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
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TEN YEARS OF JAPANESE BURROWING IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES

*Official report of the Netherlands
East Indies Government on Japa-
nese subversive activities in the
Archipelago during the last decade*



Published in the United States by the
NETHERLANDS INFORMATION BUREAU
10 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA NEW YORK



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IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES**

Dutch East Indies

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INTRODUCTION

THE PURPOSE of the revelations in the following pages is to give a synopsis of the subversive action which has been carried on by the Japanese in the Netherlands East Indies during the last ten years. In this work Japanese "tourists," scientists, commercial firms, banks and shipping company's representatives, official Japanese offices—more especially Consulates—officers, espionage agents of the Japanese army and the Japanese navy—they all took their part.

Years before the criminal mind of Hitler, that scourge of Europe, elevated subversive action in friendly neighboring countries to a system, Japan was engaged in intrigue in Asiatic countries to which it had declared itself linked with bonds of friendship centuries old.

The description that follows is strictly based on the facts that have come to light. It is a true picture of the means which have been used to undermine Dutch authority in this region and to persuade the populace to welcome the Trojan horse filled with Japanese militarists.

The reader will probably ask why the Dutch East Indies' Government did not make this scandalous intrigue of Japan's official representatives and its citizens impossible. In this respect

he can be reassured. To counteract Japan's military intentions has, during the last ten years, been the constant care of the Government. It is obvious that the interests of the country were not served by publishing such countermoves, but the reader may be convinced that the Government—obviously within the limits of international usage—took a strong position against all political, economic and military aggressors.

As the Japanese Consulates were the center of this subversive action, or as it was perpetrated under the cloak of normal commercial representation, it was exceedingly difficult to tear the evil out by its root. The methods of the Axis tyrants: betrayal, murder and attack, show a disastrous ingenuity entirely different from all democratic principles. Democracy was not built for defense against treachery, devilish wiliness, crime. It was never possible to cut out entirely the shameful abuse made by the Japanese Consulates of their diplomatic privileges.

As regards the second question: whether and to what extent the population of the Indies was taken in by the low and insidious slander of Japanese propagandists, the answer is that the Indonesians, thanks to their great powers of observation and discrimination, immediately recognized the duplicity of the intruder. The spontaneous reaction of all races in the Netherlands East Indies to the outbreak of the war is excellent proof that they have always been aware of the trap set for them by the sweet warblings of Japanese militarists.

I

300 Years of Netherlands Rule in the Netherlands Indies

FOR MORE than three hundred years, with the exception of an interim rule of a few years under Sir Stamford Raffles during the Napoleonic domination, the flag of the Netherlands has been flying over the islands of the Indian Archipelago. When these settlements were first established the prevalent conception of Colonial policy was very different from what it has become since. Commercial enterprise and the thirst for adventure made Netherlands seamen in the 16th century explore the Oceans in search of unknown lands. Out of the trade settlements there gradually grew a centralized administration which established order and peace among the native races who formerly had been fighting and destroying each other. Thus there developed a homogeneous group which advanced culturally as well as economically under Netherlands rule.

The acceleration in the means of communication and the process of industrialisation in the 19th century caused the resources of the Indies to be fully opened up and led to a period of unprecedented prosperity. The final result was the establishment of a modern Colonial administration, whereby the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Europe, the Netherlands Indies in Asia and the Netherlands West Indies in the Western hemisphere were consolidated into the Netherlands Empire which may claim to occupy an honorable place in the ranks of modern powers.

The population of Java, the most prosperous of the Islands, rose from nine millions in the beginning of the 19th century to more than forty millions at present. Mineral resources were developed and the hill sides of Java and Sumatra were planted with produce which found its way to the world's markets while the fertility of the soil was stimulated by irrigation, so that more food could be raised for the much increased population.

From Java tens of thousands of orderly and hard working natives emigrated, through the offices of the government, in ever-increasing numbers to the less densely populated neighboring islands, more especially to Sumatra but also to Borneo and Celebes which were the natural outlet for Java's population.

Modern roads, means of communication and shipping connections brought the advantages of western civilization to the most remote corners of the Archipelago. Thanks to the maintenance of peace and order, trade and industry, education and science could reach the high level at which they are now standing. Medical care and modern hygiene gradually penetrated all classes of the community while advanced teaching for the legal, medical and technological professions produced intellectual leaders. As the democratic system extended in the countries of the West, political developments in the Netherlands Indies led to an increased share being taken by the Indonesian leaders in the management of public affairs. They are now found in increasing numbers in all public bodies, not excepting the highest in the land. Native jurists, physicians and engineers take with distinction their places beside their Netherlands colleagues.

Three centuries of experience and close contact between the Netherlands Administration and the population created mutual understanding and collaboration from which great possibilities for gradual, peaceful development have resulted.

On the one hand good government and on the other hand respect for the organizing capacities of the West became the base of this collaboration. The respect for Netherlands rule was not due to fear of military force or to slavish submission but to sincere appreciation of a leadership which in spite of errors has shown itself worthy of its task. Otherwise a military power which only a few years ago counted less than twenty

thousand men could never have handled a population of seventy million. The native who is sensitive where the treatment of what he considers his rights and the administration of justice are concerned, was quite satisfied with the system existing under Netherlands rule which gave him security for his person and property. These factors—not force—were the strength of that rule.

The Policy of the Open Door

The Netherlands Indies were—subject to due consideration being given to native interests—as open to foreign as to Netherlands enterprise. The maintenance of the open door system has been the Netherlands principal defense against certain other pretensions. This system best served the interests of all foreigners and reduced the risk of the country being involved in war. For all nationalities who so wished there were opportunities to have a reasonable share in the economic development of the colony.

The United States, Great Britain, France and Japan acknowledged the ability of the Netherlands to exercise the leadership of the Asiatic part of their Empire when by the protocol to the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 they undertook to respect the integrity of the Netherlands Overseas Territories.

The following will show that it has never been Japan's intention to keep this undertaking.

Only those who do not wish to compete peacefully but who aspire to a preferential position to the detriment of others and who conceal a desire for military domination behind a pretense to leadership for which they have never shown any capacity, can be dissatisfied with the maintenance of the open door system in the Netherlands Indies.

II

Japan's Ambition to Obtain Hegemony in Asia

The principal menace to the Netherlands archipelago came from Japan which only a few decades earlier had awakened from her isolation and after having successfully adapted herself to Western technical sciences, had asserted her leadership over neighboring countries.

While she had hardly placed her first steps on the path of modernization, Japan, without any international necessity but disposing of modern technical means, has begun to subjugate the countries surrounding her to a regime which even today shows all the symptoms that marked the barbaric Middle Ages.

The Liuchiu Islands (1873) were followed by Formosa (1896) and subsequently (1910) by Korea. These successes and particularly the victory over Russia in 1904/1905 whetted Japan's appetite for new conquests on the Continent and soon directed her eyes towards the Netherlands Indies.

Dreams of greatness, stimulated by warlike leaders, made Japan strive for hegemony in Asia for which she has not the spiritual capacity. Formosa and Korea are colonies in the sense which that word had in ancient Rome. They are exploited for the benefit of the ruling country. In them there is a complete absence of modern colonial methods which should not only have economic objectives, including the welfare of the natives, but should also aim at the latter's spiritual advancement and the gradual increase which they should take in the manage-

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ment of public affairs. There is in the lands under Japanese rule no tendency to enhance the intellectual status of the native population; there are only military rule and Japanization according to the German model like a steamroller which flattens and crushes; a force and energy which under better leadership could have made the Japanese people one of the greatest in the world, led to brute military exertions which ultimately will cause that country to fail and to recede into insignificance because it has never understood the spiritual values of the civilization of the western democracies.

Instead of choosing the road to peaceful internal construction, the Japanese leaders at a fatal hour selected the path of military expansion which since then they have not left.

The insensate attack on American and British territory which the world is now witnessing is the logical sequence of a mentality respecting nothing but the iron fist. Besides, this flagrant breach of international good faith is by no means the first in Japan's modern history.

Japan tries to make the world believe that the democratic Powers have not conceded her a place in the sun, that she—under the pressure of increasing population and threatened in her existence by powerful enemies—was compelled, in order to secure the safety of the Empire, to make her way to surrounding countries. This reasoning apart from its fallacy can never logically justify the occupation of still more densely populated countries like China and Java. Moreover, as will be shown hereafter, Japan, long before her relations with the western democracies deteriorated and long before she discovered being one of the "have nots," had systematically begun to prepare for the conquest of the Netherlands Indies.

Japan Denies Having Territorial Aspirations

Nevertheless, just as in the case of her aggression against Manchuria, China and Indo-China, Japan tries to maintain the fiction that she does not desire any conquest in the Netherlands East Indies, but merely pursues economic aims.

"Japan has no territorial ambitions, she fully respects the existing sovereignty of the territory against which she is com-

pelled to take military measures and she is prepared to guarantee the integrity of that territory."

How many times have these words not been heard from those in power in Japan!

Japan had no territorial ambitions when in 1915 she presented her notorious 21 demands on China at a time when the great Powers were engaged in a life and death struggle and were not able to defend their interests in China or China's integrity! These demands implied a protectorate over China but Japan herself felt not equal to the task and was obliged to recede step by step.

Japan also had no territorial ambitions when she availed herself of the opportunity offered by an international expedition against the Soviet Army to send a considerable expeditionary force to Siberia which was withdrawn after a dismal failure!

At the World Conference at Washington in 1922 Japan became a signatory to the nine Power and four Power treaties and so bound herself to respect China's integrity and to certain mutual, naval limitations which would give security against the disturbance of the newly found peace on the Oceans.

These treaties from which Japan, after invading Manchuria and thereby violating China's neutrality, withdrew unilaterally without giving any notice, have only arrested the aggressive instincts of the land of the Rising Sun for a few years. In 1931, when the economic disorganization of the whole world gave Japan the opportunity to act with impunity, she staged an attack on the South Manchurian railway near Mukden and did this so badly that the express from Harbin could pass 45 minutes later without hindrance. This insignificant incident became the poor pretext for the occupation of China's three Eastern provinces which abroad are known as Manchuria.

Already previously, i.e. in 1928, the Japanese military rulers had planned the subjugation of Manchuria under a nominal Chinese Government dependent on them. They had for this purpose removed by means of a railway accident the energetic Chinese military Governor Chang Tso Lin. The rising Chinese nationalism was, however, already then too strong for them. They had mistaken the character of Chang Tso Lin's son:

Chang Hsueh Liang. The latter placed himself under the banner of the Kuomintang and the Central Chinese Government; whereby Japan was compelled to make war openly in order to lead Manchuria to a "spontaneous desire for independence."

The Lesson of Manchuria

As in 1915, Japan, on the occasion of her expedition against Manchuria in 1931, solemnly declared to have no territorial aspirations. The military action only intended "to liberate the 30 million misgoverned inhabitants from the tyrannic rule of Nanking which they were eager to be rid of." This assurance was given as readily as it was violated. Nobody except perhaps those whose mentality is one-sidedly trained, according to the Axis system, will see anything but a Japanese creation in the Manchukuo Government formed in 1931 with the ex-Emperor Pu Ti who for this purpose was brought from Tientsin. The Emperor of Manchukuo soon receded to the background and was not mentioned any more after the expiration of a few years. The actual ruler of Manchukuo is the Commander of the Kwantung army, at the same time Ambassador at Pu Ti's court. The only Chinese officials who exercise power are Japanese who in order to deceive have adopted Chinese names. The Government of Manchuria is no other than one of Japanese military terror which has put the country to ransom for the benefit in the first place of the Japanese militarists and in second place of the hundreds of thousands Japanese who stream into the country to occupy the places of the Chinese who are crowded out.

Let the manner in which the Japanese militarists rule Manchuria be a warning to every country of which Japan offers to guarantee the integrity! The possessing classes are systematically robbed of their belongings. Anyone offering resistance was either imprisoned for treason against the State or vanished without trace. Wherever the military regime established itself, houses of ill fame sprang into existence in large numbers, the proceeds of which were divided between the Japanese police and military. Another profitable source of revenue for the same authorities was the sale of narcotic drugs which was shame-

lessly advertised and also aimed at weakening the strength of the people as well as their power of resistance. These practices have, as confirmed by neutral observers, been repeated in the occupied territory of China proper. Amleto Vespa's book "Secret Agent of Japan" which makes revelations on this subject, rests on facts which are well known to all foreigners who have travelled in Manchuria.

The prosperity of this fertile country, which in the good years before 1931 could absorb and feed without difficulty a yearly growth of more than a million immigrants from China, was completely lost. Exhaustion of the soil and bad military management impoverished the country, and its standard of living showed a sharply downward trend. As an example of the way in which the populace was exploited it may be mentioned that in October 1941—while prices climbed to unknown heights—wages were lowered and forced labor introduced, even for women and children.

This exploitation by Japan of conquered countries is not of recent date. Long before the Teutonic method of warfare horrified the world by its complete negation of all humanitarian conventions, Formosa and Korea were so "Japanized." Japan which pretends to liberate the suppressed nations of Asia, has plundered her own colonies and reduced their people to the state of "woodcutters and water fetchers."

The Asiatic peoples which saw themselves compelled to be "liberated" by Japan's legions found to their detriment that the thumbs of the new rulers were heavier than the pressure ever exerted by the white peoples.

In 1937 tension in Europe made intervention from that quarter in Far Eastern affairs improbable. Japan then had the choice between either the development of an orderly and progressive China which in time would occupy an honorable place in the family of nations or she could attempt with military force to crush China and so lay a base for Japanese hegemony in Asia. She did not hesitate. Insignificant but welcome incidents in North China—the principal of which was that at Lukouchiao, i.e. a collision between Chinese and Japanese patrols near the Marco Polo bridge on July 7th, 1937—supplied the pretext for the despatch of a million Japanese troops to the Continent

in the hope that within a short time the resistance of the Chinese army, which lacked modern equipment, could be overcome. In this hope Japan has been bitterly disappointed, and it may well be that later historians will come to the conclusion that the Chinese-Japanese war, which began in 1937, has been the cause of Japan's decline.

Invasion of Indo-China

Japan again asserted she had no territorial aspirations when, in September 1940, she received permission from the paralyzed Vichy government under Berlin pressure to occupy the northern part of French Indo-China. The methods of the Japanese military, the stream of Japanese who followed so as to participate in the benefits which the occupation offered, had exactly the same character as previously displayed in Manchuria and in China.

This occupation was followed—in the Spring of 1941—by the intervention in the conflict between Thailand and Indo-China, a conflict "organized" by Japan herself. This dispute was settled at the expense of Indo-China which had to yield large territories. After having thus brought "benefits" to Thailand, the Japanese government prided itself particularly on not having obtained any privileges through its intervention. However, the toll of gratitude was to be levied all too soon. As far as Indo-China was concerned, that country—in May 1941—was bound hand and foot to Japan by means of an economic treaty. In July of the same year this was followed by the military occupation of the southern section of the country; before the year's end, Thailand was to fall victim to the expansion hunger of the Japanese imperialists.

Nevertheless, it is still stated that the sovereignty of France in Indo-China is fully recognized and that Japan does not foster any territorial aspirations. We now know the value of such assurances. It was a Japanese statesman who some years ago expounded the thesis that Japan cannot consider herself bound to treaties if she no longer derives advantages from them. Thus, international breach of faith was raised to the status of a virtue.

The Imperialistic Development of Modern Japan

As stated above, the imperialistic thought and the lust of conquest which are the basis of Japan's subversive action in the colonies of friendly powers—as well as in the independent states of Asia—is almost as old as the history of modern Japan. The conflict with China about the Luichiu Islands was the first of a series of wars of conquest which finally ended in the pitiable failure of the struggle with China which has now been raging since July 1937. The symptoms of these wars were that they all were waged for purposes of conquest and that none of them was forced upon Japan or was entered into for reasons of self-defense. A Chinese Formosa was certainly no threat to Japan, as little as an independent but weak Korea under Chinese sovereignty. In a Chinese Manchuria, Japan had all the opportunities which a modern country could wish for in a neighboring land, as long as she comes with peaceful intentions. The Shantung peninsula which during the World War was occupied by Japan never was a menace to her. When Japan committed her aggression against Russia after the 1914-1918 war—when the latter country was torn asunder by the revolution—the Japanese Expeditionary Force had to return unsuccessfully in 1922. At that time Japan was led by the same dreams of conquest which caused her to attack China in 1937 with such catastrophic results.

In the following pages it will be shown that Japan's ambitions with regard to the Netherlands Indies—despite all statements to the contrary—were motivated by a desire to acquire additional territory: i.e. a brutal conquest. Systematically and shamelessly Japan, during the last ten years, has prepared for just such a conquest.

"Ambassadors of Goodwill", who spoke at 300 years of friendship and were received as honored guests, really came only to organize fifth columns. Consuls accepting Netherlands decorations, tried at the same time to undermine Netherlands rule.

There was a time that Bushido (the road of the warrior) withheld Japan from dishonorable action. That was previous

to the creation of Modern Japan. Japan has borrowed from the West only technical science and combined this with the theory of violence. By accepting Western materialistic civilization without the brake of the Western democratic spirit, Japan has made herself, among the nations, into a country which only knows one law: that of the jungle.

III

Propaganda for the Preparation of an Invasion of the Netherlands Indies

Already during the World War, preparations were noticed pointing to a possible occupation of the Netherlands Indies by Japan. At different points in the Archipelago—mostly on lonely coastal spots, especially at inlets of strategic importance, road junctions, mountain passes, etc.—Japanese fishermen, traders, timber sawers, etc., established themselves and remained there year in, year out, in poor circumstances, without any prospect of making a living, but with a perseverance which could only be explained by a suspicious interest in the defense of the Netherlands Indies.

It was particularly observed that very large numbers of Japanese photographers attempted to find an existence throughout the islands, including some of the smallest places. Thanks to the freedom which was extended in the Netherlands Indies to all, including foreigners, these people had every opportunity to do their work. A comparatively large number of them traveled from village to village in certain parts of the Archipelago and by preference in the Riouw group of Islands which are situated near and around Singapore and the Coast of Indragiri.

Of the natives only few could permit themselves the luxury of having their portrait taken. These photographers therefore had a very modest visible income, but they endeavored to get to know every corner of the islands and made contact with the native officials which for their purposes was of importance.

In 1915 it seemed as if the Japanese Navy was ready for an adventure towards the South. There were a few incidents with Japanese fishermen in Netherlands Indian waters which could have been made the pretext for making certain demands on the Netherlands Government, but in those days the naval expansionists in Japan were not yet sufficiently numerous to cause their plan to be carried out.

The Japanese fishing colony at Dobo in the Aroe Islands, a very active Japanese settlement even during 1941, adopted a threatening attitude against the local authorities.

Between 1930 and 1940 similar fishery incidents became more frequent as will be shown hereafter. They were even indirectly encouraged by the Japanese navy and local consular officials in order to serve later as a *casus belli*.

Therefore, although the Netherlands Indies was spared an invasion during the World War, Japanese espionage continued thereafter in the same manner.

The Netherlands Indian Government was aware of this but did not think it necessary to deviate from their liberal policy as long as they were convinced that no defense interests of prime importance were endangered. Moreover, the majority of the orderly working group of Japanese colonists stood—at that time—aloof from these somewhat primitive activities.

Invasion of Japanese Merchandise, in 1931

The first steps in the direction of an effective expansion towards the Netherlands Indies were noticeable in 1931 and 1932 when in consequence of the universal economic crisis and the devaluation of Japanese currency, that country's industry invaded the world's markets; especially the Netherlands Indies were inundated with Japanese products.

The success so easily obtained caused Japan to attempt to so consolidate her hold on the Netherlands Indian market that it would be retained under less favorable circumstances. With this object in view, a monopolistic position was aimed at under the cry "Japanese wares through Japanese hands." It was the intention that Japanese goods should exclusively be exported by Japanese firms shipped by Japanese vessels, financed through Japanese banks and distributed through Japanese retail traders.

Japanese shops sprang into existence like mushrooms. Had not the Netherlands Indian government taken care to safeguard their own shipping, native industry and distributing interests, economic conditions in the Netherlands Indies would, in those years, have been seriously disorganized.

The March to the South

Intensive political and military interest in the affairs of the Netherlands Indies coincided with the economic invasion. The Japanese military began to include the South in their direct sphere of interest. The military adventures on the Asiatic Continent brought more liabilities than benefits, and the principal raw materials which a warlike land needs, such as oil, iron, and cotton, could not be obtained from Manchuria. But in the south lay at that time the feebly defended islands of the Indian Archipelago, which, according to Japanese writers, were supposed to possess inexhaustible natural resources. By obtaining these, all of Japan's difficulties could be solved in one blow. Moreover, the laurels gained by the army stimulated the navy. More and more in naval publications attention was drawn to the "Nanyo," i.e. "the lands of the Southern Ocean." The so-called "Nanshin-ron" i.e. the "doctrine of the march to the South," made its entry. Up to that time those in favor of an immediate expansion southwards had been confined to the jingoistic and ultra nationalistic organizations under the leadership of persons like Misuru Toyama and Ryohei Uchida, the latter being the notorious head of the ultra reactionary Black Dragon Association which has been founded on gangster principles. Their activities were tolerated and undoubtedly secretly supported by the Government, which, however, officially kept aloof from them.

This changed in January 1933, when the Great Asiatic Association was founded by among many others Prince Fuminaro Konoye, who was subsequently a few times prime minister; Koki Hirota, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Admiral Nobumasa Suet-sugu, ardent protagonist of a southward adventure and later Minister of Foreign Affairs. General Iwane Matsui, Military Commander in Formosa, later during the Chinese-Japanese war in Command in Central China. This Association published a

periodical called "Dai Asia Shugi," which prints all these illustrious names on its front page and immediately began a Pan-Asiatic campaign to draw attention to the "pitiable condition of the Asiatics in countries under white rule." The cry was "Asia for the Asiatics," and some went so far as to suggest that the whites should be driven back to West of Suez. The Association advocated that "Hegemony in Asia" should as from 1938 be made Japan's official policy. This "Asia for the Asiatics" agitation was accompanied by an intensive press campaign in the anti-Western press, which in the beginning was particularly aimed against England as the exponent of the so-called Western Imperialism. Eventually, however, this campaign was aimed against all western peoples.

This Pan-Asiatic doctrine became the official politics of the government when—in February 1938—Prince Konoye, in his capacity of Prime Minister, asserted that a New Order had to be created in Eastern Asia, the guidance and responsibility of which would repose with Japan. This "New Order" was introduced as a commonwealth of Free Asiatic Peoples, among whom Japan would by no means act as a dominator but as *primus inter pares*.

Finally, in 1940, Japan proclaimed the so-called "communal prosperity sphere" which all the countries of the Far East would have to join. But the fine phrase of "cooperation to achieve mutual prosperity" with which this new aim was announced to the world, the renaming of this so-called communal prosperity sphere, was nothing less than—entirely in keeping with German example—to claim the whole of Eastern Asia as "Lebensraum" (living space) for Japan. This became very clear when in November 1940 the Netherlands East Indies made Japan understand that it did not desire any connection with this plan. Immediately, an officially inspired campaign began against the Netherlands East Indies for obstructing "the Will of Heaven." She was accused of allowing herself to be influenced by the "mischievous" talk of England and the United States and to oppose—against her own interests—joining the "prosperity bloc." Should the Netherlands East Indies persist, then, in the opinion of many, she ought to be brought to the acceptance of a more righteous opinion by force of arms.

Financial Support to Indonesian Traders

In the Netherlands Indies the invasion of Japanese goods was made to coincide with the practical application of the "Nanshin-ron" i.e. by seeking contact with the natives and by inciting these against the Netherland administration. For so doing Japan hoped to secure native support in an eventual war of conquest against the Netherlands Indies. To achieve this all sorts of means were applied, such as support and credit for importation and distribution of Japanese goods, granted to native dealers. The object of this was to create a distributing channel which would be dependent on Japanese commercial firms; but one of the Indonesian objections against the Japanese is that they try to eliminate even small native go-betweens. This economic support was naturally accompanied by intensive agitation against Netherlands rule. The attempt failed, partly on account of the lack of organization and keenness among the native traders whose services the Japanese intended to utilize. The failure was also due to the Japanese firms, who having tried to penetrate into the economic life of the Netherlands Indies, began to fear that by fostering the trade interests of the natives and by doing away with the Chinese dealers, they would not be able to reap the full advantages of the scheme. That the attempt came to nothing because of failure to realize the soundness of the existing commercial system which has adapted itself to the needs of the country, does not affect the scheme's objectionable political features.

Action Among Native Students

The tendency of incitement against the Netherlands Indian Government is also clearly expressed by the efforts which were made to induce young natives to study in Japan. This Pan-Asiatic propaganda immediately followed the invasion of Japanese merchandise. A few dozen young men attracted by the cheapness of the education offered to them and the financial support which was promised to those who could not even pay these low fees, went to Japan. The Netherlands Indian Government naturally did not object to young men who could afford it, seeking to advance their education in Japan, especially

if they would thereby improve their opportunities of future employment. The Government, as long as the relations with Japan were officially normal, could hardly place difficulties in the way of these students, although the propaganda in favor of this scheme came from the same side as the Pan-Asiatic movement. The intentions of those who propagated these studies soon became clear. Once arrived in Japan, these students were trained for the task which was intended for them, i.e. undermining the authority of the Government of the Netherlands Indies. Those who were prepared to act as tools for Japanese propaganda were financially assisted; the others were left to their fate and their life was made disagreeable through the medium of their less scrupulous colleagues. As soon as a student made contact with the Netherlands Legation, he was automatically marked as suspicious. They were frequently invited to attend meetings of the Pan-Asiatic groups. At congresses they were put forward as "Indonesians" and leaders of a race that had risen against their Netherlands oppressors. To the honor of the native students it should be added that but very few—and these only for financial reasons—gave support to the Pan-Asiatic agitation. The majority clearly saw and soundly mistrusted the true Japanese aim.

Propaganda Among the Islamites

In order to gain the sympathy of the near Eastern and South East Asiatic populations and to incite these against England and other Powers, certain groups in Japan began a propaganda campaign so as to make that country the Protector of the Islam, although the State religion of the Japanese—Shintoism, which comprises idolization of the Emperor—is diametrically opposed to the Islam, with its very severe Godhead idea. The aforementioned Head of the Black Dragon Association financed the training of four students who were sent in 1935 to Arabia and Egypt to prepare themselves for the task of propagandists in Mohammedan countries.

As this Japanese interest in Islamic affairs would appear suspicious, a group of Mohammedans were sought who could justify this interest. These were found in a small colony of

indigeneous Mohammedans who had come from Russian Turkestan as fugitives during the Soviet Revolution. For this small group and for a few Japanese Islamites, mosques were built in great style with Japanese money in 1935 in Kobe and in 1938 in Tokyo. These were opened with much éclat. Among those who, principally, took the initiative for the mosque at Tokyo, were Vice-Admiral Ogasawara and the Pan-Asiatic leader Mitsuru Toyama, whose name has been mentioned already. The opening ceremony which was attended by the Crown Prince of Njemen (whose travelling expenses were paid by Italy) and a large number of guests from the Near East, South Asia and China, was effected by the same Toyama.

To prove how enthusiastic Japan was for the Islam; the Koran and other holy Moslem books were printed there. Propaganda with these was made also in the Netherlands Indies. But as the eagerness of these propagandists was so much greater than their knowledge of Arabic and the Holy Scripture, this Japanese edition of the Koran contained so many mistakes that the Islamitic leaders in the Netherlands East Indies warned against its use. A body of Islamites from the Netherlands East Indies, having paid a visit to a Mohammedan exhibition in Tokyo in October 1939 at the expense of Japan, returned with a very low opinion of the religious fervor of the Japanese they had met and who claimed to be "True Believers."

But shortly after their return to the Netherlands East Indies, Professor Tetsumaro Kanaya was sent out to continue the acquaintance with them and with other Islamitic leaders. Considering that this professor made contact immediately with two of his countrymen at Sourabaya, men who were known as spies, there can be little doubt as to the nature of the Japanese Islam protectors' intention.

In 1938 an Islamitic organization in the Netherlands Indies received an offer from the Islamitic Society of Japan to come to collaboration for the purpose of shaking off the yoke of their rulers. Equally, the leaders of a native nationalist party were exposed to this religiously camouflaged propaganda, the true meaning of which did not, however, escape the attention of the Indonesian Islamites.

Influencing the Native Press

Apart from propaganda among the native population under the pretext of protecting and furthering the Islam and apart also from the action in regard to Indonesian students, the attempt to influence the native press played an important part in the Japanese programs.

This form of propaganda became evident in 1933 when the editor of the Batavian Malay Journal "Bintang Timoer" with a company of journalists was invited to take a trip to Japan by the aggressively nationalistic shipping magnate Koichiro Ishahara who for many years has advocated the conquest of the Netherlands Indies. In Japan all efforts were made to obligate the guests to their hosts by affording them a splendid reception. This attempt to so impress them by exaggerated hospitality and by a show of power, that they might become propagandists for Japan and would be prepared for resistance to Netherlands rule, did not succeed. The visitors with the example of Formosa and Korea before them had enough sense to mistrust the intentions of their hosts.

Another important native journal at Batavia was offered attractive advertisement contracts in exchange for a Japanophile editorial policy. These financially weak publications did indeed accept some Japanese money and a certain anti-Netherlands tendency transpired but so as not to displease their readers the editors could not go far in this direction. The Japanese paymasters were not satisfied; they wanted a Malay propaganda paper of their own. They already had a publication called first "Java Nippo" later "Tohindo Nippo" which was paid by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs but being in the Japanese language it lent itself exclusively to propaganda among Japanese in the Indies, a task which it fulfilled with success. Already years ago the paper showed signs of not respecting the existing rule in the Netherlands Indies; but it at any rate showed some consideration for it. During recent years, however, the paper has—in a guarded way so as not to make itself liable to prosecution—systematically incited the Japanese community against the Government. As these editorial articles often had the mark of being inspired by the

Japanese Consul General who—as shown above—had it in his hand to break the paper financially, it is clear how the Japanese community was made hostile to the Government of which it enjoyed full hospitality.

Malay and Chinese Propaganda Journals

For propaganda among the native population, Semarang was taken as a base. Here two printing works were bought and the publication was begun of a Malay daily called "Sinar Selatan" which means "Star of the South." For work on the editorial staff two unfavorably known native nationalists were engaged. The contents consisted principally of speeches in the People's Council by Indonesian opposition members, of one sided news concerning crop failures and of reports concerning hygienic conditions in certain parts of the Archipelago which, taken from their context, were calculated to give a misleading impression of general conditions in the Netherlands Indies. Articles by left wing Netherlands political writers were eagerly reprinted. The editorial part also was so hostile to the Government that ere long measures had to be taken against the paper. The Director offered his apologies but continued in the same strain. After publication had already once been suspended the management was taken over by the Bank of Taiwan which financed the paper and was also otherwise interested in its political activities. The real leader, i.e. the Japanese Consul General, remained in the background. Propaganda continued although a little more guardedly.

The proprietors then tried through the medium of Japanese traders to buy two bankrupt Dutch papers at Djokja and Magelang. The object was to let these papers print stories relating to Japan's peaceable intentions, the picturesqueness of the country and the Japanese Warrior's sense of honor (Bushido). Sympathy had to be expressed for Japan's overpopulation, her poverty in raw materials, etc. In this manner the public which, with growing anxiety had during several years looked upon Japan's military ambition and preparations, was to be reassured in order to prevent the Netherlands Indies from arming herself.

For propaganda among the Chinese the "Tohindo Nippo" issued a weekly edition in Chinese which was systematically hostile to the Central Chinese Government. That government was represented as being a regime of exploitation and oppression, having no other aim than to enrich General Chiang Kai-Shek and his partisans while four hundred million Chinese were exposed to misery and robbed and murdered by the blood-thirsty Chinese armies. Against this picture were held out the blessings which Japan would confer on the Chinese—i.e. a new order, prosperity and freedom—which they would enjoy if only they would place themselves under the Nanking puppet government. A similar attempt to publish a Chinese propaganda paper was made by two Japanese agents at Sourabaya who managed to find a willing Chinese printer in that city. The paper had a short life; for a violent action against it was immediately started by the Chinese community. Apart from this open action, underground work was done such as under supervision of the Consulates and through the medium of Japanese associations, exercising pressure on Chinese who had relations in Chinese occupied territory in order to induce them to give support to Japanese policy.

The "Tohindo Nippo" also published an edition in Dutch for spreading propaganda among the Netherlands public. This publication was accompanied by a generous offer of advertisements in the principal Dutch daily and illustrated papers. The Japanese Shipping Company and several retail establishments and banks pressed by their Consuls placed advertisements, though these would reach a class of readers from whom they could expect no benefit. With the offer of advertisements came friendly articles regarding the culture, country-side and people of Japan which some papers inserted. If they were not inserted the advertisements soon ceased. An undisguised attempt at corruption was made in the case of one of the Batavia papers, the "Nieuws van den Dag," where a person of Netherland nationality who had been in the service of the "Nanyo Veem" (A Japanese Company) offered to subscribe to twenty copies daily if the paper would publish pro-Japanese articles.

The results of these activities were nullified by the hard facts of Japan's aggression against China and the manner in which

foreigners' rights were violated while the Japanese press campaign against the West and the molestations of many foreigners spoke a clearer language than the idyllic tales which were heard from Japanese agents abroad.

The net result of the extensive and expensive propaganda, the underground work, pressure and flattery did not satisfy the untiring Japanese Consular officials. It was decided to try a large scale publicity propaganda on that part of the front where Netherlands rule was assumed to be the weakest, i.e. the loyalty of the native population. In 1938 on the proposal of Keizo Kaneko—a naval spy who had worked for years in the Netherlands Indies—a plan was worked out for the publication of a Malay daily paper at Batavia, "The Political Centre of the Archipelago," for which the co-operation of prominent native nationalist leaders and journalists was to be secured. The Ministers of War, Marine, Overseas and Foreign Affairs supported the plan. In Kaneko's proposal (Document I) which was submitted to the Department of Foreign Affairs, he mentioned as base and object of the publication "good relations with the 60,000,000 natives" and "to convince the natives of the just affection felt for them by the Empire." The proposal was returned to Kaneko with the signature of Tanun Kotani, an official of the third section of the Bureau for European and Asiatic Affairs who had been Vice-Consul at Batavia (where he came back as Consul at the end of 1940) with his good wishes for the success of the enterprise (see the same document).

The method by which the paper was financed, which became apparent from a letter of the same Kaneko (Document II) to Tatsuji Kubo, the executive agent of the plant at Batavia, shows who were the parties interested in thus undermining Government rule in a friendly country. Yosuke Matsuoka, president director of the South Manchurian Railway, later Minister for Foreign Affairs, subscribed 5000 yen. The Bureau for Economic Research in East Asia (Toa Keizai Chosa Kyoku) of the same company—really an institution for training of spies—promised 50,000 yen per annum. Ainosuke Swata—a Pan-Asiatic agitator and terrorist implicated in political assassinations—held out a prospect of sending money "for the work in

the Netherlands Indies" which he hoped to gain with the aid of the army in South China. So in accordance with the German system the Government of a friendly country was to be undermined with the loot obtained from another country.

It is hardly necessary to mention that the publication was to take place under the immediate control of the Japanese Consulate, to which monthly accounts had to be submitted and through which the financing took place. As a matter of fact, as a result of a series of embezzlements committed by the Director of the paper when buying and managing the printing works, criminal proceedings were taken against him which led to much publicity and to the abrupt collapse of the scheme.

But the incitement to revolt among the native population by organizations which worked under the auspices of the Japanese Consulates did not cease and in fact became all the time more extensive. Hereafter will be shown how these commercial agents flagrantly abused their privileges and how during the last few years they systematically conducted a hostile action against the Netherlands Indian Government.

Incitement Among Native Politicians

Apart from propaganda through the press, the Japanese Consuls and secret agents gave great attention to the native nationalist leaders. To this purpose they endeavored to establish contact with the most important among those leaders. If these men happened to visit Japan, either on business or on a world trip, they were received with exaggerated hospitality. They were made much of; and sometimes the Japanese press got busy exploiting their presence in Japan. However, the brutal behavior of the Japanese in the regions they annexed or occupied, the tyrannical and totalitarian character of their regime—even in Japan—shipwrecked those efforts to use the popular movements of the Indies to serve the Japanese cause. Below the thin veneer of Japanese "sympathy" for fellow Asiatics, the blunt imperialistic intentions—aiming at making the native population a tool in the service of Japan's lust of conquest—were easily discerned.

Like in the matter of propaganda through the Islam, this would-be hospitality was closely followed by activities in the

Netherlands Indies and steps were taken by the spy Hiroshi Kubota to make further use of the contacts which had been made. Tempting offers were placed before a party journal in case it should be willing to open its columns to Japanese propaganda. The aforementioned agent Keizo Kaneko also took an active part in these proposals. Document III is the photograph of a meal of these Japanese with some Indonesian journalists. In this picture Kinichi Takenaka, Chancellor of the local Japanese Consulate, is shown. During the meal views were exchanged and vain efforts were made to incite the native guests to hostility to the Netherlands Indian Government. Free trips to Japan were offered as well as financial assistance to the party paper. The Netherlands Indian Government informed the Japanese Government that Kaneko and one of his assistants, who in the meantime had left for Japan, would not be readmitted to the Netherlands Indies. This measure caused the Japanese Government thereafter to use greater caution without, however, weakening for one moment their subversive activities. On the contrary, they were increased.

Whispering Campaign

A favorite method, much used in 1939 and 1940 and probably borrowed from the Germans, is the spreading of uncontrollable rumors for the purpose of causing unrest. Two main ideas are always present in these rumors, i.e. the invincibility of Japan's military forces and the weakness of Netherlands rule.

A few firms at Sourabaya, among whom the Nanyo Warehousing Co., the Meiyo Shokai and the Marushin Yoko were particularly noticeable, let their native clerks spread the news that Japan would soon free the Indies from Netherlands rule. Sometimes the story was that the Japanese fleet had landed troops at certain points. A few propagandists recalled the alleged prediction of a former Prince of Kedire—the so-called Djojobojo prediction—according to which Java after a short interim rule by a yellow race will again become independent and the Japanese let it be asserted that the time for this interim rule had now arrived. Their own princes—so the Japanese claimed—had indicated Japan as the liberator of the Javanese. As a cam-

paign of this nature might easily have disturbed the minds of the simple and credulous natives, the authorities took measures to check it. Japanese shopkeepers, under instructions from their officials, treated their native customers with a friendliness and civility which are unknown in Formosa and Korea. Their object was to show how peace-loving they are and that they look upon all native races as their equals. However, the conceit and innate rudeness of the Japanese were the reasons that others spoilt completely whatever these propagandists had achieved.

Incidentally, that which happened systematically and extensively at Sourabaya, also took place elsewhere. In South Celebes the Japanese shopkeepers had told the natives that the patrol planes of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Air Force, which they saw flying over with great regularity, belonged to the Japanese army.

The Japanese, ever since the occupation of the coast of Southern China—where many Chinese colonists had their relatives and their possessions—had special means to influence the Chinese residents in the Netherlands Indies. Following the “good old” German example, they tried to estrange those Chinese from the government of General Chiang Kai-Shek and transform them into followers of the pseudo-Nanking regime. This was done partly by encouraging them to invest in the occupied Southern China section and guaranteeing their safety of person and belongings; and partly through pressure in the form of a threat of confiscation or action against the relatives at home.

Once the Chinese are won over in this fashion, only one more step is needed to obtain their active collaboration for the establishment of Japanese authority in the country of their habitation.

Local organization of the so-called Ko-A-In, the council for the elevation of Asia, which, in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Army and Navy, among others, lays down the directions for the exploitation of the conquered territory, are charged with the execution of the policies of the Japanese government regarding the Chinese.

There is not the slightest doubt as to the nature of these politics in the light of the instructions of the Japanese Foreign Ministry of the 21st of June, 1939, regarding “control on the politics concerning the oversea Chinese,” later replaced by that

of July 18, 1941, which instructions were sent to all diplomatic and consulate officials in the Far East.

Apart from the application of the above described methods, these instructions also mentioned that the Ministry had sent special officials to the South for the campaign among the over-sea Chinese. The task of those officials was to belittle as much as possible the prestige of the Chungking government and to impress particularly the power and invincibility of the Axis nations. More especially, facilities were to be offered for forwarding monies to the occupied territory, and investments were to be encouraged. Such action—which for the time being would have to take place as much as possible in secret—was to be organized with the closest cooperation of the Army and Navy. As to the Netherlands Indies and surrounding countries, those would as yet be looked after by Foreign Affairs, that is, by the Japanese Consulates.

It was possible to ascertain in Batavia that a similar action among the Chinese originated from the Japanese Consulate General. Tomegoro Yoshizumi, editor of the local Japanese daily, "Tohindo Nippo"—under instructions of an especially added Vice Consul by the name of Ataru Toyoshima—visited the native restaurants regularly. Here he started conversations with native and Chinese visitors and encouraged them to break the bonds of Dutch "oppression." He added that Japan stood ready with her mighty army and fleet to dislodge the Western race forever from Asia.

A report this agent sent to his chief Toyoshima, and from which it becomes clear that this work had been done on instructions from the Consulate, is attached hereto, as Document IV. In this report Yoshizumi indicated the line of action to be followed among the Chinese and asserted that the Chinese, as well as the natives, are robbed and suppressed by the Dutch.

In February 1941 Yoshizumi was evicted from the Netherlands Indies for subversive action. But on December 8, 1941, when all Japanese were interned, this same agent was found back on the island of Bangka disguised as a native and in the possession of 57,000 guilders ready cash which he admitted to have received from the Consulate-General. It appeared that

he had returned clandestinely to the Netherlands Indies aboard a Japanese fishing boat. In view of his former activities, it is not difficult to guess what this agent was to do with so much money on the Island of Bangka which counts many Chinese among its populace. Moreover, this case gives a clear picture of the part which so-called Japanese fishermen have played in the service of Japanese espionage and their subversive action.

Radio Propaganda

The radio, too, was made use of in the Japanese propaganda campaign. For the last few years, daily broadcasts were made from Tokyo and Formosa in a number of languages: Japanese, Dutch, English, Malayan, Chinese, Anamitic, Thai, Hindustani, Spanish, Italian, etc. These talks gave a picture of world events seen, of course, in the totalitarian light of the Rising Sun. The small effect of those broadcasts may be left unconsidered; the facts and deeds of Japanese aggression still speak a clearer language to the world at large than her pathetic declarations of friendship and justice and her hypocritical anxiety to "liberate" the suppressed Asiatics from their fetters. The fact that these intentions met with small success in no way diminishes the infamy of this Japanese intrigue on the territory of friendly nations.

For a long time the Japanese radio propaganda was mainly directed against England, which was considered Japan's greatest opponent. In September 1941, however, Tokyo's radio began to turn with great ferocity against the Netherlands, simultaneously with an anti-Dutch campaign in the Japanese press. In the Malayan broadcasts, Tokyo addressed the native populace of the Netherlands Indies, in an impudent effort to estrange these local subjects from their government. The radio stated that the defense of the Netherlands Indies merely meant to protect the interests of the Dutch, so as to be able to rob the native populace with greater strength after the elimination of the Japanese danger. Japan, on the other hand, meant to bring prosperity to the Indonesians and she was prepared to liberate them with force of arms.

IV

The Economic Assault on the Netherlands Indies

Japanese Fishermen as the Vanguard of the Navy

A few thousand Japanese fishermen acted in and about the Netherlands Indian seas as forerunners of Japanese expansionism and as auxiliaries to the Japanese Navy. According to the latest information their number was about 4,000 divided over about 500 boats. Admiral Nobumasa Suetsugu, formerly commander of the combined Japanese Navy, subsequently Minister of Home Affairs—an ardent Pan-Asiatic—declared a few years ago that these fishermen were of great interest to the Japanese Navy and had an important task to fulfill in the “Japanese march towards the South.” There was a time, some six years ago, when the Japanese consuls in the Netherlands Indies who on the surface of things still adhered to the formalities of international etiquette, openly declared that they were ashamed of the manner in which those impudent people (the “fishermen”) behaved. Already in 1914 when the Netherlands were neutral they took up a threatening attitude against Netherlands rule, especially on the island of Dobo between Timor and Australia. On the expert advice of the Japanese Naval Staff they established themselves by preference at strategic points, such as the Straits between Australia and New Guinea, the North East corner of Celebes, the Island of Borneo near the entrance to the Straits of Macassar, and Singapore.

Their infringements of the Netherlands Indian Fishery laws have of late years been very numerous. At distant and weakly policed spots, they showed signs of open resistance. At Sarmi

in New Guinea it happened that crews of fishing boats which on account of a breach of the regulations were being detained, asked because of weather conditions to be allowed to go to a better shelter. When this was allowed they threw into the sea the police officers who had been placed on their vessels and fled. Similar cases have occurred in the Philippine Islands.

Terrorization of the native populace on distant small islands, the theft of fruit, turtles, etc. were frequent and formed only a minor part of their misdemeanors. Persistently they fished in territorial waters, where on account of the great distances in the Archipelago little control could be exercised. Repeatedly they were found to make suspicious soundings and charts.

The places where they established themselves were regularly visited by Japanese naval officers, especially by those stationed at Palao, the capital of the Japanese Mandated Territory. On different occasions it was found that these fishing people placed themselves in territorial waters at the disposal of the Japanese Navy to collect maritime data and generally to do intelligence work.

At Macassar it was observed that Japanese boats went out not to fish but to communicate with Japanese vessels on the high seas. In the same port Japanese fishing men were found to be smugglers of opium which they collected from Japanese ships outside of territorial waters. In other parts of the Archipelago Japanese subjects from Formosa likewise showed inclination for this illicit trade. From the Riouw Archipelago near Singapore a report was received at the end of 1938 that Japanese submarines received supplies which they required from Japanese fishing craft.

As stated above up to about six years ago—although protests never had any effect—Japan showed some sense of shame on account of the excesses caused by their fisher folk and did not officially defend these. This hypocritical chivalry, however, did not last.

In October 1938 a Netherland seaplane on patrol duty near the Island of Biliton, south of Singapore, found a Japanese motorboat in territorial waters under suspicious circumstances which, in spite of repeated orders and a warning shot across her bow, refused to stop. The crew took up a hostile attitude

and was only prepared to heave to when the boat herself was fired at, which unfortunately caused casualties. Shortly afterwards the Japanese Government demanded that apologies be tendered officially, that the "guilty party" be punished, that an indemnity be paid and guarantees be given against a repetition of the incident. There is little need to add that the Dutch Government did not comply with those arrogant demands. At the same time a violent anti-Netherlands campaign was unchained in the Japanese press. A similar case occurred immediately afterwards on the west coast of Borneo where fishermen placed themselves on a row along the railing of their boat and challenged a seaplane to fire, with the obvious intention of provoking fresh incidents. As in this case nobody was hit, the transparent intention failed.

The Netherlands Government, as a result of these incidents, decided to promise that in the future seaplanes would only be used for reconnaissance work but not for the detention of fishing boats.

From later incidents it became clear that Japanese fishermen must have been advised to take no notice of aircraft with the result that they did not take the trouble even to leave territorial waters if a naval plane showed itself.

On May 6, 1940, a naval plane found near Riouw, south of Singapore, a motorboat showing no flag which later turned out to be Japanese and in spite of repeated warnings refused to leave territorial waters. When the plane descended the boat tried to ram it, whereupon the former, wrongly but understandably, fired a series of warning shots across the bow of the vessel.

More than a month later, a highly colored report of this incident was sent to Tokyo by Consul General Ototsugu Saito, together with a fictitious story of a landing of British troops in Java. According to him the boat was fired at. This Consular official, who after the invasion of the Netherlands has done everything possible to bring about an attack on the Netherlands Indies, hoped by producing these reports at the right moment, to induce his government not to delay the war of conquest. Ototsugu Saito, to whom further reference will be made, then nearly achieved his aim.

The increasing impertinence with which the Japanese Navy tried through their fishing interests to obtain points d'appui in the Archipelago, is typified by the formation in November 1940 of the Japan Ocean Bonito and Tunny Fish Company (Nippon Enyo Batsuo Maguro K.K.) with a capital of 35,000,000 yen which wished to establish six fishing stations in the Netherlands Indies (at Amboina, Sabang, Batavia, Sourabaya, Menado and Manokwari) and proposed with trawlers to undertake the provision of fish to the whole of the Netherlands Indies. A glance at the map will show that the reason for wanting these stations was to have at these vital points experts (naval reserve personnel) familiar with the waters in the vicinity who would be available when the time for the attack would come.

Systematic Expansion Through Government Concerns

Fisheries were not the only means by which economic penetration with political and military intentions was attempted. The part was also played by agriculture, forestry and mining. Under the auspices of the Japanese Government, or of concerns which were controlled by that Government, enterprises were started—some profitable but mostly unprofitable—subordinate to expansionist and imperialistic policy.

The first Japanese Colonization Company in the Netherlands Indies, the Oriental Development Company (Toyo Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha) made its appearance around the year 1920 and was followed by several others.

This company, in which the Japanese Government has a preponderant vote, and the Managing Director of which is appointed by the Government, has principally distinguished itself in Japanizing all branches of agriculture, commerce and industry in Korea and also by acquiring land in Manchuria. It received similar concessions in the mandated islands.

The company's results in the Netherlands Indies, contrary to those obtained in Korea, Manchuria and the Mandated Territories, have been unfavorable; the same applies to other government companies which came later. Apparently Japanese

economic enterprise can only prosper in countries where, with military support, all channels of production, transportation, finance and distribution are monopolized and other nationalities are excluded; or when under a foreign flag, like at Mindanao in the Philippines, a Japanese enclave can be formed which makes a similar monopoly possible.

Where equal opportunities are given to all, which is a basic principle of Netherlands colonial policy whereby the economic development of the Netherlands Indies has largely benefited, Japanese enterprise does not seem to find a fertile soil. Free Japanese colonization has succeeded only in countries like California with a moderate climate and a white population from whose higher standard of life benefits are derivable. It is remarkable that just in such circumstances the ties of the Japanese Colonist with his country of origin are liable to loosen and that there he may forget what he has learned in his youth, i.e. that his first duty is to the glory of his Emperor and the aggrandisement of Japan.

Concealed Aims of the Government Companies

As a result of the majority holding by the Government in concerns like the Oriental Development Company, officials were continually sent out who had to look for new investments as well as to control that the money already invested was spent in the desired manner. As in the Government of Japan the influence of army and navy dominate, officers made their appearance in large numbers and military and naval interests had to be taken into consideration when starting new ventures.

This is no doubt also the cause why several Japanese concerns working with Government money have had no success. An instance is the Nanyo Kohetsu Kabushiki Kaisha, the principal subsidiary of the Oriental Development Company, working in the Netherlands Indies which went in for cotton planting in New Guinea with the twofold object of making Japan less dependent on imports from America and of supplying the Japanese fleet with a base. As cotton cannot be grown economically in New Guinea, the enterprise was bound to fail; the capital of 4,000,000 yen was entirely lost.

As the economic offensive against the Netherlands Indies in the years after 1930 began to take definite shape, the number of Government companies selecting the Archipelago for the field of their activities also increased. In 1936 two new Government concerns made their appearance for the purpose of peaceably conquering the lands of the "Southern Ocean." The one—the Formosan Development Company (Taiwan Takushoka Kabushiki Kaisha), which also worked in Siam and Malaya, had practically no interests yet in the Netherlands Indies in 1940. It was typical that the only estate which this concern acquired was on the island of Batam just opposite Singapore from which it is only a few miles distant. The company looked for other land investments similarly geographically situated. The other concern, "the South Seas Development Company" (Nanyo Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha), tried to obtain a footing in the northeasterly corner of the Netherlands Indies and began by buying up a Japanese firm in Menado (Celebes). The Nanyo Takushoku K.K. is established in the mandated islands. A special office to look after the interests of this company is attached to the Mandate Administration. A continuous stream of naval officers and expansionist agents passed between Palao and the Netherlands Indies. The Nanyo Takushoku K.K. also interested themselves in fisheries which, of course, were in the first instance called upon to do work for the Japanese Navy.

The Government Company Nanyo Kohatsu Kaisha

The most militant of the official colonization companies which were the vanguard of the Japanese military forces was the Nanyo Kohatsu Kabushiki Kaisha (South Seas Development Company) which enjoyed the special interest of the Japanese Navy and could always dispose of ample funds for experiments in New Guinea which from an economic point of view had no *raison d'être*.

That economic and military activities were to follow each other in this enterprise appeared from a letter addressed by one of their directors in Tokyo to the managers in New Guinea. Photograph of the original, and translation, are attached (Document V). The writer states that the airline, Tokyo—Palao, the

establishment of which the company had advocated, would be served by craft under the command of officers on the active list and that its especial object was expansion towards New Guinea. In May 1939 at Palao port facilities and two oil tank installations with a capacity of 10,000 tons each had been completed which were considered of primary interest for the same expansionist purpose.

A letter from President Director Haruji (Document VI with translation) showed that in 1935 an instruction was given to clandestinely conduct mining exploration in Northern New Guinea, while in 1940 the branch office at Manokwari gave similar instructions to its subordinate branches advising how this should be done and that suitable agricultural land should be looked for under the pretence of Botanical research.

From the correspondence between Japanese in New Guinea and their connections in Japan, it became more and more apparent that they definitely assumed the occupation of Netherlands New Guinea by Japan as a coming event.

The company's work in New Guinea was under the direct control of the Naval Commandant at Palao. In one letter one of the company's vessels is placed at the navy's disposal.

The Nanyo Kohatsu Kaisha in Portuguese Timor

In Portuguese Timor the Nanyo Kohatsu, like in the Netherlands Indies, exercised the functions of an aggressive economic spearhead for Japan's naval expansion. Japanese imperialists have for many years had their eyes on this Portuguese colony and its acquisition has been advocated in many circles, including persons in responsible positions. Although from the economic point of view without any importance, Timor attracted the attention of the Japanese Navy by its situation between the Netherlands Indies and Australia. Owing to the vulnerability of her small colonies in the Far East, Portugal could not effectively oppose Japanese penetration in Timor. So the official Japanese Colonial Company could act there openly, without reserve or pretense, as the penetration medium of the Tokyo Government.

When in 1938 the Japanese Navy occupied some small

islands in Southern Chinese waters which led in October of that year to the occupation of Canton, the position of the neighboring small Portuguese Colony of Macao became precarious and only slight pressure was needed in Lisbon to force the door of Timor. The Nanyo Kohatsu acquired an important share holding in the Sociedade which had economically a monopoly in Portuguese Timor. There were only a very few Japanese there at the time, but within a short time they increased to a small colony, without occupations or visible means of subsistence.

There already was a shipping connection with Palao and soon great interest was shown in aerodromes and landing possibilities for seaplanes. There was a coming and going of Japanese experts and in the course of 1940 the establishment was decided upon of an airline with seaplanes between Dilly, Timor, and Palao which would pass over the islands of the Indian Archipelago. The preparative work, transfer of staff, petrol, materials, etc., were entirely effected by the Nanyo Kohatsu. A scheme was drawn up for a series of trial flights, some of which took place in 1940.

From urgent applications of the Nanyo Kohatsu to different ministries at Tokyo, it is evident that the enterprise is not only economically unprofitable but that substantial sums are being laid out on these expansionist experiments.

Air Line Via the Netherlands Indies to Timor

From the beginning it was clear that this line without passengers or freight had a strategic purpose only and aimed at narrowing the distance between Japan and the eastern part of the Archipelago while a demand to be allowed to call at Netherlands Indian airports only awaited a favorable international constellation. In the middle of 1941 the official opening of the new line took place, followed closely by the establishment of a Japanese consulate, with its usual representatives of the Navy and the Army. Hardly had the new Consul arrived on the spot when a strategic exploration of the island and the surrounding ocean was taken in hand. Instruments for observation and military reconnaissance were introduced disguised as consular baggage, and when the Portuguese customs—Japan's

protests notwithstanding—examined this luggage and found numerous instruments, the Japanese asserted that a wrong shipment had been made and the baggage was returned to Japan.

Japanese Government Concern in Celebes

The Nanyo Kohatsu pursued in Celebes and Borneo the same policy of peaceful conquest as in New Guinea and Portuguese Timor. In Celebes, the Celebes Development Company in combination with the South Pacific Trading Company—two companies with one set of directors—were established at Menado. Originally an unobtrusive enterprise looking for genuine investments, the Celebes Development Company, under instructions from the parent company (Nanyo Kohatsu Kaisha), began to develop a plan for the economic invasion of Celebes and the Moluccas. On a great scale a buying organization for copra—the principal product of these islands—was formed. The copra was to be transported to Menado by a new line of coasting vessels, which were registered in the names of Netherlands nominees. A start was made with buying above the market price and warehousing large quantities of copra. Had this scheme succeeded after a while Netherlands shipping, the Chinese middlemen and foreign exporters would have been supplanted by Japanese. The collapse of the copra market combined with greater restrictions in Japan on export of capital made this economic assault on North Celebes miscarry after a few millions had been lost.

Japanese Government Concern in Borneo

The subsidiary of the Oriental Development Company in Borneo was called the Nanyo Ringyo Kabushiki Kaisha (Timber Working Company Nanyo Ringyo). The predecessor of this concern began to interest itself in 1930 in the forests along the Sesajap and the Sembakong rivers which constitute the hinterland of the island of Tarakan where the oil wells are. The interest shown in these wells was so obvious that the Government of the Netherlands Indies felt themselves compelled to close this territory for applicants of other than Netherlands na-

tionality. Thereupon the company applied for and was granted a timber concession on the more southerly bay of Sangkulirang. The affair was so incapably and wastefully managed that already in 1936 two million guilders had been lost and even the Japanese press criticized the reckless manner in which the Oriental Development Company granted credits. The amateurism of the enterprise was so obvious that there is every reason to doubt whether it ever was the intention to work the company along economic lines. Judging from the names of those who financed the concern, and the situation which was selected for the concession, it is more probable that the object was to have a Japanese establishment near the much desired oil fields at any cost.

The attitude towards the Netherlands Indian Government of this kind of companies in questions relating to concessions, labor, coolie immigration, etc., was always very different from that of private and genuine Japanese trading and agricultural concerns. These official companies wished to have at their disposal wireless transmitters and narrow gauge railways and constantly caused trouble which called for consular interference.

In the beginning of 1940 the company's manager at Sangkulirang was prosecuted for having incited his native employees against the authority of the Netherlands Indian Government. When after the invasion of the Netherlands in May 1940 letters were censored it became apparent that all the Japanese employees of the Nanyo Ringyo K.K., like those of the Nanyo Kohatsu K.K. in New Guinea, considered themselves pioneers for a war of aggression and that none of them had the slightest sympathy for the country which extended hospitality to them.

The above shows that the official Japanese companies were no other than the advance guard for the conquest of the Netherlands Indies. Private companies, small firms and shopkeepers also gradually began more and more to act for purposes of military intelligence.

V

Espionage

Subversive Activities of the Nanyo Warehousing Company

Reference has already been made to the above concern which is owned by the aggressively nationalistic shipping magnate Koichiro Ishihara and was one of the first Japanese firms in the Netherlands Indies to pave the way for Japan's march to the South. Incidentally it may be mentioned that the altruistic nature of Japanese nationalism should not be overrated. It does not involve considerable personal sacrifices but on the contrary, if cleverly manipulated, it constitutes a sound investment as shown by the reproduced letter of the Pan-Asiatic leader Ainosuka Swata, who was fully indemnified for his patriotism by supplies to the South China Army. Ishihara is one of those who in a few years rose through the current of the reactionary movement from an inconsiderable shopkeeper's job in Singapore, to great wealth.

In 1933 the local manager of the Nanyo Warehousing Company at Singapore was called to the police station to give information concerning espionage. Arriving at the station, he committed suicide by taking poison before he could be submitted to an interrogation.

The manager of the Batavia branch Jisaburo Handa distinguished himself in 1934 when commercial negotiations between Japan and the Netherlands did not progress as quickly as Japan hoped, by hiring a professional agitator called Katsujiro Kizaki to smash the stock of an earthenware trader at

Osaka who had refused to join in a boycott against the Netherlands Indies. The same individual was called to Batavia in 1939 by Consul General Ototsugu Saito to assist, by subversive action, in the economic negotiations of the Kobayashi mission.

The Nanyo Warehousing Company was one of the most active mediums for espionage. One of the employees of their Batavia branch, Naoju Aratame, a Navy officer who had been dismissed from the service because of his share in the military rebellion of February 1936, was detailed with this espionage work and after a while transferred in the same capacity to the Consulate General. Other branches of the firm acted similarly. Considerable quantities of propaganda literature—if possible with avoidance of customs' examinations—were imported through the intermediary of the Nanyo Warehousing Company which, after the outbreak of the war in September 1939, rendered the same services to the German Consulate. Hereafter will be shown how all Japanese shops, firms and individuals were gradually included in the spying organization. Whether they did this willingly, like the Nanyo Warehousing Company, or unwillingly, like the large commercial firms that used to be of good repute, is immaterial. There is no choice under a totalitarian form of government; all must respond to any call of the State. Moral considerations, developed during the period of the slow growth of civilization, must be pushed aside to make place for blind obedience to orders from higher authorities. Otherwise the "culprits" face economic collapse and are menaced with removal from the community.

The Part of the South Sea Association (Nanyo Kyokai) in Espionage

In connection with the Nanyo Warehousing Company the Nanyo Kyokai, which had already functioned 25 years for the promotion of investments and immigration in the Netherlands Indies, should be mentioned. This association gave advice to those who looked for a field for their activities and specialized in financing retail dealers and sending out clerks. The local sections were controlled by the consuls. The association enjoyed a good reputation enabling it to do intelligence work

without exciting suspicion of which the agents of the Japanese Government were not slow to take advantage.

During the German invasion of the Netherlands, Kyujiro Hayashi, president director of the Nanyo Kyokai, was travelling in the Netherlands Indies in the interest of his association, but also with a goodwill mission to the Government of the Netherlands Indies. He was officially welcomed everywhere. He had not yet left the Indies when from a letter written by him it became evident that his real mission was to co-ordinate espionage in the countries of the Southern Ocean, working hand in hand with the director of the Nanyo Warehousing Company for the purpose of collecting military data, organizing sabotage, trying to corrupt officials and military as well as to form a fifth column.

Inclusion of Japanese Residents in the Espionage System

In spite of the above, by far the greater part of the Japanese community in the Netherlands Indies consisted until 1935 of hard working and quiet immigrants who held aloof from subversive and spying activities and gave the police little trouble.

But after the Manchurian expedition and the consequent disapproving vote of the League of Nations in 1933, Japan's position became isolated and she took up a hostile attitude towards the Western Powers. Not only was her population—by means of systematic propaganda—united against the foreigner and prepared for an expansionist adventure, but the spiritual mobilization of the Japanese abroad, including those in the Netherlands Indies, was also taken in hand with great energy. They were asked to place themselves and their trades at the disposal of Japan's military aspirations. The alarming result of several years of pressure on the Japanese colonists abroad by military propaganda; the preaching of anti-Western doctrines and the proclaiming of Japan's destiny as the sole ruler of the Far East and, later, of Asia, have turned the Japanese living in the Asiatic countries—and especially in those countries where a Western flag was flying—into elements of hostility amidst populations which offered them a peaceful existence and protection for their lives and their possessions.

The readiness with which the Japanese community in the Netherlands Indies have been found willing to cooperate in attempts to undermine the authority of the Government of the country which has so generously and during so many years given them hospitality, will remain a permanent blot on the Japanese character.

Subversive Action in the Naval Base at Sourabaya

One of the principal centers of espionage was the naval base at Sourabaya. Several Japanese firms were made to employ clerks who had no other work than to obtain information for the Japanese authorities. These spies had been trained for their profession at an institute which resorted under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was managed by Dr. Shumei Ogawa who had already shown himself experienced on the subject when he was in the employ of the South Manchurian Railway Company. The Nanyo Warehousing Company of Batavia had an employee by the name of Naoju Aratame whose exclusive task it was to spy and who, at a later date, was transferred to the Batavia Consulate General. At Sourabaya these spies were employees of the Takenokoshi Trading Company, the Daido Boeki and the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha. That the latter—Japan's most reputable commercial concern—should resort to subversive activities is remarkable. An agent of the South Manchurian Railway Company and the Naval Spy Shinichi Sato both traveled through the Netherlands Indies, pretending to be inspectors of the Mitsui. Thus private companies, which a few years ago would certainly have refused to lend themselves to this sort of work, were compelled by their Government to assist in preparing the ground for aggression. This process under the leadership of the Consulates penetrated the entire Japanese community which became a complete spying and anti-Government organization. One of the spy firms was Kubota & Company who hardly did any business, and whose partner Hiroshi Kubota had already been in the pay of the Japanese Navy for many years.

A letter written by Kubota when he was in Japan shows that he was in direct contact with the General Staff in Formosa, attended frequent secret conferences with the General Staff at

Tokyo and had close relations with practically all prominent Pan-Asiatic leaders and protagonists of southward expansion.

Other important firms forming part of the intelligence service at Sourabaya were the Yokohama Shokai and the Toyo Menka.

A Japanese physician, Dr. Tsubota, at Sourabaya tried to obtain official documents by bringing the female staff of the Government offices at Sourabaya into contact with the personnel of the local Consulate. Two traders—Naoji Masuda and Kaoru Tasuda—paid for this purpose, devoted themselves to fifth column work and to propaganda among Chinese. For the despatch of espionage documents, the facilities granted to Consular Officials were used as well as the services of the Nanyo Warehousing Company in different places. These persons took care that such letters were placed on board the vessels of the Nanyo Kaiun.

Espionage in Other Sections of the Archipelago

Sourabaya was the principal spying center, but Batavia, Bandoeng, Palembang, Djambi, other oil ports and Menado had their ample share. In 1939 different Japanese firms were known to collect maps and charts of all parts of the Archipelago, especially of the ports. A "Port Association" in Japan which pretended to have for its object the improvement of Japanese port facilities in general took an especial interest in data pertaining to the harbors of the Netherlands Indies. One of the most active firms in this connection was the Pilot Pen Company which had a branch office at Singapore, from where their agents continually traveled to Sumatra, Java and Borneo. In the Straits Settlements the movements of these agents had already been found suspect by the authorities. It was remarkable how often the stocks of pens had to be renewed and that the principal markets for pens always were places of military interest. Instances of independently working agents were the planter Tsunehachi Kobayashi on the Tondano Lake (Northern Celebes) and a shopkeeper, also agriculturalist, at Ternate, Shunji Egawa. Kobayashi regularly sent detailed reports on conditions in his district to the Mandate Administration at Palao and to the Government at Tokyo for which he was paid

direct by both as well as by the Colonization Company Nanyo Takushokes K.K. He handed in his reports personally on board Japanese vessels at Menado. He also was the confidential adviser of all military and naval officers who came to make themselves acquainted with conditions. His plantation gave him no visible source of income. Egawa showed particular interest in naval and strategic subjects at Halmaheira about which he reported extensively and regularly to Palao and Tokyo.

Japanese Associations as Consular Agencies

Great were the activities of Japanese Associations, the presidents of which were considered as the leaders of local groups. They expected the Netherland officials to consult with them in all measures relating to individual Japanese; they considered and frequently styled themselves the local Consuls of Japan. When propaganda and espionage were systemized and intensified during the last few years the associations were included in that system. Instructions which they received from the Consuls were carefully executed.

After May 10, 1940—the date of the German invasion into the Netherlands—these associations distinguished themselves by reports to the effect that order in the Netherlands Indies could not properly be maintained and that Japanese lives and properties were insecure. The presidents of the associations at Bandoeng and Tarakan sent tendencious reports and much exaggerated versions of insignificant incidents. These were used without any investigation by the extremely aggressive Consul General Ototsugu Saito to send protests to the Netherlands Indian Government and to incite his own Government to armed intervention. Saito even went so far as to reprimand the Consul at Sourabaya who had stated that the report from Tarakan was incorrect. The Sourabaya Consul had, by not raising the incident to the required dimensions, failed in loyal cooperation.

Japanese Naval and Military Officers

The above approximately describes the preparations made by a stream of Japanese agents for the arrival of the Imperial Naval and Military Forces in the Netherlands Indies. As

Army, Navy, civil authorities, mandate administration, as well as a few official concerns, all acted separately, having their own intelligence services which crossed and sometimes countered each other, there were at all times large numbers of Japanese liaison agents in the Indies.

The most important officers charged with the organization used fictitious names. For instance, Lieutenant-Colonel Murakami, who visited the Netherlands Indies in January 1939 to guide the action, and who traveled under the adopted name of Chujiro Araki, posed as an employee of the Mitsui concern. Others, like the Captain-Lieutenant of the Navy, Soye Uzawa, head of the South Sea section of the Navy Staff, found it unnecessary to conceal their identity. They reconnoitered extensively the future field of action for Japan's military aggressors.

Suspect Japanese Hotels

A method for receiving information about defense matters, much used at Sourabaya, Palembang, Tarakan and Medan, was to give soldiers and sailors the opportunity of using small Japanese hotels for immoral purposes. It was tried, but in vain, to elicit information from officers through Japanese women who had an understanding with prominent Japanese business men, by preference with men who were attached to the repeatedly mentioned Nanyo Warehousing Company.

VI

The Kobayashi Mission

A distinct step towards the formation of a Central organ to co-ordinate the preparations for military action in the Netherlands Indies was the Kobayashi Mission. Almost immediately after the invasion of the Netherlands, the plan was mentioned in Japan of sending an impressive mission to the Netherlands Indies. Different names were mentioned as likely heads of this mission, until finally in August General Kuniaki Koiso, ex-Minister of Overseas Affairs was designated. As this General had lately given proof of aggressive views with respect to the Netherlands Indies, the Netherlands Indian Government informed the Japanese Government that he was not acceptable. Subsequently Schizo Kobayashi, Minister of Commerce and Industry, was appointed. He arrived about the middle of September with a staff of 30 persons including two naval and two army officers.

It was stated that this mission had no other object than to continue the economic negotiations which until the invasion had been conducted at The Hague by Minister Ishii. Already in 1939, when Great Britain and France were at war with Germany but active hostilities had not yet begun, Japan had considered the possibility of conquering the Netherlands Indies. However, the time for an open breach was not thought then to have come yet. For this reason an attempt was made to induce the Netherlands to accept a guarantee that the independence of the Netherlands Indies would be maintained in exchange

for far-reaching economic facilities concerning imports, immigration, establishment of Japanese industries and the formation of a financial block. Such guarantees, besides constituting an absolutely unacceptable economic capitulation, were extremely unattractive in view of Japan's recent treaty violations. As it did not then suit Japan to openly produce demands, the negotiations made no progress.

On April 15, 1940, when because of the German occupation of Denmark and Norway, an invasion of the Netherlands seemed to become more likely, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Arita, declared that Japan, in view of her close economic relations with the Netherlands Indies, was anxious for the maintenance of the status quo and would not tolerate any measures by Great Britain and France which would endanger these relations. On May 15th, after the capitulation of the Netherlands Army, a similar declaration was made to the Netherlands Minister at Tokyo, the Japanese Foreign Minister expressing his expectation that the protection of the Netherlands Indies would not be entrusted to any particular country.

The Secret Instructions to the Mission

It soon became apparent that the Mission had no unconcealed program apart from the wish to buy oil, which could have been settled direct with the oil companies (and eventually was so settled) without the necessity of sending any mission. The European situation had in the meantime become such that a German attack on England had less chance of success than at one time was thought possible and it therefore seemed not opportune to the Japanese Government to assume an openly aggressive policy, at that moment.

From a reliable Japanese source it was learned that Kobayashi's program of which in the end only a few points were hesitatingly submitted was as follows:

1. To give peaceful assurances, so as to delay armaments in the Netherlands Indies as much as possible.
2. To make the Netherlands Indies refrain from preparing the demolition of their oil fields which Japan desired to possess.
3. To induce the Netherlands Indies not to cooperate closely

with Great Britain and the United States of America, but to seek contact with the "New Order in Asia."

4. To demand supplies of materials for war industries and to have a share in the production thereof.

Not even a part of these desires were realized. The pro-German element in Japan, however, gained such force that it succeeded in obtaining on September 27th the conclusion of the Tripartite pact between the Axis Powers. The expectation that this would cause the help of Japan to be invoked was not realized. It only incited indignation and strengthened the Netherlands resolution to firmly support the policy of their allies.

It now became clear to the Japanese that demands and threats, far from leading to the desired end, would have a contrary effect. The mission became idle and waited for a turn of the tide, i.e. a definite success of the Axis. Fresh disappointments were President Roosevelt's re-election, the President's unequivocal attitude with regard to Japanese aggression in the Far East and his support of Great Britain. The military members of the Kobayashi mission spent their time in collecting as much military information as possible.

In the meantime that what happened in French Indo-China showed how the mission had proposed to accomplish its task. In Tonkin air bases and strategic points had been occupied, a mission of some hundred Japanese, whose expenses were paid by the Indo-Chinese Government, behaved as if they were the masters of the country. Demands were made for the supply of fixed quantities of produce, especially rice, while large numbers of Japanese fortune hunters entered the Colony.

Naval Attache Maeda

One of the attaches of the mission, Naval Captain Maeda—previously Naval Attache at The Hague—was friendly with the German General Wenninger, who drew up the plan of the attack on the Netherlands and afterwards went to Tokyo to make plans for a Japanese blitzkrieg in South East Asia.

While the Japanese Government hesitated to put into execution the long prepared plan of conquest, the Japanese press

conducted a shameless campaign against the Netherlands Indies, the occupation of which it openly advocated.

Mass Action in Support of the Mission

Shortly after the departure of the Kobayashi Mission, a mass meeting in support of it was organized in Tokyo. This was done by a number of associations interested in expansion to the South, which include among their members, in addition to some notorious Pan-Asiatic leaders, the two ex-Ministers of Overseas Affairs, General Kuniaki Koiso and Ryutaro Nagai. The resolution passed at this meeting which was telegraphed to Kobayashi reads as follows:

"It is Japan's pressing task to form an economic block to realize a great mutual prosperity chain which from a geographical, ethnographical and political point of view should include Japan, China, Manchukuo and the South Sea Islands.

"Since 300 years the populations of these countries suffer from the oppression and inhuman treatment by the Europeans and Americans, who have taken possession of the South Sea Islands. The Overseas Territories of the Southern Ocean are Japan's life line from a point of view of national self-defense. The expansion to these lands and the liberation of the people of Asia are Japan's mission.

"The object of this meeting is to stimulate Envoy Kobayashi to awaken the Authorities in the Netherlands Indies and to urge the establishment of a co-prosperity chain in Eastern Asia."

The mission's chances for success dwindled swiftly. Minister Kobayashi departed, as soon as the opportunity to do so without causing a stir offered itself. He was replaced by Ambassador Kenkichi Yoshizawa, who did not, however, have any acceptable suggestions to offer. The negotiations dragged until June 1941 and it looked as if they were purposely drawn out so as to give the constantly changing military members of the mission an opportunity to prepare eventual military plans—which they doubtlessly did.

VII

Direct Preparations for Invasion by Japanese Government Departments

Japan's Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs as Liberators of the Oppressed Asiatics

Resolutions like the one quoted at the close of the previous chapter are not surprising in view of a declaration which Prime Minister Prince Fumimaro Konoye made on the occasion of the New Year-1939, to the effect that it was the task of Japan to free the peoples of the Far East from their fetters. The world and the people concerned by now know what a liberation by Japan means! This declaration was repeated on October 7, 1940 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Yosuke Matsuoka in a speech to the provincial Governors. In the course of his oration he stated that Japanese troops had peaceably entered French Indo-China and that "as proved by the common declaration of the Japanese and Indo-China Governments" the territory, integrity and sovereignty of Indo-China would be fully respected by Japan. A clearer illustration of the Japanese definition of integrity is hardly thinkable; official utterances of this kind are numerous.

"Federation for the Liberation of South East Asiatic Peoples"

This organization founded on December 19, 1940, is the most recent of those which pretend to aim at the "Liberation of the oppressed people in Asia." The founders include Admiral

[57]

Takeshita, who a few years ago paid a "goodwill visit" to the Netherlands Indies, and Dr. Shumei Ogawa who as previously mentioned is head of the Institute for the training of spies established under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

So Japan has for years made preparations for an attack on the Netherlands Indies, only awaiting a favorable moment. In 1939 several tens of millions of yen were spent on military equipment in the mandated islands which were to be the base of operations.

Anti Netherland Press Campaign

Whenever it was thought opportune the Japanese press, which is completely controlled by the Government, started a campaign against the Netherlands and Netherlands Indies. One of the most violent of these coincided with the German offensive in Europe in 1940.

One of the first and worst was a letter published in the Kokumin Shimbun (the army organ at Tokyo) on April 24, 1940, in which the Netherlands were called a "rotten spot on earth." Netherland military forces were accused of having fired at defenseless Japanese fishermen and Japan—so the writer said—had no reason to behave in a gentleman-like manner towards such a nation. Similar articles in the issues of the same paper of April 29th, June 30th and August 18th advocated steps by Japan for the liberation of the people of Eastern Asia. The Hochi Shimbun of Tokyo, which had placed itself at the disposal of German propaganda, wrote before the invasion of the Netherlands that Japan should keep the situation in hand and invade the Netherlands Indies. The Tokyo "Asahi Shimbun," a paper which had previously distinguished itself by moderation and which stood in close contact with the civil authorities, wrote on July 14th that Japan should destroy the iron fetters with which the countries of Eastern Asia had been shackled by their white exploiters. The natives should be given back their independence so that with them Japan could create a "paradise of mutual assistance and mutual prosperity."

The Japan Times, a propaganda organ in the English lan-

guage of the Ministries of War and of Foreign Affairs, reprinted on November 5th, 1940 an article which the ultra reactionary shipping magnate Koichi Ishihara, to whom reference has previously been made, had contributed to the monthly magazine, Kaizo, advocating an early attack on the Netherlands Indies. This according to Ishihara could be achieved with the aid of the Indonesians, without great difficulty.

Consular Machinations to Undermine the Authority of the Netherlands Indian Government

Mention has been made of the part played by the Consulate at Sourabaya in approaching an Indonesian paper, and also of the attempts made by the Japanese consular staff to seek contact through Dr. Tsubota with typists in Government offices hoping in that way to obtain official documents. The Consulate was also responsible for the financing of a Chinese propaganda newspaper in Eastern Java and for the imposition of a tax on the profits on produce exported by Japanese. Under the supervision of Ototsugu Saito, who later became Consul General at Batavia, espionage was organized on a firm basis in East Java.

One of the Vice Consuls, Naojiro Takagi, was detached from all other work in order to be able to devote himself entirely to underground activities. He established himself as a small potato trader in the harbor district of Sourabaya. He had at his disposal a secret telephone number and it soon became known that the shop was to serve as a storage place for clandestinely imported weapons, parcels of which were also to be stored with unscrupulous Formosan confederates.

When Saito was transferred to Batavia, subversive work was immediately intensified there. As already stated, activities on a great scale were undertaken to edit a native newspaper for which purpose printing works were bought; also, advertisements were offered to the Dutch papers in hopes of thereby influencing their editorial columns.

When the European war broke out in September 1939, Saito thought that the time had arrived for letting the Indies receive the blessings of Japanese rule. He made contact with some native nationalists of doubtful loyalty. From the information

received from these people Saito formed the opinion that the conquest could be made with an army of 20,000 men. According to the Consul General, Japan would have to act by occupying in the first place the oil ports and by gaining the confidence of the Indonesian population.

However, Tokyo thought that the time for military aggression had not come yet, but the Consular staff was increased so as to continue the preparatory work on a greater scale. The spy, Naoju Aratame, until then in the employ of the Nanyo Warehousing Company, was attached to the Consulate and a new agent, Ataru Toyoshima, was made to come from Amoy especially for work among the Chinese. Mention has already been made of Toyoshima's attempts to incite the Chinese against the Netherlands Indian Government through the intermediary of an editor of the Tohindo Nippo.

A little later two agents—Kobayashi and Go Sujuki—who had been specially trained in Egypt, were sent to Batavia for propaganda among Mohammedans. A naval officer—Mamoru Ohta—who for studies of the Dutch language had been attached to the Consulate, was instructed by his superiors about the middle of 1940 to look out for suitable landing points on the coast of West Java. He carried out his task in close collaboration with the members of the Nanyo Warehousing Company, the president of the Japanese Association, and a photographer. With these people he conferred repeatedly and explored extensively along the coast. In the following October he studied once more the local situation from points which would be important for an eventual attack. On this occasion he was accompanied by Colonel Yasuto Nakayama of the Japanese economic delegation.

When the Netherlands were invaded in May, 1940 Saito, considering that the favorable opportunity had come and should not be allowed to pass, did his utmost to place an accomplished fact before the Tokyo Government. Insignificant incidents such as sayings by schoolboys at Bandoeng and an utterance at a political meeting at Semarang, were inflated to political problems affecting Japanese honor. Local Japanese associations and journalists were instructed to look for anything which could be misrepresented as having an anti-Japanese char-

acter or as a breach of the status quo. The Netherlands Indian authorities needed great self control not to take any step which would assist this Consul General in the game which he was playing.

In June 1940 two incidents appeared to occur which Tokyo was bound to take notice of. A Japanese journalist had overheard a Netherlands reservist in a store make an inquiry in the English language from which with fertile phantasy he had concluded that British troops had landed in Java. This was welcome news to Consul General Saito of which he did not fail to make use! Two thousand British troops were alleged to have been landed and the status quo had been violated! The Japanese Domei news agency promptly increased the number to 20,000! Saito's happiness was increased by the news that on May 6th a fishing boat near Riouw, in territorial waters, which flew no flag and later proved to be Japanese had been ordered to stop by a shot across her bows. The next day this was called "Cruel firing at innocent Japanese fishermen by the Netherland Navy" in the Japanese press. Now the Japanese Government was genuinely alarmed, but unfortunately for Saito the Netherlands Indian Government could prove the groundlessness of his allegations. The threatening conflict could by a narrow margin be avoided.

Other incidents which it is unnecessary to give in detail were similarly misrepresented by Saito but apparently even Tokyo thought that he had gone too far. Neither did he succeed in provoking the Netherlands Indian Government to action which would have suited his purpose.

When the Kobayashi mission came, Saito still held some trump cards up his sleeve for a last effort. He let some agent-provocateurs come from Japan. One of them, Katsujiro Kizaki, had—as mentioned above—already earned his laurels in 1934. During the negotiations of that year he made an attack on an earthenware shop in Osaka because this shop refused to collaborate in the boycott against the Netherlands Indies. Now proof could be given that the Netherlands Indies authorities were not able to protect Japanese lives and interests and that, therefore, the necessity existed to send Japanese armed forces for this purpose.

Whether Minister Kobayashi kept him back or whether the alertness of the Netherlands Indies' police prevented the worst from happening, cannot be said with any certainty. However this may be, until the departure of Saito small incidents only occurred. This went on until the day of Saito's leaving, always followed by protests from Saito in a crude and impudent form, addressed to the Netherlands East Indies Government. On December 1, 1940 Saito departed and strangely enough the incidents ceased to occur from that very date.

As successor to Minister Kobayashi came Ambassador Kenkichi Yoshizawa who commenced his task by taking up a friendly attitude, in which he was assisted by the new Consul General, Yutaka Ishizawa. Apparently both these men thought it inadvisable to hurry the outbreak of an armed conflict. The Greeks had thrown back the Italians in Albania, while the British drove them out of Egypt and back into Libya (December 1940). In other words, things did not look so good for the Axis powers at that moment.

It is, however, clear that the Japanese militarists were finding themselves on the down hill grade and could not turn back any more. The further course of events is well known. In the end the Japanese military machine, schooled in blitzkrieg treachery by German masters and forced into desperate action under economic pressure, started its attack on the United States and England.

Preparations for the Transfer of Authority

This, however, does not change the fact that for more than ten years the Japanese prepared for a war of conquest against the Netherlands East Indies, in every detail. A plan to take over authority, civil and otherwise, after a successful attack on the Netherlands Indies, had been prepared completely by various Japanese consuls.

The following is an excellent example of these preparations: Among the documents of Masaji Nonomura, Japanese Consul at Menado, which were examined in regard to clearly indicated acts of espionage, a complete plan was found for a Japanese Government in the occupied territory of

the East Indian Archipelago. That plan confirms in all details the above related facts concerning the activities of Japanese societies and leaders in the Netherland Indies. Indonesian authorities who would be maintained in their positions were destined to receive their instructions from those Japanese leaders who, in their turn, would get their orders from the repeatedly mentioned spy, Tsunuhachi Kobayashi, who was to cooperate closely with the Japanese Consulate. The same papers proved beyond doubt that Japanese consuls in the Netherlands Indies were spying on a large scale and in the most impudent fashion. Bundles of papers concerning military affairs were found burned but the order from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Oto (reproduced in Document X, added to this book) regarding the reporting of all movements of foreign ships in the Pacific, South China Sea and Indian Ocean, as well as a spy report regarding the housing of troops, written by one of the Consuls, may serve as examples of how international good faith was abused by the Oriental Axis partner.

If, furthermore, one considers the many expressions, official and unofficial, of the Japanese concerning three hundred-year-old links of friendship supposedly existing between Japan and the Netherlands, of gratitude which Japan was purported to feel towards Holland for having directed her first steps in the field of modern science, one can only feel utter disdain for that unreliable and treacherous country.

E R R A T A

PAGES	READS	SHOULD READ
18 Seventh line from bottom	"Ambassadors of Goodwill who spoke at 300 years of"	"Ambassadors of Goodwill who spoke of 300 years of"
23 Ninth line from top	"intensitive"	"intensive"
24 Fourth line from top	"For so doing"	"In so doing"
26 First line	"indigeneous"	"indigenous"
38 Eleventh line from top	"placed themselves on a row"	"placed themselves in a row"
40 Fourteenth line from bottom	"As in the Government of Japan the influence of army and navy dominate, officers . . . "	"As in the Government of Japan the influence of the army and navy predomi- nates, officers . . . "
55 Fifth line from top	"part of these desires were realized"	"part of these desires was realized"

FACSIMILES AND TRANSLATIONS
OF DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO
"TEN YEARS OF JAPANESE BURROWING"

DOCUMENT I

Photograph of a project to publish with Japanese support a Malay newspaper to influence the native population. Counter-signed by T. Kotani, an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Translation:

Acompanying letter, May 30th: 3rd Section of the Europe-Asia Bureau, from Kotani Tanun to Mr. Kaneko Keizo.

I send hereby the original of the scheme and wish you success.

Plan for the Publication of a Daily Paper in the Malay Language by Japanese in the Netherlands Indies

1. Scheme of Publication

a. Saeroen to be appointed Chief Editor. Saeroen who used to be editor of the *Pemandangan*, who is known amongst the East Indian intellectuals as pro-Japanese and whose dismissal was therefore brought about by the wealthy overseas Chinese, is now connected with the "Aneta" press bureau.

He has close relations with the elected members of the People's Council, Thamrin and Soekardjo, who are the leaders of the native independence movement. He collaborates closely with Mr. Kubo Tatsuji.

b. Plan adviser, Kubo Tatsuji. The former director of the Nichiran Shogyo, Mr. Kubo has been in the Netherlands Indies for the last 30 years and is well acquainted with the political

and economic world in the Netherlands Indies. He has friendly relations with influential natives and has a clear view of national policy. He would stand behind Saeroen as the leading force.

c. Mr. Mominoki Tatsuo would look after the Japanese news. He is a young man who has been in the Netherlands Indies for more than ten years and has profoundly studied the Malay language. He used to be editor of the Nichiron Shogyo Shimbun and is now a contributor to the Malay daily paper Soeara Oemoen and three other papers. He is in the center of the struggle for the purpose of convincing the East Indians of the true situation of the Chinese conflict and is appreciated by the Japanese as an accomplished student of the Malay language.

He is to work under Saeroen for the translation of the Japanese news.

d. Daily paper.

e. Place of publication: Batavia, the political center of the Netherlands Indies.

f. Number of pages: 8 to 10.

g. Subscription: 50 to 70 cents (Dutch) per month. Postage extra. Up to ten pages the postage is 1 cent per copy. This subscription may be thought too low but in view of the low scale of the incomes of the intellectuals the subscription, including postage, should not be more than one guilder per month.

2. BUDGET for the Publication

Section Expenses

a. Paper: for a circulation of 5,000 copies each, 8 pages daily, ten rolls required @ fl. 4.00 per roll makes per day fl. 40.00 or at 25 copies makes per month

(fl. = guilder) fl. 1,000.00

b. Postage.

25 x 5000 copies per month fl. 1250.00

c. Printing and distribution per month fl. 250.00

d. Staff per month fl. 1500.00

e. House rent, water and light per month fl. 300.00

The above estimate of expenses fl. 4300.00

Receipts

- a. Subscriptions @ 50 cents per copy per month. fl. 2500.00
- b. Refunded postages fl. 1250.00
- c. Advertisements fl. 500.00

The above estimate of receipts fl. 4250.00
Deficit fl. 50.00

This budget can be accepted as defined—after an experimental period of six months—for an independent circulation of this daily paper according to normal calculation.

3. Preparatory Expenses

- a. Purchase of the assets and advantages of an existing paper with change of name.

Amount of purchase fl. 10,000.00

If the Malay ten page paper which Saeroen and Kubo published together until June 1, 1937, be continued and changed into a daily paper with change of name and be registered, almost no purchase money will be required.

- b. Foundation expenses: Printing presses, etc. fl. 10,000.00
- c. Expenses until beginning of publication. . . . fl. 1,000.00
- d. Provision for insufficient receipts during the first 6 months. fl. 10,000.00

fl. 31,000.00

The Japanese newspapers in the Netherlands Indies are read by a small portion of the Japanese and never come under the eyes of the Chinese, Javanese, etc.

When the paper is printed in Malay and the situation in Japan is made known, a result of inestimable extent can be expected.

When this paper inserts Japanese advertisements, explains Japanese Commerce, introduces touristic and industrial Japan with friendly relations with the 60,000,000 native mass as a base, the lying news of the Chinese will be neutralized. This plan for a Malay daily paper has already been considered

for three years without being realized. However often the front was formed and however frequently discussions took place, publication did not materialize. The Japanese living in Java could hardly counteract Chinese news during the Manchurian conflict and they experienced great hardships through this adverse propaganda.

Now that the Japanese-Chinese conflict becomes more violent, the hearts of the Overseas Chinese in the Netherlands Indies are also in the grip of the warfare.

The entire Netherlands Indian press fans the hatred of the Chinese in order to carry favor with the Chinese who have the real economic power.

In the Netherlands Indies the Chinese publish ten papers in the Malay language alone and another ten in Chinese.

For our compatriots there were only two Japanese papers which through the intermediary of the Consulate were fused into one and this contains only news along the line provided by the news service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Of a Malay daily paper there is under those circumstances, of course, no question. The hope of the Japanese inhabitants is that a Malay paper will insert Japanese propaganda and commercial news. But not only this; others have to be convinced of the righteous affection of Imperial Japan.

The intellectual East Indians expect Japan to publish a Malay paper under Japanese management and the wishes of Japan and Java coincide remarkably. This opportunity, which is now mature, has been long and eagerly awaited, but if publication is not now begun it will never be realized.

In order to thoroughly study the prospects and the budget I have returned for the third time to the fatherland so as to make a last effort.

I request, dear Gentlemen, that you will agree to this for the sake of our country's march to the South.

昭和十二年八月一日

陸軍省歐亞局第三課
中島島橋榎留等
白室町 〇〇〇〇〇〇〇〇

外務省用

麹方区永田町二十月七十三番地

山王木子心三十四号

金子克郎 殿



子方世。歷三。

子為以雲如。

合子事如。

為與近古。如。大。向。以。子。方。世。歷。三。

會。

南領東印度に於ける

邦人經營局東部新聞發刊計劃

一、發刊大綱

イ、主筆にサヘロン氏起用

サヘロン氏ハ前ベマンダンソン紙主筆、東印度人智識階級に屬し親日家なるが故に先年華僑財閥より逐はれ目下マダガスカル通信社に據る。

岡氏は蘭印政府國民參議會常任議員として蘭印自治案の主唱者たるタムリン、スカルジヨウ剛氏と關係濃厚にして久保辰二氏と密接な連絡裡にあり。

ロ、金割相談役に久保辰二氏

前日蘭市樂新聞社々長久保氏は在蘭三十年、蘭印政治經濟界の

要裏に通曉し第印度人有力者と親交あり國策的活眼を具する
の士、サヘロン氏の背後に在りて指導活動す。

ヘ、日本ニュース係 横本龍夫君

横本君は在蘭餘年の生活を専心馬來係研究に没頭せる青年に
して前日南南興新聞社主筆、目下馬來新新聞スワラヤムン紙
他三紙に投稿し日支事變の真相を露印度人に明かにすべし普
中、邦人馬來新通として讀者間に隨一の定評を受く、サヘロ
ン氏の傘下に在りて日本新ニュース編輯係として協力せしむ。

エ、新聞紙とす。

カ、發行所は蘭印政治の中心バクビヤに置く

ヘ、頁数はハ。又は十頁とす。

ト、購讀料は月五十仙を徴七十五仙とす。

但郵税は別、十頁迄は郵税一部一仙。

右購讀料、紙座、然あるも東印度人智識層の收入状態より、
て彼等を指導啓蒙するには郵税共最高一盾以下を至當とす。

発行津算

支出之額

イ、紙代

五千部發行八頁として一日十連を要し連四盾として一日四〇盾
之を月廿五回發行する新聞紙代。 月一、〇〇〇盾

ロ、郵税

五千部とし月二十五回

月一、二五〇盾

ハ、印刷費及雜費

月二五〇盾

ニ、人件費

月一、五〇〇盾

、家屋水道電燈料

月三〇〇盾

以上支調總計豫算 四、三〇〇盾

收入之部

イ、購讀料

一部月五十個として月二、五〇〇盾

ロ、郵費戻り 月一、二五〇盾

ハ、廣告料 月 五〇〇盾

以上收入總計豫算 四、二五〇盾

差引收入不足 五〇盾

右營業豫算受け六ヶ月間の努力の後に於て成立する同紙の自主經營の
平常の豫定を算定したるものである。

一、發行準備費

イ、紙刊新聞の權利を買収し準備費とする。

買収費 一〇、〇〇〇盾

但しサヘロン、久保兩氏が昭和十二年六月迄發行せし馬來語
旬刊紙を繼承し日刊名義變更を政府に届出れば買収費は殆ん
ど不要なり。

ロ、設備費

活字印刷機等の購入 一〇、〇〇〇盾

ハ、發刊迄の雜費 一、〇〇〇盾

ニ、六ヶ月間の收入不足補填經費

一〇、〇〇〇盾

以上合計

三一、〇〇〇盾

之を要するに關印に於ける邦字新聞では概一紙の日本人間に購まるゝ
に留まり、支那人爪哇人等には全然知られない。

もし夫れ馬來語として日本の事情其他を知らしめんか、その効果たる
や計り知るべからざるものあり。

この新聞に日本廣告を掲げ、日本商業の説明をなし、また観光日本、
商工日本の紹介をなさば親善工作は元より促進され東印度人六千萬大
衆をして支那一流の誤報より救ふことを得べし。

右馬來新聞發刊の計劃は既に滿三ヶ年になんなんとして未だに實現
を見ざるもである。幾度か陣形を整へ幾度か修飾すると雖も更に發刊
の運びに至らざりしものである。

爪哇在會邦人は先般の新聞事業の際支那式ニュースに抗し強く惡宣傳
の限りを盡された苦を経験を有し來る。今や日支事業はより擴大され
より紛亂し南洋華僑の故郷は將に戰火の巻にある。經濟的實權を掌握
せる在蘭印華僑の熱心を買はんとする全蘭印新聞界は擧げて支那の熾
灯持ちをなしてゐる。

蘭印に於ける支那人は馬來新聞新聞のみでも十數種類を經營し支那新聞
間また十數種類を發行す。

獨り我が在留邦人のみ僅か二つの邦字新聞をへ併領事館の手で合併されて一つになり、ひたすら外務省的記事に制限するに過ぎず、況んや
庶民新聞の發行をや。

然りと雖も在留邦人の希望は馬來新聞による日本宣傳、日本商賣宣傳にある。否、寧ろ是國日本の正統受を彼等に知らしむるにある。

爪哇、スマトラ等の東印度人讀者の日本に期待する處のもの亦邦人經營馬來新聞發刊にあり、これを遂に爪哇兩國民過然の要求の一致する處である。擧げに古より慕し待つこと久し、今日にして發刊せざれば何國の目か實現するを得ん。

ひそかに算する處と豫算を考案して三再び故郷に歸り最後の努力を拂はんと欲す。

乞ふ、先輩諸賢よ、邦家南進の爲めに協賛あらんことを。

DOCUMENT II

Photograph of a letter of the naval spy, Keizo Kaneko, to Tatsuji Kubo concerning the manner of financing underground activities in the Netherlands Indies.

Translation:

At the end of the year the atmosphere in the fatherland in connection with war conditions is very tense, if compared with other years.

There are less decorations in the streets, but the first class restaurants are full each day. But one sees no Geisha festivities.

The business for which during so many years I have given myself so much trouble and which I expected to be a success has unfortunately ended in failure. In these days when the problem of the Southward policy has come to the fore, I cannot find sufficient words to offer apologies.

I went to the Department of Foreign Affairs to inquire whether a report had been received that publication of the newspaper had commenced. The prohibition of my return to the Netherlands Indies appears to be definite. I have no illusions on that subject. I only care about furthering the plan of publication of the *Warta Harian*.

No doubt there will be the necessary local complications. If you think that it will not do to make Saeroen director and chief editor, it is better that you should do it yourself and start publication immediately. In that case the value of the paper from a propaganda point of view will be considerably less. But then I shall defy the Netherlands Indian authorities in their oppressive measures against Mominoki and myself and I shall

re-enter the country. I have already conferred with the General Staff about this step which I will take as an extreme remedy.

But I hope that the plan with Saeroen can be realized. I should applaud this with many banzais. If this can be achieved I do not intend to force the return of the two of us.

Even if Mominoki and I cannot obtain access to the country I shall send enough money to make publication possible. Mat-suoka, the president of the South Manchurian Railway Co., gives 5,000 yen, which amount has been handed to Kotani. Further the Bureau for East Asiatic Economic Research (Toa Keizai Chosa Kyoku) of the South Manchurian Railway Co. (under the leadership of Ogawa Shumei) has promised 50,000 yen per annum as from next year. Also, our elder Swata takes a great deal of trouble about the matter. He intends to supply Siamese cowhides to the army and if this materializes he will obtain advantageous privileges in South China enabling him without difficulty to give 20,000 or 30,000 yen for the work in the Netherlands Indies. As regards the question of obtaining the necessary personnel, I have made preparations to send this quickly. The most important is that you in connection with local circumstances and after calm consideration let me know at an early date which measures should be taken. I particularly and ardently hope that you will quickly realize the establishment of a Malay paper. If the publication of a new paper is impossible, I think the best plan will be to buy and to transfer to Batavia the Sinar Selatan.

Mr. Amano is supposed already to have returned to Japan, but he has not arrived in Tokyo yet. Messrs. Saito and Sizumi have arrived in Tokyo but I feel no inclination to visit them. Saito has caught a chill on the trip and is confined to his bed. I left Mr. Mominoki since the end of last month at Chuzanzi Shizuoka to do a cure in the hot springs. His weight has increased and his health is better.

Here in Japan I can do nothing but await your instructions. As regards the supply of money, it can be depended upon that all requirements will be provided for. I hope that you will soon formulate a plan concerning the following points:

1. In case both or Kaneko alone cannot return to the Indies;
2. The purchase of the Sinar Selatan.

In the beginning, until the publication of the paper, Saeroen must, in accordance with his wishes and in concert with Mr. Mijoshi, be amply provided with funds.

Also, money should be sent regularly to Mrs. Mominoki. If you need money I shall send 5000 yen which Mr. Kotani has deposited with the Bank of Taiwan.

If taking all circumstances of yours into consideration it is impossible to start publication of a paper now, you should soon return to Japan to confer everywhere and to lay the basis for future work. In that case you should let me know about your return in time.

I leave Tokyo on December 28th for Amoy, Canton and Hong Kong via Formosa. I have arranged that telegrams arriving after my departure will be sent on to me. If you take a vessel going to Formosa I will assist you there in all possible ways.

In collecting money for future work the closest contact should be kept with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and it is urgently desirable thereby in all respects to cooperate with the Consulate General. Even if Mominoki and I are not allowed to return, I trust you are firmly decided to give your service in the interest of the State. Please answer me to Shirakane Daicho 1, No. 81, Shibako Tokyo c/o Swata.

December 24, 1938.

(signed) Kaneko Keizo

昭和 年 月 日

久保 辰 子



株式會社

山王

東京市麴町區永田町二丁

電話 銀座四



山保原の原
又、我々が下年不況分、例年のいし緊張を
中より、漸くの張餅は、即ち東に好しいもろ
即ちいふ。然るに、一掃、料亭にはけり、と進
退の場、市、二、三、五味、一、瓶、身、見、一、
う、い、ま、ぬ。
今日の事件、折角、多量、は、さ、入、分、良、え
結ぶ、た、好、い、居、る、ま、じ、な、さ、下、等、茶、
持、折、は、ら、中、北、一、力、治、本、南、う
問題、お、れ、今、日、七、道、の、却、家、計、し
張、わ、る、言、葉、も、た、一、種、の、一

TOKYO, JAPAN

外務省に於ては、新軍部が、
軍部、初めに、
不祥な時、
居り、
ハ、
福、
カ、
道、
自、
今、
シ、
松、

10-10850, 10-10851

[86]

[illegible]

天野氏、
 吾友、
 折に、
 未帰、
 休に、
 松本、
 (建)、
 去、


THE SANNO HOTEL
TOYOYO, JAPAN

[illegible]

WITH STAMPED RECEIPT
POKYO, JAPAN

是レハ加来、便船トモ博心取、
来レ下五、己、莫事ト批后、
申上

将来ノ工件、然ル上、外務省ト密着
連絡トシ、必要ト認服、
蒙好ミ、得、松本、批后、不、
意、思、強固、ハ、即、相、下、
即、或、公、司、内、中、一、
即、運、事、ト、本、業、
山、田、上、七、
中、二、日、二、十、日、
手、方、
[90]



DOCUMENT III

Photograph of a party which was offered on September 4, 1938 by Japanese agents at Sourabaya to some native leaders with whom they wished to collaborate. One of those present was Kinichi Takenaka, Chancellor of the Japanese Consulate at Sourabaya.

1. Dermawan Loebis, Chief Editor "Soeara Oemoem."
2. T. Mominoki, confederate of No. 10.
3. Sofwanhadi, editor "Soeara Oemoem."
4. Takenaka, 1st Secretary, Japanese Consulate.
5. Abdoel Wahab, editor "Soeara Oemoem."
6. E. Hachisuwa, Manager Yokohama Shokai.
7. Winarno, editor "Soeara Oemoem."
8. Hiroshi Kubota of Kubota & Co.; spy.
9. Takekoshi of Takenokoshi & Co.
10. K. Kaneko, Naval Spy.

DOCUMENT IV

Photograph of a report of the newspaper editor T. Yoshizumi to the agent who was attached to the Japanese Consulate at Batavia for incitement among the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies.

Translation:

To. Mr. Toyoshima:

As regards the last conclusion concerning action among the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies as already proposed by me I have reached the following final conclusion. Will you be so good as to place this letter with your criticism before the Consul General.

With esteem,
(signed) T. Yoshizumi

As a conclusion let me first state that I am opposed to the opinion that action among the Chinese can be the only means leading to a solution of the incident. The solution of the incident can be nothing more than a phase in the building up of the new order in Asia.

Therefore, the ultimate object is to make all Asiatics acknowledge that Asia should be for the Asiatics, i.e. that action is necessary for the new order in East Asia.

The point which we should realize is that our action lies in the East Indies which in respect of the Japanese-Chinese incident occupies an outsider's point of view. Under these circumstances it is necessary for all to find for the Indies a special plan of action. I personally am of the opinion that action in China

is absolutely not the same as action in the East Indies, i.e. action in China is meant to reach the Chinese direct, while the object of action in the East Indies is. . . .

This means as I have already pointed out several times that, the majority of the Chinese in the Indies have the basis of their existence there; yes, they are fused with the Netherlands Indies. They are not like the Chinese in China: grown with China.

Realizing this we must consider our plan of action. We must come to the conclusion that the series of basic ideas for the conception, "the solution of the China incident is a means for establishing the new order in East Asia," should for the purpose of working among the Indian masses be altered into "First we should bring about the conviction that the construction of the new order in Asia is important and then use this to solve the incident."

The Peranakans who number 60% are naturally entirely grown with this country. Also in the abstract they are pointed out as ardent supporters of the theory whereby they look upon the East Indies as their fatherland.

Also the Sinkehs who come straight from their mother country naturally have their means of existence in this country. Considering this close connection between these Chinese and the Netherlands Indies we must conclude that to hang out the banner "Peace between China and Japan" does not really affect their lives and it would be too much to force it upon them.

On the other hand we must seek contact on the ground of the bitter existence of the East Asiatic Colonists during 300 years of oppression and we must stimulate among them the idea of Asia for the Asiatics.

We Japanese have, in promoting the New Order, labored too much under the solution of the incident. As a matter of course the solution of the China incident is for us the most pressing problem. But do we not risk missing our object if we pay too much attention to this? Especially in the Netherlands Indies the raising of the banner, "Solution of the incident," is a gesture which probably impresses the Japanese but certainly not the Chinese.

Naturally, the anti-Japanese action of the Chinese contains many sentimental elements but peace between China and Japan

is not of importance for their existence. It is a question which is indifferent to them. In any case this is absolutely the case regarding the Peranakans.

If one considers the spirit of the newspapers published by the Peranakans and the utterances of the Chinese members of the People's Council—the highest political position of the Chinese here—we are astounded at the force of the current among them to become East Indians before anything else.

When we consider the rancour which the great mass of the Indonesian people who are unable to resist the policy of oppression, feel against Netherlands exploitation, I venture to assure that propaganda for the Japanese Kodo spirit which strives to give everyone his fair share, will find its way into Indonesian consciousness and give a shock to the Chinese who are so anxious to become East Indians.

Therefore, let us make use of the common fate of Indonesians and Chinese and arouse their enthusiasm for the construction of a new Asia. Starting from the point that Indonesians and Chinese are both East Asiatics, we must establish contact with them and only afterwards we must show that for the building-up of East Asia a struggle between Japan and China is not desirable.

KANTOOR TEL. 1062 (D)
HUIS " 5124 (W)

(第 號) 昭和 年 月 日

古
住
用
集

東印變に於て

先般提出しました華僑工作と華僑の
救済の具報後の結論について、其の段
考へて見ると、更に次のようち徹底を
して考へるに到達しました。

師匠判の上に、端侯事まで師匠に致
しませんか、

老幼

第一島嶼

(No.)

吉住用集

結論からいへば、私は、東印友の華僑
 工作を事変処理の第一の一歩
 段であると思ふことは、反対あるもので
 ある。

事変処理は勿論東亞秩序を
 是の段階に過ぎないものであるが
 然るに、然らざる東亞秩序に
 対し、東亞秩序の
 ための連組即ち東亞秩序の
 連組の徹底的な要求を促すこと
 の目的である。

此れは、我々が判然たる認識と持た

(第 一 號 昭和 年 月 日)

KANTOOR TEL. 1062 (H)
HUIS " 5124 (W)

(第 號) 昭和 年 月 日

料は思ひに、支那に於ける工作とあり
 なむとせざる工作は決して日本に非ざる
 を考へるものがある、即ち支那に於ける
 る工作は、支那人に直接あるものあり
 るか、或るや否や然りる上イ

T. YOSHIZUMI

TOHINDO NIPPON SHI

(BATAVIA JAVA).

KANTOOR TEL. 1043 (2)

HUIS " 5124 (7)

(No.)

ニ所安

吉住用箋

建設の事業は先ず思想の統一を期せしめ、而してこれを事業に反映せしめんとす。此の順序に於ては、先ず思想の統一を期せしめ、而してこれを事業に反映せしめんとす。

形而外

大割を占める。ババは勿論、物象的に
は百割を占める。然し、同時に形而上的にも、集約的な傾向と
見做せんとす。の觀念は、その(述)の如
く、燃焼に持たれざる、
又自來水より来る水に派生する。水素と
と一へば、生活の根柢と出づるに在

物の深奥

(第 二 編 第 一 章 第 一 節)

吉 住 用 美

しゝぬゝと所の引あじもあいのじありく、
其の由印おとの諸はわらとるへんは
筆端に對し、單一ある日文和平を
表す板とす。ことは、明かに實際生
活の模倣をな外しな
余りにも天トリ式本満足と云といわす。
を得あい。
むしろ我々は三百年の政のもとに味
つた板はいつつある、
植民地民衆としての南洋人の苦
惱生活に對し、
彼等の思想に生かされるべきであらう。

(No)

吉住用義

幾々日女は繁榮する建設りといふ
 にして、余りにも深刻に支那中
 國に悩んだ。

従つて支那中變解決が、今我々の
 目前に最も顯著なる問題であるとは
 いふまでもないが、支那中變解決のため
 余りに目を奪はれ、政策と失うべ
 きではない、特に東印に於ては、いた
 きに事、其解決をの表裏とある。
 ことは、日中の生活の機微には解れ
 る、のみ知れあひが、支那人の機微に
 解れるものはあいのにある。

(第 二 卷 第 一 号)

KANTOOR TEL. 1062 (B)
HUIS - 5124 (W)

第 二 章 車 月

古
任
用
集

T. YOSHIKUMI

TOHENDO NIPPON SHA

(BATAVIA JAVA).

KANTOON TEL. 1062 (M)
HUIS " 5124 (W)

(No.)

吉住用美

たうんとするの候伺観るより、もちあ
るかに驚く候、と云ふを、居るいふじあらう。

而も、臣政のトに及、辨しかねし、なるとはい
へ、例外あり、故に、致し、以、物、和、衆、
の、格、収、放、を、束、と、怨、嘆、し、こ、な、ま、か、と
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日、中、の、皇、子、を、新、外、を、
最も、御、前、に、
と、共、に、
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即、ち、かく、して、
華、僑、の、実、

(第 五 号) 昭和 年 月 日

ふい

KANTOOR TEL. 1062 (B)
HUIS " 5124 (W)

（第 2 卷）
昭和 40 年
月 日

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DOCUMENT V

Photograph of a letter from Yoshio Inoul, manager of the Nanyo Kohatsu Kaisha, during his stay in Japan on May 5, 1939, to the manager of the same company at Momi in New Guinea showing that military preparations for the occupation of New Guinea had been made.

Translation of Parts of This Letter:

After a stay of 3 days in Palao, I finally leave tomorrow per Palao Maru for Tokyo. It is remarkable how here at Palao the expansion of all tropical products has continued in all possible directions; the establishment of new companies, large and small, is astounding. It gives me great satisfaction that I have been able to meet and speak to all leading personalities. Briefly, I am of opinion that the Empire should not import the raw materials which it seeks in the South, but that it should realize the tendency to fill these requirements direct by Japanese. But it is not possible to have the requirements of Japan which progresses by leaps and bounds satisfied by the Mandated Territories only. The following important problem is that for the solution (of the raw material provision) the expansion of our countrymen to Great New Guinea is absolutely necessary. Very quietly the moment approaches wherein we shall take our great flight.

For the march of the N.K.K.K. to the Spratley Islands Mr. Taketa—section manager in our Palao offices—goes there on the 24th per Saipan Maru. There are numerous plans for the foundation of enterprises of all kinds in the Island of Hainan,

a delegation of the N.K.K.K. is there at present for research purposes.

The connection Tokyo-Palao by air has also begun to work. The traveling expenses are 360 yen per person. In two days one is in Tokyo. Letters are 30 sen in excess of the ordinary postage. There is one plane per week. Large four motor hydro planes are used and in order to perfect this air line it is served by actively serving naval officers (commanding sub-lieutenants).

The representative of the Ministry of Marine at Palao, Okuma, from whom we always have received the greatest possible help for our enterprise in New Guinea, has been transferred to the Naval Department and his successor, Naval Captain Funagi, has already arrived.

At present a large quay is being constructed on the Island of Marakaru (Malakai, Palao group) which will be able to accommodate two vessels of 6000 tons. The work is being executed by the Nanyo Sangyo K.K., while today, the 20th, with great ceremonial, the ground has been inaugurated for the construction of two 10,000 ton oil tanks. It is a satisfactory fact that such large installations which as sine qua non imply the expansion to New Guinea, can gradually be perfected.

Also, as regards the increase in personnel for New Guinea, I have been informed by Captain Okiena that permission has been given for 10 persons. He said: These 10 men must at least be equivalent to 10,000. Because we shall only select men of the quality: "one man on horseback is equal to thousand men," these 10 men will be worth 10,000 ordinary men. . . . I ardently hope, my brave comrades, that you will do your best for the exploitation of New Guinea.

Palao, May 20, 1939.

有

御一日御食之

氣主御食之

事主在之

食主御食之

賜服御食之

糧主御食之

事主

六二一日御食之

食主御食之

六二一日御食之

下

[illegible]

日本に於ける精神は外
 来文化に依る所なく
 唯日本が精神を
 金に換へては其に
 欲求するに非ず
 一國として其の
 大問題を之に解
 決する大志を有す
 我々の飛躍
 する時、この刻々として
 此の自由の空を何
 事か憂ふ者はいかに
 多し、新學部、新學
 部、新學部、新學部

要領の極上といふ
之の航空の要領を期す
為海軍現況を待た
操縦じやうに於ける司令
海軍少佐

陸軍より海軍に
部が絶大の助力
と載る大砲武官
は在るが時、これ
は母木大佐に來る

要に同六六の九島
は海軍少佐に令た
の海軍少佐は二
艘と操縦する大砲
を二子自中、海軍
い、要に同六六の九島

に一二也木にタウ武其
教地の地鎮茶其大
は無方その字情事大
二二其茶飯と其提
とある大説御書に
自阿中と神快
了る也
三三其茶同野
八其茶大野武
其十名汗何其
名其茶武
は三三其十名は其
其十名は一二人其
即一騎其午の丈夫
其其其其其十名
其其其一二人也

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收 塘 江 海 家 款
外 部 主 任 你 刻
一 日 刻 你 刻

DOCUMENT VI

Photograph of a letter dated March 15, 1935, from Haruji Matsue, president director of the Nanyo Kohatsu Kaisha, in which instructions are given regarding geological exploration of New Guinea.

Translation of Parts of This Letter:

No. Foreign Outward 29, addressed to the Manager Kosugi Michinari at Momi and co-signed by the directors, Mizumo Tsunemichi and Saito Bunya. Subject: "Foundation of the New Guinea Oil Company."

I have the honor to transmit herewith the reports received from the Naval Staff and from the Consulate General at Batavia*, both dated February 14th, concerning the above subject.

Our company would also like to apply for the permission to do experimental drillings in the territory which has been colored dark on the enclosed map.

In this connection thorough study of the Netherlands Indian mining legislation is necessary; I enclose a copy of this act and request you to make preparations.

In view of the opinion of the local authorities it is to be expected that they will not be well disposed towards this application. I request you, therefore, in great secrecy to make investigations regarding the dark colored territory which has an area of about 1,7 million hectares and also to inquire about the method of making applications. Also, you will please submit a complete proposal.

* The letter from Consul General Koshida transmitted to B. Saito, a translation of the Netherlands Indian Mining Act with documents relating to the debates in the People's Council about the establishment of the N.N.G.P.M.; also the letter from the naval staff being report No. 2 about Netherlands military affairs from the third section of the General Staff based on the daily reports of the Foreign Trade Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dealing with the N.N.G.P.M.

南洋興發株式會社



外發第二九號

本東京

外國



氏三事發所

社長 

小杉方也殿

蘭領三ツテ石油會社設立ニ關スル件

右蘭人側ノ企業事情ニ就キテ、何レモ二月十四日附ニ軍令部

及バ多クヤ銘領事 貴方々ニ情報ニ接タルヲ以テ御答答ニ供

ニ申候

當社ニ於テ、附屬紅色ノ地方ニ試掘、諸額ヲ試ニ度組ニ此レナリ

諸額ニ對シ、蘭領鑛業法ニ依リ充分ニ深ク研究ヲ要スル次第ナリ

有之、茲許世蘭領東印度鑛山業ト鑛業法一部ヲ送附申上ル

本社 南洋サイパン島

東京事務所 東京市麹町區内山下町二丁目一番地

東京ビルディング内

電話號碼部 (電報) 二八六號 (電) 二八〇〇號

南洋興發株式會社

ニ付將來ニ對スル少用意ヲ煩ヒ交尚地方官廳ノ意向等ヲ
 忖度セハ勿論此等ノ諸願ヲ喜ハサル事情七ツ有之ニ付キ
 其少含ニテ紅色地方約一百七方ヘ多シ事情及諸願ノ手續等
 ニ關シ穩密ニ研究ヲ進メテ何等カノ成案ヲ少提示相成度
 願上候
 以上

本社
 東京事務所

南洋
 東京市麹町區内山下町一丁目一番地

東京市麹町區内山下町一丁目一番地
 (電話) 三三三三

DOCUMENT VII

Photograph of a letter dated May 30, 1940, from Chuang Kung Ming, agent for the Japanese intelligence service No. 265, at Penang, addressed to the President of the Japanese Association at Batavia and destined for Kyujiro Hayashi, president of the Nanyo Kyokai, who made a "goodwill trip" through the Netherlands Indies. The letter contains a report concerning the execution of instructions received by the writer to spy and commit sabotage.

Translation of the Principal Parts of This Letter:

Outside on the envelope: Japanese Consulate, Batavia, via Japanese Association for Java, section of Nanyo Kyokai.

Sender: Chuang Kung Ming, Penang . . . Street 167.

Inside the envelope: Addressed to Hayashi Kyujiro, Batavia, President Director of Nanyo Kyokai, Japan.

To the President Sukihara.

You were so kind at the time to engage me for the Overseas Intelligence Bureau. I regret that I have as yet been able to do so little.

With the prospect of the collapse of the imperialists in Europe, your Bureau has with redoubled energy worked towards realizing the great plan for the domination of East Asia.

In accordance with your instructions to intensify my activities, I have made contact with my comrades in Siam and five of them have already entered that country in disguise. As objects of espionage it is our duty to obtain confederates, to commit sabotage, to incite the natives to hostility, and to spread alarming rumors. In this respect I entirely follow your instructions.

These five agents each work separately. You previously wrote me that a high personage would come to the South. This has now happened judging from the report in the press that Kyujiro Hayashi, an important diplomat and also head of the Intelligence Bureau, has arrived at Batavia. Our work will now become greater and we shall receive definite instructions.

To cover their shame, the local authorities have stationed mixed troops, consisting of old and feeble soldiers, at important points of communication, such as bridges.

It appears that there is dissatisfaction among the mixed troops of volunteers and only few are prepared to sacrifice their lives for this devilish regime.

We have received from above large amounts for the purpose of corrupting the soldiers and the people as well as to organize a fifth column which has to be ready when the fighting begins.

Effective propaganda combined with the war have convinced soldiers and people that the inferior Government of England will soon collapse.

Be so good as to translate this letter into Japanese before passing it on to the higher authorities.

(signed) Chuang Kung Ming

Official Overseas Intelligence Bureau No. 265

送呈府屈吧城



自英領檳城
大甲花城

無 涉 視 遠 近 宜 乎

此所不害一大明證也是地近未因歐洲戰事而
中國主義慘痛收閉時害甚於戰恐不久已見此
國賊種如當地以討者權臺其羞特調集古者
精什牌軍駐守交通要點為各鐵路全軍事要
點為飛機場亦在巡視之列又彼瘋狂之小國以為
此佈置便是安人心味不知適足以表貪婪之張
之寇惡蓋調查訪什牌又軍之意每多心裏懷
惡他方非致死命為惡魔之討討攝生而盡其
來在人禍三批撥行先此軍又軍難為其用

何來訓示局於活動事我經為命業已通
出往選同志不從五名化裝混進斯土界不過
偵查動安目標不曉同志與手相機破壞諸
端鼓勵土人反威如不進與深福完詢屬吾輩
之責為何進行表這命令為須推行以上各節
故五同志經在分道十幹笑又承承未細述
何有右夏利未指示機要事今已現案 日未
請振復表外安安員兼核振長林久已即業經
移奉於言午四時未乘何南中泉少司赴機安
抵世卿此後吾輩工作必更張益有以確訓示

中原公長劉雲

遷移在久未晤面思慕倍深遙憶起在舊志公相順
遂者說在前所古味承拓入部工作但愧才疏
毫末誠可意意深未肯機公之耳現在政重
繁張帝國樹心當止也貴部在高級人員已
早見及斯於之加倍努力向外活動以實實
現東亞霸主大志之王雄圖方略瘡尤未有
滿部是其在羅汝時未得達目的功成名就
行見向之壓迫非此舉之碧根兒勢性低首下心
於貴國人之苛斯時之樂誠有兼難行美也苛

王

海外樓閣是曉曉風
吹於五塔虎

此後此志先澤也日奉文然以之三年

可斷也如平昔年信之奉命令滿於前近河決
利用方量全鍾昭夏在雷軍民之促激一
雲五龍源以波危岸事於胸而促是事固重
大之兩物廣地東巨量之接濟念民之北畏收
效不居耳平所甘其處勇振相加以不請不奉
所報以先聲詩書南卒日而秋密寄未之
新至遲刻若以收之若操皇權則捷事迅
未更格固宜信得法又視以戰事使在軍
戊至德為政府棄國生不史即滅此城多事
詩一事乃國來為之伴陣外并處袍集鐵小
案推皇哈硬功力但著時机者至耳近未
於在在隨要國標并軍力距離事經差同
志此家何集以讓事者可有而需生未
以詳示并為何奇法以掩其地極重二年目
即所奇之所保以以通信流為而時信此
歸地遙用數來駐可云多時候頃

DOCUMENT VIII

Translation of a letter from the spy, Hiroshi Kubota, concerning his contacts with the Japanese military authorities in Formosa and Japan, also with the Pan-Asiatic leaders.

"To the permanent Director of the Meijikai Matsushita Kunisuke at Kobe (with other ink: 'please keep the details about the matter a secret from everybody')."

I have not sent you a report for a long while, but I had no time. I was a week at Taihoku. As reported in my last letter, I visited the General Staff, the Naval Attaché and the Gendarmerie and I made close contact with the Meijikai. I also pleaded to the public in a lecture in the audience hall of the Taiwan Nichi-Nichi that it is necessary to open up the South. I had great success with this. On January 10th I left Kobe, but on account of an urgent telegram I did not first go to the place of my birth. The fact is that all matters have been handed over by Otsuki to Handa and Otsuki wished to explain the situation to me. At Kobe I met Handa with whom I had a friendly conversation. In order to promote a Southward national policy and to establish contact between the Meijikai and influential Japanese in Japan I left for Tokyo with Handa who travels in the interest of his trade and with Otsuki who had to be there for business. Handa remains two days, Otsuki four days in Tokyo; I stayed there until January 30th. In the meantime I met the Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff and other important persons. I have twice had a secret meeting and have twice been to the General Staff. I also had two interviews with Admiral Taheshita and three with Rear Admiral Sosa. Furthermore, I conferred with the Dai Asia Kyokai, the Nanyo Koku-

saku Kenkyuukai (Association for the Study of National Policy for the South), Admiral Ogasawaza Chosey, Admiral Kato Kanji, Lieutenant General Ueda, the Vice-President of the Osaka Ashai, Shimomura Hiroshi, the president of the Kaizosha, Yamamoto and others. I have been extremely busy with these visits. Otherwise these gentlemen are only available for an interview of ten or fifteen minutes, but they allowed me three quarters or one and a half hours. I cannot write you details but will later tell you more orally. From all well known persons, I have been receiving letters of introduction which greatly honored me and assisted me. In Japan there is as yet little interest for and knowledge of the Nanyo. We shall first organize the opinion of the Japanese residents in the Netherlands Indies and afterwards transmit their views and wishes. All persons whom I visited appeared to be very satisfied with the Meijikai. There is no prospect of financial assistance yet, but then the Meijikai has only existed such a short time. If it gives proof of activity there is a chance of assistance in the future. What the Meijikai now has to do is: to enroll all Japanese in the Netherlands Indies as members, to levy subscriptions, to publish pamphlets in which the views of the principal Japanese are reproduced and which give a lead to the activities of these Japanese. Visitors from Japan should be given the necessary information in order that they may be able to form a correct judgment of the situation. Once or twice a year one or two members of the Meijikai should be sent to Japan to place our views before important bodies. For this, however, money is required.

Otsuki returns to Java in the middle of March; ask him for details. I remain here provisionally. Perhaps I shall help Ishira Koichiro (in the elections?). My present has been given the most prominent place by Admiral Takeshita in his drawing room.

I have heard with pleasure that Yamashita is still in good health. The building of the school progresses regularly. My address is: Meirinkai, Tokyo, Kayo Building, seventh floor, c/o Rear Admiral Sosa. If issues of the Meirinkai are bought for 10 yen and can be sold for 50 cents each in Java this will benefit the finances of the Meirinkai.

DOCUMENT IX

Officers Who Visited the Netherlands Indies in 1940

1. KATO	Tsukasa	Infantry Major
2. OKAMURA	Masayuki	Infantry Major
3. SHIHO	Kenkichi	Artillery Major
4. NAKASUJI	Toichi	Naval Lieutenant
5. TANIMOTO	Hitoshi	Lieutenant Colonel A.S.C.
6. YASUDA	Tsuneo	Major, Army Medical Corps
7. KURIYA	Tsugunori	Army Major
8. SASAKI	Takanobu	Naval Lieutenant
9. MIYO	Tatsukichi	Naval Captain
10. UCHIDA	Seihi	Major
11. KAMAZAKI	Yoshiaki	Naval Officer
12. YOSHIDA	Toshio	First Lieutenant, Navy
13. OTA	Mamoru	Naval Lieutenant
14. SUE	Hideo	Superior Officer, Army
15. KADOMATSU	Shoichi	Army Major
16. NAKAYAMA	Yasuto	Lieutenant Colonel, Army
17. HORIUCHI	Shigetada	Naval Captain
18. MIBAYASHI	Masayoshi	Captain A.S.C.
19. NAKAHARA	Yoshimasu	Naval Captain
20. MAEDA	Tadashi	Naval Captain
21. ISHIMOTO	Itsuo	Colonel
22. KONDO	Yukio	Major
23. HARADA	Yoshikazu	Colonel
24. FUKADA	Masao	Major, Army Medical Corps

The Following Also Were Visitors

KITAOKA	Haruo	Director, Nanyo Takushoku K.K.—Retired Admiral (Business and Instructive Travel)
SUGANO	Kengo	Archeologist—Retired Army Colonel (Study and Instructive Travel)
ONO	Hiroshi (Yutaka)	Retired Admiral (Adviser Nanyo Takushoku K.K., Oriental Development Co.)

The Following Travelled Under False Names

false name	Pretended function	Real name	Real function
NAGAYAMA Shunzo	Consular Secretary	TANAKA Shigekazu	Director, Nanyo Kaiun, Sourabaya
KOSAKI Ko	Soap & Perfumeries Salesman	KIZAKI Katsujiro	Author, in reality, spy
KADOMATSU Shoichi	Army Major	TAKEYAMA Funio	Employee of the Mitsui and spy in Indo-China
ARAKI Chujiro	Employee N.Y.K.	Muarakami	Colonel of the General Staff
KASHIMA Teizo	Employee Ishihara Sangyo	KASEDA Tetsuhiko	Naval Commander

DOCUMENT Xa.

Photograph of a telegraphic report from a Japanese Consul to the Foreign Minister at Tokyo regarding the defense of Ambon.

Paper marked: Diplomatic organs abroad.

Dispatched: October 11, 1941.

Arrived: October 12, 1941.

Dispatched by: Consul Kohri.

To: Consul Nonomura.

Subject: Australian troop movements.

Signal No. 15.

Telegram No. 421 to the Minister, reference to telegram No. 402.

In accordance with a report from the captain of the Tora Maru, who arrived here on the 9th, it is true that Australian troops have landed at Ambon. It is difficult to know their exact number, but in all probability there are from 50 to 100 men.

There is further information from the Manager of the Taiwan Bank, who has just arrived here from Dobo. He reports that there is steady transportation of iron bars and other building material to Ambon. Moreover, there is a rumor that some 900 Australian soldiers are in Ambon.

DOCUMENT Xb.

Photograph of an urgent telegraphic order of the Foreign Minister to the Japanese Consul-General at Batavia. The order: to gather secretly details regarding the movement of foreign ships in the Pacific, South China Sea and the Indian Ocean and to report telegraphically. Transfer of this order to the Japanese Consul in Menado.

Dispatched: November 29, 1941.

Arrived: November 30, 1941.

Sent by: Consul General Ishizawa.

To: Consul Nonomura.

Subject: Report regarding an investigation of the movements of foreign ships (to be kept secret for "foreign").

Code No. of signal 344.

Telegram from the Minister, signal No. 2431.

Urgent telegram.

As from December 1st, please telegraph in each instance: nationality, name, port of arrival or departure, date of arrival or departure, port of destination, etc. of foreign merchantmen or warships in the Pacific, the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.

昭和十二年

十月十二日

午後

書

森本折領事

野々打領事

濠洲兵ノ行動

合 一五

大臣宛 又四二一號 住電又四〇二號ニ由リ

九月歸着、虎丸船長ノ報告ニ依レバア

ンボシニ濠洲兵入リハシタル事、事實ニシテ

其ノ兵力確ナルハ知リ、難キモ五〇ノ多一〇〇

名位ナルヨシ

※

電

在

外

云

備

尚最近「ドボ」ヨリ来着、台銀經營農園

主人談ニ依ルニ近日来同地ヨリ「アンボ」向

鐵脚、其地建築材量ノ輸給且頻繁ニ

シテ一方「アンボ」ノ濠洲兵九百名ナリトノ

風説ナリ

(H)



3 9015 04296 4539

石澤總領事

野々村領事

外國船舶行動調查報告件

合三三四

外機密

大臣來金第二四三一號

緊急電報

十二月可以降太平洋、印度洋、南支那海、
方面之行動之外國船舶、軍艦、國籍、船名、
出(入)港名、出入港日、行先等御調査、上述

次電報相成度

(了)

昭和16年11月30日
3029
H H
調査
調査
調査

