

11,137 1249 - 1265

11,145 MR. OKAMOTO, further cross-examination by -
on matters relating to the affidavit of Mr. Ballantine, in
which he attempted to ask various questions concerning the
position of the U. S., the President and the State Depart-
ment, most of which the Court held were outside the scope
of the affidavit.

11,166 ADMIRAL JAMES O. RICHARDSON called as a witness.
After stating his qualifications, Admiral Richardson read
his prepared statement, Ex. 1249, and the various exhibits
to which reference is made in his statement (Ex.1250-1265).
This statement presents evidence of plans and preparations
made by the Japanese Navy leading up to naval hostilities
which Japan initiated and waged at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7,
1941. Statement appears at pages 11,166 to 11,238. Refer-
ence made to the stand taken by Japan at the London Naval
Conference on Jan. 15, 1936. Testified NAGANO had advocated
"the abolition of aircraft carriers and a drastic reduction
in capital ships and "A" Class cruisers. (11,181) The af-
fidavit also charged that NAGANO and the late ADMIRAL YAMA-
MOTO closely cooperated as early as 1936, and especially in
1941-43, in their capacities as Chief of the Japanese Naval
General Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet
in working out the plans and issuing the orders for the at-
tack on Pearl Harbor. Japan relied on three steps to exe-
cute the policy; namely, to abolish treaty limitations on
construction of aircraft carriers; construction of aircraft
carriers and supporting naval units until Japan had carrier
supremacy over the U.S.; and the use of an aircraft carrier
task force for making a secret, sudden attack to destroy
before the war began the men and ships of the U.S. Pacific
Fleet. Following Japan's withdrawal from the London Confer-
ence in January, 1936, Japan rejected American, British and
French proposals for the reciprocal exchange of information
on naval construction but continued to obtain extensive in-
formation in regard to naval construction in the U.S. by
methods including consular espionage, etc. He also surveyed
the secret developments of the Japanese fleet, showing that
on Dec. 7, 1941, Japan had ten aircraft carriers, whereas Amer-
ica had only six, with only three of them in the Pacific;
that in what he termed the "sneak attack" on Pearl Harbor,
the statement showed that Japan had sent out six carriers,
naming them, which constituted 75% of the Japanese total car-
rier tonnage strength, which hurled into the attack 360 air-
planes. Admiral Richardson termed the Japanese force "one
of the most powerful task forces ever assembled up to that
time, with overwhelming carrier air force supremacy over the
naval forces attacked.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)	
and Others)	<u>Prepared Statement and Report</u>
- AGAINST -)	<u>on Japanese Naval Preparation</u>
	<u>1931-1941</u>
ARAKI, Sadao)	
and Others)	

21.10. 6

Prepared Statement and Report by Admiral
James O. Richardson, United States Navy, Retired:

1. In response to the request of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, dated 31 May 1946, the Secretary of the Navy on 25 July 1946 designated me to appear as a witness before this Tribunal to present information in regard to documents in the custody of the Navy Department bearing on the questions at issue here.

2. I proceeded to consult official naval reports, records and documents made or kept by officers acting in the course of official duties and in accordance with established naval procedure in investigating, recording and reporting facts which are matters of concern to the United States

Navy. This statement is a report to this Tribunal of my investigation of those records which bear upon the subject of the plans and preparations made by the Japanese Navy leading up to the naval hostilities which Japan initiated and waged on and after 7 December 1941. This subject will be presented under four headings, as follows:

- (1) The plans and preparations concerned with naval construction, particularly construction of aircraft carriers.
- (2) The plans and preparations concerned with the establishment of naval bases and the erection of fortifications in the Mandated Islands.
- (3) The plans and preparations concerned with consular espionage as an aid to naval attack.
- (4) The plans and preparations for secret attack by Japanese aircraft carrier task force upon the United States naval personnel and ships at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, without notification having been given by Japan to the United States by a previous, explicit and reasoned warning that there would be a commencement of hostilities in a war by Japan against the United States.

I.

The plans and preparations concerned with naval construction, particularly construction of aircraft carriers.

3. The aircraft carrier was recognized as early as 1934 by the Japanese naval leaders, Admiral Isoroku YAMAMOTO and Admiral Osami NAGANO to be the best type of naval arm for expansion and aggression. This is shown by the following records of statements made by them.

4. This official Japanese position that aircraft carriers were essentially what they called "offensive" or aggressive naval arms was stated by Admiral YAMAMOTO and by Admiral NAGANO at meetings connected with the London Naval Conference of 1935. YAMAMOTO, who, seven years later, was to be the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet in the Pearl Harbor aircraft carrier attack, took the position at a meeting of the American and Japanese delegations on 29 October 1934 that Japan should not be suspected of having aggressive designs in the Far East. In supporting this position, YAMAMOTO said that the Japanese, in fact, were willing to abolish aircraft carriers--upon terms which the Japanese would consider satisfactory to

themselves--whereas, he said, "If they (the Japanese) had aggressive designs in the Far East, nothing would be more useful than the retention of aircraft carriers." (IPS Document No. 6250)

5. Admiral NAGANO, the leader of the Japanese delegation in the London Conference, who was soon to become Japanese Navy Minister and later, at the time of the Pearl Harbor aircraft carrier attack, to be the Chief of the Japanese Naval General Staff, speaking at an official session of the London Conference on 15 January 1936, stated again the Japanese view that aircraft carriers were the principal type of aggressive naval arms. NAGANO said, "In order to establish as complete a state of non-aggression and non-menace as possible, we advocate****the abolition of aircraft carriers," and a reduction in certain other classes of naval vessels. (IPS Document No. 6251)

6. The official naval leadership and the personal cooperation of NAGANO and YAMAMOTO are indicated not only by their joint efforts in connection with

the London Naval Conference, but also by the fact that NAGANO and YAMAMOTO for a considerable period in 1936-1937 served together as Navy Minister and Vice Minister, respectively, and later, in 1941-1943, as Chief of the Japanese Naval General Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, respectively, the positions in which they took the lead in working out the plans and in issuing the orders for the Pearl Harbor attack.

7. The records further show that NAGANO and YAMAMOTO and their associates made the construction and use of aircraft carriers a central principle of Japanese naval policy. The execution of this policy involved three steps: first, the abolition of existing treaty limitations on the construction of aircraft carriers, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and the removal of the treaty barriers to secrecy in naval construction; second, the construction of aircraft

carriers and supporting naval units until Japan had carrier supremacy over the United States; and third, the use of an aircraft carrier task force for making a secret, sudden attack to destroy before war began the men and ships of the United States Pacific Fleet while the ships were lying at anchor or moorings in Pearl Harbor.

8. The first step, namely the abolition of existing treaty limitations on the construction of aircraft carriers, was carried out under the naval leadership of YAMAMOTO and NAGANO as Japanese naval representatives attending the meetings connected with the London Naval Conference. The Washington Treaty of 1922 had limited Japan by ratio to a total carrier tonnage of 81,000 tons. The Japanese representatives demanded the abolition of the existing treaty limitations on naval construction. The Japanese demanded in place of the existing ratio or proportional limitations a treaty limitation based on what they called "a common upper limit." The other nations considered that the adoption of the proposal would result in

the abolition of any limitation rather than in the maintenance of any effective limitation.

None of the other nations agreed with the Japanese demands. The Japanese gave notice on 29 December 1934 of their intention to terminate the treaty under its terms to take effect 31 December 1936. On 16 January 1936, led by Admiral NAGANO, the Japanese withdrew from the conference, refusing to join the other nations in the formulation of a new treaty to limit naval construction.

9. Under the provisions of the Washington Treaty of 1922 and the London Treaty of 1930, Japan, the United States and Great Britain had been exchanging reports on their naval construction. When not bound by these treaty provisions because of her termination thereof, Japan, in communications which included letters exchanged in 1938 between Foreign Minister HIROTA and Ambassador Grew, rejected American, British, and French proposals for the reciprocal exchange of information on naval construction. Japan, however, continued to obtain extensive information in regard

to naval construction in the United States by methods including the consular espionage which will be described hereafter.

10. As the second step in Japanese naval policy, the Japanese Navy and Government between 1936 and 1941 proceeded with an expanded program of aircraft construction. In 1936, Japan had four carriers, with a tonnage of 68,400 tons. By 7 December 1941, however, only five years later, Japan had more than doubled her carrier strength, having ten carriers, with a tonnage of 178,070 tons.

11. In addition to increases in aircraft carrier construction, Japan, between 1931 and 1941, increased her heavy cruisers from eight in 1931 to eighteen in 1941, destroyers from fifty-two to 102, and submarines from forty-four to seventy-four. During the same period, the United States facing increasing naval responsibilities in two oceans brought its total number of heavy cruisers from ten to eighteen, the same number as Japan,

while the number of destroyers dropped from 225 to 171, and the number of submarines increased from eighty-one to 112. By way of comparison in aircraft carriers, in the years 1934 and 1936, when Admiral YAMAMOTO and Admiral HAGANO, respectively, made the statements at the London Conference as quoted above, the Japanese Navy and the United States Navy each had four aircraft carriers. On 7 December 1941, whereas Japan had ten aircraft carriers, the United States had only six and only three of them were in the Pacific.

12. The third and final step in the execution of the Japanese naval policy with regard to the construction and use of aircraft carriers was the use by Japan of an aircraft carrier task force as the attacking force in the Pearl Harbor attack. The six carriers which the Japanese sent against Pearl Harbor, namely, KAGA, AKAGI, SORYU, HIRYU, SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU, were the Japanese Navy's most powerful carriers. They constituted 75% of the Japanese Navy's entire carrier tonnage strength, and they sent into the attack 360 planes, constituting

probably 75% of the total Japanese carrier plane strength. The maximum total number of carrier based planes which the United States naval forces could have mustered if the two carriers then in the Hawaiian area, namely the USS LEXINGTON and the USS ENTERPRISE, had been at Pearl Harbor would have been approximately 180 planes. In other words, Japanese naval construction of aircraft carriers between 1936 and 1941 enabled Japan to send against the United States Navy's men and ships at Pearl Harbor one of the most powerful task forces ever assembled up to that time, with overwhelming carrier air force supremacy over the naval forces attacked. Moreover, a principal target and objective of the Japanese Navy in making the attack was to destroy the two United States carriers based at Pearl Harbor, and thereby to increase the already predominant Japanese carrier supremacy in the Pacific.

13. To summarize, Japanese plans and preparations concerned with naval construction between 1931 and 1941 were characterized by the express recognition

by NAGANO and YAMAMOTO, leading Japanese naval authorities, that aircraft carriers were the principal type of naval construction for conducting aggressive naval warfare, and by the termination by Japan of existing treaty limitations on the construction of carriers and other naval arms. Japanese naval plans and preparations, moreover, featured the construction of aircraft carriers until in 1941 Japan had attained decisive supremacy over the United States and other nations in aircraft carriers. And finally, as the climax of her naval policy of expansion and aggression, Japan on 7 December 1941, used an aircraft carrier task force to make a sudden, secret attack designed to annihilate United States naval power in the Pacific before war had actually commenced.

II

The plans and preparations concerned with the establishment of naval bases and the erection of fortifications in the Mandated Islands.

14. Documentary evidence will now be presented which indicates that the Japanese naval policy with respect to the Mandated Islands was characterized by the same objectives as those with respect to the Japanese naval policy on aircraft carriers, namely, to develop and use them for naval expansion and aggression.

15. The execution of this policy likewise was along the same lines of activity as those which were pursued in the execution of the policy with respect to aircraft carriers, namely, (1) the termination, or in this case, the direct violation of treaty limitations, (2) the construction of fortifications and of naval bases in the Islands, and (3) the use of the Islands fortifications and bases in initiating and waging naval hostilities against the United States and her allies on and after 7 December 1941.

16. The treaty and mandate limitations were established (1) by the Treaty of Versailles (1920), (2) by the mandate of the Islands to Japan pursuant to the Treaty and (3) by the Mandates treaty between the United States and Japan (1922). These limitations are stated as follows:

"...no military or naval bases shall be established or fortifications erected in the territory" of the Mandated Islands.

17. Numerous documents show that the Japanese Navy and Government established naval bases in the Mandated Islands, but for the sake of brevity and because of its adequacy, only one of them is presented. That document is the Japanese Navy's Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 1. (IPS Document No. 17)

18. Admiral YAMAMOTO, as Commander-in-Chief Combined Fleet, issued this order from his flagship, the NAGATO, on 5 November 1941. (IPS Document No. 17, p. 2/1)

It was an order that "Combined Fleet Operations in the war against the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands will be conducted in accordance with the separate volume."

The separate volume, in 151 pages of text, tables and charts, outlines operations for a war beginning with the attack on Pearl Harbor (page 2/17, 2/18). It provides for preparations for war, communications, supply, allocation of forces and other details.

19. The Mandated Islands appear in many places in this order. At page 2/67 the order establishes an allotment of supply bases. The supply bases allotted to the South Seas Force and the Advanced Expeditionary Force are the following Mandated Islands: SAIPAN, KWAJALEIN, WOTJE, JALUIT, TAROA, TRUK, PONAPE, and PALAU. These eight bases constitute more than half of the total number of naval supply bases thus allotted, namely a total of fifteen.

20. At pages 2/76 to 2/78 is an Appended Table 1, giving initial fuel allowances for supply bases. The boiler oil allowance to five of the eight Mandated Island bases totals 46,500 metric tons. Likewise allotted to the Mandate bases

are great quantities of aviation fuel, bombs, machine gun ammunition, torpedoes and mines. Rations are allotted for 36,000 persons per month at the eight Mandate bases. Large monthly replenishment allowances are tabulated at pages 2/91 to 2/94. Aircraft material for the South Seas area is to be replenished at TRUK, and submarine material at KWAJALEIN.

21. No doubt Order No. 1 is accurate in applying the term "bases" to these Mandate installations. The materials, the quantities and the areas involved indicate that these naval bases and their equipment for storage, transport, communications, and guns and ammunition had been established on a large scale and over a considerable period of time. Other documents on this point are available for presentation or examination.

22. The Mandated Islands appear in Order No. 1 also in tables of allocations of forces (pages 2/104, 105, 106). The South Seas Force, centering about the 4th Fleet (commonly called the Mandates Fleet) is allocated for rendezvous the South Seas or Mandated Islands. Operating from these bases it is ordered to aid in covering the withdrawal of the Pearl

Harbor striking force, to attack Wake and Guam as quickly as possible, and to cooperate with the striking force "in the occupation of strategic areas." Also based in the Mandates is the Commerce Destruction Unit, apparently submarines assigned by the Order to destroy sea traffic. Japanese submarines of the 6th Fleet and of other fleets regularly used bases in the Mandates. Submarines en route from Japan to Pearl Harbor rendezvoused at Kwajalein.

23. It is clear, therefore, that the Japanese Navy before 7 December 1941 had established naval bases in the Mandated Islands.

24. Likewise many other documents show that the Japanese Navy and Government erected fortifications in the Mandated Islands. For brevity only one set consisting of three documents is presented here. Two of these documents (IPS Documents No. 6254-A and No. 6254-B) are aerial reconnaissance photographs of WOTJE Island taken by United States Navy photographic intelligence units in January 1942, less than two months after war began. The third document (IPS Document No. 6254-C) is a Japanese blueprint map of WOTJE

dated 10 August 1940 captured by American forces landing at Kwajalein in February 1944.

25. An examination of these photographs shows that WOTJE, before 31 January 1942, had been fortified and equipped as a combination of an island fortress and a naval base. The blueprint map shows that before 10 August 1940 the Japanese Navy and Government had already created extensive fortifications. The magnitude of the Japanese naval installations at WOTJE is indicated by the tables of numbered items attached to each document.

26. The photograph C-23, WOTJE Island, North End, (IPS Document No. 6254-A) shows the center of the Island to be covered by two intersecting paved airfield runways, each 300 feet wide, one more than a mile long (5700 feet), the other 3900 feet long, and suitable for large land-based bombers as well as lesser aircraft. Two (or three) large hangars and two large, shop-type buildings are seen west of the runways.

North of these hangars is a large seaplane ramp, with a hangar 150 feet wide by perhaps 300 feet long suitable for the largest seaplanes.

27. Many gun positions are seen, including a northern and a southern 3-gun Dual Purpose Anti-Aircraft and Coast Defense Battery each with adjacent power plant, munitions storage, command post and barracks area. The guns are probably 5-inch or 6-inch guns. Numerous blockhouses are observed along the shore in the photographs and map.

28. Storage tanks for heavy oil and structures for ammunition storage are indicated on the Japanese map by lettering and also on the photographs by clouds of black smoke showing where U. S. Navy aviators have located the tanks and ammunition storages.

29. Trenches, pillboxes, machine gun emplacements, wire entanglements, a connecting system of roads, plus a total of more than fifty buildings are also to be observed on the photographs and map.

30. In photograph C-22 (IPS Document No. 6254-B) are shown the large, two-story radio transmitter buildings, flanked by three radio towers, and by other buildings and tanks.
31. The total volume of installations on WOTJE, as shown by this Japanese map dated 10 August 1940 and by these aerial photographs dated 31 January 1942, is sufficient to show that the Japanese Navy and Government had been engaged in establishing the bases and erecting the fortifications at least prior to the middle of 1940 and perhaps at least during the entire year 1940 as well as 1941. I am informed that additional evidence on this point is to be introduced later in another section of this case in the form of statements from residents of the Islands who worked on the construction at WOTJE for the Japanese.
32. It appears that the documents prepared by the Japanese Navy, namely Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 1, and the Map of WOTJE, are sufficient to show that the Japanese Navy and Government before 7 December 1941 established naval bases and erected fortifications.

III

The plans and preparations concerned with
consular espionage as an aid to naval attack.

33. Numerous documents and records show that the Japanese Navy and Government, particularly the Foreign Office, between 1931 and 1941, were engaged in a policy of surveillance, reconnaissance and espionage with respect to the naval establishment and activities of the United States Navy and Government.
34. The United States Naval Court of Inquiry on the Pearl Harbor Attack stated, in its findings of fact, that Japan's espionage system utilized her civilian, consular and diplomatic nationals throughout the world and enabled her to keep constantly informed of the United States naval building program and of the location and movements of United States naval vessels.
35. An extensive continuous espionage was conducted under the direction of the Japanese Navy and Government, particularly the Foreign Office, at Honolulu, through Consul General

Nagao KIYA and his 200 consular agents scattered throughout the Islands.

36. Documents which show the nature and extent of this espionage and particularly its heavy contribution to the Pearl Harbor attack, will now be presented. These documents are authenticated copies of some of the messages exchanged between the Japanese Consul General's office at Honolulu and the Japanese Navy and Foreign Office at Tokyo. They were coded messages sent via commercial communication companies. (IFS Documents No. 6255-A, -C, -D, -E, -F, -G, -H and -I)

37. In order that the messages may be understood in their references to places and areas at Pearl Harbor, a chart of Pearl Harbor has been prepared and will now be offered. (IFS Document No. 6258)

38. The first message (IPS Document No. 6255-A, Japanese message #83) is from Tokyo, apparently from the Foreign Office because it bears the name of Admiral TOYODA, the Foreign Minister. It reads as follows:

From: Tokyo (Toyoda)
To: Honolulu
September 24, 1941

#83

Strictly secret.

Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible:

1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub-areas. (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you like.)

Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the arsenal.

Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)

Area C. East Loch.

Area D. Middle Loch.

Area E. West Loch and the communicating water routes.

2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on these

at anchor, (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side of same wharf.)

ARMY 23260

Trans. 10/9/41 (S)"

39. The next message (IPS Document No. 6255-C, Japanese message #111) from Tokyo, apparently is another Foreign Office message as it bears the name of Foreign Minister TOGO. It reads as follows:

"From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu (Riyoji)
15 November 1941

#111

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

JD-1: 6991 25644 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (S)"

40. The next message, (IPS Document No. 6255-D, Japanese message #222) illustrates the type of information which the Japanese Consul General was sending to Tokyo less than a month before Pearl Harbor. It reads as follows:

"From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Tokyo
November 18, 1941

#222

1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #219 on that day.

Area A - A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.

Area C - 3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.

2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at Docks "KS". 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in Area D.

3. At 10:00 a.m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.

Relayed to _____.

Army 25817

Trans. 12/6/41 (2)"

41. The next message, (IPS Document No. 6255-E, Japanese message #123) raises three important questions preparatory to the Pearl Harbor attack. It likewise bears the name of Foreign Minister TOGO and thereby indicates close liaison between the Japanese Foreign Office and the Japanese Navy. It reads as follows:

"From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
December 2, 1941 (translated by Army
30 December 1941)

J-19

#123 (Secret outside the department)

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets."

(Introduce Kuehn confession.)

42. On the same day as the date of the preceding Japanese message #123, namely 2 December 1941, Bernard Julius Otto Kuehn, according to his recorded confession, (IPS Document No. 6256-A and B) which has been presented in evidence, delivered to Consul General KITA and his assistants at his office in Honolulu information and documents as requested by the Consul General. The confession also indicates that Kuehn was paid a considerable sum of money, apparently not less than \$10,000, for his services in providing such information to the Japanese Consul General and therefore in turn to the Japanese Navy and Foreign Office at Tokyo. The information and papers delivered by Kuehn, included full details of United States ships present, with their berthing locations in the harbor, and also a comprehensive code of signals by which such information could be communicated to Japanese submarines or other Japanese naval units then en route to Pearl Harbor.

43. The Kuehn code, repeated practically verbatim as Kuehn had delivered it to Consul General KITA, was duly transmitted by KITA to Tokyo by message dated 3

December 1941. The Lanikai Beach House and Kalama House mentioned in the message were houses occupied by Kuehn, according to his confession. This message (IPS Document No. 6255-F, Japanese Message #245) reads as follows:

44. "From: Honorable (Mita)
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941 (Translated by Navy 11 December 1941)
(PA-K2)

#245 (in 2 parts, complete)

(military secret).

From Ichiro Fujii to the Chief of #3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters.

1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the following:

1. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows:

<u>Meaning</u>		<u>Signal</u>
Battleship divisions including scouts and screen units	: Preparing to sortie	: 1
	:	:
	:	:
A number of carriers	: Preparing to sortie	: 2
	: All departed between	:
Battleship divisions	: 1st and 3rd	: 3
	: Several departed	:
Carriers	: between 1st and 3rd	: 4
	: All departed between	:
Carriers	: 1st and 3rd	: 5
	: All departed between	:
Battleship divisions	: 4th and 6th	: 6
	: Several departed	:
Carriers	: between 4th and 6th	: 7
	: All departed between	:
Carriers	: 4th and 6th	: 8

2. Signals.

1. Lanikai Beach House will show lights during the night as follows:

	<u>Signal</u>
One light between 8 and 9 p.m.	1
" " " 9 and 10 p.m.	2
" " " 10 and 11 p.m.	3
" " " 11 and 12 p.m.	4

II.

Two lights " 12 and 1 a.m.	5
" " " 1 and 2 a.m.	6
" " " 2 and 3 a.m.	7
" " " 3 and 4 a.m.	8

(Part 2)

III. Lanikai Bay, during daylight.

If there is a "star" on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates signals 1, 2, 3, or 4.

If there is a "star" and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8.

IV. Lights in the attic window of Kalama House will indicate the following:

<u>Times</u>	<u>Signal</u>
1900-2000	3
2000-2100	4
2100-2200	5
2200-2300	6
2300-2400	7
0000-0100	8

V. K.G.M.B. Want Ads.

A. Chinese rug, etc. for sale, apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6.

B. CHIC. CO farm etc. apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7.

C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P.O. box 1476 indicates 5 or 8.

3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made from Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanatorium at a point halfway between Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road (latitude 20°40' N., longitude 156°19' W., visible from seaward to the southeast and southwest of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be made daily until your EXEX signal is received:

<u>Time</u>	<u>Signal</u>
from 7-12	3 or 6
from 8-9	4 or 7
from 9-10	5 or 8."

45. In further compliance with the request which had been forwarded under the name of the Foreign Minister, Consul General KITA sent the following messages, which were no doubt relayed in due course to the Japanese Fleet, then closely approaching Pearl Harbor. The message dated 5 December 1941 (IPS Document No. 6255-G, Japanese message #252) reads as follows:

"From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
5 December 1941 (translated by Navy 10 December
1941)
(PA-K2)

#252

(1) During Friday morning, the 5th, the three battleships mentioned in my message #239 arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days.

(2) The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day.

(3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th:

8 battleships.
3 light cruisers.
16 destroyers.

Four ships of the Honolulu class and ***** were in dock."

46. A message of 6 December from Honolulu to Tokyo provides direct information for the "surprise attack" which the message mentions, dealing with the important subjects of barrage balloons and torpedo nets. This message, (IPS Document No. 6255-H, Japanese message #253) reads as follows:

"From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941* (translated by Army 8 December
1941)
PA-12

#253 Re the last part of your #123.

1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Ewa, there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results of my investigation."

47. On the eve of the attack, the Japanese Consul General sent to Tokyo the following message regarding the ships at anchor and lying at docks in Pearl Harbor. The message is (IPS Document No. 6255-I, Japanese message #254) and it reads as follows:

"From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941 (translated by Army 6 December 1941)
PA-K2
#254

1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were _____ and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left.

2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm."

48. The documents on Japanese espionage and reconnaissance which have been presented have been limited to a few of those dealing with consular espionage in Honolulu, because they show that the activities of the Japanese Navy and Foreign Office in planning and conducting this consular espionage as an aid to the Pearl Harbor attack may be classed with their other activities in preparation for aggressive warfare.

IV

The plans and preparations for secret attack by Japanese carrier task force upon the United States naval personnel and ships at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on 7 December 1941, without notification having been given by Japan to the United States by a previous, explicit and reasoned warning that there would be a commencement of hostilities in a war by Japan against the United States.

50. The plans and preparations made by the Japanese Navy with respect to construction of aircraft carriers and of naval bases and fortifications in the Mandated Islands has been presented. Consideration has also been given to Japanese naval plans and preparations concerned with consular espionage as a preparation for surprise naval attack. The consummation of the foregoing plans in delivering the attack on Pearl Harbor by the use of the aircraft carriers, of the fortified Island bases and of the espionage reports will now be presented.
51. The attack will be considered with respect to (1) its objectives, (2) its plan and (3) its execution.
52. The documents used in this analysis of the attack will be principally (1) the Japanese Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 1 (IPS Document No. 17); (2) Allied Translator and Interpreter Section, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Research Report No. 131, Date 1 December 1945, entitled Japan's

Decision to Fight (IPS Document No. 1628); and

(3) Research Report No. 132, from the same source, hereinafter referred to as ATIS, entitled The Pearl Harbor Operation (IPS Document No. 1627).

53. 1. The objectives of the Pearl Harbor attack have been stated by Admiral NAGANO to be:

"(1) rendering impotent the United States Pacific Fleet in order to gain time and maintain freedom of action in the South Seas operation (including the Philippine Islands), and (2) the defense of our mandated islands."
(IPS Document No. 1628, p. 66)

The Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Admiral ITO said:

"This Fleet (at Pearl Harbor) will be utterly crushed with one blow at the very beginning of hostilities... If we insure our strategic supremacy at the very outset of the conflict by attacking and seizing all key points at one blow while America is still unprepared, we can swing the scales of later operations in our favor." (IPS Document No. 1627, pp. 7, 8)

54. In Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 1, pages 2/7, 8 (IPS Document No. 17), the general objectives of the entire Japanese operations are stated as follows:

- "1. In the east, the American Fleet will be destroyed and the American lines of operation and supply lines to the Orient will be cut.
- "2. In the west, British Malaya will be occupied and British lines of operation and supply lines to the Orient, as well as the Burma Road, will be cut.
- "3. Enemy forces in the Orient will be destroyed, bases of operation will be seized, and areas with natural resources will be occupied.
- "4. Strategic areas will be seized and developed; defenses will be strengthened in order to establish a durable basis for operations.
- "5. Enemy forces will be intercepted and annihilated.
- "6. Victories will be exploited to break the enemy's will to fight."

55. 2. The plan of the Pearl Harbor attack, according to NAGANO, was conceived by YAMAMOTO the first part of January, 1941, and was worked out by operations staff officers beginning in September, 1941. (IPS Document No. 1628, p. 66)
The Japanese naval personnel who knew of the entire plan in

advance included NAGANO and YAMAMOTO, and those who knew part of the plan included Admiral SHIMADA, Navy Minister, and Admiral OKA, Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs. (Id., p. 67) Preparatory to a final formulation of the plan, war games were held at Tokyo on September 2 to 13, 1941, with approximately forty key Japanese Naval officers participating and with NAGANO as the ranking officer in charge acting as umpire. (Id., pp. 4, 5, 6)

56. According to Japanese naval officers who took part in the preparation of the plan, among the problems to be solved were how to attack most effectively the United States Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian area. They stated:

"It was decided that a torpedo attack against anchored ships was the most effective method of putting the main strength of the United States Pacific Fleet in the Hawaii area out of action...

Hence, the following two obstacles were considered:

- (a) The fact that Pearl Harbor is narrow and shallow.
- (b) The fact that Pearl Harbor was probably equipped with torpedo nets.

- (c) In regard to point (a), it was planned to attach stabilizers to the torpedoes and launch them from an extremely low altitude.
- (d) In regard to point (b), since success could not be counted on, a bombing attack was also employed."

57. Additional problems were refueling and effecting surprise in the attack. On these points the same officers stated (Id., p. 68): "The ability to refuel and a surprise attack were the keys to this operation. If either of them failed, the execution of the operation would have been impossible." Refueling at sea was dealt with by making it a matter for special training. To insure surprise, the little travelled northern ocean route was to be used, screening destroyers were to be sent ahead, and complete radio silence was to be carried out at sea while doceptive radio activity was to be conducted in the Inland Sea and Kyushu areas. (Id., p. 68)

58. The plan provided in detail for the organization of a select Task Force, under the command of Admiral NAGUMO, and

made up of 6 aircraft carriers, supported by 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 11 destroyers, 3 submarines and 8 tankers. (Id., p. 33) Additional units included submarines, both regular size and midget submarines manned by specially trained officers. (Id., p. 78; IPS Document No. 1627, pp. 17-23) Carrier-borne attack airplanes numbered 360, namely, 135 dive bombing planes, 104 horizontal bombing planes, 40 torpedo planes, and 81 strafing planes. Targets assigned were principally aircraft carriers, airbases and grounded airplanes, but in execution battleships received special attention because of the absence of carriers. (IPS Document No. 1628, p. 84)

59. The plan provided, also, for lesser forces to operate in various areas. (IPS Document No. 17, pp. 2/104-6).

60. Neither in this plan for the Pearl Harbor attack nor in any other Japanese document among the Navy records have I found any indication that the planners gave any consideration to the applicability or the non-applicability of the Third Hague Convention requiring warning before attack.

61. 3. The execution of the plan. On 5 November 1941, Admiral NAGANO issued an order to Admiral YAMAMOTO (IPS Document No. 1626, p. 75) under which YAMAMOTO on the same date (IPS Document No. 17, p. 2/1) issued Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 1, putting the plan into effect. On 7 November, YAMAMOTO issued Order No. 2 (Id., p. 2/152) fixing Y-Day for 8 December, in accordance with the provision in the plan for fixing Y-Day, and, later, X-Day (Id., pp. 2, 3).
62. On the same date, 7 November 1941, YAMAMOTO issued from his flagship, the HAGITO, an order which directed the Task Force to assemble at Hitokappu Bay at Etorofu Island in the Kuriles, and to take on supplies until 22 November. (IPS Document No. 1626, p. 77)
63. On 25 November, YAMAMOTO ordered the Task Force to move out on 26 November and to "proceed without being detected" to the covering rendezvous point set for 3 December. (IPS Document No. 1626, p. 78)
64. On 26 November 1941 at 0600 hours the Task Force moved out on its trip of more than 3000 miles to Pearl Harbor. (Id., p. 78)

65. On 2 December the Task Force under way received a Combined Fleet order stating "X-Day will be 8 December" (7 December Pearl Harbor time). (Id., p. 78)
66. On 2 December, Admiral YAMAMOTO from his flagship, the YAMATO, gave the order to proceed with the attack.
67. On the night of 6-7 December (Pearl Harbor time) the Task Force made the run-in southward at top speed (26 knots).
68. On the early morning of 7 December (Pearl Harbor time) the carriers, when 230 miles due north of Oahu, launched the planes of the First Attack Unit, at 0130 hours, and when 200 miles north of Oahu launched the planes of the Second Attack Unit at 0245 hours. (IPS Document No. 1628, p. 71) The planes rendezvoused to the south of the carriers and then flew in to the attack. Torpedo planes and dive bombers attacked from 7:55 to 8:25 A.M. Horizontal bombers were the principal attackers in an attack lasting from 8:40 to 9:15. Dive bombers attacked from 9:15 to 9:45, when the raid ended.

69. The Task Force, after launching its planes withdrew at high speed to the northwest, where the planes, except for approximately 28, returned to the carriers, between 10:30 A.M. and 1:30 P.M. The Task Force then proceeded to Kure, arriving on 23 December.
70. The attackers killed 1,999 officers and enlisted men of the U. S. Navy. Rear Admiral Isaac Campbell Kidd, U.S.N., commander of battleship division #1, was killed, presumably in the explosions aboard his flagship, the USS ARIZONA, where he was last seen in action. All told, the ARIZONA lost 47 officers and 1056 enlisted men. (Navy Department, Chief Naval Personnel, Certif. 15 July 1946). The U. S. Marine Corps suffered casualties of 109 killed. (Marine Corps Director Personnel Certif. 7 May 1946). The U. S. Army lost 234 killed. (War Department Casualty Branch Certif. 8 July 1946). Civilians killed in the attack numbered 54. (War Records Bureau, University of Hawaii, Rept. Spec. Agt. CIC, AFMIDPAC dated 7 June 1946).
71. The United States lost outright 188 planes; Japan, 29. The United States suffered severe damage to, or loss of,

3 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 destroyers, and 4 miscellaneous vessels; Japan lost 5 midget submarines.

72. The disproportionate extent of losses marks the extent to which HAGANO and YAMAMOTO and their associates in the Japanese Navy and Government had succeeded in maintaining secrecy and in attaining surprise in their naval plans and preparations between 1931 and 1941, reaching on 7 December 1941 the climax of their successful planning and preparing.

73. By their repeated emphatic warnings in orders and elsewhere that only by complete secrecy and complete surprise could the Pearl Harbor attack succeed, HAGANO and YAMAMOTO and their associates had succeeded in achieving complete secrecy and complete surprise in the Pearl Harbor attack.

74. I have been unable to find in the records of the United States Government any information regarding any Japanese document or communication by which the Japanese Government gave to the United States a previous, explicit and reasoned

warning that Japan was about to commence hostilities against the United States. A notice from the Japanese Foreign Office announcing that "there has arisen a state of war" between Japan and the United States was received in the Office of the Secretary of State at 2:35 A.M. on 10 December 1941, sixty-six hours and forty minutes after the first torpedoes and bombs from the Japanese carrier planes struck Pearl Harbor.