

who had taken fright and were reporting from safe areas. Thus really valuable information was negligible. I have heard it said that no information that influenced operational plans was ever received."

g. There is strong reason to assume that the Navy's SSO existed on a larger scale prior to the war when its "resident officers" could operate throughout the world instead of limiting their activities to Asia. There was ample opportunity for collecting intelligence through agents masked as representatives of Japanese business firms. Naval attaches disclosed that such commercial representatives met with the embassy officials monthly, and that in Germany, at least, they studied and translated technical publications, giving copies of such translations to the attache for forwarding to the Navy Ministry.

h. Whatever contribution the Navy's minor wartime Special Service Organization made to operational intelligence was a very meager one, indeed, and was of negligible, if any, value to the Naval General Staff.

5. Kempei Tai

a. The Japanese Kempei Tai, often referred to as the military police and by the Japanese as the gendarmerie had powers nearly as broad as those of the Nazi Gestapo. Although in the field it worked with the Army, it was under the jurisdiction of the War Ministry and controlled both administrative and judicial police and, as a military organization, was divided into administrative and judicial sections. It had wide powers, vested with the right to exercise Japan's authority over military personnel and the general public alike.

b. Headquarters were in Tokyo for training and for the organization in Japan, Korea, Formosa and the South Seas; there were separate headquarters (and training) in China, Manchuria, and Malaya. Selection was rigid, based on physical and mental tests and on family eligibility; training covered special investigation, administration of justice, organic law, administration, geography, history, self-defense and the art of making an arrest.

c. In the South Seas, the organization was broken down into gendarmerie sections, each embracing general affairs, police affairs, special investigations, and judicial affairs, for each area or island. Apparently the work of Tokumu Kikan was carried out by the Kempei in this area. Elsewhere, outside of Japan, each area army was assigned Kempei units at headquarters and division level, with the Kempei being on its own below that level. Total Kempei complement for an army is estimated at 1000, 20 of whom are at top headquarters echelon.

d. Counter-intelligence was a primary function of the Kempei, and in areas where Tokumu Kikan also functioned, there was an understandable overlap. To avoid friction, a Kempei officer was sometimes attached to the Tokumu Kikan for liaison duty.

e. Particularly in New Guinea and areas in which Tokumu Kikan was non-existent, the Kempei performed a valuable role for operational intelligence, mostly by use of natives utilized both as spies and for counter-intelligence. Statements by Army and Navy high command that natives were generally valueless because of lack of knowledge or friendliness to the Allies are true insofar as intelligence for planning level is concerned, but the Kempei found good use for them in ferreting out Allied positions, observation posts, and even, in some instances, intentions. Examples of such usefulness in the way of tactical intelligence are appended (exhibit A).

f. Kempei doctrine did not call for active participation in prisoner-of-war interrogation work. The teachings called for the Kempei to handle preliminary screenings of the prisoners to prevent their escape and to protect them from civilians. This, however, was not the practice. The Kempei in the field was under control of the commanding general of the area army, and there is ample evidence from our own repatriated prisoners-of-war that their treatment -- or mistreatment -- was delegated by the Army to the Kempei.

g. Its work with prisoners-of-war was Kempei's principal contribution to Japanese military operational intelligence. The secondary contribution, use of natives for scouting, spying, and counter-intelligence was to front-line intelligence of immediate tactical importance, rather than to long-range planning.

VII ANALYSIS OF JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES AND PLANNING

1. Introduction

a. Investigation of Japanese military and naval intelligence has disclosed significant information concerning the Japanese estimates of American and Allied intentions, strength and capabilities made at various stages of the war. Important aspects of the part which intelligence played in Japanese operational planning and conduct of the war are revealed in the information at hand.

b. The primary objective of this part of the report has been to analyze the Japanese estimates of the situation, and their consequent planning, as disclosed in the interrogations and statements of Japanese command and staff officers and in documentary material now available. In order that the accuracy of the estimates and their effect on operations may be gauged, certain facts and figures from US Navy and War Department records concerning US plans, forces, etc, are utilized herein for comparative purposes.

c. This is not purported to be a full historical account of each operation or campaign discussed here. Ordinarily, only the aspects of these operations which are pertinent to the Japanese estimates under examination are recounted, although additional facts are sometimes set forth to show the surrounding circumstances and to facilitate a better understanding of the problems involved. For historical accounts of the war in the Asiatic-Pacific theatre, reference is made to the reports of the Military Analysis and Naval Analysis Divisions of the US Strategic Bombing Survey.

d. The greater part of the material forming the basis for this analysis was developed from interrogations and questionnaires directed to command and staff officers of the Japanese Army and Navy by USSBS. Information developed from Japanese sources by other agencies also was used as indicated.

- (1) The majority of the estimates concerning existing and potential US air power, naval power and merchant marine, purportedly prepared by the Japanese at and shortly prior to the start of hostilities for use in their military planning, were obtained from the office of the chief secretary of the Japanese Imperial Privy Council. Others were collected from various military and government officials concerned with such matters. These sources did not appear to have had any prepared esti-

mates as to existing and potential US military ground forces except the figures furnished by the Privy Council as to present and anticipated Marine Corps personnel strength as a part of the estimates of Navy personnel strength.

- (2) The data concerning actual US strength, production, etc, which have been used for comparison with the Japanese estimates, were obtained from the following sources:
 - (a) Navy Department, Air Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence, which compiled the information concerning US naval air strength, naval strength and fleet disposition and damage.
 - (b) War Department, Office of Statistical Control, Army Air Forces.
 - (c) War Department, Operations Division, OPD.

2. Summary and Conclusions

a. The enemy intelligence estimates and planning are discussed in the chronological order of their development, commencing with the estimates and plans made in preparation for the war and continuing through the succeeding operations and campaigns. The degree of consideration given intelligence aspects of the various operations was determined by the amount of pertinent information which had been developed from Japanese sources. Certain conclusions are suggested by the analysis of enemy intelligence estimates and planning through the various stages of the war.

b. The Japanese were in possession of intelligence concerning US air and naval forces in the Pacific areas prior to the commencement of the war -- information which was timely, adequate in coverage, substantially accurate and in considerable detail. The relatively economical and expeditious completion of Japan's major offensive operations within the first few months of the war can be largely attributed to this. The contribution of Japanese intelligence was at its highest point during this period, and thereafter was on a generally declining scale.

c. The enemy seriously erred in his estimate of the recuperative powers of the US and the ability to reorganize American resources for war after the crippling blow was struck at Pearl Harbor. The inability of the US to stem effectively the tide of Japanese conquest during the first few months caused the enemy to underestimate US military potential and capabilities. This led Japan to over-extend her conquests and lines of communications. The US invasion at Guadalcanal caught the enemy by surprise and unprepared

for any effective defense or counterstroke, for the reason that he estimated it was beyond Allied capabilities to marshal naval power, shipping, troops or supplies in sufficient strength to launch any effective counter-offensive before the end of 1942.

d. A basic misconception, which was very costly, was the enemy underestimation of the fighting capabilities of the American military man. Both the strength and fighting qualities of US troops were misjudged, particularly in the Guadalcanal and early New Guinea campaigns, with the result that the Japanese committed forces to these operations which were insufficient to avoid decisive and successive defeats. Another striking illustration of this enemy error was the view held at the beginning of the war that Japan's air forces could maintain supremacy if Allied airpower did not exceed theirs by a ratio of more than 10 to one. This estimate was revised by October 1943 to a ratio of 3 to one, but it is not known what later revisions were made with respect to this appraisal.

e. A recurring factor in the failures of the Japanese to make accurate estimates of the situation, particularly with respect to the strength of US forces, is to be found in the feeling general among Japanese officers that their forces were able to inflict relatively greater losses in battle than they sustained. In fact, Lieutenant General Arisue, chief of intelligence at Army General Headquarters, said in his answers to an USSBS questionnaire on 3 November 1945 that it was the "impression" in the Japanese Army "that personnel losses inflicted on the US forces were greater than our own." A noteworthy example of this was the weight given by the Army and Navy staffs to the ridiculously exaggerated reports by their pilots concerning the losses inflicted upon the US carrier task force off Formosa on 12-14 October 1944. The Japanese concluded the Allies were unable to support a major invasion at that time, and defense preparations in the Philippines were not pressed as they might have been. The consequences were costly.

f. Prior to and during the early months of the war, the Japanese seriously underestimated the capabilities of US submarines. It was thought that they would be employed in cutting communications by means of anti-merchant shipping attacks, but their extensive and effective employment against Japanese naval craft, as well as for reconnaissance and for air-sea rescue, came as a surprise. The achievements of US submarines in sinking Japan's warships and merchant shipping far exceeded anything they had expected and was a decisive factor in destroying their ability to wage war.

g. The enemy never comprehended adequately the military and industrial potential of the US. This is a basic explanation for the repeated occasions when American moves were made before the enemy expected them -- and with greater strength than he estimated was possible.

The ability of the US to marshal military and naval forces, to provide adequate transport, and to supply these forces with superior equipment and materiel, appears to have consistently exceeded the Japanese estimates.

h. Except for the opening operations of the war, the Japanese military forces were seriously handicapped by a rather consistent lack of operational intelligence. Frequently, the enemy had little specific factual information concerning the strength of US forces within operational range, their dispositions, or their movements, although a considerable amount of such intelligence could have been obtained through an efficient organization and through employment of the facilities and forces he controlled. The major cause of this critical deficiency was the failure to maintain regular and thorough air search and reconnaissance. The numerous instances in which US carrier task forces achieved surprise in their strikes, due to inadequate enemy air search and reconnaissance, are mentioned in the succeeding pages. The enemy's lack of adequate operational intelligence during the Battle for Leyte Gulf made efficient operations by his forces most difficult, if not practically impossible. At times even an Allied landing force achieved complete surprise, as at Hollandia. The enemy also failed to make effective use of submarines, coast watchers and natives for reconnaissance and intelligence purposes.

i. As the war progressed, and particularly after the Gilberts and Marshalls campaigns, the information available to the Japanese staffs from intelligence sources diminished sharply in quantity and usefulness. This necessitated increasing dependence on tactical and strategic considerations and on professional speculation for the formulation of estimates of the situation. That the Japanese frequently were able, in the latter stages of the war, to estimate impending Allied moves with some accuracy is due in large part to the fact that the number of possible objectives was fast being narrowed down as the Allies approached the obvious ultimate objective -- the home islands.

3. Japanese Estimates Made in Preparation for the War

a. During the months prior to their attack on the United States, the Japanese were assiduously utilizing all of their intelligence resources to collect and evaluate available information on the military strength and potentialities of the United States for use in formulating their own military plans. That they were successful in obtaining fairly complete information concerning US military forces then in being is evident in the Japanese estimates uncovered during this study; however, although their estimates were surprisingly accurate in several respects, it is apparent that they were not able to comprehend adequately American military and industrial potentials, American fighting capabilities, and the ability

of the US Navy to overcome problems in logistics and supply.

b. These estimates and statistics are set forth here in tables 1 through 7 for consideration as being indicative to a large extent of the basis for Japanese war planning and of their deduction of the American ability to wage successful war. The figures cover (1) air forces -- Army, Navy and airplane production capacity; (2) Navy -- warship strength, fleet disposition and personnel, and (3) merchant marine.

Table 1
Japanese Estimate of US Air Strength at Start of War.
Compared to Actual Figures
Navy

	<u>Japanese</u> <u>Estimate</u>	<u>Actual</u> <u>Figure</u>
(1) Present strength (as of Oct 41) - planes	4,535	5,291
pilots	5,823	4,873

bombers	1,000	1,066
fighters	500	574*
recco	1,000	737
flying boats	450	457
training, etc	1,585	2,475

(2) Planned expansion (to be in service by end of 1943, of which 12,000 are authorized by the budget)	15,000	26,172

(3) Expected increase (as of Jan 42) - planes	5,000 to	
pilots	5,500	5,233
pilots	6,000	5,991

(as of Jul 42) - planes	7,300	7,030
pilots	10,000	9,551

(as of Jul 43) - planes	14,000	16,834
pilots	15,915	21,367

*Of which 74 obsolete

Table 2
Japanese Estimate of US Air Strength at Start of War.
Compared to Actual Figures
Army

	<u>Japanese Estimate</u>	<u>Actual Figure</u>
(1) Present strength (as of Dec 41) - planes	6,000 to 6,500	12,297
-----	-----	-----
heavy bombers	100 to 150	288
medium bombers	700	745
light bombers	200	799
pursuit planes	1,000	2,170
recco	1,000	475
training, etc	3,000 to 3,500	7,340
-----	-----	-----
(2) Planned expansion (to be in service by end of 1944, of which 42,218 are authorized by the budget)	40,000	72,726
-----	-----	-----
heavy bombers	4,000	12,813
medium bombers	8,000	6,189
light bombers	3,000	2,980
pursuit planes	10,000	17,198
training, etc	15,000	17,060
-----	-----	-----
(3) Expected increase (as of Jun 42) - planes	10,000	8,876
-----	-----	-----
(as of Dec 42) - planes	20,000	21,007

Table 3
Japanese Estimate of US Air Strength at Start of War.
Compared to Actual Figures
Airplane Production Capacity

	<u>Japanese Estimate</u>	<u>Actual Figure</u>
(1) Estimate made Dec 41 for monthly production (as of Jul 41)	1,500	1,459
(as of Dec 41)	2,200	2,464
(as of Jun 42)	3,000 to 3,500	3,703

(2) Estimate made in 1941 for potential production totals (end of 1941)	19,300	19,445
(end of 1942)	47,900	47,675
(end of 1943)	85,900	85,433

Table 4
Japanese Estimate of US Naval Strength at Start of War.
Compared to Actual Figures
Warship Strength and Potentials
(Estimate Prepared 9 Dec 41)

		<u>S h i p s</u>		<u>T o n n a g e</u>	
		<u>Jap Est:</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Jap Est</u>	<u>Actual</u>
(1) For end Dec 41 -	BB	14	: 16	450,000:	501,700
	CV	7	: 7	155,000:	154,600
	CA & CL	37	: 37	330,225:	328,975
	DD	180	: 173	263,210:	241,160
	SS	114	: 112	122,625:	117,155
	Totals	352	345	1,321,060:	1,343,590

(2) For Dec 43 -	BB	20	: 22	680,600:	731,700
	CV	9	: 10	207,500:	257,000
	CV & CL	61	: 48	546,225:	441,250
	DD	325	: 334	540,450:	572,050
	SS	162	: 178	199,425:	226,828
	Totals	577	: 592	2,174,200:	2,228,828

(3) For Dec 45 -	BB	27	: 23	1,024,600:	792,700
	CV	17	: 21	431,500:	555,100
	CV & CL	85	: 69	892,225:	690,450
	DD	363	: 354	620,250:	702,560
	SS	186	: 206	237,825:	309,894
	Totals	678	: 673	3,206,400:	3,050,704

(Japanese notes indicated their estimates did not include training ships or the DD Reuben James; listed as sunk by 9 Dec 2 BBs (West Virginia and Oklahoma, total 60,800 tons) and the CV Enterprise (19,900 tons); and listed as greatly damaged 4 BBs and about 4 CAs.)

Table 5
Japanese Estimate of US Naval Strength at Start of War.
Compared to Actual Figures
Fleet Disposition
 (Estimate Prepared 9 Dec 41)

	Asiatic Fleet	Pacific Fleet		Atlantic Fleet	Totals
	Est:Act	Hawaii Est:Act	W Coast Est:Act	Est:Act	Est:Act
Battleships	- : -	6 : 8	1 : 1	8 : 8	15 : 17
Heavy Cruisers	1 : 1	11 : 2	1 : 0	5 : 15	18 : 18
Light Cruisers	2 : 1	8 : 16	0 : 3	9 : 0	19 : 20
Carriers	- : -	1 : 2	1 : 1	4 : 5	6 : 8
Destroyers	15 : 13	56? : 45	19 : 9	81 : 105	171? : 172
Submarines	30 : 29	25? : 12	9 : 10	48 : 61	112? : 112
Seaplane Tenders	4 : 4	5 : 8	9 : 5	24 : 15	32 : 32
Flying Boats	36 : 28	114 : 66	67 : 0	162 : 162	378 : 256

Note: (?) in destroyer and submarine figures were in Japanese estimate.

Table 6
Japanese Estimate of US Naval Strength at Start of War.
Compared to Actual Figures
Naval Personnel
 (Estimates Prepared in Dec 41)

	As of Dec 41		As of Dec 43.		As of Dec 45	
	Est	Act	Est	Act	Est	Act
<u>Officers</u>	:	:	:	:	:	:
Navy	11,814:	38,601	13,070:	219,279	25,400:	215,747
Marine	3,700:	4,066	5,900:	28,193	11,400:	22,844
Total	15,514:	42,667	18,970:	247,472	36,800:	238,519
<u>Men</u>	:	:	:	:	:	:
Navy	224,511:	343,726	296,000:	2,154,815	385,000:	2,035,347
Marine	49,776:	71,729	89,000:	376,976	109,000:	289,857
Total	274,287:	415,455	385,000:	2,531,791	494,000:	2,325,204
<u>Grand</u>	:	:	:	:	:	:
<u>Totals</u>	289,801:	458,122	403,970:	2,779,263	530,800:	2,563,795

Japanese notes on their estimates showed that (1) except for Dec 41, numbers of personnel were assumed; (2) personnel in Dec 41 included about 10% of activated reserves in addition to figures shown and the same percentage for activated reserves should be added to figures for Dec 43 and 45; (3) among officers listed, only 65% will be regular Navy in Dec 43 and only 57% in Dec 45.

Table 7
Japanese Estimate of US Merchant Ship Strength at Start
of War. Compared to Actual Figures
 (Estimates Prepared in Dec 41)

	<u>Japanese Estimate</u>		<u>Actual Figures</u>	
	<u>Ships :</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Ships :</u>	<u>Tons</u>
(1) Present condition (as of Dec 41) - Seagoing vessels	747:	4,143,000	1,184:	7,032,797
Tankers	348:	2,570,000	370:	2,676,484
Govt-owned ships	64:	408,000	76:	504,016
Total	1,159:	7,121,000	1,630:	10,213,297
Great Lakes ships	411:	2,268,000	397:	2,232,736
Grand total	1,570:	9,389,000	2,027:	12,446,033
(2) Planned expansion (to be completed by end of 1943)	1,325:	9,600,000	2,815:	- - - - -
(3) Estimated US merchant ship construction capacity -- 1941		1,500,000		1,165,165
1942		3,500,000		8,044,527
1943		5,000,000		19,211,991

Note: Actual figures shown above include construction for Allies as well as for US Merchant Marine.

4. Pearl Harbor Attack

a. The shocking success of the Japanese attack on Pearl harbor was due to careful planning based upon nearly complete intelligence as to the position, movements and strength of US forces in the area.

b. According to Rear Admiral Tomioka of the Naval General Staff, and Fleet Admiral Nagano, Chief of the General Staff and later Supreme Naval Advisor to the Emperor, the Japanese Naval General Staff had information that the US fleet usually operated from Monday or Tuesday through Friday, came into Pearl Harbor for the weekend, and was due to be in Pearl Harbor the weekend of 7 December (USSBS interrogations 355-7, 498-9). Moreover, these officers report that an American radio broadcast on either 3 or 5 December 1941 stated which units, by names, were based at Pearl Harbor and that this information was relayed by Tokyo to the Japanese task force en route to attack.

c. The Japanese had a large amount of detailed information concerning US fleet units, air strength, and other military installations at Pearl Harbor which was put to effective use in the surprise attack. After the raid, crashed Japanese planes and a beached midget submarine yielded annotated charts and other documents which set forth the US situation in fairly accurate detail.

- (1) The midget submarine had on board a US Navy Hydrographic Office chart which had been used as a track chart for the sub's intended transit of the harbor. It was annotated with detailed navigational data, with the names and positions of major units expected to be in the harbor, and with the berthing areas of minor units and auxiliaries. Similar intelligence concerning ship anchorages, charts for aircraft torpedo runs against specified targets, and data on Honolulu radio frequencies were found in crashed planes.
(CinCPac-CinCPOA Weekly Intelligence 1-22, 8 Dec 44).

d. The leader of the first attacking flight, Captain Fuchida, has reported the careful preparations which accounted for the effectiveness of the attack (USSBS interrogation 603). The attacking pilots were briefed on 23 November, 3 December, 7 December and at a final session 2 hours before the attack on 8 December (Tokyo time). At the briefing the day prior to the attack, the revised estimate of the major units at Pearl was announced as no carriers, 7 battleships and 7 cruisers. Actually there were 3 battleships and 8 cruisers. At the final briefing, the pilots were given

mimeographed sheets indicating -- with names in most cases and with substantial accuracy -- the probable positions of the warships berthed around Ford Island and at the Navy Yard. A 4-plane reconnaissance flight preceded the attack to determine definitely whether the American fleet was in the harbor and reported to the leader of the first attack flight in the air that such was the situation.

e. The Pearl Harbor attack was planned on the basis that it should deprive our fleet of its striking power for about 3 to 6 months by sinking or seriously damaging 4 battleships and 4 aircraft carriers. This was expected to give the Japanese a definite strategic supremacy for a sufficient time to permit capture of the key areas in the Pacific-Asiatic area before the US could mobilize its manpower and industry and mount any effective counter-offensive. Details of this planning have been discussed by Fleet Admiral Nagan (USSBS interrogation 498-4), Captain Fuchida (USSBS interrogation 603-6) and by the chief yeoman on the staff of C-in-C Combined Fleet (CinCPac-CinCPOA Weekly Intelligence 1-22, 8 Dec 44).

f. The Japanese were prepared to lose one-third of their participating units in the Pearl Harbor attack; actually, the cost was 29 planes, 1 fleet-type submarine, and 5 midget submarines.

g. The final estimate of the Japanese Naval General Staff as to losses inflicted on the American forces, based on 10 photographs taken by attacking planes and on pilot reports, is shown below as compared with actual American losses. The Japanese figures were compiled by USSBS, Naval Analysis Section, in a brief on "The Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor"; the US figures were compiled by the Navy Department, Air Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence:

(1) Ships sunk --	<u>Jap Est</u>	<u>Actual</u>
	4 BB	3 BB
	1 cruiser	1 AM
	2 tankers	
(2) Ships heavily damaged --	4 BB	2 BB
		3 CL
		3 DD
		1 AR
(3) Ships damaged --	1 BB	3 BB
		1 AV
(4) Aircraft destroyed --	260	87
(Jap figure includes 10 shot down, rest destroyed on ground)		

h. The enemy did not repeat the attack on Pearl Harbor due to the fact that their intelligence on the results was not gathered and evaluated until 3 days after the attack. It was believed, according to Captain Fuchida (USSBS interrogation 113-2), that by that time the area would be reinforced with land-based planes from elsewhere, as well as by our carriers which were at sea at the time of the attack. Thus the risk was considered too great.

i. No photographic or reconnaissance flights were made after the attack for the purpose of assessing the damage, except that one element of fight aircraft was ordered, upon completion of its attack mission, to fly as low as possible and observe results.

5. Japanese Occupation of the Philippines

a. The Japanese operations against the Philippines at the beginning of the war met with comparatively early and economical success due, again, to fairly complete intelligence concerning Allied forces which permitted effective operational planning, coupled with the element of surprise. The Japanese estimate of the situation in the Philippines was found to be substantially correct, although US ground forces maintained organized resistance longer than the Japanese had anticipated.

b. The key to the success of the Philippine operation as planned was the execution of the mission of the 11th Air Fleet, based in Formosa -- the annihilation of American air strength in the Philippines within a week. It has been revealed by Vice Admiral Shiraichi, then chief of staff of the 2nd Fleet (USSBS interrogation 33-4,5), and by Captain Takahashi, then on the staff of the 11th Air Fleet (USSBS interrogation 74-3,5), that the Japanese were able to commence their attacks on 8 December armed with practically exact information as to the strength and disposition of American air forces in Luzon. This was accomplished by reconnaissance flights on 24-25 November which reported 300 planes in the Luzon area (actually there was a total of 317). The plan to destroy US air strength was substantially accomplished, most of the planes being destroyed on the ground. The Japanese had anticipated some attacks by B-17s on their task force when it was about 600 miles off shore, but nothing severe was expected. The main body of the approaching fleet received no air attack; however, one light cruiser and some destroyers which went in close to shore in landing troops sustained damage in air attacks.

c. The Japanese correctly anticipated that US naval forces in the Philippines area were insufficient to attempt any fleet action against their 2nd Fleet, which supported the thrust. Statements of Vice Admiral Shiraichi (USSBS interrogation 33-3,4) and Captain Fujita, then also a 2nd Fleet staff officer (USSBS interro-

gation 67-4) disclose that the plans for the occupation of the Philippines and the East Indies-Southeast Asia area were based on the assumption that the Pearl Harbor attack would neutralize the US fleet striking power for several months. Therefore this entire operation was planned for a hurried completion before the US could marshal its available fleet strength and strike in the Pacific. US submarine forces in the area, however, attacked with vigor and inflicted serious losses on their shipping, as the Japanese had expected.

6. Battle of Midway

a. The battle of Midway was a notable early occasion where US intelligence concerning the enemy was superior to the enemy's intelligence concerning the US, thus affording an opportunity to organize and employ our forces effectively and achieve a victory of decisive importance.

b. The enemy estimated that the initial opposition to his assault would come from a land-based force of 100 2 and 4-engined planes and 200 land-based fighters, according to 2 officers who participated in the mission -- Captain Fuchida, then air group commander of the CV Akagi (USSBS interrogation 603-15), and Captain Katanabe, then a staff officer on the Combined Fleet (USSBS interrogation 65-4). It was not expected that opposition from a naval task force and carrier-based planes would be encountered until the third or fourth day after the initial attack.

c. As it developed, the coordinated air attacks by US land-based forces, consisting of 51 multi-engined planes, 6 torpedo planes, and 62 fighters, and the planes of the 3 American carriers in the area, inflicted a costly defeat on the Japanese navy. Four carriers (Kaga, Akagi, Hiryu and Soryu) and one heavy cruiser (Mikuma) were sunk. This deprived their task force of its air support and caused abandonment of their attempt to seize Midway with landing forces.

7. Solomons Campaigns

a. Several important misconceptions on the part of the Japanese respecting US strength and capabilities were in large part responsible for the success of the counter-offensive move through the Solomons area, which marked the Allied transition from the defensive to the offensive.

b. The Japanese staff opinion was to the effect that, due to US Naval losses at Pearl Harbor and heavy shipping losses in the Atlantic, the US would be unable to sustain any major operation before the end of 1942. The American thrust into the Solomons in the

Guadalcanal area in August 1942 caught the Japanese by complete surprise at a time when they were unprepared to defend or mount any effective counter-stroke.

b. After the first American landings had been made at Guadalcanal, Japanese intelligence erred disastrously as to the strength of the forces that had landed, reporting there were less than 1,000 troops in the operation whereas more than 19,000 troops were involved, including the 1st Marine Division with part of the 2nd Marine Division and 2 Army battalions. The Japanese Army staff also made the error of basing estimated troop requirements for recapturing these positions on their experiences with the Chinese and with the British forces in the Malayan campaign.

c. Largely as a result of these erroneous appraisals of US strength and capabilities, the Japanese made several attempts to recapture Guadalcanal with insufficient forces which were destroyed in turn. These under-estimates of US strength were responsible for giving American forces the vital opportunity to gradually strengthen their positions. In August, the Japanese attempted the recapture of Guadalcanal with one battalion, which was wiped out. In September, an unsuccessful assault was made with 3 battalions. When they apprehended the increase in US strength, a large scale joint Army and Navy assault using 29,000 troops (2 divisions) was planned for 21 October, which was defeated decisively in the latter part of that month. Subsequent attempts were likewise ineffective and Guadalcanal was evacuated by the enemy in January 1943.

d. As a consequence of their early underestimation of US strength, the Japanese air and naval power was substantially weakened by losses incurred in the series of piecemeal commitments of forces used in ineffective counter-attacks. The best Japanese carrier air groups were substantially wiped out as units in these actions; the long series of naval actions seriously cut down their warship strength in all categories. Transport shipping losses resulted in a shortage that progressively curtailed their operations, not only in the Solomons-New Guinea area, but later in other areas as well.

e. The effects of this poorly conceived plan of operations in the Solomons were far reaching. The virtual destruction of the carrier air group strength, which in November 1943 had been loaned by the Combined Fleet (then based at Truk) for operations out of Rabaul, rendered the fleet incapable of supporting the Japanese positions in the Gilberts and Marshalls either by fleet action or with adequate air forces. Subsequent Allied moves into the Marianas and Philippines were made before they could replace losses adequately. These losses had a persisting effect upon the overall war strength and capabilities of Japan from which she was never able to recover.

(Sources on Japanese phases of the Solomons campaigns were statements by Captain Ohmae, chief of staff of the Southeastern Fleet and in charge of operational planning for the Solomons area 1942-43 (USSBS interrogation 192-2); Captain Yamamoto, then on the staff of DesRon 2 (USSBS interrogation 467-2,10); Vice Admiral Fukudome, then chief of planning on the General Staff (USSBS interrogation 503-26, 524-4,5,6,11), and Lieutenant General Miyazaki, chief of staff of the 17th Army at Guadalcanal 1942-43 (USSBS interrogation 497-3,4).)

8. Central Pacific Campaigns

a. In the summer of 1943, Japanese Imperial Headquarters estimated that the American threat from the east would be primarily a naval action. They considered a move straight across the Central Pacific area from the Hawaiian Islands to Japan as the most probable and most formidable threat, and a full-scale fleet action was envisaged. A move from the south into the eastern Carolines-Marshalls area was considered the second most probable threat. A thrust from the Aleutians into Hokkaido was considered least likely.

b. The Japanese naval policy at this time was to secure a decisive naval engagement with the American fleet as early as possible during 1943. They estimated that they would have a 50-50 chance of winning. It was anticipated that if the Combined Fleet were kept concentrated at Truk, the American fleet would eventually move into that area and present an opportunity for the desired decisive engagement.

c. Near the end of September 1943, Admiral Koga, C-in-C of the Combined Fleet, received information that an American task force was approaching the Marshalls area. The Combined Fleet was put in readiness at Truk with the object of intercepting the American task force in a decisive engagement. In October 1943, it was again anticipated that an American task force was moving north into the Marshalls area, and the main part of the Combined Fleet was moved to Eniwetok in hopes of the desired battle. The mistaken information leading to these moves was received by the Combined Fleet headquarters from Tokyo in each instance. The source of the information was not known.

d. The actual US move into the Gilberts area was first revealed on the day a task force struck Nauru, 16 November 1943, when the Japanese search planes out of Nauru discovered the US forces moving in for the attack. Further strikes and the landings at Tarawa and Makin followed during the ensuing days.

e. By the time that the US moves were made into the Gilberts

and the Marshalls, Admiral Koga had been obliged to abandon his objective of a decisive naval engagement in 1943, and these thrusts were not countered by fleet action as had been originally planned. This was due to the fact that the carrier air strength of the Combined Fleet had been virtually destroyed in the land-based operations of these carrier air groups out of Rabaul, particularly in connection with our Bougainville operations in November 1943. The fleet was deemed incapable of fighting a major action without its air arm.

f. After the landings in the Gilberts in November 1943, the staff estimate by the Japanese Combined Fleet was that the next American move would most likely be into the Marshalls. The US carrier task force strike on Kwajalein on 4 December 1943 was an indication of this. A second possibility considered was a move into the Carolines in the Ponape-Kusaie area. The third possibility considered was a direct thrust at Truk, which was not believed likely. However, the exact intent of the Americans was not established until the Marshalls assault commenced on 25 January 1944. It was not expected that we would strike directly at the heart of the Marshalls and take Kwajalein as we did, but that other islands on the periphery would be taken first.

(Sources on Japanese phases of the Central Pacific campaigns were statements by Vice Admiral Fukudome, chief of staff of the Combined Fleet in 1943-44 (USSBS interrogations 503-19,20,21,26,27, 524-4,5,6); Commander Nakajima, Combined Fleet intelligence officer 1943-45 (USSBS interrogation 139-2); Captain Ohmae, staff officer of the 1st Mobile Fleet in 1943-45 (USSBS interrogation 160-2) and Commander Matsuura, staff officer of air squadron 22 in 1943-44 (USSBS interrogation 123-2,3).)

9. Marianas Campaign

a. After American forces had captured the Admiralty Islands, it appears to have been the consensus of the Japanese staff that the next American offensive in the Western Pacific area would come in April or May 1944. In this instance the anticipation of the next US move was early, as the action commenced in June, with the success of the operation insured by victory in the Battle of the Philippine Sea, 19-20 June.

b. It was thought that the next objective would be either Palau or the Marianas, with Palau the most likely. The thrust against Palau was expected to be implemented from either the Admiralties or New Guinea. The alternative estimate was that the thrust would be directly across the Central Pacific from the east

and aimed at the Marianas, with Saipan as the most likely first objective. The latter estimate proved to be correct.

c. The defense operation plan (A-Go plan) which was devised to counter the anticipated next US thrust in the Pacific contemplated that it would be essentially a naval operation, executed by a carrier task force and an amphibious force. The Japanese plan committed their main fleet strength to a decisive naval engagement in the Philippines-Palau area, based on the belief that the American move would be from the Admiralties-New Guinea direction to Palau. The plan also, however, contemplated the use of the fleet in the event that the assault was aimed at the Marianas, and was later modified to provide for a naval action between the Philippines and the Marianas when it became apparent that the offensive would be aimed at the Marianas.

d. Japanese staff estimates which have been uncovered as to the strength of American forces likely to be employed in the Marianas operation are limited to the expected carrier strength in the carrier task force. These estimates were of an accurate character, ranging from 12-15 carriers, whereas the carrier task force actually consisted of 14 carriers, including light Independence class CVLs.

(Sources on Japanese phases of the Marianas campaign described above were statements by Admiral Toyoda, C-in-C of the Combined Fleet in 1944-45 (USSEBS interrogation 378-6,7); Vice Admiral Ozawa, C-in-C of the fleet task force in the Battle of the Philippine Sea (USSEBS interrogation 32-2,3,4), and Captain Ohnase, staff officer of the 1st Mobile Fleet and the 3rd Fleet (USSEBS interrogation 441-3).)

e. At this point it should be noted that in March 1944 the Japanese Naval General Staff was in possession of considerable intelligence of a rather comprehensive nature concerning the organizations, dispositions and strengths of US Army and Navy air forces. In March 1944 the Naval General Staff issued a printed report covering these matters and representing a significant synthesis of intelligence work; it was later captured on Saipan (CinCPac-CinCPOA item 10,089; see also page 60 of this report). This information was at hand when the Japanese staffs formulated their A-Go plans for the defense of the Palau-Marianas areas. Examination of this document reveals that at the time of its distribution, much of the information was fresh, surprisingly accurate in some respects and much more detailed than might have been expected, although it contains a certain amount of error and speculation. Its scope is worldwide, covering US air forces in all theaters.

- (1) The report describes the staff and command organization of the Army Air Forces top command and the disposition, employment and organization of each air force. In most instances the numbers of the units in each air force command down to groups and squadrons are designated, with the type of plane flown by each squadron usually stated specifically, even in many cases to the modification letters. The number of planes for each unit is indicated by reference to a typical table of organization, together with a separate estimate of the total planes for each air force. Some information as to bases used, areas of operations, and the service, air support and transport commands is included in the case of most air forces. Each air force organization is shown in a separate chart, with accompanying explanatory and supplementary remarks.
- (2) The organization of the land-based Pacific naval air commands are described and shown in a chart, although this information is somewhat sketchy and inaccurate. The enemy was aware of the increasing use of PB4Ys (Liberators) by the Navy in the Pacific for patrol and attack bombing, largely supplanting flying boats, and also the fact that naval aviation was replacing army air forces for patrol, convoy escort and anti-submarine missions. Naval multi-engine patrol commands, Fleet Air Wings 1 and 2, were known to have been operating in the South Pacific and Hawaiian areas respectively, although individual squadron assignments were not known, excepting those operating from Australia.
- (3) A list of US aircraft carriers is set forth with descriptions and charts showing carrier squadron organizations and estimates of their plane complements. The treatment of the US carrier air organization displays a considerable knowledge of its makeup and a marked appreciation of its striking power and capabilities.
- (4) The list of large carriers (CVs) shows the status of operating units and those under construction with substantial accuracy. That the Japanese were securing timely and accurate intelligence concerning US carrier activities is evident. It is significant that this report showed Carrier Air Group 6 attached to the USS Intrepid (CV) in March 1944.

When the Intrepid came to the Pacific late in December 1943, she had Air Group 8 aboard. However, before she left Pearl Harbor to participate in the Marshalls Islands operation and the strike on Truk, she put Air Group 8 ashore and embarked Air Group 6 in its place. The Intrepid returned to Pearl Harbor to repair battle damage at the end of February 1944. This timely knowledge of the shifting of air groups at Pearl Harbor indicates either that there was a leak of this information at Pearl Harbor which was promptly transmitted to Tokyo in January or February, or that this information was secured from a pilot or crewman captured in the Marshalls or at Truk. The latter seems more likely.

- (5) Likewise, the enemy knew that Air Group 12 succeeded Air Group 3 aboard the Saratoga in September 1943. The correct air groups were also listed for the Enterprise, Essex, Yorktown, Lexington, Ranger and Bunker Hill.
- (6) The list of 8 carriers of the Independence class (CVLs) is accurate and complete, including the hull numbers, which never had been announced publicly. The air groups embarked on 4 of them were named correctly; those named for the other 4 were incorrect. The information on escort carriers (CVEs) was neither complete nor accurate, although the names of a number of them are listed and the sinking of the Liscome Bay was noted. Their estimate that the Kaiser built escort carriers displaced 18,000 tons betrayed speculation in the absence of factual information.
- (7) This report also showed that Japanese intelligence has kept informed concerning the rapid expansion of our Marine Corps aviation and its organization into wings, which were composed of fighter, dive bomber and torpedo bomber squadrons. The attempt to locate the individual squadrons was unsuccessful, although the actual number of Marine squadrons deployed in various sections of the Pacific area is indicated with fair accuracy.
- (8) It is apparent that some of this intelligence was obtained from pre-war public announcements and other parts were obtained from public publications, broadcasts, etc, made during the war. The more

important secret and confidential information was obtained by other methods.

10. Philippines Campaign

a. Preliminary Estimates. After the loss of Saipan, the Japanese Army and Navy staffs were fully aware that they faced a critical situation and that it would be most difficult to avoid final defeat. This called for the most effective use of all forces that could be marshalled; and this, in turn, required careful planning based upon thorough analysis of all available information. A considerable quantity of material has been developed from Japanese sources indicating the extensive staff work done by the Army and Navy in the period between the Saipan landings and the Leyte landings, June-September 1944. In view of the fact that the Japanese Army and Navy used somewhat different approaches to the planning problems involved, apparently due in part to differences in their available intelligence, and reached estimates as to the situation that differed in important respects, the estimates and consequent planning of the two services are considered separately.

(1) Army Estimates

- (a) It appears there was a substantial divergence of opinion within the top Army commands as to where and when the next blow would fall. Lieutenant General Arisue, chief of G-2 of the Army General Staff, said that after the landing on Saipan it was felt the next attack would come in the Philippines, although it might be Iwo Jima (USSES interrogation 217-2). It was decided to prepare for a decisive battle on Mindanao and to strengthen the supply line through Okinawa, Formosa, and Luzon. The landings in Palau and Morotai in September 1944 confirmed the view that the next move would be against Mindanao. The Leyte landing came as a surprise, with the main Army forces concentrated at Mindanao and Luzon.
- (b) The 4th Air Army staff, at Manila, is said to have estimated that US intentions were to either invade Palau and from there invade the Philippines at either Leyte or Lamon Bay, or to invade Morotai and from there invade Mindanao at Davao. After the landing at Sansapor on 30 July 1944, this second estimate was considered the more probable, according to Colonel Matsumae, senior staff officer of the

4th Air Army in 1944-45 (USSBS interrogation 249-4,5). At this time the Japanese thought that the Philippines landings would be made in September or early October. After the landings at Palau and Morotai on 15 September, it was felt that a landing north of Mindanao was more probable, particularly in view of the landing at Palau. The estimate as to the timing of our next move was then revised to November, as it was the staff opinion that at least 2 months time would be necessary for preparation.

- (c) On the other hand, Major General Nishimura, an assistant chief of staff to General Yamashita during the Philippine campaign, has stated that the possible landing points considered were Zamboanga, Davao, Leyte, Santa Cruz, and Aparri (USSBS interrogation 416-6). Leyte was said to have been thought the most likely point and their best Army division, the 16th, was placed there.
- (d) The Army General Staff was said to have foreseen an eventual American movement in the Philippines as far back as October 1943. Two eventualities were then considered -- a move northward from New Guinea, and a naval assault directly across the Pacific from the east. This line of reasoning was disclosed by Lieutenant Colonel Iwakoski, a member of the General Staff from 1940-45 (USSBS interrogation 416-4,5,6,7). He said there was also some thought of the possibility of a movement working from Burma across the continent toward the Philippines. The attack on the Philippines was envisioned as an attempt to sever the Japanese supply lines in the south. Plans were made to build up strength in the Philippines, but due to much greater shipping losses than had been anticipated, this could not be accomplished. The main movement of forces and supplies to strengthen the Philippines did not get under way until June 1944 and the planned shipments were only 60 per cent completed when the US assault was made on Leyte in October 1944.

(2) Navy Estimates

- (a) The Japanese Naval General Staff considered

that the loss of Saipan and the destruction of the Japanese air and fleet striking power in the Battle of the Philippine Sea (19-20 June 1944) gave US forces a freedom of movement in the area around the Philippines, Nansei Shoto and Formosa. This left these areas and also, to a lesser extent, the home islands, open to attack. It is stated the staff estimated that following the landing on Saipan, there would be landings on Tinian and Guam in July, followed by landings in the Palaus and Malaheras in the middle of September, and that after newly-acquired land bases had been put into operation, the Philippines would be invaded after the middle of November 1944. These estimates were in substantial accord with the way the situation actually developed, except that the Philippine operation commenced a month earlier than expected.

(b) Admiral Toyoda, C-in-C of the Combined Fleet for the year following May 1944, testified he held the opinion that the Allied attack on the Philippines would commence in August or September (USSBS interrogation 378-7). He added that it was impossible for the Army and Navy to prepare an adequate defense by that time, since both services "had lost practically all their supporting aircraft" in the Marianas and preceding operations.

(c) Based upon these estimates, the Combined Fleet staff drew its "Sho-Go" plan for the defense of the line joining the Philippines, Formosa, Nansei Shoto, home islands, Hokkaido and the Kuriles. The anticipated scenes of action were divided into 4 areas, and 4 sub-plans were devised to facilitate preparations and command in each area, priority being given in the following order:

- "Sho" 1 Operation - Philippines area.
- "Sho" 2 Operation - Southern Kyushu, Formosa, and Nansei Shoto.
- "Sho" 3 Operation - Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu, and Ogasawara Islands.
- "Sho" 4 Operation - Hokkaido and Kuriles.

This information is contained in answers by

the Minister of the Navy to USSBS memoranda Nav O,3, and in statements by Captain Fuchida, air staff officer of the Combined Fleet (USSBS interrogation 113-6,7).

- (d) It appears from other sources that by August, and particularly after the Palau and Morotai landings on 15 September, it was agreed in the top naval commands that the next Allied move would be against the Philippines. This is according to statements of Vice Admiral Fukudome, 2nd Air Fleet commander (USSBS interrogation 503-2) and Captain Fuchida (USSBS interrogation 113-6,7). It seems, however, that the anticipated timing of the assault and its location in the Philippines remained matters of contention among the command and staff officers until the Leyte operation actually commenced. Apparently, most believed that the assault would come in November, although there was strong opinion that it would be in early October; and, as mentioned above, Admiral Toyoda, C-in-C of the Combined Fleet, picked August or September as the probable time. Such is expressed by Captain Fuchida; by Commander Nakajima, staff intelligence officer of the Combined Fleet (USSBS interrogation 139-4,5), and by Captain Ohmae, chief of staff of the 1st Mobile and the 3rd Fleets (USSBS interrogation 150-3). The original prevailing opinion that Mindanao was the most likely place for a Philippines invasion persisted, although Samar, Leyte and Luzon were considered likely spots, with Yap also considered a likelihood for the next Allied move.
- (e) It is noteworthy that the Japanese forces in the Philippines were unaware that the US carrier task force was on the move until 2 or 3 days before the September carrier strikes commenced. This detail was disclosed by Captain Genda, of the Naval General Staff (USSBS interrogation 473-2), and by Colonel Matsumae, senior staff officer of the 4th Air Army in Manila (USSBS interrogation 249-6). It is admitted that about 200 Army planes were caught by surprise and destroyed at Negros, Panay, Tangeo, Tanjay and Cagayan in the

first strike. It is said that the 4th Air Army had only 2 hours warning and was unable to disperse planes and take adequate defense measures. Similarly, 100 fighters were reported lost at Cebu.

b. Estimates Made After Task Force Strikes Commenced for Leyte Operation

- (1) When the US carrier task force attacks commenced on Okinawa and the Nansei Shoto on 10 October 1944, it was conjectured that this was probably a prelude to an offensive against the Philippines. However, the enemy reconnaissance from Okinawa was inadequate. According to Vice Admiral Fukudome, 2nd Air Fleet Commander (USSBS interrogation 503-3), the search planes reported that the Allied force had 2 or 3 carriers and perhaps a battleship as its capital strength. Obviously only one task group was observed before all of the Japanese search planes were shot down.
- (2) The Air Army Staff appraisal of US plans after the strikes commenced in the Nansei Shoto was that these strikes were designed to interdict the supply of planes to the Philippines. This diagnosis was correct. The Japanese considered this move as confirmatory of a belief that our next landing would be north of Mindanao, probably at either Leyte, Lamon Bay, Aparri or Formosa. They did not regard these strikes as an immediate prelude to an invasion, as they did not believe that we could mount a major invasion until November. Their failure to speed defense preparations was ascribed in part to the fact that the Army and Navy air staffs gave sufficient credence to their pilots' ridiculously exaggerated reports as to losses inflicted upon the US carrier task force in their attacks on 12-14 October 1944 off Formosa, that they did not believe it likely that Allied forces would be able to proceed with an invasion at that time. The assault in October at Leyte caught them before their defense preparations were completed. Such is the testimony of Lieutenant Colonel Tanaka, staff officer at Army Air Headquarters (USSBS interrogation 486-5); Commander Yamaguchi, operations officer of the 2nd Air Fleet at Formosa (USSBS interrogation 193-3), and Colonel Matsumae, senior staff officer of the 4th Air Army (USSBS interrogation 249-11).

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- (3) Prior to the task force strikes on Formosa the Naval General Staff believed that the attack was destined for the Philippines, and after the strike they were certain, according to a General Staff officer, Captain Genda (USSBS interrogation 473-3). Accordingly, the Sho 1 operation plan had been activated to the extent of shifting the 2nd Air Fleet from Kanoya to Formosa, where it was standing by when the strikes occurred. After the strikes this air fleet was shifted to the Philippines. The original plan of Imperial Headquarters to unify the command of the Navy and Army air forces for the Sho operations was not accomplished, except with respect to the far north.
- (4) The diversity of opinion that existed at high command and staff levels is further indicated by answers prepared by the Navy Minister in response to USSBS memorandum Nav O. He declared it was the estimate that these carrier task force strikes in October in the Nansei Shoto, Formosa and the Philippines were no more than simple raids and were not thought to be steps preparatory to the invasion of the Philippines.
- (5) According to the Navy Minister, the Japanese estimate of the available US strength as of 15 October was as follows:

2nd Fleet

10 CV, 6 CVL, 8-12 CVE, 6 cruisers, 40-50 DD.
(Actual figures were 8 CV, 8 CVL, 6 BB, 6 CA, 2 CL(AA), 7 CL, 58 DD.)

Damage inflicted on US task force off Formosa 12-14 October, 4 CVs sunk or severely damaged. (Actual figures were 1 CA damaged, 1 CL damaged.)

7th Fleet

10 BB, 20 CVE, 20 cruisers. (Actual figures were 18 CVE, 6 OBB, 5 CA, 6 CL, 90 DD.)

Troops

15 divisions, including Marines. (Actual figures on troops committed to the Leyte landing were 4 divisions plus a Ranger battalion (the 6th Army consisted of 2 corps of 2 divisions each), a total of 50,843 troops.)

- (6) Intelligence available to Admiral Toyoda, C-in-C of the Combined Fleet, on 20 October which caused him to order the fleet to the Philippines consisted of the following:

That the 7th Fleet and transports were standing by in the vicinity of Leyte Gulf.

That although the carrier task force was believed to be operating in waters to the east of the Philippines, it was thought to have suffered considerable damage.

That the estimated tactical organization of US forces available for the operation was

Army

General MacArthur

General Krueger, 6th Army Admiral Kincaid,
7th Fleet

Navy

Admiral Nimitz

Admiral Halsey, 3rd Fleet

That Nimitz was to cooperate with MacArthur in the Philippine invasion.

That the estimated disposition of US forces was
3rd Fleet -- operating in waters to east of Philippines; base, Ulithi.

7th Fleet -- Leyte Gulf.

6th Army -- committed to Leyte landings; preparatory base, Western New Guinea.

Far Eastern Air Force -- based and operating from Morotai and Western New Guinea.

- (7) Admiral Toyoda's intelligence concerning the situation on 20 October was substantially correct. The first information received at fleet headquarters in Japan that a landing was in process in Leyte Gulf was on 17 October when activities of minesweepers and demolition teams were seen by coast watchers. On the 18th a ship-to-ship conversation was intercepted which disclosed that landings were to be south of Tacloban. Minesweepers were operating in the Dulag area. On the 20th shore watchers and reconnaissance planes reported the following forces in

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the Leyte area, according to Captain Ohmae, chief of staff of the 1st Mobile and 3rd Fleets (USSBS interrogation 150-3,4):

In Leyte Gulf -- 14 BBs and cruisers, 7 carriers, and 50 small combatant ships.

Off Samar -- 80 transports and 20 small combatant ships.

Approaching -- 5 BBs, 10 cruisers, 20 transports.

Off Tacloban (80 miles away) -- 4 CVEs, 2 BBs, 2 cruisers and 6 DDs.

That about 3 Army divisions were landing that day (20 Oct).

- (8) The Combined Fleet was not ordered into action until receipt of the report from watchers that actual landings were taking place at Leyte Gulf on the 20th, according to Captain Fuchida, the fleet air officer (USSBS interrogation 113-6,7,8). It was the mission of the Combined Fleet to destroy forces engaged in the landing operation in the Philippines. The intelligence as to the Leyte landings activated the Sho 1 operation.
- (9) It was not anticipated that a landing on Leyte would be made close to Tacloban and the defenses were not designed against such a landing. As a consequence, the landing near Tacloban succeeded in cutting off the vital stores of supplies at that base, which had to be abandoned.
- (10) The Japanese also underestimated the power and effectiveness of the US naval bombardment, according to Major General Nishimura, assistant chief of staff to General Yamashita during the campaign (USSBS interrogation 418-5). At Leyte, he said, the shelling caused their troops to panic, resulting in an abandonment of their first and second defense lines and a withdrawal into the northwest corner of Leyte. He characterized Japanese planning for the Leyte campaign as "very bad".

c. The Intelligence Factor in the Battle for Leyte Gulf

- (1) To facilitate a consideration of the intelligence

problems involved and the manner in which intelligence was handled by the Japanese in connection with the battle for Leyte Gulf, a chart showing the Japanese fleet command organization is reproduced below from the interrogation of Vice Admiral Kurita (USSES 47):

COMMAND ORGANIZATION, BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF




Chart 14

- (2) The Japanese battle plan also will be sketched in general outline as an aid to the present discussion. For a full account of this battle, reference is made to the report of the Naval Analysis Division, USSES.
- (3) The primary mission of the Combined Fleet was the destruction of the landing forces and supporting shipping at Leyte Gulf. It was planned to accomplish this by a 2-pronged, pincers operation by surface forces. The 1st Diversion Attack Force of the 2nd Fleet (Vice Admiral Kurita) was to pass through the Visayas and Sibuyan Sea, transit San Bernardino Strait and, from the northeasterly direction, attack the transports and other shipping employed in effecting and supporting the landing operation in Leyte Gulf in the early morning of 25 October. The "C" Force of the 2nd Fleet (Rear Admiral Nishimura) was to cross the Sulu Sea, force the Surigao Straits, and attack the amphibious forces and shipping in Leyte Gulf from the

south, also in the early morning of the 25th, about one hour before the other force attacked. The 2nd Diversion Attack Force, which consisted of the 5th Fleet (Vice Admiral Shima) was to attack in coordination with the "C" Force using the same approach to the gulf.

(Information on this phase of the Japanese planning is contained in the interrogations of Vice Admiral Kurita (USSBS 47-5,6), Captain Fuchida (USSBS 113-6,7,9), Admiral Toyoda (USSBS 378-8), Commander Mori (USSBS 233-3,4), Rear Admiral Koyanagi (USSBS 149-5,7,8), and Commander Nishino (USSBS 390-2,3,4), all members of the forces involved).

- (4) The 3rd Fleet (Vice Admiral Ozawa) was to approach the Philippines from Japan via the Bungo channel on a southerly course; make contact with the US carrier task force which was believed to be operating east of Luzon; launch carrier air attacks upon this task force, and avail itself of any favorable opportunity for surface action. Primarily, the 3rd Fleet was to keep this force engaged and decoy it to the north of Luzon, so that the other attack forces would be free from attack from the US carrier task force while carrying out their mission at Leyte Gulf. It was also planned that the US carrier task force should be drawn into the attack range of Formosa and Philippine land-based planes, according to Captain Ohmae (USSBS interrogation 150-2,3,5), Captain Fuchida (USSBS interrogation 113-9), and Rear Admiral Matsuda, (USSBS interrogation 345-3,4), all officers in that action.
- (5) The Combined Base Air Force (Vice Admiral Fukudome) had the mission of coordinating land-based air attacks with the attacks of the Japanese 3rd Fleet upon the US carrier task force; of attacking the landing forces, and of furnishing such air cover and reconnaissance as it could to the attacking naval forces in the south. It was planned to coordinate the available army air forces in this plan, according to Captain Fuchida (USSBS interrogation 113-6,7,9), Commander Yamaguchi, Operations Officer of the Combined Base Air Force and 2nd Air Fleet (USSBS interrogation 193-3,4), and Vice Admiral Kurita (USSBS interrogation 47-7).

- (6) This bold Japanese battle plan was put into execution by their force commanders according to plan, although the American forces struck earlier than expected and this required some changes; but it could not be carried through or accomplished and ended disastrously. Several factors entered into this decisive Japanese defeat besides the overall superiority of the American forces. The air superiority of US carrier air forces over the combined enemy land-based Army and Navy air forces and their carrier air forces was marked, and no doubt decisive.
- (7) The failure of the enemy to achieve the coordinated timing of the actions of their various forces and mutual support, which was so vital to the success of this plan, had critical results. This was due partly to poor communications and to severe submarine and air attacks on Admiral Kurita's 2nd Fleet on 23 and 24 October which, said the Admiral, slowed his advance to the planned attack as well as materially weakening his force (USSBS interrogation 47-6,7,8,9,18,20,23,24,25). His explanation was substantiated by his chief of staff, Rear Admiral Koyanagi (USSBS interrogation 149-2,3) as well as by Commander Yamaguchi (USSBS interrogation 193-5) and Commander Mori (USSBS interrogation 233-5,6,7,8).
- (8) Investigation shows that a continuing basic weakness in the Japanese position throughout this action was the lack of adequate operational intelligence. This is seen to have contributed to their other difficulties and to have compounded them. They were unable to get adequate timely information as to the strength, location and movements of US forces, and as a consequence were operating a large part of the time by guess and chance. The chief cause of the lack of adequate intelligence in this situation was the recurring failure to maintain air reconnaissance, which was admittedly a cardinal weakness. There is no indication that there was any effective Japanese submarine scouting in these actions. Captain Ohmae, 3rd Fleet chief of staff, stated that inadequate reconnaissance was one of the main reasons for failure of the operations (USSBS interrogation 150-9), and this is borne out in the interrogations of Rear Admiral Koyanagi (USSBS interrogation 149-3,4),

Commander Yamaguchi (USSBS interrogation 193-4), and Vice Admiral Kurita.

- (9) The seriousness of the predicament that confronted the various enemy forces due to lack of intelligence has been indicated by certain incidents reported by the command and staff officers involved. Their reports are somewhat confused and contradictory, but this is no doubt indicative in large part of their mental state at the time of the events, which seems rather understandable under the circumstances.
- (10) Vice Admiral Kurita has recounted how he was twice attacked by submarines on 23 October at 0643, as he was beginning to enter the Philippine waters. His movements were known and he was under attack from that time onward. His flagship, the Atago, and also the heavy cruiser Maya, were sunk and the Takao was disabled by submarine attacks the first day. The next day he was under air attack while traversing the Philippines. American air attacks sank the new super-battleship Musashi and disabled the cruiser Myoko, and all of his other battleships were damaged with one or 2 hits or more. He retired to the westward for a period under the severity of the air attacks, which made him late in reaching Leyte Gulf (USSBS interrogation 47-6,7,8).
- (11) In contrast to Kurita's situation of being under repeated surveillance and attack, he had practically no worthwhile intelligence concerning US forces. He states that when he left Brunei to launch the attack he was informed that there were about 200 American transports, 7 battleships and "appropriate accompanying cruisers and destroyers" at Leyte Gulf. However, he received no reconnaissance information from land-based planes in the Philippines. The first warning of air attack on the morning of the 24th was that planes had been reported over Manila and thereafter were soon detected by the ships' radar at 100-120 km. They estimated that the US carrier task force was about 80-100 miles northeast of San Bernardino Strait on the afternoon of the 24th, mainly on the basis of the direction of the flight of the planes, but had no specific reconnaissance or other factual basis for the determination at the time. When he sortied from San Bernardino Strait at midnight he had not received any information on the position of the US carrier task

force. He expected to have to fight his way out of the Strait and was surprised when no force appeared. The next morning, 25 October, in proceeding south off the Samar east coast toward Leyte Gulf, the first knowledge that there was a force between Kurita and the Gulf came when he visually sighted carrier planes and then escort carriers (USSBS interrogation 47-6,7,8,9,10,13).

- (12) According to his chief of staff, Rear Admiral Koyanagi (USSBS interrogation 149-3), they "were quite taken aback" and there was doubt as to whose these carriers were. It also appears that the planes of the Japanese 3rd Fleet, which had attacked the US carrier task force off the east coast of Luzon on the 24th, did not transmit any information concerning the strength, disposition or movements of that force. The enemy staff had to resort largely to speculation in attempting to estimate the situation. The chief of staff further states that in the engagement on the morning of the 25th with the 7th Fleet escort carrier force off Samar, the Japanese were obliged to do their firing, maneuvering, and estimation of results on the basis of visual sightings from shipboard. They estimated that the US force consisted of 5 or 6 carriers, 2 or 3 battleships and a few cruisers. They decided that one carrier, one cruiser and one destroyer had been sunk by them.

- (13) On 25 October, before this engagement, the 7th Fleet forces in Leyte Gulf or in that immediate vicinity actually consisted of the following, according to figures compiled by the Air Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence:

16 CVE, 6 OBB, 5 CA, 6 CL, 88 DD.

In this engagement the following US ships were sunk:

2 CVE, 2 DD, 1 DE, 1 MTB.

- (14) During the engagement outside of Leyte Gulf with the 7th Fleet forces, Admiral Kurita did intercept radio messages from the 7th Fleet to the fast carrier task force reporting that they were under severe attack and requesting aid, and also the reply that help could not be furnished for 2 hours. Kurita also feared attacks by land-based planes at

Leyte, but he had no information as to what plane strength the Americans had ashore, if any. At the time he broke off this engagement and headed north, after 1000, he had received no communication from, or intelligence concerning, Rear Admiral Nishimura's force except a report on the 24th that he was under air attack while passing south of Negros and 2 reports the early morning of the 25th announcing that he was under torpedo boat attack and estimating his time of arrival at the target. Neither did he have any information from Vice Admiral Ozawa's 3rd Fleet, except a report on the 24th that his planes had attacked the US task force and some landed in the water and the remainder in the Philippines. Two fleet seaplanes were sent out to scout the Surigao area and the area to the north off the east coast of the Philippines. Neither returned; the one which scouted north reported nothing seen; the other never reported. After he had changed course to the north he received an indirect radio communication indicating that Nishimura had suffered severe damages in an action early that morning, but no specific information or details as to the extent of damages, his location or plans. Sometime during the day on the 25th, after changing course to the north, Kurita received an indirect radio report to the effect that Ozawa's 3rd Fleet had been heavily engaged and damaged, had lost the flagship, and intended a night torpedo attack. There was no specific information as to the extent of Ozawa's damage, his location, the location of our carrier task force, or the existing strength of either. No information or instructions were received during the northward course from Admiral Toyoda, C-in-C Combined Fleet. Failing to encounter our forces, Kurita retired through San Bernardino Strait that night. (USSBS interrogation 47-10,11,17,18,20,24,25).

- (15) The degree of blame which may be attached to Kurita for his failure to take his losses, which it was anticipated would amount to as much as 50 per cent, and resolutely press through his attack on the 7th Fleet carrier force and the fat target of transport shipping in Leyte Gulf, in accordance with the operation plan and the repeated order of Admiral Toyoda, will probably be the subject of lively discussion for some time. In view of the deplorable lack of working intelligence indicated above, it

is easily understandable that the most effective use of his force could hardly have been expected.

- (16) The senior surviving officer in Rear Admiral Nishimura's "C" Force, Commander Nishino, CO of the destroyer Shigure, has testified concerning the intelligence aspects of their operation. All of the ships in this force, except the Shigure, were sunk in the Battle of Surigao Strait in the early morning of 25 October, when they encountered the battle line of our 7th Fleet in their attempt to force the strait. The operation plan, as it effected this force, was to force the strait from the south and attack the transport shipping and warships in Leyte Gulf in coordination with the attack by Vice Admiral Kurita's force from the northeast. Nishimura's force was to enter the Gulf first and attack at 0630. Vice Admiral Shima's 5th Fleet was to follow Nishimura's force into Leyte Gulf and attack in coordination. (USSBS interrogation 390-3,5).
- (17) Their advance intelligence was to the effect that there would be 2 or more battleships, 5 or 6 cruisers, 10 or more destroyers and 80 transports in Leyte Gulf. They considered that they would be able to force the strait, except for a possible excess in US cruiser strength. They had occasional reports on the US fast carrier task force, but were not concerned with its position and movements as it was out of striking range. Word was received during the 24th that Shima's fleet was coming south through the Sulu Sea astern of Nishimura's force, but it was never sighted until the battle was underway and there was never any effective coordination.
- (18) Rear Admiral Nishimura arrived at the southern entrance to Surigao Strait at 0230, which was earlier than the plan provided, and received the undivided attention of the 7th Fleet battle line. Vice Admiral Shima's force did not arrive at the scene of the Surigao action until it was over and he failed to press any effective attack. At about 1200 on the 25th the Shigure reported the disastrous results of the Surigao action to Admirals Toyoda and Kurita, but made no report of the situation to Shima, although the latter was passed on retirement from the Strait at about

0450. (USSBS interrogation 390-2,3,4,5,7,9).

- (19) The mission of Shima's 5th Fleet was to follow Nishimura's force through Surigao Strait and attack the transports and forces in Leyte Gulf after they had been attacked by Kurita and Nishimura. Shima's staff received an air reconnaissance report on the 23rd reporting that the main body of the US Naval force, consisting of 7 or 8 battleships and about 40 transports, were in the Gulf and that some torpedo boats were at the entrance. The forces of Shima and Nishimura never sighted each other until the battle had been joined and Shima's staff determined Nishimura's position from the gun flashes. These 2 forces were not in communication with each other until Nishimura broadcast the fact that the torpedo attack had been made upon him, opening the action in the straits. After Shima had made his late entry and abortive attack effort, and had reversed course and retired following a collision involving his flagship, he advised Kurita and Tokyo of the reversal of course but stated nothing else as to the events of the night or the situation with respect to Nishimura, according to Commander Mori, a staff officer of the 5th Fleet (USSBS interrogation 233-3,4,5,6,10).
- (20) The Japanese 3rd Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral Ozawa, was assigned the mission of engaging the American fast carrier task force off the east coast of Luzon and drawing it as far north as possible in order to keep it out of striking range of their other forces which were to attack the shipping in Leyte Gulf. It was also planned to lure the US task force within striking range of their land based planes on Luzon and Formosa.
- (21) On the morning of the 20th, before the Japanese 3rd Fleet sortied from the Inland Sea, its information with respect to the US carrier task force was to the effect that it contained about 7 carriers and was located off Leyte. The first contact occurred when a carrier search plane sighted the US task force at about 0700 on the 24th, east of Luzon at a distance of 350 miles from the Japanese Fleet. They closed to 130-150 miles and launched all flyable planes, about 80, in an attack on the American forces. These planes were ordered to land on Luzon after the attack for the

reason, declared Captain Ohmae, the Chief of Staff, that "our ships would be sunk because we went too near on purpose to lure your ships to the north. Surely we would be sunk; that was our duty." (USSBS interrogation 150-4,5). This duty and prognostication were pretty well fulfilled in both respects.

- (22) So far as Ozawa's 3rd Fleet knew, it was not sighted until about 1600 on the 24th when one of the US planes made contact. They were surprised that they were not attacked that day, but concluded that attacks made on the Japanese 2nd Fleet while traversing the Visayas had occupied the US carrier task force. At this time it was thought that 2 US carriers had been damaged and the force contained only one carrier and 2 battleships. Part of their 3rd Fleet was dispatched that night to make a surface attack on the US task force, but contact was lost after waiting for the conclusion of a torpedo attack by their land-based planes and was never regained. They had no report on the movements of the US force during the night after this contact was lost. This is the testimony of Rear Admiral Matsuda, commander of CarDiv 4 (USSBS interrogation 345-5) and Captain Ohmae (USSBS interrogation 150-5,6).
- (23) The next morning, the 25th, they estimated that their fleet was about 100 miles from the US task force, but their search planes failed to locate it. At that time their 3rd Fleet had not received sufficient information to determine how the operations of the other forces were progressing or just what was the situation, reports Captain Ohmae. That afternoon a message was received from Vice Admiral Kurita reporting that he had sunk 3 or 4 carriers off Samar, but nothing was said about coming north to help the 3rd Fleet. Commencing at 0900, US carrier task force planes struck the Japanese 3rd Fleet 4 times as it retired to north in accordance with the plan to lure the US task force in that direction, and sank the 4 carriers in that force plus 1 cruiser and 3 destroyers. The US task force lost the light carrier Princeton.
- (24) Looking at the matter in retrospect, the Japanese officers who played major roles in the Battle for Leyte Gulf, and whose testimony appears in the

paragraphs above, share the opinion that the principal cause for the failure of their operations was the weakness in the air. This was attributed mainly to the losses inflicted on their air forces in Formosa and the Philippines by the US carrier task forces preliminary to and during the Leyte landings. It was repeatedly pointed out that the lack of adequate reconnaissance and the consequent lack of operational intelligence was a prime factor in the breakdown of the operation. This aspect of the Japanese air weakness, as well as the ineffective nature of their air attack and defense, deprived the Japanese of any substantial likelihood of success. The Japanese naval officers involved have affirmed that this bold plan was generally considered as doomed, but that such a desperate stroke was conceived as the only possible chance of averting the disaster fast closing in on them.

d. The Operations at Leyte

- (1) Due to the fact that the Japanese had concentrated the bulk of their defense forces against a Philippine invasion at Luzon and Mindanao, they had only one division (the 16th) at Leyte when the landings occurred. US ground forces enjoyed a commanding superiority. Most of their Leyte supplies were concentrated at Tacloban. When the landings were made close to Tacloban, covered by the unexpectedly heavy naval and air bombardment, the panic-stricken Japanese fled their first 2 lines of defense, abandoned their supplies and their prepared defense positions, and withdrew to the northwest corner of Leyte. It was necessary for the enemy to rush reinforcements and supplies to Leyte in order to maintain any effective defense.
- (2) Over a 40 day period, from 20 October to 30 November, shipping was assembled in Manila and dispatched to Ormoc with troops and supplies in an attempt to reinforce the Japanese position at Leyte. Of the 25 ships sent, all but 6 were sunk by US carrier air attacks, with most of the supplies lost and very heavy troop losses. US landings on Samar and the islands off northern Leyte destroyed any chance of supply from Legaspi. The American landing at Ormoc was the final strangling blow. It was the staff opinion that these losses of shipping, supplies and troops in the effort to reinforce Leyte

were so heavy as to render it impossible to sustain any effective defense of the Philippines as a whole, or even of Luzon, according to Major General Nishimura, assistant chief of staff to General Yamashita (USSBS interrogation 418-1,2,3,4,5,6).

e. The Mindoro Operation

- (1) The American landing on Mindoro on 15 December 1944 was a development not expected by the enemy. Both the timing and the location of the landing were a surprise. Although eventual amphibious operations against Luzon were fully anticipated, there was a great diversity of opinion as to where the intermediate moves would be made and apparently, from the scant material at hand on the subject, all were erroneous.
- (2) From answers by the Navy Minister to USSBS memorandum Nav 3, it appears that the Naval General Staff made an estimate of Allied plans on 1 December 1944 based on the opinion that the Allies would continue to be absorbed in expansion and strengthening of the Leyte beachhead for some time. The next move was expected to be to the east and south coast of Luzon, including the islands in the vicinity, in preparation for the conquest of Luzon.
- (3) The staff of the 4th Air Army (Manila) anticipated that American forces would first engage in overland expansion in all possible directions from Leyte. Then it was speculated that landings would be made at either Negros or Panay and at Legaspi. There was also some thought of an attack on North Borneo and Palawan. After the Mindoro amphibious force was seen underway in the Sulu Sea, the Japanese were still unable to perceive US intentions, according to Colonel Matsumae, senior staff officer of the 4th Air Army (USSBS interrogation 249-6,7,8).

f. The Lingayen Operation

- (1) The Japanese Army General Staff considered that it had lost the Leyte campaign by the middle of December 1944. Although US moves indicated that a landing on Luzon would come soon, they did not expect it until the end of January, and were surprised at the early landing at Lingayen Gulf on 9 January,

reports Lieutenant General Miyazaki, chief of operational planning for the Army General Staff after 14 December 1944 (USSBS interrogation 502-4). Likewise, General Yamashita's staff did not anticipate landings in Luzon until the end of January or early February, it is stated by Major General Nishimura (USSBS interrogation 418-2).

- (2) On 1 January 1945, the 4th Air Army staff estimated that US plans would call for simultaneous landings at Aparri, Lingayen and Batangas, according to Colonel Matsumae.
- (3) The Naval General Staff estimated on 1 January 1945 that the next landings would be made on the south or southwest coasts of Luzon (answers by Navy Minister to USSBS memorandum Nav 3).
- (4) The movement of US amphibious forces northward from Mindoro on 5 January was scouted by Japanese planes but its destination was not learned until it was reached. The first time that the Japanese were said to have known that US forces intended a landing at Lingayen Gulf was when the ships in the force appeared in the Gulf. This is the testimony of Vice Admiral Fukudome, Combined Base Air Force and 2nd Air Fleet commander (USSBS interrogation 503-10).
- (5) The heavy losses of shipping, troops and supplies in the attempt to hold Leyte forced General Yamashita to the conclusion that a full-scale defense of Luzon was impossible, according to his assistant chief of staff, Major General Nishimura (USSBS interrogation 418-1,2,5,6,7). It was determined to resort to a delaying action in Luzon, and the army forces were withdrawn from the Manila area to the mountains to the north around Baguio and to the hills east of Manila; the air and naval personnel in the Clark Field area were expected to attempt to hold at that point. The staff estimated that it would have about 50 days to effect this redistribution of forces after 10 December, when the move commenced. When the US invasion struck at Lingayen on 9 January, this redeployment was less than half completed. Reinforcements being shipped from Manchuria were attacked by American air forces with large losses of troops and shipping. Under these circumstances, the loss of the Luzon campaign was considered a foregone conclusion.

11. Iwo Jima Campaign

a. After the success of the Philippine campaign became apparent, the Japanese Naval General Staff considered that their access to the resources in the southern region had been effectively severed. It was estimated that the American strategy was then aimed at the areas surrounding the East China Sea. Important operational points in that area had to be strengthened and defended at all costs, especially the Nansei Shoto. The Japanese objective was to hold out in the Nansei Shoto-Formosa-Shanghai area and, at least, make any advance as costly as possible and gain time for the defense of the homeland, according to answers by the Navy Minister to USSBS Memoranda Nav O & 3.

b. The Naval General Staff was said to have made preparations for the defense of Iwo Jima on the belief that this would be the objective of an amphibious assault as a preliminary to the larger operations expected. This is the testimony of Rear Admiral Tomioka, chief of the General Staff planning section (USSBS interrogation 355-2,5), and of Captain Ohmae, also of the General Staff, in his answers to a questionnaire of the Japanese Intelligence Section, USSBS, dated 20 November 1945.

c. From another Naval General Staff officer, Commander Okumiya (USSBS interrogation 104-2) it is revealed that the General Staff estimated the US forces which would be committed to the Iwo Jima operation were as follows:

12 CV, 8-10 BB, 20 cruisers, 50 DD

2½ divisions in the assault landing force.

The Army General Staff, according to Lieutenant General Arisue's reply to an USSBS questionnaire of 3 November 1945, expected that 2 to 3 divisions would be employed in the Iwo Jima operation. The General Staff further determined about the end of the third week in January, said Arisue, General Staff G-2 chief, that the operations against Iwo would commence after the middle of February, basing this estimate on raids by US task forces and on the activity of submarines and search aircraft.

d. Actual figures on US forces committed directly to the Iwo operation, as compiled by the Air Intelligence Branch of ONI, were:

Carrier task forces -- 4 CV, 2 CVL, 6 CL, 2 CL(AA), 24 DD (the main strength of the carrier task force was engaged principally in preliminary and supporting strikes on the home islands, Nansei Shoto, and Formosa).

Amphibious forces -- 2 BB, 6 OBB, 1 CB, 9 CA, 9 CL, 44 DD, 1 CV, 11 CVE.

Assault troops -- 70,647 Marines, 570 Army.

e. Apparently the enemy anticipated that US forces would make carrier air strikes against the home islands and simultaneously commence landing operations against Iwo Jima. They seem to have been fairly well forewarned in this instance. Their air reconnaissance of the Guam area on 14 February revealed:

At Apra harbor -- 2 large transports, 30 medium and small transports.

At airfield 1 -- 50 large and 30 small aircraft.

At airfield 2 -- 150 probable B-29s and a few small planes.

At sea -- 2 carriers heading 220 degrees, distant 120 miles from Guam; at about 90 miles W of Saipan, about 100 ships were discovered heading NW.

f. On 15 February, at 1600, Japanese patrol planes reported sighting one battleship and about 15 cruisers and destroyers in a ring formation, bearing 160 degrees distant 160 miles from Iwo Jima, according to answers by the Navy Minister to USSBS memorandum Nav 6.

g. The enemy expected air attacks to be made on the Tokyo area on 16 February after a search plane on a 150 degree sector from Kisarazu failed to return on the 15th and an RDF fix showed something moving north of Iwo Jima. An offensive search mission of 15 planes was sent out after this, but they were all lost without report. Such is the information contained in answers by the Navy Minister to USSBS Memorandum Nav 7 and in the interrogation of Commander Okuniya of the Navy General Staff (USSBS 104-2).

12. Okinawa Campaign

a. Before the Iwo Jima operation commenced, the Japanese operations plan "Ten-go" had been drawn to counter the expected assault on the line connecting the Nansei Shoto-Formosa-China coast. This plan did not include Iwo Jima, although an attack on Iwo Jima, probably followed by an attack on the Nansei Shoto, was envisaged. It is said that the fall of Iwo Jima did not bring any change in the basic "Ten-Go" plan, but that it would have presented obstacles to the effective activation of the later "Ketsu-Go" plan for the defense of the homeland.

b. The "Ten" operations were designed primarily as air operations ("Ten" meaning heaven). The operations plan was divided into 4 sub-plans for the organization of the defenses of the 4 regions where assaults were expected, with priority given to the defense preparations in their numbered order:

Ten 1 - Nansei Shoto and Formosa.

Ten 2 - Formosa.

Ten 3 - East and south coasts of China and Formosa.

Ten 4 - Hainan.

c. Carrier task force strikes and amphibious operations were expected. It was planned to break up these operations by "kamikaze" or "special attack" tactics directed at the task force units, transport shipping and amphibious craft. The plan provided for the combination of Navy and Army air forces and the concentration of the major portion of them in Kyushu and the Nansei Shoto, according to answers by the Navy Minister to USSBS Memorandum Nav O, and to statements of Commander Miyazaki of the Naval General Staff (USSBS interrogation 369-3,6,9).

d. Lieutenant General Arisue, Chief of G-2 of the Army General Staff, testified that the prevailing opinion in the Army and Navy General Staffs was that Okinawa would most likely be the next US assault objective after the Iwo Jima operation, although there was some anticipation of landings at Hongkong and Formosa. (USSBS interrogation 217-2). He also reported that in early February his staff had estimated the timing of the next major operation as late March. The determination that the objective would be Okinawa was not reached until the middle of March, and this was based upon an analysis of US task force raids, the assembly and deployment of forces and from US search aircraft and submarine activity. The first estimate made in early February was that about 3 divisions of troops would be employed, but a later estimate was that about 6 divisions would be used, Lieutenant General Arisue stated in answers to an USSBS Japanese Intelligence Section questionnaire dated 9 December 1945.

e. The Naval General Staff reportedly had made preparations on the expectation there would be an assault on Okinawa late in March 1945. They estimated that 18-20 CVs and 5-7 divisions of troops would be employed in this operation. This estimate of the landing forces was based on the Japanese experience that the US usually employed twice the strength of the defending units. They believed that US intelligence knew the strength of the defending forces. This is disclosed by Rear Admiral Tomioka (USSBS interrogation 355-2,5), by Captain Ohase (answers to USSBS Japanese

Intelligence questionnaire of 20 Nov 45), by the Navy Minister (answers to USSBS memorandum Nav 5) and by Commander Miyazaki (USSBS interrogation 369-3,6,9), all at General Staff planning level.

f. By 16 March, the Japanese official reports show that it had become very difficult to collect the necessary information for making accurate estimates concerning the impending American operations. Air reconnaissance and air attacks on the Marianas area became exceedingly difficult after the landings at Iwo. Air attacks on the homeland severed communications lines, as well as reducing communications facilities and aircraft production. (Answers by the Navy Minister to USSBS memorandum Nav 6).

g. The Japanese 32nd Army, which was stationed in the Nansei Shoto, was warned before the landings in the Okinawa area that conditions indicated "a possible attack against Formosa or the Nansei Shoto (particularly Okinawa)" at the end of March or in early April. The warning was an intelligence report dated 23 March, antedating the landings in the Marianas by 2 days, and consisting of an addendum by the 62nd Division to a 32nd Army "Estimate of the Situation", which US forces captured on Okinawa (CinCPac-CinCPAC Weekly Intelligence, Vol. 1, 47, 4 June 1945). The bases used for the prediction as to our next assault were:

- (1) The strategy conference held in Washington in early March, attended by Admirals King, Nimitz and Halsey, was considered as an indication of a major move in the Pacific within about 20-30 days on the basis of past experience.
- (2) It was reported there were 7 divisions of troops in the Marianas and 2 or 3 in the Philippines available for a new operation.
- (3) A concentration of transports was reported in the Marianas, greater than before the Iwo Jima operation, and enough "to carry 3 or 4 divisions" as experience had shown.
- (4) Air attacks against Formosa and reconnaissance of Okinawa from the Marianas and Philippines had become very frequent.
- (5) Since February there had been a conspicuous increase in submarine activity southeast of Kyushu, around the Nansei Shoto (particularly Okinawa), and off Formosa. The number of submarine contacts in the Ogasawara Shoto and off the China Coast had decreased.

- (6) It was considered probable that a favorable offensive position in the war would be taken by America before the opening of the San Francisco Conference (25 April) for prestige purposes, and that Formosa and the Nansei Shoto, especially Okinawa, were the most likely targets.

h. The 32nd Army's "Estimate of the Situation" discussed broadly in a conjectural way the anticipated plans and capabilities of the Allied forces. The Allied operations against Japan were expected to be in 3 phases. First would be "completion of the envelopment of Japan" by advancing to a line running from southeast China through Formosa to Iwo Jima. Second the envelopment would be tightened by advances to Shanghai, Okinawa and the Ogasawara Shoto. Third would be the attack on the main islands of Japan. It was considered that conditions might eliminate the southeast China and Formosa operations, in which case the Americans were expected to attack Okinawa with 5 divisions in April or May. This latter predicted date conflicts with other conjectures in the same "Estimate". Following the Nansei Shoto or Okinawa operation, the next American capability considered in this Army "Estimate" was an attack on Chichi Jima and Naha Jima in April or May with 2 American divisions, and another attack on Shanghai.

i. On 25 March the Navy judged that the US carrier task force would return to Ulithi for a time, after Japanese attacks against it 18 March off Kyushu were thought to have severely damaged 5 ships, and that no assault on the Nansei Shoto would be made until sometime between 1 and 20 April. However, on 25 March it was reported that a large force with a transport convoy had invaded and occupied the Keramas. This was correctly viewed as a preliminary operation in the attack on Okinawa. The Nansei Shoto were considered to be of such strategic importance that the Japanese Navy, in its operation plan, committed every element of its air and surface strength in the defense. (Answers by the Navy Minister to USSBS memorandum Nav 7).

j. The "Ten-Go" operation was put into execution in March 1945 with the commencement of Allied amphibious operations in the Keramas. The Japanese expected that repeated "special" attacks by their Army and Navy air forces against Allied surface forces supporting the Okinawa operations would inflict such severe damage that, coupled with a stout defensive stand by their land forces, they would be able to delay any subsequent American advances for a considerable period of time. A series of escorted group "special" attacks was organized when new convoys or favorable transport or shipping targets presented themselves in the Okinawa area. These were known as the "Kikusui" operations. These attacks were made by both Army and Navy planes, under Navy command, and the planning and operations

for this phase are described in detail by the Navy Minister (answers to USSBS memorandum Nav 0) and by Lieutenant General Sugawara, currently chief of Air General Headquarters and CG of the 6th Air Army (USSBS interrogation 351-3,4,5,12). The "Kikusui" operations were discontinued on 21-22 June because it was deemed necessary to commence preparing defenses of the home islands, and because of the strengthening of the new American bases in the Okinawas.

k. The enemy's estimate as to the strength of the US task force used in the Okinawa operation, according to the Navy Minister (answers to USSBS memorandum Nav 0):

16 CVs, 86 BBs and cruisers.

For comparison, actual strength, as compiled by the Air Branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence, was:

11 CVs, 7 CVLs, 8 BBs, 9 OBBs, 1 CB, 12 CAs, 10 CLs, 4 CL(AA)s, 58 DDs, 18 CVEs, and 2857 miscellaneous and landing craft.

13. Enemy Estimates and Planning in Preparation for Anticipated Invasion of the Homeland

a. After the fall of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, the Japanese Naval General Staff had no thought that the eventual Allied advance into the homeland could be stopped. The success of these naval-amphibious operations made it possible to steadily reduce the Japanese national and military strength through thoroughly effective employment of heavy, land-based air power. It was expected that the US would increase the tempo of attack to hasten the end of the war as much as possible. However, the enemy also recognized that newly-won positions made it possible for the US to delay the assault on the homeland until the most opportune occasion should present itself, when a quick move would be possible. This reasoning is contained in the statements of the Navy Minister (answers to USSBS memoranda Nav 0, 7) and of Rear Admiral Tomioka, chief of the Naval General Staff planning section (USSBS interrogation 355-2).

b. General Kawabe, commanding general of Air General Headquarters, testified (USSBS interrogation 343-5) that it was the prevailing opinion at Imperial Headquarters that the invasion would probably take one of 2 courses:

- (1) If Russia did not enter the war it was thought the Allies would land in Kyushu in October or November.
- (2) If Russia did enter the war it was thought a

landing would be made on the Kanto Plain in the fall or winter.

It was also considered that the US might secure B-29 bases in China, near Shanghai, as a preliminary move.

c. There was some other speculation on possible intermediate moves. It was thought likely that the US would take some of the other islands in the Nansei Shoto between Okinawa and Kyushu, build air bases on them, and use them for stepping stones for attacks on the Kanto Plain and other distant areas in the home islands. Answers by the Navy Minister to USSBS memorandum Nav 7 and statements by Commander Miyazaki of the General Staff (USSBS interrogation 369-7,9) disclose that the General Staff did not believe there was much likelihood of a landing on the China coast; if such a landing were made it was thought it would be a small one at Swatow for political purposes. Nor were landings on Hokkaido considered likely.

d. These same sources report that the predominant opinion in both the Army and Navy General Staffs, which presumably discussed the matter jointly in Imperial Headquarters sessions, was that the first American invasion would be made at Kyushu. Simultaneous landings on Shikoku also were held likely, and it was felt that the first invasion would be followed within a few months by landings in the Tokyo-Kanto Plain area. The Army and the Navy joined in a strategic decision that the Ariake Bay and Miyazaki areas of Kyushu should be prepared speedily for defense as the 2 most likely points of the first invasion. Defense preparations also were made at other points in the Kyushu, Shikoku and Kanto areas.

e. The enemy's estimates as to the general locations and order of our next invasions coincided with Allied plans which, in fact, called for the first landings to be made at Ariake Wan and Miyazaki, as well as Kushikino, in Kyushu. The fact that the Ariake Bay and Miyazaki areas of southeastern Kyushu are by far the most suitable places on the Kyushu coast for bringing ships close in-shore and for carrying out large scale amphibious operations dictated Allied choice of these landing points, and made the Japanese prediction a fairly obvious one.

f. There was considerable variance in the estimates as to the timing of the anticipated assaults.

- (1) In the Naval General Staff, the expectations ranged from July to November 1945 for the Kyushu landings, and from December 1945 onward for the landings in the Kanto Plains area. It was believed that we would need air bases in Kyushu or

Shikoku before landing operations in the Tokyo area could be carried out. This Navy line of thought was disclosed by the Navy Minister (answers to USSBS memorandum Nav 7); by Rear Admiral Tomioka (USSBS interrogation 355-2,6,7), and by Commander Miyazaki (USSBS interrogation 369-2,9).

- (2) The available Army estimates ranged from September to November 1945 for landings in Kyushu, and from January to the spring of 1946 for landings in the Kanto area, according to Major General Takashima, 12th Area Army chief of staff (USSBS interrogation 478-2), and Lieutenant General Tazoe, Air General Army chief of staff (FEAF Advon Intelligence Memorandum 7 of 22 Sept 45).

g. An interesting statement highlighting the anticipated Japanese defense problems, and the difficulties in intelligence and planning with relation to these problems, is contained in Lieutenant General Tazoe's interview in the FEAF Intelligence Memorandum:

"Plans for Defense against Invasion of Japan. We expected an Allied invasion of southern Kyushu or of the northwestern coast of Kyushu. We expected also that an invasion would be made against the Kanto area, taking into consideration transportation and supplies. The invasion of Kyushu was expected in September or October, and of Kanto, in the coming spring. We expected that the US Navy would continue bombardment before, during and after the invasion, and that the 8th Air Force, 20th Bomber Command and FEAF would continue operations against Japan to smooth the way for landing parties. Our sources were quite poor and we had difficulty in collecting information on the intentions of the Allied forces. (One) source of information was from isolated islands where troops still remained, but reception was very poor. Radio communications with Leyte ceased with the invasion of Ormoc; until recently radio communication continued with Truk and Rabaul, but it was very poor."

h. The operation plan which was drawn for the defense of the homeland was known as the "Ketsu ^{su-go}" plan. This appears to have been formulated in April 1945, and was activated for decisive defensive action on 10 July when the 20-day period of intermittent carrier task force air and bombardment attacks on the Japanese home islands commenced. This defense plan provided primarily for air operations. All of the Navy air forces and the bulk of the Army air forces were concentrated at Kyushu with the mission of destroying

our Surface and landing forces in "Kamikaze" or "Special" attacks. It was not generally expected that the invasion would be stopped effectively by these attacks, but the hope and expectation was that heavy losses, amounting to 30 to 50 per cent, could be inflicted upon the first assault waves of landing forces. These were expected to consist of anywhere from 15 to 50 divisions (the Allied plan called for 15 divisions in the Kyushu landings). The enemy was resigned to fighting in the home islands and extensive preparations of beach and ground defenses were being made. This included plans for suicidal surface craft and infantry attacks on our landing forces. Only a few believed it possible to defeat the landing attempts.

(Sources for the "Ketsu-Go" phase of planning were statements by the Navy Minister (answers to USSBS memoranda Nav 0, 7); Rear Admiral Tomioka (USSBS interrogation 355-2,6,7); Commander Miyazaki (USSBS interrogation 369-2,9,10,11); Lieutenant General Sugawara CG of the 6th Air Army (USSBS interrogation 351-11), and Major General Takashima (USSBS interrogation 478-2).)

1. The Japanese Naval General Staff prepared certain estimates on 1 May 1945 as to the strength of the US Naval and ground forces at the end of May and each succeeding month through August 1945. These estimates provided the basis for operational planning by the General Staff for the expected assaults on the homeland. They are set forth below in tables 8 and 9 to show the nature and quality of the Japanese intelligence estimates and planning in the final months of the war. The Japanese estimates were submitted by Captain Ohmae of the Naval General Staff in a report on Japanese Naval Intelligence prepared at the request of USSBS Japanese Intelligence Section. Actual US figures were compiled by the Air Branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence (table 8) and by the Statistical Control Division, Army Ground Forces (table 9).

Table 8
Japanese Estimates of US Naval Strength Prepared 1 May 1945.
Compared to Actual Figures

	<u>End May</u>		<u>End June</u>		<u>End July</u>		<u>End Aug</u>	
	Est	Act	Est	Act	Est	Act	Est	Act
<u>CVs</u>								
On hand	13	15	20	12	25	16	25	16
Available	26	27	27	28	28	28	28	28
<u>CVEs</u>								
On hand	58	20	64	17	70	18	74	19
Available	75	69	80	70	85	71	89	71
<u>ESs</u>								
On hand	20	23	21	23	23	23	24	23
Available	21	23	22	23	23	23	24	23
<u>Cruisers</u>								
On hand	16	54	25	54	35	53	36	53
Available	49	68	56	71	64	72	64	73
<u>DDs</u>								
On hand	209	342	228	353	244	359	254	372
Available	289	381	308	372	324	361	331	380

"On hand" figure indicates ships in the Pacific ready for immediate use against Japan.
 "Available" figure indicates total US naval strength in the categories listed.

Japanese notes on above estimates indicate they were based on the following suppositions:

- (1) Figures are based on those announced by the US at the end of April and as further effected by "Ten" operations.
- (2) In regard to ships believed damaged or sunk, the most pessimistic view was taken and aircraft carriers were considered only badly damaged, while escort carriers were considered as half being sunk and half being damaged.
- (3) In regard to badly damaged ships, it was considered that half could be made ready for action in 2 or 3 months and half in from 3 to 4 months.
- (4) It was considered that the new carrier Antietam would be ready for action at the end of June, the Tarawa at the end of July, and the Boxer at the end of August. The Saratoga and Ranger were believed to be used for training and were not included.
- (5) In the figures on ships on hand, vessels loaned to Britain and ships lost before Okinawa are included.

Table 9
Japanese Estimates of US Ground Forces Strength Prepared
1 May 1945. Compared to Actual Figures

<u>Divisions</u>	<u>End Apr</u>		<u>End May</u>		<u>End June</u>		<u>End July</u>		<u>End Aug</u>	
<u>Army</u>	<u>Est</u>	<u>Act</u>	<u>Est</u>	<u>Act</u>	<u>Est</u>	<u>Act</u>	<u>Est</u>	<u>Act</u>	<u>Est</u>	<u>Act</u>
<u>Infantry</u>										
Allotted	43	19	44	19	44	19	53	19	70	19
Strength	90	67	90	66	90	65	90	65	90	59
<u>Armored</u>										
Allotted	4	1	4	1	5	1	7	1	10	1
Strength	22	16	22	16	22	16	22	17	22	16
<u>Airborne</u>										
Allotted	2	1	2	1	2	1	3	1	4	1
Strength	10	5	10	5	10	5	10	6	10	6
<u>Cavalry</u>										
Allotted	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Strength	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1
<u>Total</u>										
Allotted	50	22	51	22	52	22	64	22	85	22
Strength	134	89	134	88	134	87	134	89	134	82
<u>Marine</u>										
Allotted	5	6	6	6	7	6	7	6	3	6
Strength	10	6	10	6	10	6	10	6	10	6
<u>Grand Total</u>										
Allotted*	57	28	59	28	61	28	?	28	95	28
Strength	144	95	144	94	144	93	144	95	144	88

"Allotted" figures indicate strength allotted to the operation against Japan.

"Strength" figures indicate whole ground forces strength possessed.

Japanese notes on above estimates indicate they were based on the following suppositions:

- (1) Every month after May, 2 divisions would be sent as reinforcement from the US for the operation against Japan; this explains discrepancy in grand total estimate of allotted forces marked by (*).
- (2) Out of 60 divisions on the European front, about half would be sent to the Pacific for the operation against Japan -- about 10 divisions departing from Europe the middle and end of May and arriving in the Philippines by the end of July, and about 20 divisions departing from Europe in June and arriving in the Philippines by the end of August. The necessary amount of equipment for the transferred strength and the necessary munitions for the operation would be sent to the Philippines directly from the US.

J. It is interesting to note that during the first phase of the US Carrier task force attacks on the Kanto area in July, which caused the Japanese to activate their "Ketsu-Go" plan for the defense of the homeland, there was neither air opposition to the attacks nor any form of thorough air search. As a consequence, the raids and bombardments on Kamaishi and Muroran were complete surprises, it is revealed in the Navy Minister's answers to USSBS memorandum Nav O.

k. The end of the war on 15 August obviated any further test of these Japanese estimates, plans and defenses.

REFERENCE NOTES

1. A major source of information for this report was interrogations of Japanese officials in Tokyo and written reports received in response to requests of the survey on the subject of Japanese Military and Naval Intelligence.

2. A reference list of the 51 interrogations conducted by the Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS, during the period 1 November-1 December 1945, and of the written reports received, follows. Copies of these may be found with the original of this report in the office of the Chairman, USSBS.

Interrogations: Navy

<u>Jap Intel No</u>	<u>USSBS No</u>		
2	208	Ozawa, H, Comdr	Chief of 4th Dept (Communications) Navy General Staff
3	219	Arita, Y, Capt	CO of carrier; member Navy General Staff
4	222	Takeuchi, K, RADM	Chief US intelligence section, Navy General Staff
5	236	Imai, H, Comdr	Chief of Naval General Staff section dealing with Latin America
6	246	Ono, T, RADM	Director of Naval Intelligence, Naval General Staff
7	250	Yokura, S, Comdr	Officer on Naval General Staff in charge of aeronautical intelligence
12	291	Teraf, Y, Comdr	Air officer in War Plans Section, Naval General Staff
14	310	Obayashi, J, RADM	CO of 2 carriers and two air flots
15	309	Nekajima, C, Comdr	Staff officer, Combined Naval Force
16	330	Shiba, K, Capt	Chief of propaganda at Naval General Staff; some operational duties

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<u>Jap Intel No</u>	<u>USSES No</u>		
17	329	Okuniya, W, Comdr	Air officer on several carriers; staff officer on Naval General Staff for one year
18	350	Ohmoe, T, Capt	Officer responsible for estimates of Allied intentions and capa- bilities for Naval General Staff
21	355	Tomicka, S, RAdm	Chief, 1st Dept, Naval General Staff, in charge of planning defense of homeland
23	356	Yamaguchi, W, Comdr	Air officer of 4th Fleet and Senior Staff officer of 1st Air Fleet
24	369	Wiyazaki, I, Comdr	Asst to Chief of Operations Plans, Naval General Staff
25B	410	Takeuchi, K, RAdm	Chief, Naval General Staff section dealing with US
27	421	Sanematsu, Y, Capt	Chief of section of Naval Gen- eral Staff dealing with overall economic capabilities of US
29	374	Takita, N, Comdr	In charge of estimating US carrier and land based naval air strength
32	384	Toyoda, T, Lt	In airframe unit of Yokosuka Air Technical Arsenal, studying Allied aircraft
33	431	Setake, T, Lt Comdr	Officer in the Naval Communica- tions Interception Center at Owada
42	425	Nekagawa, T, Lt Comdr	Officer in charge of plane and ship recognition for Navy
43	603	Fuchida, M, Capt	CO of air group in Pearl Harbor attack
45	432	Ito, T, Capt	Personnel section of Navy Ministry

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<u>Jap Intel No</u>	<u>USSES No</u>		
46	433	Handa, N, Comdr	Staff communications officer for destroyer and cruiser squadron
47	437	Otani, T, Comdr	Operations officer of 2nd Fleet
50	605	Yanagita, W, Lt Comdr	Officer in charge of training yomushi (ground officers in Naval air force)

Interrogations: Army

1	238	Arisue, S, Lt Gen	Chief of intelligence, Army General Staff
8	270	Miyashi, M, Col	Chief of operations section, Army General Staff, under which intelligence operated
9	267	Fujiwara, M, Lt Col	Chief, weather section of Army General Staff
10	284	Toga, H, Major	Instructor at Air Officers School at Toyooka
11	306	Otsu, T, Capt	Head of air raid warning system in Tokyo Area
13	307	Matsumura, Lt Col	Staff officer in 3rd Air Brigade and CO of 98th Air Regiment
19	362	Ashihara, T, Lt Col	Chief of intelligence section of Air General Headquarters and concurrently chief technical intelligence section, Air Hq
20	343	Kawabe, M, Gen	Commanding general, Air General Headquarters
22	364	Oya, K, Lt Col	Chief of section dealing with intelligence concerning Latin America and US in Army General Staff
28	412	Saeki, A, Major	Squadron commander in New Guinea campaign

Jap Intel No	USSES No		
31	449	Anno, H, Major	In intelligence section of Kwantung Army
35	402	Sugita, K, Col	Chief of Army General Staff section dealing with US
40	450	Ohmura, S, Lt Col	Staff officer 25th Army in Sumatra
44	451	Kimura, T, Major	Chief, intelligence section, 51st Army in Tokyo area
48	604	Shimzu, T, Col	Instructor at Army War College
51	608	Tokunaga, H, Lt. Col	Chief, intelligence section, 57th Army in Kyushu

Interrogations: Attaches

30	455	Yokoyama, I, RAdm	Attache in Washington
38	411	Suzuki, M, Capt	Attache in Berlin
39	422	Wachi, K, Capt	Attache in Argentina
41	423	Suzuki, M, Capt	Attache in Mexico

Interrogations: Special Service Organizations

25A	372	Asai, I, Lt Col	Intelligence section in Kwantung Army serviced by Tokumu Kikan
26	398	Yamazaki, J, Lt Col	In China section, Army General Staff, serviced by Tokumu Kikan
34	452	Nozaki, T, Lt Col	Instructor in Kempei Tai School in Tokyo
36	397	Harada, H, Maj Gen	Head of Nanking Tokumu Kikan
49	607	Yamamura, Lt Col	On staff of Kempei Tai in Manchuria

Interrogations: Foreign Service

37	442	Sone, E, Civilian	Experienced Foreign Office employee
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Reports

1. Report on Japanese Army Intelligence submitted 3 November 1945 by Lt Gen Arisue, Seizo, IJA, chief of G-2, Army General Staff.
2. Report on Japanese Naval Intelligence submitted 20 November 1945 by Captain Ohmoe, Teshikazu, IJN, chief of operations planning, Naval General Staff.
3. Report on the organization and operation of First Naval Air Technical Arsenal (addendum to interrogation 384, Lt Toyoda, t, IJN) submitted 26 November 1945.
4. Report on Japanese Naval Intelligence submitted by RAdm Takeuchi, Kaoru, IJN, chief of 5th Section (US and Latin America) of 3rd Department (Naval Intelligence) of the Naval General Staff.

EXHIBIT AJAPANESE SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Available evidence of Japanese knowledge of Allied activities has been screened, excerpted and classified by source, using as reference material USSBS, JICPOA, ATIS, NEFIS and SOPAC translations of Japanese documents, interrogation of Japanese prisoners of war, and Japanese military officials in Tokyo. Representative examples of information derived from these sources are included under the following headings:

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I INTELLIGENCE DERIVED FROM ALLIED PRISONERS OF WAR**1. The Importance Attached to POW Information**

a. The following excerpt from the 51st Division intelligence plans of May 1945, as translated in ATIS Bulletin 416, is evidence of the importance the Japanese attached to the capture of prisoners of war:

"The capture of POW and the reliability of their intelligence is a profitable manner in which to accumulate intelligence. Since the enemy are white forces and do not know what they are doing, by direct action on our part they can be captured with comparative ease.

"Therefore all units, particularly all front line units, sentries and patrols, will have many opportunities to execute unexpected attacks and surprise attacks and use pitfalls and, in addition, if abrupt challenges are unavoidable, their escape must be prevented by endeavouring to wound or mortally injure with a sudden blow or some such means, using positive and daring originality in action. At the same time the high ranking officers must plan to encourage and lead in this to the end that POW be captured."

2. The Techniques Used

a. Interrogation. The following extracts from a captured booklet, "Japanese Instructions on How to Interrogate", translated by Headquarters AAF SWPA in Intelligence Summary 242, is interesting as representing an official view. Its application by individual commanders is another matter:

"Introduction: The main point of interrogation of prisoners is to secure truth of everything prisoner of war knows, but prisoner may be patriotic. Needless to say, prisoners of war insist on their rights and duties in accordance with international law, and it is difficult to make them say anything against their national interest. On the whole, interrogation of prisoners of war is not like that of criminals. For a disposition, tangible proof is needed, but it is almost impossible to judge authenticity, for there are no limits to the scope of his knowledge, and if he says 'I do not know' force may not be used to get a stronger statement from him. It is clear from Field Service Regulations that information given by prisoners is comparatively reliable. Originality and zeal should be used to secure true and

full details. What follows are general principles to cover a situation where there is an abundance of time. Interrogation officers will act in accordance with these principles, depending on the particular prisoner, circumstances, time and place.

"Points Concerning Actual Interrogation: Interrogation officers will rapidly ascertain prisoner of war's character, ability, memory, emotional changes, and like, and must adopt suitable interrogation methods to do this. You must develop a sixth sense to catch him out when lying. You must not get excited even with prisoners of war who are arrogant and always answer 'I don't know'. Always remain calm. You must be careful when using invective, rebukes or torture (gomon) for it will cause him to lie and make a fool of you.

"Means of Obtaining Statement. Means vary with nationality - British and American troops. (To be carried out circumstances permitting). Infuse anti-war sentiments. Military objectives of England and America are anti-religious; they do not seek peace or freedom. Recall enjoyable existence of pre-war days. Show corruption of public morals, deficiency of materials and frequency of strikes in their own country. With British troops - American atrocities (Bojo) to women in England. With American troops - state of women's anti-war movement in America.

"Measures to be normally adopted: Torture (Gomon) (embraces beating, kicking, and all conduct involving physical suffering). It is the most clumsy method and only to be used when all else fails. (TN: specially marked in text). When violent torture is used, change interrogation officers and it is beneficial if one new officer questions in a sympathetic fashion.

"Threats: As a hint of physical discomforts to come, such as murder, torture, starving, deprivation of sleep, military confinement, etc. Mental discomforts to come, such as that he will not receive same treatment as other prisoners of war, in event of exchange of prisoners he will be kept till the last, he will be forbidden to send letters, will be forbidden to inform his home he is a prisoner of war, etc.

"Arouse hatred and weariness of war, such as do you know where your wife now lives?...that district was heavily bombed by Germany recently. Do you know to

what area she has been evacuated?; Britain is retreating from OO to OO; if she is soon defeated you will be able to return to your wife and child who are saying 'Come quickly'. Take this line particularly with those who have wife and children."

b. Torture of Prisoners of War

- (1) The following official instructions on "Handling of Prisoners of War and Captured Documents" were prescribed for the Torokina Operations in a document dated 1 March 1944, as translated in SOPAC Serial 01295, Item 1333:

"It is forbidden to make on-the-spot disposition of any officers among the prisoners of war. (The text implies that prisoners of war other than officers may be disposed of: 'Furyocho Shoko I No Genchi Shobun No Kin Su'. This text was shown to a petty officer first class, prisoner of war, who stated it means that 'anything, including killing, may be done with prisoners of war below officer rank'. Full discretion is apparently in the hands of the front line unit commander to kill enlisted prisoners or send them to the rear).

"After prisoners of war have been submitted quickly to the necessary examination at battalion headquarters, they will be immediately evacuated to regimental headquarters.

"Confiscated documents will be quickly sent to regimental headquarters.

"Detachment headquarters will catalogue all unusual articles among the captured arms, ammunition, food, etc; every man will go about his own tasks and the ones in charge will send them (the lists of spoils?) to division command post."

- (2) The following information was extracted from a collection of information obtained from Japanese prisoners of war captured near Aitape; dated 25 May 1944, it appears in NEFIS Interrogation Report A12/3540/6:

"An informant, while at Karakok, witnessed the beheading of a prisoner of war (possibly an American). The prisoner of war was tied to a tree and questioned,

but as the answers did not satisfy the Japanese he was beaten incessantly. Next morning he was beheaded, after first having been struck on the shoulders with a sword. A second informant witnessed the same occurrence. He further stated that the prisoner of war after being fed, for which purpose one hand was released, was interrogated. The answers did not seem to be satisfactory, and he was beaten with wooden clubs by several Japanese for about one hour. Next morning at about 0700 hours, the American prisoner of war, Japanese soldiers and coolies went to a certain place where there were trenches. At 0800 hours, American planes bombed the airfield. At 1200 hours, the American was given a meal. At 1400 hours, he was beheaded and buried on the spot. All this occurred under great hilarity from the Japanese".

- (3) The following extract is from an interview with missionaries rescued in Hollandia operations as published in Interrogation Report, ACofS G-2, Alamo Force, of 8 May 1944. One of the missionaries, Dr T G Braun, who had been in New Guinea 14 years and who since 1934 had worked at the mission hospital at Ameie near Madang, said:

"He has heard of numerous instances of the execution of captured airmen. He stated that on numerous occasions, military police had informed him that not one American airman would be permitted to live. He gave as the reason the alleged fact that American tanks had deliberately run over Japanese prisoners at Buna.

"One officer said that the policy was to tie up the captured airmen, question them pleasantly until they would give no further information, and then require them to kneel with a broomstick inside the knee joints. He stated that after one or two hours of this 'most of them would talk'. After the second interrogation was finished, they would be beaten and executed, usually by decapitation."

3. Examples of Information obtained

- a. An example of the type and usefulness of information obtained by the Japanese from Allied prisoners of war is shown in the following document translated in ATIS Enemy Publication 76:

"Prisoner of war made this chart of the organization of

5 Air Force:

5 Air Force

Bomber Air Brigade			Fighter Air Brigade
3 Air Regiment	90 Air Regiment	43 Air Regiment	3-4 Air Regiments
8 Squadron	B-24		1 Air Regiment - 4 Squadron
13 Squadron	B-17		Types of planes:
90 Squadron	Mixed		P-38
89 Squadron			P-39
B-25			P-40

"In 8 Squadron, there are five planes; 15-20 pilots.

"This man has had 500 flying hours.

"There are rumors that the American Army 41 Division is in New Guinea.

"Performance of 'North American'

Equipped with 8 machine guns.

Bore: 50 caliber.

Type and amount of bomb load: 4 500-pound bombs.

Cruising time: maximum, 10 hours; ordinary 4 hours.

"This man has arrived at Dobadura in the vicinity of Buna as well as at Moresby."

b. The following interrogation report was published by the Japanese 6 Base Force Headquarters, dated 10 August 1943, and marked 6 Base Force Secret 344:

"Prisoner of war interrogation report: Second interrogation carried out on 5th, 6th and 9th August 1943 at 6 Base Force Headquarters of A, 1st Lieut (Reserve) U S Army.

"1. General

(1) Hawaii:

The senior commanding officer of the American Army Air Forces is Lieut Gen Emmons.
Bombers: B-24s; 1 unit each at Kahuku, Mokuleia, Wheeler and Kuuloo airfields.
Fighters: P-40s; 1 unit each at Kahuku, Wheeler and Garth airfields; also 1 unit each at Barking Sands on

Kauai and at Hilo.
PBX: number unknown.
SBD: none.

(2) Midway

The senior command officer is a colonel (commanding officer for the whole island; doesn't know whether there is a separate commanding officer for the air forces).
Bombers: not usually stationed there.
Fighters: Buffalos and Grummans are used for short-range patrols; number unknown.

(3) Canton

Highest commanding officer is a colonel (concurrently air commanding officer).
P-39: 15.
PBX: none.

(4) Palmyra

Commanding officer of the naval base is of the rank of captain (concurrently air commanding officer).
Buffalos or SBDs: about 6.
Float-recco: about 6.
PBX: about 6.

(5) Funsuti

Marine base of about 200 Marines, highest officer in command with rank of colonel, concurrently air commander.
Grumman fighters: about 15.

(6) Johnston

Highest officer in command of the naval base has the rank of captain (concurrently air commander).
SBD: 12-15.

"2. Plan Reconnoitered in This Area

(1) Complete photo reconnaissance by 3 planes.
Believes photo reconnaissance to have been made.

"3. Howland and Baker

(1) Not used at present and no future plans.

"4. Plans for Attacking the Marshalls

- (1) None whatsoever.

"5. Liaison with Submarines

- (1) Before a bombing, one submarine is stationed from 20 to 50 miles away from the objective in this area in case something goes wrong. However, no direct radio contact is made.

"6. Defenses of Bases in the Pacific Area

- (1) Hawaii: Navy personnel 2000-3000. Army personnel 2000-4000. Completely equipped with guns. Send up balloons at night and from time to time during the day for reconnaissance. About 200 tanks and about 12 amphibious tanks.
- (2) Midway: About 100 Marines; there are no tanks.
- (3) Canton: About 100 army men at army bases. Intermediate base, defenses good. Small number of tanks.
- (4) Palmyra: About 300 naval personnel. There are trenches and a few AA guns. No tanks.
- (5) Funafuti: About 200 Marines. There are tanks.
- (6) Johnston: From 150-200 naval personnel. No tanks.
- (7) Gardner: There are plans for an airfield.
- (8) Enderbury: No airfield.

"7. Ship Movements

- (1) Hawaii: One or 2 battleships or cruisers, etc, a day, 3 transports a day, moving in or out; according to his experience there are always 2 or 3 ships at anchor in Pearl Harbor.
- (2) Midway: Only transports at anchor, no warships.
- (3) Canton: No ships at anchor.
- (4) Funafuti: No ships at anchor.
- (5) Palmyra: Ships at anchor -- unknown.

"8. New Weapons

- (1) None whatsoever.

"9. Transport from Hawaii to the South

- (1) Personnel: C-87 (remodelled B-24) used for pilots and high officials.

- (2) Freight: Use C-87 and Douglas (largely engines and other airplane and radio materiel).

"10. Radar

- (1) He doesn't know about ships, but some of the fighters and nearly all other types of aircraft use radar which scans to a distance of about 90 miles with a half-mile error.

"11. Transport from Hawaii to the Southwest

- (1) It takes about one month to go from Hawaii to Australia, routes unknown.

"12. Dispatch and Receipt of Orders for Air Attacks in this Area

- (1) After leaving Hawaii, the squadron leader alone opens sealed orders and he learns of the mission for the first time. Details unknown. It appears that nothing like a special radioed order is received a day or so before the attack. At the time of the Nauru attack, two general officers were aboard.

"13. Patrol activity

- (1) By ship or boat for about 100 (nautical) miles at both Midway and Hawaii. By radar for about 100 (nautical) miles. By patrol planes 800 (nautical) miles out (4 watches). Patrol directions unknown."

c. An interrogation labelled "Report 120" and published by the 3rd Air Army 19 September 1943, contains detailed information concerning the 9th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron. The table of contents, extracted from the translation in ATIS Bulletin 1098, is illustrative:

"I Summary

"II Items Investigated

1. Personal History of Prisoner of War
2. Movement Prior to Being Shot Down
3. Organization and Disposal of the American Air Force.
4. Flight Situation
5. Training and Instructions
6. Repair and Supply
7. Characteristics of the P-38 and P-5
8. Condition of Pandabesuwaru Airfield

"Attached chart -- 9th Photo Squadron Organization Table

"Attached sketch 1 -- Movements of His Plane

"Attached sketch 2 -- Cameras Installed on P-38 & P-5

"Attached sketch 3 -- Pandabesuwaru Airfield (early September)

"Attached sketch 4 -- Pandabesuwaru Airfield (early May)"

d. Intelligence reports classified Military Ultra Secret, dated 25 November 1943 to 16 March 1944, were variously issued by the 4th Air Army Staff Section, the 18th Army Staff Section, and the 18th Army Rear Echelon Headquarters attached to the 31st Anchorage Force. The following example is extracted from ATIS Bulletin 1250:

"According to the statement of an Allied prisoner of war, the American Army produced during the middle part of July of this year a new model fighter, the P-51 (North American). They have already begun to use these at home and in the European Theater, and they will soon appear in this area. This plane has the same engine as the P-40. It is used as a dive bomber or fighter. It is extremely fast (maximum speed is over 300 km per hour; cruising cannons or four 20 mm cannons, and 2 machine guns. It can operate at great altitudes and its maneuverability is great."

e. The following translation from JICPOA Item 7384 is of a Japanese document captured on Makin atoll and issued by 3rd Special Base Forces, Makin detachment, on 26 October 1943. Asterisks indicate material omitted by JICPOA for security reasons:

"Prisoner of War Interrogation Report.

Date of capture: 22 October 1943.

Place: Mukojima (Biketi Island) in Makin Atoll.

"Prisoners' names, ranks, and histories:

"Pilot - Navy reserve lieutenant (junior grade)* (28 years old). Graduated in 1938 from Notre Dame University (which is a school of the French System) in Chicago. Thereafter he was employed as a civilian pilot. He has done aviation work since he was 17 years old. He entered the Navy in 1941, and after a year's training served mainly as a pilot instructor. His present tour of duty is the first in combat. He became a lieutenant (junior grade) in September of 1943.

"Radioman and photographer - Navy second class petty officer* (30 years old).* Newspaper typesetter before he entered the service.

"Machine gunner - Navy second class petty officer* (20 years old). Farmer.

"According to a synthesis of the prisoner of war stories, on 5 July two carriers (Princeton and Belleau Wood) left Philadelphia escorted by four destroyers. They sailed to Honolulu via Panama and engaged in training. They left Honolulu on 12 September escorted by two light cruisers and two destroyers, and proceeded in a southwesterly direction at a speed of 15 to 28 knots, while taking evasive action and following a zig-zag course.

"These carriers are converted aircraft carriers of about 10,000 tons with a top speed of 28 knots. They have no heavy guns, but carry a total of 30 25 mm and 7.7 mm machine guns. The plane complement of each aircraft carrier consists of 20 Grumman F4Fs and 5 Grumman TBFs. One or two planes are also carried in reserve.

"Since, according to the original plans, the prisoners of war were supplementary personnel, they were not aboard the carrier when the striking force left Honolulu in a carrier based plane and landed on the carrier about 445 miles southwest of Honolulu as substitute personnel.

"The Grumman TBF (carrier-based) is a single-engine plane with a speed of 400 kilometers per hour and a range of 4,000 kilometers, and has a 1700 horse-power engine. It is equipped with 1 12.7 mm machine gun with 200 rounds of ammunition, and 2 7.7 mm machine guns, with 100 rounds of ammunition for each gun. Besides this, it carries 4x250-kilogram bombs. About half of these planes are equipped with radar.

"The striking force changed its course to west when about 200 miles east of Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands, and thereafter moved in an area some 100-200 miles away, presumably at top speed.

"On each mission, all 25 planes take off from a carrier. The ships send them out alternately. Some of the planes carry out security patrol over the carriers.

"The prisoners' plane (TEF) took off at about 0750 hours on 19 September in order to carry out independent reconnaissance of the results of the operations. They arrived over Tarawa about 0900 hours; and, after they had made one and a half trips in the north and south direction while carrying out photographic reconnaissance, the fuel tank of their plane was hit, and they made a forced landing about 5 miles to the south of Betio Island (an uninhabited island) where they remained for 4 weeks. However, they had no provisions, and not being able to get along on coconuts, on 20 October they came to Mukojima (Bikati Island) in order to get some food.

"While in their rubber boats after being forced down, these men sighted 10 Douglas SBD's. They were questioned further on this point, and they said that they did not know whether there was another striking force, but that these planes indicated that there might have been. They said that only the captain of the ship would know that.

"They did not know anything at all about the names of the vessels escorting the striking force and such matters.

"They saw no ships of other forces and no islands after leaving Honolulu, although it is conjectured that they came within range of aircraft operating from the Palmyra and Canton bases. Consequently, the ships did not refuel (at sea).

"They said that there were 2 small type aircraft carriers anchored in Pearl Harbor, but that there were no planes aboard them; and they said that these were thought of as escort ships, not carriers. They also said that there was one damaged cruiser (in Pearl Harbor, damaged in the Solomons) and that one sunken battleship and 6 or 7 destroyers could be seen.

"Prisoner of war stated that, although they were not sure, they thought there were 12 or 13 large type planes at the airfields on Oahu.

"They did not use colored signals when they sighted the BBDs because they were worried about being sighted by Japanese planes, and were not sure whether or not these were Japanese planes.

"Every day, as they drifted, they saw Japanese planes go by.

"They did not immediately give themselves up when they arrived at Turkurere Island (an uninhabited island) because they did not know whether or not food would be given them, and because they thought that they would be killed.

"They had expected to escape to somewhere if they were not captured when they came to Mukojima (Bikati Island).

"They are said to have told the natives on Bikati the following: 'We are confident that the United States will invade the Marshalls and the Gilberts in December about Christmas time, and recapture these islands, so don't treat us roughly'. In the interrogation they insisted that they had not made this statement."

f. Another document based on prisoner of war information shows its dissemination by the 3rd (intelligence) Department of the Navy General Staff, which published the following report as "American Military Classified Report 84" dated 21 October 1943. Captured on Makin, it was translated as JICPOA Item 2164:

"The contents of the report . . . will be handled with greatest secrecy. They will not be revealed to anyone not directly concerned. Of course it is realized that this report will pass through intelligence channels, but extreme circumspection is required.

"Hawaiian Patrol Situation and Miscellaneous Information
(Source: Prisoner of War Interrogation):

"The prisoners (2 reserve 1st lieutenants of the crew of a B-24) have been engaged in patrol duty in Hawaii from November 1942 to the end of May 1943. The gist of the interrogation follows:

"1. Outline of Carrying out Patrols

a. Chain of command: The commanding officer of the Naval forces in this area directs these operations, and Army Air Forces are under his command for control activities.

b. Number of patrol planes and number sent out: Naval seaplanes, PBY, 8 planes; Army bombers, B-24, 8 planes. The total of 16 planes is basic; but, depending on materials, and other circumstances, normally 12 to 16 planes are used. In the past 7 months there was never a time when there was less than a minimum of 10 planes.

c. Patrol areas: Generally divided into 4 areas of northwest, northeast, southwest, southeast. If there are no unusual situations, the whole area is equally patrolled by the 16 planes. In the past, emphasis has been placed on the northwest district.

"2. The Plans is Shown in the Following Diagram (not reproduced)

a. In case there is no particular change in the situation and the areas are equally patrolled (not reproduced).

b. When emphasis is placed on the northwest district (not reproduced).

"3. How the Patrols are Carried Out

a. B-24s and PBYs are disposed alternately (in order to facilitate rescue in case a plane is forced down.)

b. Distances out to sea by planes: The general rule is 300 miles, but taking into consideration the evening meal, they usually go 700 miles and return home. The short leg of the course is 120 miles. The search lines are as shown in figure (not reproduced).

c. Time of departure and return (all planes leave at the same time): Departure 0700, return 1700 when going out 700 miles.

d. Usual altitude: 1,000 feet (305 m).

e. Bases used: Navy - Lani Lagoon, Pearl Harbor, Kaneohe. Army - Kahuku Point, Mokuleia, Wheeler, Kipapa, Kaula Point. Note: The Army planes were distributed one squadron to each base, and one squadron had the duty each day. Lately, however, each squadron has been sending out the required number of planes every day.

f. Plane crews' duty: As a rule, crews go up once a week. Because of a shortage in the number of planes, they are used twice a week, but there are said to be plenty of extra crews even when a crew is used but once a week.

g. All use automatic pilot control.

h. Radar is employed near the extremity of patrol only. In this manner, gaps in the patrol defense are avoided. (The effective range of the radar is about 90 miles).

i. Methods of contact with the base: Radio is used to report discovery of the enemy. As a principle they should report their position every hour, but there are many who do not. Call signs, etc, are unknown.

j. Code words: In case of a forced landing and dispatch of a flying boat is desired, the following code words are used: 'Here we are gathering nuts in May.' In the event of return because of bad weather: 'There is front.' Others not clear.

k. Extent of weather hindrance: If visibility is poor below an altitude of 1,000 feet, the plane turns back. If it is raining, but there is good vision at the edge of the storm, the plane will take off. However, if on the way it should encounter dense clouds, the plane should patrol the areas of good visibility until the regular return time. During the 7 months, take-offs were stopped 3 times due to inclement weather.

l. Friendly recognition: Location of Allied ships is previously known. In case a ship is encountered, the ship will fire a pre-arranged colored flare (red, blue, or green as decided for that day.) Next, the plane will fire the same color flare. Prisoner claims that the lack of strict enforcement of agreement caused him to drop bombs on a friendly submarine, scoring a near miss and causing considerable damage.

m. Night patrolling not enforced.

n. On patrol: Three 500 pound (225 kilograms) bombs, as well as 2x395 gallon (150 liter) (sic) tanks of gasoline, are carried in the bomb bay.

o. When an unidentified plane is discovered by radar, a report is made after closing and confirming its identity.

p. On the perimeter of Oahu there are five radar stations, but the number in the interior is unknown. Their effectiveness is from 85 to 90 miles.

q. After return to base, the hourly weather and any other unusual occurrence is reported (even a detailed report of flotsam is made).

"4. Outline of the weekly work of the Air Force in Hawaii

a. Once a week they carry out the patrol as described in the previous paragraphs.

b. The squadron engaged in patrol takes a day of rest after a patrol. Sunday has been abandoned as a day of rest since the bombing of Pearl Harbor.

c. Of the remaining five days, three are spent in flight training operations as follows: Bombing training (approximately 3-4 hours) - the bombing range is on the island of Kauai. 50-kilogram sand bombs are dropped on a target consisting of 3 concentric circles of 50 feet, 100 feet and 200 feet diameter. Gunnery training (approximately 2-3 hours) - firing is carried out on a sleeve towed by a P-70 (the machine gun armament of the A-20A has been modified and it has been converted into a night fighter). Maintenance Flight (approximately 3 hours) - Inspection of gauges and other things, and making compass deviation correction. The two days when there are no flights, operations are allotted in maintaining the plane. The crew spends its time swimming at the club or resting. Leave or liberty - Except for days of holiday routine, officers only are permitted to leave the station at night for areas from which they could return within 2 hours (written in English: 2 hours alert).

"5. The state of supplies in Hawaii

a. In general, no difficulty is encountered in supply.

b. Military stores are brought in on average of once a month. The convoys of 15 to 20 ships are escorted by approximately 5 destroyers.

c. In replenishing airplanes, large planes, two-motor and one, are ferried; the wings and propellers of small planes are removed, and they are crated and shipped in freighters. There is a great number of unassembled fighters in storage.

d. Within the city, except for liquor, there is no real shortage.

"6. Air traffic to the front line via Hawaii

a. On the average, there are from 60 to 70 planes being ferried each month to the front, the majority of these are B-25s, and there are a few B-24s. However, many B-25s are used for transportation purposes. Although occasionally there are formations consisting of a maximum of 16 planes, the number varies. They fly from the homeland, and after a week's rest depart for the south.

b. Until about May, all essential repair materials for the front lines were shipped by air to Hawaii. However, when the assembly and repair shop, now under construction in Fiji, is completed, repairs can be made there. There is an extremely small scale assembly and repair shop in Brisbane.

c. About 1 April this year, a policy of using B-17s chiefly in the European theater was decided upon. The B-24, which has greater range than the former will be used chiefly in the Pacific theater. The greater part of the force of B-17s has returned to the mainland.

"7. The armed strength in Hawaii around May

a. Practically confirmed a total of Army and Navy of about 150,000. The Army and Navy disposition and organization is not known. Strength of an Army division: Peace time, 1 division, 10,000 men; war time, 1 division, 20,000 men.

b. Number of planes: Army planes, 400 approximately; Navy planes, 400 approximately; total 800 approximately.

c. In Hawaii, there is a small reconnaissance school, but otherwise no air school.

d. Shipping matters unknown".

g. The following interrogation notes on U S air forces in the Solomons and other air subjects were extracted from a notebook consisting of jotted notes by staff officers of various Japanese 18th Army commands. The notebook was captured on Hollandia 23 April 1944 and dated 25 October 1943 to the end of January 1944; holder and unit unknown. It is extracted from ATIS Enemy Publication 173:

"Principal Subjects of Interrogation

- (1) Air strength in the Solomons.
- (2) Plans to knock out Rabaul (with sketch of possible landing points.
- (3) Distribution of air strength at Torokina, Mono Island, New Georgia, Guadalcanal and Espirito Santo.
- (4) Development of completed first-line airfields.
- (5) Notes on B-29.
- (6) Total U S strength in South Pacific and Southwest Pacific areas."

h. The following extract is from the mimeographed file of the Japanese 4th Air Army News for the period 13 January-15 March 1944, maintained by the 14th Field Air Supply Depot. This section, entitled "Special News 22", dated 6 March and issued by the 4th Air Army Operations Section, was translated in ATIS Bulletin 1214:

"Following are the results of inquiry on matters concerning chemical warfare, obtained from interrogation of a prisoner of war:

"A. Enemy Preparations for Chemical Warfare

There are chemical plants in every ordnance factory in the United States, and it can be presumed that they are manufacturing gases. The chemical warfare service arsenals center particularly in Salt Lake City, Utah; Besakana (presumably Texarkana) Texas; and Edgewood, Maryland. Moreover, there are educational facilities for chemical warfare in arsenals under command. In September of last year, the provisional chemical warfare school was established hastily in Sidney, Australia, and was instructing officers who were sent from each force of the Army. (It is said that an officer of the prisoner of war's unit was sent to this school in October).

Heard that several types of gasses had been sent to and stored in Guadalcanal and Montuseru Island. However, details are not known due to strict enforcement of secrecy. Many bombs of various kinds are stored in Guadalcanal.

Each units has been provided with a decontamination unit in Guadalcanal area (POWs unit in particular) due to the possibility of an enemy night gas attack similar to those carried out by the Japanese in China. Also special intelligence reports assert that from September of last year the Japanese have been forwarding to each flying regiment a new type of gas which is odorless and colorless. In view of this, airplanes were dispatched immediately to Hawaii, Guadalcanal and Port Moresby to take defensive and offensive measures; and at the same time the chemical warfare school was established in Sydney for instruction in offensive and defensive use of gas. However, if the war situation becomes favorable, POW thinks America will not be compelled to use chemical warfare.

"B. Enemy Methods of Using Gas

(1) Method of spraying from airplane has been particularly stressed, and flying at the lowest possible altitude is approved. This is carried out at 50 feet from the ground, even though the enemy has been forewarned. (It is said the B-17 will be equipped with 6 spraying apparatus, containing 15 liters each. The B-24 and B-25 will be equipped with 4 such apparatus.) There are small and large types of gas bombs for use with various types of airplanes. Lightness is the main factor, and non-persistent gas bombs will be used.

(2) Firing of gas shells is usually done by trench mortars (7 cm, 10 cm, 15 cm are the 3 standard types).

(3) It can be anticipated that gas shells would be mixed with other shells and fired upon islands and ships.

(4) Hand grenades.

"C. Types of Enemy Gas Shells: Chloropicrin, Diphenyl, Mustard, Lewisite

(1) There are four standard types of gas as above, but POW heard of a gas regiment with new type of gas which is odorless and colorless, capable of causing

instant death. However, details are unknown due to strict secrecy.

"D. Enemy's Preparation and Extent of Training Against Chemical Warfare

(1) Complete individual equipment consists of gas mask, protective clothing, and anti-gas ointment (in tube or can). Decontamination unit, and decontaminating soldiers in each regiment (about 30 men) are equipped with complete protective equipment.

(2) Gas warning to airfields and to AA artillery units is given by using triangular warning apparatus.

(3) It is said that the POW while stationed in Hawaii underwent long hours of gas mask training, about 2 hours daily for one week each month, under the direction of chemical warfare officer. At Guadalcanal, to test and survey the concentration of gas on cloudy or rainy days, green colored poles about 11 meters long and 150 cm in diameter are placed around key points to the airfield, and if mustard gas comes into contact with them they turn red. A captain commands a decontamination unit with a total personnel of about 200. Decontamination is carried out by mobile decontaminators. It is said there is an armored mobile decontaminator in Hawaii.

"E. Miscellaneous

(1) Anti-gas ointment is generally effective for more than 24 hours. The main idea is to decontaminate gas-bombed, gas-sprayed areas, or areas effected by gas, before passing through them so that they will not be an unprepared passage of these areas.

(2) Unit commanders for forces using gas are in demand (sentence incomplete). There is such a force with a warrant officer as commander in Hawaii, but in Port Moresby and Guadalcanal these forces have not yet appeared. Surprise must be achieved when a gas attack is made, and a great quantity of gas must be concentrated in one area. Therefore an opportune time must be selected with special care. If a surprise attack were made against Rabaul, it would be accomplished with 60 B-24s, 50 B-25s, and 200 fighter planes. First, AA positions would be attacked with non-persistent gas bombs (by B-24s) and then airfields and cities would be sprayed with gas (by B-25s).

1. Another example of detailed information obtained by the Japanese from POW sources is contained in the following document, "Observations in Chemical Warfare in the Southeastern Area Obtained from Prisoners of War and Intelligence Reports", dated 20 November 1943 and published by Ikioi Staff Section Intelligence Unit 5. Translation is from ATIS Bulletin 1277:

"A. Observations on the significance of the enemy's chemical warfare: In spite of the inferiority of our chemical surface equipment, the use of gas against an exhausted and weary enemy would be effective (sources agree). Chemical warfare is an accessory and is not a decisive factor nor a unique tactical method for general warfare (sources disagree). The value of chemical warfare in tropical lands depends upon meteorological conditions (the rest of the sentence is illegible). The effectiveness of chemical warfare in the jungle is not evident; hence no conclusions can be made. If gas is to be used in the jungle, special facilities must be set up in the area (certain points are still a mystery).

"B. Other matters: As for the gas units, there is great secrecy and no statement was made concerning them, but it is likely that in Moresby and on Guadalcanal there are a number of these units, each under the command of a warrant officer (uncertainty exists). Although we have been able to make distinction between the storage places for gas shells and the storehouse for general aerial bombs, the details are still not evident because of proper camouflage and adequate secrecy. The relations of the ammunition storehouse to certain air fields in Moresby is indicated in the sketches on separate sheet 5 (not translated). As to the methods by which gas would be laid and which method would be the most suitable, the first preference would be by spraying it from airplanes, the second by firing it from guns (sources agree). As to the time when gas may be most effectively used, it is explained that at daybreak or on dark nights it would be most suitable. This is because there would be no wind and there would be a change in temperature (sources agree).

"C. The characteristics of the U S Army gas mask: As yet we had not captured a gas mask of the U S Army. As it is a valuable piece of equipment, the technical laboratories of 6th Army have been investigating it in precise details. The main characteristics of the gas mask are as follows: