Overall description of the Japanese Prison
Camp system -- Number of camps, different types, unusual
locations
Over 500 Japanese POW camps and civilian
internment camps stretched from Rangoon (Burma-Myanmar) down through
Malaya, Singapore, Sumatra, across Indonesia (NEI) as far east as
Rabaul in the Solomon Islands. Hundreds of camps stretched north
through the Celebes, Borneo, the Philippines, Hainan Island, Taiwan and
Korea.
In Japan alone, over 160 POW slave labor camps
existed at the time of surrender. Camps were located in many areas of
mainland China including notorious camps in the Hong Kong and Shanghai
areas. Prisoners were used mainly for mining coal, ore, ship building,
airfield construction and military defense bunkers. The most notorious
were a camp in Palawan (massacre of 150 Yanks), Sandakan where 2,200
died in
a forced march (Borneo), and a series of camps along the Burma-Thailand
Death Railway where an estimated 15,000 Allied POWS perished, along
with almost 180,000 civilians impressed into slavery.
During the Japanese occupation of the NEI, two large groups of people
were deprived of their freedom: prisoners-of-war and detained
civilians. These groups ended up in different camps. Both groups
consisted of considerable numbers of people, many more than the
Japanese had expected and the allies had
expected at the liberation. It has been calculated that 42,233 European
servicemen in the Indies had become prisoners-of-war: 3,847 servicemen
of the Royal
Dutch Navy, 36,869 of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) and
3,847 servicemen of the KNIL auxiliary corps.
Around 8,200 of them lost their lives, about one
out of every five. Besides, many native servicemen of the KNIL fell
into
the hands of the Japanese army, of course. The Javanese and Sundanese
were soon set free, but most of the Menadoese, Amboinese and Timorese,
the Christian natives were held. Except on Borneo, most
prisoners-of-war
did not stay on the islands where they were captured, but were
transported elsewhere, especially to be put to work.
The number of civilians interned by the
Japanese is estimated to have been 125,000. The largest group concerned
civilians from the Netherlands
East Indies. According to Dr. D. van Velden (from whose book "The
Japanese
camps for civilians" a lot of information has been taken) 96,300
civilians
ended up in Japanese camps; 13,120 (13.6%) succumbed. During the war
the
Japanese reported to the Red Cross that there were 98,000 detainees, of
whom 16,800 died (17%). Though the precise figures are not known, we
may assume
that about 100,000 civilians from the Indies were in Japanese camps, of
whom
one in six died.
The
Burma-Thailand Death Railway - Lives lost and percentages of total POWs
3,098 Dutch (19%)
6,904 English (29%)
2,646 Australians (31%)
131 American (23%)
180,000 Asiatic (90%)
Source: Dutch
National War Memorial Museum
Overall description of the POWs - Number of Americans,
other nationalities
Americans: 36,260 Military of whom 13,381 died as POWS (38.2%) plus
13,996 civilians of whom 1536 died (11%) [American Ex POW Assn]
Australians: 21,000+ Military of whom 8031 died as POWS (39%) [AWM)
British: 50,000+ Military of who 12,433 died as POWS (25%) plus over
25,000 Indian troops (death rate unknown) [IWM]
Dutch: 100,000+ Military of whom an estimated 25% perished
Civilians: Estimated 250,000 Dutch civilians and other westerners in
the Netherlands East Indies. Civilian death rate estimated at 15%.
Thirteen ships were sunk while transporting 15,712 POWs from Southeast
Asia to Japan. Some of the ships sunk had no survivors. An estimated
10,720 prisoners died on these unmarked Hell Ships on the way to Japan.
A
quick look at the State of Residence for POWs (that we have determined
so far) shows the Top 5 States as: California, Texas, New Mexico,
Pennsylvania, New York, and Illinois.
Description of living
conditions inside the camps
In general, the accommodations were of two distinct structures: In the
tropic areas, barracks were made of bamboo with Atap leaves for roofing
material. Barracks generally held 100 men and were 20 feet wide and 100
feet long with double platforms running down both sides of the
interior. Each man slept lived in his assigned 2 foot wide space. In
the northern climes, e.g., Japan, they barracks were typical for the
Japanese army and had similar interior arrangements. The exteriors were
simply clapboard or stucco with tile roofs. Insulation was unknown.
Rarely was heat allowed inside the POW barracks.
First, blankets made from shredded wood, rarely provided the protection
needed against the winter chill. Lice and voracious bed bugs were
extant in almost every camp, augmented by swarms of blue-bottle flies
and mosquitoes in the summers. Most barracks had dirt floors that
become muddy and fouled as a result of severe dysentery.
Historical characters in Japanese govt. that were
responsible for
prison camps
First, and foremost, was General Hideki Tojo who
made the decision to use
the prisoners as expendable slaves and was responsible for the policy
to "Kill All the Prisoners" upon invasion of the homelands or imminent
danger. Each POW considered their immediate camp commandant as the most
notorious -- however, a few stand out as horrific.
Second, in the pantheon
of evil, would be Lieutenant General Masaharu Homma
who deliberately
chose to ignore the plight of the POWS captured in the Philippines. At
the Nichols Field (Pasay) POW Camp was the Japanese Camp commander,
Naval Lieutenant Sato, a thug called "The White
Angel." This brutal and
sadistic officer always appeared in a spotless white uniform and
delighted in abusing, torturing and often executing American POWS
whenever he had the whim. In Osaka was Colonel Murata
who delighted in
humiliating prisoners in front of civilians and authorized the theft of
prisoner's Red Cross packages.
Third was Shiro Ishii, the commander of
the Unit 731 Medical Experimental Operations in China. He personally
directed the mass murder of civilians to test poisonous chemicals,
plagues and vivisection upon living patients. He was never tried for
his crimes.
Elements of Japanese military culture that was
reflected in the running
of the camps
As a hierarchal society, all owing fealty to the Emperor, each person
believed that anyone "above them in rank" could give them orders "in
the name of the Emperor." Mythical powers of the Samurai were
inculcated into the military, to wit, surrender was the ultimate
disgrace. Ergo, every POW was the lowest and vilest person in existence.
Unit 731 - character and
significance of this unit
Unit 731, headquartered in Harbin China, was created to develop
chemical and biological weaponry. Experiments included replacing blood
with anti-freeze, developing flea borne plagues, surgery practice for
future combat medic by use of live, conscious prisoners deliberately
shot for these training exercises. Anesthesia was rarely used. These
medical experiments were also practiced in other camps in the Osaka,
Kobe and Tokyo area camps.
Simply stated, Kirk colluded with a Christian Japanese guard to obtain
glass photographic plates, created a pin-hole camera, and took pictures
of his fellow starving prisoners in the Fukuoka #3 (Yahata) POW camp.
Believing all POWs in this camp would die, he hoped that these plates
would be found to prove the horrific treatment of the POWS.
Background of the "gag order" surrounding the telling
of POW histories
The origin in clouded but the requests stem from the
prior decision of
FDR to keep from the public, the suffering of the POWS under the
Japanese. Escaped prisoners (Dyess from Cabanatuan) had revealed the
horrific treatments in early 1943. FDR wanted nothing to divert the
public's attention from the forthcoming campaigns in Europe. Many --
not
all -- rescued POWS were instructed to sign a sheets promising not to
talk about what happened to them. In some rare instances, some men were
contacted by FBI agents when they arrived home and told "not to talk"
or they would face a life time at Leavenworth Prison. No satisfactory
explanation has been found for this policy during the post war years
except to prevent early revelation of evidence used in the War Crimes
Trials.
Acquisition and use of
evidence (affidavits, other) of the POWs at the Tokyo war crimes trials
Each prisoner, upon rescue, was required to complete a
5"x7"
identification card and an affidavit in response to a series of written
questions. The latter became the basis to determine -- in general --
where
war crimes were committed. Certain men were selected to expand their
affidavits and to describe in detail their "witness" to a war crime.
These became the basic elements of the charges levied against thousands
of Japanese criminals. (We have many many examples.)
Probable
First and Final POWs Captured by the Japanese
Japan
had invaded North Malaya and also occupied the international settlement
in
Shanghai even before Pearl Harbor was bombed. The HMS Peterel
(crew of
21) was sunk 2 hours after Pearl was attacked. Right after that, the
USS Wake (crew of 14) was ordered to
surrender. Then the SS President
Harrison (156 total) was sunk and those on board were
interned. We do have a page on William Bowden
who was purportedly the "first Allied airman captured by the Japanese"
on Dec. 8, 1941, when his plane crashed in the Gulf of Siam.
The
final prisoners taken is harder to track, but probably they were airmen
downed during air raids on mainland Japan. Below is from Toru
Fukubayashi's data:
Aug. 10, 1945, a Firefly operating out of Royal
Navy’s carrier Indefatigable,
while attacking Koriyama Airfield, had one wing of the plane shot off
by AA fire and crashed in the rice paddy in Nishikawa,
Nishibukuro-mura, Iwase-gun (present Sukagawa-shi), Fukushima-ken.
Sub-Lt. Burn F. O’NEILL and Sub-Lt. Thomas I. DAEBY bailed out and
landed on a rice paddy. They were taken prisoners and sent to the
Tohoku A/D HQ in Sendai-shi via Sukagawa Kempei Tai and Koriyama Kempei
Tai. They were transferred to Omori POW Camp in Tokyo on Aug. 17 after
the war, and returned to New Zealand.
Aug. 10, 1945, TBF (#JZ136) operating out of Royal Navy’s carrier Implacable
made a forced landing in the field near the Kamimata railway station in
Takine-mura, Tamura-gun, (present Takine-cho, Tamura-shi),
Fukushima-ken. Lt. Victor H. SPENCE and Petty Officer Jack ROGERSON got
out of the plane and ran into the mountains, but were found 2 days
later near Kawauchi-mura, Futaba-gun and surrounded by the members of
the civil defense corps and captured. They were handed over to the
Japanese army soldiers and sent to Tohoku A/D HQ in Sendai-shi on the
following day. They were transferred to Omori POW Camp in Tokyo on Aug.
17 after the war, and returned to the UK.
Aug. 10, 1945, F4U operating out of USS Hancock
(CV-19) was hit by AA fire while attacking Obanazawa Airfield, and made
a forced landing in the brush in Fukubara-mura, Kitamurayama-gun
(present Obanazawa-shi), Yamagata-ken. Ens. John W. PETERSON was
captured by the villagers, and sent to the Tohoku A/D HQ in Sendai-shi.
He was transferred to Omori POW Camp in Tokyo on Aug. 17 after the war,
and returned to the US.
Aug. 14, 1945, P-47 (507FG, 465SQ) was
attacked by 2 Japanese fighters (Hien?) and was afire while patrolling
along the coast of Kyushu, and crashed into the sea. 2/Lt. William L.
McDaniel bailed out and was taken prisoner. He was sent to Seibu A/D HQ
in Fukuoka and executed by beheading at Aburayama on the following
day. Aug. 14, 1945, TBM (#69272, Bennington CV-20) crashed in
Tokyo Bay, while attacking Shibaura factory. Lt.(jg) Lee M. PASLEY and
ARM2/c John M. McCARTHY were taken prisoners, and sent to Navy Ofuna
POW Camp, whence they returned to the US after the war.
Aug. 15, 1945, Seefire (HMS Indefatigable)
engaged in a dogfight with a Zeke piloted by SFPO Kaoru TAMURA
scrambled out of Mobara Naval Airbase ended in a tie, and the seafire
crashed in a rice paddy in Naganuma, Satsubo, Nishi-mura, Chosei-gun
(present Chonan-cho), Chiba-ken. Sub-Lt. Fred HOCKLAY bailed out and
landed on Obuta, Higashi-mura, Chosei-gun. He was taken prisoner by
civil defense guards and turned over to a training unit stationing at
Higashimura primary school. After the Emperor’s broadcast on
termination of the war at noon, he was taken, by two-wheeled cart, to
Myoshouji temple in Iwai, Mutsuzawa-cho, where a small unit of 426 Reg.
was stationed, then to Ichinomiya primary school in Ichinomiya-cho,
where 426 Inf. Reg. HQ was stationed. After dark, he was taken to the
mountains south of Ichinomiya-shi urban area, and executed.
Japan and the Geneva ConventionA very enlightening chapter from the Judgment for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.
Japan Agreed to Apply the Geneva Convention, 1929
The
Secretary of State of the United States directed the American Legation
in Switzerland, on 18 December 1941, to request the Government of
Switzerland to inform the Japanese Government that the Government of
the United States intended to abide by the Geneva Prisoner of War
Convention and the Geneva Red Cross Convention, both of which had been
signed on 27 July 1929, that it further intended to extend and apply
the provisions of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention ot any civilian
enemy aliens that it might intern, that it hoped that the Japanese
Government would apply the provisions of these conventions reciprocally
as indicated, and that the Government of the United States would
appreciate an expression of intention by the Japanese Government in
that respect. The inquiry was delivered to the Japanese Foreign
Minister TOGO on 27 December 1941 by the Minister for Switzerland.
The
Governments of Great Britain and the Dominions of Canada, Australia and
New Zealand also inquired through the Argentine Ambassador in Tokyo on
3 January 1942. In that inquiry, those Governments said that they would
observe the terms of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 1929
towards Japan and asked if the Japanese Government was prepared to make
a similar declaration.
On 5 January 1942, the Argentine
Ambassador delivered another note on behalf of Great Britain, Canada,
Australia and New Zealand, proposing that in the application of
Articles 11 and 12 of the Convention relating to the provision of food
and clothing to prisoners, both parties take into consideration the
national and racial customs of the prisoners.
Upon receipt of
these inquiries, TOGO called upon the War Ministry, Navy Ministry,
Ministry for Home Affairs, and Ministry of Overseas Affairs for their
opinion. At that time, TOJO was concurrently Prime Minister and War
Minister; MUTO was Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War
Ministry; SATO was MUTO's assistant in the MIlitary affairs Bureau,
KIMURA was Vice-Minister of War; SHIMADA was Navy Minister; OKA was
Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau in the Naval Ministry; and HOSHINO
was Chief Secretary of the Cabinet.
TOGO was concerned for the
safety of the Japanese living in Allied countries, and for that reason
desired to give a favorable answer to the inquiries and so instructed
the Bureau of Treaties, pointing out that the fate of Japanese
residents amounting to several hundred thousands, in the enemy
countries would be affected by the treatment by Japan of the prisoners
of war and civilian internees who might be in her power. The War
Ministry agreed with TOGO. On 23 January 1942, KIMURA told TOGO: "In
view of the fact that the Geneva Convention relating to prisoners of
war was not ratified by His Majesty, we can hardly announce our
observance of the same. But it would be safe to notify the world that
we have no objection to acting in accordance with the Convention in the
treatment of prisoners of war. As regards providing prisoners of war
with food and clothing, we have no objection to giving due
consideration to the national or racial habits and customs of the
prisoners."
TOGO answered the American and British inquiries on
29 January 1942. His note to the Government of the United States read
as follows: "Japan strictly observes the Geneva Convention of July 27,
1929, relative to the Red Cross, as a signatory of that Convention. The
Imperial Government has not yet ratified the Convention relating to
treatment of prisoners of war of 27 July 1929. It is therefore not
bound by the said Convention. nevertheless it will apply 'mutatis
mutandis' the provisions of that Convention to American prisoners of
war in its power." The note addressed to the Governments of Great
Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand on the same date was as
follows: "The Imperial Government has not ratified the agreement
concerning the treatment of prisoners of war dated 27 July 1929, and
therefore, it would not be bound to any extent by the said agreement,
but would apply 'mutatis mutandis' the provisions of the said agreement
toward the British, Canadian, Australian and New Xealand prisoners of
war under Japanese control. The Imperial Government would consider the
national and racial manners and customs under reciprocal conditions
when supplying clothing and provisions to prisoners of war." The same
assurances were given to the other Allied Powers.
As the War
Ministry had not agreed to extend these provisions to civilian
internees, TOGO, through his Vice-Minister, inquired of the War
Ministry on 27 January 1942, regarding the application of the Prisoner
of War Convention to non-combatant internees. After conferences, the
War Ministry acquiesced further in TOGO's plan to protect Japanese
nationals in Allied countries, and on 6 February 1942 KIMURA told TOGO:
"The 1929 Convention relating to prisoners of war has no binding power
whatsoever on Japan. But this Ministry has no objection to applying the
principles of the Convention to non-combatant internees within such
limits as it is applicable, provided, however, that no person be
subjected to labor against his will."
TOGO informed the
Government of the United States on 13 February 1942 that, "The Imperial
Government will apply for the duration of the war under conditions of
reciprocity the provisions of the Convention relating to treatment of
prisoners of war of 27 July 1929 to enemy civilian internees, in so far
as they are applicable and provided that they are not made to work
without their consent."
Taking note of the assurance TOGO had
addressed the British countries on 29 January 1942 that Japan would
take into consideration the national and racial customs of the
prisoners of war in supplying them with clothing and provisions, the
United Stats addressed another inquiry on that subject. That inquiry
was dated 20 February 1942, and stated that the Government of the
United States would be bound by the same provisions for prisoners of
war as for civilian internees in conformity with Articles 11 and 12 of
the Geneva Convention and expected in consequence that the Japanese
Government would equally conform to those provisions in the treatment
of prisoners of war and civilian internees. TOGO answered this inquiry
on 2 March 1942, in the following manner: "The Imperial Government
intends to take into consideration, with regard to provisions and
clothing to be distributed, the racial and national customs of American
prisoners of war and civilian internees placed under Japanese power."
This
exchange of assurances constituted a solemn agreement binding the
Government of Japan as well as the Governments of the other combatants
to apply the provisions of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 27
July 1929 to prisoners of war and civilian internees alike, to take
into consideration the national and racial customs of those prisoners
and internees when supplying them with food and clothing as required by
that Convention, and not to force internees to work. The agreement
provided that the Convention was to be applied in a spirit of
reciprocity, that is to say equally by both sides, each performing in
kind and in return for that done by the other. The only exception to
this rule established by the agreement were such as might be justified
under the reservation "mutatis mutandis". That the agreement did not
allow an exception to be made by reason of conflict with the municipal
law of Japan is plain upon construction and is shown by TOGO's
testimony as follows: "The inquiries from the United States and Britain
were therefore referred in the normal course by the Foreign Ministry
Treaty Bureau, which managed such matters, to the War Ministry, as the
ministry empowered to decide the question. The answer which came back
was that we should undertake to apply the terms of the Geneva
Convention mutatis mutandis', and it was therefore so replied to the
Governments inquiring.
"Although the prosecution seems to
consider that by the giving of this answer Japan became bound by the
Convention to the same extent as if she had ratified it, I assumed (and
still assume) that we were binding ourselves only to apply to
Convention so far as circumstances permitted. 'Mutatis mutandis', then,
I supposed to imply that in the absence of serious hindrances the
Convention would be applied; I assumed also (although this was only
assumption on my part) that where the requirements of the Convention
came into conflict with the provisions of domestic law, the former
would prevail." The Director of the Bureau of Treaties, who conducted
the conferences with the other Ministries regarding the answer to be
given the Allied inquiries, further confirmed this.
Although
when it was made, the members of the TOJO Cabinet intended that the
Allied Powers should understand the agreement as we have interpreted
it, they did not abide by the agreement. Instead is was used as a means
to secure good treatment for Japanese who might become prisoners of war
or be interned by the Allied Powers. When Vice-Minister KIMURA answered
TOGO's request for his opinion regarding the answer to be made to the
Allied inquiries, he said that "it would be safe to notify the world"
that Japan would observe the Convention, but he prefaced that statement
with the remark that the Government could hardly afford to announce an
intention to observe the Convention in view of the fact that the
Emperor had not ratified it. The successive Japanese governments did
not enforce the Convention, for although the Ministers of State
considered these assurances to the Allies to be a promise to perform
new and additional duties for the benefit of prisoners of war and
internees, they never issued any new orders or instructions to their
officers in charge of prisoners of war and internees to carry this new
promise into execution and never set up any system which secured
performance of the promise. Instead of making an effort to perform this
agreement, they made efforts to conceal from the Allies their guilty
non-performance by denying access to the prisoner of war and internee
camps; by limiting the length, contents and number of letters which a
prisoner or internee might mail; by suppressing all news regarding such
prisoners and internees; and by neglecting to answer or by making false
answers to protests and inquiries addressed to them regarding the
treatment of prisoners and internees.
Reference has been made in
an earlier part of this judgment to the effect of the various
conventions in relation to the treatment of prisoners of war and
civilian internees and to the obligations of belligerents in that
respect. Whatever view may be taken of the assurance or undertaking of
the Japanese Government to comply with the Geneva Prisoner of War
Convention "mutatis mutandis, the fact remains that under the customary
rules of war, acknowledged by all civilized nations, all prisoners of
war and civilian internees must be given humane treatment. It is the
grossly inhumane treatment by the Japanese military forces as referred
to in this part of the judgment that is particularly reprehensible and
criminal. A person guilty of such inhumanities cannot escape punishment
on the plea that he or his government is not bound by any particular
convention. The general principles of the law exist independently of
the said conventions. The conventions merely reaffirm the pre-existing
law and prescribe detailed provisions for its application.
As to
the effect of the undertaking by the Japanese Government to observe the
convention "mutatis mutandis", counsel for the Defence submitted, inter
alia, that the insufficiency of food and medical supplies in many of
the instances established was due to disorganization and lack of
transport facilities resulting from the Allied offensives. Whatever
merit that argument has in its narrow application, it loses effect in
face of the proof that the Allied Powers proposed to the Japanese
Government that they should send, for distribution among prisoners of
war and internees, the necessary supplies; which offer was refused by
the Japanese Government.
It is not necessary to enter into a
precise definition of the condition "mutatis mutandis", for at no stage
in the defence was anything said or even suggested to the effect that
these words justified the atrocities and other grossly inhumane acts of
Japanese forces, nor was it argued that these words could justify the
looting, pillaging and arson which as been clearly established. On
those points, the accused who gave evidence, for the most part, did no
more than plead complete ignorance of the happenings deposed to.
Any
interpretation placed on the condition which attempted to justify the
atrocities would amount to nothing more than a submission that by the
insertion of the words "mutatis mutandis" the Japanese military forces
would be permitted with impunity to behave with gross barbarity under
the guise of complying with a Convention which prescribed humane
treatment as its cardinal principle. Such a submission could not be
accepted.
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