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UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
MORALE DIVISION  
(Pacific)

SPECIAL INTERVIEW WITH THE MAYOR OF NAGASAKI,  
Jukichi Okada.

Interrogator: H. B. English

Interpreter : Andrew Fureda

Interview held at 1300 hours, 21 November 1945, at the city hall.

The Mayor had prepared a memorandum covering wartime morale of which he presented us a copy.

- E - Since your memorandum covers the matter of confidence in winning the war, will you please discuss with us the matter of the people's commitment to the objectives of the G.E.A. war.
- O - At the time of the North China Incident, there was little talk of the GEA co-prosperity sphere. That idea was propagated after Pearl Harbor.

Having been in America, I knew her industrial power and knew that war with American would not be easy. But the people were deceived and it was difficult for me to lead them. If I told the truth, the army would put pressure on me. So I went as far as I could without incurring the army's objection. Now the people see that I took the right attitude during the war and they are quite impressed.

The people thought that Japan was winning because they were told so but they began to have doubts after Saipan. The government very cleverly suppressed foreign news dispatches and controlled the radio. The Police did a good job in suppressing people's ideas.

- E - How did they do that?
- O - Plain clothesmen mingled with the people and arrested those who spoke against Japan. (The phrase 'against Japan' was used twice and is a good translation) Both civil and military police.
- E - What did they do after arrest?
- O - Most of them were kept a few days in jail and released. A few were taken to court. Not many.
- E - Do you imply that a warning was enough?
- O - Yes.

E - Were there any group demonstrations for a compromise peace?

O - Never! Some may have wished it but they did not dare.

E - I meant just three or four in small groups.

O - We talked about such things with our intimate friends but we shut up when any stranger was around.

E - To what extent did the people support the idea of the co-prosperity sphere?

O - The lower class more than the upper. Some upper class people believed in it.

The Rotary Clubs were under suspicion because they were of American origin. The government put on so much pressure that many became afraid and activities were suspended. I was president of the Nagasaki Rotary.

E - Do you think that the sort of people who were in Rotary supported the idea of co-prosperity?

O - Perhaps a little at first but as the war wore on they were smart enough to know that things were not going well.

I think it is interesting to note how little hostility there is here to the Americans. One might think it would be different because of the atomic bomb. But it is not. Nagasaki has had a long history of contact with foreigners. It is easy to run one city now in relation to the occupation. There is no danger here. Elsewhere it may not be so true.

This will show how things are. There have been rumors that Chungking and Great Britain will send occupation troops here. I have had delegations from the people to say that they hope it will not be so, they want only Americans. Therefore the Americans need not worry about any possible danger.

E - I should like to know about the people's attitude toward the leadership, both national and local. I know that this is a somewhat delicate subject and would emphasize that we are not prying into your personal attitude but asking you to report what the situation was with the people during the war.

O - At first the people supported the leadership wholeheartedly. Then came doubts. Most of the dissatisfaction was against the militarists.

E - Including the Navy?

O - Yes, for us in Japan no distinction.....You in America may consider that the Army was guilty of more ruthlessness but for us there is no distinction. There was also some dissatisfaction with the Ken leadership. There was little change in attitude toward the city. The prestige of the army fell to the ground. Those in the prefectural government who supported the army also lost prestige.

E - What about the chonakai?

O - That was various. Some were unworthy and the mayor removed them.

E - What did the people think about them?

O - They cooperated because without them they got no rations.

E - (We attempted to get a picture of group solidarity in non-war connected groups. It appears that there are no such groups. A considerable discussion may be summarized:) There were a few ultra-militarist societies. If there were any others, they had to keep quiet.

E - What was the effect of the morale control measures?

O - That they were bothersome but this is war and we are too busy to trouble. They were immersed in the problems of living.

E - What about the cabinet changes? The people lost interest in such changes. There was no change in policy, only a change in the gang in power. Tojo was very unpopular. I think no one in Nagasaki has any use for him. (Then?) They did not like him much; they thought him a poor imitation of Hitler.

Mr. Okada was graduated from the political science department of the Tokyo Imperial University in 1913. He entered the Engineering works of the Mitsubishi Dockyard. He rose to be vice-manager by 1926. In 1919 he took a trip around the world studying post-war conditions for the Mitsubishi Co. Stayed longest in America.

He first was elected mayor in 1941 and was reelected this year. The election has to be approved by the Home Minister and this year the approval was so long delayed that Mr. Okada suspected that it had to be referred to the Occupation Authorities.

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UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
MORALE DIVISION  
(Pacific)

Special Interview with Eisuke Negishi, Assistant Dean of Students,  
Nagasaki College of Industrial Management.

TIME: 10:30 to 12:00, 7 December 1945.

INTERVIEWER: Mr. H. B. English

Mr. Negishi is currently acting as Interpreter for M. G. in Nagasaki and was recommended to us by Major Lowery as a very good observer of the contemporary scene. He was born in 1890, was educated in England from age 6 to 15 - his father was agent in London for N.Y.K. He returned to Japan from 1905 to 1917, completing the middle school and the higher school. He entered the Imperial University in the Literary College or Faculty but left without a diploma. He returned to what his father called 'my England' where he took courses in London University and worked for N.Y.K. Upon his return home he entered the employ of the Oriental Steamship Co. as a passenger clerk, then in their Yokahama office. For a time in 1923 he worked in the Hong Kong office. After further service in Tokyo he came in 1925 to Nagasaki College of Ind. Mgt. as a professor of English.

He was wounded in the atomic bombing and spent 1½ months in bed, but his personal experience was slight - he saw a flash and the next thing he knew he was under some debris. His wounds were a fracture and glass cuts.

As his English is fluent and correct the interview was in english; H. B. English acted as interrogator but Kuroda was present and occasionally interposed a question. There was complete frankness and lack of tension throughout.

E - Will you try to chart the curve of morale throughout the war period?

N - Out students at the Nagasaki Commercial College were somewhat antagonistic towards the war as was natural considering their interests. Many of them wanted to evade conscription as long as possible. In other higher schools one might find more of the nationalistic spirit. Before the war it was possible for a college student to postpone his army service till he finished or till he was 28 years old. During the war this was shortened so that a man could be excused only if it would be possible for him to be graduated by 24; then it was cut to such an extent that no one had exemption when his time came. At this point many of the students began to volunteer so that they might be sent into officer's training. But there was still a great deal of unenthusiasm for the war. Of course there was no outward show of opposition.

E - Can you estimate the percent?

N - At first as high as 80% were more or less opposed to the war but as the war went on the government's propaganda began to take hold.



E - Do you think it was the propaganda or the course of the war?

N - Mostly, I think, the propaganda. At least in my school. In other schools, I don't know.

E - How about the general population?

N - Outwardly everyone was glad to go to war but in the family circle there was a wish that the war would be over. By the end of 1944 the majority felt that all was lost.

E - What were the causes of the decline?

N - First of all, the bombing. It was very disheartening. Morale declined after the bombing began this spring by leaps and bounds. Of course if one talked about it too openly, he would be taken in by the Kempeitai or Thought Control Police.

E - Were there many who did?

N - Quite a few.

E - This the police deny.

N - None the less there were many. It was forbidden to express doubt that Japan would win. The Government said that the spirit was mightier than material resources. But a garbage collector spoke up and said that he thought the country was the case. He was arrested and severely lectured, threatened. He told me about it the other day and said that it was a good thing that Japan was defeated because now a man could say what he things. I was under suspicion because I had lived in England and was shadowed. English teachers were all under suspicion and although the classes were continued, the time spent on English was cut in half. This enabled us to teach the practical side of English but not to get them to appreciate the spirit of English literature.

The second thing was the food shortage. Much of this shortage was due to poor distribution. Nothing in Japan moves horizontally; everything moves up or down from the central administration. The shortage began in the winter of '43. The ration was set nationally and at a minimum level.

The majority of those enticed into war work were enticed by the promise of extra rations.

E - Did this make for hard feelings?

N - Yes, it did. Workers got all sorts of ration favors. In Nagasaki there is really only one company, the Mitsubishi, but in other places there might be several companies and there was competition for workers by means of ration favors. I have heard that in Tokyo the students took advantage of this to graft.

E - Did all students have to do war work?

N - Yes, all except those physically unfit. They spent 8 hours a day, usually in hard physical labor. They were supposed to have class work besides but in fact they could not and did not. The Profs. just supervised their attendance and did the welfare work for the students. This began in July, 1944. The coll. was nearly closed.

Thus we received a call from the Mitsubishi for 250 laborers. We had 230 in the third year class. Of these 45 were physically unfit and continued class. That left 195 available for the manpower draft. We had to include 55 from the second year class of 260. These 55 were rotated among the class in order to be fair. Later the medical requirements were so relaxed that only 15 of the 3rd year students were exempt; they were really so unfit that they were sent home and the 3d year classes were abandoned.

E - You implied that the people were discontented with the food distribution. Was there talk about this? Yes, but it had to be guarded, for fear of the secret police.

N - May I say that I do not understand the way the secret police have been retained. They have, to be sure, been dismissed from that bureau which has been abolished. But the same men have been reemployed in other places, example the regular police. This does not give confidence to the opposition. Many of us think that when the occupation is over, the old gang will come back into power and take revenge on those who now collaborate with the Americans. I think it will be twenty years before the Americans should leave.

The trouble is that the Japanese have been indifferent to politics. They have been forced to follow. It will take a long time to educate them in any other way.

E - What would you do in the way of education?

N - First I would reform the primary schools. That is where you have to begin. That's why I say it would take twenty years. We must show children what democracy means by actually exposing them to democracy in the schools, not merely talking about it.

E - Excellent! But again how would you set about it?

N - Select for teachers persons who show promise of being really democratic. Then import some American educators to train them in the ways of democratic education. (This was expanded.)

E - Was there any other cause of morale decline?

N - (Long pause for thought - not embarrassed or trying to cover up). There were too many regulations - this particularly irritated the better educated. Then having to stand in line for hours in the wind sort of upsets the peace of the household.

E - How the people's trust in information?

N - At first they tended to believe everything but later distrust grew.  
(I probed on this a little but he really had no specific information.)

E - How about our propaganda leaflets? He did not think they accomplished much.

E - Besides radio and newspaper propaganda, what morale control measures were taken?

N - Patriotic Societies were formed. Neighborhood meetings were ~~at~~ called and people were urged to join. There were directives to the tonari gumi - most a lot of lies - which they had to pass on to the people. The Imperial Rule Assistance Soc. sent down an order that meetings must be opened by bowing to the throne and a prayer. If any family did not attend and conform they would lose their rations and would be held up to ridicule as unpatriotic. The same thing was true of a family which was not represented at the ry. station when the ashes of a soldier from that Tonari gumi were returned. Sometimes one had something else to do but did not dare be absent.

E - You saw quite a little of the industrial life of this city. What was the manpower situation? I am interested in the human side of it and in the material as it bears on the human. Take the lack of materials; of course that cuts down production. But what of its indirect effects? Were there any? (This directive probe was only to get him started.)

N - Yes, it did. The men could not do their best and accomplish things as they wanted to do. So they grumbled against the management. (There was skip here in N's thinking - not in my notes.)

There were supervisors in the factory who had the authority to beat workers who seemed idle or not to be exerting themselves. They did too, and in a few cases they beat men to death.

E - Was there any deliberate slowdown?

N - Some.

E - Why?

N - Inborn laziness, I guess. Of course many of these men were drafted from far off places and came against their will. Also they got homesick. Then the conditions in the dormitories were very bad - insanitary and verminous. Some of the student workers said that they were working only to make the Mitsubishi fatter. I don't know how general such feeling was - it could only be expressed to one in whom you had complete confidence. There were plainclothesmen in the factories and even in the night schools.

One of our professors of economics was complained of by such an agent and he was put in prison for three months, dismissed from his post and exiled to northern Korea. He expressed some sympathy with communism.

- E - (Endeavored to get the matter of freely organized groups other than the patriotic and war effort societies.)
- N - These do not exist. No society can exist unless the government wishes it.
- E - I understood it must have government permission but -
- N - No, not merely that. Since the war, only if the government set up the society can it exist at all. No merely private society can exist at all. If you were to try to organize a small debating society, your request would be denied and you would be under suspicion.

Mr. N. stayed to share a c-ration lunch with us and during the lunch explained that the students worked for 60 yen a month. I inquired why they did not get jobs as regular workers at much higher pay. First they worked only 8 hours. Second they did not wish to resign from the college as it was so hard to get in. Third they kept out of the army a little longer. Of the 60 yen wages - which was set by the Tokyo government for the entire country - 40 yen went to school tuition and expenses, compulsory savings and the like so that the take home wage was 20 yen a month.



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UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
MORALE DIVISION  
(Pacific)

Special Interview with Dr. Kyoshi Takese, Professor of Psychiatry,  
Nagasaki Medical College.

Contact with Prof. Takese had previously been made through Prof. Baba of the N. Commercial College. Takese is living in a village about ten miles from Isahaya, more than twenty from Nagasaki, to which he commutes by train. The interview took place in his home, a very superior village home but inferior to what he would have had in N. (He had been forced to move from his rented house in N. by a strategm; this was fortunate since the house was destroyed in the atomic bombing.)

Interrogator: H. B. English

Interpreter: Andrew Kuroda

Also present during most of the interview and participating in it freely was Mrs. Takese.

Date: 1 December 1945

The interview will not be reported in the form of question and answer; few notes were taken and every effort was made to keep it on the level of informality - in the main successfully. However the interview was structured in much the usual fashion for special interviews.

Dr. Takese said that the scientists of Japan knew from the beginning that it was hopeless to war with America. Their only concern was to be ready to die with their families. Most people were elated at first with the early victories but even then there were some - probably many - who realized the hopelessness of the conflict. As ~~long~~ long as the victories rolled in the people were willing to tighten their belts but when things went against them, their willingness to put out and to sacrifice declined. This began with Guadalcanal and increased with Marianas campaign. The required sacrifices became greater and the shortage of food helped to make them pessimistic. It is a part of the Japanese character, however, to fight on even literally to the death. Takese thinks and believes his view is shared by others that Japan did enough in the war that it need not be ashamed. Now nearly everyone realizes that their previous ignorance of America was profound; most of them think that the shaking up as a result of defeat may prove a good thing. Certainly this is the attitude of the intelligencia but it goes up and down the social groups pretty generally.

At this point Mrs. Takese joined us. She was one of the vice-presidents of the Nagasaki Women's Association. She confirmed her husband's statement that the women began to slacken in enthusiasm as the war went badly, though she believed that the



women were more solidly committed than the men. She explained the Women's Assn. It was fusion of two national groups, one primarily patriotic, the other a sort of civilian defense outfit. The national president was some very high noblewoman. They prepared comfort kits for the soldiers, tried to promote farm production, maintained nurseries for the children of working women. In June of this year the Assn. was disbanded on the grounds that women should be tending to their homes and the education of their children.

Prof. Takese added that the drafted manpowers was supposed to have become much less efficient.

The question of the war's objectives was raised. First what did the people think they were. They did not think. They were just plunged into war, willy nilly. Few saw it coming and they were not at all consulted. They were already tired out by the Chinese war and apprehensive of the outcome. Taking on America too seemed like too much. Had the people been consulted they would have undoubtedly said no. This was particularly true in Nagasaki which has been so much helped by American Missionary Schools. There was very little hostility to the Americans even during the war. And when the American planes went over N. on the way of Omura and did not bomb N. many of the common people thought it was because of the traditional bonds between N. and America.

E. suggested that apparently the apathy thus described evidently gave way to some enthusiasm for the Tojo co-prosperity sphere idea. How much so and how was it done? Well the people did not want war but when they were in it they tried to understand what it was supposed to be all about. Intellectuals tried to understand it first and then to help the common people understand. It was really quite an increase in cultural standard. The idea of co-prosperity eventually took hold. It continued to be pretty firmly held until the end. Now, however, it is just never mentioned - people seem to have forgotten all about it.

As to the machinery of morale control, there were public meetings, newsreels, propaganda in the schools (some of it aimed at the parents), and Ken directives which were passed on through the Tonari gumi. (E. had previously mentioned the press and the radio.) Of them all, T. believed the newsreel most effective.

People resented the police control of rationing, did not consider it fair. The work of the tonari gumi was on the whole good.

E. asked whether the Tonari gumi might become an instrumentality for democracy. T. replied that it was already a good example of simple democracy. Mrs. T. said it promoted neighborliness and threw the rich and poor together (especially true in Japan where rich and poor live cheek by jowl H.B.E.) And things were much more effective when they were discussed. This talking things over

is a peculiarly Japanese trait. (I think something was lost in translation here; they mean some sort of peculiar sort of talking things out, I believe). E. agreed with all this but pointed out that the tonari gumi mainly served to pass on orders from above. It might be a democratic instrument but it was for undemocratic purposes. Could the flow be reversed, let the tonari gumi serve more as the basic unit in policy making. T. agreed. A rather long discussion of Democracy followed. Both R's felt that there was very little understanding of democracy. T. thinks that the movies may be a powerful force in its development.

E. asked about the schools. Both were emphatic that the schools were undemocratic in matter and method. There are some changes in the content already under way but the change in the temper of the schools will take a long time. E. raised the question of the family pattern. The R's agreed that this was of crucial importance. Japanese parents love their children but after they are very little do not know how to show it. They begin to demand absolute obedience. This is the very key of Japanese family life. Mrs. T. said that in her judgment Japan lost the war because there was not enough love in the Japanese national life. In America a father can be a pal with his sons but never in Japan. The admiring crowd of farm children who stood in front of the big open wall of the room in which the talk proceeded (with the temperature not much above 40 degrees F.) was commented on and T. pointed proudly to his motion picture equipment with which he entertains the children as proof of his own fondness for children.

Discussion then turned to the attitude of the Japanese toward Americans. Mr. T. and to a less extent Mrs. T. could not free themselves from the bonds of their own attitudes. They do not believe that Japanese people ever came to hate Americans or that the attitude fell very greatly during the war. E. ventured politely to insist that they were talking of the better educated classes and they with equal politeness implied that E. had been talking to too many uneducated ones. As a compromise it was agreed that the attitude spurted up after the occupation. T. believes there will continue to be a great revival of pro-American everything. I think he implied that the Japanese are suckers for the winner.

Finally we raised the question of the Emperor. T. agreed other R's that the people venerate the Emperor and want him to remain. They have not thought beyond that. They will accept any program which leaves him a position of reverence.

Somewhere along the line, Mrs. T. brought up the position of women and believed that there is a great movement toward a better position. It was the conventional position, but obviously well thought out and sincere.

I get the impression of a man who is not peculiarly sensitive to the currents of opinion in his own country. He is a sincere moderate, but not an active one. Like most of the intelligencia

he does not seem to sense his own responsibility. Should another war come it would again be a case of shikatanenai. Mrs. T. is probably more vigorous than he and he obviously depends upon her judgment a great deal. (That in Japan!)

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UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
MORALE DIVISION  
(Pacific)

Interview With The Ken Police Officials: Nakagasaki Ken.

INTERROGATOR: H. B. English (E)

Interpreter: Harry Fox (F)

Respondents: The Assistant Chief of Police, The Superintendent of Police in Charge of Plain Clothes Work, and The Chief of Police.

Our appointment with the Chief was for 16 hours but we finished our other appointments at the prefecture by 1430 and decided to see whether the Chief could not push up the hour. We found the Assistant available and began the interview with him. The other respondents enter as indicated.

Date: 30 November 1945.

E - We are interested in learning the effect of the war upon the general morale of the people of Japan. Will you tell us what you think?

Mr. Yoshimatsu Tagawa, Assistant Chief of the Keisatsubu: All feel that the leaders made a serious mistake.

F - We want to know the state of morale during the war.

T - Everyone thought that we were going to win.

E - We would like you to chart the curve of confidence in winning from the beginning to the end of the war, typing changes to various events.

T - From the beginning to the end, everyone including myself, was perfectly confident that we should win in the end. There was no change in this right up to the end.

E - Not even after the atomic bomb hit Nagasaki? (This direct question was the product of my astonishment at such a stupid lie.)

T - Of course after the bomb it did seem doubtful.

E - (We decided that we would get nothing but the official line from this respondent, who was obviously nervous and evasive; and turned therefore to "safer" topics.)

Will you tell us what measures were taken to maintain public morale?

T - The government did everything possible to encourage it.

E - What sorts of things?

T - The answer amounted to repeating "everything possible".

E - Were there public meetings or rallies?

T - No.

At this point we were joined by Mr. T. Toyoshima, Chief of the section of criminal affairs. He had been asked by the Chief to be with him when we discussed the background report which the Chief had been asked to make.

E - Suppose we turn to negative activities in support of morale. What was done when someone talked in favor of a compromise peace?

Toyoshima: If anyone had, it would be the responsibility of the military police. But no such thing happened, positively nothing of the kind at all.

E - Suppose a workman in a factory talked along such lines in a corner to his associates?

Toyoshima: There were agents of the secret police in the factories but absolutely nothing of the sort ever occurred.

E - How about the control of rumors?

Toyoshima: That would indeed be in the province of the Keisatsu (civil police) but there was none - none at all.

E - How about the Koreans?

Toyoshima: They made no trouble at all - they did not even spread rumors.

E - Were there new police regulations with the war?

Toyoshima: Yes, there were many from the central government. For the most part they were covered by the general regulation to do nothing which would interfere with the prosecution of the war. We were short-handed in the police department and they made us a lot of trouble but it was mostly paperwork. The people obeyed the regulations but we had a lot of work to see that everyone became acquainted with them and to make many new reports. But there was no difficulty in enforcement.

E - Were there any public sports spectacles, whether commercial or not?

Toyoshima: No, they were prohibited after the war began.

At this time the Chief of Police came, much to our relief, since it was clear that we should get nothing useful from this pair of underlings. Mr. Tagawa bowed himself out with obvious relief and Mr. Toyoshima henceforth contented himself with a watchful silence.

E - (Same question to open as was given to Tagawa)

Mr. Katsumi Mikawa, Chief of Police, Nagasaki Prefecture: I am only recently come to the Police Bureau - only about one month in this office. Previously I have been in other civil service positions. (There was a long preliminary talk in which it developed that Mr. Mikawa had been, during the war, Asst. Chief of the Section of Public and Social Affairs in the Home Affairs Ministry - translation on this point not quite clear but his curriculum vitae will be attached. Mr. English therefore courteously cut short this recital.)

M - (continuing) I was closely connected with the problem of mobilizing manpower for war work. At first it was very easy to get volunteers. You had only to announce that you needed a thousand men and you would soon have at least 900. This was the case during the first year of the war. The next year there were great difficulties in mobilizing for war industry. People began to think and to complain that the officials were arbitrary and asked too much. It was partly a matter of manpower shortage as many young men went off to war and war industry rose. The point is that the people no longer readily accepted the necessary hardships but complained. Beginning this year the difficulties were really quite tremendous. People objected and downright refused to work in the coal mines where there was a serious shortage.

Friction also developed because the military who were in charge of airplane production refused to release men for the mines, despite the urgent need. As a total result, during this year the manpower mobilization was not good. All of this bears on the question of morale. The people's refusal showed that their spirit had changed. Two year's ago they would have gladly volunteered.

E - Can you explain the change?

M - The people thought that we were too hard on them.

F - But formerly they did not think so. Why the change?

M - From the time of the Mariannas campaign they were not so sure of winning. They doubted the government propaganda. Hence the change in attitude towards the manpower mobilization.

E - Will you discuss the degree to which the people were committed to the objectives of the war. First what did they think they were?

M - The G.E.A. co-prosperity sphere. The government stage a huge propaganda campaign and the public was completely sold on it. Very completely!

E - Was this true of all classes?



~~Mr. Offenberg: The papers were full of it.~~

M - Well a few so-called internationalists - they were really very few indeed - dissented. Certainly all officials were with it save for a very few whose dissent was ~~not~~ extremely private.

E - How did the government sell this idea?

M - Of course the papers were full of it. News, articles, editorials. The Premier made talks over the radio. I ought to add that most of the people did not yet realize that there was serious prospect of trouble with America.

Let me go back to my statement about general conditions. I neglected to state that the worsening in living conditions particularly food had a lot to do with the weakening of morale. This change came gradually.

E - How about changes in commitment to the purposes of the war as time went on?

M - The suffering and discomforts of the war period gradually weakened their sense of commitment - they began to think more and more of their own welfare. Yet even though they lost their spirit, very few changed their opinion as to the desirability of the objectives.

E - You have already implied something about the people's confidence in their leaders. Will you speak more on this point? (F in interpreting spoke of Tojo thus structuring the reply.)

M - Tojo was idealized almost as a god at the beginning of the war. As the war went badly, people lost faith in him. The hardships endured also lessened faith in all leaders.

E - The morale was high at first; what means were used to effect this? We know about the newspaper campaign. What other means were used?

M - It is not mainly a matter of the means. Deeply embedded in the Japanese spirit is the will to follow the leaders as they work for the national good. All that was necessary was to have the people know that this was their country's program and they would enthusiastically set to work on it. I must emphasize then that it is not mainly a matter of any particular means but of utilizing something very strong in our national life. It did not have to be created. However there were some other things. There was the fact of the thought police. They took in any critics. There were not many. Then there was the newspaper - in the field of the means of morale control this is the most important. One thing here. If any person in any way gave voice to dubious views or even slightly obstructed the war effort, he was held up to scorn in the papers. This was a very strong factor.

E - Did the Tenari Gumi play any part?

M - Yes, they were used to distribute pronouncements - an important part in dissemination of what the people were to do and think.

E - ~~But~~ When were they organized?

M - Before the war, in about Sowa 4 or 5.

E - What is the present state of morale?

M - Resignation. There is no help for it. The people now recognize that the war purposes were futile.

E - You speak of them as futile; do you mean that they now feel that the purposes were futile or that they were impossible of attainment by war?

M - Both. Yes, I think I mean both. Certainly they now recognize on all hands that it was a great mistake to go against a great country like America. The attitude of the people toward the Americans (and the soldiers) is one of respect and appreciation. The government had told them that when the Americans marched in civilians would be massacred and raped but now they find the soldiers on the contrary most friendly.

On the other hand, there is a lot being said about adopting American democracy but I think the people are more interested in food and other living conditions.

E - At the time of the surrender, the people were more or less stunned; how do they feel now?

M - The feelings of fear lasted until the occupation actually began. Now the people feel more secure. They were also fearful about the Emperor - even more than for themselves. Now they think that the Emperor will be allowed to remain.

E - Anyone can easily find out that the Japanese people venerate the Emperor. But it is not easy to learn what they conceive his role to be. I think they cannot verbalize their attitude. Can you do it for them?

M - The average person in Japan is politically illiterate. They simply haven't thought that far. Nor has it been discussed in the papers. There is just one thing in their feeling - they want the power taken from the military and given back to the Emperor. (I do not think that this is quite what he meant; perhaps not quite what he said. He was mainly objecting to the militarists, not thinking of increasing the Emperor's prerogatives. Yet that may be part of it. B.E.)

E - Was there any increase in freak religions, etc? Any new prophets, etc.?

M - No. There has been some increase or revival of interest in Christianity since the end. Aside from the national religion, there is no very great religiosity in Japan.

E - What about the American leaflets?

M - At the first, they actually stimulated Japanese morale. Those which predicted which city would be bombed next were, on the other hand, very effective.

E - How about the others? We have our theories and would like to compare them with yours.

M - I saw only a few and don't remember them well. I never took them very seriously and most people did not.

E - How about the radio?

M - The rules against listening were too strict. I did not listen.

E - Were not the officials allowed to listen?

M - No, they were particularly enjoined not to. Some of the soldiers heard broadcasts and brought home reports. Short wave sets were collected shortly after the beginning of the war.

At this point English brought the interview ostensibly to a close, had his thanks expressed and started to rise. As an ostensible afterthought, he said: "I should like you to indulge in a little prophesy. This, I think is the curve of Japanese attitude toward the Americans and things American. (I drew a simple line showing a drop as we approached Pearl Harbor Day, then a precipitous drop during the war and up to the atom bomb and the surrender. Then I skipped the line but indicated a point quite high, almost up to the pre-war level to indicate the present attitude. Both the officials were rather visibly impressed; and of course they expressed complete agreement.) Where will the line go from now on? Mr. M. was a bit reluctant but said that he feared it would go down. Times will be hard and people will blame the occupation. He is sorry but he thinks it inevitable.

Mr. M. then expressed a desire that we convey to the Occupation Authorities his opinion that it is of the greatest importance to curb sex offenses on the part of soldiers. He knows that this is a difficult matter. But it is vital to the continuance of really good feeling.

The interview was closed at 1630. Before leaving, Mr. English told Mr. M. that he believe he had the most realistic appraisal of public attitudes of any one he had talked with. This was said mainly for the benefit of Mr. Toyoshima that he might see that the Americans were not taken in by the stupid lies of the police. Mr. M. is a typical bureaucrat, perhaps, but has not yet learned to be a police bureaucrat.

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UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
e3

**Special Interview with Mr. Takejiro Nishioka.**

Nakasaki, 16 November 1945. Began 1345, end 1610.

**Interrogator: H. B. English.**

**Interpreter: Andrew Kuroda.**

Also present: Lt. Comdr. Henry Taylor and Lt. (jg) Lefko of the USSBS regional G-2.

Mr. Nishioka's career is outlined in the appended document which seems to bring him up to about 1942. Since then he has been under arrest and was exonerated. He resumed the direction of the N. Newspaper about ten month's ago.

All direct questions are by E. - certain questions by Taylor were put after E. had concluded and are not here reported. Interpreter explained Mr. English's mission as prescribed in the direction for special interviews and directly interpreted the nature of morale as understood by the Survey.

E - Please ask Mr. N. to tell us about the attitude of the people during the war. For example, will he deal with the question of their confidence in Japan's ability to win.

N - (Mr. N. had speech which required utterance; he is a parliamentarian )  
By means of propaganda, a majority of the people of Japan were led to support the war policy of the government. However, they were not unanimous. It is a conservative estimate that 18 million persons out of 75 million did not support Tojo. The intellectuals were quite unanimous in their disapproval but were powerless. Tojo gathered the like-minded of the Diet together into the Imperial Assistance Party and dissolved the Diet. Tremendous pressure was exercised by the police in favor of the recommended candidates.

E - Did the majority favoring the war change as the war went on.

N - May I take things in my own order? (Here followed a somewhat involved description of the organizational activities of the Imperial Assistance Party, especially of General Abe 'who is now in prison' - said with much satisfaction - in organizing youth groups.) All persons who did not agree with Tojo were branded as pro-British and pro-American, unpatriotic. This was officially done by the police who called in the heads of the Neighborhood Associations and made them swear before the gods to oppose the non-recommended candidates. Still about 3 million votes were polled by such candidates.

Government communiques magnified victories and minimized setbacks and defeats. Newspapers were very closely censored. My newspaper, founded in 1925 as the Nagasaki Democrat, had 60% of the circulation in the Ken as against 40% for the other 14 papers combined. As a paper conservation measure, all were ordered merged. To prevent me from being made president as was my due, the government threw me into jail



on trumped up charges and while I was there manipulated the circulation figures. When I was vindicated and released, I was forbidden to even go near the Nagasaki Shimbun, the new merged paper, though I owned 43% of the property. Only ten months ago was I able to resume direction of my property. This is typical of the situation all over Japan.

E - Was there any change in sentiment from Tojo's 4-to-1 majority as the war wore on?

N - There was little change among the common people; they had no means of learning about what was going on. The middle classes began to wake up from about the middle of the war on. If there had only been a free press for just one day, the people would have the attitude they now have. Toward the end, however, even the common people cooperated less well with the government. Doubts were fairly common among the middle group from Saipan on, certainty of defeat from Okinawa on.

E - How did the people feel about the leaders who followed Tojo's fall?

N - They rejoiced more at the departure of a bad one than at the coming of someone they trusted.

E - Why did Tojo fall?

N - Living conditions were very bad, people were losing relatives, the conviction that the war must be going badly gained ground all the time. The intellectuals were quietly active in starting the view and it spread gradually to all.

E - You have answered us in terms of the people's confidence in their leadership; will you deal please with their belief in the purposes of the Greater East Asia war.

N - Tojo spread abroad the slogan of emancipation of Asiatics from white supremacy or rather slavery. This the people accepted. There was much talk about the brutal imperialism of G. B. and America. Also there was propaganda to the effect that the control of S. E. Asia by the western powers meant the economic strangulation of Japan. Most accepted this theory, but not the intellectuals. Slowly there came a change. Stories began to spread about the very bad way the soldiers and the commanders acted in conquered territories. Thus the idealism was not trusted so much. But most continued to believe in Japan's cause till the end.

I failed to speak earlier of the effect of the bombing. There was much propaganda about a new weapon with which to attack the U. S. Then the B-29's began to destroy the cities. At first there was good interception. When that failed, the people lost heart. The communiques as always minimized the damage but it could not be hidden. People saw with their own eyes that what the papers were forced to print was only 1/10th the truth.



I People began to write anonymous letters to the papers and ask why the truth about such and such a raid was not told. We got thousands of them.

E - Can we get some of those letters? Do you have some?

N - No, all of ours were burned when our plant was destroyed by the atomic bomb.

E - Do you have any suggestions as to courageous editors who might have preserved some of these letters? (Not answered.)

N - It was the same with the radio as with the papers - they were very closely controlled.

E - Let me change to another aspect of morale. We are interested in group solidarity - not merely in respect to war activities but all kinds of groups. Was there any change during the war?

N - (A rather long statement which came to the effect that as war confidence decreases group solidarity breaks down.)

E - Any concrete instances?

N - The allied POW's at work for the shipyards noticed a slowing up in Japanese workers; they became clock watchers.

E - When was this?

N - I can't date it.

E - How about the American propaganda?

N - Some of it was pretty clever, most of it was quite bad. The best was an appeal which was based on a Japanese classic story which is much beloved by the commonpeople - about a cat who assumed human features and was finally detected.

I am going to Tokyo next week and would like to see someone on General MacArthur's staff.

Commander Taylor could make no commitment but would see what could be done.

SUMMARY: There is no question of the sincerity of Mr. N. but he impressed me as a man who sees everything through the eyes of an "official line" - a line which we are apt to find very congenial, but which may not coincide too well with facts. He never missed an opportunity to excuse the intelligentsia.

# The Japanese Fight for Suffrage



Station in Japan for universal suffrage is nation-wide and violent, culminating recently in the dissolution of the Diet after a free-for-all fight on the floor of the House. Above is a suffragist mass meeting in the new Wrestling Amphitheater, the largest edifice of the kind in the world.



Propagandists for the universal suffrage movement en route over Tokio, speaking from their car and scattering literature. In the words of *The Mikado*, their "object is sublime; it must succeed in time."



Not much here that is suggestive of the Japan of Gilbert and Sullivan, of Etoh Esh, Mo Esh and the rest. Tokio street demonstrations, very occidental in character, were part of the demand for suffrage reform. Note the "flu" masks worn by the cautious ones, "avoiding crowds," being a trifle impracticable at the moment.



In this unusual photograph is shown a bit of "direct action." Nishitoku, one of the suffrage leaders, dictating terms to Minister of the Interior Tokana in the reception room of the Diet Building. And, in true Mrs. Pankhurstian manner, threatening dire consequences to his political fortune if the suffrage plea be not heeded.

*From an American magazine.*

6021      ⑥ 2634  
3

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
MORALE DIVISION  
(Pacific)

Special Interview with Sadao Urakami, Assistant Ration Officer for Nagasaki.

Interrogator: H. B. English  
Interpreter: Andrew Kuroda

Mr. Urakami had been very useful to the Sampling Team and it was thought that he might serve as a special respondent. As will be seen, this hope did not prove.

- E - Will you tell us a little about food conditions, etc. during the war?
- U - As you know, food was insufficient, especially toward the end of the war. Even if one had the money there was not enough to go around.
- E - Will you tell us, not your own opinion, but your estimate of the opinions of the people about Japan's ability to win the war?
- U - I think that about 50% of the people were confident that we would win. This % gradually decreased. Others hoped for a compromise and there was toward the end a great deal of desire for the intervention of some third party. This feeling grew after Saipan. However at the beginning most of the people trusted what they read in the newspapers. Later they became more skeptical.
- E - What was the attitude of the people generally toward the purposes or objectives for which Japan was waging war?
- U - The government issued propagnada about Japan's being encircled by her enemies. There was hope for a settlement by negotiation but when the U. S. froze the funds of Japan in the U. S. ~~the~~ it began to look hopeless. Then the shipment of oil from the Dutch Indies came along. The U.S. insisted on the evacuation of Japanese troops from China and that was too much for nearly everyone in Japan. If Pres. Roosevelt had granted more generous terms the war could have been avoided. As the war wore on, the reasons for starting it were less important. It had to be finished.
- E - What about the leadership?
- U - There was great confidence at first in the leadership of the country. The many cabinet changes made the people uneasy.

- E - Was this uneasiness when the Tojo government fell or was it when T. began to take over so many posts?
- U - Both. We felt that it was impossible for one person to hold down so many posts effectively. (Note the failure to object on other grounds). Personally Mr. Urakami hoped for greater strength when a new cabinet was formed.
- E - How about local leadership?
- U - The local leaders merely transmitted orders from Tokyo.
- E - There is still a function for local leadership. Did people have faith in their fairness and ability?
- U - The people knew very little. The leaders were responsible. Now the papers begin to tell the truth. They could not speak during the war. The ken government was more concerned with enforcing the orders of the central government than with the welfare of the people. The governor himself was fair but many of the middle leaders abused their privileges.
- E - How about the chonaikaicho?
- U - There were some 260 of them and of course they differed. Some were unworthy, others were greatly respected.
- E - How about group solidarity, not only in war efforts but in other associations?
- U - Organizations like the Ladies Assn. or the Reserve Assn. are all directed from above.
- E - Did the spirit of group activity change with the war?
- U - As living conditions worsened, group solidarity weakened.
- E - Were there troubles about rationing?
- U - People grumbled about the special rations given to the workers the Misuibishi plant and other factories.
- E - How about officials?
- U - They had no special rations but some of them abused their positions to get special favors. This was known and objected to by the people but they could do nothing about it.
- E - What about the present and future for Japan?
- U - For two years we shall undoubtedly have very hard living conditions, but after that we should be able to get up to above prewar conditions. Also Japan should be democratized.



E - How will the people bear the hardships?

U - If they have enough food to sustain life, there will be no riots.

E - What will their attitude be?

U - They will still be inclined to follow their leaders. For too long they have been fed too little truth.

Urakami was born in 1905, attended the Nagasaki Commercial High School. Worked for a Taxi company in Osaka. Attended a police school in Formosa for six months and became foreman of penitentiary guards for twelve years. He came to Nagasaki six years ago in the secretariate of the finance department, transferred to the ration department last January. He is in the third class of the lower civil service.

The interview reads better than it sounded. U. was evidently very hesitant to express any opinion, and was not quite intelligent enough to see that we offered him an "out" when we asked him to report the attitudes of others rather than his own. We shortened the interview because both the interviewer and the interrogator felt that it was not productive.

Special Interview with  
Mayor of Tokitsu Mura,  
Nagasaki Ken.

Interrogator: H. B. English  
Interpreter: Jun Okasaki.  
Dec. 4, 1945.

The nature of our mission and my particular requirements of the Mayor were explained in the regular manner.

E. Please tell us about the conditions of livelihood in your mura during the war.

Mayor: As conditions of scarcity developed, the black market came into being. The farmers got along quite well by dealing in that market, even tho they were often unable to get things they wanted.

E. When did this black market get going?

M. Some time in 1942.

E. Please tell us about the people's confidence in winning the war - any changes from beginning to end.

M. At the beginning nearly everyone thought that the war could be won but after the raids on Omura began and the planes went overhead here all the time, they began to wonder. Also goods became more scarce. Then the draft of workers for war factories made people uneasy. (Apparently he means this as a factor in confidence, not of resentment). By April of this year there were frank doubts.

E. When was it that the planes began to come over on the way to Omura?

M. I believe it was in 1943.

E. Was it after the fall of Saipan?

M. Yes, I think so but there were a few from China bases.

E. Did you have many evacuees here before the big bomb?

M. Not very many, but after the atomic bomb very many.

E. What arrangements were made by public authorities?

M. The evacuees paid for their living quarters and food. Those in need got money from the Ken on recommendation of their home mayor. There was some private charity. Local people here helped by finding places for them to rent.

E. Did evacuation cause crowding?

M. Tremendous. Even before it began, people were being forced to utilize attics and outbuildings.

E. Did the crowding lead to any complaints? (P) E.g. was there trouble about children being in the way or not getting along.

M. Things worked out very satisfactorily. I thought that we should treat the evacuees kindly and told the villagers so.

E. Did the evacuees work on the farms, etc.

M. Very few. (In answer to your last question, I should say that there was some complaint by evacuees about high prices for rent and food. As to work, there was some surprise that so few were able to work on the farms. But the evacuees were mostly old people and small children.

Some of the younger people commuted to Nagasaki to work.

E. In addition to propaganda by newspaper and radio, what steps were taken to support morale?

M. The Imperial Assistance Assn. and the govt. - these I may add were really almost the same thing - held meetings through the tonari gumi urging more food stuff production and greater savings. It worked like this: The mayors of the machi and mura of a gun would meet and be given a talk by someone from the regional office of the ken (chi-hojimusho) or perhaps from the ken office itself. Then the next day the mayors would meet with the heads of the burako and they in turn would pass things on to the tonari gumi.

E. Was there any attempt at negative measures- by the police, for example?

M. No.

E. Was there any trouble with the labor mobilization?

M. I don't know. There was a special office in the ken for that.

E. What was done about people spreading rumors?

M. In the country this is not much of a problem. Nothing was done. I was ordered to form an anti-espionage society but I ignored the order as there was no need here.

E. Were many leaflets dropped here?

M. Quite a few.

E. Contents?

M. I did not see many and don't remember much. One dealt with Saipan as the last five minutes before Japan's destruction. It told us to urge the Emperor to end the war.

E. Which of the leaflets did you consider the best?

M. I doubt that the leaflets any of them have any very explicit effect. Were not conscious of any change in morale. But they were part of the total picture. When Japanese interception failed and the enemy could take time safely to drop leaflets, that was rather impressive.

E. What about ARP.

M. It was nominal.

E. Bombing?

M. L6 bombs were dropped near the school in Mar, 45.

It was when the first flights over Japan (the word used was 'task force') were being made. I think it was before the big Tokyo raids. The only damage was windows.

E. (The rather directive structuring about the people's being unable to speak their true thoughts about the Emperor and my hope that he as a more intelligent person could interpret their feelings.)

M. All desire the Emperor's retention. As to his role- that is too big a question for me. But the people all think that the Emperor is a true lover of peace. The notion of the 8 corners of the world and all peoples under one roof shows that. They believe that the end of the war was due to his benevolent desire to spare his people and others.

The Mayor's vita is attached. He was pretty uneasy during the interview and often took out time to think. But I think that he was reasonably sincere in his replies.

父房吉名義、以時津村收入役事務を處理す

自昭和七年一月三十一日

時津村收入役

自昭和九年一月三十一日

時津村助役

自昭和十三年一月三十一日

時津村長

自昭和十三年一月三十一日

時津村農業會長

自昭和十九年六月

時津村漁業會長

右之通り相違無之候也

昭和二十一年十二月六日

横山政美





復歴書

住所 長崎縣西彼杵郡時津村三二七番戸

氏名

横山政美

生年月日

明治三十七年八月二日生

學子

解任

明治四十四年四月

時津尋常高等小學校、入學

大正八年三月

全校高等科第二學年卒業

大正八年四月

長崎縣立農學校、入學

大正十一年三月

全校卒業

職

業

自大正十二年十一月

准教員として時津尋常高等小學校、卒業職

至大正十三年一月

年齢若くして公民権ヲキル為

自大正十三年一月三十一日

至昭和七年一月三十一日

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Special Interview with Eiji Nozawa:  
Principal of the Youth School,  
Tokitsu, Nagasaki Ken.

Interrogator: H.B.English  
Interpreter: Jun Okazaki

12/4/45

The field team was using the Youth School Building for interviews. As the Youth Schools are peculiarly nationalistic, it seemed worth while to endeavor to get the point of its principal.

E. Will you kindly describe this mura for me since we have just arrived.

N. At present we have about 8000 inhabitants. The population formerly was around 6000 but we have received many evacuees from Nagasaki. The mura is mainly agricultural but there is some part-time fishing for additional revenue. One baraku has a number of people who commute from Nagasaki - mostly laborers but some white collar workers. The community is a reasonably prosperous one as villages go in Japan.

E. Were there any air raids?

N. Yes fifteen bombs were dropped not very far from the school. No one was hurt and the damage was negligible. There was much broken glass and a few roofs were blown partly off. A few fishermen and farmers along the coast were strafed but no one was hurt. There were some more windows and roofs damaged at the time of the atomic bomb on Nagasaki. Of course the planes went overhead constantly on their way to Omura. (Naval Base.)

E. Were there any changes in the people's confidence of winning the war?

N. They seemed full of confidence from beginning to end but after a time they used to ask me, 'Honorable Teacher, do you think we win?' Perhaps the asking of such questions showed some doubts.

E. When were such questions begun?

N. I believe at the time when the air raids were beginning to get heavy. - about May of June, 1945.

E. Did the children ever ask any questions showing lack of confidence in winning? (A positive answer was not expected but would have been significant if obtained.) No. Certainly not many. You realize that the children were led to believe that we should certainly win.

E. What was the reaction to the surrender?

N. The people were disappointed. The Nagasaki bombing was on the 9th of Aug. This school was a reception center. The Army doctors here doubted that the news was authentic. It was perhaps ~~three~~ a day before they would accept it.

E. What were the children taught as to the purposes of the war?

N. They were taught on the basis of the Imperial Rescript.

E. Could you tell me about that? (Probe) For example, were they taught that the war was for the co-prosperity sphere?

N. Yes. They were also taught to lay down their lives for the Emperor, because he asked it. (some unwillingness to continue).

E. Was there any change in the people's attitude to local leaders?

N. No.

E. We know that the people of Japan venerate the Emperor. But most of them are unable to put in words what they think should be his role. Can you as a more intelligent person interpret to us what they think? (P) The role of the Emperor changed from the time of the Shogunate to the present quite a lot. What will it be now?

N. You must realize that our attitude to the Emperor transcends the light of reason. We have faith in him but not as to a human leader.

E. What should be his relation to his Cabinet, etc.

N. The officials of all ranks try to understand the will of the Emperor and then to do it as they understand it.

E. Will that continue to be the relation?

N. Yes. (Pause). There will be no change in that but if we get a democracy, then the Emperor will be closer to the people.

E. Many people express some such idea. They speak of barriers between the Emperor and the people. How may these barriers be removed?

N. If the Diet becomes more representative of the people, then the will of the Emperor will be more clearly made known to the Diet. We must elect representatives of the people - true representatives. In that case, the government will be one in which full confidence can be placed.

E. Do you think that the people are ready for more local self government?

N. Yes through the development of democracy. But the people do have much political consciousness. Unless they are further trained in self government, it will be no more than a large noisy meeting of the unreformed.

Mr. Nozawa was born and educated in Nagasaki Ken, went to a small town agricultural school and then to normal school. He was a grade school teacher for 8 yrs. and 14 years teacher in the youth school. He came to Tokitsu 1 yr. ago.

I believe the interview rather clearly expresses his mystical nationalism, his essentially anti-democratic bias, together with some 'popular' leanings.

疎開冬童月別調査表

年別	一月	二月	三月	四月	五月	六月	七月	八月	九月	十月	十一月	十二月
初年	九	七	四	三	二	一	一	二	三	四	五	六
二年	三	四	一	二	三	四	五	六	七	八	九	一〇
三年	二	一	六	五	四	三	二	一	二	三	四	五
四年	一	七	三	二	一	六	五	四	三	二	一	六
五年	一	一	四	三	二	一	六	五	四	三	二	一
六年	一	九	二	一	六	五	四	三	二	一	六	五
七年	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一
八年	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一
九年	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一
十年	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一
計	二九	二二	一〇	一〇	一〇	一〇	一〇	一〇	一〇	一〇	一〇	一〇

一、二、三、四、五、六、七、八、九、一〇、一一、一二、一三、一四、一五、一六、一七、一八、一九、二〇、二一、二二、二三、二四、二五、二六、二七、二八、二九、三〇、三一、三二、三三、三四、三五、三六、三七、三八、三九、四〇、四一、四二、四三、四四、四五、四六、四七、四八、四九、五〇、五一、五二、五三、五四、五五、五六、五七、五八、五九、六〇、六一、六二、六三、六四、六五、六六、六七、六八、六九、七〇、七一、七二、七三、七四、七五、七六、七七、七八、七九、八〇、八一、八二、八三、八四、八五、八六、八七、八八、八九、九〇、九一、九二、九三、九四、九五、九六、九七、九八、九九、一〇〇



疎開児童月別調査表

年別	昭和十九年	昭和二十年	昭和二十一年	昭和二十二年	昭和二十三年	昭和二十四年	昭和二十五年	昭和二十六年	昭和二十七年	昭和二十八年	昭和二十九年	昭和三十年	計
一月	七	九	九	八	六	五	九	一	五	四	一	一	一
二月	三	三	二	二	一	二	二	三	三	四	一	一	一
三月	二	二	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一
四月	二	二	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一
五月	二	二	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一	一
六月	三	二	五	二	三	三	二	二	二	二	二	二	二
七月	三	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二
八月	三	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二
九月	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二
十月	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二
十一月	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二
十二月	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二	二
計	二四	三六	六四	三六	二九	二六	二六	二六	二六	二六	二六	二六	二六

備考

昭和十九年八月中三集団三三六二八名

三十年三月中二集団三三六一四二名

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UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
MORALE DIVISION  
(Pacific)

12/5/45

Special Interview with the  
Principal of the Methodist Middle School  
for Girls.

This took the form of an informal evening's conversation between Andrew Kuroda, Mr. Moto and H. B. English. No notes were taken at all.

Mr. Moto thought that the commitment to the purposes of the war was very high. On the other hand, he did not think that the governmental campaign of hatred to Americans was effective. In their hearts the Japanese did not hate them, even though some resentment of the enemy is natural. He was most emphatic in attributing this to the common people and not merely to the intellectuals.

The democratic tendency in Japan is admittedly rather superficial but Mr. Moto has high hopes for the new suffrage arrangements. The rest is a matter of education.

Pressed for a program, he would establish a demonstration school and show what a Christian democratic school can be like. Mr. English expressed hearty approval of this but pointed out that such demonstration schools in American - there are some fifty or more of them of one sort or another - have not made very fast progress. What would one such school do for Japan? Isn't there something else?

M Mr. Moto fell back on the need to Christianize Japan. Was this not a pretty distant prospect? He thought not. Indeed he thinks that the Emperor may be converted soon and carry the whole nation with him into Christianity.

State Shinto in the schools did not seem to him much of a problem. The veneration of the Emperor is merely the expression of respect. Of course as a Christian he regards the Emperor as merely a man but he does respect him and thinks he is a good man. And he is the symbol of national unity. If he were removed there would be a terrific national upheaval.

Apparently during the war Mr. Moto was a go-along in a guarded way. What else could he do? For his faith he was willing to die. ~~What~~ But when his country was at war, he thought it his duty to support it. Now he was in trouble with the educational officer of M. G. who apparently thinks that Christianity should be put above allegiance to Japan, though he would certainly not apply that standard to America.

I am impressed anew with the relative futility and sterility of the intellectuals of Japan. Mr. Moto is a good administrator of his school and may be a considerable influence for good in that way. But that is all.

Mr. Takejiro Nishioka's Career.

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Amme

1. He has born at Ginya-Machi, Nagasaki City, Nagasaki Prefecture at May 23rd of Meiji (1890). The place of domicile is 80, Nakagawa-machi, Nagasaki city. The present place is 21, 3-chome, Ichigaya-Tamachi, Ushigomeku, Tokyo city.
1. He left the Tozan Institute - one of Mission school at Nagasaki and he graduated the law department of the Waseda University at July in 5th of Taisho (1917).
1. He was engaged in physical labour at Nagasaki and or in Tokyo from 28th of Meiji (1905) to 3rd of Taisho (1915).
1. From 3rd of Taisho (1915) to July 5th of Taisho (1917), that is to say: to the day of the graduation of the Waseda University he was a journalist for about one and a half years.
1. In the 3rd of Taisho (1915) he called together those of the same mind of the University of the Government or Private establishment and established the young men's radical party and then came to be its leader and he insisted the decisive action of the universal suffrage. This is the origin of the multitude agitation in our country.
1. He went to China, Korea, Manchuria and India, twice in 3rd of Taisho (1915) and 5th of the same (1917).
1. At September in 5th of Taisho (1917) he published the initial number of a magazine - "Seinenyuben" and he had been engaged in the political education of young men as its president and chief editor before he went abroad for prosecuting his study.
1. In 6th of Taisho (1918), he was elected as a standing manager in the League of the Universal Suffrage established by his senior in 6th of Taisho (1918), and he made every efforts to the agitation of the universal suffrage with his senior.
1. In 8th of Taisho (1920) he called together the young men in the whole country with those of the same mind and he organized the League of the Young Men's Reconstruction. As its leader, he did its demonstration sometimes and went canvassing to the whole country. He visited Premier Hara, Prince Yamagata or Mr. K. Kato and insisted the decisive action of the universal suffrage and he struggled for the propagation of the universal suffrage.
1. In 9th of Taisho (1921), he formed the independent club with his seniors - Messrs. Y. Ozaki, S. Shimada, K. Matsumoto and Y. Imai and he was elected as one of its ranks. He struggled to make the universal suffrage become a problem in the Imperial Diet.

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1. In the meantime, he was condemned to a penalty seven times, owing to a fatal slips of the pen and the discussion, by the Government.

In the 10th of Taisho(1922), he went to England for prosecuting his study of parliamentarism and social policy, moreover, he travelled about United States of America, French, Germany, Italy, Chekko-Surovekiya, Ireland and other countries. At February in 13th of Taisho(1925) he returned to Japan owing to the dissolution and stood as a candidate for election.

1. At may in 13th of Taisho(1925) he stood as a candidate of Nagasaki Prefecture. He defeated Mr. T.Honda, the greatest influential person in Nagasaki Prefecture, that is chairman of the head office of the Kenseikai and he acquired the highest point and he was elected as a member of parliament.

1. At November in 13th of Taisho(1925) he published the initial number of the Nagasaki Minyu Newspaper and he came to be its president.

1. Owing to the manifesto and the speech about six great problem at Nagasaki -the problem of Kwanmon Tunnel (between Shimonoseki/Moji) museum and aquarium etc., he was brought as action and came to be a guilty person. At February in 14th of Taisha(1926), he was disqualified for a member of parliament.

1. He became a member of the Rikken Seiyukai.

1. At February in 14th of Taisho(1926) he published the initial number of the Sasebo Minyu Newspaper at Sasebo city and came to be its president.

1. At February in 3rd of Showa(1928) he stood as a candidate of Nagasaki prefecture and he acquired the highest point and he was elected as a member of parliament.

1. In 3rd of Showa(1928), he became the standing secretary of the head office of the Rikken Seiyukai.

1. At February in 5th of Showa(1930), he acquired the highest points in Nagasaki Prefecture and he was selected as a member of parliament. In the meantime, he had often been selected as a manager of the head office, a standing manager of the head office and a manager in the House of Representatives.

1. In 7th of Showa(1932), he came to be a parliament manager in the House of Representatives.

1. He was ordered as a member of committee of the consideration meeting of resources.

1. He was ordered to be a committee of the International Tourist Committee Meeting.



( 3 )

1. At February in 11th Showa(1936) , he stood as a candidate in Nagasaki Prefecture with S. Kuranari (his younger brother). he acquired the highest points and he was elected and also Kuranari acquired the second points and also he was elected as a member of parliament.
1. In 11th of Showa(1936), he was sent by the House of Representatives as one of the representatives for the inspection of all the region of Philippine and the South Sea Islands.
1. He was elected as one of committee in the committee meeting of encouraging saving.
1. At April in 12th of Showa (1937) he stood as a candidate in Nagasaki Prefecture with Kuranari and Ota, five men were to be elected and we three men were elected without accident.
1. In 12th of Showa(1937), as the head of the consolatery party in the House of Representatives, he was sent to Shanghai and Formosa with 15 members.
1. He was appointed to a vice minister of the Naval Political Affairs at September of 14th of Showa(1939).
1. He had often been elected as a Parliamentary Manager of the House of Representatives.
1. He received the senior grade of the fifth class court rank and the third class of Rising Sun.
1. In the General Election at April in 17th of Showa (1942), he stood as a candidate under Tojo Cabinet as a unrecommender.
1. He was greatly intervened by all the authorities at Nagasaki - police, prefecture, gendarmery, the municipal office, the public procurator's office, Yokusankai and Yokusan Senendan and he was the person obtaining the next number and he failed to be elected.
1. At present he is the president of Nagasaki Newspaper office which in only one newspaper office at Nagasaki Prefecture.

The end.

23 October 1945

SECRET

CIVIL INTELLIGENCE REPORT

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F-5  
Amme

Subject: NISHIOKA, Takejiro, Brief Personal History of.

Born: May 1890, NAGASAKI Ken, NAGASAKI City

Present Address: NAGASAKI City, Nakagawa machi No. 30

Education: Graduate of NASEDA University Law School, 1917

Work:

1905-1915 various types of ordinary hard labor  
NAGASAKI and TOKYO

1915-1917 (1) Reporter, Miyako Press (popular among  
geisha circles) while attending school.

(2) During this period organized a Young  
Men's Progressive Party (Seinen-kyu Shinto) amongst  
Tokyo University students. Purpose: Universal  
suffrage; claims this is the beginning of the  
popular-suffrage party (Min shu do) in Japan.

(3) Travelled in Korea, China, India.

1918 Established the Suffrage Society (Futsu  
Senkyo Kisei Domei Kai).

1920 Organized a Society for the Improvement of  
Young Men. Members traveled throughout Japan.  
They were aided in this democratic work by HARA  
(then Premier), Prince YAMAGATA and Lord KATO,  
Komei.

1921 Organized the MUSHOKOKU Club with the aid of  
SHIMADA, Saburo, MATSUNOTO, Kimihara and IMAI,  
Kayuki. This group acted as lobbyists in the Diet  
for popular suffrage. Seven of its members were  
sentenced for speeches and writings.

1922 Studied Parliamentary Procedure and Social  
Activities in England.

1925 returned to Japan (after Diet resigned), be-  
came candidate and was elected to the lower house of  
the Diet. Started the NAGASAKI MINYU (People's Friend)  
Newspaper.

1927 (1) Lost his seat in the Diet because of his  
lectures on the KAIMON Tunnel Project.

(2) Became a member of the Constitutional Party  
(Rikken-Seiyukai).

(3) Started another "People's Friend" newspaper  
in SASEBO.

1928 Elected to Diet from Nagasaki.

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1930 Elected to Diet from Nagasaki.

1932 (1)Elected to Diet from Nagasaki.

(2)In the Diet became head committee man of the general affairs Comm., Investigation of Natural Resources Comm. and the International Tourists Committee.

1936 (1)Elected to Diet from Nagasaki.

(2)Was dispatched to investigate the Inner and Outer South Seas Areas: also the Philippines.

(3)Thrift Assn. Committee member.

1937 Sent to Shanghai to investigate the morale of Japanese soldiers stationed there.

1939 Became Kaigun Seimu Jikan (Naval Political vice-Minister)in the Lower House of the Diet.

1941 Was not recommended by TOJO for leadership in the Yokusan Seijikai (Imperial Assistance Party) but won nomination regardless. Was not elected.

1942-1945 Manager and President of the Nagasaki newspaper.

Note on the 1941 General Election; In the last general election many false accusations and much pressure was made to bear upon Nishioka. The politicians of the Diet under TOJO recognized his power in the Diet as well as in Nagasaki (the last time elected he received 4/5 of all the votes cast even though there were four (4) other candidates against him), and as a result was not recommended as a candidate for election to the Diet. His popularity among the people however, won him an unrecommended candidacy. This resulted in a second attempt by Tojo supporters to put Nishioka out of the running. The Police Inspector from Nagasaki was sent to Tokyo with an order for Nishioka to return to Nagasaki at once. At the depot in Nagasaki he was met by the Nagasaki City Police Chief and 30 other armed police, was arrested, and escorted to jail. (No civilians were allowed to be on the station platform at his arrival, which made them think a royal prince must be arriving). The police did not lead him directly to jail, but first paraded him through the city streets. He was not allowed to speak, nor later to write a word in his behalf; nor were the people allowed to use posters in his support. Police representatives were sent throughout the ken stating that Nishioka had abandoned his post in the Diet, that he was pro-American and an enemy of the country. He was held on a trumped-up charge of buying voters. Every Neighborhood Society Leader was made to promise in writing that he would vote for the recommended candidate, and were even led to shrines and made to vow to Gods that they would do so. At the polls the people were carefully watched by the police. For example, at a certain poll a certain policeman, suspecting a Korean voter, approached him and asked, "For whom would you vote? Please write." and the Korean wrote Nishioka's name.

Whereupon the policeman snapped "Keshi karan" in an attempt to intimidate him. Asked the Korean, "For whom shall I vote?" "Write BABA, Genji" said the policeman. This was witnessed and reported by the keeper of the poll at which the incident occurred. On the strength of this incident Nishioka tried to bring suit against the Japanese Government but his request was annulled by the official prosecutor of Nagasaki Ken. Nishioka then appealed directly to the Supreme Court (Daishinin) in Tokyo; whereupon that august body came to Nagasaki, tried Nishioka and acquitted him. He was given reparation (a mere 50 yen) the receipt of which he carries in his purse. The signature on the receipt is that of the Legal Minister, who is now in prison by request of the Allied Forces Command.) The two (2) chief prosecutors of the city lost their positions.

Some of the police officers against him met "violent death" and some were **discharged** from office, but still some remain:

HIRA, Toshiyuki	Now in Tokyo
HISAYASU	Then Chief Police Inspector, now Governor of AKITA Prefecture.
MATSUURA, Sakai	Then Police Inspector, now vice-Governor of IBARAGI Prefecture.
KAWAGUCHI, Masataro	Foreign Affairs Chief of the Minister of the Interior.
KASHI, Gentaro	Then Chief Police Inspector, SHIMANE Prefecture (not working now).
TOYOSHIMA,	Chief Police Detective, Nagasaki Pref.
KAMOSHIMA	Now at Police Station, Sasebo.
OKADA, Hagi	Now a prefectural governor.
OKADA, Jukichi	Now Nagasaki City Mayor.