

OBJECTIVES

Notify world we have atomic bomb 1000 to 1.

It seems wiser not to mention that bigger ones will

? ?

follow for we want to have our acts more dreadful

than our words to the Japs.

Call on the Japs to surrender.

Making it clear that if they do not all subsequent

slaughter is their guilt; making it clear that also

we do not count on the bomb alone but intend to fol-

low it with the foot soldiers and fleet.

Give credit in general to all concerned but leave details

to the report from those to whom the details would be

more natural.

Notify the Russians that they do not get the secret for

nothing but might if a proper international organ-

isation were effected.

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~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

Notify the people in the plants that they are not  
in danger.

Get the fact that the British are partners but we have  
[the credit and] the plants and have spent the money --  
before it is brought out by a critic.

Hold the second story so it won't compete with the  
President's message.

Choose a military target like a naval base if possible  
so that wholesale killing of civilians will be on  
the heads of the Japanese who refused to surrender  
at our ultimatum.

*we have  
made  
substantial  
contributions  
and other  
contributions*

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5. The point of use of the first bomb was discussed and the general view appeared to be that its best point of use would be on a Japanese fleet concentration in the Harbor of Truk. General Styer suggested Tokio but it was pointed out that the bomb should be used where, if it failed to go off, it would land in water of sufficient depth to prevent easy salvage. The Japanese were selected as they would not be so apt to secure knowledge from it as would the Germans.

RRR

AIDE MEMOIRE OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT  
AND THE PRIME MINISTER AT HYDE PARK,  
SEPTEMBER 18th, 1944.

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1. The suggestion that the world should be informed regarding Tube Alloys, with a view to an international agreement regarding its control and use, is not accepted. The matter should continue to be regarded as of the utmost secrecy; but when a "bomb" is finally available, it might perhaps, after mature consideration, be used against the Japanese, who should be warned that this bombardment will be repeated until they surrender.

2. Full collaboration between the United States and the British Government in developing Tube Alloys for military and commercial purposes should continue after the defeat of Japan unless and until terminated by joint agreement.

3. Enquiries should be made regarding the activities of Professor Bohr and steps taken to ensure that he is responsible for no leakage of information, particularly to the Russians.

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O  
P  
Y



Copy 2 of 2 copies  
of 1 page serial B

10, Downing Street,  
Whitehall.

TOP SECRET

TUBE ALLOYS

Aide-memoire of conversation between the President and the  
Prime Minister at Hyde Park, September 18, 1944. (Notation:  
Actually 19th)

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F.D.R. W.C.

Note: A copy of this aide-memoire was left with President Roosevelt. Another copy was given to Admiral Leahy to hand to Lord Cherwell.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

# MONSANTO CHEMICAL COMPANY

CLINTON LABORATORIES

P. O. BOX 1991

KNOXVILLE 11, TENNESSEE

July 14, 1945

Mr. M. D. Whitaker  
P. O. Box 1991  
Knoxville, Tennessee

Dear Sir:

Now that Germany, our most formidable enemy, is vanquished, some of the men engaged in research on this project are saying that they hope the weapon created here is never used, or are saying they fear the misuse of the weapon by our War Department. They argue that the rationalization of self-defense has been removed by the surrender of Germany, for Japan is not capable of such grandiose technology that a project of this type entails.

It may be of interest to you to know that all of us do not concur in such an opinion. Some of us can remember the days in the dismal thirties when Japan rode ruthlessly over the peaceful and defenseless Chinese; of course none of us can forget the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor. While two wrongs do not make a right by any means, an enemy who gives no quarter can expect none. Our avowed goal is the unconditional surrender of the aggressor nations; we will not deviate from our course until the goal is won. Therefore, it behooves us to support our brothers and buddies overseas with the best and most potent weapons it is in our power to devise, to end this damnable confusion and strife, and to allow the world to return to peaceful pursuits as soon as possible.

Our weapon, presumably, is essentially nothing more than an extrapolation of existing devices (although that extrapolation may be almost logarithmic!). It is hard to imagine anything more conclusive than the devastation of all the eastern coastal cities of Japan by fire bombs; a more fiendish hell than the inferno of blazing Tokyo is beyond the pale of conception. Then why do we attempt to draw the line of morality here, when it is a question of degree, not a question of kind?

Therefore, with no strings attached, let the War Department use this weapon at the earliest and most expeditious moment, in whatever manner will produce optimum results in the way of shortening the war and saving American lives.

Sincerely yours,

*Evan J. Young*  
Evan J. Young

~~SECRET~~  
THIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED  
Order Sec Army By TAG per  
720564

PROCLAMATION

It is evident that this disaster was part of enemy strategy by which they plan to crush the fighting spirit of the people of our country by means of inhumanly cruel air attacks.

People of HIROSHIMA Prefecture: although damage is great we must remember that this is war. We must feel absolutely no fear. Already plans are steadily being drawn up for relief and restoration measures. The military is furnishing all-out assistance. Return to your places of business immediately. We must not rest a single day in our war effort.

All military personnel must also exhibit a warm friendship for battle and encourage and treat with consideration the victims, thereby seeking to effect the people's immediate return to the line of battle.

This disaster has been a great misfortune and has resulted in a large number of deaths. We feel grief from deep within our hearts. While praying for happiness of our dead in a future world, we must bear firmly in mind that the annihilation of the stubborn enemy is our road to revenge. I am confident that with persistence ours will be the eventual victory, but we must subjugate all difficulties and pain and go forward to battle for our Emperor.

7 August 1945

TAKANO, GENSHIN

Governor  
HIROSHIMA Prefecture.

## 告 諭

今次ノ災害ハ慘極マル空襲ニヨリ吾國民戰意ノ破碎ヲ圖ラントスル敵ノ謀略ニ基クモノナリ、廣島縣民諸君ヨ、被害ハ大ナリト雖モ之戰爭ノ常ナリ、斷ジテ怯ムコトナク救護復舊ノ措置ハ既ニ着々ト講ゼラレツツアリ、軍モ亦絕對ノ援助ヲ提供セラレツツアリ、速ニ各職場ニ復歸セヨ戰爭ハ一日モ休止スルコトナシ

一般戰民諸君モ亦暖カキ戰友愛ヲ以テ罹災者諸君ヲ勞リ之ヲ鼓舞激勵シ其ノ速カナル戰列復歸ヲ圖ラレタシ

今次災害ニ際シ不幸ニモ相當數ノ戰災死者ヲ出セリ、衷心ヨリ哀悼ノ意ヲ表シ、ソノ冥福ヲ祈ルト共ニ其ノ仇敵ニ酬ユル道ハ斷乎驕敵ヲ擊碎スルニアルヲ銘記セヨ、吾等ハアクマデモ最後ノ戰勝ヲ信ジ凡ユル難苦ヲ克服シテ大皇戰ニ挺身セム

昭和二十年八月七日

廣島縣知事 高野源進



HIGHHOLD  
HUNTINGTON, LONG ISLAND

December 10, 1946.

Strictly confidential

Dear General Groves:

I am sending you enclosed a copy of the article on "The Atomic Bomb and the Surrender of Japan", which Mr. Bundy and I think is at last complete and what we wanted. You have been so kind in this that I am sending you a copy in order that you might have an opportunity to see it before it gets into print and to let us know if you see anything objectionable. I hope you won't, and don't think you will because we have tried to be as careful as we could.

I am very grateful to you for your help in preparing this and I hope that it will do the good that it was intended to do towards answering some of the unjust and damaging things that have been said.

With kindest regards, I am

Faithfully yours,

*Henry L. Stimson*

---

Major General Leslie R. Groves,  
The Pentagon,  
Washington, D. C.

The foregoing pages, as I understand it, contain the reasoning of the Interim Committee and its scientific advisers. I have discussed the work of these gentlemen at length in order to make it clear that we sought the best advice that we could find. The Committee's function was, of course, entirely advisory. The ultimate responsibility for the recommendation to the President rested upon me, and I have no desire to veil it. The conclusions of the Committee were similar to my own, although I reached mine independently. I felt that to surely and effectively compel the Emperor and his military advisers to surrender at once, they must be administered a tremendous shock, coupled with illustrative damage and destruction. Such an effective shock would save many times the number of lives, both American and Japanese, that it would cost.

The facts upon which my reasoning was based and steps taken to carry it out now follow.

U. S. Policy toward Japan in July 1945

The principal political, social, and military objective of the United States in the summer of 1945 was the prompt and complete surrender of Japan. Only the complete destruction of her military power could open the way to lasting peace.

Japan, in July 1945, had been seriously weakened by our increasingly violent attacks. It was known to us that she had gone so far as to make tentative proposals of peace to the Soviet government. These vague proposals were however wholly unacceptable to the nations at war with Japan, and there was as yet no indication of any weakening in the Japanese determination to fight rather than accept unconditional surrender. If she should choose to fight to the end, she had still a great military force.

In the middle of July, 1945, the intelligence section of the War Department General Staff estimated Japanese military strength as follows: in the Home Islands,

slightly under 2,000,000; in Korea, Manchuria, China proper, and Formosa, slightly over 2,000,000; in French Indo-China, Thailand, and Burma, over 800,000; in the East Indies Area, and the Philippines, over 500,000; in the by-passed Pacific Islands, over 100,000. The total strength of the Japanese Army was estimated at about 5,000,000 men. These estimates later proved to be in very close agreement with official Japanese figures.

The Japanese Army was in much better condition than the Japanese Navy and Air Force. The Navy had practically ceased to exist except as a harrying force against an invasion fleet. The Air Force had been reduced mainly to reliance upon Kamikaze, or suicide, attacks. These latter, however, had already inflicted serious damage on our sea-going forces, and their possible effectiveness in a last-ditch fight was a matter of real concern to our naval leaders.

As we understood it in July, there was a very strong possibility that the Japanese Government might determine upon resistance to the end, in all the areas of the Far East under its control. In such an event the Allies would be faced by the enormous task of destroying an armed force of five million men and five thousand suicide aircraft, belonging to a race which had already amply

demonstrated its ability to fight literally to the death. We may note in passing that total Japanese military casualties during the preceding three and a half years had been less than 700,000 men.

The strategic plans of our armed forces for the defeat of Japan, as they stood in July, had been prepared without reference to the atomic bomb which had not yet been tested in New Mexico. We were planning an intensified sea and air blockade, and greatly intensified strategic air bombing, through the summer and early fall, to be followed on November 1 by an invasion of the southern island of Kyushu. This would be followed in turn by an invasion of the main island of Honshu in the Spring of 1946. The total U.S. military and naval force involved in this grand design was of the order of 5,000,000 men; if all those indirectly concerned are included, it was larger still.

We estimated that if we should be forced to carry this plan to its conclusion, the major fighting would not end until the latter part of 1946, at the earliest. I was informed that such operations might be expected to cost over a million casualties, to American forces alone. Additional large losses might be expected among our allies, and of course if our campaign were successful, and if we could judge by previous experience, enemy casualties would be much larger than our own.

To carry out this atomic mission against Japan, the military staff presented me a list of suggested targets. I had requested that this be done in order that I might ensure, as far as possible, that the bombing be confined to military objectives. With Mr. Truman's warm approval I struck off that list the city of Kyoto; it was the shrine city of Japanese art and culture, and although it contained two or three small factories, it was a predominantly non-military target. I approved four other targets including the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Line 6. Change this entire paragraph to read as follows

"The importance of the atomic mission was so great that the detailed plans were presented to me for approval. After some discussion, and ~~with the~~ warm approval of Mr. Truman, I struck the city of Kyoto off the list of targets. While Kyoto was a legitimate military objective, it had been the ancient capitol of Japan and was a shrine city of Japanese art, culture and religion. I determined that it should be spared. I approved four other targets including the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki."

No. 3191  
5 Jun

and opposition to the remilitarization of Japan. Approximately 5,000 persons attended and votes and funds were collected to further these objectives. JCP members reportedly added verbal propaganda: In conjunction with the Sendai showing, AKAMATSU gave a lecture in which she stated: "The Yoshida government, puppet of American imperialism, is beginning to collapse...We must not miss this opportunity to unite the entire Japanese people in a grand patriotic front to fight for peace and independence." (B-2) (b)

A showing held recently at Yamagata City, Yamagata Prefecture was reportedly conducted under the guidance of the JCP. MAKABE Jin, allegedly a Communist sympathizer, in a critique of the exhibition printed in the Yamagata Press, concluded that "all voters should see the exhibition before voting, to stimulate a reconsideration of the candidates." (a)

A showing in Akita Prefecture was sponsored by the Dawn Oil Painting Society---of which MURAKAMI Ken, reportedly a Communist, is the leading figure; the Akita Prefectural Council of Labor Unions, believed to be JCP-dominated; and the Akita Prefectural Synthetic Art League. During the exhibition, a known JCP member and two other persons distributed handbills and peace ballots. (e)

e. Atom Bombings of Japan Declared Pointless: The Women's Democratic Club, Fukuoka Branch sponsored a roundtable discussion honoring AKAMATSU and MARUKI in connection with the showing of the atom bomb murals at Fukuoka. At the meeting, AKAMATSU emphasized the following points: "After the Potsdam Declaration was announced, ten days elapsed before the first atomic bomb was dropped. Despite the fact that during that ten day period, the intention of the Japanese Government to surrender was made clearly known...the unnecessary step of dropping the bomb was taken. It is now asserted, self-righteously, that the bomb was used as the last resort to expedite the termination of the war. If this is true, then there was no object in dropping the second atomic bomb at Nagasaki." (f)

At a reported discussion meeting in connection with the exhibition, held at Yokosuka City Hall, Communist KIBUCHI Yoshiji allegedly argued that "it was well known on 6 Aug 45, that Russia would enter the war on 9 Aug 45... It was also known that Japan would eventually lose the war; why then did America use such a horrible weapon? Japan was to be controlled by the four big powers, but by dropping the bomb, America came to occupy Japan herself. This indicates that the true character of America, as well as capitalism, is to employ every means available, regardless of whether people would cry or die, if (America) benefits by it." (B-3) (b)

## SECURITY BRIEFS

3. General Situation:

a. New Sodomei Officials: Representatives of the Japan Federation of Labor Unions (Sodomei) recently elected right-wing socialist, MATSUOKA Komakichi, to the presidential seat for the ensuing term. Some 200 convention delegates, (INTSUM 3189), representing an allegedly 350,000 union members, elected another well-known Socialist, KIKUKAWA Tadao, to the post of general-secretary. Conferees further decided to designate the 1-2 Jun 51 convention as the "Sixth Regular National Convention of Sodomei." (B-2) (g)

Comment: MATSUOKA Komakichi, frequently referred to as Japan's "dean of labor organizers," carries considerable weight within the Japan Socialist party and commands strong support from the ranks of organized labor (INTSUM 3155). He was Speaker of the Lower House under KATAYAMA, and later visited the United States.

b. Mindanao Messages to U.S., UN: PAIK Moo (HAKU Bu), Union of Greater Korean Republic in Japan (Mindanao) official, reportedly wrote a letter praising the U.S. stand against communism to President Truman on 2 Jun. (B-2) Other Mindanao officials are drafting a similar letter to be sent to the United Nations Security Council, according to fairly reliable sources. (B-3) (g)

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- (a) A/R, Fifth CIC District, D5-531 (5b)
  - (b) CI Div/RES Files, "Exhibitions of Atom Bomb Paintings"
  - (c) A/R, Fifth CIC District, D5-531 (5b)
  - (d) A/R, First CIC District, D1-5.330 (5b)
  - (e) CIC Spot Reports, 3-4 Jun 51