"I have noted in red
the
subtle dissembling of Hirohito." -- Roger Mansell
August
14, 1945, New York Times
TO OUR GOOD AND LOYAL SUBJECTS:
After pondering deeply the general trends of the world
and the
actual conditions obtaining in our empire today, we have decided to
effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to an
extraordinary measure.
We have ordered our Government to communicate to the
Governments of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet
Union that our empire accepts the provisions
of their joint declaration.
To strive for the common prosperity and happiness of all
nations as well as the security and well-being of our subjects is the
solemn obligation which has been handed down by our imperial ancestors
and which we lay close to the heart.
Indeed, we declared war on
America
and Britain out of our sincere desire to insure Japan's
self-preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from
our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or
to embark upon territorial aggrandizement.
But now the war has lasted for nearly four years.
Despite the
best that has been done by everyone-the gallant fighting of the
military and naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of our servants
of the State and the devoted service of our 100,000,000 people-the war situation has developed not necessarily to
Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world
have all turned against her interest.
Moreover, the enemy has begun
to
employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do
damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent
lives. Should we continue to fight, it would not only result in an
ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it
would lead to the total extinction of human civilization.
Such being the case, how are we to save the millions of
our
subjects, or to atone ourselves before the hallowed spirits of our
imperial ancestors? This is the reason why we have ordered the
acceptance of the provisions of the joint declaration of the powers.
We cannot but express the deepest sense of regret to our
allied nations of East Asia, who have consistently
cooperated with the Empire toward the emancipation of East Asia.
The thought of those officers and men as well as others
who
have fallen in the fields of battle, those who died at their posts of
duty, or those who met with death [otherwise] and all their bereaved
families, pains our heart night and day.
The welfare of the wounded and the war sufferers and of
those
who have lost their home and livelihood is the object of our profound
solicitude. The hardships and sufferings to which our nation is to be
subjected hereafter will be certainly great.
We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all of
you, our
subjects. However, it is according to the dictates of time and fate
that we have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the
generations to come by enduring the [unavoidable] and suffering what is
unsufferable. Having been able to save * * * and maintain the structure
of the Imperial State, we are always with you, our good and loyal
subjects, relying upon your sincerity and integrity.
Beware most strictly of any outbursts of emotion that
may
engender needless complications, of any fraternal contention and strife
that may create confusion, lead you astray and cause you to lose the
confidence of the world.
Let the entire nation continue as one family from
generation
to generation, ever firm in its faith of the imperishableness of its
divine land, and mindful of its heavy burden of responsibilities, and
the long road before it. Unite your total strength to be devoted to the
construction for the future. Cultivate the ways of rectitude, nobility
of spirit, and work with resolution so that
you may enhance the innate glory of the Imperial State and
keep pace with the progress of the world.
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See also these assorted photos and news clippings re the Investigation of Emperor
Hirohito for prosecution as war criminal. (Record Group
153, Box 107, Folders 2 and 26)
On Jan. 24, 1946, MacArthur
wrote a message to the Joints Chiefs of Staff regarding the emperor:
He is a symbol which unites all
Japanese. Destroy him and the nation will disintegrate. Practically all
Japanese venerate him as the social head of the State and believe
rightly or wrongly that the Potsdam Agreements were intended to
maintain him as the emperor of Japan. They will regard Allied action to
the contrary as the greatest betrayal in their history and the hatreds
and resentments engendered by this thought will unquestionably last for
all measurable time. A vendetta for revenge will thereby be initiated
whose cycle may well not be completed for centuries if ever.
The whole of Japan can be expected, in my opinion, to resist the action
either by passive or semi-active means..... It would be absolutely
essential to greatly increase the occupational forces. It is quite
possible that a minimum of a million troops would be required which
would have to be maintained for an indefinite number of years.
The decision as to whether the emperor should be tried as a war
criminal involves a policy determination upon such a high level that I
would not feel it appropriate for me to make a recommendation; but if
the decision by the heads of states is in the affirmative, I recommend
the above measures as imperative. ( Original
document)
MacArthur's message regarding criminal action against the Emperor
Hirohito was handled the very next day. Here's from a blog posting of
mine:
February 10, 2010
MacArthur on Exemption of the
Emperor
from War Criminals, January 25, 1946
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/064shoshi.html
Documents
with Commentaries Part
3 Formulation of the GHQ Draft and Response of the Japanese Government
3-3
Telegram, MacArthur to Eisenhower, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army
Forces, Pacific, concerning exemption of the Emperor from War
Criminals, January 25, 1946
The U.S. Joint Chiefs
of Staff, on November 29, 1945, ordered MacArthur to gather information
regarding whether the Emperor had committed any war crimes. In response
to this, MacArthur sent a telegram dated January 25, 1946 reporting
that there was no evidence of the Emperor having committed any war
crimes. In addition to this, MacArthur stated that charging the Emperor
would cause confusion in the situation in Japan thus requiring a longer
occupation with increased military and civilian personnel. He made it
clear that he would prefer not to charge the Emperor in consideration
of the burden such action would create for the United States.
Actual Title of Source |
Incoming Classified Message From: CINCAFPAC Adv
Tokyo, Japan
To: War Department |
Date |
25 January, 1946 |
Document Number |
State Department Records Decimal File,
1945-1949"894.001
HIROHITO/1-2546"<Sheet No. SDDF (B)00065> |
Repository (reproduction) |
National Diet Library |
Repository |
U.S. National Archives & Records
Administration (RG59) |
Note |
Microfiche |
In a review of a book by
Leonard Mosley on the Emperor of Japan, author David Bergamini wrote:
In September 1945,
the Japanese cabinet, in anticipation of Allied demands, drew up a list
of war criminals. Hirohito forthrightly refused even to consider it
because, he said, these were his 'most loyal retainers.' MacArthur
needed the emperor untried and unreviled. - LIFE magazine, June 17, 1966
For further study into why Emperor Hirohito was not tried at the Tokyo
War Crimes Trials (IMTFE), see Victors' Justice: Tokyo War Crimes Trial
by Richard H. Minear (2015), pp. 138-145. Another book that may be
helpful, a rebuttal of sorts composed of articles by scholars including
Japanese, is Beyond Victor's Justice? The Tokyo War
Crimes Trial Revisited by Simpson, McCormack, and Tanaka
(2011). See also the section, "Why Hirohito Was Not Tried," in War Responsibility and Historical Memory:
Hirohito's Apparition by Herbert Bix (2008):
General Douglas MacArthur, before
he had even arrived on Japanese soil, assumed incorrectly that Hirohito
had been a mere figurehead emperor and a virtually powerless puppet of
Japan's "militarists." This helped the US military to use him just as
Japan's militarists had once done, to ease their rule, legitimize
reforms, and insure their smooth implementation... Such
occupation-sponsored myths strengthened Japanese victim consciousness
and impede the search for truth... But when some of the judges on the
Tokyo tribunal felt compelled to call attention in their dissenting
final judgments to the emperor's total, unqualified political immunity
from leadership crimes even though he had launched the aggressive war,
they insured that the Hirohito case would be remembered.
One of these judges giving a dissenting
opinion at the trial, Justice Bernard of France, disagreed because the
emperor was NOT included in the list of those to be prosecuted, even
though he felt there was enough evidence to implicate the emperor.
Another individual brought out in prominence in this whole matter is
MacArthur's military secretary, Brig. Gen. Bonner Fellers. Here is one
excerpt, out of many possible, from Embracing
Defeat by John Dower (p. 297):
Had the imperial household been
privy to communications at the top level of GHQ, they would have been
ecstatic, for there was little fundamental difference between their
hopes and SCAP's intentions. On October 1, MacArthur received through
Fellers a short legal brief that made absolutely clear that SCAP had no
interest in seriously investigating Hirohito's actual role in the war
undertaken in his name. The brief took as "facts" that the emperor had
not exercised free will in signing the declaration of war; that he had
"lack of knowledge of the true state of affairs"; and that he had
risked his life in attempting to effect the surrender. It offered, in
awkward legalese, the one-sentence "Conclusion" that "If fraud, menace
or duress sufficient to negative intent can be affirmatively
established by the Emperor, he could not stand convicted in a
democratic court of law." And it ended with the following
"Recommendation":
a. That in the interest of
peaceful occupation and rehabilitation of Japan, prevention of
revolution and communism, all facts surrounding the execution of the
declaration of war and subsequent position of the Emperor which tend to
show fraud, menace or duress be marshalled.
b. That if such facts are sufficient to establish an affirmative
defense beyond a reasonable doubt, positive action be taken to prevent
indictment and prosecution of the Emperor as a war criminal.
On the next day, General Fellers prepared a long memorandum for
MacArthur's exclusive perusal that spelled out in richer detail why it
was imperative that such mitigating "facts" be marshaled. Fellers's
memo was written before SCAP's "civil liberties" directive, before free
discussion existed in Japan, before political prisoners had been
released from prison, before the most basic questions of "war
responsibility" had been clearly formulated, before trends in popular
sentiment had been seriously evaluated, before it was even legal for
Japanese to speak such phrases as "popular sovereignty." It read, in
full, as follows:
The attitude of the Japanese
toward their Emperor is not generally understood. Unlike Christians,
the Japanese have no God with whom to commune. Their Emperor is the
living symbol of the race in whom lies the virtues of their ancestors.
He is the incarnation of national spirit, incapable of wrong or
misdeeds. Loyalty to him is absolute. Although no one fears him, all
hold their Emperor in reverential awe. They would not touch him, look
into his face, address him, step on his shadow. Their abject homage to
him amounts to a self abnegation sustained by a religious patriotism
the depth of which is incomprehensible to Westerners.
It would be a sacrilege to entertain the idea that the Emperor is on a
level with the people or any governmental official. To try him as a war
criminal would not only be blasphemous but a denial of spiritual
freedom.
The Imperial War Rescript, 8 December 1941, was the inescapable
responsibility of the Emperor who, as the head of a then sovereign
state, possessed the legal right to issue it. From the highest and most
reliable sources, it can be established that the war did not stem from
the Emperor himself. He has personally said that he had no intention to
have the War Rescript used as Tojo used it.
It is a fundamental American concept that the people of any nation have
the inherent right to choose their own government. Were the Japanese
given this opportunity, they would select the Emperor as the symbolic
head of the state. The masses are especially devoted to Hirohito. They
feel that his addressing the people personally made him unprecedentally
close to them. His rescript demanding peace filled them with joy. They
know he is no puppet now. They feel his retention is not a barrier to
as liberal a government as they are qualified to enjoy.
In effecting our bloodless invasion, we requisitioned the services of
the Emperor. By his order seven million soldiers laid down their arms
and are being rapidly demobilized. Through his act hundreds of
thousands of American casualties were avoided and the war terminated
far ahead of schedule. Therefore having made good use of the Emperor,
to try him for war crimes, to the Japanese, would amount to a breach of
faith. Moreover, the Japanese feel that unconditional surrender as
outlined in the Potsdam Declaration meant preservation of the State
structure, which includes the Emperor.
If the Emperor were tried for war crimes, the governmental structure
would collapse and a general uprising would be inevitable. The people
will uncomplainingly stand any other humiliation. Although they are
disarmed, there would be chaos and bloodshed. It would necessitate a
large expeditionary force with many thousands of public officials. The
period of occupation would be prolonged and we would have alienated the
Japanese.
American long range interests require friendly relations with the
Orient based on mutual respect, faith and understanding. In the long
run it is of paramount, national importance that Japan harbor no
lasting resentment.
SCAP's commitment to saving and using the emperor was firm. The
pressing, immediate task was to create the most usable emperor possible.
Furthermore, Japanese defendants in the trials were compliant in not
mentioning anything which would incriminate the emperor; from p. 325 in
Dower's work:
Before the war crimes trials
actually convened, SCAP, the IPS, and Japanese officials worked behind
the scenes not only to prevent Emperor Hirohito from being indicted,
but also to slant the testimony of the defendants to ensure that no one
implicated him. Former admiral and prime minister Yonai, following
Fellers's advice, apparently did caution Tojo to take care not to
incriminate the emperor in any way. The collaborative campaign to shape
the nature of the trials went considerably beyond this, however. High
officials in court circles and the government collaborated with GHQ in
compiling lists of prospective war criminals, while the hundred or so
prominent individuals eventually arrested as "Class A" suspects and
incarcerated in Sugamo Prison for the duration of the trial (of whom
only twenty-eight were indicted) solemnly vowed on their own to protect
their sovereign against any possible taint of war responsibility. The
sustained intensity of this campaign to protect the emperor was
revealed when, in testifying before the tribunal on December 31, 1947,
Tojo momentarily strayed from the agreed-on line concerning imperial
innocence and referred to the emperor's ultimate authority. The
American-led prosecution immediately arranged that he be secretly
coached to recant this testimony.
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