

RESTRICTED

U.S. STRATEGIC
BOMBING SURVEY

JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE
SECTION, G-2

JAPANESE MILITARY
AND NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
INTERROGATIONS



U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
G-2, Japanese Intelligence Section
Tokyo, Japan

RESTRICTED

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REPORT ON JAPANESE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SUBMITTED BY
REAR ADMIRAL TAKEUCHI, KAORU, IJN, CHIEF OF FIFTH
SECTION (U. S. and LATIN AMERICA) OF THIRD DEPARTMENT
(NAVAL INTELLIGENCE) OF NAVAL GENERAL STAFF.

This report was submitted in response to a written request to Admiral TAKEUCHI from the Japanese Intelligence Section. It is reproduced here in question and answer form.

Further information on Japanese Naval Intelligence obtained from Admiral TAKEUCHI is contained in Interrogation No. 222 (Jap Intell #4) of 3 November 1945.

THE WRITTEN REPORT FOLLOWS:

A. ORGANIZATION

Q. What was the organization of Naval Intelligence? Include charts and tables showing organization and command relationships.

A. The Third Division of the Naval General Staff was the Central Naval Intelligence Agency. Under the Director with the rank of Rear Admiral were five sections; viz., Direct Control Staff, 5th Section, 6th Section, 7th Section, and 8th Section. The organization details are tabulated as follows:

Staff Division (III)

Director Rear-Admiral N. Nekase

Under direct control of the Director

Member A, Captain S. Tsukada	(1. Propaganda towards foreign nations. (2. Collection of information concerning international affairs.
Member B. Lieut. - Commander G. Yajima	(1. Plans for collecting information . (2. Collection of information . (3. Prevention of hostile intelligence and propaganda activities.
Member C. (Vacant)	
Member D, (Additional Post) ----- Commander H. Ozawa	(1. Part of plans for collecting information (2. Partly concerning information
Member E, (Additional Post) ----- Lieut. - Commander M. Takita	Part of collecting information concerning international aeronautical affairs.

Chief Rear-Admiral K. Takeuchi

- (1. Intelligence and propaganda campaign
(towards the nations in charge of the
(Section, Viz. nations in American
(Continents.
- (2. Estimation of the national affairs
(of the nations in charge of the
(Section.
- (3. Plans for collecting information in
(regard to the nations in charge of
(the Section.

- Member A,
Captain Y. Senemetsu -
- (1. Inquiry of military, naval and
(national affairs of U.S.A.
(Collections of informations, charts
(and maps of the U.S.A.
 - (2. Part of the plan for collecting
(information .
 - (3. Part of propaganda campaign.

Member B.
(Vacant)

- Member C.
Lieut. Commander
N. Imsi
- (1. Inquiry of military, naval and
(national affairs of Latin American
(nations.
(Collection of information , charts
(and map of the above nations.
 - (2. Inquiry of locations of military and
(naval units and part of national
(affairs of U.S.A.
 - (3. Collection and arrangement of infor-
(mation , charts and maps of U.S.A.
(and her territory.
 - (4. Part of propaganda campaign.

- Member D,
Lieut. - Commander
M. Takite ---
- (1. Inquiry of aeronautical affairs of
(U.S.A.
 - (2. Collection and arrangement of mat-
(erials concerning aeronautical
(affairs of U.S.A.

The Sixth Section.

Chief Captain S. Kobetto

- (1. Intelligence and propaganda campaign
(toward China and Manchoukuo.
- (2. Inquiry of the national affairs of
(China and Manchoukuo.
- (3. Plans for collecting information
(concerning China and Manchoukuo.

- Member A.
Commander N. Koshibe ---
- (1. Inquiry of naval, military and national
(affairs of China. Collection of infor-
(mation , charts and maps of this country.
 - (2. Part of plans for collecting informa-
(tion .
 - (3. Part of propaganda campaign.

- Member B,
(Additional post)
Commander N. Koshibe
- Inquiry of naval, military and na-
tional affairs of Manchoukuo. Part of
collections of information, charts
and maps of the country.

Member C,
(Additional post
during vacancy)
Commander N. Koshiha

Collection of information , charts
and maps of China and Manchoukuo.

The Seventh Section

Chief Captain S. Yamaguchi

- (1. Intelligence and propaganda campaign
(towards the nations in charge of the
(section.
- (2. Estimation of national affairs of the
(nations in charge of the Section.
- (3. Part of plans for collecting information
(of the nations in charge of the Sections.

Member A,
Commander Z. Okazaki

- (1. Inquiry of military, naval and national
(affairs of U.S.S.R.; nations adjoining
(U.S.S.R. (excluding Germany, Manchoukuo
(and China), Balkan nations, Iraq and
(Arabia. Collection of information ,
(charts and maps of these nations.
- (2. Part of plans for collecting information.
- (3. Part of propaganda campaign.

Member B,
(Additional post
during vacancy)
Commander Z. Okazaki

- (1. Collection of information , charts and
(maps of U.S.S.R. and other nations.
- (2. Part of plans for collecting information.
- (3. Part of propaganda campaign.

Member C,
(Additional post
during vacancy)
Captain O. Tsukada

- (1. Inquiry of military, naval and national
(affairs of Germany, naval and national
(affairs of Germany, and collection of
(same.
- (2. Part of plans for collecting information.
- (3. Part of propaganda campaign.

Member D,
(Additional post
during vacancy)
Captain Z. Okazaki

- (1. Inquiry of naval, military and national
(affairs of France, Italy, Belgium, Spain
(and their territories(excluding French
(Indo-China, Kwanchow Bay and French
(islands in the Pacific Ocean), Switzer-
(land, Denmark, Sweden and Norway.
(Collection of information , charts and
(maps of the above-mentioned nations.
- (2. Matters concerning the League of Nations.
- (3. Part of plans for collecting informa-
(tion .
- (4. Part of propaganda campaign.

The Eighth Section

Chief (temporary) Captain K. Irie

- (1. Intelligence and propaganda campaign
(towards the nations in charge of the
(Section.
- (2. Estimation of national affairs of the
(nations in charge of the Section.
- (3. Plans for collecting information of
(the nations in charge of the Section.

Member A,

Captain K. Irie

- (1. Inquiry of national affairs of British Empire and her whole territory (excluding Canada), Egypt and French islands in the Pacific Ocean.
- (Collection of information , maps and charts of the above-mentioned nations.
- (2. Part of plans for collecting information .
- (3. Part of propaganda campaign.

Member B,

Lieut - Commander
T. Yoshida

- (1. Inquiry of national, military and naval affairs of India and Australia.
- (2. Part of collecting information, charts and maps of these nations.
- (3. Part of plans for collecting information .
- (4. Part of propaganda campaign.

Member C,

Captain T. Fukuoka

- (1. Inquiry of national, military and naval affairs of Portugal, Holland and their territory, New Guinea, Siam, French Indo-China(containing Kwanchow Bay), Philippines and Burma.
- (Collection of information , charts and maps of the above-mentioned nations.
- (2. Part of plans for collecting information .
- (3. Part of propaganda campaign.

Q. 2. To what extent were Naval Intelligence activities integrated with those of the Army? With government agencies? With Army Air Forces? With Naval Air Forces?

A. There were, between the Army and the Navy Intelligence Divisions reciprocal exchange of copies in regard to information of mutual interest. There was no intelligence officer holding a concurrent post in the Army and Navy Intelligence Divisions.

With reference to Government agencies, the same procedure as in the case of the Army described above was adopted with the various Ministries concerned.

There was no direct contact to the Army Air Forces, all liaison being made only through the above-mentioned Army Intelligence Division of The Army General Staff.

Aside from sending to the Naval Air Forces information of interest to them just as was done to the Fleets, there was no special relationship with them. However, the important data of the information obtained by the Naval Air Forces was sent directly to the Naval General Staff.

Q. 3. How was this integration accomplished? Describe in detail.

A. Nothing further to add to the reply given in 2.

Q. 4. Give the total number of Naval personnel assigned either full or part time to intelligence duties. How many officers? How many enlisted? How many full time? How many part time or additional duty?

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A. Naval Personnel with Intelligence Duties		
	At the Beginning of war	At the cessation of hostilities
Officers	29	97
Enlisted	1	9
Full Time	64	174
Part Time or Additional Duty	1	63
Total Number Full Time Part Time Personnel	65	237

The above figures are for the personnel of the Third Division of the Naval General Staff; i.e., the Central Naval Intelligence Agency. At some headquarters of the front, there seemed to be Intelligence Squads: centering around one or a few officers (most frequently with additional duties) with a small number of enlisted men as assistants, but they had the principal work of processing the telegrams and documents from various areas and seemed not to engage in any duties that might be classed as independent intelligence activities. As they had no direct connection with the Central Naval Intelligence Agency, details concerning these squads are unavailable.

Q. 5. How many intelligence personnel were assigned each unit afloat? Officers? Enlisted?

A. As explained in the preceding paragraph, because their activities were not under the Central Naval Intelligence Agency's cognizance, details are unavailable.

Q. 6. Describe in detail the organization of Intelligence in the Naval Air Arm.

A. For the reason explained above, details unknown.

Q. 7. What was the proportion of Regular Navy Officers (Academy Graduates) to Reserve Officers in the Naval Intelligence Organization?

A. At the Central Naval Intelligence Agency the proportion was approximately: Regular Navy Officers, 1: Reserve Officers, 3.5.

B. SELECTION AND TRAINING.

Q. 1. How were intelligence personnel selected?

A. Proficiency in languages, experience in duties abroad, rejection from fleet duty because of poor eyesight or other reasons, the expressed desire of some to enter this service, etc., became at times the reasons for selecting the personnel, but I understand that there was no set rule for the selection of intelligence personnel.

Q. 2. Were they specially trained for intelligence duties?

A. There were examples of a few who received foreign language instruction in Japan and even a smaller number who were sent abroad for study, but in general there was no special training.

Q. 3. What were the specialized schools for intelligence training and where were they located?

A. None.

Q. 4. Describe the curricula in these specialized intelligence training schools. What texts or printed materials were used? Include copies.

A. None.

Q. 5. How many students attended these schools at any one session?

A. None.

Q. 6. What was the total number of students graduated from such schools?

A. None.

Q. 7. What special methods and aids were used to train officers for intelligence duties?

A. No special methods, aside from the recurrent posting of men in similar duties.

C. OPERATIONS

Q. 1. Describe in detail the duties of Intelligence Officers, both Staff and in units afloat, including in the Air Arm briefing and interrogation of pilots, escape and evasion, technical intelligence, etc.

A. Although without direct knowledge, I believe it to be as follows:

(a) Duties of Intelligence Officers, both Staff and in units afloat:

- (1) Processing and compilation of all information from the Central Naval Intelligence Agency and all Japanese Navy Units.
- (2) Processing and compilation of all information gained by own unit.
- (3) Reporting of all necessary information to the Central Agency and dissemination to all front line Units.
- (4) Replies to queries and expression of views to the Chief of Staff or Unit Commanders.

(b) The intelligence activities of the Air Forces were conducted, I believe, under their own independent plans on a rather small scale. Because they were not in direct relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency, I have no information regarding the itemized details requested in this paragraph of your questionnaire, but I am under the impression that they did not engage in any effective intelligence activities.

Q. 2. What were your sources of information? List in order of importance and reliability.

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- A. (a) A composite picture obtained from information amassed during a long period mainly from public radio broadcasts and publications. Because of its nature as over-all information, the greatest importance was placed on this.
- (b) Documents belonging to the enemy. Most reliable, but only a small quantity available.
- (c) Information from prisoners. Neither reliable nor abundant.

Q. 3. How was information processed and used after it was received?

- A. (a) Edited, compiled and filed.
- (b) Checked with information gained from other sources.
- (c) When decided as worth to use, disseminated to the minimum limited number of officers concerned as were deemed necessary.
- (d) When untrustworthy, it was the rule not to disseminate the information.

Q. 4. Describe in detail systems and methods used in the dissemination of intelligence information: To other intelligence activities? To Fleet Units?

- A. (a) System and method of dissemination:

There is no fixed form; uncomplicated information or those requiring immediate dissemination, by telegram; others, through printed documents.

Invisible ink and other special methods not utilized.

Periodical printed information, I recall, existed toward the beginning of the war, but since the summer of 1942 their publication was suspended.

- (b) Dissemination to other intelligence activities and fleet units:
- (1) To home land-units (the Naval Station HQ and the like) ordinary mail, air mail and telegraph utilized.
- (2) To fleets abroad, air mail and telegraph.
- (3) No special air service for delivery of intelligence documents.

Q. 5. Give in detail methods of estimating:

- (a) U.S. Strength?
- (b) U.S. Losses?
- (c) U.S. Intentions (future plans and moves)

A. The estimation method adopted by the Central Intelligence Agency was as follows: The Operations Staff and the front-line units, I understand, added their own information and views to the data provided by the Central Agency and planned their operations accordingly.

- (a) The basic materials for estimates were information gained by our forces through actual combat or reconnaissance, and continuous long-term statistics obtained from enemy and neutral news reports. This materials were checked through documents on hand at the front and through information gained from prisoners.
- (b) The same method as above.
- (c) Estimates made statistically through views based on general tactics, American propaganda, and through continuous watching and tracing of the movements of Allied personnel and of craft, air, surface, and sub.

Q. 6. What was the procedure used in extracting information from:

- (a) U.S. Prisoners of War?
- (b) Captured documents?
- (c) Natives in country where action took place?

A. (a) All information gained at the front was reported to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Among the prisoners of war of the naval units, those sent to Japan proper were at first quartered at the Ofuna War Prisoners' Camp near Yokohama, where the sick and wounded were given medical treatment and after recuperation were sent to the regular war prisoners' camps that were under Army supervision.

At the Ofuna camp, aside from interrogation necessary for obtaining name and identification, there were occasions when a free conversations held to obtain data on general information.

However, most of the prisoners of war were reserve or petty officers ill-informed on military affairs. The regular officers were uncommunicative. Moreover, we made it a fixed policy not to force unwilling prisoners to reveal information. Accordingly, we did not obtain any information of value from prisoners of war.

- (b) It was the rule to send all captured documents to the Central Intelligence Agency where it was translated and used primarily for checking with information from other sources.
- (c) The Central Intelligence Agency had no connection with the utilization of natives. At the front line units, natives seemed to be questioned about the local particulars, but further than that I have not heard of any successful positive efforts for extraction of information from natives.

The natives in general seemed to be loyal to Allied Forces.

Q. 7. To what extent did German intelligence on Allied or U.S. Air Forces and equipment aid the Japanese? Was any other German intelligence useful to you?

A. (a) I have the impression that in the Pacific War no important, directly effective information concerning the enemy had been obtained from the Germans.

(b) Information from Germans concerning their own arms might have been valuable of technical aid to Japan.

Q. 8. What provision was made for analyzing captured equipment, including crashed aircraft? How was such information used? How was it disseminated?

A. Captured equipment was not handled by the Central Intelligence Agency, but was analyzed by the various technical experts directly concerned (for instance, the navy yard personnel). Copies of their reports were sent to all departments concerned.

Q. 9. Did you gain any useful intelligence through capture of any U.S. Mail? From letters or diaries taken from bodies of U.S. Officers or men or from Prisoners of War?

A. Unaware of any such instances.

Q. 10. What Naval intelligence documents, pamphlets, Field Manuals, brochures, doctrines, etc. were published. Enclose copies.

A. (a) Intelligence documents and pamphlets were published non-periodically, classified according to the important countries. Because of the voluminous amount, I cannot recall the titles of separate documents, but most of them were brochures with such titles as Military Affairs, Politics, and Economics, and when necessary with sub-titles.

(b) I recall that one or two kinds of field manuals and doctrines were published over ten years ago, but there is no extant copy.

(c) All publications of the Central Intelligence Agency completely burnt. Investigations to date reveal that copies distributed to fleets and other units were also burnt. I regret it very much that we are unable to present copies thereof to you.

Q. 11. Describe sources of information in arriving at the Japanese estimate of U.S. order of battle and enclose copy of estimate as of December 1941 and also estimate as of 1 August 1945.

A. (a) All documents concerning this point were burnt. Moreover, previous to December 1941, I was engaged as a government official in departments other than the Navy Department; therefore, I do not know either what estimates of U.S. order of battle were made or the sources of information for such estimates.

(b) No general estimates of U.S. order of battle were made by the Central Naval Intelligence Agency as of August 1, 1945.

However, I recall that general estimates on the fighting strength of the U.S. Forces in the Pacific Area were made, based on former combat reports from our units, captured documents, news reports from American and neutral sources, and long-term statistics gathered by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The estimates were as follows:

Battleships ready for action:	New 8	Old 8
Carriers (regular and those converted from cruisers) ready for action:		16-20
Escort carriers ready for action:		50
1st line submarines		100
1st line army aircraft	less than 10,000	
1st line shore based navy aircraft		4,000 - 5,000
Army ground forces and Marine corps		50 to 60 divisions

D. EFFECTIVENESS

Q. 1. How successful and accurate was your intelligence organization in making periodic estimates of:

- (a) Allied and U.S. Air Strength?
 - (b) Location and composition of U.S. Naval Forces and Ground Forces?
 - (c) U.S. capabilities?
 - (d) U. S. intentions?
- A. (a) U.S. air strength in Pacific was estimated, I believe, within approximately 20% discrepancy of the actual strength. Allied air strength other than that of U.S. air forces and U.S. air strength outside the Pacific area was not estimated.
- (b) A general knowledge of U.S. Naval strength and the locations of U.S. ground forces was usually obtained through reconnaissance made by front-line forces. It was extremely difficult for the Central Intelligence Agency to make such estimates.
- A rough estimate of the composition was made but it was difficult to obtain any worth-while detailed data.
- (c) Our Central Intelligence Agency thought that estimates of U.S. capabilities were satisfactory.
- (d) It was extremely difficult to estimate U.S. intentions. The Intelligence Agency made estimates merely as rough guesses.

Q. 2. Were you able to predict any major U.S. moves or landings? How?

A. I believe that there was no instance of any reliable, concrete prediction.

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Q. 3. How successfully were you able to get useful information out to your fleet units?

- A. (a) On account of telegraphic congestion, not infrequently it took over 24 hours to transmit a message.
- (b) It seems that in case of printed information it took several weeks to several months in order to reach the fleet.
- (c) It seems that not infrequently the information disseminated to the fleet was neither fully understood nor used to advantage.

Q. 4. How reliable was Japanese technical intelligence on Allied and U/S equipment?

A. As far as the Central Intelligence Agency was concerned, I believe the information was not unsatisfactory from the point of reliability, but there were many instances of the information being obtained too late.

Q. 5. How effective and successful did you find interrogation of U.S. Airmen and other Prisoners of War?

A. Most of the prisoners interrogated were reserve officers or petty officers poorly informed on military affairs. The regular officers, aside from their small total number, did not reveal any valuable information. Because we did not attempt to extort replies from them, the interrogation of prisoners was unsuccessful.

E. AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY AND RECONNAISSANCE

Q. 1. To what extent did the Japanese Navy rely on photographic intelligence?

A. It seems photographic intelligence was not relied on to any great extent. The central Intelligence Agency had no organization or personnel for this. Among the Air Forces, there seem to be some who on their own initiatives engaged in photographic intelligence activities.

Q. 2. Comment on its effectiveness.

A. I believe they were effective in determining battle results.

Q. 3. Describe the method of securing and disseminating photographic intelligence.

A. For the reason stated above, there was no special method of securing photographic intelligence.

Photographs were disseminated in copies thereof or as documents or telegrams explaining the main points to all departments concerned, but I understand there were no special methods such as the use of television.

Q. 4. How many squadrons were engaged exclusively in this work?

A. Absolutely none.

Q. 5. How many planes were assigned to such squadrons?

A. Absolutely none.

Report of Japanese Naval Intelligence: (Cont'd.)

- Q. 6. Comment on Japanese aerial reconnaissance stating number of aircraft engaged in this work, its effectiveness, method of exchange of information between aircraft and their bases. Enclose copies of Search Sector plans for each stage of the War (each Campaign).
- A. In the Japanese Navy, aerial reconnaissance was outside the scope of the Intelligence Bureau activities. I regret, therefore, that I have no knowledge that would qualify me to make any reply. There are no existing copies of Search Sector plans.
- Q. 7. Describe the procedure followed in taking action on sightings reported by reconnaissance aircraft.
- A. Regret unable to reply to this question for reasons stated above.

F. JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE PRIOR TO THE WAR

- Q. 1. Summarize Japanese intelligence activities prior to the War using A, B, and C as guides for detail of information desired.
- Q. 2. What information did you have on 7 December 1943 and prior thereto of:
- (a) Number, type, size and disposition of U.S. Navy vessels in Hawaiian waters?
 - (b) U.S. defensive installations, supply installations and their location in Hawaiian area?
 - (c) U.S. Ground Forces and their location in Hawaiian area.
 - (d) U.S. Air Forces, size, type and number of aircraft, in Hawaiian Area.
- Q. 3. How was this information gained?
- Q. 4. How was this information disseminated and to what extent to your Naval Units afloat and forces in the field?

(NOTE: The following statement was made in answer to all questions asked in Section F.)

- A. As all points mentioned here are concerning with matters that occurred while I was serving as a government official in departments other than the Navy Department, I have no data with which to reply to these points.

G. GENERAL

Q. 1. What were the outstanding accomplishments of Japanese Naval Intelligence immediately prior to and during the war?

A. My impression is that nothing particularly outstanding was accomplished by them. I was always dissatisfied with what they were doing.

Q. 2. At what stage or stages of the War do you consider Japanese Naval Intelligence was most effective? i.e. Aleutins? Solomons? Bismark Sea? New Guinea? Marshalls? Philippines? Iwo-Okinawa? etc. At what time or times was it poorest? Reasons?

A. In the progress of the war, the effectiveness of Japanese Naval Intelligence increased steadily, because those who were engaged in this work became more and more accustomed.

Q. 3. What was your estimate of U.S. Intelligence?

A. I realize that U.S. Intelligence was far more superior than that of the Japanese.