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CITY OF FUKUOKA - BACKGROUND REPORT

Fukuoka, capital of the Prefecture of Fukuoka, lies on Hakata Bay on the Northwest coast of Kyushu and is the commercial and administrative center for that part of the island. Its port handles a large proportion of the empire's traffic with Korea and a major branch of the Kyushu railroad runs through the city. Coal is mined on its outskirts and its industries include two iron works, a rubber company and numerous warehouses. Its population in 1940 was 323,217 and in June 1945, according to the prefectural records, 324,449.

1 INFORMANTS

Most of the persons interviewed for the information contained in this report are described in the following list. (A few are identified when cited.) In the body of the report attribution of specific items or other references to them will be made by means of the letters used in this list:

- a TSUCHIYA, Koroku; Chief of Ken (Prefectural) Police, 40 years old, an economist and lawyer by training, graduate of Tokyo Imperial University. This informant had come from Yamaguchi Ken and taken over his present position only on 17 October, 1945. His predecessor was living in Nagata, Higashi Yama Mura, 80 km away and the shortage of transportation made it impossible to interview him. For most of the information obtained from the prefectural government, Tsuchiya called upon subordinates, notably b and c below.
- b RUYU, Jiro; Deputy Police Superintendent of Fukuoka Ken, 41 years old, a career civil servant in the police department. He had held his present position since 6 July, 1945 and prior to that was Chief of the Economic Control Section of the Ken. He appeared to be well informed and anxious to supply the information required, but not particularly clear-headed about extracting it from his departmental statistics in the form required.

14 (14) etc.

- c FUJITA, Shinji; Head of General Affairs Division of Fukuoka City government. This informant was the spokesman for the Mayor HATANAKA, 39 years old, graduate of Kobe Higher Commercial College and the Kyushu Imperial University, a lawyer by training. He was unusually well informed, clear-headed and apparently candid.
- d KIMIJIMA, Takeo; Professor of Rubber and Fuel Chemistry in the Engineering College of Kyushu Imperial University, a man of about 50 who had visited America in 1917-1918 and again in 1935-1936 when he studied at Columbia University and at the University of Akron. His home had been destroyed in the raid of 19 June, and his family evacuated. He spoke fair English and appeared to be candid but not especially well informed on other than technical and scientific matters.
- e IKEMI, Tatsujiro; proprietor of a high-grade house of prostitution and entertainment in the Shin-Yanagi Machi with some interest in the other enterprises of this character in the same section of the city; wholesale contractor and purveyor of prostitutes to similar enterprises in Tokyo and Osaka; Chief of Civilian Air Raid (?) Defense for Fukuoka City; Chairman of the County Council of Nakahara Mura; 76 years old, very wealthy, with two sons who are university graduates, one of them in economics and political science at the University of Chicago, and both now university professors. When he learned that the Assistant Research Leader's (Baron Goto's) parents came from the same county as himself, he became exceedingly informative and apparently entirely candid.
- f TSURUDA, Shigeki and YOSHIDA, Tatsuo; Factory Superintendent and office manager, respectively, of the Nippon Rubber Company. This enterprise was undamaged by bombing and employed about 3800 persons. Both were men in the middle forties and appeared to be doing their best to supply the information sought as completely as they were able.
- g HINO, Ashihei; foremost living writer and novelist of Japan, the "Japanese Ernie Fyle," formerly a non-commissioned officer in the China Incident, later civilian official in charge of Army Information and Education in the Phillipine Islands; widely read by all classes; 38 years old.
- h HOJO, H.; Professor of Forensic Medicine, Medical College, Kyushu Imperial University, about 50, studied in Berlin and Zurich 1933-1935; toxicologist employed by the police in many criminal cases; voluble, frequently protested his eagerness to cooperate, but talked so much in group discussion with i and j, that the latter were somewhat crowded out.

- 1 SAKUMA, Kanae; early fifties, Professor of Literature and Law (actually teaches and researches in psychology, especially the psychology of language), Kyushu Imperial University; studied in Berlin in early 1920s and took doctorate there; Japan's best and probably leading psychologist; well-to-do; very slow speaking and thinking but both clear headed and profound. Apparently candid, but on rather abstract level. Knew practically nothing about the people and how they felt.
- j WADA, Ben; middle thirties, docent and assistant to Sakuma; speaks excellent English, although educated exclusively in Japan.
- k ITO, Senshu; Police Inspector of the Prefecture whose home was completely destroyed
- l SAKAMOTO, Akira; Head of Ration Bureau of City Hall
- m TAGAMI, Shigeji; Head of Bureau of Health of City Hall
- x This symbol will be used for a whole group of informants who who will be individually named and characterized, but who have the following conditions in common:
  - 1 They were relatives or friends of individual members of the interviewing team;
  - 2 They were individuals who the interviewers had special reason to believe were exceptionally candid and (in respect of the items used in this report) well informed;
  - 3 They were interviewed under non-official and intimate conditions, usually in their own homes, such that the degree of rapport was immeasurably greater than any obtained in cross-section interviews;
  - 4 The interviewers maintained the objective, non-valua-tive attitude characteristic of cross section inter-views. (All exceptions to this are noted.)

This group of informants supplied material of considerable value not obtained in any other way. Hence all interviewers were encouraged to report in writing any conversations they had which met the above criteria. Sometimes the major portion of such reports did not bear upon the immediate subject of this inquiry or upon purely local conditions, but most of

them contained at least some information useful for the present purpose. This by no means exhausts their utility and the original reports are appended and their further exploitation for intelligence on the present state of opinion is urged

2 BOMBING AND AIR RAID EXPERIENCE.

Fukuoka City was intensively bombed only one occasion, namely, the night of 19-20 June, 1945. This attack was carried out by 221 aircraft of the 21st Bomber Command, which dropped 1525 tons of incendiary bombs between approximately 1100 and 0100 hours, local time (Bomber Command report, 0011K to 0153K). It caused destruction by fire estimated by the air force at 22% and by the prefectural authorities at 24%. (The breakdown of this figure into various types of building appears in Part J-E, attach, Section II-A.) It is interesting to note that the prefectural authorities estimated the tonnage of incendiaries dropped in this attack at only 120 tons. It is not clear whether this is due to the inherent difficulty of estimating incendiaries as against H-E or to an exaggerated respect for their efficiency.

The prefecture also reports an attack by high explosive estimated at 1.6 tons by daylight on 23 June, 1945 on the Mushiroda air field (this may have been a target of opportunity) and a strafing attack by fighter planes on 29 July, 1945 in the Imajyuku district in which 3 persons were killed and 5 injured.

The city was, moreover, subjected to 64 air raid alarms between 1 May, and 13 August, 1945 occasioned by the passage of aircraft over Fukuoka on the way to other targets. The effects imputed to these alarms by certain of our informants will be dealt with in the app-



ropriate places.

The effect of the attack upon public transportation facilities was relatively transient, but street railway service was always interrupted during the numerous alerts in May, June, July and August.

No reconstruction was undertaken before the end of the war and almost none had been initiated at the time of our visit, 16-25, November, 1945.

### 3 AIR RAID PRECAUTIONS

#### A Demolitions (Source c)

Demolitions for the purpose of providing fire-breaks were carried out by the prefectural government beginning in March 1945 and involved the destruction of 4988 buildings, chiefly dwellings. Preparation of plans for demolitions was entirely secret and the first information the inhabitants had of them occurred when condemnation certificates were posted on the buildings to be demolished. There was no possibility of appeal, but provision was made for explaining the theory, method and mode of compensation for demolitions to the people. A special committee called "Cho-nai-kai Rengo-Kai" (Committee of precinct representatives) was constituted, with 32 members, one for each of the 32 school districts, each of which comprised several Cho-nai-kai or precinct associations. The whole plan was explained to this committee, whose members then explained it to the Cho-nai-kai they represented. Cho-nai-kai leaders explained it to the leaders of their constituent Tonari-gumi (Neighborhood Associations) who in turn explained it to the members of their neighborhood associations.

Compensation for buildings was paid by the prefecture, (up to 3000 yen at once, the balance payable in 5 years), moving expenses by the city, and the land was leased to the city in perpetuity. No payments on these leases have yet been made, but the initial ones are expected to be made soon. Prices were established by a special appraisal board.

The fire-breaks started from existing streets and followed so far as possible plans for future streets, parks, playgrounds, public buildings, etc. which had already been made by a city planning commission set up in obedience to the national City Planning law of 1919.

Although there was no provision for complaints, source regarded the demolition plans as equitable and felt that they were generally so regarded. He was quite sure that there was no corruption or favoritism in their execution and cited cases of rich and in-

fluent persons whose properties were included. In another city (Kokura) there were charges of corruption and favoritism.

The effectiveness of the fire breaks was nil.

The figures given by the Prefecture (source a) were somewhat different:

4858 houses razed (April-August, 1945) half or more.  
591 houses evacuated from vicinity of factories.  
1560 houses evacuated "at the last minute."  
Some of these were outside the city.

B Air Raid Shelters (Sources a, b and c)

At the peak of public construction only 10 per cent of the population of Fukuoka could be accommodated in public shelters. Private, factory and cooperatively constructed shelters constituted the remainder and were considered collectively to provide enough to shelter the entire population. There was general recognition of their inadequacies as to fire-roofing, ventilation, sanitation, etc. and a general feeling that the government had somehow fallen down on the job. We did not note any disposition to criticize specific authorities. Since most of the shelters had been constructed by themselves, the tendency was merely to deplore the lack of suitable materials. Shikata ga nai.

C Warning System (Sources a, b and x)

This was generally regarded as satisfactory. Warnings originated with the Army and were telephoned by it to the prefecture which in turn informed the mayors of its constituent cities, towns and villages as well as (directly) the police. The police sounded the sirens which warned the public, including the Keibodan or civilian A R P organization. One of the Keibodan's duties was manning watch towers to spot fires. At first there were three stages of alarm:

<u>Joho chui ho</u>	or Advance conditional report	not public
<u>Keikai keiho</u>	or Alert	about 38 minutes
<u>Kushu keiho</u>	or Imminent danger	about 15 minutes
<u>Kushu keijo</u>	or Imminent danger off	
<u>Keikai keiho keijo</u>	or Alert off	

The prefecture reports that the intervals between warnings and actual appearance of planes over the region were reduced in October 1944 in order to minimize interference with war production, with the implication that the above intervals were the ones usual after the reduction. Apparently the advance conditional report (Joho chui ho) was not transmitted to the general public, so that after October 1944, at least, only two stages of public warning were used.

Although the prefecture characterizes the interval as insuf-

ficient to permit preparation for attack, this is probably a case of hind-sight after frequent repetition of alarms without attacks had caused the people to become somewhat slack in their preparations. It seems entirely likely that after one had buried and dug up his clothing 40 or 50 times to no purpose he would be inclined to assume that the 51st raid would also pass his city by. At all events, there was little or no complaint on this score by our respondents and non-official informants.

Quotation from IMOTO, Assistant Inspector of Fukuoka (City) Police.

I was in charge of mobilizing police and sounding air raid raid warnings from police installations. At the time of the 19 June attack I was at home but came to the station on hearing the alert. I think that the imminent danger signal came about 10 or 15 minutes after the alert signal. I was so used to air raid warnings that I do not remember clearly what happened this particular time. I sent policemen to their posts. We had no special police except the Keibodan which was always mobilized in air raids. We issued no extraordinary orders.

D Flak

Anti-aircraft fire was unanimously regarded by our informants and by such respondents as mentioned it as inadequate. No attempt was made by any civil authority to secure increased protection from the army, since no civil authority may make any recommendation or representation whatever to the army in Japan.

E Post raid care (Sources a and b, and as noted)

The official account of post-raid care estimates that 20 per cent of the bombed out population were sheltered for the first night or two after the bombing in temples and schools, the only billeting provided by the authorities for general use. The rest of the bomb victims are believed to have found temporary refuge with relatives or friends. In the light of many accounts by bombed out persons it would appear that even this 20 per cent estimate is too high.

An even more flattering account is given by those responsible for it of post-raid feeding and with considerably less evidence of its effectiveness from non official sources. The official account follows:

Informant: SAKAMOTO, Akira, Chief of City Rationing Bureau.

Distribution of hard tack was given over to Bureau of Public Welfare. The Rationing Bureau planned to mobilize all restaurants through the restaurateurs' association to deliver rice cakes to the victims. This was actually carried out on the 20th, 21st, and

22nd, after the bombing of 19 June. Victims were assembled in East and West Parks. They lived in air raid shelters and a temple. After the 22nd the victims were given 3 days' supply of rice, 330 grams per person per day. They were then given rice ration coupons. They had to return home to look for their identity cards in order to have proof of identity in order to prove that they were bombed out in order to get bomb victim certificates to receive rice coupons. If identity cards could not be found they still applied to Chanai-Kai-cho and sought to establish their identity in other ways, and received bomb victim certificates. Then they went to the ration board for rice coupons. The victims assembled in the parks were helped by relatives and soon went to the homes of relatives.

Informant: TAGAMI, Shigeji, Bureau of Health.

This Bureau had charge of the distribution of hard-tack and clothing. There were, however, no stores of the latter at the time of the bombing. Hard-tack was stored at (1) City Hall, (2) Tojin Primary School, (3) Kego Primary School, (4) East Park and (5) Kami Hanazono Foodstuffs Corporation. Directly after the bombing, the Chonaikai-Cho went to these places to get hard-tack. There were 2000 crates in all, divided equally into 5 parts, one part at each storage place. Each crate supplied 50 people for 2 meals. In all, rice to the value of 1,000,000 yen was apportioned to air raid victims, including those in hospitals. The city was indemnified by the Tokyo government for cost of treatment but not for the cost of feeding those hospitalized.

Several accounts by individual victims of the fire raid are appended. The first of these, TSUBONE, resident at the time near

Oohori Park, was one of those who apparently received the full aid described by the authorities:

The planes came at 11:30 PM. There was an alarm preceding them. Before the bombs came we dug a hole in a field near our house, put in clothing and food, and then covered it over with dirt. We took shelter in an air raid hole. The bombs fell in progression. The house in the rear of our house was hit. People fled, but my two daughters and I helped the owner put out the flames, - - that is, we were going to but we forgot the buckets. Smoke became terrible, but finally with six children about 17 years old and 4 adults we put out the fire. However, other fires had spread so that it was impossible to return to our own home. Therefore we went into a large field nearby. We had to abandon the hole in the smaller field near the house where we had buried our goods. The raid was over about 2:30 AM.

Roll call was held by the chief of the neighborhood group (tonari-gumi-cho) and the numbers of people reported by him to the chief of the precinct (cho-nai-kai-cho). About 9:00 A M people of the neighborhood group assembled with its chief to discuss matters. People were told by the precinct chief to go to the Tojin Machi school to get food. They received one bag of hard tack per person and 3 days' supply of rice (two to three shaku). Water, one weeks supply of soy sauce, canned fish, salt and sake were also given. My family took refuge for 10 days in the one large home left standing in the neighborhood. My son and his wife, however, slept in Oohori Park on the ground. After 10 days my family moved in with relatives.

Less fortunate was informant ITO, Senshu, Prefectural Police Inspector:

When the alarm sounded I went to the Prefecture Office (Kencho) leaving my children, wife and mother at home. So far as possible, my family put our clothing and household goods into our family air raid shelter. In an area 25 yards square, bombs fell so numerously that it was impossible to put out the fires. All clothing and furnishings were burned in the shelter as well as in the house. The family escaped with only the clothes they were wearing by wading into a nearby river up to their waists.

In the neighborhood only one house was left standing, so my family of 7 persons, plus 2 persons from another burned house, stayed 2 nights with the family that owned it, which already consisted of 4 persons. During the 20th we used rice which we had with us. On the 21st we received hard-tack, one bag for each person. A bag contained enough for 2 meals. On the 22nd and 23rd we stayed at a friend's house in Tojin-Machi and moved out to a farm in Futsuka Ichi on the 24th, 20 km from Fukuoka.

At Futsuka Ichi my whole family of 7 persons lived in one 10-



mat room of the farm house. We received a certificate from the Cho-nai-kai-cho as bomb victims and took this to the city hall to get our new rice coupons. Our bomb victim certificate allowed us to buy small special stores of bean curd (miso), dried fish (surume), pickles, sea weed (kombu), paper, sake and beer and also 12 meters per person of cotton cloth. Most of these were unobtainable. Our rice ration tickets were burned but we received emergency rice rations very quickly. We were allowed also to buy special bomb victim portions of rice at Futsuka Ichi. We had saved our own clothing ration coupons but as there was nothing to buy these were merely formal. At this point informant displayed a large booklet of unused clothing stamps. We were supposed to receive one piece of clothing and bedding each but actually my family of 7 received only one blanket. At Futsuka Ichi I was able to purchase pressed coal bricks. Clothing I received from relatives and friends.

After the end of the war there was a general distribution by lot of army shirts and pants to every one, including bomb victims, conducted in Futsuka Ichi by the village mayor's office.

WAKAO, Kenkichi, chief of the Neighborhood group (Tonari-gumi-cho) of DAIMYO MACHI, 1. CHOME reported:

No one in my neighborhood (in which 7 houses were destroyed) received hard tack or other food from the government so far as I have known. There were no casualties in my neighborhood. We gave our own blankets and clothes to our burned out neighbors.

The role of the police in post-raid care may be inferred from the following quotation from Assistant Inspector IMOTO, continuing that in section 3C:

After the raid I went first to Yanagi Machi to inspect the damage and thence to other sections of the city. By noon of 20 June, I had completed my inspection.

The police were ordered to help in moving wounded persons to hospitals. Hard tack was distributed to bomb victims by the Foodstuffs Control Corporation (Shokuryo Eidan) of the prefecture. The police were also quite useful in quieting and reassuring the people. (sic!)

According to the City Bureau of Public Welfare, (Kosei-ka), wounded air raid victims were hospitalized in the 3 municipal hospitals, the University hospital and in 2 private hospitals. The number of persons reported as severely wounded in the raid is 1059. (1045 are reported to have been killed.) Moving of wounded to hospitals was affected by the precinct chiefs (Cho-nai-kai-cho) and the

A R P (Keibo-dan) organization. Medications prepared in advance by the Bureau proved ample.

4 DISRUPTIVE BEHAVIOR (Sources as noted)

District Attorneys or Prosecutors (Kenji) NAKAMURA and YAMAMOTO agreed that crime decreased during the war owing to patriotic fervor to serve the nation and to the enlistment of men in the army. The fact that the police force was reduced by conscription probably also had something to do with the reduction in number of convictions. Alcoholism convictions decreased because of the scarcity of spirits.

A tabulation of the number of persons brought to trial in the Fukuoka Judicial District during the period from March to August, inclusive, 1945, is appended. There is a time lag of one to four weeks between offense and trial. Black market cases are included in the category "Offenses Against the National Mobilization Law" and constitute a large proportion of such cases. It should be noted that these figures are for the Branch Court of Fukuoka city whereas those in the second table below (of black market cases exclusively) are for the whole Prefecture of Fukuoka.

TABLE I  
RECORDS FOR FUKUOKA JUDICIAL DISTRICT  
March to August 1945  
Number of persons brought to trial.

OFFENSE	MARCH	APRIL	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUGUST
Liquor Tax Law	0	0	0	0	1	2
Forest Law	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bearing of Arms	1	0	54	0	1	21
Offense against National Mob. Law	83	54	105	122	101	146

Selling Stolen Goods	0	13	12	14	1	5
Embezzlement	6	5	1	4	9	1
Blackmail	0	5	7	2	6	0
Fraud	11	14	13	7	5	3
Armed Robbery and Assault	0	2	0	1	3	0
Armed Robbery	0	0	2	0	0	0
Robbery	116	127	116	106	60	73
Accidental Homicide at work	0	10	16	2	4	5
Accidental Homicide	15	0	2	0	1	0
Harming others Result: Death	1	0	0	0	3	0
Harming others: Drunken Behavior included.	6	22	10	12	4	17
Attempted Homicide	2	0	0	1	1	2
Homicide	1	0	1	0	1	1
Bribes	0	0	0	0	1	0
Gambling	119	34	19	33	38	33
Forgery	1	0	2	0	0	0
Breaking and Entering	0	0	1	1	0	0
Obstructing Public Way	0	0	0	1	2	0
Obstructing Water	0	0	0	0	2	1
Arson	17	8	11	6	1	1
Offenses Against Gunpowder Control	0	1	0	2	0	1
Other Crimes	<u>10</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>4</u>

TOTAL 388 303 392 321 258 315

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TABLE II.

Black Market Cases Prosecuted by Price Control Bureau of PREFECTURE, March through October, 1945.

	Cases	Persons	Convictions	Paroles
March	181	209	112	45
April	161	188	163	26
May	264	318	137	97
June	383	417	85	51
July	342	375	54	52
August	313	356	60	34
September	507	559	29	104
October	236	305	98	29

Asked why the number of convictions declined while the number of prosecutions rose, a striking feature of the above table, the Bureau Chief replied, with a touch of humor, that it was not possible to punish black marketers since every one depended upon them in order to get enough to eat. Many informants regarded the increases in black market operations and the diminished productivity of labor as the best behavioral indices of diminished morale.

NAKAMURA and YAMAMOTO further report -

During and after the attack of 19 June, there were numerous cases of petty thievery from empty houses and air raid shelters. These could not be controlled because the police force had been reduced to a state of inefficiency by loss of men to the army. There was, however, nothing approaching large scale looting.

This is confirmed by non-official sources. It seems probably that the "numerous" cases of petty thievery, which incidentally were chiefly of food, would be considered in an American city of

corresponding size, remarkably few.

A number of informants (x) remarked on the grafting and embezzling by officers stationed in Japan and one (x) told of soldiers begging rice from farmers because they were starving while their officers lived well.

Juvenile delinquency is said (a, c & x) to have increased but (c) to date from long before the raids and to be due to the facts that (1) for the first time, both sexes worked together in factories and (2) youngsters working in factories had plenty of money, more than ever before.

At present (x) there is a great deal of stealing of food, especially from the farmers.

#### 5 ESCAPE BEHAVIOR

The Chief of the Bureau of Public Health (Eisei-ka) stated that he knew of no cases of drug addiction and that drunkenness was rare owing to scarcity of alcoholic beverages. The snap judgment of the head of one of the city hospitals was that there was little or no increase in nervous cases during the war. No psychiatrist was interviewed in Fukuoka, but Dr. OKUMURA, successor to SHIMODA in the Medical School is to send a report to the writer at Tokyo. It will be attached as Appendix. Cf. also Section 6, ENTERTAINMENT.

#### 6 ENTERTAINMENT

As indicated in Part J-E, Fukuoka city had 6 motion picture houses before the bombing and 3 afterward. During the 6 months before the bombing the average monthly attendance in all 6 was 40,205; in the 3 that survived the attack, 21,075. In the 3 months following the bombing, the 3 remaining cinemas played to an average monthly attendance of 31,474, thus serving 50 per cent more patrons than before and accounting for more than half of the business of the three destroyed houses. This probably means that they operated at full capacity. They did not increase their hours which were 1200-2000 (3 shows) daily and 1000-2000 (4 shows) Sundays.

The number of licensed prostitutes average 7650 for the six months preceding the raid and 5400 for the three months following (a & b). This was due to the fact that after the raid many managers of whorehouses permitted their girls to evacuate to their homes and approximately 30 per cent of them took advantage



of this offer (e). After the raid of 19 June, Informant (e) closed his establishments and allowed such of his indentured employees as desired to return to their homes. He re-opened on popular demand on 1 July, and had more business than ever before, although his staff had been reduced 30 per cent. Prices of services were fixed by the price control regulations, but the tips given by his patrons increased greatly. The price of sake was evidently not subject to control, for he reports that his charge for 2nd class sake rose from 8 yen to 150 yen and for 1st grade sake from 15 yen to 200 yen. He describes a sort of edite, bibite! spirit, a tendency to make the most of the present with the clear implication of a belief that there might well be no future.

His patronage during the war consisted chiefly of high ranking officers and war industrialists. (It might be noted that his main establishment enjoys the reputation among connoisseurs, both Japanese and American, of being the finest and most luxurious house of prostitution in the world.) Among the military from Brigadier General up, he reports that despair as to the outcome of the war was evident from the beginning of the bombing of Japan, i.e., from November 1944. Below that rank, no such change was apparent.

#### 7 EVACUATION

No method was found of validating the Prefecture's statistics (reported in Part J-E) on evacuation. The costs of evacuation were sometimes paid, in accordance with the tables issued by the national Home Ministry in Tokyo, but this was by no means always the case. Since a disproportionate number of the evacuees were well-to-do people, the subsidies for moving costs were probably often not sought. Except for that required by the demolition program (described in section 3 A above) evacuation appears never to have been compulsory in Fukuoka, but merely encouraged by the offer of the Home Ministry subsidies, of wood for crating, etc.

#### 8 WAR PARTICIPATION BY CIVILIANS

Questions on this subject generally evoked bewilderment from informants. Replies mentioned working in factories and on farms with some hesitation as though astonished that any one should find it remarkable that workers should work and that farmers should farm. If

one seeks to make clear that it is voluntary, self-initiated and unpaid activities that are being sought the bewilderment increases, as if it were unthinkable to do anything that the government did not order and administer. All persons were blood-typed at government order but neither blood nor plasma banks were known and we encountered no donors of blood nor mention of blood donations. Students were put to work in factories, usually under the leadership of their teachers and in groups and sometimes the largest part of their pay went to their schools, but there was little else to distinguish them from other, regular, factory employees.

The one activity of the sort evidently contemplated by this inquiry was the A R P activity of the Keibo-dan. Participation in this was apparently devoted and enthusiastic on the part of some young patriots, a number of whom lost their lives in the incendiary attack. One air raid warden (x) reported that when he saw the flames approaching his home so rapidly, he ran away to the shelter to be with his family. When he was reprimanded by the police for this he replied that houses could be rebuilt, but not his life. He does not know whether others did the same thing or not. He stated that the largest percentage of those killed in the bombing of Fukuoka were young men and women who **stuck** to the last to their duties and were too late to escape. The Prefecture (a & b) estimates that participation in the Keibo-dan was about 50 per cent willing and 50 per cent forced. The effectiveness of this organization during the attack is difficult to estimate, but it was probably low. A house here and there may have been saved, but in general, lack of equipment (pumps, etc.) seems to have made civilian efforts

pretty futile. (Assistant Inspector IMOTO.) Spontaneous cooperation in fighting fire was not uncommon. A case was cited in section 3E above in which the spirit was willing but the buckets were forgotten and it is probable that much of this neighborhood cooperation was of this character. IMOTO's deputy remarked, "In my neighborhood every one cooperated. We made holes to put our clothes and provisions in and helped each other in putting out fires. It is quite true that air raid wardens were generally becoming less and less zealous. The members of the Keibo-dan, however, continued to climb into the towers to watch for planes during raids."

The KEIBO-DAN is a Volunteer Firemens' Association which operates in peace time and the addition of a new branch (Air Watchers Brigade) was all that was required to make it function as an A R P organization.

The city of Fukuoka is divided into 3 parts, (1) Nishi Fukuoka, (2) Fukuoka and (3) Hakozaki. Each of these units has an independent head, but there is one Chief and Assistant Chief over all three. The following is a chart of the Hakozaki area Keibo-Dan personell from the Chief down.

DAN CHO (Chief)	
Over Division Chief	
FUKUDAN CHO (Ass't Chief)	
Ass't Division Chief	
1st Bundan Cho (1st Division Chief)	
1st Fuku Bundan Cho (1st Division Ass't Chief)	
FUKUBUN DAN-CHO & SHO BO-BUCHO	KIEGOBU - BUCHO
Head of Fire Ext. Brigade	Head of Watchers' Brigade
SHOBO BU FUKUBUCHO	KEIYOBU - FUKU BUCHO
Ass't Head of Fire Ext. Brigade	Ass't head of Watchers' Brigade

SHOBO BU HAN-CHO  
Head of Fire Ext. Company  
SHOBO BU FUKU HAN-CHO  
Ass't Head of Fire Ext. Company  
SHOBO BU KEIBOIN GOIN  
Fire Extinguishing Platoon Chief

KEIGOBU - HANCHO  
Head of Watchers' Company  
KEIGO BU - FUKUHANCHO  
Ass't to Head of Watchers' Co.  
KEIGO BU - KEIBO IN GOIN  
Watchers' Platoon Chief

The leader of the SHEBO BU - KEIBOIN estimated that about 55 men comprised his unit and about the same number of men in the corresponding unit. They were recruited by canvassing, done by the HAN-CHO. This leader entered the KEIBO-DAN in 1936. He is a mat-maker by trade. He was away at the time of the raid. Names and addresses of the people listed above are given in 2.

The duty of the KEIGO-BU was to watch for planes. The duty of the SHOBO BU was to extinguish fires. On the KEIKAI KEIHO, all members of each group assembled in their hq'ts. At KUSHU KEIHO, the members of the SHOBO-BU went to their stations. As no one in the KEIGO BU was interviewed, it is not clear exactly how they functioned.

FUJIN-KAI (Womens' Associations, subsidiary to Tonari-gumi) members (1) ran around every block at time of alert by siren signal (KEIKAI KEIHO) saying "Keikai Keiko." (2) at time of imminent danger signal saying "Kushiu Keiho," (3) formed bucket brigades. This las was not done on every alert, but several practices were held and the procedure was carried out, though not very generally or effectively at the time of the incendiary attack.

#### 9 SHELTER BEHAVIOR

Panics in and at shelters were denied by all civil authorities questioned on the subject. None had heard of any. One of our x informants, however, the wife of the air raid warden who ran away, told of the following incident:

I rushed into the public air raid shelter with my 8-year

old daughter. It was quite dark -- no one had thought to light the kerosene lantern with which it was furnished -- but I suppose there were about a hundred people there. An incendiary fell at one of its entrances and we were nearly suffocated with smoke. We were terrified. A general rush for the opposite entrance occurred in which children were trampled. In my terror I myself forgot all about my own daughter until she found me outside the shelter."

Dissatisfaction with air raid shelters was general but their inadequacies were regarded as unavoidable. Except for the above incident, our inquiries failed to elicit any report of behavior in shelters different from that in other wartime situations.

10 CHILDREN (Sources a, b, c & x)

Children were not evacuated as such or in school or other groups from Fukuoka. Some evacuated with their families, particularly among the upper classes and a few were sent to relatives by families who remained in the city. Since most children were not evacuated, there were no special provisions for those not evacuated. The children attending those schools which were destroyed were distributed by whole grades to other, undamaged, schools. The city's schools were closed for only 2 or 3 days. There was some slight increase in complaints of thefts of school lunches but, except for that, no known increase in delinquency among school children.

11 POLICE MEASURES CONNECTED WITH BOMBING

A During the war there was a steady weakening of the police forces, both prefectural and city, by conscription of their members into the armed services.

B The only change in the nature of their activities occasioned by the war was the addition of responsibility for air raid alarm signals. On the special occasion of the incendiary attack they had several emer-



gency duties already described in section 3E. On all alerts the police reserves were called out.

C The National Mobilization Act of course created a number of new offenses and hence added to the activities subject to police surveillance. Enforcement of crop collections from farmers, control of black markets, etc., constituted the major part of this additional burden.

D No change in the severity of prescribed penalties was reported, but the ratio of convictions to indictments for black market operations fell rapidly from April through June 1945, and never returned to its former value, as indicated in table II, section 4

One x informant, a former member of the "Thought Police" (Tokkoka) and a friend of Lieut. Potter, said that repressive measures generally were increased without end, but without specifying what measures. The implication was that old methods were applied more intensively, not that new ones were invented or applied.

## 12 SUBVERSIVE BEHAVIOR

A No evidence of subversive behavior in the sense of the questions under this topic was discovered either from official or from non-official sources. There appear to have been no rumors of a defeatist or subversive character other than the word of mouth transmission of matters of fact such as the reports of travelers returned from Tokyo that the destruction there was worse than the impression of it given by newspapers and radio.

B There were no demonstrations against the war. There was one Diet member, Seigo Nakano, who openly criticized the Tojo government for its dictatorial character and for making war. He was early taken into custody and in March 1945, committed suicide. It was generally be-

lieved that he had been killed by the police, but since the end of the war it has been established that he was a protest suicide. (Source f)

C There was no evidence of organized sabotage. There is evidence of a slowing down of production, some of it due to slower work by laborers and some to other causes, but it does not seem properly characterizable as sabotage. The causes of this production drop are discussed more fully in the next section. One activity that had some of the effect of sabotage in, particularly, metal working factories was the use of company materials and time for the making of household utensils and other metal articles of daily life for sale or barter on the black market, usually (but not always) to augment the food ration legitimately obtainable. (Source x)

D We obtained no evidence in Fukuoka City of any political underground activities whatever.

### 13 WORK BEHAVIOR

The industry selected for special inquiry was the Fukuoka plant of the Nippon Rubber Company, which manufactured tires and shoes for the armed forces and employed from about 3000 to 3900 persons. (Some additional information was gained from the Fukuoka Kosan Kabushikik-asha, a plant manufacturing airplane wheels and employing 350 persons.) The plant was undamaged and still operating, although on a reduced scale, at the time of our visit.

A There were no changes in working hours.

B Absenteeism rose markedly after the raid of 19 June, owing to (1) destruction of employees' homes, (2) destruction of homes of families or relatives of employees and absence of employees to help rehabilitate these. Informant f said that normal attendance in

May and earlier was 75% of the employees on the rolls. (The high rate of absence, 25 per cent was explained by the fact that the company was obliged by the government to carry on its rolls many super-annuated and invalid former employees who never came to work). In the first week after the 19 June raid, absenteeism was 50%, in the second week, 40%. It dropped to 35% about 1 August, but never did return to the normal of 25%.

The attendance record (unusually good) of the Fukuoka Branch of the Kyushu Electric Supply Co. for April-October, 1945 is given below:

RECORD OF ABSENTEEISM - KYUSHU ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY  
APRIL - OCTOBER, 1945

Month	total members	total		Reasons for Absence					
		present	absent	illness	whole- sale	domestic matters	moving	labor	other
April	7740	7153	587	191	53	264	57	17	0
May	7533	6797	736	204	180	227	104	20	1
June	6949	5870	1079	238	191	211	349	29	61
July	7699	6605	1094	269	178	286	335	11	15
Aug.	6944	5769	1175	449	182	291	203	8	42
Sept.	7080	5971	1109	473	213	306	60	15	42
Oct.	7419	6630	789	393	176	182	5	20	13

Note:- Whole sale - Shopping tours  
Moving - Evacuation  
Labor - Free work performed for the government as patriotic duty, (this was enforced).

Following is the reason given by the members of the Liaison Department of Kyushu Electric Power Co. for the lack of decrease in workers during the war - There was little absenteeism because food was supplied at the office.

Questioned as to what kind of food was offered, the following list was given:-

3 rice cakes  
pickles  
sweet potatoes, in place of rice at times  
chicken, once during the whole war

For a week after the raid, there was an increase in absenteeism due to the confusion prevailing and need for evacuation

Nothing but exhortation appears to have been done about absenteeism in Fukuoka plants. Throughout 1945, workers often absented themselves to go to the country for food or to deal on black markets.

C Productivity of workers was markedly reduced during the bombing period by (1) interruptions of operations by air raid alarms (64 between 1 May, and 13 August), (2) interruptions of street railway transportation to work by air raid alarms, (3) slowing down of workers by depression over outlook in war, (4) in some cases, especially metal working factories, use of company time for private projects, although this began earlier than the period of frequent air alarms, (5) slowing down of workers doing hard labor, e.g., mining with the justification that they dare not work hard because that makes them hungrier and thus unable to get along on their ration

14 HEALTH

TABULATION OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES, FUKUOKA CITY

(Received from the Health Bureau)  
TAGAMI, Shigeju, Chief, (EISEI-KA)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Cases</u>
1940	980
1941	604
1942	605
1943	504
1944	767
1945 (As of 30 Nov.)	1,099

Breakdown by month for 1945 (Through 30 Nov.)

January	95
February	64
March	78
April	60
May	54
June	58
July	133
August	310
September	71
October	103
November	93

Breakdown of type for 1945 (Through 30 Nov.)

Type	Jan.-30 Oct.	November
Typhoid Fever	122	3
Para Typhoid	24	1
Dysentery	485	*
Diphtheria	407	6
Scarlet Fever	14	*
Epidemic Spinal Meningitis	30	*
Small Pox	1	*
Eruptive Typhoid	5	* (* None)

Note:

The chief of the bureau said that he knew of no cases of drug addiction and that drunkenness was rare due to scarcity of liquor. He also stated that as the war progressed bodies weakened due to lack of nourishment and medicines; that doctors were pre-empted by the army. The incendiary raid killed doctors in Fukuoka . . .45, according to him. Broken water mains caused an increased incidence of disease. TAGAMI further says that reports of communicable diseases have been slow in coming in and that for the later months the true figures will probably be 3 or 4 times those given. Dysentery is believed to be especially prevalent. According to the "snap judgment" of the head of one of the hospitals who happened to be in the office at the time, there was little increase in nervous cases during the war.



FUKUOKA

Electric Power Consumption in 1000 K.W.H.

Consumed by

	<u>HOMES</u>	<u>SMALL INDUSTRY</u> (50 kwh./mo. or less)	<u>LARGE INDUSTRY</u> (more than 50 kwh./mo.)	<u>LIGHTING</u>	<u>TRANSPORTATION</u>
1943					
Octo.	56	761	3625	754	288
Nov.	56	764	3638	754	304
Dec.	56	783	3728	755	279
1944					
Jan.	56	751	3578	755	301
Feb.	56	720	3427	754	268
March	56	738	3515	754	282
April	56	767	3378	758	275
May	56	744	3276	736	287
June	57	720	3173	639	255
July	57	702	3093	614	278
Aug.	57	706	3112	623	279
Sept.	58	709	3123	591	283
Oct.	57	716	3153	574	293
Nov.	58	728	3209	707	297
Dec.	58	729	3211	797	286
1945					
Jan.	57	701	3090	892	278
Feb.	58	652	2870	881	271
March	58	587	2585	881	286
April	56	590	2598	792	283
May	55	590	2598	623	279
June	45	590	2599	400	262
July	33	486	2140	399	185
Aug.	39	391	1720	330	215

5004

(3)

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
MORALE DIVISION  
(Pacific)

Background Report

Form J E

This form duplicates Form J in Japanese, but the tables have been condensed.

Meiji Bldg. Tokyo

This report is to cover Fukuoka shi ~~naohi~~ (a) ~~mura~~

Names and titles of persons actually supplying information.

Naokuni Miyaji  
police superintendent  
Chief of guard section

Ruyji, Jiro  
Dep. Police Supt.  
of Prefecture

Name and title of official responsible for returning report

Karoku Tsuchiya Chief of Police Department

Date of submitting report November 21, 1945

You are ordered to fill in the following report from official records. Where you do not have the official records write "No Records" in the appropriate spaces and indicate where the records may be secured.

You need make no statement in the spaces which are crossed off.

If sufficient space is not allowed for replies on this form, use a continuation sheet, numbering items to correspond with the numbers on the form.

Where monthly statistics are called for, you are to furnish them for the period beginning 1 May 1945 and extending to August 15, 1945.

Give all numerical answers in arabic figures. Where an answer in words is called for, reply in English if you can. (When the exact English term is in doubt, add the Japanese word in parenthesis.) If no one capable of answering in English is available to you, answer in Japanese.

It is required of you that this report be filled in as soon as possible. As soon as it is ready, you should communicate with Dr. Adams at Kyoshintei Hotel

He will make an appointment for you to discuss this report in person.

The following data pertains to the above mentioned city, town, or village.

I. BOMBING DATA

A. Bomb Attacks

For each attack give the date in Arabic numerals:

In column (a) if the attack was by day, mark X under the word Day; if by night, mark the X under the word Night.

In column (b) if the attack was high level, mark X under High; if the attack was low level, mark X under Low.

In column (c) if the attack was mostly by high explosive bombs, mark X under Explosive; if the attack was mostly by incendiary bombs, mark X under Incendiary; if the attack was about equally high explosive and incendiary, mark X under both Explosive and Incendiary.

In column (d) write the estimated total weight in metric tons of the bombs dropped.

In column (e) write the length of time the bombers were over the area.

Use column (f) for any comments. If no alarm was given for a particular raid, be sure to mark "No Alarm" in this column.

Date	a		b		c		d	e	f
	Day	Night	High	Low	Explosive	Incendiary	Tons	Minutes	Comments
6.19		X	X			X	120	3 ~ 11	big fire in the center of the city
6.23	X			X	X		1.6	0 ~ 20	Mushiroda air-field

B. Machine Gun Attacks

C. Alarms without Attacks

Date	Comment	Date	Day	Night
7.29	Same in the continuation sheets			

## II. BOMB DAMAGE

### A. Damage to buildings.

In the table below record the total amount of damage to buildings resulting from aerial bombardments in this district. State the number and the percentage (%) of buildings of each type listed which were (a) undamaged; (b) damaged but usable and (c) damaged and unusable.

"Business places" refers to wholesale and retail stores and office buildings.

"Industrial plants" refers to factories.

"Domiciles" refers to all houses and apartment buildings used as living quarters.

"Cultural and entertainment" buildings refers to libraries, museums, schools, theaters, auditoria, etc.

"Government" and municipal buildings refers to post offices, police headquarters, tax office, prefectural buildings, city, town and village buildings and all the buildings housing governmental administrative personnel.

"Shrines" refers to all Buddhist, Shinto or Christian religious edifices.

	Business Places		Industrial Plants		Domiciles		Cultural & Entertainment Bldgs.		Govt. Bldgs.		Shrines	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Undamaged	3213	5.9	111	65	37945	79.8	58	79	19	82	10	67
Damaged but usable	35	0.8	4	2	195	0.4	5	7	2	9		
Damaged, unusable	3327	40.2	57	33	9387	19.8	10	14	2	9	5	33
Total	5575		172		47527		73		23		15	

Note: The percentage of undamaged buildings plus the percentage of damaged but usable buildings plus the percentage of damaged and unusable buildings should in all cases equal 100%.

If a building was damaged more than once, record only the most severe damage.

B. Damage to Public Utilities.

1. Transportation: Report about changes in the state of transportation during the bombing period.

A separate report should be made for busses, tram lines, subways, and the State Railways lines for this area only. The report may be made in either of the two ways shown below: (a) By the total number of paying passengers carried monthly, or (b) By the total number of hours public vehicles were in service monthly during the report period. One bus operating one hour counts as one bus hour. Report the total number of bus-hours per month. Similarly one tram car operating one hour counts as one tram car-hour. One subway car (not the whole train) operating one hour is one subway car-hour; one state railway passenger car operating one hour is one railway car-hour.

If your report is in terms of passengers carried, write (a) before the figures; if the report is in terms of vehicle hours, write (b) before the figures.

Month	Bus (a) or (b)	Trams (a) or (b)	Subway (a) or (b)	State Rlw. (a) or (b)	Comment
May	49,867 (a) 1,168 (b)	6303,977 (a) 32,807 (b)			
June	54,452 (a) 1,005 (b)	5344,113 (a) 23,571 (b)			
July	45,104 (a) 1,177 (b)	4803,620 (a) 26,383 (b)			
Aug.	53,073 (a) 1,086 (b)	5172,004 (a) 16,647 (b)			

State the average capacity of the public transportation vehicles -- include seated and standing passengers.

One bus 60 One subway car \_\_\_\_\_  
 One tramcar 140 One State Rlw. car 200

2. Electricity. Record for each month of the period the total number of k.w.h. consumed by (a) homes; (b) commercial and industrial users.

Calendar Month	Total K.W.H. consumed by Homes	Total K.W.H. consumed by Industrial & Commercial
May	678,153	3,187,531
June	655,520	3,118,693
July	732,450	2,626,144
August	679,512	2,111,240

3. Gas. Record for each month of the period the total number of cubic meters of gas consumed by (a) homes; (b) commercial and industrial users.



Calendar Month	No. of meters consumed by Homes	No. of meters consumed by Ind. & Com.
May	276,684	156,845
June	248,535	136,315
July	24,992	51,288
August	59,785	39,272

4 Water. In the appropriate spaces below, record the extent of damage to municipal water systems in the following manner: Record for each month the total number of liters of water distributed to (a) private consumers and (b) commercial and industrial users.

Calendar Month	Total No. of Liters of Water distributed to Public Consumers	Total No. of Liters of Water distributed to Industrial Users
May	874,125 (litre)	291,375 (litre)
June	911,700	303,900
July	1,001,025	333,875
August	962,295	320,765

C. Casualties.

Record in the appropriate spaces below the total number of civilians severely wounded as a result of bombing and the total number of civilians killed as a result of bombing in this area. By the term "severely wounded" is meant cases requiring hospitalization or confinement to bed at home.

Total No. Severely Wounded	Total Number Killed
1,059	1,045

D. Effects to Living Quarters.

Record below the number and percentage of the total civilian population in this district bombed out of their normal living quarters temporarily and the number and percentage of the total civilian population bombed out of normal living quarters permanently. By "temporarily" we mean cases where the home is unusable but repairable. By "permanently" we mean by unrepairable damage.

Homes Bombed Out Temporarily		Homes Bombed Out Permanently	
No. homes	330	No.	13,714 Homes
%	2.65 - .5%	%	21
# persons	1650 (est. 5 to home)	# persons	62,136 persons
% persons	.5% of popula.	% persons	19.2% of population



### III. AIR RAID DEFENSE

#### A. Demolition of Houses to Provide Fire Breaks.

1. Total number of houses so destroyed 4421
2. Number of people living in such houses 29,270
3. Provisions for rehousing (Describe below briefly)  
*We entirely induced them to take refuge to their relatives or acquaintances' residences. we had not lodging equipments for the refugees.*

#### 4. Provisions for compensation: (Describe briefly below)

a. We paid them as the compensation between 40 yen and 600 yen per tanbo setting up more than 20 classes.

b. As to the compensation for removal we paid them based on the table of annexed paper. And in addition we paid between 30 yen & 200 yen per man as the security.

#### B. Air raid Shelters

1. Indicate the percentage of population who could be accommodated by:

	% Oct 1944	% April 1945
Public Shelters	<u>6</u>	<u>10</u>
Factory Shelters	<u>15</u>	<u>22</u>
Private Home or Apartment Shelters	<u>80</u>	<u>100</u>

The percentage is to be calculated against the total number for whom the shelters were built.

#### 2. Rating of Adequacy of Public Shelters:

	Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory	Comments
(a) Capacity	<u>100 - - 300</u>	<u>built on hillsides etc.</u>
(b) Ventilation	<u>1 - 3 openings</u>	<u>2 or 3 ventilation equipments</u>
(c) Cleanliness	<u>unsatisfactory</u>	<u>w.c. equipment imperfect</u>
(d) Sleeping Facilities	<u>none</u>	<u>not provided in order to make capacity greater.</u>
(e) Safety-degree of Protection Offered	<u>satisfactory to some degree</u>	<u>no small damage done by fire in the neighborhood.</u>
(f) Accessibility to Public	<u>inconvenient</u>	<u>inconvenient for the people to take refuge due to its location.</u>

#### C. Warning system.

##### 1. First general public alert.

- (a) How great was the interval between the sounding of this alert and the time when the raid was expected \_\_\_\_\_ in the case of a day attack? Minutes no interval.

- (b) How great was the interval between the sounding of this alert and the time when the raid was expected in the case of a night attack?  
Minutes 38.
- (c) Was the time usually sufficient to permit most of the people to prepare for the attack? Explain.  
*insufficient.*
- (d) Did this interval change during the war? When? How? Why?  
*It was changed since Oct. 1944. To avoid the decline of the war production, it was decided to give the alert after getting the reliable information.*
2. The immediate warning.

- (a) How great was the interval between the sounding of this alert and the time when the raid was expected in the case of a day attack? Minutes  
no record.
- (b) How great was the interval between the sounding of this alert and the time when the raid was expected in the case of a night attack?  
Minutes 15.
- (c) Did this interval change during the war? When? How? Why?  
*It was changed since about Oct. 1944. To avoid the decline of the war production, it was decided to give the alert after getting the reliable information.*

D. Post-Raid Care.

1. Billeting.

Describe, briefly, the provisions made for emergency post-raid billeting.  
*we let them take refuge to schools, temples, shrines etc in a mass and supplied them bread, rice etc.*

Were billeting facilities adequate or inadequate in number and quality? Explain.  
*They were adequate in quality, but short in number.*

What per cent of the bombed out people were housed in:

Emergency Barracks	<u>none</u>
Temples & Schools	<u>20%</u>
Air Raid Shelters	<u>1%</u>
Private Homes	<u>25%</u>
Left Town	<u>50%</u>
Other	<u>4%</u>
	<u>Total 100%</u>

2. Feeding.

Describe, briefly, the measures taken for emergency post-raid feeding.

*we supplied two times food of hard tacks to the sufferers in the following morning, and after that, supplied two days' food of boiled rice & pickles. And after that distributed rice (one kg per person), side dish (miso, soy, pickle etc) for one week specialy.*

Were the provisions adequate or inadequate in quantity and quality?

*They were adequate both in quantity and quality.*

Were any extra rations provided?

*we provided <sup>one weeks portion of</sup> emergency provisions <sup>for all the citizen</sup> such as rice, hard pickle, hard tacks, miso, shoyu etc*

Who were responsible for emergency feeding?

*The Major of Fukuoka.*

IV. BEHAVIOR DISTURBING PUBLIC ORDER

A. Looting

Looting is here defined as the theft of articles from living quarters, offices, stores, industrial plants and bomb shelters during and after a bombing attack.

Record the number of arrests and number of convictions in court for looting per month.

Calendar Month	Number of Arrests for Looting	Number of Court Convictions
<i>May</i>	<i>2 (air raid) not booked</i>	<i>2</i>
<i>June</i>		
<i>July</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2</i>
<i>August</i>		

B. Crime.

Record below crime statistics, month by month. Statistics for crimes against property (thefts, arson, etc.), crimes against persons (assault, murder, etc.), and sex crimes (rape, etc.) are to be recorded separately in the appropriate spaces.

Month	Crimes against Property		Crimes against Persons		Sex Crimes	
	Arrests	Convictions	Arrests	Convictions	Arr.	Con.
<i>May</i>	<i>87</i>	<i>87</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>		
<i>June</i>	<i>81</i>	<i>81</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>		
<i>July</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>7</i>
<i>August</i>	<i>36</i>	<i>36</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>4</i>		

### V. SUICIDE & DRUGS

Record the number of suicides, the number of arrests and convictions in court for drunken disorderliness, and for habitual use of narcotic drugs, month by month.

Month	No. of Suicides	Drunken Disorderliness		Drug Addiction	
		Arrests	Convictions	Arr.	Conv.
May		5			
June		2			
July		10			
August		1			

### VI. ENTERTAINMENT

Estimate the average monthly attendance for the six months period preceding the first bombing attack and the average for the last three months before the surrender.

	Average per month for 6 months before bombing	Average per month for last 3 months of war
Plays	<i>not on record</i>	<i>not on record</i>
Sports	<i>not on record</i>	<i>not on record</i>
Prostitution (Licensed)	7,650	5,400
Movie Houses	40,205 in all 6 21,075 in 3 survivors	31,474
The number of persons who invited geisha girls	<i>not on record</i>	<i>not on record</i>

### VII. EVACUATION

Give below the number of evacuees per month from this area (excluding those within the same To, Shi, Machi, Mura)

Month	No. of Evacuees
May	2223
June	1976
July	1350
August	925

State the proportion of these evacuations which were initiated by the government? 31%

State proportion which were initiated by the people themselves 69%

Describe below the kinds of people who were evacuated.

2d page Hansen Memo, 8th line from top  
for 3, read 3A  
for "it" read "if"

# 1. Bombing Data.

## B. machine gun attacks

Date	comment
5.29	by small airplanes. 3 persons were killed and 5 injured at Imajuku, Fukuoka City.

## C. Alarms without Attacks

Date	Day	night
5.1	X	
5.3	X	
5.4	X	X
5.5	X	
5.7	X	
5.10	X	
5.11	X	
5.13	X	X
5.14	X	X
5.16	X	
5.17		X



Date	Day	night	Date	Day	night
5.19		X	6.18	X	X
5.21		X	6.21	X	
5.23	X	X	6.22	X	X
5.24	X		6.23		X
6.1	X		6.25	X	X
6.5		X	6.26		X
6.7	X		6.27		X
6.8		X	6.28		X
6.10		X	6.29		X
6.12		X	6.30	X	X
6.14		X	7.1	X	X
6.16		X	7.2	X	X
6.17		X	7.3	X	X

7.4	X	X	7.23	X	X
7.5	X		7.25	X	X
7.7	X		7.26	X	X
7.8	X		7.27	X	X
7.9	X	X	7.29	X	X
7.10	X	X	7.30	X	X
7.12	X	X	8.4	X	
7.14	X		8.5		X
7.15	X	X	8.7	X	
7.16	X	X	8.8	X	
7.17		X	8.11	X	
7.18	X	X	8.12	X	
7.19		X	8.13	X	
7.22	X				

### III. Air Raid Defence.

#### A. Demolition of Houses to provide Fire Breaks.

##### 4. Provisions for compensation

##### 6. Table of Security for remove.

distance Number of Family	less than 50 Kilometres		less than 200 Km.	less than 500 Km.	less than 100 Km.	more than 1000 Km.
	in the city	out of the city				
one person	160 yen	200 yen	300 yen	400 yen	500 yen	600 yen
less than four persons	320	400	500	600	700	800
less than six persons	400	500	600	700	800	900
more than seven person	480	600	700	800	900	1000

酒稅法	森林法	兵役法	國家總動員法	贓物收受故買罪保	橫領	熱喝	詐欺	強盜傷人	強盜	竊盜	業務上過失致死傷	過失致死傷	傷害致死	傷害	殺人未遂	殺人	贈賄	賭博	文書偽造	住居侵入	往來妨害	水利妨害	失火	罪名	
			1 83 八三	6 六	11 一一			116 一六	15 一五			1 一	6 六	2 二	1 一	118 一八	1 一						17 一七	三 MARCH	
			54 五 四	13 一 三 五 四	5 五	5 五	14 一 四 二	2 二	127 二 七 〇	10 一 〇		22 二 二				34 三 四						8 八	四 APRIL		
5 五	54 五 四	105 一 〇 五	12 一 二	1 一	7 七	13 一 三	2 二	116 一 六 六	16 一 六 二	2 二		10 一 〇		1 一	19 一 九	2 二	1 一					11 一 一	五 MAY		
		122 二 二 二	14 一 四	4 四	2 二	7 七	1 一	106 一 〇 六	2 二			12 一 二	1 一		33 三 三		1 一	1 一				6 六	六 JUNE		
1 一	1 一	101 一 〇 一	1 一	4 九	6 六	5 五	3 三	60 六 〇 四	4 四 一			3 三	4 四	1 一	1 一	1 一	38 三 八					2 二	2 二	1 一	七 JULY
2 二	21 二 一	146 一 四 六	5 五	1 一	3 三			73 七 三	5 五			17 一 七	2 二	1 一	33 三 三							1 一	八 AUG.		

昭和二十年  
1945

自三月  
至八月  
MARCH  
AUG

各月事件受理區別人員表  
NO. OF PERSONS BROUGHT TO TRIAL IN COURT DIST.

裁判所

IN DEATH  
HOMICIDE  
BRIBES  
GAMBLING  
REARINGS  
ENTRANCES  
OBSTRUCTION  
PLUGS  
BARRIERS  
ANSON

第三三三

TOTAL  
OTHER  
OTHERS  
COUNT  
COUNT  
COUNT

計	其他	銃砲火藥類 取締法
388	三八八	10 一 〇
303	三〇三	8 八 一
392	三九二	15 一 五
321	三二一	7 七 二
258	二五八	13 一 三
315	三一五	4 四 一

裁  
判  
所