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"I have noted in red
the subtle dissembling of Hirohito." -- Roger Mansell
August
14, 1945, New York Times
TO OUR GOOD AND LOYAL SUBJECTS:
After pondering deeply the general trends of the world
and the actual conditions obtaining in our empire today,
we have decided to effect a settlement of the present
situation by resorting to an extraordinary measure.
We have ordered our Government to communicate to the
Governments of the United States, Great Britain, China
and the Soviet Union that our empire accepts
the provisions of their joint declaration.
To strive for the common prosperity and happiness of
all nations as well as the security and well-being of
our subjects is the solemn obligation which has been
handed down by our imperial ancestors and which we lay
close to the heart.
Indeed, we declared war on
America and Britain out of our sincere desire to
insure Japan's self-preservation and the
stabilization of East Asia, it being far from our
thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of
other nations or to embark upon territorial
aggrandizement.
But now the war has lasted for nearly four years.
Despite the best that has been done by everyone-the
gallant fighting of the military and naval forces, the
diligence and assiduity of our servants of the State and
the devoted service of our 100,000,000 people-the
war situation has developed not necessarily to
Japan's advantage, while the general
trends of the world have all turned against her
interest.
Moreover, the enemy has begun
to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the
power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable,
taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we
continue to fight, it would not only result in an
ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese
nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction
of human civilization.
Such being the case, how are we to save the millions of
our subjects, or to atone ourselves before the hallowed
spirits of our imperial ancestors? This is the reason
why we have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of
the joint declaration of the powers.
We cannot but express the deepest sense of regret to
our allied nations of East Asia, who have consistently
cooperated with the Empire toward the emancipation of East Asia.
The thought of those officers and men as well as others
who have fallen in the fields of battle, those who died
at their posts of duty, or those who met with death
[otherwise] and all their bereaved families, pains our
heart night and day.
The welfare of the wounded and the war sufferers and of
those who have lost their home and livelihood is the
object of our profound solicitude. The hardships and
sufferings to which our nation is to be subjected
hereafter will be certainly great.
We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all of
you, our subjects. However, it is according to the
dictates of time and fate that we have resolved to pave
the way for a grand peace for all the generations to
come by enduring the [unavoidable] and suffering what is
unsufferable. Having been able to save * * * and
maintain the structure of the Imperial State, we are
always with you, our good and loyal subjects, relying
upon your sincerity and integrity.
Beware most strictly of any outbursts of emotion that
may engender needless complications, of any fraternal
contention and strife that may create confusion, lead
you astray and cause you to lose the confidence of the
world.
Let the entire nation continue as one family from
generation to generation, ever firm in its faith of the
imperishableness of its divine land, and mindful of its
heavy burden of responsibilities, and the long road
before it. Unite your total strength to be devoted to
the construction for the future. Cultivate the ways of
rectitude, nobility of spirit, and work
with resolution so that you may enhance the innate
glory of the Imperial State and keep pace
with the progress of the world.
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See also these assorted photos and news clippings re the Investigation
of Emperor Hirohito for prosecution as war criminal. (Record
Group 153, Box 107, Folders 2 and 26)
On Jan. 24, 1946,
MacArthur wrote a message to the Joints Chiefs of Staff regarding
the emperor:
He is a symbol which unites all
Japanese. Destroy him and the nation will disintegrate.
Practically all Japanese venerate him as the social head of the
State and believe rightly or wrongly that the Potsdam Agreements
were intended to maintain him as the emperor of Japan. They will
regard Allied action to the contrary as the greatest betrayal in
their history and the hatreds and resentments engendered by this
thought will unquestionably last for all measurable time. A
vendetta for revenge will thereby be initiated whose cycle may
well not be completed for centuries if ever.
The whole of Japan can be expected, in my opinion, to resist the
action either by passive or semi-active means..... It would be
absolutely essential to greatly increase the occupational
forces. It is quite possible that a minimum of a million troops
would be required which would have to be maintained for an
indefinite number of years.
The decision as to whether the emperor should be tried as a war
criminal involves a policy determination upon such a high level
that I would not feel it appropriate for me to make a
recommendation; but if the decision by the heads of states is in
the affirmative, I recommend the above measures as imperative. ( Original
document)
MacArthur's message regarding criminal action against the Emperor
Hirohito was handled the very next day. Here's from a blog posting
of mine:
February 10, 2010
MacArthur on Exemption of the
Emperor
from War Criminals, January 25, 1946
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/064shoshi.html
Documents
with
Commentaries Part 3 Formulation of the GHQ Draft and
Response of the Japanese Government
3-3 Telegram, MacArthur to
Eisenhower, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific,
concerning exemption of the Emperor from War Criminals,
January 25, 1946
The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, on November 29, 1945, ordered
MacArthur to gather information regarding whether the Emperor
had committed any war crimes. In response to this, MacArthur
sent a telegram dated January 25, 1946 reporting that there
was no evidence of the Emperor having committed any war
crimes. In addition to this, MacArthur stated that charging
the Emperor would cause confusion in the situation in Japan
thus requiring a longer occupation with increased military and
civilian personnel. He made it clear that he would prefer not
to charge the Emperor in consideration of the burden such
action would create for the United States.
| Actual Title of Source |
Incoming Classified Message From: CINCAFPAC Adv
Tokyo, Japan To: War Department |
| Date |
25 January, 1946 |
| Document Number |
State Department Records Decimal File,
1945-1949"894.001 HIROHITO/1-2546"<Sheet No. SDDF
(B)00065> |
| Repository (reproduction) |
National Diet Library |
| Repository |
U.S. National Archives & Records
Administration (RG59) |
| Note |
Microfiche |
In a review of a
book by Leonard Mosley on the Emperor of Japan, author David
Bergamini wrote:
In September
1945, the Japanese cabinet, in anticipation of Allied
demands, drew up a list of war criminals. Hirohito forthrightly
refused even to consider it because, he said, these were his
'most loyal retainers.' MacArthur needed the emperor untried and
unreviled. - LIFE
magazine, June 17, 1966
For further study into why Emperor Hirohito was not tried at the
Tokyo War Crimes Trials (IMTFE), see Victors' Justice: Tokyo War Crimes
Trial by Richard H. Minear (2015), pp. 138-145.
Another book that may be helpful, a rebuttal of sorts composed of
articles by scholars including Japanese, is Beyond Victor's Justice? The Tokyo
War Crimes Trial Revisited by Simpson, McCormack,
and Tanaka (2011). See also the section, "Why Hirohito Was Not
Tried," in War Responsibility
and Historical Memory: Hirohito's Apparition by Herbert
Bix (2008):
General Douglas MacArthur, before
he had even arrived on Japanese soil, assumed incorrectly that
Hirohito had been a mere figurehead emperor and a virtually
powerless puppet of Japan's "militarists." This helped the US
military to use him just as Japan's militarists had once done,
to ease their rule, legitimize reforms, and insure their smooth
implementation... Such occupation-sponsored myths strengthened
Japanese victim consciousness and impede the search for truth...
But when some of the judges on the Tokyo tribunal felt compelled
to call attention in their dissenting final judgments to the
emperor's total, unqualified political immunity from leadership
crimes even though he had launched the aggressive war, they
insured that the Hirohito case would be remembered.
One of these judges giving a dissenting opinion at the trial,
Justice Bernard of France, disagreed because the emperor was NOT
included in the list of those to be prosecuted, even though he
felt there was enough evidence to implicate the emperor.
Another individual brought out in prominence in this whole matter
is MacArthur's military secretary, Brig. Gen. Bonner Fellers. Here
is one excerpt, out of many possible, from Embracing
Defeat by John Dower (p. 297):
Had the imperial household been
privy to communications at the top level of GHQ, they would have
been ecstatic, for there was little fundamental difference
between their hopes and SCAP's intentions. On October 1,
MacArthur received through Fellers a short legal brief that made
absolutely clear that SCAP had no interest in seriously
investigating Hirohito's actual role in the war undertaken in
his name. The brief took as "facts" that the emperor had not
exercised free will in signing the declaration of war; that he
had "lack of knowledge of the true state of affairs"; and that
he had risked his life in attempting to effect the surrender. It
offered, in awkward legalese, the one-sentence "Conclusion" that
"If fraud, menace or duress sufficient to negative intent can be
affirmatively established by the Emperor, he could not stand
convicted in a democratic court of law." And it ended with the
following "Recommendation":
a. That in the interest of
peaceful occupation and rehabilitation of Japan, prevention of
revolution and communism, all facts surrounding the execution
of the declaration of war and subsequent position of the
Emperor which tend to show fraud, menace or duress be
marshalled.
b. That if such facts are sufficient to establish an
affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt, positive action
be taken to prevent indictment and prosecution of the Emperor
as a war criminal.
On the next day, General Fellers prepared a long memorandum for
MacArthur's exclusive perusal that spelled out in richer detail
why it was imperative that such mitigating "facts" be marshaled.
Fellers's memo was written before SCAP's "civil liberties"
directive, before free discussion existed in Japan, before
political prisoners had been released from prison, before the
most basic questions of "war responsibility" had been clearly
formulated, before trends in popular sentiment had been
seriously evaluated, before it was even legal for Japanese to
speak such phrases as "popular sovereignty." It read, in full,
as follows:
The attitude of the Japanese
toward their Emperor is not generally understood. Unlike
Christians, the Japanese have no God with whom to commune.
Their Emperor is the living symbol of the race in whom lies
the virtues of their ancestors. He is the incarnation of
national spirit, incapable of wrong or misdeeds. Loyalty to
him is absolute. Although no one fears him, all hold their
Emperor in reverential awe. They would not touch him, look
into his face, address him, step on his shadow. Their abject
homage to him amounts to a self abnegation sustained by a
religious patriotism the depth of which is incomprehensible to
Westerners.
It would be a sacrilege to entertain the idea that the Emperor
is on a level with the people or any governmental official. To
try him as a war criminal would not only be blasphemous but a
denial of spiritual freedom.
The Imperial War Rescript, 8 December 1941, was the
inescapable responsibility of the Emperor who, as the head of
a then sovereign state, possessed the legal right to issue it.
From the highest and most reliable sources, it can be
established that the war did not stem from the Emperor
himself. He has personally said that he had no intention to
have the War Rescript used as Tojo used it.
It is a fundamental American concept that the people of any
nation have the inherent right to choose their own government.
Were the Japanese given this opportunity, they would select
the Emperor as the symbolic head of the state. The masses are
especially devoted to Hirohito. They feel that his addressing
the people personally made him unprecedentally close to them.
His rescript demanding peace filled them with joy. They know
he is no puppet now. They feel his retention is not a barrier
to as liberal a government as they are qualified to enjoy.
In effecting our bloodless invasion, we requisitioned the
services of the Emperor. By his order seven million soldiers
laid down their arms and are being rapidly demobilized.
Through his act hundreds of thousands of American casualties
were avoided and the war terminated far ahead of schedule.
Therefore having made good use of the Emperor, to try him for
war crimes, to the Japanese, would amount to a breach of
faith. Moreover, the Japanese feel that unconditional
surrender as outlined in the Potsdam Declaration meant
preservation of the State structure, which includes the
Emperor.
If the Emperor were tried for war crimes, the governmental
structure would collapse and a general uprising would be
inevitable. The people will uncomplainingly stand any other
humiliation. Although they are disarmed, there would be chaos
and bloodshed. It would necessitate a large expeditionary
force with many thousands of public officials. The period of
occupation would be prolonged and we would have alienated the
Japanese.
American long range interests require friendly relations with
the Orient based on mutual respect, faith and understanding.
In the long run it is of paramount, national importance that
Japan harbor no lasting resentment.
SCAP's commitment to saving and using the emperor was firm. The
pressing, immediate task was to create the most usable emperor
possible.
Furthermore, Japanese defendants in the trials were compliant in
not mentioning anything which would incriminate the emperor; from
p. 325 in Dower's work:
Before the war crimes trials
actually convened, SCAP, the IPS, and Japanese officials worked
behind the scenes not only to prevent Emperor Hirohito from
being indicted, but also to slant the testimony of the
defendants to ensure that no one implicated him. Former admiral
and prime minister Yonai, following Fellers's advice, apparently
did caution Tojo to take care not to incriminate the emperor in
any way. The collaborative campaign to shape the nature of the
trials went considerably beyond this, however. High officials in
court circles and the government collaborated with GHQ in
compiling lists of prospective war criminals, while the hundred
or so prominent individuals eventually arrested as "Class A"
suspects and incarcerated in Sugamo Prison for the duration of
the trial (of whom only twenty-eight were indicted) solemnly
vowed on their own to protect their sovereign against any
possible taint of war responsibility. The sustained intensity of
this campaign to protect the emperor was revealed when, in
testifying before the tribunal on December 31, 1947, Tojo
momentarily strayed from the agreed-on line concerning imperial
innocence and referred to the emperor's ultimate authority. The
American-led prosecution immediately arranged that he be
secretly coached to recant this testimony.
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