on their activities secretly. See ZJY-2769, 16 Feb 51, CE File V-1.

See also: [] ZJLA-1027
[] ZJLA-1242
[] ZJLA-1742 (p. 35),
[] ZJL-229-C&R
Jonan Enterprises Co., Ltd., CE File III-36.2.

The present staff of the KAWABE Kikan includes ARISUE Seizo (ZJL-788, [] 22 Jan 52, KAWABE Torashiro Dossier.)

In his work of American G-2 GHQ KAWABE Torashiro relied quite extensively from time to time upon the service of ARISUE Seizo. (ZJL-748, [] 15 Nov. 51, [] Dossier.)

See [] 15 Mar 50, p.15, 27; 21 Sep 50, p.3; #62109, 17 Jul 50, Vol I; 1 Nov 50;
[] 18 Mar 50, 2 Oct 50, 26 Oct 50; [] ZJJ-76, 11 Apr 52;

ARISUE Seizo

Former military leader, working for increased unity of rightist underground groups.
(SO 80395, 30 Nov 51, Tokyo B-2)

Subscriber Soviet Press (qv) (ZJJ-30, 29 Feb 52, □ □ B-2)

Worked with HAYASHI Saburo in Historical Material Section of the Demobil Bureau,
1945-1947; used to be friend of HAYASHI but completely incompatible. (ZJJ-51, 21 Mar 52,
□ □ B-3)

Was to be head of HOKKAIDO Branch of KAWABE Organ when it was requested that it be
formed in 1948 by Gen Willoughby. (ZJJ-56, 28 Mar 52, □ □ B-3)

Former Mil attache to Germany, worked in MacArthur's War History Editing Office in NYK.
(ZJJ-72, 11 Apr 52, Yomiuri Shimbu Newspaper)

Mil Attache in Rome when KAWABE Torashiro (qv) was same in Berlin; became close friends
thru this and service in JIGS. (ZJJ-87, 18 Apr 52, □ □ B-3)

One of 4 generals in KATO Intelligence Organization, contributed A in name, according
to March 1952 Zenei article by SUGIMURA Kenzo. (A.7./210, 30 Apr 52, British Liaison)

Lt Gen, grad Mil academy 1917, War college 1923, member Mil Aff Sect of War Minis;
mil attache in Rome, active in bringing Japan in tri partite agreement with Germany and
Italy; since war headed joint comm of army, navy, For and Hom Ministry personnel for
liaison with occupation forces; set up office in Nippon Club to handle liaison between
American forces and first Demobilization Bureau; in 1947 closed office and joined
KAWABE Organ (qv); address 139 4-chome, Matsubara-cho, Setagaya-ku. (ZJJ-91, 25 April
1952, □ □ B-3)

Believed to be connected with ASHIDA Hitoshi (qv). (ZJJ-91, 25 April 52, □ □ B-3)

Close associate of KATO Tatsuya (qv) according to article in Shinso, Special Issue 5,
15 Mar 49, forwarded Wash as ZJLA-1042, 20 Jun 50, untranslated backed by SONO Akira (qv)

Attended inaugural meeting of Sakurada Kai 8 May 52 in Sakurada Kaikan. (ZJJ-116, 23
May 52, □ □ B-3)

Head of ARISUE Kikan, private intell group subordinate to UGAKI Kikan; 1944-5, maj-gen
G-2, JIGS; with group, possibly staff of parent organ (526776, USALO, NK, 18 Oct 50);
among Jap secret police agents participating in central espionage organ set up in
MacArthur HQ, Japan (724564, ChiCom broadcast 1 Nov 48); has KODAMA Kikan subordinate,
same level as KAWAMOTO Yoshitaro (qv) Kikan; (ZJYW-2917, 10 Dec 51, Wash files)

Central figure of KATO Agency, composed of officers from Nakano School; ex lt general;
member Mil Acad 29th Class; ex M/A to Vatican; head of ARISUE Agency; in close liaison
with SHIOTANI Masuhiko (qv) ex instructor at Nakano School; member of YOSHIDA Shigeru's
brain trust on military affairs; in contact with MARUYAMA Fusayasu (qv); works for
Suke Mori Co; operates agency with WATANABE Wataru (qv) as central figure, smuggling
between China and Japan and engaged in Formosan Volunteer Army movements; contact with
SONO Akira (qv). (D2-876 (5) 28 May 52, 441st CIC, CCP document)

ZJTA-264, 26 October 1948, subj: Interrogation of KOMATSUBARA Yukuo,
Attachment 2.

* * * E X T R A C T * *

There are two high ranking Japanese officers who are known to be in the employ of the US Army. They are ex Lt Gen TANAKA Ryukichi and ex Lt Gen ARISUE Seizo and former Japanese Army officers in general harbor antipathy towards these two. The former in particular is a parasite who sold out the army and no Japanese has any use for him. The latter is not so bad. There are those among his former classmates who understand his position and are happy that there may be many occasions in which he can help them in his capacity as a suitable liaison man with the occupation forces. On the other hand, there are those who have misunderstood him, and many of them feel that he should not have submitted their names to the occupation forces when there was no actual need to do so. Therefore, it is important that the US Army use him advantageously as a liaison man. On the other hand, it is necessary to consider that there will be instances where adverse effects may arise.

....from ATIS interrogation report #19663, 21 Sept 48, of Komatsubara Yukuo.

FOR COORDINATION WITH US Army

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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Date: 2005

SECRET

OFFICIAL DISPATCH - KASPOK

VIA: Air

DISPATCH NO. 2424-504

TO : Chief, FBZ

DATE: 14 June 1949

FROM : []

SUBJECT: General - Operations - G-2 FEC
Specific - Plan TAKEMATSU

1. Attached hereto is a file prepared by [] giving considerable history on the development of Plan TAKEMATSU, which is the over-all operational plan of G-2 FEC in the field of clandestine operations within Japan and in peripheral areas, utilizing former Japanese intelligence personnel.

2. Information contained in this file has been made available to [] and []

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FOR COORDINATION WITH US Army

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(A) Privacy ☐

(B) Methods/Sources ☒

(C) Foreign Relations ☐

1/issue

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SECRET

20 May 1949

MEMORANDUM

To : C

From: C

1. Attached are several memoranda which may be of some interest to you and possibly C

2. In addition to the above, reference is made to my memorandum of 9 May 1949. The statement attached thereto by Lt Suechika included several pages which tie in directly with the TAKE operations.

3. Current information on TAKEMATSU is not available here, however, from conversations I have had with persons who should know, I believe the following to be true:

a. TAKE operations in Western Japan have been completely cancelled.

b. TAKE operations in Northern Japan have bogged down due to a number of factors... high budget requirements, lack of agent personnel, and particularly, lack of good case officers.

c. A boat for TAKE in Hokkaido has been purchased and is probably directly controlled by ARISUE, Sensaburo in Abashiri.

d. MATSU operations are apparently going ahead but on a reduced scale and with limited funds.

4. I am not familiar with the degree to which you have been filled in on TAKEMATSU matters, so I am sending these miscellaneous bits of information. I myself have received no information officially on the background of the project.

SECRET

SECRET

20 May 1949

MEMORANDUM

To : C =

From : C =

1. The following information was received from a highly reliable source on 23 October 1948:

TAKEMATSU is the code name for a secret intelligence operation presently being established by the AC/S G-2, GHQ JFC. The operation is designed to provide domestic intelligence from within Japan (JAPANESE) as well as positive intelligence from without (TAIWAN). TAKEMATSU is to be manned and run by Japanese personnel with U.S. personnel involved only at the high policy level. The entire operation is to be financed by G-2.

The Japanese personnel who have been selected as the central staff of TAKEMATSU are as follows:

General KAWABE
General ARISUE
General TATSUI
Colonel YOKOI
Mr TATSUMI (Consultant in England at the time of the
Shanghai Incident)
Plus one more individual, name unknown.

U. S. personnel directing TAKEMATSU are as follows:

Major General WILLOUGHBY
Colonel DUFF (supervises MATSU)
Colonel LACEY (supervises TAKE)
Colonel BEATTON (advisory capacity)
Colonel SVENSSON (advisory capacity)

The following meetings between Japanese and U. S. personnel have been held:

15 Sept 1948 - DUFF-KAWABE-TATSUMI (General conversation)
25 Sept 1948 - DUFF-LACEY-KAWABE-TATSUMI (KAWABE requested an initial operational fund of 87,000 yen. It was also requested that an operational house be provided for their (the Japanese use.)

SECRET

C O P Y

S E C R E T

- 2 Oct 1943 - DUFF-LACEY-HOSTERMAN-MARTIN-KAWABE-CASSIMI
(General conversation. HOSTERMAN is Operations Officer at 441st CIC; MARTIN is Deputy Commander.)
- 9 Oct 1943 - DUFF-LACEY-HOSTERMAN-MARTIN-KAWABE-CASSIMI
(KAWABE was informed that an operational house had been obtained near the old Technical Intelligence Detachment location. KAWABE was paid 37,000 yen by HOSTERMAN as the first installment on his original request. MARTIN acted as the witnessing officer.)

S E C R E T

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SECRET

10 May 1948

MEMORANDUM

To : []

From : []

1. The following information was received from a highly reliable source on 25 November 1948:

On 20 November 1948 a meeting was held at the CIS Special Activities House in which the following were in attendance:

Colonel LACEY
General KAWABE
General YOSHINAKA
General ARISUE
Lieut. TAKAI (Eisei interpreter)
Lieut. KAWANISHI (Eisei interpreter)

The meeting was initiated by Colonel LACEY who desired to discuss the TAKEMATSU plan in general.

LACEY informed those present that the space at the old Technical Intelligence Detachment had been assured and would be ready for occupancy by 22 November 1948. Further, that a post system would be initiated for entering the compound. LACEY suggested that they visit the installation on 22 or 23 November. General KAWABE agreed to visit in company with his secretary TOGO.

LACEY stated that he had made plans with 1st Col. SALASER to have a vehicle available for operational purposes. He had a driver in mind who had formerly worked for the Japanese General Staff.

LACEY stated that the CIS Special Activities House will continue as the meeting place of U.S.-Japanese TAKEMATSU directors. Lt. TAKAI and two others will be used for liaison personnel.

KAWABE mentioned that General SANADA had just arrived in Tokyo from Hokkaido and that they will meet him following the meeting. SANADA is a friend and acquaintance of General ARISUE.

KAWABE outlined the following plans concerning Southern Japan to LACEY:

PART I: The primary mission of TAME in the southern district will be the procurement of military information. This plan has been devised by General NOTANI Itano who is presently in business in Hoku (believed to be in Yamaguchi-Ken.) Hoku will be the base of operations.

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KOTANI's business will provide the necessary cover. As soon as possible, agents will be dispatched to South Korea, following which they will cross the 38th parallel and subsequently report on North Korea and Manchuria. Secret trade will be established for this enterprise. A trader in Yamaguchi-Ken will be provided with one half the necessary funds (from Japanese sources) to establish an operational base in that prefecture. His trade routes into Korea will be used for the infiltration of agents. This project will require direct or indirect protection and full cooperation from the local CIO teams. Local authorities should realize that the operations are illegal but, at the same time, that they are authorized. If and when agents are apprehended, a suitable means must be established to effect their release. Initially a budget (from U.S. funds) will be necessary to support the operation, but eventually it will be self supporting.

PART II: An intelligence base might be established on Tsushima. This island is presently being utilized by smugglers from South Korea. Current information indicates that there is a secret organization there set up to aid smugglers. Such an agency might be penetrated by TAFE agents for intelligence purposes; it might serve as a means of infiltrating Japanese agents into South Korea. By utilizing Tsushima as a base of operations, seamen and fishermen can be employed as agents for obtaining pertinent information on Soviet shipping between Port Arthur, Dairen and Vladivostok. It is felt that a "speed boat" will be required to carry on operations from Tsushima. Two or three good prospects for agents for this base have already been selected.

PART III: This phase of the operation involves the use of American radio equipment. They would be utilized as follows:

Headquarters in Hefu --	4	(General communications for the intelligence network)
Base on Tsushima -----	2	(General communications)
Radio monitors -----	6	(Location of these sets unstated; to be used in monitoring Chinese, Korean, and Russian broadcasts)

LACEY promised that he would get the necessary equipment.

KAWASE submitted the following estimated budget for the above proposed operations in Southern Japan for the first six months:

Salary for base personnel -----	1,050,000
Investment in smuggling business -----	1,000,000
Five agents at 50,000 per month -----	1,500,000
Sub-total	3,550,000
Reserve	355,000
Total budget	3,905,000 yen

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KAWABE outlined the following plans for Northern Japan to LACBY:

Operations in Northern Japan will begin in April 1949. During the winter, however, personnel will be utilized in making plans for the spring season. General SANADA will be the responsible man in the Northern District. His headquarters will be located in Sibir. He will have sub-detachments in Sapporo, Abashiri, Wakkanai, Hakodate, and on Rebun and Richiri Islands. During the winter repatriates from Karafuto and the Kuriles will be interviewed for what intelligence they have to offer. In the meantime the preliminary plans are as follows: Contact reliable Japanese in Karafuto; send repatriates back into the target area as agents; establish smuggling with the target area using fountain pens and watches as bartering material; dispatch fishermen into the area; purposely shipwreck sailers in the target area; patrol the adjacent waters with speed boats; utilize radio intercept for intelligence purposes. ARISUR, Sensaburo, younger brother of General ARISUR will be working under General SANADA. KAWABE recommends ARISUR for a position of trust.

KAWABE submitted the following budget for the above proposed operations in Northern Japan for the first six months:

Salary for base personnel	1,120,000
Ten agents at 30,000 per month	300,000
Investment in smuggling business	4,000,000
Sub-total	5,420,000
Reserve	542,000
Total Budget	5,962,000

The following special requests were made by KAWABE:

- a. That special credentials be issued to TAKE personnel for protection against Occupation and Japanese authorities.
- b. That specific intelligence targets be given to the Japanese directors of TAKE.
- c. That as much information as possible obtained by the Occupation Forces on the target areas be made available to TAKE personnel for their study.
- d. That in the event adequate office space cannot be found by the various TAKE units, space be allotted within buildings already in use by the CIC.
- e. That in emergency, and when special security is required, U.S. couriers may be utilized.
- f. That four (4) all wave radio receivers (RCA) be made available by January 1949.
- g. That maps of the target areas, preferably former Japanese General Staff issue, be made available immediately.
- h. That five (5) cameras and film be made available by December 1948.
- i. That several bottles of invisible ink be provided as soon as possible.

S E C R E T

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S E C R E T

20 May 1949

MEMORANDUM

To : C

From: C

1. The following information was received from a highly reliable source on 15 December 1948:

On 3 December 1948 a meeting took place at the CIS Special Activities House in which the following were in attendance:

Colonel LACEY
Lt Col A. W. IND
General KAWABE
Lieut. TAKAY
Lieut. NAKANISHI

This meeting was initiated by Colonel LACEY who opened the conversations with a discussion of General WILLOUGHBY's comments on the plans which had been submitted by KAWABE on 20 November 1948. The following specific points were taken up:

a. WILLOUGHBY wants a separate budget prepared for TARE and MATSU projects. Budgets to include expenses for November 1948. (KAWABE agreed to submit the budgets by 6 December.)

b. WILLOUGHBY wants the primary sector of TARE concentrated in Northern Japan (Sakhalin and the Kuriles) rather than Korea as originally planned. (KAWABE stated that he would meet with General SANADA and submit plans within three weeks.)

c. WILLOUGHBY approves, however, the general plan of penetration into Korea.

d. WILLOUGHBY approves of agents being dispatched into North Korea and Manchuria for the purposes of reconnoitering military installations there.

e. WILLOUGHBY desires more information on the purpose of using intercept of radio broadcasts for intelligence. He wants a detailed report from KAWABE on this phase.

LACEY informed KAWABE that Lt Col IND will assist in the direction of TARE from now on.

S E C R E T

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KAWABE is to meet ARISUE, Sengaburo on 5 December. When asked by LACEY if ARISUE, Sengaburo knows of General ARISUE's relations with HQ, KAWABE stated that ARISUE, Sengaburo knew only that ARISUE was working for KAWABE but that he might suspect his brother's relations with HQ.

KAWABE stated that General KOTANI will be in Tokyo shortly with more detailed plans for the Korean penetration. He felt that if any agents are to be employed by KOTANI, steps should be taken (by LACEY) to cover their expenses. KAWABE described KOTANI as a Russian expert who hoped that he would be allowed to remain in his present assignment. (LACEY and IND agreed with KAWABE on the above two points.)

IND requested a specific operational plan and report be submitted on the following points:

- a. What boats are presently available for operational use?
- b. How many agents are on hand for use in operations?
- c. What base personnel and equipment are presently available?
- d. What are the possibilities of establishing a fishing industry?
- e. What office space is available for agents' use?

LACEY stated as follows concerning the special requests made by KAWABE at the meeting of 20 November:

- a. Credentials for TAME personnel would be given further study.
- b. Specific intelligence targets would be issued to the Japanese directors of TAME.
- c. As much information as possible obtained by the Occupation Forces on the target areas would be made available to TAME personnel for their study.
- d. Office space or quarters within CIC installations for TAME personnel is disapproved.
- e. CIC courier system could be utilized in the event of emergency or need for special security.
- f. No radios will be made available pending KAWABE's study of their use.
- g. Maps of the target areas would be made available in the near future.

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- b. Cameras will be issued as soon as operations begin.
- i. A formula for invisible ink will be made available.

In closing, KAWABE stated that General TATSUNE had some reports of the MATSU organ and wanted to know if he should await the return of MI (away on a trip) for their submission. LACEY said that he would take them and submit them to WILLOUGHBY.

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COPY

20 Jan 1949

MEMORANDUM

To : C >

From: C >

1. The following information was received from a highly reliable source on 10 January 1949:

On 28 December 1948 a meeting took place at the GIC Special Activities House in which the following were in attendance:

Colonel LACEY
Lt Col IND
Lt Col HOSTERMAN (in place of DUFF)
General KAWABE
General ARISUE

The meeting was initiated by LACEY who announced that a 1940, black, four door sedan, Engine No. 18F5283528, would be made available to KAWABE. He also stated that Japanese typewriters had been procured for the use of TAKEMATSU personnel.

KAWABE stated that the operational plans for MATSU are being drafted. Boundaries of jurisdictional responsibility are presently being set up. Offices will be established within the following locations and with the listed persons responsible for their operations:

Tokyo	TATSUMI, Michi
Sapporo	HAGI, Saburo
Aomori	SASAKI, Kaname
Gunma	ISODA, Saburo
Osaka	KIMURA, Matsujiro
Tokushima	UEDA, Masao
Yamaguchi	TOKUNAGA, Shikanosuke
Fukuoka	ABE, Kunio

Definite plans have not been laid for Sendai, Nagoya, and Kanazawa. In some cases the local GIC in the above locations have been contacted by the MATSU Branch Chiefs. No offices have been established by MATSU units in the field. Operations are carried on from the various Chiefs' homes. MATSU will begin reporting information in January 1949.

KAWABE stated that an operational plan for TAKU in Hokkaido is being translated and will be submitted. He said that the TAKU organization in Hokkaido is having a difficult time finding suitable space for headquarters and office space. He reported that ARISUE, Sennaburo has located two fishing boats in Hokkaido which are in excellent condition, radio-equipped and ready for operation. They are twenty-one (21) and seventeen (17) tons in size. They may be purchased for 840,000 yen and 680,000 yen respectively.

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LACEY stated that he would consult with WILDOUGHBY on the matter of purchasing the boats.

KAWABE estimated the total budget of TAKE in Hokkaido for the first six months of operations at 6,079,000 yen. He feels ARISUE, Sen-saburo will be able to reduce the budget to 5,000,000 yen through the sale of fish, if the boats mentioned above could be purchased and used during non-operational periods for that purpose.

According to KAWABE a report on "Present Conditions in Karafuto" has been submitted by TAKE in Hokkaido and is now pending translation. It will be forwarded later.

ARISUE mentioned that he would like to get the map he used during the war returned to him. He believes it is in the office of General H. J. Casey.

LACEY closed the meeting with emphasis on the fact that WILDOUGHBY is opposed to the TAKE operation in Western Japan. He wants the concentration to be in the north.

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HEADQUARTERS
SIXTH COMBATTANT INTELLIGENCE CORPS DISTRICT
4TH COMBATTANT INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT
CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS
PAC EAST COMMAND

APC 7

5 February 1949

INFORMAL MEMORANDUM

TO

: Eyes only

Colonel A. T. Lacey

1. Attached hereto is a paragraph by paragraph critique of the plan which you showed me while on my recent trip to Tokyo. I recognize that there is not very much in my remarks which might be considered constructive criticism. I find the whole plan so poorly laid out, however, that any suggested improvements would involve the rewriting of the entire document.

2. As you already know, I have strong suspicions concerning Arisue, Kawabe, and the rest of that crowd. Unfortunately I cannot, from Hokkaido, support my suspicions with the proper evidence. Among other things, I believe that most of the organization shown in the attached plan as "proposed" actually already exists. I feel that the authors of the plan cannot be as uninformed about the target area as their draft would indicate. Furthermore, a tip from a friend in Tokyo indicates that Arisue, for some time, has been flitting with British Intelligence; if this is true, it is entirely possible that "Takeo" could or has been "sold" to our English friends. (Just as a matter of interest, Chachi Shigoo, a close, personal friend and business associate of Arisue's, has received permission from the British to distribute British films throughout Japan.)

3. I recommend, as a test, that Kawabe be directed to develop a penetration of the target area at his own expense. Then, if he is able to support the penetration with documentary evidence and decent intelligence, that he be given financial and other support by us. Very frankly, I feel that the whole operation is nothing more than a high level shakedown.

4. If I can be of any farther help in this matter, please let me know.

Best personal regards,

(NOTE: Critique is filed with ZJTA-504).

S E C R E T

C O P Y

K A P O K

VIA: AIR

DISPATCH NO. ZNJA-811

S E C R E T

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, FDZ

DATE: 8 March 1950

FROM : Chief of Station, []

SUBJECT: General - Project PORTICO
Specific - List of JSO Agents

1. We attach hereto list of JSO agents and informants procured by [] This list is usually kept in his personal safe of [] [] has never been permitted to see it. Recently, a fortunate accident placed this file, and certain others, briefly in []'s possession. He took advantage of the opportunity.

2. The five names marked by an asterisk appear in the original file on a separate TS list. They are believed to be the special informants of [] and, possibly, [] and []

3. A third file provided the following list of special agents employed by [] and the operations in which they are active:

Name	Operation
ASAEDA Shigeharu	Baker Jig
FURUSAWA Yosuke	Baker Easy
HIRASHIMA Ichiro	Zebra
KORI Kikuo	Baken Dog
MASAKI Koro	Baker Baker
NONOYAMA Haruyoshi	Baker George
TOKIGUCHI Ryutaro	Baker Mike

These operations are presumably all in the Kanto area. They have been described in a summarized report of operations for 1949 which [] was likewise able to secure, again at considerable personal risk, it also being a closely guarded document. Microfilm of this document will follow. Read in conjunction with the foregoing list, it gives us an excellent summary of JSO operations in this area.

FOR COORDINATION WITH US Army

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy ☐

(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒

(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

S E C R E T

CLASSIFICATION

K A P O K

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency

Date: 2005

S E C R E T

C O P Y

K A P O K

AGENTS AND INFORMANTS OF JSO

ANDO Yoshisaburo
AOKI Teruo
*ARISUE Seizo
ASADA Iwao
ASAEDA Shigeharu
DAIKAKU Shizuo
FUKAI Eiichi
FUKUDA Minoru
FURUSAWA Yosuke
HANADA Toyoji
HIRASHIMA Ichiro
HIRATA Tsuneo
HOSHINO Takashi
IWAKUNA Raishiro
IWAMOTO Ryoji
KAI Kosei
KAMADA Takashi
*KAWABE Torashiro
KOJIMA Shichizo
KOJIMA Takeo
KORI Kikuo
KOZAKA Goichi
MASAKI Goro
MASUDA Kuwazo
MITSUHASHI Masao
MIYAKE Shigeru
MIZOGUCHI Junzo

NAGATA Yukio
NAKANO Toshio
NONOYAMA Haruyoshi
NOZAKI Yoshio
OGI Hiroshi
OKUDA Naoshige
OKUDAIRA Takenari
ONOJI Seiji
SATO Shoge
*SHIMOMURA Sadamu
*TATSUMI Eiichi
TAKIGUCHI Ryutaro
TSUNODA Shiro
UEMURA Shigeru
UMEMURA Sumiji
YAMAMOTO Noboru
YAMAMOTO Wakahiko
YAMAMURO Shukei
YAMAOKA Michitaka
YAMASAKI Yoshiko
YANAGIDA Hidetaka
YARIMIZU Michio
YASUDA Akira
YOSHIZAWA Kiyoshi
YOSHIKAWA Takeshi
*YOSHINAKA Hataro

S E C R E T

SECRET

Subject: JIS - Turnover of Russian
Material to American "G.I.O."

Report No.: ZJL-596 (B)

Date of Information: 24 July 1950

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Date Acquired: 25 July 1950

Evaluation: B-2

Date of Report: 3 August 1950

Source: [] []

The ANISUN SEIKO KIKAN, in accordance with Japanese Underground Government decisions, has assembled all available former staff headquarters documents pertaining to investigations (Research) and operations against Russia. Through ANISUN Seiko this material has been tendered to the US Force's G.I.O., (SIG). These documents were turned over in April 1950.

INDEXED - JAPAN DESK

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Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy ☐

(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒

(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

Dr. J. L. [unclear]

SECRET

7 Aug '50

From: Tokyo, Japan

Report No: ZJL-404

Local File No: PD-091

No. of Pages: 3

No. of Enclosures: 0

Report Made By: []

Approved By: []

ARR

Distribution:

By copy to:

Wash - 2
Files - 3
[] - 1

Orally to:

Japanese Intell.
Service - Gen.

Source Cryptonym: []

References: ZJL-369; ZJLA-1083

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

1. [] was one of the "four staff officers" (see para. 1 of the attached report) present at the 3 August meeting of prominent Rightist intelligence figures, and he was also present at the second meeting discussed in para. 10 of the report. Through his efforts, the group has secured the use of three additional ships. Whereas his reports to date have been dependent upon incomplete information he could elicit from [] and others in the group, for the first time he finds himself in an excellent position within the planning group and will therefore be able from now on to report information at first-hand.
2. [] has been unable as yet to procure specific information on the number, type, and specialties of troops being sent to Formosa and Indo-China nor has he been able to ask securely for anything but the most general information concerning their recruitment. Certain details which concern operations to Indo-China and the recruiting of troops have been withheld from this report pending verification and amplification. [] was to be called to another meeting on 6 August. Afterward, he and [] were to go to Shinoda to supervise final preparations for the loading and dispatch of the ships sailing from that port. He feels, and we concur, that it would be highly dangerous at this time to press for any details beyond those given to him by [] or divulged at staff meetings of the group. He has detailed directives of the specific information we would like to have but has been told to avoid any straining of his good cover position merely to secure the answers.
3. The meeting discussed in para. 10 was conducted in rapid Shanghai dialect for which []'s weak Mandarin Chinese aided him very little. All he was able to follow was the general outline of the conversation.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

Classification

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FORM NO. 81-80
FEB 1949

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy ☒
(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒
(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

44-5-3-304
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SECRET

Subject: Military and Intelligence Plans
of the Japanese Rightist Underground

Report No: ZJL-
(PD-091)

Date of Information: Up to 5 August 1950

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Date Acquired: 5 August, 1950

Evaluation: B-2 except as stated

Date of Report: 7 August, 1950

Source: ☐ except as stated

1. 3 August, 1950, a meeting was held by some of the top level Rightist leaders adhering to General UGAKI Insei and involved in the current plans of the Rightist Underground to dispatch ships to Formosa and to Indo-China. Vice Admirals KODAYASHI Shozaburo and KA AGUCHI Tadaaki, Lieut. General NIEMOTO Hiroshi, and Major General SATANABE Itaru were the leaders present; Colonel KAGAWA, Commander MURUYA, four other staff officers also attended. General NIEMOTO had returned within the past two weeks from Formosa in order to work out details of shipping plans.
2. The main topics of discussion were the shipments of troops to Formosa and Indo-China, liaison possibilities to North China and to Korea, and the recent decentralization order from General UGAKI to his underground followers.
3. A fleet of twelve ships is scheduled for assembly, loading and readiness on 10 August. Sailing date for those ships leaving from Shimoda will be about 22 August; departure of ships from other ports will approximate this date. Rendezvous point is to be tentatively a spot to the south of Kyushu and east of the Tanaga Islands group, from which point the ships will proceed separately to another spot just within the "MacArthur Line", the southern limit set for Japanese fishing boats. From that point on the fleet will travel together and will be met beyond the MacArthur line by elements of the Chinese Nationalist Navy and escorted into Chilung, Formosa, presumably after disembarking Japanese volunteer troops at an earlier rendezvous off shore.
4. The ships will have Japanese Board of Trade papers permitting entry to Formosan waters for purposes of legitimate trade. Tea is the registered cargo from Japan; bananas and sugar have been listed as cargo for the return voyage. The Chinese Nationalist Government Mission in Tokyo is the source of funds for rental of the ships. Most of the ships will be about fifty tons of the coastal steamer type, and rental fees for one month are 10,000 Japanese yen per ton. Each crew will consist of a captain, an engineer, five seamen and firemen provided by the owners and a troop commander and a radio and code operator installed by the Japanese militarists renting the ships. It is anticipated that ships going beyond Formosa to Indo-China will do so without permits, but with possible Chinese Nationalist protection for a part of the voyage.

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Classification

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5. General NEMOTO will return to Formosa in August 1950 on one of the ships and will supervise disposition of Japanese volunteer troops there. Colonel TSUJI Masanobu went back to Indo-China in early June, stopping at Formosa a few days en route for conferences with NEMOTO.
 6. In addition to the current voyage, the Japanese leaders themselves, apart from Chinese Nationalist support, are planning to make the following liaison trips as soon as sufficient capital can be accumulated to insure more independent action:

Area	Area Commander	Present Troop Strength Estimates		Method
		(D-3)		
Formosa	Lt Gen. NEMOTO	3,000 plus pilots	3,000 plus pilots	Chinese Nationalist financing and arrangement.
Indo-China	?	2,500	2,500	Clandestine shipping, Japan to Vietnam and Vietnam, NEMOTO SAUNICHI NOBORA and TSUJI Masanobu in charge.
Korea	Lt Gen. KATO Hakujiro (North Korean side)	2,000	4,000	Smuggling to Korea, Maj Gen. WATANABE Wataru in charge.
Manchuria	Lt. Gen. NOBURA	40,000 (includes units from Siberia and in North China)	20,000	Intelligence Liaison from Indochina north via Vietnam by TSUJI and his agents; possible alternate route through North China and the Korea smuggling channels of WATANABE.

7. By direct order of General UGAKI, an apparent decentralization of Rightist organizations is to be effected. The decentralization order came from UGAKI personally, and General WATANABE made it quite clear that its purpose, as explained by UGAKI, was twofold:
 - a. to calm American fears concerning the real strength and centralization of the Japanese Rightist Underground;
 - b. in case that either UGAKI or Admiral NOMURA may be removed in the near future from the "purge" list, extent of their underground backing and pseudo-military connections will not be evident.

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8. Operations of the Rightist Underground are to be split into apparently independent agencies. Southern operations, i.e., to Formosa and Indo-China will be engineered with the logistic aid of the Chinese Nationalists; northern operations will depend greatly upon American tacit permission and backing. In both cases, some intelligence information will be furnished in return for support; however, especially in Indo-China and Korea, the particular interests of Japanese nationalism which might be served by dealing with Communist regimes are to be pursued without informing either the Chinese Nationalists or the Americans.
9. The organizations adhering to Lt. General ARISUE Seizo and TANAKA Ryuichi, including those of MATANABE Kataru and of General YAMAGUCHI in Saburo Hokkaido, most of YAMAGUCHI Genshichi (CHIAI TAI Takao or Cozu)'s group, and most of TSUCHIDA Yutaka's National Peace and Independence Preparations Committee will supervise the northern operations. Lt. General NEHOTO, former minister to Indo-China, MATSUMOTO KAESU, Lt. General OIKAWA Genshichi, Col. TSUJI Masanobu, Commander FURUYA, INAGIARA Toru of the Foreign Office, and former minister to Hongkong, BABA, (the last three named are from TSUCHIDA's Committee) will concentrate on southern operations. Admirals KAWAGUCHI and KOBAYASHI and Lt. General KAWADE Torashiro will be responsible for the overall secret coordination under UGAKI's personal direction.
10. Commander FURUYA met 5 August 1950 at the Tokyo Port with three Chinese Nationalists, one of whom was a member of the Chinese Nationalist Mission in Tokyo, to discuss terms of payment, salary for troops, escort and reception at Formosa of the ships being dispatched there in August 1950. Efforts were made by FURUYA to insure receipt from the Chinese of one-half of the guaranty money for ship rental in advance of the departure date. This was tentatively promised and further discussion will be held after 10 August when preparations for departure are underway.

SECRET

44-5-557

Subject: Foreign Liaisons and Operations
of the JIS Groups

Report No: ZJL-444
(PD-107)

Date of Information: as of September 8, 1950

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Date Acquired: 9 September, 1950

Evaluation: B-2 except as stated

Date of Report: 13 September, 1950

Source: ☐ ☐

1. The various liaisons from JIS leaders within the ^{ISSEI} ~~UGAKI~~ Groups to various high personages and operational units within the American GHQ at Tokyo, which were discussed in general in an earlier report, illustrate very clearly the complexity, duplications, and changeability of any JIS liaisons today. Individuals within almost every group on the operating level are making local liaisons to American intelligence officers from G-2 and CIC, and supposedly giving some of the product of their operations, domestic or otherwise, background or current, to their American connections. At the same time, however, there are top level personages such as KAWABE, SAKURAI, and NOMURA of the Advisory Board of the group and ARISUE, close to the first two named, who have a solid working arrangement with American intelligence forces in Japan and who use the same information handed by individuals to lower level American contacts to enhance their value and prestige and bolster their organizational position in the eyes of American leaders.
2. The most pressing reason for duplication of both operational direction and liaison contacts is the need for monetary support. The lower levels of the groups, which carry out the actual operations, are almost entirely dependent upon their own efforts to procure a livelihood, and the easiest way to do this without a supporting salary from another line of work is to effect a direct liaison. Until there is a regularly salaried Japanese Intelligence Service, such will be the case. It must be remembered that this definitely applies to all foreign contacts and operations of the JIS groups, not merely to GHQ contacts, and that the system includes a tremendous amount of "pirating" of intelligence information reports.

3. Operations into Korea and Korean Connections.

(Sub-Source for para. 3a: ☐ ☐ Evaluation: C-2)

- a. The most important single figure in Japanese operations into Korea is (Maj. General) Wataru WATANABE. For well over a year he has operated, under the general direction of Lt. General ARISUE, smuggling and intelligence operations into the Republic of Korea and into North Korea. These operations have had American financial support. Some of them have produced little intelligence information that was not largely fabricated, but others, run in connection with Koreans such as BOKU

Classification

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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FORM NO. 11-50
FEB 1949

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy ☐
(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒
(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

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Date: 2005

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See
51-59
#6.

RETSU, president of the League of Korean Residents in Japan, have been highly productive if poorly exploited. On the other hand, some of the connections of these operations in North Korea must be watched closely. Specifically, since contact has been established to Lt. General KATO Hakui, now with the North Korean People's Army, opportunities for the North Koreans to deceive Japanese operatives have increased along with opportunities for Japanese operatives to get information back to Japan. Lt. General KATO was formerly hiding out near the Manchurian border at Chang Pai Shan, but finally joined the North Korean forces for nationalistic reasons. Several of KATO's Japanese soldiers in the North Korean Army have recently been captured and brought to Tokyo for interrogation. (Evaluation: C-3) KATO is reported to have received from Nahotka former Lt. General SAITO Yahei, wartime Chief of Staff in Korea, as his assistant. SAITO had also fought in Manchuria, and after the war had gone over to the Chinese Communist side. Recently he was sent from the training ground for Soviet-controlled Japanese troops at Nahotka to aid in the North Korean strategy. (Lt. General SHIMIZU, now at Nahotka under Soviet orders, is chief of that training unit. KATO also has connections to Lt. General HOMMA (Masaharu?), who served with the Chinese Communist 8th Route Army and who is currently part of the staff of the Chinese People's Army Corps in Manchuria. SHIMIZU and HOMMA were commanders of the Chiamussu and Tungan Headquarters respectively of the Japanese 5th Army under 5th Army Commander General KITA Seichi. In this manner, ARISUE and WATANABE Wataru hope to draw information from operations into both Korea and Manchuria and possibly, by liaison routes to SHIMIZU, even from Siberia. The danger which they do not clearly recognize, according to their boastful conversation, is the duplicity and skill of the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists. WATANABE's chief assistants in running these operations are former Kempei (Colonel OTSUKA Kenzo and former Air Force (Colonel) MIZUTANI. TMKK Colonel HIDAKA Tomiaki may or may not be associated with him at present, but was in the past.

- b. Colonel HIDAKA Tomiaki is a good example of an operator who formed his own American liaisons while simultaneously operating under orders of WATANABE Wataru whom he knew was also American-financed. While WATANABE liaised with G-2 intelligence officers concerning smuggling operations HIDAKA ran into Korea, HIDAKA made his own G-2 Operations contacts through a friend and sold the operation all over again. HIDAKA is no longer associated with WATANABE Wataru, but not because of this duplication; his ability at Korean operations was very questionable. (Sub-Source for the above statement: [] of the ARISUE Kikan; Evaluation: C-2.) In addition, Colonel HIDAKA comes from one of the most illustrious families in Kyushu, where American control is all but non-existent over Japanese intelligence operations and secret societies. The colonel's brother or cousin, a lieutenant colonel who has in his past career been an Army Intelligence officer, is the chief, under Tomiaki HIDAKA's supervision, of two groups of operatives in Kyushu. One of these groups, including Lt. Col. HIDAKA himself, works

on anti-Communist operations for a local CIC unit, but the second one, under HIDAKA leadership, is actively engaged in ultra-nationalistic propaganda and intelligence operations with a view toward rebirth of Japanese militarism. Such activities are very easy in Kyushu. Through both SONODA and a Captain MURAKAMI who was formerly in TMKK work on Formosa, C and C maintained liaison with the HIDAKA organization and other units and ultra-nationalist societies in Kyushu.

- c. Colonel TSUJI Masanobu, previously reported incorrectly as having returned to Indo-China, is now planned to serve as one of WATANABE Wataru's assistants in future operations into North Korea. Reasons for this switch of plans and for the previous erroneous report are outlined below. TSUJI has his own CIC contacts for whom he has been working since his return to Japan in the latter part of 1949.

4. Southern Operations - Formosa and the Chinese National Government.

a. Liaisons in General

The very top level of the UGAKI Federation is closely aligned with the right-wing of the Chinese Nationalist Government on a liaison basis. One possibility which is just a plausible rumor is that YOKAMURA Yasutsugu is close to UGAKI and actually handling much of the direction on this. Even without this strong pro-Nationalist leader at the center of the organization, evidences of Chinese Nationalist liaison, support, and financing in branches of the UGAKI federation are many. On the other hand, the attitude of Japanese Kikan leaders and of the central advisors is that the Chinese Nationalists should be used for financial and logistic support and should be aided on Formosa in the hope that they will win, but that these operations and these hopes should not be permitted to interfere either with independent Japanese operations vis-a-vis the Chinese Communists or with the definite need for satisfactory future relations with whatever force and intelligence service controls China, which, realistically speaking, means the Chinese People's Government.

b. Specific Local Liaisons

YOKOYAMA Yui, as well as UGAKI Issai, possesses first-rate connections to the Chinese Mission here. (NOTE: Cf. ZJL-436) The entire plan for Japanese volunteer enlistment for Formosan defense was given financial and logistic support from the very beginning by the Chinese Nationalists, particularly General CHU Shih Ming. On the other hand, the YOKOYAMA-KAWAGUCHI-KOBAYASHI-NEMOTO combination which started this up is not the only group which has had Chinese aid. The ARISUE Kikan was the one able to send NEMOTO to Formosa in June, 1949, and KUMAMOTO a former Major SATO of the Kwantung Army G-2 Staff in Manchuria, ARISUE's henchman, has been one of the most instrumental figures on the operating level dealing with the Chinese Nationalists on a trading basis of recruits in exchange for sugar and bananas. KUMAMOTO's liaisons to the

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Chinese Communists have been simultaneous. In addition, one must not forget that the vast majority of Japanese Rightist operatives are not only Pan-Asiatic in their thinking but also have in the past served in the China Theater where almost all of them developed Chinese contacts. Particularly, most who were there in the post-war period developed, from a reverse position, not merely penetrations but also cooperative operations with the right-wing of the Chinese Nationalist Kuomintang and the Kuomintang-controlled Chinese Intelligence groups, with whom they have so much in common ideologically.

* FURUYA, who will now be the principal contact man on behalf of both the ARISUE and KAWAGUCHI groups in arranging the logistic support for operations henceforth to Formosa and operations utilizing Formosa as a mounting area, has the task of securing the support of the Chinese organization known as the "RAINSHA" (親友社) for the latter type of operations to the mainland of China and into Indo-China.

These operating-level liaisons at Tokyo are limited chiefly to the ARISUE Kikan and the KAWAGUCHI Kikan, including of course (Vice Admiral) * KOBAYASHI Shozaburo, and the Foreign Office and former Foreign Office figures who adhere to TSUCHIDA Yutaka's National Peace and Independence Committee. Of course, HORIUCHI Genjo and his cohorts, outside the UGAKI Federation but liaising into it, maintain contacts and liaisons with both Chinese Mission figures and with the Chinese Nationalist leaders as well; so do innumerable Pan-Asiatic figures and groups which have been mentioned in past reports. For the latter there is a natural ideological identity of interests with the right-wing Kuomintang.

e. The Formosa Liaisons

The two key figures in these liaisons, joint operations, and military cooperation are NEMOTO Hiroshi and WATANABE Ikujiro, both called Army Lieutenant Generals. Actually, WATANABE Ikujiro, a bald man of about fifty-eight years, may be (Vice Admiral) MAEDA Minoru utilizing "ex-Army" for cover reasons. Both have served on Formosa previously, NEMOTO going from Formosa to Peiping where he was a Chief of Staff to the North China Command. Although both have been to Japan recently several times and "WATANABE" is still in Japan with the intention of commanding personally the fifth expedition to Formosa once it gets underway, they may properly be considered the representatives of the UGAKI Federation to the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa for the purpose of joint operations: military, smuggling and intelligence. They will also have a hand in the mounting on Formosa of Japanese operations against the mainland with the logistic support of the Chinese "RAINSHA". NEMOTO will be in charge of the placement of Japanese troops on Formosa and the contact to whom Japanese operatives dispatched to China and Indo-China will report. Since the UGAKI Groups have little intention of permitting the Chinese Nationalists to get control over the operations or of giving them more than a by-product

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of the information gained. On the other hand, control of operations going THROUGH Formosa or being mounted or re-mounted on Formosa will be retained by Tokyo groups and individuals; NEMOTO, as a military man and a non-professional in intelligence work, will serve only as contact and channel.

5. Southern Operations - Indo-China

The original plan formulated early this spring for operations into Indo-China entailed the use of Col. TSUJI Masanobu as chief of those operations to both Vietnam, Vietnam, and the French government. While at Imperial General Headquarters, TSUJI was the protege of Lt. General ARISUE, then staff intelligence as a Major General; ARISUE continues to think very highly of TSUJI, and the plan was ARISUE's. It was so definitely slated that when NEMOTO went back to Formosa in June, 1950 after a brief trip to Kagoshima, TSUJI was reputed to have been on board. It was TSUJI and WATANABE Wataru who met NEMOTO at the Kagoshima Conference. He was later reported as having gone on from there to Indo-China, (according to information elicited from [] The actual facts and mistaken identity came out much later: KUMAMOTO of the ARISUE Kikan, who supervised the third expedition to Formosa in June, took with him not TSUJI but a former Lt. Colonel and Commander of the Shanghai Tokko Kempeitai, ~~TSUKITA~~ ^{SHUNICHI} they picked up NEMOTO at Kagoshima. It seems that not everyone shared ARISUE's and WATANABE Wataru's enthusiasm for TSUJI, especially personnel from the Southeast Asia theater of operations. Major General KIMURA, former Commanding Officer of Japanese Military Government for the Burma Theater, and MATSUMOTO SHUNICHI, former Minister Plenipotentiary to Indo-China and later Vice-Foreign Minister, were the two most influential objectors. MATSUMOTO, as a member of TSUCHIDA's Committee and chiefly through TSUCHIDA and FURUYA personally, had been assisting for some time in placement of intelligence operatives from various Japanese Kikans on ships of his friends going to Indo-China and to Malaya legally and illegally. In the past, he had also had excellent connections to operations of the special Kempei (the Tokko Kempei) in both Indo-China and South China and had maintained a fairly accurate contact system to individual ex-Kempei operatives up to date. When FURUYA approached him on the matter of several ships for the KAWA-GUCHI Kikan's forthcoming fourth expedition in early July, MATSUMOTO agreed, but by earlier discussion with both FURUYA, TSUCHIDA, ~~IWAHARA~~, and others, he had made it quite clear that TSUJI was in his opinion quite unsuitable for work in Indo-China, as were most former military men; he demanded introduction of former Kempei special operations officers and Tokumu Kikan men instead of the personnel TSUJI wanted. In early June, KIMURA, a newcomer to the ARISUE Kikan whose chief task it was to "fix" the Maritime Safety Bureau, the Board of Trade and other Japanese government agencies with bribes from the profits, also flatly objected to TSUJI being involved in any Southeast Asia operations. TSUJI, while an Imperial GHQ G-2 representative from Singapore in Burma, had apparently made himself thoroughly obnoxious to many of the local commanders as well as to the "political officers" such as KIMURA. KIMURA favored ASADA Goro, former special operative at Bangkok. The general

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consensus of former Southeast Asia staff opinion was that (a) TSUJI was too closely identified with the French; (b) TSUJI was insecure, operationally incompetent, and not liked by natives of the area; (c) TSUJI was thoroughly known and "blown" to the Chinese Communists, who did not like him either. MATSUMOTO introduced professionals such as former Indo-China Tokko Kempei Colonel HAYASHI Hidesumi, former Kempei (Military Police) Colonel TOMIMURA, and Lt. Col. TOMITA to the federation as well as others. INAAZE Takeo, as a former Nakano School man, threw his weight against ARISUE's man; at the last minute, the central advisory group ordered replacement of TSUJI by Lt. Colonel TOMITA and the latter went as advance contact agent for about twenty agent personnel to be sent on the fourth expedition.

Although the failure of the fourth expedition delayed dispatch of those agents, they will go about the end of October with the fifth Formosa expedition and will be re-mounted from Formosa with the cooperation of the Chinese Nationalist RAINSHA. ASADA Goro, now with the Foreign Office, TOMIMURA, and possibly HAYASHI Hidesumi will go. HAYASHI is apparently in charge of most Indo-China operatives for the group, but there appears to be someone above him who will supervise all operations in that general area as far as professional intelligence operations are concerned. NEMOTO will be their liaison man unless a better means can be devised. MATSUMOTO Shunichi will continue to aid in the logistic support, and in the overall recruiting policy.

The general plan for Indo-China operations entails playing both sides in the struggle, with the ultimate objective of those operatives on the Vietminh side of securing liaisons into the Chinese Communist connections of the Vietminh. Some information on the Vietminh will be given to the French by those operatives who are aligned on the French and Vietnam side; some information on the French will be used to further the cause of those operatives working for HO Chi Minh.

6. Asian Operations - India and Pakistan

Through ^{INA} MIZUNO and ^{INA} TOSHIDA of the ARISUE Kikan operating under direction of Major General KIMURA, connections have been made to commercial companies who have placed representatives as technical advisors to the governments of India and Pakistan. In this manner, several operatives with legitimate business and technical experience have been placed within those representations.

7. Connections to the Chinese Communists

- a. One of the most striking liaisons to develop in the past year has been that between the chief of the General Affairs Section of the Overseas Democratic Chinese Cooperative Association in Tokyo, a Chinese referred to as "DEN" by Japanese, and former Kwantung Army Major SATO @ KUMAMOTO of the ARISUE Kikan. DEN's organizational headquarters is located at #61877, Sixth Floor of the Marunouchi Building, Tokyo. It is definitely

identified as a Chinese Communist organization. This liaison is definitely an attempted doubling operation from both sides, with KUMAMOTO probably giving more than he gets. (Sub-source for the above: [] Evaluation: C-3.)

In addition to his contact to KUMAMOTO, DEN gives directives to former Lt. General KAWASAKI, now living in Kyoto under the alias of FUKUDA. After the war, DEN was KAWASAKI's superior while the latter served as an advisor in the Chinese Communist 8th Route Army. KAWASAKI is reputed to feel that the Chinese Communists, as Asiatics rather than as Communists, represent the hope of a strong anti-white force in the Far East. KAWASAKI is not connected to the UGAKI Groups to the best of any knowledge obtainable at present; agents of UGAKI Groups de liaison to him. (Evaluation: B-3.)

A former (second lieutenant) OCHI, now employed in the KOSEIKA 厚生課 of the Education Ministry, who once served under a Major HAYASHI, who has been with the Chinese Communist People's Army for four years in Manchuria in their Air Force branch, has been contacted secretly by a messenger of HAYASHI's and will resign and go to Manchuria. OCHI will keep in touch with YOSHIDA of the ARISUE Kikan.

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14 Sept '50

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References: ZJL-404, 436, 444.

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

1. This report covers details of the aftermath of the fourth expedition to Formosa and future plans for the next expedition. This supplements the facts outlined in ZJL-436.
2. In addition, ZJL-444 has included certain high-level planning changes regarding overall policy for the expeditions and particularly the Sino-Japanese joint operation nature of the expedition, as well as certain significant personnel changes. It is clear, when details of the operational planning are revealed, that the Japanese groups have a very skillful plan devised by which Chinese support is secured and yet the operation remains essentially Japanese and for JIS benefit.
3. Information from other sources, particularly the newspapers, confirm WATANABE Saburo's part in the smuggling operation. After YAMAMI's appearance for questioning, a new flurry of news reports came out. YOMIURI News Magazine (weekly) for the first week in September carried an article on the case. It seems, however, that like most unsuccessful Rightist enterprises in post-war Japan, it has become first-rate scandal material for the leading papers but practically a dead issue as far as government punitive action is concerned.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy ☐

(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒

(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

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Classification

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Date: 2005

44-7-8-18

Subject: Secret Shipping Plans and
Activities of JIS Groups
(Cont. to ZJL-436)

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Evaluation: B-2

Source: []

Report No: ZJL-1116
(PD-109)

Date of Information: 4 September 1950

Date Acquired: 5 September and 9 September 1950

Date of Report: 14 September 1950

1. After details of the fourth recruit-smuggling expedition to Formosa were disclosed in all of the leading Japanese newspapers, the ~~KAWAGUCHI~~ *Tadetsu* Kikan issued tentative instructions to its personnel as to cover stories which were to be used in case of arrest and as to future activities. ~~YAMAMI~~ *Kashiro* was told to give himself up on August 26 and exonerate himself from blame by feigning lack of any knowledge of the true circumstances. This he was able to do because of pressure to smother the case which was exerted by high Navy officials within the ~~OGAKI~~ *Federation*, and by ~~General~~ *KIDUNA*. At the same time, a rigorous investigation was undertaken and still continues to fix the responsibility for failure of the expedition plan. After a discreet interval, KAWAGUCHI himself made a trip to Osaka and Kyoto on 30 August to look into the matter, leaving FURUYA and ~~OKAWA~~ *in charge* at Tokyo.

2. ~~Reasons~~ *Genshichi* for failure of the expedition were considered by KAWAGUCHI and ~~FURUYA~~ *Tatsuo* to be the following:

- a. NAKAMIZO (~~14~~ *14*), cover company chief of the KAWAGUCHI Kikan's ~~HEIWA~~ *Trust Credit Company*, gave an overt recruiting speech to youths in the vicinity of Kyoto in mid-June, 1950 in order to gain recruit volunteers. This tipped off investigators for both the Communists and for the leading daily newspapers.
- b. Intelligence brokers and sharp middlemen interfered in the business; this was particularly true of the KURIME?? Small Boat Company to which the KAWAGUCHI Kikan had originally made a request for procurement of ships. The office of this company is located at #25 Tachibana Cho, Nihonbashi, Chuo Ku, Tokyo. These brokers and middlemen intended to make a sizable profit out of the entire expedition. One of the chief figures in this deal, which was to involve procurement of about sixty ships through that company and others eventually, was ~~WATANABE~~ *Saburo*. He is a rich businessman with a reputation for many shady business, black market, intelligence brokering and other deals in the past. About 38 years old, he was formerly a civilian Tokumu Kikan operative in North China during wartime and earlier, and is a smugglers' contact man now. KAWAGUCHI originally decided to work through him in procurement. There were many haggling sessions and considerable stalling. Therefore FURUYA asked OKAWA,

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former Minister MATSUMOTO Shunichi and YAMAMI to get ships so that something could be accomplished. WATANABE Saburo was still involved, however, and fortunately for the KAWAGUCHI Kikan, because much of the blame for the expedition could be shifted to him. He was paid for his services, and has slid out of many similar difficulties before, so it did not cause any difficulty. He and not WATANABE Ikujiro turned out to be the "certain WATANABE" mentioned by the newspapers as having been sought by the Maritime Police.

- c. The Chinese emissary, LU, came to Japan from Formosa later than expected, so that funds were not authorized in time to back up Vice Admiral KORAYASHI's note.
- d. Vice Admiral SUGAWA, who had charge of shipping details on the fourth expedition under KAWAGUCHI, failed to follow through in his duties and instead passed over several hundred thousand yen of organization money to young subordinates to carry out those duties at the last minute. In this manner, secret information leaked out in the vicinity of Kyoto.
3. The future activities of the KAWAGUCHI Kikan, as previously reported, will be integrated under supervision of the ARISUE Kikan in regard to the fifth smuggling expedition. This runs counter to the Central Headquarters order splitting ARISUE off from southern operations, but is felt to be necessary in view of the dismal failure of the fourth expedition, which is still being discussed at length by YOMIURI News Magazine and other leading daily newspapers. Initial funds for the expedition will be partly supplied through KAWAGUCHI's HEIWA Credit Company and from GHQ contacts of the ARISUE Kikan who do not know, however, details of the Formosan plan. FURUYA and OIKAWA will be in charge of ship procurement, liaison, contacts, and negotiations on behalf of both Kikans. Since KUMAMOTO Major SATO of the ARISUE Kikan successfully handled the third expedition in June, bringing back ¥ 6,000,000 worth of bananas which were put on sale in the Tokyo markets, he will aid in mounting the new expedition. In line with the desired policy of FURUYA and OIKAWA, efforts will be made to purchase ships rather than work through brokers. Preparations are already in progress for the fifth expedition, and cargoes will include not only coast patrol officers, army specialists, and political intelligence officers for Formosa, but also political intelligence officers numbering about twenty who will be sent to Indo-China. Details will be worked out after KAWAGUCHI confers with ARISUE, and departure date is tentatively the end of October.

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14 Sept. '50

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Approved By: C

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Source Cryptonym: C

References: ZJL-442; 444; 446

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

1. This report is based upon information supplied directly by C during a seven hour interview recently.
2. Since ZJL-442 was intended as a consolidated survey up to the date of its preparation concerning the organization of the top structure of the JIS groups federated under UGAKI, this report is felt necessary to correct certain errors in that interim summary, clarify certain identities, and note certain recent changes of significance in order to preserve the validity of the previous report.
3. Some of these errors, such as that concerning SUGAWA and that concerning the mistake of MURAI for SAKURAI have been due to mis-reading of the original written Japanese report turned in by C; when he is pressed for time, his writing is all but undecipherable. Other errors such as the ones concerning KIMURA and GOTO were errors in his eliciting of preliminary information. The circumstances of the erroneous report on TSUJI have been explained at length in ZJL-444.
4. It is quite possible, as previously stated in the covering letter to ZJL-442, that further errors exist which will be clarified and discovered from time to time.
5. The fact that General KIMURA was Political Affairs Chief for Burma was inadvertently confirmed by C in his personal history statement.
6. One reason why C feels MAEDA Minoru may actually be the real identity for WATANABE Ikujiro is that recently the names of both OIKAWA Genshichi and MAEDA Minoru have been linked in newspaper accounts with the ill-fated fourth expedition to Formosa, and the rumors of MAEDA's whereabouts therein printed fit in general with what C knows to have been "WATANABE Ikujiro's" intended movements. In addition, WATANABE Ikujiro has long been considered an alias for something, and "WATANABE" uses considerable Navy terminology at meetings. We reserve judgment; C himself offered it as an opinion.

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FORM NO. 81-89
FEB 1949

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods/Sources

(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

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Subject: Organization of Rightist and
JIS Groups under UGAKI:
Errata and Addenda

Report No: ZJL-445
(PD-108)
Date of Information: up to 9 September 1950

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Date Acquired: 9 September 1950

Evaluation: B-2 except as stated

Date of Report: 14 September 1950

Source: []

1. The following are significant corrections to information supplied in a previous report on this subject (Cf. ZJL-442) which have now been satisfactorily clarified:

- a. Lt. General ~~SAKURAI~~ Tokutaro, rather than ~~MURAI~~ Tokutaro, is the correct name and rank for the man on the Central Board of Advisors. There is no MURAI Tokutaro. Nevertheless, the statement that KAWABE supervises the SAKURAI Kikan is generally true; he does so, with SAKURAI's assistance. SAKURAI is no longer in direct operative leadership of the Kikan bearing his name. He cooperates with KAWABE in overall direction. *Tenochino*
- b. The rank stated for GOTO Hidenori, active chieftain of the SAKURAI Kikan should be Lt. Colonel, TMKK, not Lt. General.
- c. Colonel ~~TSUJI~~ Masanobu is no longer involved in Indo-China operations at all. (Cf. ZJL-444)
- d. General ~~KIMURA~~ was listed as former Commanding Officer for Burma. His actual rank and duties were Major General KIMURA, Commanding Officer, Burma Military Government of the Japanese Army. He came under the jurisdiction of ~~ARISUE~~ Seizo sometime shortly before June as a liaison man, lobbyist, and "fixer" dealing with various Japanese government agencies. He has now organized his own Kikan under ARISUE's direction.
- e. ~~SUGAWA~~ Jiro, previously described as an Army Lieutenant General, is actually a Navy man, promoted to Vice Admiral at the end of the war. He was commanding officer of the Navy Special Landing Forces at Shanghai about 1943 or 1944. He is about 48. He was responsible for overall coordination of the fourth expedition to Formosa under ~~KAWAGUCHI~~, his superior, and it was primarily his carelessness regarding money and the security of his subordinates which botched the expedition. He accepted responsibility and is now in temporary eclipse. *Tedatsu* (Cf. PD 325)

2. The following shifts in assignment have been made recently:

- a. Lt. General ~~TANAKA~~ Ryuichi is no longer working directly with KAWABE and SAKURAI in general supervisory work, but is designated "Special Classification"

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Advisor" to General UGAKI. His real duties in this capacity are as top level liaison man between UGAKI's headquarters at Nagaoka City, Izu and the headquarters of KAWABE, KOBAYASHI, NOMURA, and others of the Central Advisory Group.

b. Another individual who is prominent as courier and contact man among the top levels of the organization is a certain ~~SATOMI~~ ^{Ho jime}, handling particular liaisons and contacts to ~~XOKOYAMA~~ and ~~XABEYAMA~~.

3. The following additions to previous information may ^{Yui} ~~serve to identify~~ ^{Sydechi ka} a few of the top leaders more clearly:

a. Lieutenant General ~~XATANABE~~ ^{Ikuiro} may be an alias for Navy Vice Admiral ~~XANDA Minoru~~ (田田 敏), who was at one time during the war at Gunshireibu and connected with the Formosan fleet base at Taipei. "XATANABE" is about fifty-eight, stocky, and bald-headed with a ring-shaped fringe of gray hair. His present address, when he has been in Tokyo, is in Suginami Ku. He works closely with NEMOTO and uses the latter's two Tokyo offices, one of which belongs to the KAWAGUCHI Kikan.

b. The name which KAWAGUCHI Tadatsu used during much of his wartime service is ~~XIWATA Kozasemon~~ (岩田 孝左衛門). He returned from the North China Command about the end of 1944. He is about 63 years old. Various cover agencies he has used are the ~~XTOHOKAI~~ (東方会), the ~~XREISHISHA~~, and, as a hangover from Peiping days, the ~~XSino-Japanese KORENKA~~ (支線会). His address is Shiba Ku, Sakuragawa Cho, #1.

c. ~~XWAAZE Takeo~~ ^{Takeo} ~~XIWABUCHI Goshichi~~ is about 52 or 53 years old, a classmate of ARISUE, and at the time of the February 26 Incident was involved along with ARISUE, NEMOTO and others of the Young Turks then serving at Imperial General Headquarters as staff officers. He was the staff planner who initiated the action which led to establishment of the Special Intelligence (TMKK) courses within the Nakano School, then a Kempei establishment. He later became its second commanding officer with the rank of full colonel. Both the above names are aliases, but his real name is unknown. Both he, ARISUE, and TANAKA are "surrender-time" lieutenant generals; that is, last-minute promotions.

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy ☐
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

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Subject: Plans and Activities of JIS and
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Report No: ZJL-483
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I. Current Activities.

A. Smuggling of Volunteers to Formosa.

1. After the failure of the ~~KAWAGUCHI~~ Kikan in August concerning the fourth expedition to Taiwan, it had been decided to utilize personnel of the ~~ARISUE~~ Kikan, particularly Major ~~SATO~~ & Mr. ~~KIMAMOTO~~, successful manager of the June expedition to Formosa in conjunction with personnel of the ~~KAWAGUCHI~~ Kikan such as ~~FURUYA~~ Tatsuo and ~~OIKAWA~~ Michio who were unpublicized in the Maruyoshi Maru Case and not responsible for it. ~~NAKAMIZO~~ of the ~~KAWAGUCHI~~ Kikan was to aid in financing details. ~~FURUYA~~ and ~~OIKAWA~~ gradually disassociated themselves from plans for another expedition and also from the ~~KAWAGUCHI~~ organization in general, however, and began re-strengthening their connections with ~~TSUCHIDA~~ Yutaka's National Peace and Independence Preparations Committee. There were several reasons for this. First, the overbearing attitude and orders of the ~~ARISUE~~ Kikan began to rankle ~~FURUYA~~ and his deputy; second, the arraignment and questioning of ~~KAWAGUCHI~~ Tadaatsu himself in the Kansai area towards the end of September made it highly undesirable to continue a close connection with him; thirdly, Vice-Admiral ~~KAWATO~~ Yoshitaro viewed the entire project, particularly the Army control of it, with considerable disapproval and told ~~FURUYA~~ so; ~~FURUYA~~ is a very cautious man by nature and did not like the loose security of either the ~~ARISUE~~ or ~~KAWAGUCHI~~ Kikans, and when his new deputy, ~~OIKAWA~~'s name appeared in SHINSEI Magazine as "an adventurous man connected somehow to the problems of ship-procurement for smuggling of Japanese Naval personnel to Formosa", ~~FURUYA~~ decided it was time to pull out. Since both had covered their tracks quite well, they by no means fell heir to the general publicity and disgrace surrounding the failure of ~~KAWAGUCHI~~, ~~YAHAMI~~, ~~KATANABE~~ Saburo, ~~SATO~~ Kazutomo, ~~NAKAMIZO~~, and Vice Admiral ~~SUGAWA~~ Jiro.

2. For a time, plans continued and liaison was maintained with ~~ARISUE~~ Kikan members ~~HAYASHI~~ Masao, Colonel ~~SHIMURA~~ of the former Burma Military Government Staff, and ~~KUHAMOTO~~ & ~~SATO~~, and it looked as though the ~~TSUCHIYA~~ Kikan (the group of ~~TSUCHIDA~~ Yutaka & ~~TSUCHIYA~~) would be responsible, through ~~FURUYA~~ and ~~OIKAWA~~, for procurement of crews and ships for a November expedition while the ~~ARISUE~~ Kikan was to handle recruiting, mobilizing, and logistics of delivery. Antipathy toward both ~~ARISUE~~

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his operatives in Tokyo, and toward his principal subordinate operation unit chiefs, ~~WATANABE Wataru~~ and ~~KODAMA Yoshio~~, and in particular, antipathy to the semi-overt manner in which ARISUE's men could afford to operate because of their GHQ connections and backing, however, made it desirable to do little more than keep in touch with how the ARISUE men were going to run the operation. Although the mounting of any further expedition to Formosa has become almost a unilateral operation of the ARISUE and ~~WATANABE Wataru Kikans~~, ~~FURUYA~~ has maintained excellent relations with Colonel ~~LIAN~~, a provost officer of the Chinese Nationalist Mission in Tokyo, and the ~~RONAN Enterprises, Incorporated~~ (城南企業 K.K.), now the financial operations wing of the ~~TSUCHIDA-BARA-SATONI~~ Organization, has been offered for use to transport individual military officers of the ARISUE-~~WATANABE~~ Organization to and from Formosa to handle details of the volunteer shipment program.

3. On matters concerning Lt. General ~~NEOTO Hiroshi~~, the Chinese Government on Formosa, and the volunteer problem, the remnants of the ~~KAWAGUCHI Kikan~~ still are involved as individuals, particularly because of ~~WATANABE Saburo~~ ~~HOZAKI Kimio's~~ purported connections to both ~~NEOTO~~ and smuggling facilities. As a group, however, it appears that the ~~KAWAGUCHI Kikan~~ is being purposely victimized overtly as the scapegoat organization preparing for shipment of volunteers to Formosa in order to protect and disguise future operations of ARISUE. ~~KAWAGUCHI~~ himself has been completely inactive since his release from questioning. As yet there is no definite word as to when ARISUE and ~~WATANABE Wataru~~ will mount the next expedition.

B. Relations with the Chinese Nationalists.

1. The most direct connection to the Chinese Nationalist Government is of course that of Lt. General ~~NEOTO Hiroshi~~ on Formosa, but this is primarily a military relationship. Until a new expedition of volunteers can be sent safely and secretly to Formosa, this situation will not change. Vice-Admiral ~~MAEDA Minoru~~ ~~MAEDA Torao~~, © Lt. General ~~WATANABE Ikuhiro~~, is now in Tokyo, but probably conducts the most effective liaison of an intelligence nature to ~~NEOTO~~, and cooperates with him closely. Admiral ~~MAEDA's~~ agency is, however, merely a logistic and communication facility, not an actually operative kikan except by aid of the Chinese Mission or another JIS organization.

2. Operations are planned for ~~WATANABE Wataru~~, ARISUE's subordinate Kikan chief, who went during September to Kagoshima, Kyushu, to take over establishment of external operations to Formosa and South China as well as to Korea and Manchuria, under the close supervision of ARISUE of course. Since ~~TSUJI Kusanobu~~ is closely connected to both ARISUE, ~~WATANABE Wataru~~ and to a couple of unidentified American agencies, and since he also was in Kyushu for conferences about the end of September and the beginning of October, it is presumed that both ~~TSUJI~~ and some form of American backing are involved as well.

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3. In Tokyo, almost every group maintains excellent relations with the Chinese Mission. Since the early part of October, many plans have been formulated with Chinese intelligence officers such as Lt. Colonel BAN, Chinese provost officer in Tokyo, with Mr. LIU Jung Chang (呂榮章), and with a Major CHEN (陳) by various underground groups here, for the purpose of further intelligence operations into the China coast, Indo-China, and Central China. Most of these operational plans, however, have as yet come to nothing and are still in the discussional stage. (Evaluation of last statement: B-3: Source can hardly speak with authority for more than his own particular group; other groups may already be very active in implementing plans.) The Chinese are reluctant to risk further scandal and further loss of money, so are waiting for safe and sound plans.

C. Operations regarding Chinese Communist Government.

1. WATANABE Nataru has reportedly brought up a plan for operations into Manchuria involving the use of Koreans selected from the former Korean Residents League of Japan who are actually anti-Communist, according to him. This operation, through ARISUE's support and sponsorship, is to be effected with American backing. (B-3)

2. In addition, ARISUE's subordinate, SATO G. KUMAMOTO, has plans for exploiting use of commercial connections to the Overseas Democratic Chinese Association in Tokyo and of friendly Japanese shipping agencies carrying on trade with Tientsin, Shanghai, and Dairen. On this score also, FURUYA, SATOMI, and other members of the new TSUCHIDA-BABA organization balked and refused cooperation with the more direct and daring plan of ARISUE; they pointed out that even though KAMAGUCHI's "Peace Credit Union Company" and many other companies with which they individually had connections and/or affiliations were engaged in semi-legal trade with Chinese ports, infiltration of agents by use of such companies would not only be immediately suspect to the Chinese Communists, but would also be mixing financial and intelligence operations and would also destroy the value and future of the companies themselves. FURUYA believed that by secret briefing and discreet interrogation methods, information could be safely elicited from captains and crewmen of such ships, but that however less attractive this type of information might be, attempts to get anything more than that would blow the entire thing. Vice-Admiral KAWAHOTO Yoshitaro refused to cooperate on the same grounds that FURUYA and SATOMI did, thereby ruling out use of the SUN Oil Company, Tokyo, which he secretly operates and which would have been of great aid to ARISUE's and WATANABE's plans.

3. It seems very likely that the DAIKO Trade Company, controlled by subordinates of KODAMA Yoshio, will be involved in such infiltration for ARISUE, although not operationally. Most of the operational personnel will be engineered through KIDUWA, YAMAGUCHI Keiichi, and TSUJI Masanobu, the latter working in conjunction with WATANABE Nataru and the MITSU BOSHI →

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Three Star Company, one of WATANABE's Tokyo fronts. Through KODAMA, it is possible that the use of commercial channels operated by friends of Foreign Office Counselor KORIUCHI Ganjo may also be obtained.

4. ARISUE intends to give some of the product to American GHQ agents in return for financial support, but will so disguise the means and methods of operation that GHQ will believe that it is completely the work of his own unit. The entire plan is considered by most of the other groups to be highly dangerous in view of the looseness of operational security that the two operating kikan have demonstrated in the past and particularly in view of the tight surveillance and close watchfulness of the Chinese People's Government regarding Japanese shipping to their ports. (Sub-source for the above paragraph: ☐ ☐ Evaluation: C-3).

D. Operations into the Philippines

DOI Akira has a subordinate named TERUO Nobuhiko (神保信彦) who is beginning commercial and intelligence operations into the Philippines. The chief objective is to operate against the Chinese Communists and the Philippine "Hukbalahap" party presumably, although details are not clear. (B-6, 1 October 1950.)

E. Operations into Indo-China.

Former Kempei Lt. Colonel TOBITA has already been dispatched to Indo-China through the good services of NEMOTO Hiroshi. It is not confirmed but is rumored that two of the other eighteen to twenty operatives scheduled for intelligence operations in Indo-China have also already gone there, and rumor has it that TERUO Rinatsu is one of these, but TERUO is reported by another sub-source as an alias for TERAKAWA, who is believed to be still in Tokyo. Former Kempei Colonel YAYASHI Hideozumi is no longer mentioned as having any connection to Indo-China operations of the various groups, and the ARISUE Kikan appears to be taking the lead in operational planning for that area. The general scheme remains the same: namely, that agents filtered into Saigon and Bangkok through the logistic support of NEMOTO, MAEDA Minoru & WATANABE Ikujiro and the Chinese Nationalist Kuomintang Intelligence will liaise with Japanese still in the Viet Minh forces, particularly Major ISHII Kojiro, and also will use Bangkok and Saigon as operating bases for projects involving India, Burma, Malay, and Pakistan. Use of military men, particularly former operations staff officers, on this plan is considered unwise by the Navy-Foreign Office cliques, who are now out of the plan. (Sub-source for this paragraph: ☐ ☐ Evaluation C-6, ☐ ☐ indicated that it was his opinion that ☐ ☐ got the impressions, except for the information on TERUO's alias, from MATSUMOTO Shunichi, who was involved in conferences with various JIS men, particularly of the ARISUE Group, regarding the plans and the area.)

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II. Plans and Efforts for Unification; Manoeuvres and Present Inter-Relationships of Various Groups.

A. General.

1. By mid-September, quarrels over the scandal resulting from the failure of the fourth expedition to Formosa and mutual recriminations concerning responsibility for it had dissolved the "unification" spirit and harmony of the summer months. Two other factors which during the summer had strongly induced cooperation and even a measure of real unification between various federated groups also had diminished by the end of September; one was the possible national danger from the Korean War situation, and the other was the possibility of a very strong bargaining position for military resurgence and a peace treaty within a few months which would be highly favorable to the Japanese Right. With these reasons or general inducements toward unity becoming weaker, old enmities and hatreds resurged and divergent opinions caused new rifts which seemed to be insurmountable for the visible future. One major difference in the nature of the rifts this time became manifest by the second week in October, 1950. Firstly, the rifts are neither minor in nature, nor are they something which developed overnight, nor are they differences which will be erased easily and rapidly, indeed, if ever; secondly, they are fundamentally ideological and political in nature, despite their application to operational procedure and planning. Despite the strenuous efforts of certain elements at the top and center of the loosely federated groups under IGAKI's banner, notably KA ABE, Torashiro, ANAKA Ryukichi and ANAKA Shinichi, the rapidly deteriorating and disintegrating "federation" demonstrated in early October a dangerous tendency to split bitterly if not even permanently into two main mutually hostile nuclei with a third powerful axis in between pulling on both of them and vice versa. [] indicated that the splits were as bitter and as difficult to mend as those in the pre-war days between the Army jingoists, the Army Moderates-Navy HQ clique, and the Navy Moderates-Foreign Office cliques.

2. The chief entities were the dynamic "Armyist-Bourbon Militarist" - Ultra Right clique, against the "Navy-Foreign Office-Moderates" clique. In between these two hostile factions was a small but highly placed group of Army Moderates who are chiefly militarist in thinking, but not as pre-war in type as the first group and who desire compromise and cooperation of all nationalists primarily.

a. The chief figure among the "Armyist-Bourbon Militarists" is the increasingly powerful ARISUE Seizo, whose personality and current activities have aroused so much antagonism in the opposite camp as to make the rift almost a personal issue. ARISUE is almost universally hated by rival group leaders for several reasons: first of all, he has power, more of it each day, and he has plans and operations actually being implemented with a minimum of difficulty, but

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both the power and the operating ability derive from his GHQ connections, which he flaunts continually and which he uses increasingly to bolster his budget and prestige in a drive for personal power and position; secondly, he is an "armyist" of the worst type, with neither patience nor desire to consider or cooperate with the Navy men, a feeling which goes all the way back to the 26 February Incident of 1936; thirdly, he is considered short-sighted in his political thinking, believing firmly that once the Americans are out of Japan, a militarist-controlled regime can very rapidly be brought in from behind the scenes; fourthly, in the meantime, he takes every advantage of present confused conditions for materialistic self-interest and is a thorough-going "apres-guerre" opportunist to whom ideals come second and his power always first. ARISUE is the chief object of enmity from the Navy-Foreign Office-Moderates point of view, but his longtime semi-autonomous subordinate, WATANABE Wataru, and his newest henchman, the notorious KODAMA Yoshio, are hated almost as much, and for many of the same reasons. KODAMA is hated particularly by the former Japanese Navy men, who utilized his civilian wartime "kikan" in their operations, because of graft he carried out against their budget then and because of post-war charges he made overtly against the Navy and his appropriation of one million dollars worth of radium and drugs because "they did not pay for operational work done for them". In addition, he is generally despised though feared as a thorough gangster and racketeer, however successful at such vocations. WATANABE is disliked more for ideological and personal reasons, and because he is closely connected to ARISUE. Former Major General DOI Akio (or Akira) falls into this group, as does his "kikan" and other figures known to have such unreconstructed Armyist and militarist ideas are the (late) Lt. General ~~SAKURAI Tokutaro~~ and his kikan led by Colonel ~~OGOTO Hidenori~~, Colonels ~~TSUJI Masanobu~~, ~~YUIDAKA Tomiaki~~, ~~CASHIRO~~, and ~~OKADA Yoshimasa~~, and Lt. General ~~OHKAWA Genshichi~~ among many other subordinate figures of the ARISUE and Army cliques and groups, and former general ~~TAJIMA Juzo~~ (西尾 尉造) and ~~NOBAYASHI Saito~~ (小畑 清造) on the top level advisory board. Lt. Generals ~~KAWABE Torashiro~~ and ~~TANAKA Ryukichi~~ for quite a time shared the dislike for ARISUE felt by the opposite camp because of prestige and power from GHQ connections and because of tendencies to agree with ARISUE's "post treaty coup d'etat behind the scenes" type of short-sighted planning. However, during the course of October and early November, 1950, compromise efforts and less rigidly "Army-type" political thinking on the part of these two generals has identified them instead as the chief figures of the "middle group." (Of. (c) below.)

b. The opposite camp, though it can be lumped under a general category as "Navy-Foreign Office-Moderate", cannot be considered a strongly centralized and single entity. Its chief unifying factors are enmity to and jealousy of ARISUE plus a general similarity of ideology.

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Other than the new ~~TSUCHIDA-SATOMI-BABA~~ organization, KAWAMOTO Yoshitaro's own Navy groups, and the remnants of the partially dis-owned KAWAGUCHI Kikan, it has no actively operating intelligence groups at present, and even figures like KAWAGUCHI Tadantsu and ~~KOBAYASHI~~ Shozaburo have lost much face, as HORTICHT Ganjo did earlier, with their own former Foreign Office, Navy, and political Rightist associates for precipitous action and over-hasty attempts to begin operating. Much of their opposition to the Army groups is merely a revival of the time-honored hatred of the Moderate Right Navy and Foreign Office for the Ultra Rightists of the Army General Staff.

As stated above, much of the hatred springs from strenuous objection to the personality and past actions of individual figures on the Army side such as ARISUE, WATANABE, and KODAMA, with whom they refuse to compromise at all. Much of that feeling results from jealousy and frustration. There are, nevertheless, in addition, bitter differences of opinion regarding ideological convictions, operational projects and methods, and political planning and policy which are just as important, and from a future viewpoint, even more important. Most of the Opposition groups within the underground Right, particularly former Navy and Foreign Office figures, have less brash assurance and cockiness about the future than their Army counterparts, and again fear the rapid, over-confident Army plan for renaissance of militarism as the most direct road to disaster. They feel that Japan should be carried along with the natural tide that will sweep her back into technological, economic, and cultural domination of the non-Communist Oriental world, and then, relying upon America's necessity for a bulwark against Russia in the Far East, gradually re-assert Japan's political and intelligence influence and operative hegemony in the Far East. Rash moves to seize what will eventually be offered would only destroy America's trust in the new Japan. Only after this slow, gradual, and natural re-assertion of Japan's pre-dominance in the Orient can Japan afford to utilize them openly for a strong militarist bid for expansion of the Empire. At the same time, the internal political situation must be handled with considerable finesse and care to disguise from American eyes the shift of behind-the-scenes control into the hands of militarist-nationalists. Naturally, every opportunity to push the overt government of Japan further to the Right must be utilized, but nothing must be done that cannot be excused or explained to the Anglo-American bloc. The struggle between America and Russia and the forgetful nature of American leadership aids this greatly, because even in the past year exercise of apparent moderation, "democratic" intent, and patience has often resulted in American leaders quite naturally being forced to adhere to or even encourage measures and policies which the Moderate Right had intended all along. Japan will then eventually be in a position to do one of three things, depending upon world conditions at the time of her natural resurgence technologically, economically, then politically and even militarily: first, if the "cold war" is still in progress,

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Japan can easily replace India as the chief mediating "third force" between America and Russia, using it for bargains and concessions from America and at the same time re-assert her "Greater East Asia" position as the defender and champion of Oriental Nationalist groups from wrongs by either side; secondly, if it should come to war, Japan would throw most of her weight, for a terrific price in power, territorial aggrandizement, and independence of action in re-establishing imperialism internally, on the Anglo-American side; thirdly, if America has succeeded in defeating Russia, with or without Japanese help, Japan will be in an excellent position to take advantage of the tired and weakened condition of America to embark upon much more aggressive policies in the Far East, if not actual elimination of American Far Eastern influence entirely. Whether this program takes five years or twenty years, no one step of it should be hurried, as all of the Opposition leaders fear the Army men will again want to do. They deplore the lack of realism and subtlety of Army thinking, and fear again the bluntness, over-confidence and impatience of men like KOBAYASHI Saizo and ARISUE Seizo who have no real conception of world problems, attitudes, and new ideas, situations, and relationships.

The Opposition leadership ranges all the way from the pseudo-Rightist propagandist NABEYAMA Sadachika to ultra-conservatives KANAMOTO Yoshitaro and YOKOYAMA Yui, and divergency of opinion is great. They are not united, and they are not strong at present. Nevertheless, their viewpoint is realistic, restrained, cautious, and far more astute. They stand a far better chance of securing and retaining support of the Liberal Party's right wing as well as the old-line "Zaibatsu" and political purgee support, such as the SUMITOMOs, IWASAKIs, TOYODAs, and HATOYAMA Ichiro's group. They are much more able to deceive both American interests and "democratic Japanese" people in the long run, and with their emphasis on "patriotic, democratic, new-style Nationalism" rather than upon pre-war military violence, they stand a far greater chance of eventual success and a wider basis of support.

c. The Army Moderates or Compromise Group may dissolve into either of the two major factions at any time, or it may eventually become the solidifying and unifying force utilizing and controlling both. Its present position is narrow and tenuous, and its adherents few. However, they are high, powerful, and skilful. KAWABE Torashiro, despite his Army General Staff background and despite his past exemplification (in Navy eyes) of unmitigated and unilateral Armyism, is now viewed with increasing favor for his recent attempts to soften the Army jingoists and to reach a working basis and common policy agreement with Navy and Foreign Office-led factions. Lt. General SUMITA Raishiro (田島 英次郎) is another Army man who is advocating a slow, cautious, and restrained approach to the objective of Japanese resurgence; Lt. General TANAKA Ryukichi is following KAWABE's lead in his work as "messenger boy" to UGAKI and NOMURA Kichisaburo; KAMATA →

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Sawaichiro (鋤田澤一郎) and TANAKA Shinichi, despite their close collaboration with ARISUE, are also inclined towards compromise, caution, and unification of the Right. On the operating levels, Lt. General IWAAZE Takeo (伊和泉 武雄), whose group, strong in Nakano School men, is probably the most experienced and professional of the inter-related Army intelligence groups, made his position very clear to leaders of the TSUCHIDA-SATOMI organization at a conference in mid-October. He admitted that his organization runs some collaborative enterprises with ARISUE, SONO Akira of the Foreign Office's Intelligence Department (who liaises with ARISUE through Maj. General KIMURA), and with TANAKA Shinichi, but stated that he has an aversion to ARISUE's political ideas and to his semi-overt manner and high-handed plans and methods of operation. On the other hand, he wished cooperation with the Navy and Moderate leaders and above all, a united, professional-minded intelligence service of cautious, clandestine, and experienced operatives rather than amateur Army staff officers. He felt that KODAMA Yoshio's chief talents were demonstrated solely in the hijacking and brokering of information from news publications and other intelligence agencies. On the other hand, ARISUE's men have accomplished many fine operations, as has KAWABE's organization, and their prestige with the Americans is good. There should be no reason, if ARISUE could be persuaded to forego his personal push toward complete power in the JIS relying on GHQ backing, why both factions could not work harmoniously together, under the direction of a coordinator above ARISUE. He also warned that the former Navy and Foreign Office groups must show greater adhesion and professionalism themselves.

3. The Compromise Attempt: 10 October to 25 October, 1950.

a. Chiefly pushed by IWAAZE, KAWABE, KAWAMOTO Yoshitaro, NOMURA Kichisaburo, and TANAKA Shinichi both individually and collectively, an attempt was made during this period to repair the shattered "federation".

b. KAWABE, IWAAZE, and TANAKA particularly contacted KAWAMOTO, SATOMI, ABABA Kensuke, YOKOYAMA Yui, and NOMURA, and elaborated an overall plan which would have retained AUCAKI Kazunari (Issai) as titular head, but which would have given NOMURA Kichisaburo far greater authority as virtual "chief of general staff", on the highest level of overall direction. Underneath was to be General KOBAYASHI Saizo as deputy chief, and a Board of Advisors including Vice Admiral KOBAYASHI Shozaburo, YOKOYAMA Yui, Lt. General SUMITA Raishiro, Lt. General KAWABE Torashiro, TANAKA Ryukichi, General NISHIO Juzo, former Foreign Office leaders KUBARA Fusanosuke, and *SHINOHARA Tetsu, and "former" Communist labor-leader, KITAHARA Shiro. This top leadership was to decide definitively on all

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major political and operational policy, and was to possess far greater central and unified authority than before. After preliminary discussions with KANAMOTO and SATOMI, Army representative TANAKA agreed that underneath this Advisory Board were to be two intelligence departments of such separation and autonomy as to be worth calling separate services. The first was to be headed by ARISUE Seigo with IWAAZE deputy for internal operations (which would include TANAKA Shinichi and certain of KODAMA's subordinates) and WATANABE Hataru deputy for external operations. This department would not only have operative control over all former army operations and groups such as KAMANE's and DOI Akira's, but would supervise all intelligence operations carried out jointly with American intelligence agencies under Far East Command jurisdiction. The second intelligence "department" was to be under KANAMOTO Yoshitaro, with TSUCHIDA Yutaka as deputy chief. FURUYA Tatsuo would handle secret external operations and either TANAKA Shinichi or a subordinate selected by KANAMOTO would handle internal anti-Communist operations. In addition, various supporting agencies were to be created. NABEYAMA Sadachika would handle Propaganda Department operations through his vast semi-overt propaganda-subversion organization. SATOMI Hajime would handle all liaison at the working level to the political leaders in Japan and to present government agencies, including supervision, for example, of ARISUE's connections into the Foreign Office through KIURA Toshio and AKIRA. BARA Kensuke would be in charge of lower level relations and liaisons to foreign countries and planning for Foreign Office-backed operations to foreign countries other than Communist nations. Independent fund-raising operations not connected with American intelligence and military agencies were to be placed under general liaison control of SUZUKI Keishi of the ARISUE Kikan, with MURAHARA Shiro of the TSUCHIDA Kikan as deputy, and utilizing MATSUMOTO Shunichi for Indo-Malay-Indo-China trade, KANAI Tatsuo (河相 達夫) for Australia-Japan trade, the new JONAN Enterprises Ltd. of KANASHIMA, HEGUCHI, and MIYAZAKI (a TSUCHIDA-SATOMI fund-raising affiliate), the DATKO Company of MIYANO and other of KODAMA Yoshio's subordinates, the TAISEI Company to which both Colonels OKADA Yoshimasa and IGARASHI Ken of ARISUE-WATANABE affiliations have connections, the Peace Credit Company operated by KAMAGUCHI Tadaatsu's group, and the Chinese trading company known as the HEIJIRO, (earlier concerned in the MIYOTO Formosa Volunteer Recruiting operations and formerly connected to KAMAGUCHI and more recently connected to WATANABE Hataru), and various other commercial companies which could be utilized to contribute funds to the overall federation. Former Major General KAMATA Sawaichiro (or Senzo??) was to handle General Affairs and Personnel Distribution, and possibly, with professional assistance from certain IWAAZE Kikan operatives, Training unless NABEYAMA and IWAAZE themselves share responsibility for that in the future.

c. Most of these arrangements were apparently accepted in principle by both NOMURA and KANAMOTO, but the Opposition leaders on the op-

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erating level, such as KAWAMOTO and TSUCHIDA, desired clarification in detail of the exact inter-relationship between the two intelligence "departments" and the limits of jurisdiction of each. KAWAMOTO, as a former close associate of ARISUE this past year, and TSUCHIDA, as ARISUE's former liaison man into Foreign Office circles this past year, were both highly in favor of unification but well aware of ARISUE's character and unilateral tendencies. SATOMI Hajime, therefore, drew up a counter-plan in detail, relying heavily upon the assistance of FURUYA Tatsuo and OIKAWA Michio, which was aimed at even tighter unification and centralization and which went into considerable detail on the organizational structure. The major additions were that KATAGUCHI Tadaatsu (who, although a former Lt. General, has been ranged consistently on the Navy-Moderates side) should head a Security Investigation Department. The plan also earmarked KURIHARA Shigeru for head of the Funds Department, with two deputies, one SUZUKI Keishi and the other a "zaibatsu" representative to be chosen by the Board of Advisors. The major point of conflict was insistence upon their part (with FURUYA Tatsuo's October plan for a CIC liaison in mind) that collaboration on the part of the Second Intelligence Department or any group thereof with any Far Eastern American intelligence agency, if such connection were merely to gain vitally needed operating funds, need not have the permission of ARISUE and need not be under ARISUE's control and surveillance. They pointed out that ARISUE's organization had more than once dealt directly with Chinese agencies to get operating funds during the past year, just as they had, and might do so again on the Volunteers for Formosa case. Why, then, should they be required either to submit all American contact plans to ARISUE or to submit all information going to American agencies to ARISUE or even KAWABE? If the objective were merely the low-level one of raising funds, it could hardly hamper ARISUE's connections. At the same time, there seemed little reason why ARISUE and the First Intelligence Department should have a monopoly on the financial and authoritative benefits of Occupation connections. The matter of liaison to Japanese political leaders and to various agencies of the Japanese government was another matter; that was purely business and operational, and one voice, whether it be SATOMI or someone higher up, should be authorized to speak authoritatively at the working level on policy for the entire group. Furthermore, political considerations and the aspirations of political leaders like YOSHIDA Shigeru, HATOYAMA Ichiro, former Prince MATSUDAIRA, TSUMAGATA Taketomo, SHIRATORI Toshio, HORIUCHI Ganjo, and SHIDEHARA might frequently have a direct bearing on whether any given operation by either Intelligence Department were advisable or not. Therefore, close policy control by the Board of Advisors over operational plans of both Intelligence Departments was mandatory, with a Policy Planning Committee, including the chiefs of both the Foreign Liaison Department and the Governmental Liaisons Department (tentatively BABA and SATOMI), reviewing and approving all operations from an overall policy viewpoint.

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d. This, of course, ARISUE refused to accept at all, as did many of the other Army leaders. At the height of his operative capacity and personal power, ARISUE refused to be bothered with checking with anybody, much less any politicians and former Foreign Office dignitaries, as to whether he should effect a certain operation or not. ARISUE was not the only Army leader who objected to the Navy-Foreign Office insistence that other operations and liaisons with American agencies could be carried out independently for economic reasons, even though both KAWABE and Admiral NOMURA had been working for a long time with Americans independently of ARISUE, and above his level. The resultant mutual recriminations and bitter accusations destroyed even further any chance of cooperation and unity, to the extent that by the last week in October, the "federation" was little more than a name or possibly even a dream.

4. Current Position of the Groups (4 November, 1950)

On the operating level, the various "kikans" are split along the factional lines discussed above, and each is pursuing its independent course. The plans, projects and activities of ARISUE's men and the other kikans have been discussed at length above in Part I. ARISUE is advancing unilaterally on most all fronts, although some cooperation continues in internal operations with the anti-Communist penetration efforts of IWAAZE Takeo and his men. Much of this cooperation is under overall direction of KAWABE Torashiro, however, who formerly took a far more active part in "fronting" for IWAAZE and ARISUE. In addition, ARISUE's and IWAAZE's pipeline into Foreign Office anti-Communist intelligence operations through SOMO Akira continues jointly. More or less directly under ARISUE are Major General KIMURA, former Burma MG officer, WATANABE Wataru for external operations, SUZUKI Keishi for economic operations, and KODAMA Yoshio and particularly his subordinates for low-level internal operations. DOI Akira and OIKAWA Genshichi are now joint heads of a new "kikan" using most of DOI's former operatives, and this new group liaises closely with ARISUE's. ARISUE and IWAAZE's group have frequently interchanged personnel, but IWAAZE is still quite cool towards close cooperation with ARISUE. KAGUCHI Tadatsuo is still completely inactive, as are Vice Admirals SUGAWA Jiro and KOBAYASHI Shozaburo, though the latter are getting ready to back at a high level the new SATOMI-TSUCHIDA organization. (Cf. below) KAWABE and TANAKA Ryukichi have continued general liaison work and fronting for IWAAZE, kept up their GHQ connections, and during the last week in October were on the highest level at violent odds with the Navy-Foreign Office figures, even NOMURA and KAWAMOTO, for the Opposition's inflexibility on the unification compromise issue. The first week of November, however, saw KAWABE, IWAAZE, and TANAKA listening with increasing interest to an overture from the New National Peace and Independence Preparations Committee (cf. below) for overall cooperation and sponsorship. Furthermore, KAWABE is reputedly not entirely satisfied with ARISUE's recent bid for increasing power, and may throw his weight in favor of the Opposition groups. (Evaluation for this last statement: B-3.)

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5. The New National Peace and Independence Preparations Committee, and the JONAN Enterprises Company, Ltd.

a. The original plan for the secret operational section was formulated at the time of the great compromise attempt, and it enjoyed wide circulation and theoretical approval. Organizationally and operationally, it was chiefly a combination of the ideas of FURUYA Tatsuo and OIKAWA Michio, but its backing came from such distinguished higher-ups as KOBAYASHI Shozaburo, BABA Kensuke, and even KAWAMOTO Yoshitaro. It was incorporated into the larger organizational plan submitted by SATOMI during the compromise negotiations and was slanted with that in mind. After failure of the unification attempt, individual operatives like ~~IGARASHI~~ Ken of ~~WATANABE~~ Wataru affiliations and ~~WAMBU~~ Kanichi of the IWAAZE Kikan dropped out of the new grouping with which they had been greatly interested. They are still on good liaising terms, however, and may join in later.

b. Present Organization.

Organization was decided at a conference at the JONAN Enterprises Ltd. offices at Tomoe Cho, Nishikubo, Shinagawa Ku, Tokyo on 2 October and confirmed later at another conference there 24 October, 1950.

Policy Advisors: KOBAYASHI Shozaburo and YOKOYAMA Yui; if possible, KAWABE Torashiro and TANAKA Shinichi will be added, particularly to assist in operations of the Liaison Bureau to Japanese government agencies such as the new Police Reserve Force and to other agencies such as the Army leaders; close cooperation with IWAAZE Takeo is desired.

Active Chairman: BABA Kensuke

Vice Chairman: TSUCHIDA Yutaka

Administrative

Staff Members: KAWAI Tatsuo (河井 辰雄) and KURIHARA Shigeru (栗原 茂)

Financial Section: JONAN Enterprises Company Ltd., with ~~KAWASUMI~~ Keizo its President (川島 敬三郎) and ~~NOGUCHI~~ Hisao its general manager. (野口 久雄).

Special Intelligence Operations
Chief

: FURUYA Tatsuo

Deputy Chiefs

: OIKAWA Michio, and an unidentified and separate deputy chief connected with KAWAMOTO Yoshitaro.

Liaison Bureau : SATOMI Hajime or Ho (望見 南).

Deputy Chiefs : ~~KOGA Katsu~~ or ~~Ichishi~~ (古賀 梁).
MATSUOTO Ichiro (松本 一郎).

Some of the personnel intended for use in the Operations Section under FURUYA are a former Major named ~~IKUYAMA~~ (生山), a former Navy ~~THK~~ lieutenant named ~~TAJIMA~~ (田島), and ~~MURASAKI~~ ~~Yoshibumi~~ ~~YONDA~~ ~~Yoshibumi~~ former Army Lt. Colonel at Osaka, whom FURUYA and OIKAWA particularly wanted for internal operations in the Kansai. In addition, ~~MATSUOTO~~ Ichiro, former Navy Commander, will assist in the recruiting and training of additional young men with former intelligence experience. The other wing of FURUYA's operations, in conjunction with the former KAWAMOTO Kikan deputy are not yet clearly established.

c. Organizational Objectives and Plans.

There are two primary differences between this new organization and other operative groups now in existence. When the unification scheme failed, it destroyed the intended plan to use this group as the nucleus for the secret operations unit of an overall Japanese Intelligence Service, composed of young men and professional intelligence men of field grade rank or lower drawn from all the existing kikans. Nevertheless, that remains one of the new organization's distinctive features despite its now modest beginnings: it is not over-burdened with "name" figures, special advisors, advisors, directors, assistant directors, and committee men, nor is its organization even a primary consideration; but it is primarily aimed at expansion, recruiting, and training of field grade and junior grade intelligence officers of some experience in streamlined, professional, post-war methods of intelligence activity, indoctrination in sound operational planning now while activity is limited, and some cautious use of such methods within limits of both security and existing circumstances. This group will then expand in numbers as time goes by. The second major distinction is that a clear-cut demarcation has been made between financial activities and professional intelligence operations, and this is the principal guide to the future professional nature desired for the organization. At present, actual intelligence operations vary all the way from refugee-interrogation (for material to give to CIC so that salaries can be paid) to bits of local anti-Communist information, and include plans for future external secret operations.

d. Ideologically, their objectives may be summed up as a gradual, relatively peaceful, and quite cautious re-establishment internally of Imperial Nationalism, and re-building of Japan's position as a world power with her eventual domination of the Far East, if not all Asiatic peoples, in mind. Their views as to how these objectives may be achieved differ very little from those expressed in para. 2(b) above concerning the "Navy-Foreign Office" cliques' point of view.

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e. Activities.

They have three current projects of a major nature, plus the operational assignment recently of certain of their members such as IKUYAMA and MURASAKI to the problem of procuring anti-Communist information within Japan. The three major projects are: (1) infiltration of personnel, particularly field grade officers of experience if possible, (as advisors), into the new Police Reserve, and continued influence, through FURUYA's and SATO's friend, WATANABE (fnu), and also through JONAN Enterprises Ltd., into the Maritime Safety Bureau; (2) running an operational net, for procurement of information regarding the JCP and also regarding Communist China, under American CIC direction, with the main objective being payment of salaries; (3) a canvassing and interrogation of recent repatriates from Asia mainland areas both for training and practice in systematic interrogation and research work and also in order to be able to offer information to Americans. FURUYA feels that the connection to WATANABE and to the Maritime Safety Bureau is vital since eventually that agency will be the nucleus of a revived Japanese Defense Navy and that permission for such revival will probably precede American consent for any full scale re-establishment of a Japanese Army. Therefore, by excellent relations maintained now with WATANABE, probably future chief of operations for the Defense Navy, the group would have access to the first adequate "service" cover available. Operationally, difficulties have arisen in that their "Financial Department" can supply only enough funds for operating expenses as yet, necessitating American contacts to supply living expenses; however, both FURUYA and OIKAWA are primarily interested and experienced in foreign intelligence and have little knowledge of or competence at anti-JCP operations, which is the primary concern of their American sponsors. The organization is therefore quite anxious to establish connections through Lt. General TANAKA Shinichi to Lt. Generals KANABE and TANAKA Ryukichi, whom they would like to have back them eventually as the secret foreign espionage counterpart of the EMATE Kikan for secret domestic counter-intelligence. (CF: COVER LETTER NOTE.) TANAKA Shinichi was involved all throughout late September and early October with the JONAN Enterprises Company in a shady deal to procure 20,000 surplus American Army blankets from Yokohama at a bargain price, presumably for charitable purposes, as far as the Americans were concerned. Therefore, TANAKA is favorably inclined, though he desires inclusion of TSUJI Masanobu in the set-up. Since TSUJI is personally affable and sincere, and has excellent Nationalistic ideals and prestige in addition to American connections, even if he is recognized by professionals as slightly dense and ideologically childish, the SATO-BABA combine has no objections at all provided TSUJI's involvement in the secret intelligence operations is carefully minimized. In the Liaison Section he would not only be a decided asset in dealing with Americans and Japanese government per-

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sonnel, but would be invaluable as a contact man to other "kikans" and striking evidence to all concerned of the new group's wide-based character and compromise potentialities. This move might also pave the way for KAWABE's support, they feel. If this occurs, ARISUE should be neatly circumvented, not in the immediate future, but for the long-range future. (Speculation; B-6.)

f. Financial Operations of JONAN Enterprises, Ltd.

Its president, is at present contracting for the provisioning of the new Police Reserve, and also the Maritime Safety Police Corps Auxiliary with foodstuffs. Their purveying warehouses are located conveniently in URAWA City. Other enterprises include cooperation with an unidentified shipping company loosely connected to KAWAGUCHI Tadaatsu's Peace Credit Company on shipping ventures to North China and Manchuria ports. (Cf. I, 4, (c) above). This cooperation extends to shipping ventures to Okinawa and Formosa. Lt. Colonel BAN of the Chinese Mission has been contacted for assistance in the procurement of ships for ventures to both areas. KAWASHIMA (KAWAJIMA) and NOGUCHI are now busily engaged also in procurement of copper, iron and tin, and any kind of scrap metal for the purpose of getting the Japan Copper Tube and Pipe Mfg. Co. to manufacture them, after which they will be used for trade to China. FURUYA adamantly refuses to involve himself in any of these operations or to utilize them or permit utilization of them for intelligence-gathering purposes. (Cf. I, 4 (C) above.)

III. Specific Biographical Information on Personalities

A. Members of the NEW National Peace and Independence Preparations Committee.

FURUYA Tatsuo.

This individual has been thoroughly described in previous reports. New information regarding him reveals only that he has apparently had close liaison connections for quite some time to Vice Admiral KAWAMOTO Yoshitaro as well as to KOBAYASHI Shozaburo.

TSUCHIDA Yutaka @ TSUCHIYA Yutaka.

Age : About (fifty-two.)
Home Address : Shinagawa Ku, Nishikubo, Tomoe Cho. Number unknown.
Office : Vice-Chairman, New Peace and Independence Preparations Committee, Minato Ku, Shiba, Nakamon Cho % TSUCHIYA Yutaka.
Experience : No military service. A longtime Foreign Service official, he became Consul at Shanghai about the time that Ambassador TANI was first sent to the WANG Ching Wei government (about 1942 or late 1941). He later became chief (consul general)

of the Shanghai Consulate. During all this time, he was the channel for most of the intelligence information gathered by the TMKK, the Foreign Office representatives in the WANG government, and the undercover operatives of the Japanese Navy, Foreign Office, commercial and civilian agencies, and Chinese puppet government. After the war, he was the first chairman of the Japanese Residents Association of Shanghai. He was arrested by the Shanghai Garrison HQ about January or February 1946 because of failure to hand over funds collected for repatriation of the Japanese, funds which should have been passed to the Chinese Central Government and which had been collected from Japanese residents of Shanghai who complained about it. Another evident reason was that he had secretly repatriated several high-ranking Japanese military and intelligence figures under aliases and also hidden others from investigation by the Chinese. HORIUCHI Ganjo, Minister to China, who believed in overt collaboration with the Chinese Nationalists, also used his influence to ruin TSUCHIDA, partly so that he could replace him. TSUCHIDA was repatriated about December, 1946. After that time, he cooperated with ARISUE, TANAKA Ryukichi, and SAKURAI Tokutaro for quite some time in gathering of intelligence information concerning the JCP, Chinese Communists, and research into Soviet operations in China, a subject in which he is supposed to be very well-informed and particularly interested. Ill-feeling between himself and HORIUCHI Ganjo, plus revelation of his past intelligence connections through War Crimes Trials in Shanghai, made it impossible for him to re-enter the Foreign Office.

BABA Kensuke.

Former Minister to Hongkong. Little else is known of his background than has been previously reported. He has many friends in the Foreign Office Intelligence Department, including both SONO Akira and USAMI Hiroshi.

SATOMI Hajime (Ho??) ()

1445-10
He is (about fifty-six years old) height about 5'5", weight about 135 lbs, is slightly stocky in build and wears black-rimmed glasses. He has never been in the Japanese Armed Forces as far as can be determined, but was a former civilian Tokumu Kikan operator first with the Japanese Foreign Office and then with the South Manchurian Railway Company's investigative section in Manchuria and North China, and ended up at the time of the surrender in Mukden. His previous tour of duty with Foreign Office TMKK Intelligence is not placed, but he also has had connection with anti-Soviet operations of SONO Akira. After the war, until his repatriation, SATOMI played an active role, along with WATANABE Wataru, USAMI, and former consul

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ISHII of Tientsin in both the Sino-Japanese Collaborative Movement and other activities related to the Chinese Nationalist IRRA. His additional duties involved build-up of stay-behind Japanese Intelligence agents and groups. His connections since his return to Japan have been mainly with BABA, TSUCHIDA, YOKOYAMA Yui (after the latter's release from Sugamo), and KOBAYASHI Shozaburo. He avoided direct involvement in any intelligence activity until recently because he disapproves strongly of the gangsterish level of current operational groups and feels that they are conditioned by stupidly pre-war political ideas and methods, unsound planning, and "apres-guerre" self-interest and corruption. He is cautious, business-like, and meticulous, and though he is not an expert operator himself, he therefore prefers sensibly to leave intelligence gathering to professional experts, handle liaison and contacts, and to maintain a distinct separation of financial and operational functions. His research ability, business-like planning, and ideological practicality, however, make him very capable in an overall directorial capacity as well. ✓

MATSUMOTO Ichiro ()

8-14-14
He is now living with FURUYA temporarily at Omiya City, although his home is Osaka, where he has been, since his repatriation in late 1945, a director of the Osaka Oil Company (which has affiliations to the Sun Oil Company of Tokyo, to which KAWAMOTO Yoshitaro is connected.) He is (about forty-nine years old) and is a former Commander in the Navy who received a post-surrender promotion to Captain. He graduated from Navy Officers School several years ahead of FURUYA. MATSUMOTO became a Lieut. (jg) in 1941, after service in West India, Indo-China and with the South Asia Fleet. He then attended Navy Staff College, and graduated in 1942. He was then sent to Shanghai, where he first handled combat and then intelligence staff duties. He later was transferred to the Singapore HQ, from which he was sent first to India, then to Batavia, and finally to Amoy, where he was at the time of the surrender. He has two sons, one, age 26, who was a former Army 2nd Lieutenant at Changchun, Manchuria, and is now working in the Transportation Ministry, and his elder son, who is now employed by the Fukuoka City Price Control Agency, in Kyushu. MATSUMOTO has some experience in intelligence staff work and in training. He came to Tokyo on 17 October, 1950 at FURUYA's request to talk over plans for re-activation of intelligence activities. He is primarily interested in elimination of post-war materialism and corruption, re-indoctrination of Japanese young people to nationalism, and selection from young nationalist groups of competent individuals who can be trained and briefed carefully for future intelligence service work. Such a group would thus form the nucleus for a trained centralized JIS in the service more capable than the past ones in coping with intelligence activities of other nations.

KAWASHIMA Keizo and NOGUCHI Hisao are both former Ministry of Transportation officials who have branched out into private business. Their headquarters, JONAN Enterprises, Ltd., is located on the second floor of a Mr. MIZUNO's residence at Tomoe Cho, Nishikubo.

MURASAWA Yoshibumi @ HONDA Yoshibumi, former Lt. Colonel, Army, former

Intelligence Staff Officer, and former member of HORIUCHI Ganjo's Far Eastern Affairs Research Society, has already been described in previous reports.

B. Personalities in the NABEYAMA Sadachika Organization.

These loosely affiliated groups, under leadership of NABEYAMA Sadachika, are working primarily for propaganda, subversion, and ideological indoctrination of Japanese youth in a Rightist direction, but also engages, throughout its wide-spread branches, in some low-level anti-Communist intelligence collection. It is very well known, and NABEYAMA, as its leader, has a prominent place in anti-Communist circles despite strong beliefs in those circles that he may actually be a double agent, along with MITAMURA Shiro. The following subordinate personalities, as far as is known, are proven Rightists, notwithstanding.

* IMAZU (Imu) (今津), one of the chief figures of the Independence Youth League. * (DOKURITSU SEINEN KYOKAI)

* IMAI Takeo (今井武雄), former Deputy Chief of Staff in North China, and * KUSANO Fumio (草野文男), former Colonel, Army, of the same theater, who are leading subordinate "name" figures in NABEYAMA's World Democracy Research Association. * (SEKAI MINSHU KENKYU KAI) at the Hokkaido Press Bldg, 6 Chome, Nishi Ginza, Tokyo.

C. Personalities of the "REISHISHA" (Repatriates Anonymous Association) now Affiliated with NABEYAMA's MJRA

This organization is split into two wings, of which NABEYAMA practically controls one through its close affiliation to his World Democracy Research Association in the branches. Its headquarters is located at #2309 Kodake Machi, Suginami Ku, Tokyo.

* OMASA Masakazu (大政 正和), formerly in the section of REISHISHA run by KAWAGUCHI Tadaatsu and still in close liaison with the latter, is the chief connection to NABEYAMA Sadachika, operating at the above address.

* TOMATSU Keigi (戸松 慶議) is his subordinate.

In the organization, TOMATSU Takeo (武男) is chief of the Kyushu District from Kumamoto City. * NAKIDA Keiji (坂田 慶司) is chief of the Kansai District. * SHINOHARA Toshio (新原 恒夫), Shikoku; * YOKOI Sho (横井 章) the Chukoku District (Hiroshima, Kure); * SATO Zenji (佐藤 善治), the Hokkaido District; * SHIBATA Tetsuo (柴田 鉄男), the Tohoku District; * TOMATSU Sadao (真田 貞夫), the Kanto District; and * KASAHARA Sakae (笠原 栄) supervises the North Kanto District from Utsunomiya.

D. Direct Affiliates of KA AGUCHI Tadaatsu

* OHASHI Masatoshi and * NAKAMIZO (fnu) are subordinates connected with the REISHISHA Organization, as is former artillery officer, NAKAMIZO, and they are also liaison men on KA AGUCHI's behalf to the * KIKUSUIKAI (Chrysanthemum Water League) and the * Nippon Anti-Communist League, two ultra-nationalist secret societies chiefly strong in Kyushu to which KA AGUCHI is a chief advisor. NAKAMIZO also operates in KA AGUCHI's economic operations through the Peace Credit Union Company, Ltd. * MIYAZAKI SHIMIZO Kabushiki Kaisha located at Shiba, Sakuragawa Cho, Minato-ku, Tokyo.

Unplaced KA AGUCHI intelligence service subordinates * ASO Tatsuo (阿相 達雄) and * DAIWA Haruo (大沢 治夫) maintain liaison with the New National Peace and Independence Preparations Committee for KA AGUCHI. They are also contact men to KOMAYASHI Shozaburo.

E. MIYAZAKI Takeo.

This elusive figure is believed to be actually former Lt. General * MIYABUCHI Itsuo (南淵 流雄), one-time head of the Army Information Bureau in South China as a Colonel, after assisting, (as Colonel MIYAMOTO Goyu) in the foundation of * MIYANO Intelligence School. It is known that as MIYABUCHI he carried out intelligence operations in the South China theater. He has two subordinate organizations, one composed of many former Nakano School officials and graduates, and which has already been reported as far as identifiable. A second group, working closely with the ARISUE Kikan includes the following:

Former Major HAYASHI Masao (林 正久), South China Tokumu Kikan officer and last year a member of the ARISUE organization; NAMBU Kanichi (南部 賢一) who is a former * ARISUE Kikan TEKK officer; * HIGUCHI Kiyoshi (樋口 武義); * YADA Katsuaki (戸田 勝秋); * SUGI U.A. Masayoshi (杉村 正義); and * MIYAZAKI Hideo (紫山 秀夫).

F. Subordinates of MATANABE Wataru.

In addition to former Navy Captain * WASABEIKI Naoki (believed to be an alias) of 1 Chome, Sakura Shinmachi, Setagaya Ku, former Army Air Force Colonel * MIYAZAKI Chotaro (age 46) living at #37 2-chome, Tamagawa Yaga, Setagaya Ku, there are many others connected with the Mitsuboshi Commercial Enterprises Company. At the Nissan Building, 1-Chome, Marunouchi, Tokyo, * MIYAZAKI Kenzo, former Kempei Lt. Colonel, * MIYAMOTO Shigeru, former TEKK captain, and * HATTORI Tetsu, former Army staff major, still locate their headquarters and report to MATANABE. HIDAKA Shiro @ Tomiaki, associated briefly last spring with the parallel DOI Akira Kikan at the Kuhana Hotel, and more recently returned to Kyushu, has again joined forces with MATANABE Wataru, after the latter's trip to Kagoshima in September. Former Colonels OKADA Yoshimasa (岡田 芳政)

AKA
MITSUBOSHI

and IGARASHI Ken are also deputies of another but unidentified wing of WATANABE's various subordinate agencies.

G. ~~KOMIYAMA~~ Kyoze, chief of the ~~Korean Economic Research Society~~, is a semi-overt subordinate to Maj. General KAMATA Sawaichiro, who is closely connected to KAMATA Torashiro, TANAKA Ryukichi, and the central general staff of the now-shattered federation. KOMIYAMA keeps in very close touch with WATANABE Mataru on Korean operations.

H. KAWAMOTO Yoshitaro, former Vice Admiral, connected to the ~~Gun Oil Company~~ at 1 Chome, Ginza, was formerly working very closely with ARISUE Seizo but is now completely separate. His subordinates and actual operations are unknown, but one of his liaisons is a Navy Captain who was a TANK officer in Europe, and another is former Commander ~~KASHURA~~ (or ~~OKURA~~) Kiyotil, (age about 40) #79, 2-Chome, Yaga, Setagaya Ku, who was formerly connected with FURUYA in the Far East Affairs Research Society as liaison to Navy brass. KAWAMOTO is very sharp, military, and close-mouthed.

J. MAEDA Torao @ MAEDA Minoru, former Vice Admiral, using the alias of former Lt. General WATANABE Ikujiro, is located at Fujiya, Toranomon, Tokyo, but also utilizes NEMOTO Hiroshi's Tokyo offices in the Teikoku Bank Building occasionally. His principal subordinate is ~~OKADA~~ Terusato (岡田 照男), believed to be a former Navy Commander.

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Subject: JIS - Activities of Leading
JIS Personalities

Report No:

ZJL- 661

Date of Information: 25 May 51, ~~correct~~
as noted

Place Acquired: Tokyo, Japan

Date Acquired: 26 May 51, ~~correct~~
as noted

Evaluation: C-3

Date of Report: 29 June 51

Source: C □

1. ^X Former Colonel KAGAWA Yasuo (香川 義雄), formerly attached to the Second Section of the Army General Staff, is now engaged exclusively in organizing an espionage KIKAN to work against foreign powers. Direction and funds for this KIKAN come from NAKANO Tetsu.

2. ARISUE Seigo is being condemned as a "comprador strategist" (RAITHEN-AN SHIMMUN-KAN) and has been ostracized by members of the former SAKURA KAI group.**

1. ^X NAKANO Tetsu Shimbashi, former president of DOKKI News Agency, has split with the KITO KIKAN, and is planning to establish a SHIMAN KIKAN which will form the basis for an independent movement for the reconstruction of Japan. (Date of Info: 2 June 1951; date acquired: 3 June 1951)

Field Comments:

** See ZJLA-1231 and reports referenced therein for information on the SAKURA KAI. ARISUE's "work with the Americans" policy has been the cause of difficulties with other JIS leaders previously reported by BAKELER/L.

See ZJLA-1095 for possible covert source of para 1.

(C □ D)

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

Classification
EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy ☐
(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒
(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

AKISUE POSITIVE

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

Date:

ARISUE Seigo

Born: 22 May 1895.

Permanent Address: No. 33, Chashiuchi, Bibai-machi, Sorachi-gun, Hokkaido

Schools from which graduated: Military Academy, 25 May 1917
Military Staff College, 29 Nov 1924

Career: Was Chief of G-2, Army General Staff from August 1942 until the end of the war. An outline of the posts held by subject follows:

- 1917 - Commissioned as 2nd Lt.
- 1921 - Promoted to 1st Lt.
- 1925 - Performed minor duties at G.H.Q.
- 1928 - Was sent to Italy for military study in Italian Army War College
- 1931 - Promoted to Major. Commander of Battalion
- 1932 - Private Secretary of Army Minister
- 1935 - Assigned to duties in the War Ministry
- 1936 - Military Attache to Rome as Lt Col.
- 1938 - Advanced to rank of Col.
- 1939 - 6 months, Chief of Staff Section, Army Ministry.
6 months, member of North China Army Staff.
- 1941 - Major General, Vice Chief of North China Army Staff
- 1942 - July, assigned to G.H.Q.
August, made Chief of G-2, Army General Staff
- 1945 - March, Lt General, G.H.Q., representative with Atsugi and Yokohama Commissions.

Note: Since the occupation Lt General ARISUE has been the senior military member of the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy Liaison Committee

SOURCE: U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Interrogation No. 238, 1 Nov 1945.

On 16 Apr 1946, Mr. OHTA, Liaison Office, Ministry of Finance, contacted 441st Intell Det re info on Lt Gen ARISUE. Advised there were 2 brothers, both generals, both extremely pro-German and active in effecting the Tokyo-Berlin pact. One of the brothers died prior to war's end, but the other is now cooperating with American forces and holds a position in the Demobilization Office. Informant characterized ARISUE as being a very clever turncoat, who turned out as part of the welcoming committee for Gen'l MacArthur, despite his bitter anti-Allied attitude prior to and during the war. OHTA advised he had heard rumors that ARISUE headed ARISUE KIKAN, An Army Secret Service organization during the war and this organization had a fund of ¥100,000,000 which was hauled away to a secret hiding place just prior to the Occupation.

FOR COORDINATION WITH U.S. Army

SUMMARY OF INFO, 22 Apr 1946

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy ☐
(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒
(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

FILE IN

(Intelligence Section Notes, dated 6 May 1946, on Maj Gen'l ARISUE Seizo)

1. Subject is shown in the 1944 Army Register as having been promoted to Maj Gen in Oct 1941 and having assumed the position of chief of #2 Dept, Gen'l Staff Hq, attached to the Army Staff of Imperial GHQ in Oct 1942. Penned notation appended to the entry states that he is attached to the Army Sec of the War Ministry since 21 Sep 45. As the Chief Liaison Officer of the Jap War Ministry, he is in very close contact with G-2 of GHQ.

2. Personality cards show that ARISUE has had a long administrative career in the Army. He attended courses at the War College at Turin, Italy from 1929 to 1931 and was from time to time attached to various Italian Infantry Regiments. He was Military Attache at the Japanese Embassy in Rome from 1936 to 1939. Records do not show what his duties were upon his return to Japan, but there are indications that he held a position of importance in that he was Chairman of the funeral services for Lt Gen MORIYA (Mil Attache to Jap Embassy in Thailand) in May 1943. He was a Vice-President of the House of Peers later in 1943. He was a representative at the Tri-Partite Technical Commission meeting at the official residence of Premier TOJO in April 1944. He was a chairman of funeral services for Prince KANIN in May 1945. A certain boastful informant at present being interviewed states that ARISUE was delegated to persuade him to approve the Tri-Partite Alliance with Germany and Italy.

3. A member of the Japanese Central Liaison Office has told an officer of this section confidentially that there have been many inquiries to and within his own organization as to why ARISUE "who was deeply involved in Japan's progress toward war" has not been arrested as a war criminal. He states that his habitual reply is that he has no doubt that ARISUE will be asked to join his friends at Sugamo as soon as his usefulness to GHQ in connection with demobilization has ceased.

1. The following notes are the result of informal conversations with Gen'l ARISUE. It is emphasized that many of these remarks are, to a certain extent little more than surmise but, it is equally felt that they may not be too far fetched to merit some little attention.

2. ARISUE is a man of almost incredible vitality, combining a boyish boisterousness with an extremely shrewd and able mind, well aware of the difficulties of his position and determined to make the best out of a very bad job. He considers he is now in a position of key importance to SCAP - he never loses an opportunity of pointing out how useful he is in ironing out difficulties of procedure, misunderstandings and frictions which of necessity must arise between the occupation authorities, however far-seeing and liberal-minded these may be, and the representatives of a conquered nation - and he intends to strengthen his position and exploit it to the full. He is, moreover, a soldier of great experience in both the military and political spheres, deeply versed in Far Eastern affairs, having held a number of very high positions which have maintained him at the very centre of the Japanese military and intelligence machine. He has collected around him a group of men, all of whom are very experienced, active, and clear-minded, some of whom, like Colonel TANAKA, are of first rate ability. Lastly, he is a man of considerable personal charm.

3. ARISUE belongs to the same group of high ranking officers such as General ITAGAKI (deeply involved in many phases of Tokuma Kikan activity in China, now in Singapore, where he represented Field Marshal TERAUCHI at the surrender negotiations); General KAGESA, the real creator of the WANG CHING WEI puppet government at Nanking; General TANAKA, the writer of the famous "Memorial", and General TOJO himself, in other words to the group of military leaders who forced their conception of Japanese power, conquest and rule on the Far East. ARISUE never mentions the ideas and ideals of these men, but it is clear from the way he speaks of them that he considers them the finest minds of the Japanese Army.

4. There has, however, appeared a rift between these men; their apprehension at and condemnation of the attitude taken up by General TANAKA Ryukichi, ARISUE stated, in so many words, that he considered TANAKA's attitude in providing the International Prosecutions authorities with evidence against TOJO and in writing his book "GUMBATSU", dishonorable in the extreme and accuses him of being a liar and of misrepresenting and distorting for his own ends events for which TOJO will be tried but in which TANAKA himself played a leading part.

5. ARISUE betrays great anxiety for TOJO and he implies that TOJO's case has been prejudged and that, whatever the evidence, he will hang. On the other hand he is most anxious that everything possible should be done to counter TANAKA's evidence which, rightly or wrongly, he considers will provide the prosecution with their most effective weapons. In this connection he is most anxious that the defense should have available as a witness General TAGESA, and it is implied that the latter, knowing how deeply implicated TANAKA was himself will be able to discredit the honesty of the evidence he is producing against TOJO. It would appear that ARISUE hopes that it might be thus possible either to make TOJO's conviction fail or, at least, to make it so difficult that it would appear unjust; in either case, ARISUE and the party he represents would gain a moral victory of incalculable value; in the former case, the verdict of an American court finding TOJO innocent would clear the whole military clique and, in the latter case there would be such discredit cast on the same court that it would never recover its prestige.

6. With ref to ARISUE's ideas for the immediate future the following points are offered: He loses no opportunity of passing discrediting remarks on the personnel and methods of the present C.L.O., stating that this organization offers all the characteristics of the slow moving and inefficient Japanese civilian administration; Army officers should be in charge who would expedite matters of liaison between SCAP and the Japanese Government.

He states that No. 1 Demobilization Ministry ceases to function as from the end of this month, after which he believes he will be appointed in some sort of special liaison capacity to G-2 and a number of his present officers will take up posts in C.L.O. He thus hopes to base himself (and picked officers of his) in the heart of SCAP where he may be in the best position to see what happens. It is to be noted that he is already exceedingly well informed; he is aware, for example, that Colonel YAMAMURA, of the Kempeitai, has been subjected to a number of interrogations and these have been most productive - this implies that YAMAMURA, although not connected with ARISUE has informed the latter of his activities. It should also be remembered that a nominee of his, HIROSE, was implicated in the BA MAW Affair, a result of which certain members of the C.L.O. and Foreign Ministry are now in Sugamo.

7. These remarks are not to be taken as implying that there is centering around ARISUE, a group of officers who are determined to thwart the Allied authorities in the measures they are taking. Rather they should be read as implying that this group of able men will do all in their power to assist the Allied authorities while doing so in such a way as to preserve their position and influence, convinced as they are that they alone are capable ultimately of ruling Japan. They are playing on the assumption that the Allied occupation will not last indefinitely, certainly not long enough to prevent either themselves or the other, younger men, whom they can imbue with their ideas, from maintaining their influence in the shaping of Japan.

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET

(When Filled In)

PERSONALITY (201) FILE REQUEST

TO	RI/ANALYSIS SECTION	DATE	13 Feb 58	ACTION	
FROM	RI/AN/201	ROOM NO	1504 K	TELEPHONE	4628

INSTRUCTIONS: Form must be typed or printed in block letters.

SECTION I: List 201 number, name and identifying data in the spaces provided. All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: List cryptonym or pseudonym, if assigned. If true name is sensitive, obtain 201 number from 201 Control Desk and complete Section I and Section III. On a separate form, enter the 201 number and complete Section II and Section III. Submit each form separately.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

SENSITIVE		1. SOURCE DOCUMENT	
NONSENSITIVE		PJTA-21618	
NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)
ARISUE	Seizo		
			SEX 3.
			M F

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2.	(Last)	(First)	(Middle)	(Title)

PHOTO 4.	BIRTH DATE 5.	COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6.	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7.	OTHER IDENTIFICATION 8.
YES NO	D 22 M 05 Y 95	JAP		1. 2. 3.
OCCUPATION/POSITION				OCC/POS. CODE 9.
Former Gen				ARMY

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM	PSEUDONYM

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10.	ACTION DESK 11.	SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST 12.	THIRD COUNTRY INTEREST 12a.
JAP	FE/1		

COMMENTS:

Worked for Gen WILLOUGHBY

Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

PERMANENT CHANGE

(2)(B) Methods/Sources

(2)(C) Foreign Relations

RESTRICTED FILE

YES

NO

SIGNATURE

CONFIDENTIAL

8 October 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IOB

SUBJECT : Contact with Ex Lt. Gen. ARISUE

1. On 12 Sept. I attended a farewell dinner in honor of Phil NAGAO, my former assistant at the Embassy, given by Ex Lt. Gen. ARISUE Seise. ARISUE was formerly ~~was~~ on the staff of Gen. Willeghby's "Special Operations Branch", and evidently was a trusted confidant.

2. I, personally know very little about ARISUE with the exception of what I found in the IRB files which conclude that he is "an opportunist", but that he does maintain a number of contacts from his former Army days. He also is regarded as well off financially, and there seems to be such doubt as to the source of his income.

3. During the dinner mentioned above, ARISUE mentioned that he would like to maintain contact with me - as an Embassy official in the political division - following Nagao's departure. I opined that such should prove mutually beneficial, and let it go at that!

4. Following this meeting, I check him out with [] and found out that ARISUE is listed as a close contact of []

5. It is requested that you advise COS of this recent contact and ask him whether or not he wishes me to (a) pursue this contact or (b) drop it graciously. Personally, I prefer the latter!

[]

INSTRUCTIONS FROM C/IOB:

"Let die on well-known vine....." 21 Oct. 1958

[]

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy ☐
(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒
(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMO IOB : CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE []

[]

SECRET

Encl. to FJTA

30357

Date

15 September 1959

PERSONALITY INFORMATION DATA

Address and Tel. No.	Name ARISUE Saizo
Permanent Address #33, Chashiuchi, Bibai-machi, Sorachi-gun, Hokkaido	201 No. 215925
Present Position Former Lt. Gen., Intelligence type, position unknown Assigned as Research Officer with Foreign Ministry	Photo
Physical Description	
DOB & POB 22 May 1895	
Family	
Education Subject is a graduate of both the Military Academy and the War College.	
Languages	
Previous Career 1917 - Subject graduated from the Military Academy, and was com- missioned a 2nd Lt. 1921 - Promoted to 1st Lt. 1923 - Subject graduated from the War College. (cont'd on attached sheets)	
Personality (Habits, use of Money, Hobbies, Literature, Vices, etc.) Subject reportedly is well off financially, but there seems to be some doubt as to the source of his income. Subject is a man of almost incredible vitality, combining a boyish boisterousness with an extremely shrewd and able mind. He has been characterized as an opportunist and as being a very clever turncoat, who turned out as part of the welcoming committee for Gen. MacArthur, despite his bitter anti-Allied attitude prior to and during the War.	
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT	

Approved for Release

by the Central Intelligence Agency

Date:

SECRET

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy ☐(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

21: 0922
Cap to FJTA 30357

Dated: _____

-2-

ARISUE Seizo (JIS)
(cont'd)

Previous Career: (cont'd)

- 1925 - Subject performed minor duties at GHQ.
- 1928 - Subject was sent to Italy for military study in the Italian Army War College.
- 1929 - He attended courses at the War College in Turin, Italy, from 1929 to 1931. During this period he was, from time to time, attached to various Italian Infantry Regiments.
- 1931 - Promoted to Major. He served as Commander of a Battalion.
- 1932 - Private Secretary of Army Minister.
- 1935 - Assigned to duties in the War Ministry, as a member of the Military Affairs Section.
- 1936 - Subject was assigned as Military Attache to Rome, as a Lt. Col., and served in this position until March 1939. While Subject was serving in Rome as Military Attache, KAWABE Torashiro held the equivalent position in Berlin. The two developed a close association.
- 1938 - Promoted to rank of Col.
- 1939 - From 1939 to 1940, Subject was a member of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry. He was active in bringing Japan into the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. During this period he served as Chief of Staff Section, Army Ministry for six months, and as a member of the North China Army Staff for six months.
- 1941 - From 1941 to 1942, as a Major General, Subject served as a staff officer, and then as Deputy Chief of Staff of the North China Army Area Command.

Enc. ETA 30357

Dated: _____

-3-

ARISUE Seizo (JIS)
(cont'd)

Previous Career: (cont'd)

- 1942 - In July Subject was assigned to G.H.Q., and in August he was made Chief of G-2, the Intelligence Section of the Japanese Imperial General Staff, and served in this capacity until 1945.
- 1943 - In May Subject was Chairman of the funeral services for Lt. Gen. MORIYA, the Military Attache to the Japanese Embassy in Thailand. Later in 1943, he was a Vice-President of the House of Peers.
- 1944 - Subject was a representative at the Tripartite Technical Commission meeting at the official residence of Premier TOJO in April 1944.
- 1945 - In March, as a Lt. Gen., GHQ, he served as a representative with the Atsugi and Yokohama Commissions. In May he was Chairman of the funeral services for Prince KANIN. After the war, from August to September, Subject headed a joint committee of Army, Navy, Foreign and Home Ministeries personnel for liaison with the occupation forces. He set up an office in the Nippon Club, Yuraku-cho, Tokyo, to handle liaison between the American forces and the First Demobilization Bureau. It was also reported that since the occupation, Subject had been the senior military member of the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy Liaison Committee. From 1945 to 1947, he worked in MacArthur's War History Editing Office in the NYK Bldg., and worked in the Historical Material Section of the Demobilization Bureau. During this time HAYASHI Saburo was also employed in the same section, and worked with Subject.
- 1946 - On 16 April 1946, Mr. OHTA of the Liaison Office, Ministry of Finance, contacted the 441st Intelligence Detachment concerning information on Subject. He stated that he had heard rumors that Subject had headed the ARISUE KIKAN, an Army Secret Service organization during the war, and that this organization had a fund of ¥100,000,000 which was hauled away to a secret hiding place just prior to the Occupation. A member of the Japanese Central Liaison Office reported that there had been many inquiries to and within his own organization as to why Subject "who was deeply involved in Japan's

31. 4/22
cl. to FJTA 30357
Dated: _____

-4-

ARISUE Seizo (JIS)
(cont'd)

Previous Career: (cont'd)

progress toward war" had not been arrested as a war criminal. He stated that his habitual reply was that he had no doubt that Subject would be asked to join his friends at Sugamo as soon as his usefulness to GHQ in connection with demobilization had ceased. Subject reportedly was well aware of the difficulties of his position and determined to make the best out of a very bad job. He considered that he was in a position of key importance to SCAP, and he never lost an opportunity to point out how useful he was in ironing out difficulties of procedure, misunderstanding, and frictions which of necessity must arise between the occupation authorities and the representatives of a conquered nation. He intended to strengthen his position and exploit it to the full. Subject is a soldier of great experience in both the military and political spheres and deeply versed in Far Eastern affairs. At this time he had collected around him a group of men, all of whom were very experienced, active, and clear-minded. Subject belonged to the same group of high-ranking officers as General ITAGAKI, General KAGESA, General TANAKA, and General TOJO, in other words, to the group of military leaders who had forced their conception of Japanese power, conquest and rule on the Far East. Subject never mentioned the ideas and ideals of these men, but it was clear from the way he spoke of them that he considered them the finest minds of the Japanese Army. Subject also betrayed great anxiety over TOJO, and implies that TOJO's case had been prejudged.

- 1947 - Subject closed his office because the liaison work had gone into other channels. After the war he had assisted KAWABE Torashiro financially after the war, and the two had strengthened their friendship. Therefore KAWABE persuaded TATSUMI Eiichi, YOSHINAKA Wataro, and American officers who opposed Subject to include him in the KAWABE Organization, and Subject joined this Organization.
- 1948 - According to another report, about the end of 1948, General WILLOUGHBY requested the formation of an intelligence organization, which became known as the KAWABE Organization. It was composed of the following: SHIMOMURA Sadamu, Advisor; KAWABE

ARISUE Seizo (JIS)
(cont'd)

Previous Career: (cont'd)

- Torashiro, Frontman; and three geographical heads, TATSUMI Eiichi - Honshu, YOSHINAKA Wataru - Kyushu, and Subject - Hokkaido.
- 1951 - In September 1951, Subject was listed as one of the Soviet Press subscribers. The Soviet Press was one of the daily newspapers published by the Soviet Press News Agency (Sobieto Puresu Tsushin Sha Kabushiki Kaisha).
- 1952 - In March Zenei (Vanguard), a JCP magazine reported Subject to be one of the men directing the activities of the KATO Intelligence Agency, a G-2 group. KAWABE Torashiro and TANAKA Ryukichi also worked with Subject in directing this group. A report of April listed Subject in a group of Japanese military personnel connected with American organizations in Tokyo. He was working under G-2, the KAWABE Organization (Kikan). He was also listed among the Japanese military personnel affiliated with party organizations, in a group with TANAKA Shinichi. This group was believed to be connected with ASHIDA Hitoshi, who was affiliated with the Progressive Party. Subject attended the inaugural meeting of the Sakurada Kai held on 8 May 1952. This was an organization of general officers from the Japanese Military Academy graduating classes between the years 1913 and 1921. It was stated that the purpose of the organization was to promote friendly relations among the members.
- 1959 - Assigned as Research Officer with the Foreign Ministry. Applied for visa to the U.S. to visit the Japanese Embassy in Washington for the purpose of studying economic and social conditions in the U.S. Plans to remain in the U.S. about 17 days. Scheduled to leave Japan 10 Sept 1959.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy ☐
 (2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒
 (2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Immigration and Naturalization Service

Approved for Release
 by the Central Intelligence Agency
 Date: 2005

FOR COORDINATION WITH

INS

Instructions: Any handwritten entries shall be in block capital letters. All Spanish names shall be hyphenated with the father's name first and the mother's name following.

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
 Department of Justice
 Washington 25, D. C.

FILE NO.
DATE
9-10-59

The alien listed below has been admitted to the United States under the provisions of section 101 (a) 15 (A) or 101 (a) 15 (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

NAME (Last, in CAPS)	(First)	(Middle)	OCCUPATION
ARISUE	SEIZU		GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL
HOME ADDRESS			
139-4 Matsubara-cho, Setagawa-ku, Tokyo, Japan			
DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH			
Hokkaido, Japan 5-22-1895			
RACE		NATIONALITY	
yellow		Japan	
PURPOSE AND LENGTH OF INTENDED STAY			
Gov't business - indefinite period			
DATE AND PLACE OF ADMISSION TO UNITED STATES			
9-10-59 Honolulu, Hawaii			
DESTINATION			
Japanese Embassy, Washin gton, D C.			
ACCOMPANYING CHILDREN UNDER 14			
none			

Other agencies are requested to furnish any derogatory subversive information regarding this alien to the F.B.I.

MEMORANDUM COORDINATION		
Date	INITIALS	
ANALYST		
DIV.	BRANCH	
FE	2170	ag
RE EDITOR		
RE TYPIST		

Assistant Commissioner
 Examinations Division

cc: C.I.A.
 G-2
 O.S.I.
 1-57

(Rev. 1-1-57)

FILE IN

CS COPY

Encl 1 CSOI 51764,286

23 Sep 59
 1000

SECRET

6861-3/764286

16 MAR 1961

NOT SUITABLE FOR MICROFILM

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: ^oARISUN, Seisun
Vina - Japanese

1. Reference is made to the I-57 request form concerning Seisun ARISUN, born 22 May 1895, who entered the United States on 10 September 1950. Following is a summary of numerous reports in the files concerning Subject, dated between 1940 and 1950, and coming from sources considered in the most part to be usually reliable.

2. Subject was active in bringing Japan into the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy before World War II. He was active in intelligence work from 1942, when he was appointed Chief of G-2, the Intelligence Section of the Japanese Imperial General Staff. He was one of the foremost proponents of the revival of Japanese intelligence activity after World War II. At the close of the war, he headed a joint committee of Army, Navy, Foreign and Home Ministry personnel for liaison with the occupation forces. He apparently maintained a close working relationship in intelligence matters with the American forces in Japan and was responsible for introducing many Japanese officers into joint intelligence work with the Americans. Subject's own Kikan (group), established about 1948, and its subordinate entities were powerful and extensive, and Subject exercised great personal power over Japanese intelligence service circles until the end of 1950.

3. In the fall of 1950 Subject was at the zenith of his power, though still nominally subordinate to Terashima KAWANE, former ^{Chief of Staff} Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2, and leader of the powerful KATO Kikan. About November 1950, however, most of the leaders in Japanese intelligence circles broke with Subject, who had become quite power-mad and self-seeking in an opportunistic effort to strengthen his own position. He persistently advocated close American supervision of the future Japanese military defense forces and intelligence service activities, feeling that his own power and prestige was dependent upon his American connections and contacts. As of the Spring of 1951 Subject was virtually excluded from the revival plans of the principal proponents of a future Japanese Intelligence Service or armed service.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy ☐

(2)(B) Methods/Sources ☒

(2)(G) Foreign Relations ☐

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4. In September 1951, Subject was listed as one of the subscribers to the Soviet Press, one of the daily newspapers published by the Soviet Press News Agency. Several reports in 1952, such as articles in Japanese Communist Party publications, mentioned that Subject was still active in intelligence work, but it is believed that he no longer held a very prominent position in this field, and little or no information concerning his connection with intelligence had been received since then.

5. This office has no objection to the Bureau making the above information available to other officially interested United States Government agencies as deemed advisable.

CSG1-3/764,266

SECRET