

LIST - SIAM POW INTERNMENT CENTRE



Tel. No.— **Abbey 1272 Ext. 253.**

Any further communication on this subject should be addressed to—
The Under-Secretary of State,
The War Office
(as opposite)
and the following number quoted.



**THE WAR OFFICE,
Cas. PW.,
Hotel Victoria,
Northumberland Ave.,
London, W.C.2.**

SS/330/141/559 (Cas. PW)

Reference

27 January, 1947.

Memorandum for :-

The Theater Provost Marshal,
HQ. Communications Zone (Forward),
European Theater of Operations,
A.P.O. 887, U.S. Army.

Attention :- Chief of Prisoner of War
Division.

The enclosed documents, which were among a consignment of Far East records received in this office from Alfisa, are forwarded for your information concerning the American personnel mentioned therein.

Will you kindly acknowledge receipt.



Kend

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
Office of the Theater Provost Marshal

KCJ/r1

383.6-PMG

APO 757
6 February 1947

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Correspondence

TO : War Department
Office of the Provost Marshal General
Washington 25, D.C.

1. The attached correspondence is forwarded as a matter
pertaining to your office.

FOR THE THEATER PROVOST MARSHAL:

T. H. Dameron
T. H. DAMERON
Colonel, CMP
Chief, PW Division

Incl: Ltr fr The War Office, London,
dtd 27 Jan 47, reference:
SS/330/141/559 (Cas. PW)
w/documents from Alfsea re
American personnel (PWs)



*1 copy forwarded
to APO casualty
with ref. that is to be found to
Navy after checked.
3 March 1947
JHK*

PMDFW

Death Roll of Americans, Ex-PSOW

AGO, Casualty Section
Rm 1E 512, Pentagon

PMDO, PW Div
Rm 5E 475, Pentagon

4 March 1947

Mrs. Klein
72931

Attached death roll of former American prisoners of war is forwarded to you for your information. It is requested that when you have completed your check, you will forward it to the Navy Department, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington 25, D. C., so that they may complete their records on those names listed who are members of the U. S. Navy.

FOR THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL:

1 Incl
List

L. E. GRIFFITH
Major, CMP
Chief, Prisoner of War Division

*Siam POWs Internment Centre
Burial Ground Siam &
Burma*

JKS
SGKLEIN: fhl:72931
PW DIV: PM:O: 4 Mar 47

No. 4, ✓

37

自昭和十七年八月十五日
至昭和二十年九月五日

FROM 15/8/1942
TO 5/9/1945

米人其他死亡者墓地别名簿

AMERICAN & OTHER POWS. BIRTH ROLLS OF VARIOUS CEMETERIES.

(一三六名) (136 names)


DUPLICATE

泰俘虜收容所

SIAM POWS INTERMENT CENTRE.


LIST - SIAM POW INTERMENT CENTRE

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此圖係由... (Handwritten text describing the map's source or purpose)

DEATH ROLL OF EX- P. O. W.

Nationality : AMERICAN.

*** Burial-Ground : NATONPATON, SIAM.

| | | | | | | | |
|---|-------------------------------|-----|----------|---|-----|----|-----|
| 1 | o HERRERA, Livorio Montoya. | Pte | 38065444 | 5 | 19. | 5. | 27. |
| 2 | o BENDER, George Frederick J. | Smn | 3123539 | 3 | | 5 | 22 |

=====

*** Burial-Ground : KANCHANABURI, SIAM.

| | | | | | | | |
|----|-----------------------------------|--------|----------|---|-----|----|----|
| 1 | o WILLIAM, David Marvin. | Smn | 2916350 | 4 | 18. | 6. | 1. |
| 2 | o HENDRICK, Robert Harry. | Smn | 3113303 | 3 | | 12 | 30 |
| 3 | o SCHUELKE, John Harry. (HENRY) | 2/P.O. | 03933362 | 3 | | | |
| 4 | o Bussey, Sam Mann | Pte | 3452882 | 3 | 19. | 1. | 18 |
| 5 | o BOWLEY, Raymond J. | Sgt | 20813346 | 3 | 19. | 1. | 26 |
| 6 | o EASTWOOD, Howard Wade | Cpl | 20814103 | 3 | | | 28 |
| 7 | o ROGERS, John William | Pte | 204109 | 3 | | | 28 |
| 8 | o WILLIAMSON, Naberuth (BAGGER) | Cpl | 20813733 | 3 | | | 28 |
| 9 | o SIMPSON, Ward Helvey | Pte | 20814173 | 3 | | | 30 |
| 10 | o COLLINS, Columbus Marion JR | " | 38038751 | 3 | 19. | 2. | 29 |
| 11 | o BLAIR, Kenneth Sutherland (LBN) | Sgt(N) | 2149598 | 3 | 19. | 3. | 23 |

Burial-ground: Neeke Station, Neeke, Siam.

| | | | | | | | |
|---|-------------------------|--------|----------|---|-----|-----|----|
| 1 | o CALLAHAN, Melvin Carl | Sailor | 3601538 | 3 | 19. | 1. | 4 |
| 2 | o DALESIO, Frank | Pte | 36009960 | 3 | 18. | 12. | 24 |

Burial-ground: Saigon, F.I.

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|------------------------|------|--------|---------|---|-----|-----|---|
| 1 | o TANBERG, Albert Neil | BKR3 | Cpl(N) | 2832702 | 8 | 19. | 11. | 2 |
|---|------------------------|------|--------|---------|---|-----|-----|---|

Burial-ground: Lepoh, Burma.

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|------------------------|------|--------|----------|---|-----|----|----|
| 1 | o MUSTO, James William | 6262 | Pte(N) | 2237690 | 3 | 18. | 7. | 25 |
| 2 | o PFELL, Stanley A. | | Pte | 20815880 | 3 | 18. | 9. | 22 |

Burial-ground: Tanbizaya, Burma.

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|-------------------------|--|--------|----------|---|-----|----|----|
| 1 | o DUPLER, Harley Harold | | Sgt(N) | 204598 | 5 | 18. | 5. | 14 |
| 2 | o WILSON, Edwin P. | | Pte | 20813339 | 5 | 18. | 6. | 12 |

Burial-ground: Fadong, Burma.

| | | | | | | | | |
|---|------------------------------|--------|--------|---------|---|-----|----|----|
| 1 | o WHITE, James Henry | SPIC | PO1(N) | 2741782 | 5 | 18. | 4. | 14 |
| 2 | o KONDZELA, Lawrence Francis | | Pte(N) | 3001106 | 5 | | | 13 |
| 3 | o LUSK, Joe Martin True | MARINE | Sgt(N) | 271816 | 5 | | | 28 |

Nationality: U. S. A.

Burial-ground: Aparong, Burma.

| Ser. No. | Names | Rank | Reg. No. | Gr. | Date of Death |
|----------|---------------------------------|------------------|------------------------------|-----|---------------|
| 1 | HUTCHINSON, Martin Bill | S2C Pte(N) | 3114506 | 5 | 18. 7. 5 |
| 2 | JAMES, Edward Richard | Em2 P02(N) | 4012918 | 5 | 21 |
| 3 | GRAHAM, Richard Gresham | Y3C P03(N) | 2916278 | 5 | 23 |
| 4 | TREMONTÉ, Ted Joseph | Y3C Pte | 36008820 | 5 | 29 |
| 5 | DRAKE, James Patrick | " | 20813077 | 5 | 18. 8. 1 |
| 6 | TUCKER, William Edward | MUS2 Pte(N) | 3822234 | 5 | 9 |
| 7 | PYE, Guy Edgar | Gm3 P03(N) | 3561015 | 5 | 12 |
| 8 | HITTLE, Robert Glenn | SK3 P02(N) | 3760386 | 5 | 17 |
| 9 | PETERSON, Lennart Oley | Gm2 P02(N) | 2998359 | 5 | 22 |
| 10 | HANSEN, Ralph Robert | SIC Pte(N) | 3214300 | 5 | 22 |
| 11 | REED, Clarence Oscar | Rm2e P02(N) | 3112202 | 5 | 23 |
| 12 | HOCH, Joyce Wesley | Pte | 38060221 | 5 | 25 |
| 13 | WATERS, Nelson Hugh | Cporl | 20813732 | 5 | 18. 9. 2 |
| 14 | BUHLMAN, Clarence Nelson | SIC Pte(N) | 3374947 | 5 | 6 |
| 15 | SOULE, George Irvin | Gm3C P03(N) | 3855087 | 5 | 8 |
| 16 | GARWOOD, Edward Dering | Rm2e P02(N) | 2580301 | 5 | 8 |
| 17 | FAULKNER, Harold Leon | Cpol | 20812952 | 5 | 8 |
| 18 | WIDMEYER, Harry Clark | Pte(N) | 2823123 | 5 | 11 |
| 19 | JONES, Samuel Avis | Pte | 37036059 | 5 | 11 |
| 20 | DEATS, Louis Frank, Jr. | Cpl | 20813180 | 5 | 11 |
| 21 | GUY, James Andrew | S2C Pte(N) | 3288115 | 5 | 12 |
| 22 | BAXTER, Bill Ray | Pte | 20813863 20813863 | 5 | 13 |
| 23 | DEMOIN, Achiel Rene | cem POI(N) | 3108456 | 5 | 14 |
| 24 | CARTER, Fredrick Lester | Gmc P03(N) | 3821422 | 5 | 16 |
| 25 | GRAY, Harry | Pte | 6750365 | 5 | 17 |
| 26 | YELL, Archie Bill | Cpl | 38036040 | 5 | 18 |
| 27 | HOLSINGER, Frank Oscar | Cpl(N) | 275077 | 5 | 18 |
| 28 | WYNNE WYNN, Marvin Anglous | S11 Pte(N) | 3601106 | 5 | 19 |
| 29 | IVEY, Dan Richard | Pte | 20813154 | 5 | 26 |
| 30 | CANTRELL, James Albert | Pte(N) | 3603049 | 5 | 26 |
| 31 | ALEXANDER, James Garland | Sgt | 20812924 | 5 | 26 |
| 32 | BAERMAN, Donald George | S2C Pte(N) | 4143526 | 5 | 27 |
| 33 | SEWELL, Dan Homer | Cpl | 20814097 | 5 | 29 |
| 34 | BATCHELOR, William Charles, Jr. | Pte(N) | 3813773 | 5 | 18.10. 1 |
| 35 | HALL, Ervin Leroy | S11 Pte(N) | 3001094 | 5 | 2 |
| 36 | WOLTZ, Donald Glenn | Pte | 20813194 | 5 | 6 |
| 37 | MORGAN, John | ARMY-US/3252 Sgt | ? | 5 | 18 |
| 38 | JOWELL, Johnnie Dudley | Pte | 20813069 | 5 | 18 |
| 39 | STOUT, George William | " | 20812975 | 5 | 31 |
| 40 | RICH, Robert Lee | " | 20813719 | 5 | 18.11. 1 |
| 41 | SPENCER, Mason Dale | S2C Pte(N) | 3114343 | 5 | 9 |
| 42 | ABRAMS, Russell Eugene | Y3C P03(N) | 2873503 | 5 | 9 |
| 43 | BOREN, Lemuel Maxey | Lieut | 0-397024 | 5 | 13 |
| 44 | BOYLE, Algers Curling | Cpl | 20813667 | 5 | 17 |
| 45 | PARKER, Allard Thomas | Pte | 20813088 | 5 | 17 |
| 46 | OFFERLE, Irvin Oscar | Sgt | 20813824 | 5 | 18 |
| 47 | MORRISON, Clinton D. | Pte | 20813326 | 5 | 18 |
| 48 | FEELEY, James John | S2C Pte(N) | 3287018 | 5 | 18 |

Burial-ground: Changaraya, Burma.

| | | | | | |
|---|---------------------------|--------------|----------|---|----------|
| 1 | BROTHERS, Frank Wheeler | L/Cpl(N) | 2658173 | 3 | 18.11. 8 |
| 2 | WILSON, James Raydell | MAR Pte | 509529 | 3 | 17 |
| 3 | MATTFELDT, William Fuller | " | 19000197 | 3 | 16 |
| 4 | DICKENS, William H. | " | 36105805 | 3 | 19. 1. 1 |
| 5 | EKLUND, Rudolph Laroy | " | 38027525 | 3 | 5 |
| 6 | PITTS, Gaston E. | L/Cpl | 20813159 | 3 | 14 |
| 7 | GOEDEL, Franklin | CIVILIAN Pte | | 3 | 23 |

US/2138-3278

DEATH ROLL OF EX - P. O. W.

Nationality: U. S. A.

Burial-ground: Anganaan, Burma.

| Ser.No. | Names | Rank | Reg. No. | Gr. | Date of Death |
|---------|-------------------------------|--------------|-----------|-----|---------------|
| 1 | LINDSLEY, Albert John | sic Pte(N) | 2833353 | 5 | 18. 6. 1 |
| 2 | WILLIS, Donnis Wayne | sic " (N) | 2916330 | 5 | 10 |
| 3 | BENNER, Kelvin William | EM3C P03(N) | 3858575 | 5 | 28 |
| 4 | BOWEN, Glenn Marion | Sgt | 20814091 | 3 | 18.12.11 |
| 5 | TRIM, Donald Paul | cof P03(N) | 3417221 | 3 | 11 |
| 6 | TIEMANN, Elton William | Pte | 38051061 | 3 | 14 |
| 7 | HATLEN, Edwin Arthur | smic Pte(N) | 3001001 | 3 | 21 |
| 8 | YOUNG, Kenneth Asa | S " (N) | 3114650 | 3 | 22 |
| 9 | PISTOLE, Frank Lyle Harold | amm3C P03(N) | 3201073 | 3 | 26 |
| 10 | ARMOUR, Floyd | Pte(N) | 3422332 | 5 | 18. 7.17 |
| 11 | CARNEY, Wendell D. | Pte | 208134764 | 5 | 22 |
| 12 | ANDERSEN, Julius Andrew | " | 37021953 | 5 | 23 |
| 13 | HAMPTON, Robert Wade | Lieut | 0-360734 | 5 | 29 |
| 14 | LUMPKIN, Samuel Hugh | Capt | 0-387367 | 5 | 18. 8. 1 |
| 15 | HALL, Howard Lee | Sgt | 20813668 | 5 | 2 |
| 16 | SILVA, Eugene John | Pte | 39078080 | 5 | 3 |
| 17 | ROTH, John Thomas | mm2C P02(N) | 3211967 | 5 | 6 |
| 18 | PARISH, Bartow Harrison | amm2C " (N) | 2943374 | 5 | 16 |
| 19 | OMOTH, Robert Engman | s/i Pte(N) | 3858625 | 5 | 16 |
| 20 | BRANHAM, Lawrence Randolph | sc " (N) | 2625971 | 5 | 17 |
| 21 | DEMPSEY, Austin Elmo | Pte | 20813008 | 5 | 20 |
| 22 | KELM, Albert Mason | Cpl | 20812958 | 5 | 21 |
| 23 | MANION, Tommy, Jr. | s/i Pte(N) | 3720785 | 5 | 22 |
| 24 | KUNKE, Ozeslaus John | Gm2C P02(N) | 2830324 | 5 | 23 |
| 25 | YATES, Donald Ralph | mm3C Pte(N) | 3721278 | 5 | 24 |
| 26 | SHAW, Edwin Earl | Sgt | 20813666 | 5 | 25 |
| 27 | WHATLEY, Hiram Jefferson, Jr. | Pte | 20813002 | 5 | 26 |
| 28 | DOIRON, Lloyd Walter | " | 38052155 | 5 | 27 |
| 29 | PULLEN, Robert Harold | sic Pte(N) | 3373208 | 5 | 30 |
| 30 | BUSHNELL, Edgar Wayne | csk POI(N) | 3207140 | 5 | 30 |
| 31 | KETMAN, Robert Earl, Jr. | sic Pte(N) | 3214287 | 5 | 18. 9. 6 |
| 32 | SHAVER, Harvey D. | Pte | 20813898 | 5 | 6 |
| 33 | RUSSELL, Charles E. Jr. | " | 20813897 | 5 | 7 |
| 34 | BRAY, Charles Bruce | Sgt | 20813006 | 5 | 8 |
| 35 | GUTHRIE, William Leo | Pte | 38038681 | 5 | 10 |
| 36 | KOELLING, Vernon Louis | mus2 Pte(N) | 3214437 | 5 | 11 |
| 37 | SCHANDUA, James Edgar | Pte | 20812840 | 5 | 14 |
| 38 | KALOVIS, Edward Burdette | " | 16020064 | 5 | 16 |
| 39 | EBAUGH, Forest Vergil | sc Pte(N) | 3422280 | 5 | 19 |
| 40 | JOHSON, Edward Irvin | sk3 P03(N) | 3933193 | 5 | 18 |
| 41 | LEE, Earl Henry | sic Pte(N) | 3285765 | 5 | 21 |
| 42 | WARD, Frank Calvin | EM3C P03(N) | 3721044 | 5 | 21 |
| 43 | LUNA, Elton | Pte | 20814160 | 5 | 22 |
| 44 | GILLIAM, Robert E. | " | 34104921 | 5 | 23 |
| 45 | FORGEY, Jed Dillmas | Cpl | 20813594 | 5 | 27 |
| 46 | CPRIER, Dale Rogers | PHM3C P03(N) | 2915604 | 5 | 27 |
| 47 | UPPERMANN, Max | Sgt | 20813731 | 5 | 18.10. 4 |
| 48 | COX, Charles Alexander | Cpl | 208138285 | 5 | 4 |
| 49 | GODFREY, Donald Francis | sic Pte(N) | 3214348 | 5 | 6 |
| 50 | KITCHINGS, Harry Anderson | Cpl | 20812930 | 5 | 14 |
| 51 | BROWN, Joseph Roy, Jr. | " | 34083491 | 5 | 18.11. 24 |
| 52 | HIRSCHBERG, Louis | FCIC P02(N) | 2070114 | 5 | 26 |
| 53 | ELLIS, Frank Dopson | CWT POI(N) | 2678339 | 3 | 19. 2.24 |

DEATH ROLL OF EX - P. O. W.

Nationality : Canada.

Burial-ground: Tarmakam, Kanchanaburi, Siam.

| <u>Ser.No.</u> | <u>N a m e s</u> | <u>Rank</u> | <u>Reg.No.</u> | <u>Gr.</u> | <u>Date of Death</u> |
|----------------|---------------------------|-------------|----------------|------------|----------------------|
| 1 | DORVAL, Norman <i>nr</i> | Pte | 6142762 | 1 | 18. 2. 4 |
| 2 | HASLETT, Howard <i>nr</i> | Gnr | 863654 | 4 | 18. 4.23 |

DEATH ROLL OF EX - P. O. W.

Nationality : Denmark,
Burial-ground: Kanchanaburi, Siam.

| <u>Ser.No.</u> | <u>N a m e</u> | <u>Rank</u> | <u>Reg. No.</u> | <u>Gr.</u> | <u>Date of Death</u> |
|----------------|-------------------------------------|-------------|-----------------|------------|----------------------|
| 1 | ANDERSEN, George Axel ^{MR} | Sgt | 5355 | 4 | 18. 9.12 |

DEATH ROLL OF EX- P. O. W.

Nationality: New Zealand.

Burial-ground: Village of Tagile, Siam.

| <u>No.</u> | <u>N a m e</u> | <u>Rank</u> | <u>Reg.No.</u> | <u>Gr.</u> | <u>Date of Death</u> |
|------------|---|-------------|----------------|------------|----------------------|
| 1 | DUNNINGHAM, Albert Lawrence ^{RC} | L/Cpl | 7792 | 4 | 20. 7. 1 |

Burial-ground: Tarmoang, Siam.

| | | | | | |
|---|--|------|--------|---|----------|
| 1 | SUTHERLAND, Arthur Wemyss Gordon ^{RC} | Capt | 106132 | 2 | 20. 8. 8 |
|---|--|------|--------|---|----------|

~~RESTRICTED~~
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES
INDIA-BURMA THEATER

Report of Information Obtained in Interrogation
of Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees
Evacuated from Camps in Southeast Asia
During the Period 23 August to 15 October, 1945

Short Title: SEAC POW REPORT

Note:

The text of this report is not classified
with the exception of Sections III, V, and
VI, which are classified RESTRICTED.

Compiled at New Delhi, India
20 November 1945

~~RESTRICTED~~
This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States within
the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C.
§ 1 and 32, as amended. The transmission or the
revelation of its contents in any manner to an
unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~RESTRICTED~~

Regraded unclassified
15 Sept 1955
W. Lee
Capt AGC

INTERROGATION OF POWS EVACUATED
FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA

D I S T R I B U T I O N

Agency:

| | |
|-------------------------------------|-----|
| OPD, War Department | (1) |
| MIS, War Department | |
| CFM Branch | (2) |
| MIS-X | (2) |
| OPMG, War Department | |
| PW Info Branch | (1) |
| Hq, USF, I-BT | |
| Chief, USMO Gp | (1) |
| War Crimes Bd, JAGD | (3) |
| Casualty Br, AGO | (2) |
| U.S. Naval Liaison Sec | (1) |
| File | (1) |
| CG, USF, Singapore | (1) |
| Main Hq, "E" Gp, GHQ SEA & India | (1) |

SEAC PO' REPORT

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- Exhibit "A" - Form of War Crimes Questionnaire given to all evacuated personnel.
- Exhibit "B" - Form of IS-X Questionnaire given to all officers and selected other personnel.
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II - CAPTURE

- Exhibit "D" - Roster of 131st FA kept at Singapore.
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- Exhibit "K" - Aerial photographs of some camp locations reported before the war's end.
- Exhibit "L" - Rules for POW's in Branch #3.
- Exhibit "M" - Compilation of Camp Rules made from Memory by two POW's, Pvt Peel and Cpl Bankhead.
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I - INTRODUCTION

1. Personnel Evacuated
2. Intelligence Processing of Evacuees
3. Scope of this Report
4. Form of the Report

I - INTRODUCTION

1. Personnel Evacuated:

On 25 August 1945, the first six Americans evacuated from internment in Southeast Asia after the cessation of hostilities arrived at the 142nd General Hospital in Calcutta. (A group of prisoners had previously been released from internment at Rangoon with the fall of that city but the interrogation of those men has previously been the subject of a full report and will not be considered here.) Shortly thereafter, the evacuation plan designated operation "Mainland" was in full operation, and by 15 October 1945 all but a handful of the American personnel known to be in Southeast Asia camps had been moved by Air Transport Command from Bhejburi and Bangkok in Thailand, Saigon in Indo-China, Singapore and Batavia, Java to Calcutta. This evacuation was as follows:

| <u>Branch</u> | <u>From Asiatic Mainland (Burma, Thai, FIC)</u> | <u>From Singapore</u> | <u>From Batavia</u> | <u>Total (b)</u> |
|--------------------|---|---------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|
| U. S. Army | 307 | 42 | 24 | 373 |
| U. S. Navy | 196 | 10 | 29 | 235 |
| U. S. Marine Corps | 17 | 2 | 3 | 22 |
| Merchant Marine | • | 25 | 28 | 53 |
| Civilians | 26 (a) | 21 | 38 | 85 |
| TOTALS | 546 | 100 | 122 | 768 |

Notes:

(a) Of these, 5 proved not to be Americans, and were immediately transferred to RANMI control at Alvedera, Alipore, Calcutta.

(b) The breakdown by service branch does not agree with figures reported by 142nd General Hospital, which reports 244 Navy, 43 Merchant Marine, and 86 Civilians. The figures given above were drawn after a check of each evacuee against available unit rosters, and is believed to be accurate.

At the time this report was written there were approximately 12 civilians reported being evacuated from camps on the East Coast of Sumatra, and an unknown small number yet to be evacuated from Singapore, Saigon, and possibly other points including Soerabaja, Java, and Maching,orneo. These reports are being investigated and the evacuation of further small groups of civilians from time to time may be expected. No large groups, however, is now anticipated.

Personnel evacuated included the following:

a. From Burma, Thailand, and Indo-China were members of the 2nd Battalion, 131st Field Artillery, survivors of the USS HOUSTON, some enlisted aircrew personnel originally interned in Saigon, and a few civilians.

b. Evacuees from Singapore included captured aircrew personnel originally of the 10th, 14th, and 20th Air Forces, the 19th Bomb Group, GTRAF, a Naval Aircrew, some of these having originally been interned at Saigon, and also Merchant Marine personnel from the ships AMERICAN LEADER, ILLIAM HUMPHREY, SANOKLA, and HOWLY, civilians interned in Singapore, and at Tavoy Internment Camp, Burma.

c. From Batavia Java, were survivors of the USS POPE, USS BIRCH, one officer from the USS LEGGISE, all of whom were originally interned at Macassar in the Celebes, a few of the crew of the HOUSTON, 131st FA, aircrew, and Merchant Marine personnel from camps in Java, and a group of Merchant Marine personnel who had been sent from Singapore to work camps in Sumatra.

2. Intelligence Processing of Evacuees:

By directive of the Commanding General, India-Burma Theater, the agency designated for the intelligence processing of evacuated prisoners of war and civilian internees was MIS-X India, in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and headed by Captain Errol L. Schjonber, CE. With the termination of censorship at the cessation of hostilities, an interrogation team was formed of former censorship personnel to conduct the interrogation at the 142nd General Hospital in Calcutta. This team was composed of the following:

1st Lt. Howard R. Patch, Jr., in charge
1st Lt. Sam J. Corelis
1st Lt. Alexander P. Erdlejohn
1st Lt. John P. Hargas
1st Lt. Nathaniel W. Morrisette
2nd Lt. Melvin R. Mirick
T/Sgt. Frank Cavelsack
S/Sgt. Luke J. Pandick

This organization was set up on or about 20 August 1945, and processing began 25 August, continuing until 20 October 1945, at which time the majority of evacuees had been processed, and the team was disbanded. Lt. Patch proceeded to Headquarters, United States Forces, India-Burma Theater, at New Delhi under orders to draft the present report, and the processing of any further evacuees was assigned to the branch office of the Counter Intelligence Corps at Calcutta.

The following processing was given:

a. The contents of restricted letter AG 363.6 (24 Mar 45) CE-S-B-11, dated 29 March 1945, TAGO, subject: "Publicity in Connection with Escaped, Liberated, or Repatriated Prisoners of War", and, when received, the amended contents of similar letter dated 4 October 1945, were read and explained to all evacuees save those too ill for processing. Each evacuee was then required to execute in duplicate a certificate of compliance and understanding of above letter, as required by its terms. One copy of the certificate, witnessed by the processing officer, was retained by the evacuee; the other copy was forwarded by MIS-X India to the Captured Personnel and Material Branch, Military Intelligence Service, Washington.

b. All evacuees able to do so were given a short-form questionnaire on War Crimes, and were assisted in completing this where necessary. A copy of this form is appended as Exhibit "A" to this report. When completed, these questionnaires were screened by the MIS-X officer to determine which evacuees had information warranting further interrogation. After screening by MIS-X, the War Crimes questionnaires were turned over to the Counter-Intelligence Corps. Those individuals who appeared to have specific knowledge of War Crimes and atrocities committed against Allied personnel were interrogated at length by CIC agents. Sworn statements and depositions were taken as deemed necessary to perpetuate the testimony for use in future war crimes prosecutions. Approximately 15 CIC Agents were engaged on this phase of the processing under the supervision of Major T. W. Stapton, Executive Officer, CIC, India-Burma Theater, and special agent R. W. Elise, Calcutta Branch Office, CIC, India-Burma Theater.

c. All commissioned officers, and selected enlisted enlisted men, merchant seamen, and civilians, were then given the full MIS-X questionnaire appended hereto as Exhibit "B". Selection of those other than officers who should be given this questionnaire was done on the basis of the screening of War Crimes questionnaires referred to above. Criteria were: the scope of the individual's experiences, the size of the group of Americans of which he was a member, the locations in which he had been interned, and his apparent intelligence and ability to report useful information.

In some cases, the individual was fully capable of filling out the questionnaire without assistance; in others, assistance was given; in a few cases, the interrogating officer retained the questionnaire as a guide for questioning, filling out the form himself.

d. On completion, the MIS-X questionnaires were collected, reproduced, and distributed to agencies requiring them. The following distribution was made:

- | | | |
|-----|--|------------|
| (1) | War Crimes Board, JAG, Hq USF, IBT | - 2 copies |
| (2) | Captured Personnel & Material Br, MIS | - 1 copy |
| (3) | Casualty Br, AGO, Hq USF, IBT | - 1 copy |
| (4) | Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, Hq USF, IBT | - 1 copy |
| (5) | Where Naval or Merchant Marine personnel, to U.S. Naval Liaison Office, 6 Church Street, Calcutta. | - 1 copy |
| (6) | Where Air Forces personnel, to Asst. Chief of Staff, A-2, Hq USAAF, IBT, APO 671. | - 1 copy |

e. On the basis of information in the questionnaires, further information was sought and obtained from key personnel such as officers senior in their groups, other leaders, and personnel who were alone in or members of small groups of Americans in isolated areas. This further information included the preparation of extended narratives, further questioning where possible to clarify points raised in the questionnaires, and the collection of documentary material such as maps and rosters where these were reported. In some cases this collection of further material was hampered by the departure of the individual for the United States, but it was usually possible to complete all processing, including such supplementary items, within three or four days after the arrival of the evacuees, and thus prior to completion of medical processing and shipment. Materials collected in this way were likewise reproduced and distributed with the questionnaires.

f. The following is a schematic representation of the interrogation given:

| <u>Branch</u> | <u>Evacuated to 15 Oct.</u> | <u>Security Ltr & Certificate</u> | <u>War Crimes Questionnaire Given</u> | <u>Full MIS-X Interr.</u> |
|-----------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| U. S. Army | 373 | 364 | 364 | 116 |
| U. S. Navy | 235 | 221 | 221 | 55 |
| U. S. Marines | 22 | 22 | 22 | 8 |
| Merchant Marine | 53 | 52 | 52 | 17 |
| Civilian | 85 | 61 | 61 | 31 |
| TOTAL | 768 | 720 | 720 | 227 |

Those not included in the above processing included three officers and twenty enlisted personnel too ill for interrogation, and given immediate air evacuation to the United States, one Merchant Seaman who departed from the hospital before he could be contacted and twenty-four civilians not processed for individual reasons, some being seriously ill, some non-Americans, and a large number of children.

3. Scope of this Report:

This report is designed to present in topical form a summary of all material obtained in the processing described above. All matters which were the subject of interrogation will be covered, with two exceptions. The first excepted topic is that of War Crimes, which has been covered in the investigations conducted by the Counter Intelligence Corps and the War Crimes Board. The second excepted topic is that of detailed casualty information; all material relevant to this subject has been referred to the Casualty Branch of the Adjutant General's Office, Hq USF, IBT, for

transmission to Washington.

All material included in the report, with the exception of Section IV, A, 1 (Camp Locations) was gained in the course of the processing described. The material included in the section on locations of internment camps has been taken from every available source, including available maps and gazetteers, the Broadsheets published by the British "E" Group, reports from Southeast Asia Command Headquarters, RAAF, and other agencies in search for information on prisoners of war and internees. This has been done in order to provide the fullest possible summary of material on the identity of those places where American personnel have been interned.

In order to assure as complete a coverage as possible, information was sought from at least two persons at every known internment camp, with others where possible. As indicated above, full narratives were taken from the leader or other key personnel of all major groups of American internees, and also from individuals in areas where there were so few American personnel as to limit the availability of information. It should be emphasized, however, that the proportionately small number of Americans interned in Southeast Asia, probably in the neighborhood of one thousand all told, as compared to the larger numbers of British, Dutch, Australian, and native troops in the area, substantially reduces the coverage that can be obtained of conditions over the whole area.

4. Form of the Report:

This report has been prepared in topical form, in order that separate sections may be made available where desired to agencies interested in them who would not require the entire body of the report. As a result, there may be found to be a slight amount of duplication of information; it was felt that this was preferable to a draft which would require distribution in full to a large number of different agencies.

II - CAPTURE

This section will deal with the history of capture of personnel, relevant factors involved, evasion of capture, contact with natives and treatment at their hands, assembly at collecting points, transfer to permanent camps, preliminary interrogations, and treatment during this period.

A. Personnel evacuated from Thailand and Indo-China.

1. Personnel of the 131st FA Battalion.
2. Survivors of the USS HOUSTON.
3. Transfer of 131st FA and HOUSTON personnel to Burma and Thailand.
4. Capture of Aircrew and other personnel in Burma, Thailand, and Indo-China.

B. Capture and Internment in Malaya.

1. Aircrew personnel.
2. Merchant Marine crews.
3. Civilian Personnel.

C. Capture and Internment of Groups recovered in Java.

1. Personnel formerly at Macassar, Celebes.
2. Other military personnel evacuated from Java.
3. Merchant Marine and Civilian Personnel.

D. Personnel recovered in Sumatra.

E. Conclusion and Notes.

II - CAPTURE

A. Personnel Evacuated from Thailand and Indo-China.

1. Capture of 2nd Battalion, 131st Field Artillery (less E Battery):

At the time of its capitulation, this organization was fighting a rear-guard action, its mission the support of Australian infantry in the defense of Java against Japanese forces. The Battalion had left the United States on 21 November 1941 from San Francisco, calling at Honolulu, Brisbane, and Darwin enroute to Soerabaja, Java, at which point it disembarked 16 January 1942, moving to camp at Singosari Air Base, about 8½ kilometers northwest of Malang (5 miles) and a 65 miles road march from the port, travelling almost due south. Here the unit had had its first contact with native treachery when the Indonesians built fires on the airfield to attract Japanese aircraft to the positions. Other units based here included elements of the 19th and 22nd Bomb Groups, and also British, Australian, and Dutch forces. Air attacks were periodically sustained from groups of from six to seventeen or more Japanese bombers, usually during daylight hours, with some damage to aircraft and motor vehicles on the ground. Personnel casualties here were not reported.

On 27 February 1942, the Battalion was divided. 'E' Battery was left at Malang, and its further history up to the time of capture, when it surrendered on Madoera Island, is not known. The rest of the unit advanced, moving through Jogjakarta, Pasikmalaja, and Bandoeng to Buitenzorg, where camp was made on a rubber plantation at 0300 hours 2 March. They had been designated part of the BLACK force, a motorized shock force designed for quick hard thrusts against Japanese elements attacking Bandoeng. Road blocks were set up on 3 March, and the Japanese were reported to be within 15 miles of the position. On 4 March, the Battalion went into position south of Leuwiliang and engaged the enemy at 1432 hours at 200 yards range, with tanks, artillery and personnel as targets. Although the fire mission had some reported success, the unit was twice forced to move its positions as a result of enemy mortar fire. On 5 March, the Battalion was ordered to move to Soekaboemi to cover the threat on Bandoeng, with the understanding that the vacated positions would be maintained by Dutch forces. The move was commenced at 2000 hours, but on departure, instead of assuming the Leuwiliang positions, the Dutch forces retreated. The Battalion thus was forced to continue its march to Bandoeng, which it reached on 6 March, taking cover in a rubber plantation 18 miles southeast of the city to await further orders.

After almost constant air attack, on 7 March, the Battalion prepared to retreat to the coast, but prior to departure, word came of the Dutch capitulation of the entire island of Java. The cease fire order was effective at 1200 hours 8 March 1945, and the 131st moved from its bivouac in the woods to a race track in Garoet, where arms were stacked and surrendered, together with most motor vehicles and equipment.

At this time, the Battalion Commander, Lt. Col. Blucher S. Tharp, announced that any who wished to try to reach the seacoast to evade capture should do so. He did not, apparently, advise such procedure or recommend it. Several groups made the attempt, including Major Winthrop H. Rogers, Lts. T. J. Smith and R. E. Stensland, several American enlisted men, and a group of Australian troops numbering, in one report, about 300. These men arrived on the coast about 2100 hours 9 March, and maintained a constant watch along approximately 15 miles of coastland for five days, living off what food could be procured locally, including chicken, goat, potatoes and tea. Reconnaissance parties were sent out over 30 miles of the coast, without success. On 14 March word was received that personnel not back by the 16th would be shot, and thus, after one more futile reconnaissance, the men returned to Garoet, arriving at 2200 hours on 14 March. Some enlisted personnel did not rejoin the unit until a substantial time later -- several weeks, apparently -- but these reported a similar failure on the part of all with whom they were in contact. Hostility of the natives together with the lack of shipping in which to leave the island were ascribed as reasons for the failure of these evasion attempts.

After five days at Garoet, the Battalion was moved to a tea plantation at Taspada, about 8 miles from Garoet. Preparations were under way to establish a permanent base here when, on 22 March, the unit was moved to the rail junction at Tjibatoe. From this point on an advance party of 5 officers and 15 men left by rail for Batavia at 0630 hours 26 March, and were quartered together with a large number of allied troops in the Koen Chinese School in Batavia. The last stragglers who returned from the south coast were also quartered at the Koen School.

On 30 March, the main body of the Battalion entrained at Tjibatoe for Batavia, from which point they were marched 7 miles to a permanent camp at Tandjoengpriok, the Dutch Naval Base northeast of Batavia. The men of the 131st remained at these two points until 15 May, at which time they were united at the Dutch 10th Battalion Camp in Batavia, usually called Bicycle Camp.

During this preliminary period, the personnel of the 131st did not suffer severe hardships. The only contact with the Japanese was with line units which had been engaged in the brief combat near Bandoeng, and these were reported amicable and helpful. The Japanese cooperated with motor transport and with supplies; the officers, at least, were permitted to do shopping in Bandoeng, and were able to purchase tobacco and other supplies that were extremely welcome later on. The unit moved as a whole; it had its own supplies, and there was no contact with prison guards until arrival at Batavia for the march to Tandjoengpriok. Enlisted personnel were reported as having several days' rations in their own hands at the time of capitulation, and were able to supplement this by purchase of fruits and other items from the natives. The only reports of mistreatment occur during the march to Tandjoengpriok, where some beatings were reported.

There was a preliminary interrogation at Tandjoengpriok, but it appears to have been cursory and in the nature of a registration. Those personnel who had attempted to evade capture appear to have been questioned at greater length, but this appears to have been carried on largely by combat personnel of the enemy forces, covering general information regarding the unit and its supply situation, available material, and the location of supporting Air Force units. This was conducted without brutality or unpleasantness at the Koen Chinese School. In addition to these, a similar brief interrogation was given some of the field grade officers, along approximately the same lines. There was no further interrogation reported when all the unit's personnel, save for "E" Battery, was collected at Bicycle Camp in Batavia, totalling about 546 officers and men.

2. Capture of Survivors of USS HOUSTON:

This ship, a heavy cruiser, had already been crippled in a previous action, and was proceeding westward in the Java Sea toward Sunda Straits. It was attacked and sunk by Japanese vessels and aircraft at a point reported about 8 miles north-northeast of St. Nicholas' Point, the extreme northwestern tip of Java. It is understood that technical details of the engagement and sinking were gathered by personnel of the U.S. Naval Liaison Office in Calcutta from survivors. Abandon ship was ordered at or about 2400 hours of 28 February 1942, and ship sank about 30 minutes later.

Survivors were either picked up by Japanese craft and landed by them in the Banten Bay coast, or themselves made their way to shore at points on Banten Bay, Pandjau, and other islands in the bay, down along the western coast between Tjigaling and Laboeha. There were no reports of mistreatment of survivors in the water nor while on rafts, though some of the latter were apprehensive lest they be subjected to sadistic

gun fire. Those picked up in the water by the Japanese Navy were briefly interrogated, landed, and turned over to the Japanese Army for internment in Serang Jail. Treatment by Naval personnel was reported good; dry clothes, food, and tobacco were furnished these survivors.

The personnel who themselves reached land along the coast can be roughly divided into two groups, those who landed at points north or east of Anjer Kideol lighthouse, and those who drifted with the current down Soenda Straits to points between Anjer and Laboehan. Of these, the former attempted evasion by moving up into the hills either north of Pjilegon or east of Serang, and were without exception betrayed by the natives into Japanese hands. It appears that this cooperation was purchased by the Japanese; there were several reports of money being paid the natives by Japanese officers, some cases specifically stating that ten guilders per head was the fee. While under native control, there were also reports of men being beaten, stripped of clothing, and robbed of money, jewelry, and other valuables. In most cases, however, the Japanese appear to have taken control very promptly, and all of this group were rounded up and set to work on Banten Bay unloading supplies that were being landed from Japanese transport.

This work continued for several days, under a broiling hot sun, with inadequate clothing, and almost no food and water. The work was coolie labor, the loads extreme, and the only relief was the occasional opportunity to steal a small quantity of rations from the supplies being landed; as they were closely watched, such opportunities do not seem to have been frequent. The working hours were from dawn until dark.

When the unloading was completed, the men loaded the supplies, which included food, medicine, ammunition, and general supply items not specifically reported, into wagons. They were then forced to haul these at bayonet point, barefoot on gravel roads, from the beaches to Serang, covering distances up to twenty miles without relief from heat, hunger, and thirst. These carts were marked with Red Cross Markings, but there was some report of air attack during this operation despite the markings. The men were occasionally permitted to climb coco palms, if their strength would permit, and this was the only reported source of food or beverage. It is clear that the entire operation was carried out on forced labor techniques. Finally, on arrival at Serang, the men were quartered in the Serang Jail and also in the Banten Park Theater, in both cases under extremely overcrowded conditions, and in the latter with a complete lack of sanitary facilities, the men being herded into the bare concrete-floored audience and held there.

The second group, landing west and south of these men, attempted to make their way inland between Pjinanka and Laboehan. Some Japanese patrols, encountered, and the natives were universally hostile. One group was held bound to posts overnight in the two square in Menes. In all cases, discovery of their presence by the natives resulted in the appearance of Japanese troops within eight hours -- which gave the natives ample time for a preliminary beating and robbing on their own -- following which they were rounded up and moved to Pangkasbitong, Panarajan, and Pandeglang, and finally collected with the other men at Serang. Food during this preliminary period was only haphazardly obtained; at Pandeglang Jail it was reported to consist of 3/4th pint of warm green water and a handful rotted rice per day.

At Serang, systematic threats, beatings, humiliation and starvation were continued with no slackening. One officer was reported to have made a daily inspection of the Banten Park Theater during which he cursed at and threatened those held there, brandishing a pistol at them and kicking those too weak or ill to move. Here too the men were given a preliminary interrogation; as with the 131st personnel, it was cursory and largely a registration. Save for those who, after rescue from the water, had been questioned by Japanese Naval personnel aboard ship, it was the only interrogation reported.

On or about 6 March, 8 American officers were moved out of Serang, presumably for Japan, as a result of a further questioning of officers which was designed apparently to screen those with technical or tactical and strategic knowledge of value to higher headquarters. Some officers reported being able to escape this draft through an assumption of stupidity and ignorance which was evidently not difficult to achieve.

The balance of the survivors, reported to number approximately 360 officers and men, were held at Serang until 13 April 1942, at which time they moved to the Dutch Trench Battalion Camp (Bicycle Camp) in Batavia. Here there were already a large number of allied troops, and also three Americans. Here too, they were joined by the personnel of the 131st FA, as noted above, on 15 May 1942.

3. Transfer of HOUSTON and 131st FA personnel to Burma:

All of the above personnel remained at Bicycle Camp from May until October 1942. Here they were joined by stragglers, evaders, and a few personnel left in Malang Hospital at the time the 131st moved forward, and included some members of the 19th Bomb Group. One specific report mentions the arrival on 12 September of a group composed of one officer and 65 enlisted men from Timor; the branch or nationality of this group, however, is not mentioned. The fact that it was specifically noted by Americans, however, raises some possibility that this group may also have been American, though there is nothing in available rosters or other materials to indicate the nature of the group if such were the case. Some of the others who arrived here during this interval had successfully evaded capture at Malang and continued to remain hidden in the jungles for periods of several months; in all cases final capture was the result of betrayal by natives who discovered their hiding places or with whom they sought refuge.

Out of this consolidated group, labor drafts began to be formed in October 1942. On 3 October, a group including 191 Americans under Captain Archie L. Fitzsimmons was sent to Burma via Singapore, where a five day stop was made. On 11 October a second group including 68 Americans under Captain L. L. Diegler was shipped out via Singapore, leaving there 27 October presumably for either Japan or Formosa. This group was composed entirely of technical specialists. Also on 11 October, a group under Lt. Col. Blucher S. Sharp, Commanding Officer of the 2nd Battalion, 131st FA, departed for Burma, going by water to Singapore, and on 7 January 1943 leaving Singapore by rail for Penang, and thence by water to Moulmein, Burma.

Conditions during these transfers depended directly on the size of the group being transferred. Captain Fitzsimmons' group found good conditions from Batavia to Singapore, during which time there were only 400 PW's aboard ship. At Singapore five days after arrival there, 1500 Australians were added to the group, shipping on a transport of about 4000 tons. From there to Burma, conditions were of the worst, extremely limited space being available for the men below decks where they were usually forced to remain; sanitation, food and water were sharply limited, and the suffering was reported intense.

Colonel Sharp's party experienced crowded and unsanitary conditions from the very first. Aboard the DAI NICHU MARU out of Batavia, a space per man of 80 square centimeters was reported, 16 men being crowded into a compartment 8' x 8' x 4'. Food consisted of wormy rice and a watery vegetable stew without meat, and one pint of water per man per day was issued.

For both groups the temporary stay at Singapore was a relief; food there was better, and the crowding at Changi Jail had not yet reached the proportions reported by later arrivals. There was a canteen from which food stocks could be augmented, and some issue of Red Cross stores, apparently holdovers from the shipments sent to Japan at the time of the

Tokyo earthquake in 1923. Rice, spinach, and fish (whitebait, a small minnow-like fish) were the basic ration. But this relief lasted a bare five days for Captain Fitzsimmons' group, which departed 14 October, and barely two months for Colonel Sharp's group.

Enroute from Singapore to Penang, this party travelled in boxcars, leaving Singapore at 0200 hours 8 January 1943, passing Kuala Lumpur at 2300 hours the same day, and arriving at Prai 2000 hours on the 9th. Departure from Prai was on board the MOJI MARU on 11 January. Conditions aboard were at first somewhat less severe than on the DAI NICHU MARU out of Batavia, but on 15 January, the convoy was attacked by aircraft reported as American PBY's. Some damage and several Japanese casualties were reported on board the MOJI MARU; a sister ship in the convoy, the NATSUMI MARU, was sunk, with the survivors of this sinking being taken aboard the MOJI MARU. From this point onward, conditions were the worst encountered at any point; personnel were unable to obtain sufficient water of any kind, and rations were reduced. Bathing or shaving was impossible. On 17 January, the men arrived in poor condition at Moulmein.

Captain Fitzsimmons' men had already arrived here on 26 October, and had left on 30 October, moving south to work camps below Thanbyuzayat along the Burma-Thailand railroad on which construction had been started in July of 1942. Late in January, Colonel Sharp's group also moved down to the work camps.

Work on the railroad continued for all of these men until November of 1943, the P's being split up into Mobile Camp groups and stationed along the line of construction in temporary camps. They were moved to base camps of a more permanent nature when illness or regrouping of parties required this. Most of the camps in Burma were referred to by their distances from Thanbyuzayat; those in Thailand either by the names of nearby Thai towns, or by names given them by the Japanese.

In January and April of 1944, the groups were reconstituted, some of the men being sent to rest camps near Kanchanaburi and thence to new work parties on airfields and railroad maintenance work in Thailand, and others going to Indo-China for airfield and harbor work there. Railroad maintenance camps were located along the Burma-Thai railroad and also the Bangkok-Chiangmai, Bangkok-Ubonrajthani and Bangkok-Saigon lines. Airfields were in areas near Bhejuri and Bangkok. During this time, these men were joined by others captured in Burma and Indo-China, and officers were largely segregated in officers camps, one being reported at Kanchanaburi, Thailand. With the exception of this transfer, and a transfer of Air Force officers and some others from Saigon to Singapore, personnel remained at these assignments until the end of the war. At that time they were collected at Bhejuri, Bangkok, and Saigon, and evacuated from these points by air to Calcutta.

4. Capture of Aircrew and Other Personnel in Burma, Thailand and Indo-China:

Personnel captured in these areas experienced widely contrasting histories. Military personnel captured in Burma were interned at Rangoon, and having been released in April 1945, have been the subject of a previous report. Civilians taken in Burma were arrested by Burmese police or native troops, and taken by them to the Japanese authorities. All Americans recovered in this category were members of a mission in Akyab, and were held at the mission compound there. They were taken to Rangoon, held there under house arrest for four months, and then into jail at Rangoon. In April 1942, they were transferred to Tavoy, where they remained until the war's end and evacuation via Singapore to Calcutta. A brief interrogation of these persons was conducted by the Japanese, at the Office of the district Commissioner in Akyab. This does not appear to have been pressed with any force; the internees were clergymen, and their professions of ignorance of military matters was accepted.

The only reports of capture in Thailand are from aircrew personnel. These were taken by Thai police to their own headquarters, and were at no time released to the Japanese save briefly for interrogation purposes. The details of their capture and subsequent treatment are thus of little importance to this report; they were well-treated, and comfortably interned. In one case, two men had some difficulty when their signs of surrender were apparently misunderstood, causing the Thai police to open fire on them, but this was without injury to them. No other difficulties of any kind were reported.

Personnel captured in Indo-China included Military and Naval aircrew personnel, and the crew of the armored boat GMAF of 5th Interceptor Squadron. In all cases, shelter and help in evasion of capture was sought originally from French residents, ranging from Hanoi down past Tourane (where the GMAF was beached after engine failure) to Saigon. Initial cooperation seems to have been the rule, followed by later defection and failure when Japanese pressure made the French apprehensive for their own safety. Initial cooperation included supply of food, clothing, and shelter, together with directions for routes and means of avoiding capture. It is not clear whether there were any clear-cut cases of outright betrayal subsequently, though this is suggested in some reports. Other causes of capture ascribed include erroneous instructions received from French or natives, misunderstandings between French and American personnel, treachery by the Annamites, inadequate briefing on the areas involved, and in one case, issue of evasion materials designed for a different area and lacking correct language material.

Both the personnel in Thailand and those in Indo-China who were collected at Saigon, were interrogated by the Japanese. This interrogation seems always to have been long and thorough, covering the tactical missions involved, equipment used, and such other items as the possibility of invasion of Indo-China, and the dropping of arms and equipment by parachute both there and in Thailand. This interrogation was accompanied by threats and beatings in Indo-China; the presence of Thai authorities made such mistreatment impossible for those interned at Bangkok.

From these groups, the personnel captured in Indo-China were moved to camps in the Saigon area, with the officers quartered in special officers' camps from which they were later moved to Changi Jail, Singapore. The men remained in Indo-China and the officers at Singapore until the end of the war. The personnel captured in Thailand were interned by Thai authorities in well-maintained and comfortable camps, chiefly civilian internment centers. Since with the tacit approval of the Thai government, arrangements were already under way for their "escape" from this area, when hostilities ended they were the first group ready for evacuation to Calcutta.

B. CAPTURE AND INTERMENT IN MALAYA

1. Aircrew personnel:

Evacuees from Singapore included aircrew personnel captured in many parts of Southeast Asia, including Burma, Indo-China, Malaya and Java. Recoveries included crews from the 10th, 14th, and 20th Air Forces. They were moved from Burma via Penang, or from Saigon or Batavia direct to Singapore, and spent most of their internment at Changi Jail. Capture histories will be found in those parts of this section which cover the area in which capture took place. Only two aircrews were captured in Malaya itself from which personnel were later evacuated to Calcutta, both being B-29 crews of 20th Bomber Command.

Of these, one landed in the water off Singapore Island, after a mission over the warehouse area at the Navy Yard on 2 March 1945, piloted by Lt. E. G. Millar. The crew made their way to Raffles Lighthouse

and thence to Malacca Straits in one-man life-boats. At this point they encountered treacherous Malay natives, were taken to Johore Baru, fed, and their presence reported to the Japanese. A Kampei Bai patrol boat was thus advised of their whereabouts and enabled to intercept them when they resumed their journey by water.

The second L-29, with Lt. Colonel D. J. Humphrey in command, had a more spectacular history. On a mission over the Singapore dock area on 11 January 1945, it was attacked by fighters and ultimately disabled. The ship came down in the area near the Rompin River just north of hilly country at 103.10' E, 2.40'N, after the #3 engine had failed and wing tanks exploded. Some personnel aboard were killed during this engagement or died in the crash. Two were captured by a Japanese patrol and taken to a police station at 'Rambu' (possibly Rangkam, or Endau) and from there to Outram Prison Camp. Three, Colonel, Humphrey, Lt. William Duffy and Lt. A. C. Saltzman, evading capture by the same patrol, were able to escape to the northwest, where they joined a force of Chinese Communist guerrillas from whom they remained until the end of the war.

These three, on the approach of the patrol, were apparently successful in hiding themselves in the bush and off the road, and also seem to have been helped by the two who were captured, in that these gave the patrol the impression that there were no others in the area. Assistance had already been obtained for all five men from the guerrilla forces, and their contribution to the evasion appears to have been a substantial one, aiding in the original concealment, and then indicating routes of evasion. After the encounter with the patrol, the guerrillas led Colonel Humphrey's group to a headquarters in the hills, and from this point they led a nomadic existence, enjoying the status of guests rather than prisoners, passing through Johore, Nagri Sembilan, and part of Pahang for a total distance of over 600 miles. A full report of this history and the subsequent moves and experiences of the group is, according to Colonel Humphrey, being prepared for 20th Air Force Headquarters in Washington.

2. Merchant Marine Crews:

Members of the crews of four merchant vessels were also largely evacuated from Singapore, the MS SANKLA, the WILLIAM HUMPHREY, the AMERICAN LEADER, and the RICHARD HOVEY. Of these, the first three were all sunk by a German raider, the sea raider #28, Captain Von Rickstetter commanding.

The HUMPHREY was sunk in August 1942, apparently in the South Atlantic. On 10 September 1942, the LEADER was sunk by the raider about 800 miles west of Capetown, South Africa, and in both cases survivors were picked up by the raider after the sinkings. The exact date or location of the first sinking was not reported. The raider then proceeded to Batavia, Java, where these survivors were turned over to the Japanese on 6 November 1942. Most were transferred thereafter to Singapore, where they were interned for the duration at Changi Jail.

Sea raider #28 then returned to the Indian Ocean, and sank the SANKLA at about 2037 hours of 29 November, at a point about 400 miles southeast of Madagascar. Survivors were again picked up, and were turned over to the Japanese at Singapore on 19 February 1943, it being reported that 39 out of a crew of 59 were landed at this time.

Survivors of these three sinkings were, on the whole, well treated by the German crew. It should be noted, however, that the interrogation given these men, by an agent of the Gestapo aboard the raider, was long, thorough, and expert, in contrast to later questionings by the Japanese when transfer of custody was made.

After these survivors were all collected at Singapore, a few were sent up to work on the Burma railroad. These all returned so far as is known, on completion of the work on the road, and were likewise evacuated from Singapore. Another group was sent by water to Sumatra, and suffered severe losses when their ship was torpedoed about 100 miles off the coast at Padang. Those surviving this sinking were employed on the Padang-Pakan Baroe railroad construction, and were evacuated by LCI from Pakan Baroe at the end of the war. Those not drafted for these work parties remained in the Singapore area, with occasional transfers from one camp to another, until their evacuation.

The fourth merchant ship, the HOVEY, was sunk by a Japanese submarine on 29 March 1944, and its survivors landed by the sub at Penang Naval Base in Malaya. Some mistreatment and hardship are reported by this group. They were interrogated by the Japanese apparently with some care, after being taken out of the water, information being sought on convoy operations and air escort techniques. They were confined in solitary at Penang during this time, and thence were taken to 'an Indian Prison Camp' and to Singapore.

3. Civilian Personnel.

A substantial group of civilian personnel was evacuated from Singapore; these had either been interned after capture in Malaya, or had been captured in Burma, interned at the civilian internment camp at Tavoy, and thence transferred overland for evacuation. Experiences of this latter group have already been discussed (bottom, p.5).

Those taken at homes in Malaya were collected at the Raffles Hotel, at "atong, or at Karikal (about 5 miles from Singapore) and, during most of the war, were interned at Changi Jail. The final year and a half of internment, however, was spent at Singapore Road Camp, to which point all civilians in Changi appear to have been sent in late April or early May of 1944.

C. CAPTURE AND INTERNMENT OF PERSONNEL RECOVERED IN JAVA

Capture of the 2nd Battalion, 131st FA, and of the survivors of the USS HOUSTON, both of which took place in Java, have already been discussed. Few of these personnel remained in Java until the end of the war, although some were retained in clerical or medical capacities at Bicycle Camp, Batavia, and a few were too sick to be moved when these units were transferred to Burma. Other personnel recovered in Java included personnel from the USS PERCH, the USS POPE, the USS LANGLEY, the SS TAIJUAN, a few merchant marine personnel from the SS HUMPHREY and the AMERICAN LEADER (details of capture noted above) a few from "E" Battery of the 2nd Battalion, 131st FA, and a small group of civilians.

1. Personnel formerly interned at Macassar, Celebes:

Survivors of the crews of the USS POPE, the USS PERCH, the USS LANGLEY, and a few others, were for most of the war interned at Macassar Camp in the Celebes. Details of the sinking of these vessels and the subsequent capture of survivors is not known in detail, since Macassar internees were evacuated to another area at the end of the war, believed to be Manila. Thus the only personnel available for interrogation on the above points were those who had been transferred by the Japanese from the Celebes to Java for work parties at Bandung and Batavia, and who then were evacuated from Batavia to Calcutta. The POPE was enroute with HMS ELMSTER and HMS ENCOUNTER via Sunda Straits to Colombo or Tjilatjap, and was sunk in the Java Sea engagement 1 March 43 o/a 1300 hours. Almost all survivors are said to have gathered in a group in rafts and lifeboats in the water, and were picked up by Japanese destroyers 3 March, stripped of their oil and water-soaked clothing, sprayed with a vile-smelling disinfectant, officers and men promptly segregated, and sent below to emergency

quarters. There seems to have been no evidence of mistreatment; they were transferred to another destroyer at sea, and taken to Macassar, landed and interned in the jail. From this point they were moved to an internment camp a few miles outside Macassar, formerly the Dutch KIL Barracks, some weeks later.

The USS PERCH was depth charged by destroyers in the Java Sea 90 miles from some islands north of Soerabaja on 3 March 42. She surrendered, and was taken aboard a destroyer. Here there were some reports of slappings and other mistreatment, and it is charged that the Japanese destroyer crew took from these men all their personal belongings, including rings, watches, and other valuables. These men were likewise taken and landed at Macassar.

The USS LANGLEY was engaged in ferrying P-40 aircraft from Fremantle, Australia, to Christmas Island, and while berthed at the latter point, apparently was lost when the island was taken by a Japanese amphibious force on 31 March 1942. With the exception of Lt. Commander Thomas A. Donovan, USN, who were evacuated from Java, the disposition of the rest of the crew of this ship is not known; Commander Donovan was briefly interrogated by the commanding officer of the landing force and sent aboard the Jap cruiser NATORI, to the Celebes.

During 1942 and 1943, work parties were made up at this camp and sent to Japan, to nickel mines in the Celebes, and, in a draft of officers, to Java. Thereafter, all non-military internees were segregated in another camp in the Celebes, and on 5 June 1944, all remaining prisoners at KIL Camp were moved to a new location south of the original camp. Here they remained until, on 26 July 1945, a group of 200 were sent to Batavia via Soerabaja, Java. This trip was made on a small oil tanker under the worst possible conditions, overcrowded, and under a broiling tropical sun, with food consisting of a half-pint of water per day, a few ships' biscuits, and two spoonfuls of sugar. On arrival at Soerabaja, they were placed in a transit camp, then entrained for Batavia, where they arrived after a two day ride in August 1945. It is reported that 122 American POW's remained in Macassar at this time, with A. C. Sawyer CSM, USN, in command, and M. O. Mattila, CSK, USN, in charge of administration.

2. Other Military Personnel evacuated from Java

A small miscellaneous group of military personnel evacuated from Java included aircrew personnel forced down in that area, a few patients in Malang Hospital, formerly of the 131st FA, who were left there and who succeeded in evading capture for some substantial period of time, and a few members of Battery "E" of the 131st FA, which was taken in Madoera Island, but most of whose personnel were shipped to Japan.

The history of the capture of Battery "E" is substantially like that of the rest of the Battalion; it was stationed on Madoera, and capitulated there at the time of the general surrender of Java. One officer is quoted as reporting some disorder at the time of the surrender, with Dutch troops turning machine gun fire on the American personnel to force a capitulation. In the absence of any large group from "E" Battery, this report cannot be evaluated here.

The men of the battery were taken to "Kermal" Camp in Bangkawang, Madoera, and from there to a number of camps in Soerabaja including one at Jaarmarcht, the "HRS Camp" and one at Percek. They left Soerabaja on 15 October 1942 for Bendoeng, were moved to Batavia, and thence to Singapore, where they arrived 2 November. On 7 November nearly all the battery save a few left behind in Batavia, Bendoeng and possibly Singapore, were shipped out by sea, apparently for Japan.

Of the aircrew personnel, one pilot, Lt. C. L. Reagan, of the 20th Pursuit Group, made a crash landing in north central Java, another aircrew of the 91st Bomb Group came down near Waingapoe, on Soemba, and a third plane, piloted by Lt. W. H. Calienne of Hq & Hq Sq, 35th Pursuit Group, CMCRAF, was forced down on Bali. Finally, a few members of the 19th Bomb Group left behind when that unit evacuated Java, were captured and later evacuated from Java.

In a history somewhat like that of Colonel Humphrey's group in Malaya, S/Sgt George W. Hess of 28th Bomb Sq., 19th Bomb Group, with a small group of others attempted to evade capture by working back into the hills. The similarity is enhanced by Sgt. Hess' report that one of their number, S/Sgt Brunley, did succeed in getting away to Australia. Sgt. Hess, however, was spotted by natives while out searching for supplies, and allowed himself to be taken by them. He reports that he could have got away, but that in so doing he would have caused a search to be made which would have resulted in the probable capture of the entire group. After capture he was interrogated at Bandoeng, moved to Batavia, and from there to Singapore on 15 October.

Lieut. Reagan of 20th Pursuit Group crashed on 29 February 1942, and succeeded in evading capture until 7 March by carefully avoiding roads, villages, and native Indonesians. On the latter date, however, he was caught by natives, tied to a tree, robbed of all possessions, and held for the arrival of the Japanese who took him to Blora, where he was bound, put in a warehouse, and interrogated several times. From there he was taken to Soerabaja, and from that point to work camps in central Java, including Madjakerta, Ngawi, Tjepinum, Soekamiskin, and finally to Amberawa in February 1944. He and the Reverend John Braman, a civilian internee, are the only American personnel reported as having been at Amberawa, which is reported as one of the worst camps in Java.

Lt. W. D. Haines of 91st Bomb Group reports making a crash landing near Waingapoe, on Soemba Island. The presence of this aircrew was reported to the Japanese by the natives, and they were badly treated by drunken guards who beat them severely during their interrogation at Waingapoe. Lt. Haines himself was later transferred to Macassar Camp in the Celebes, and from there to Batavia. The only crewman, Pvt. J. A. Collins, went with him to Macassar Camp, and was last reported at that camp.

A similar history is reported by Lt. W. H. Gallienne of Hq and Hq Sqdn, 35th Pursuit Group, GHQAF, who was forced down on Bali, taken to the Bali Hotel in Denpasar, and there interrogated. Conditions at this hotel, reported used as a collecting point for prisoners, were atrocious and filthy. From here he went to a civilian prison, was transferred to Soerabaja, and spent some time in the CEZ Hospital there as well as later at Jaarmarcht. He was moved on 15 May 1943 to Bicycle Camp, Batavia, where he spent the rest of his internment.

3. Merchant Marine and Civilians in Java.

Details of the capture of most of the survivors of Merchant Marine sinkings have already been given; a substantial number of these crews appear to have remained in Java, principally in Batavia. Two ships, the SS TAIJUAN and the SS SISUNIHON NAVA, in Soerabaja harbor at the time of the island's capitulation, had been engaged by personnel of the U. S. Army for a relief mission to Bataan and Corregidor. Four of these men were evacuated from Java in September, 1945, all members of the crew of the TAIJUAN.

This ship was apparently very nearly ready for departure to the Philippines when the Dutch surrendered Java; loading and other preparations had been in progress for four days. Ship and cargo were blown up by the Dutch to prevent capture by the Japanese, and the crew members contacted so far were all arrested at their homes, after periods of varying success at evasion of capture. They were interned at various times at numerous different camps throughout the Soerabaja area, in central, and western Java, and at the end of the war were in Malang, Tjimahi (2), and Ngawi.

Civilians were arrested in their homes, and taken to civilian internee camps at many different points in Java, including six or seven reported in the Batavia area, three in Amberawa, at least two in Bandoeng-Tjimahi area, and a few which have not been located as yet. One civilian, Slikker, evaded

capture until 6 July 1944, and two, a musician named A. Castor and an American woman, Maria Kaminoff McVay, succeeded in avoiding internment for the entire war, though they were both arrested and questioned by the Kempei Tai on several occasions. In both cases, however, the success of this evasion appears to rest on an adroit assumption of neutral citizenship in various countries at various times to suit the changing political situation, though it is clear that knowledge of the areas involved and the availability of contact with friendly natives and others in those areas was a material factor in both cases.

D. PERSONNEL RECOVERIES FROM SUMATRA

The capture of those personnel recovered in Sumatra at the end of the war has in all cases already been given, since these personnel were chiefly survivors of merchant vessels drafted out of Singapore internment camps and Changi Jail to work on the Pedang-Pekan Baroe railroad. It should be noted, however, that this draft was on a ship which was attacked by allied forces, presumably submarines, and sunk about 110 miles south of Pedang and about 12 or 15 miles off the Sumatra coast on 18 September, 1944. The name of this ship is not known, but it is referred to in records gathered from POW Headquarters in Batavia as the "F-2" shipment.

Survivors were picked up in the water by Japanese craft if but only if they were not wounded or too weak to get themselves into the rescue vessels. Survivors found to be wounded after rescue were thrown back into the water. Those eventually landed were taken by foot to Pedang under atrocious conditions, and by rail to work camps on the railroad. The road constructions were carried on under forced conditions, and completed on 14 August 1945. Shortly after this time, surviving internees were evacuated by plane from Pekan Baroe.

The only other evacuation from Sumatra was of three civilians, a woman whose home was in Sumatra, at Pekan Herin, near Rangoon, who was interned at the women's civilian camp at Bonkineng, and two correspondents who were on a Dutch ship sunk off Sumatra 7 March 1942. These two landed on Sumatra on 13 March, and were taken by a Jap patrol on 4 April, when they were taken by truck to Palembang. They were interned here, at Boekit Besar, in the Mantok Jail on Banka Island, and finally at Loebok Linggan, on the Belaban rubber estate in Sumatra, from which point they were evacuated. At the time this report was compiled, a further group of perhaps a dozen American civilians were reported awaiting evacuation from Sumatra East Coast Camps in the area near Medan and Tandjoengbelai, but this evacuation had not yet been accomplished.

E. CONCLUSION

The above histories are necessarily fragmentary and incomplete, particularly in those cases where a single American internee or a very small group was involved. Complete records of both capture and subsequent transfers have been reported as existing at Japanese POW Headquarters offices at Singapore, Batavia, and possibly other points. Some of these records have been recovered and are now in process of translation. Others may be recovered in Japan itself. Arrival of this material should clarify the fate or disposition of many Americans in Southeast Asia, particularly with regard to the several shipments of work drafts and others made from Southeast Asia to points in Japan, and perhaps to other points outside this Theater, about which little or nothing is now known.

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III - INTERROGATION

This section will deal with interrogation of prisoners of war and civilian internees by the enemy, with methods used, times and places of interrogation, and the types of information sought.

A. Military Personnel.

1. General Comment.
2. 131st FA Personnel.
3. USS HOUSTON Personnel.
4. Aircrew Personnel.
5. Personnel Captured after Evasion.
6. Miscellaneous Cases.

B. Merchant Marine Personnel.

C. Civilian Personnel.

D. Summary.

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III - INTERROGATION

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A. MILITARY PERSONNEL

1. General Comment:

As has already been noted, the Japanese did not usually interrogate enlisted personnel of either the Army or Navy to any extent sufficient to provide relevant facts or warrant extensive conclusions. Such interrogations as were given were largely in the nature of a registration of personnel at prisoner-of-war collecting points; the few exceptions to this rule reported in the case of HOUSTON personnel rescued in the water and taken aboard Japanese Naval vessels for transfer to shore were interrogations conducted in large groups, in which the enlisted men participated rarely if at all, and the questions that were put were almost entirely directed to and answered by commissioned officers in the groups.

Exceptions to the above rule were, however, noted. One was in the case of aircrew personnel. These men were questioned at considerable length and with great pains to collect available information in all reported cases. Another exception comprised those persons who had succeeded in evading capture for any period of time; and it might be noted that factors relevant to this type of personnel would also apply in the case of persons recaptured after a successful escape, although there are no reported cases of personnel surviving such recapture. A third exception comprises the occasional individual selected by the enemy interrogators apparently at random, and questioned at length concerning his unit, its armament, supplies, disposition, tactics, and other factors; out of the entire number of military personnel evacuated from Southeast Asia, at most three or four cases of this kind are reported.

Officer personnel, by contrast, were almost invariably interrogated, regardless of wounds or other disability at the time of capture, and at considerable length. The one marked exception to this was in the case of the 131st FA Bn; here it is reported that only "senior officers" by which is apparently meant officers of field grade, were questioned.

There were two reported cases of "special" interrogations--both apparently pertaining to the maintenance of security in the internment camps. One was the interrogation of Captain William D. Parker, U.S. Army, at Bangkok Military Prison, three years after his capture, when a search of the prison showed him to possess copies of a local newspaper apparently printed by the underground, the BANGKOK CHRONICLE. Major Winthrop H. Rogers was likewise questioned for the same reason. The other was a most thorough and exhaustive questioning of all civilian internees at Changi Jail, Singapore, starting 10 October 1943, accompanied by a thorough search of the area. The cause of this investigation is not reported, but may be ascribed likewise to some incident giving rise to a suspicion that underground activities were being carried on in the Camp.

Interrogation was in all cases made at the earliest practical moment, and for this reason some indication of the time and place of the interrogation of every unit is noted in the histories of capture in the preceding section. The only case in which there seems to have been unexplained delay is in the case of the main body of the 131st FA, which was not contacted by Japanese authorities save to issue directives until their arrival at Tandjoeng Prick Camp almost a month after capitulation.

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Segregation of ranks for interrogation purposes does not seem to have been systematically carried out. The survivors of the USS POPE were promptly segregated, though non-commissioned officers were not separated from other enlisted men. In contrast, personnel of the HOUSTON, also aboard Japanese naval vessels, were not only not separated in any way, but were questioned in groups, with both officers and men present at the same time. This, however, is the only case of group questioning of this kind which has been reported; it seems to have been general practice to interrogate one man at a time.

Treatment prior to interrogation, where commented on, appears to have been good. Details are not available; the usual comment was that good treatment was received "until they got through questioning us". This, however, seems to have applied only in the case of personnel from whom the Japanese expected information of some value, i.e. those who, for one reason or another, had been selected for interrogation on specific points and for specific reasons.

With the exception of naval gun crew and merchant marine personnel captured by Raider #28, and who, as noted in Section II, were interrogated by a Gestapo officer aboard, all personnel were questioned by Japanese officers or non-commissioned officers, aided where necessary by interpreters either Korean or Japanese. The use of a substantial number of Japanese who had been educated either in Hawaii or the United States was reported, in most cases as interrogating officers and in one case as interpreter. Their command of English, however, varied widely, and in many cases was extremely poor. In one case of this kind, the interrogator was a Hawaiian Japanese who spoke extremely poor English; in the same room was a Japanese officer who apparently spoke no English whatsoever. Later events proved the by-stander to be extremely fluent in English.

The topics of interrogation naturally varied with the person being questioned. One generality, however, can be made; in a substantial number of cases, the topics covered were matters of which the prisoner did not and could not have any knowledge whatsoever. A large volume of questioning centered around such topics as the subject's home life in the United States, his profession, interests, and political views, with no immediate connection drawn to the situation at hand. This may be regarded, however, as simply a part of normal interrogation techniques, made with a view to drawing out the subject in harmless ways to open a way for further questioning. Yet the scope and technique of questions on the immediate military situation and also on all other military topics was, with a few exceptions in the case of aircrew personnel, reported as sketchy, elementary, inadequate, and, to use a word frequently found in the reports, childish.

The Japanese interrogator's response to replies given seems to have gone far beyond the bounds of traditional oriental impassive calm. Two patterns may be indicated. In one, the attitude remained impassive, even smug, conveying the impression "Yes, yes, we know all that; go on!" The other was diametrically opposed, consisting of sharply expressed disbelief, shouted threats, and beatings or slappings with or without the assistance of attending guards. There seems to have been very little middle ground. The result of these techniques was that, on one hand, many falsehoods were accepted as truth, and on the other, truth was often branded as falsehood, in both cases disclosing the patent inadequacy of the interrogator's previous knowledge of the subject. This extensive display of reaction

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thus is believed to have impaired seriously the effectiveness of the interrogations in extracting pertinent information.

2. 131st FA Personnel:

Enlisted men, with a few exceptions, were not interrogated at all. Senior officers interrogated at Fandoeng were well treated, offered cigarettes, and questioned regarding the location of Air Force units and other troops, and regarding materials and supplies held by the 131st. One of the few enlisted men questioned was asked concerning the location of strategic objectives and their defenses in the continental United States; this was the only case of this type of questioning disclosed. Answers to these questions were, on the whole, guarded; one officer referred to the Geneva convention provisions, and was not further pressed. The statement that there were no other U.S. Army units on Java brought the query whether one battalion of field artillery could defend the whole island--apparently hoping to draw a statement of what other defenses existed--a trap into which no reported subject fell. Questions regarding life in the United States were answered truthfully, and elicited some skepticism and considerable superiority of manner from the interrogator. Other questions on military subjects were usually answered, and answered by "telling the Japs what they already know"; in cases where subject refused to answer, there was an immediate display of hostility and threats of punishment, though with this group there are no cases of serious mistreatment during interrogation reported. The consensus of opinion expressed by members of this group was, "The Nips love long talks. Tell them what they know already, and they nod wisely and think it is new information". The interrogations here may be summarized, then, as being superficial, inept, and cursory, with only very few persons questioned.

3. USS HOUSTON Personnel:

Topics included the size, composition, and strength of the Asiatic Fleet, the whereabouts of Admiral Hart (whom the Japanese insisted was aboard), the nature and amount of subsistence supplies available to the naval units in the area, the location of minefields and channels through them, and the same intensive questioning regarding conditions in the United States. Again, the tendency of the subject being questioned was, so far as he was sure the information was already possessed by the enemy, to talk, and talk as elusively as possible. Any other course of action produced immediate and occasionally serious brutality, slappings, beatings, and threats of worse. One group of men in Serang Jail, were, while being marched over for a questioning, startled to hear screams, and were told that those were the screams of a man who wasn't telling the truth. On arriving at the building where they were to be questioned, they were led past a Dutch prisoner sitting in a chair, bound, with a metal band about his head, which was apparently being tightened by some sort of thumbscrew. This was the only case of actual use of torture devices as a part of interrogation reported by this group, and was apparently not applied to any American personnel.

4. Aircrew Personnel:

Interrogations of these men were universally long and thorough, and, where conducted by Japanese Air Corps personnel, occasionally reported of an intelligent and high quality, otherwise stupid. Topics included location of bases, names

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of commanders, types of planes flown, and performance, armament missions, and such special matters as might be known by the subject being questioned, e.g., in the case of one crew grounded in Indo-China, details of the alleged parachuting of guns, ammunition, and supplies, by American airforce units to underground organizations. Refusal to answer brought a response varying from superior indifference to brutality and beatings. One subject was asked to make a recording for broadcast to the United States, to deal with the hopelessness of resistance to the Japanese forces. This request was refused, and apparently led to no reprisals. Confessions of ignorance were with this group successful if a satisfactory reason for the ignorance could be offered, thus replies in the vein "I am a new man in the unit and unfamiliar with its organization" or "My rank is insufficient for me to be entrusted with that type of information" or "I am a pilot and not told about administrative matters" were reported as successful evasions of questions. In all cases, however, it was apparent that some answer was expected and would be insisted upon; as a general rule, that answer could be utterly remote from the truth and still be acceptable unless the falsehood were one on which the interrogator believed that he had correct information already--in which case, regardless of the actual truth or falsehood of either the interrogator's beliefs or his subject's reply, harsh treatment including beatings could be expected. With this one qualification, however, it is readily apparent from the reports of this group of personnel that either evasion or outright falsehood were easier and safer than a flat refusal to answer, with the latter's invariable reward of brutality limited only by the whim of the interrogator and the guards assisting him.

5. Personnel Captured After Evasion:

Of all different classes of military personnel, this group as such received the harshest type of treatment, and were, second only to the aircrew personnel, the most thoroughly questioned. One exception to this was found, in the case of personnel who attempted to reach shipping in southern Java after the capitulation of the 131st FA at Garoet. These men surrendered themselves in some cases to front-line combat troops, and were interrogated by them in a thoroughly humane and proper fashion. In such cases, the questioning of these persons did not appear to treat specifically of the issue of evasion--at least, there are no reports of questioning along that line--but were merely a more thorough and extensive coverage of the same material already reported for personnel of the unit. Where, as in most cases, the evader was apprehended by or turned in to agents of the Kempei Tai, the matter was different; systematic abuse, beatings, starvation, chronic disbelief of any answer of any kind, characterized these interrogations. They were carried on for long periods, in one case for twelve hours, and lasted for as long as four to six weeks, covering the evasion attempt in detail, and also general information of a military nature.

6. Miscellaneous Cases:

In the course of his interrogation, Lt. D. F. Austin, of the U.S. Navy, was forced under duress to make a written statement for the use of propaganda agencies on the subject of the attack on Pearl Harbor. This occurred at Batavia; it was not possible to locate a copy of the statement, and specific details on the nature of the duress employed were not obtained. Thus it is not specifically known what form of mistreatment was applied nor for how long it was continued.

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In the course of his interrogation, Captain Fralick of the armored boat GNAT was likewise subjected to substantial pressure consisting in part of being shown other personnel (apparently natives) being tortured during questioning and warned of a like fate if he did not cooperate. His report states that he was able to avoid difficulty, however, by fabricating a long and complicated story concerning defenses and installations in the Batsan-Corregidor area, and by drawing a map of that area--all of which information was in fact completely false. He states, however, that it was accepted by his interrogators at face value. It has not been possible to recover any copies of this map, nor any reports of the interrogation to determine exactly what Captain Fralick's answers contained.

NM3c Edward Dewberry, U.S. Navy, was interrogated at Malang Hospital, and the Japanese her permitted interrogation by Indonesian political officials, reported to be members of the Nationalist Party. This questioning appears to have been wholly related to economic and social matters, covering life in the United States, subject's family life, interests, occupation, and other matters of a largely domestic nature. This questioning was carried on on a friendly basis, without force or mistreatment, in the presence of Japanese personnel.

Captain William D. Parker and Major Winthrop H. Rogers, both U.S. Army, were interrogated at considerable length at Bangkok early in 1945 regarding copies of the BANGKOK CHRONICLE which were found in their possession. Captain Parker was very seriously mistreated, and badly beaten up; it appears that he was unable to furnish the Japanese with any explanation for his possession of this newspaper, which was printed by the underground, and suffered the fate usual in such cases. Major Rogers, by contrast, reports that he simply indicated that as senior officer of his group he was required to keep up on the news, and suffered no further trouble in the matter.

Other miscellaneous items include the several types of "screening" interrogations either to make up work parties of specialists or to select personnel for further questioning in Japan. Some reference to these has already been made in discussing capture histories in Section II; it need only be added here that these questionings are reported to have been superficial, and easily evaded through an assumption of stupidity or ignorance.

F. MERCHANT MARINE PERSONNEL

With the exception of the HOVEY, which was sunk by a Japanese submarine, all ships from whom any substantial number of crewmen were evacuated to Calcutta were sunk by the German raider #28, and were interrogated by an agent or officer of the Gestapo. This was clearly and by contrast with all other interrogations the one expert interrogator reported. The questionings were long, and thorough, running through several sessions, and covered in minute detail every possible point which such personnel could be expected to have knowledge, including all aspects of convoy operations, ships, cargoes, routes, codes used, armament, life-saving equipment, escort and air cover, and other matters. Answers were accepted; refusal to answer or lying was taken with, as one subject reports, "threats and gestures". There was no report of brutality or physical mistreatment of any kind.

All of this class of personnel was, of course, reinterrogated by the Japanese on being handed over to them. Topics covered there, and in the interrogations by the Gestapo, were the same as those given above.

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used were the same as those in the interrogation of HOUSTON personnel, brutality and ineptitude.

The interrogation of the crew of the TAIJUAN, who were captured chiefly in their homes in Soerabaja, had two matters noted that were not reported in other cases. The Japanese, members of the Kempei Tai, apparently had information leading them to believe that these men had weapons in their possession, and a line of questioning was reported that was apparently designed to locate these weapons. It was, however, easily met by cocked-up stories regarding the disposition or loss of the weapons, which in fact some crewmen did possess, and had hidden by burying in or near their homes. The other matter was an apparently earnest effort by the Kempei Tai to persuade these men, both Filipinos and Americans, to take responsible jobs in the Soerabaja dock area under the Japanese. Lurid promises of soft living, good pay, women, and luxuries were made; the offers were refused, and the refusal led to severe beatings. This group were also questioned on the nature of the mission of their ship; reports on the interrogations did not disclose whether or not the interrogators were able to gain any knowledge of its true nature--the answers given were fabricated stories of fair consistency, and seemed to satisfy the questioner.

C. CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

Questioning of civilian personnel seems to have been a perfunctory check for possible knowledge of a military nature, easily avoided by any replies which would present a logical reason for ignorance of such matters on the part of the subject interrogated. Thus the three missionaries arrested at Akyab and interrogated by the Kempei Tai at the local District Commissioner's Office there--and reinterrogated later at Rangoon Jail--were able to avoid any difficulty by indicating that their work was religious in nature, and in no way concerned with amphibious or airborne operations.

Yet it is from civilian source that the most detailed report of the use of torture as an aid to interrogation is gained--in material submitted by Dr. R. A. Thompson and Dr. J. G. Hanna on the investigation of 10 October 1943 at Changi Prison. These reports indicate, in conformity with all others received, that matters would proceed smoothly so long as the expected answers were received; where such answers were not forthcoming, it was reported that, in addition to the beatings, almost universally reported, two forms of water torture, two forms of electric shock torture, refined forms of twisting and maiming of the subject's body, and threats of death to subject or his family carried to the near final stage with such realism as to cause, in two reported cases, the fainting of the victim. It was reported that, as a result of this interrogation of 57 persons, 20 were permanently disabled, and at least one was killed during interrogation, with twelve other deaths partially or wholly caused by the mistreatment received.

No information is presently available on the nature of the investigation being conducted--as to what information was sought, nor as to the reasons for its initiation.

Interrogation of civilians at the time of their internment is not well nor clearly reported, other than in the case of the Akyab missionary group. Questioning seems to have been directed toward the domestic affairs of the subject, home life, family, etc., and some clumsy attempts made to get information

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of a political nature, with reference perhaps to the problems of occupying the area in which the individual was taken. There are occasional reports of slapping, kicking, and other brutality. Some use of native assistants is reported in Indonesia.

D. SUMMARY

It is readily apparent that Japanese interrogations are conducted with force rather than skill, that there was no substantial use of "catch questions" or other trickery, and that the guiding principle was to get an answer--in many cases to get an answer predetermined in the interrogator's mind by his concept of the facts--and that there was no effective limit to the brutality that would be employed to get that answer. The reports are unanimous in an agreement that the only possible method of coping with this type of questioning was the preparation, in advance, of a long and wordy and apparently consistent story, which need have only the most superficial relation to true fact--if any. In all cases where such a method was employed, the results appear to have been eminently successful; the interrogator was satisfied, and the true facts safeguarded without the inevitable injury and maiming that accompanied adherence to the provisions of the Geneva Convention and refusal to reply.

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IV - INTERNMENT CAMPS

A. ADMINISTRATION

1. Camp identification, location, and area commands:
 - a. Camps on the Burma Railroad
 - b. Other Japanese Camps in Burma, Thailand, and Indo-China
 - c. Thai Government Camps
 - d. Camps in Malaya
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 - f. Camps in Sumatra
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2. Camp Commanders and Guards
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B. LIVING CONDITIONS

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4. Clothing
5. Medicine and Health
6. Morale Factors
 - a. General
 - b. Recreational Facilities
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C. WORKING CONDITIONS

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2. Assignment to Work Parties
3. Supervision

D. CHANGES IN CONDITIONS, REPRESENTATIONS TO COMMANDERS

IV - INTERNMENT CAMPS

A. ADMINISTRATION

1. Camp identification, location, and area commands:

A total of over two hundred internment camps in Southeast Asia were reported by American personnel, of which about one hundred and fifty can be located with a fair degree of accuracy, and forty more with some assurance. It is impossible to be absolutely certain of the identity or locations of all camps, since they were reported by names spelled phonetically, and by names in many cases assigned by the Japanese without regard to local villages or other identifiable landmarks. Thus there is a substantial possibility of duplication, though it is believed that the total extent of such duplication does not exceed ten per cent of the listings submitted as Exhibit "I" to this report. Included in the above are all locations where American personnel were known to have been held for an overnight period or longer.

These camps spread geographically from Rangoon in the northwest to Hanoi, Indo-China in the northeast, and Waingapoe, Soemba, to the southeast, an area of roughly four million square miles. Conditions in them varied from the comparative luxury enjoyed in internment under the Thai government at Bangkok to the hell-holes of torture and starvation at 80-Kilo Camp at Apalon, Burma, Changi Jail in Singapore, Ambarawa in Java, and the camps south of Pagan Baroe in Sumatra. For purposes of clarity, the following treatment has been divided geographically, and approximately similar order will be used in succeeding topics of this section. The phonetic names have been abandoned in this text save where no definitely ascertainable location has been ascribed to the camp, but the original phonetic spellings will be found in the listings in the appendix.

a. Camps on the Burma Railroad:

This railroad, which was built by POW labor augmented by coolie gangs, began at Thanbyuzayat, south of Moulmein, Burma, where it joined existing trackage between Moulmein and Ye, and extended southeast to join the Bangkok line to Malaya at Bangkok, Thailand, for a total of about 394 kilometers or 244 miles of new construction. Sixty camp locations were reported along its length, with possibility of duplication in four to eight cases. Most were work camps in the jungle, of a highly temporary nature, and abandoned when the particular section of the road nearby was completed. Base camps, of a more permanent nature, and usually including a base "hospital" were also spread along the line, and of these, some were retained as maintenance camps when work was completed. The designation for these camps in Burma was usually their kilometer distance from Thanbyuzayat; in Thailand the Japanese apparently ascribed names to them which only occasionally correspond to local townsites.

Base camps included those at Thanbyuzayat, 18-Kilo, 80-Kilo, and 100-Kilo points in Burma, and Hin Tab, "Tarsa" (at either Tha Sea or Ban Wang Yai), Ta Makam and Kanchanaburi in Thailand. At Kanchanaburi were several camps designated as Rest Camps after completion of the road, as well as one officer's camp.

During most of the work on the railroad, the interned PWs were divided into groups known as Mobile Camps. These moved from camp to camp along the right of way as work progressed. Most reports from American prisoners come from groups which worked south from Thanbyuzayat along the Burma section of the railroad, although a few Americans were included in later work parties shipped up from Singapore who started work up from Banpong in late spring of 1943. Construction was begun in July 1942, before the arrival of any Americans, and was completed in November of 1943.

The overall command charged with this operation was Prisoner of War Branch #3, originally headed by Lt. Colonel Nagatoma, with headquarters at Thanbyuzayat. It is not clear whether PW Branch #5, originally commanded by Captain Mizutani, was at first a subordinate or a separate command. As organization developed, the #3 Branch became the Thailand headquarters, located at 105-Kilo Camp, and a Colonel Ichi assumed command. At this time, PW Branch #5 moved to headquarters at 85-Kilo Camp in the Apelon area, probably near Taddin, under Colonel Nagatoma. Colonel Nagatoma's second in command was a Lieutenant Naito. This information, drawn entirely from the interrogation of evacuees, has not as yet been checked with Japanese records, since such records have not yet been received for this area.

In the appendix to this section, together with the exhibits comprising lists of known camps, will be found maps indicating the approximate route of the railroad and major camp locations.

b. Other Japanese Camps in Burma, Thailand, and Indo-China:

Other Japanese camps in Burma, not connected with the railroad construction, included camps at Rangoon, the Jail at Moulmein, and a civilian internment camp at Tavoy. It is not clear whether this last camp was under the PW Branch Headquarters at Rangoon or that at Singapore. There was also a camp reported at Ye in Burma, but no American personnel were found there at the end of the war, and none reported ever having been there.

On completion of the Burma railroad construction, the Mobile Camp groups were broken up. Most of these men spent a period of time at rest camps in the Kanchanaburi-Ta Makam area between November of 1943 and April of 1944. From this point, men were gradually returned to maintenance work along the Burma line and also other railroads, to work parties on airfields and to dock work, in both Bangkok and nearby Thailand areas, and also in Indo-China in and near Saigon.

Most important of these camps were the maintenance camps on the Burma railroad, and at Hnong Pla Duck, Nakhom Pathon, and possibly Wangkanai on the line out of Bangkok, with hospital camps reported at Kanchanaburi and Nakhom Pathon. Maintenance camps were also reported on the Bangkok-Chiangmai railroad, though it is less clear as to where these were located and whether any Americans were sent to work at them. Such camps are believed to have existed at Dam Maung (also an airfield camp) and possibly also Chung Go and Lampang. A camp on the line to Saigon was also reported at Prachinburi. Airfield camps were reported at Dam Maung, Nakhom Nayok (northeast of Prachinburi) and in the Shejburi area, including one possibly at Lambhang.

PW Branch commands reported in these Thailand camps include #2, with no definitely known location, and #7, with headquarters at Kanchanaburi. Colonel Ichi, Colonel Yamagata, and Colonel Sugawara are reported as commanders of Branch #2, and it is possible that this branch may have had its headquarters at "Chung Kai" (either Wangkanai on the Burma RR or Jung Go on the Bangkok-Chiangmai line) or at Nakhom Pathon, or possibly at different times both. It was apparently charged with the maintenance of railroad lines other than the Burma route. The function of Branch #7 at Kanchanaburi, if other than the administration of the several camps at that point and perhaps a share in the maintenance work charged to Branch #3 on the Burma line, is not known.

In Indo-China, the large majority of camps were located in the Saigon area, and included a camp in the dock area and a French army barrack which may have been the camp referred to as St. Martin des Pallieres. Outside of Saigon, camps were reported at Cholon, Dalat, Tuy Hoa, "Pumi", Hanoi, Nha Trang, Khanh Hoa, and Tourane. There were other

locations used perhaps as collecting points, such as town and village jails, but the small number of Americans captured in this area does not permit of extensive reporting or identification of these points.

c. Thailand Government Internment Camps:

There were only two camps reported as being under direct control, of the Thai government, one apparently shared with the Japanese at the Bangkok Military prison, and the civilian internment camp at Vachiravaud (Vajiravudh ?) College. Aircrew personnel interned in the military prison seem to have been transferred later to the civilian camp, and all internment consolidated there at the college. All internment under the Thai government was under a Major Chakrabandhu, with a Captain Torsakdi Yomni as his assistant.

d. Camps in Malaya:

There were approximately sixteen internment camps in Malaya, of which only three are definitely known to have existed outside of the Singapore area. The outstanding camps were those at Changi Jail, "Selerang" Outram Road, Sime Road, and the Kranji Hospital Camp. Area commanders reported included Major General Fukyu, Generals Arimura and Saito, and Lt. Col. Kawabe; commanders at Changi, which was the principle Singapore internment camp, included officers named (Rank unreported in most cases) Takahashi, Numari, Tominaga, and Kobiyashe. Information received from other sources indicates that the commanding generals concerned were Major General Fukuei, who was in command in July, 1942, and later Major General Arimura, who replaced Fukuei in January 1943, and Major General Saito, who assumed command in March 1944 and retained it until the war's end. The Malaya PW Headquarters at Singapore had three branches, #1 being at Pakan Baroe, Sumatra, #2 at Palembang, Sumatra, and #3 in Singapore City itself.

There are several references in the reports to temporary internment points outside of the Straits Settlements, but with the exception of Butterworth Prison, at Butterworth on the Malay Coast near Penang Island, it has not been possible to locate these points from the information given. References to "an Indian POW Camp" are frequent; there is no indication as to the whereabouts of this camp.

e. Camps in Java:

As with the Burma camps, it is difficult to determine the exact number of PW and civilian internment camps located in Java so long as dependence on phonetically identified places raises the possibility of duplication. It is clear, however, that there were camps located in at least fifty places, and possibly as many as sixty-five. The most important of these, from the standpoint of American personnel, were the 10th Bn. (Bicycle) Camp in Batavia, the Naval Base at Tandjoengpriok, the Makassar, Glodok, and Tjideng camps in Batavia, the St. Vincentes and Mater Dolorosa hospitals in Muester Cornelis, a suburb of Batavia, and the camps at Tangerang, Tjimahi, Bandoeng, Amberawa, and Soerabaja.

Branch PW Headquarters officers are reported at the Sobunhonshe Offices at Batavia, and at Bandoeng. None is reported at Soerabaja, but it is considered probable that such a headquarters was also located in that city. Commanders at Batavia include Lt. Col. Kawabe and, during 1943-44, a Colonel Takada; at Bandoeng, Lt. Colonel Misso Anami; and, at Soerabaja, Col. Kawabe. One report, probably reflecting conditions in 1943, suggests that a Major General Saito was in command of all PW affairs in Java at that time. A Colonel Marohama may also have commanded a PW Branch in the Java area; this name is reported as a commander from an internee at Macasura Camp, Batavia.

f. Camps in Sumatra:

Information on Camps in Sumatra is limited by the extremely small number of Americans found in that area. Only twelve are definitely known to have been employed on the railroad construction from Padang to Pekan Baroe, a project almost as great and fully as exacting and cruelly forced through as was the Burma railroad construction, and the number of civilians in internment camps was small and scattered. It is definitely known that there were several camps in the Pekan Baroe area, where Branch #1 of Malay PW Headquarters was located. On the railroad running south to Moeerapantai, and then east to most existing line at Sidjondjoeng there were a number of transient work camps much like the "Kilo" camps in Burma, on at least seven of which Americans ^{were} reported, and there was apparently a base camp at Moeerapantai as well as at Sidjondjoeng and Pekan Baroe.

g. Miscellaneous:

American personnel were also reported held at Denpasar, Bali, and Waingapoe, Soemba, and at least temporarily at "Karmel" and Bangkalang on Madoera Island. There were, of course, large numbers of personnel interned in the Celebes, but since nearly all of these were evacuated to Manila, the only information available is related to internment at Macassar Jail, KIL Camp, and the new camp built south of KIL at Macassar. No information is presently available on the administrative organization of these areas nor the identity of commanding officers.

2. Camp Commanders and Guards:

Since relatively few internees had direct contact with camp commanders, their reports on this topic were fragmentary. Such contact, of course, was primarily the responsibility of the Senior Representatives, most of whom were British or Dutch. Thus familiarity with commanders was largely limited to hearsay, and this in turn the less reliable in that Americans do not easily grasp the spelling of oriental names as a matter of course. For these reasons it has not been possible to compile more than a barely partial list of Japanese commanders and other responsible personnel in the individual camps. What information has been gathered is listed with the camps in Exhibit "I".

It will be noted that names of camp commanders recur as assigned to different camps at different times. There is, of course, the probability of some duplication, particularly in the case of common Japanese names such as Suzuki; at the same time, it should be noted that the same commander would frequently be transferred from one camp to another with the transfer of the group of prisoners for which he was responsible. This practice was especially common along the Bangkok-Moulmein railroad in Burma and Thailand, where both commanders and guard personnel were moved with the Mobile Camp groups to which they were assigned.

Commanders of the camps in all areas ranged widely in rank, the highest reported being that of Captain, the lowest Private. In a few cases command was reported in the hands of Koreans; it has not been possible to distinguish between Japanese and Korean personnel with any certainty pending the receipt of whatever documents may be recovered by RANWI teams presently combing all headquarters areas in Southeast Asia.

Guard personnel, included Japanese enlisted men up to and including the rank of Sergeant and large numbers of natives and Koreans. The Koreans were found chiefly in the camps in Burma and Thailand. Sikhs were reported at Changi Jail in Singapore, but not elsewhere. Indonesians (and possibly some Malaysians, the reports merely specifying "natives") were used as guards at labor camps in Java and Sumatra, and native police are reported in Burma, Thailand, and, at least in the earlier periods, at Macassar, Celebes.

This report makes no attempt to list or identify guard personnel in detail; such a listing is germane only to the War Crimes investigations already fully covered by the Counter Intelligence Corps. The picture may be suggested by a quotation from one civilian internee, "A buck private had full authority to do as he pleased; a POW couldn't go any higher." And it is quite apparent that this authority was consistently abused.

The guards were illiterate and low-grade personnel. Their sudden rise to a position of command, directing the lives and labors of large groups of men quickly developed a latent and infectious cruel streak in their characters. Domination over men of races which had, in their eyes, traditionally asserted a superiority over them was a new and wonderful thing; it led to an unrelieved display of arrogance, cruelty, and bestiality. They spoke no English, and made no apparent effort to learn it. Being largely treated as animals by their own superiors, they bettered their instructors, and showed an inspired skill in humiliating, degrading, and torturing those in their charge. Reports substantiating this analysis come from all sections of Southeast Asia without distinction.

While the reports vary widely in appraising the conduct of native guards as compared with the Japanese, it has not been possible to draw from them any clearly valid general summary. Officers' reports suggest that the Sikh guards at Changi treated prisoners as well or better than did the Japanese; enlisted men seem to have found them the same or worse. Treatment from Koreans is generally said to have been the same as that received from the Japanese, possibly harsher in the early stages of the war, and quite clearly less harsh than the Japanese toward the end. It appears that Koreans, and to some extent native guards, sensed the imminence of an Allied victory in late 1944 or early 1945, and conducted themselves accordingly, whereas it is certain that Japanese enlisted personnel had no suspicion of impending defeat until the very last weeks of the war if at all. It is interesting to note that in some cases both Koreans and Japanese definitely favored officer personnel, providing them with occasional supplies of liquor or tobacco, and, in one report, with opportunity to bathe in jungle streams in Burma. This may perhaps be explained by other reports indicating that guards also made a practice of selling food, medicines, and other supplies to internees, in some cases supplies looted by them from Japanese and Red Cross stocks. It is clear that officers would be considered the best customers for such sales.

Camp commanders regarded their guards' conduct with approval either tacit or expressed in almost all cases. There is no reported case of a guard's conduct being corrected or punished by his superiors; this, perhaps may in small part be because of the need to "save face", yet there are sufficient reports of officers and commanders participating in or encouraging the mistreatment of prisoners to indicate that little correction was ever sought. The only camp commander (outside of those under the Thai Government at Bangkok) reported as requiring any remotely decent standard of conduct on the part of his staff was a Captain Mariyama, who replaced Lt. Sonai at Bicycle Camp, Batavia. Of him, it is reported that he bettered the conditions found under Sonai, an improvement it would have been difficult to avoid in the light of Sonai's consistent sadism and cruelty.

Lt. Sonai was probably the most universally remembered commander in the reports; it is evident that he gave cause to be remembered. Other commanders who are frequently reported include Lt. Wakamatsu at 10C-Kilo camp on the Burma railroad, Lt. Naito as second-in-command to Colonel Nagatomi at #W Branch #3 in Thailand, Lt. Takahashi at Changi camp, Singapore, and one Okagawa (rank unknown) at Ambarawa, Java. All of these are charged with individual brutality as well as with the command of camps in which mistreatment was widespread and apparently encouraged.

Reports of treatment which was at least indifferent rather than positively abusive, in addition to that on Capt. Mariyama, were received on a

Lt. Suzuki, who was commander of Bicycle Camp prior to Sonzi and up to 20 August, 1942 (and who may later have been in charge of some work parties in Burma, though there is nothing to show that this was the same individual, and the Burma Suzuki was far less favorably reported), and on his executive officer, Lt. Kitagiri. Similar reports were also received on a Captain Suzuki at Dam Muang, Thailand and on a Captain Haguchi commanding the officers' camp at Kanchanaburi. These individuals apparently made some slight effort to cooperate with prisoners in bettering conditions under the constant pressure of short supply and directives from higher headquarters requiring the completion of assigned work projects regardless of cost in life or health. It must be noted, however, that these reports stress chiefly the negative - failure to do harm - rather than any substantial amount of positive beneficence.

3. Camp Regulations and Discipline:

The regulations published for the conduct of prisoners were probably based on some general directive drafted by a central authority in Tokyo, since it is reported that officers were frequently seen thumbing books apparently containing such directives. No such books have as yet been recovered, however, and though all reported compilations of rules show a large number of common topics and similar trends of intent, there is considerable variation in the local regulations reported, both as to phrasing and strictness or severity. With the establishment of organized POW Branches and Branch Commands, compiled regulations were issued by these offices for their subordinate camps, and these too show some degree of similarity, though they are not identical. One example of such a Branch Headquarters directive is appended as Exhibit "E" and was issued by Colonel Nagatomi from Branch #3 in Thailand; a compilation from memory of local camp rules drawn up by two evacuated American POWs is appended as Exhibit "M".

Even after the publication of such directives, however, it must be stressed that local commanders had free rein in their interpretation, and even apparent authority to amend or extend them, or to make new rulings, far beyond the like power of any American commander. Thus, for example, a ruling that a latrine guard would be posted at each barracks with responsibility for all personnel who left it to use the latrine was established in all camps. In some, this guard was a fellow prisoner detailed to the duty. In others, it was a Korean or other native guard; and while in some cases the prisoner was merely required to report his number to this guard on leaving the barracks, in others he was required to ask for and receive permission (which the guard apparently had power to withhold!) before leaving. In one reported case, a prisoner was beaten for failure to request such permission - which had never before been required at that camp; on the next subsequent occasion, he was beaten for annoying the guard when he did request it. Although regulations appear to have been posted in English in all camps, changes were frequent and unannounced - often made individually by non-English-speaking guards.

With the variance between different guards in a given camp, between different periods in one camp, and invariably wide differences as between different camps (with transfer from one to another a fairly frequent occurrence) it is apparent that a prisoner or internee required almost psychic sensitivity to avoid confusion, and the inevitable infringement of innumerable petty rules. Conditions under which these men lived did not tend to develop sensitivity.

The rules most frequently reported as supplementing the general type of directive appended to this report have one common characteristic, a pettiness and smallness of substance designed skillfully to inconvenience, irritate, and above all degrade the prisoner. All prisoners and internees,

regardless of rank, were required when covered to salute all guard personnel from a position of strict attention; when uncovered, they were required to bow in oriental fashion. Officers were frequently and severely beaten for failure to honor guard privates and native guards in this way. When guard personnel entered a barracks, the first prisoner to see him was to call the entire barracks to attention; insufficiently rigid and braced attention was the excuse for much beating and mistreatment. Lying down during the daytime was prohibited, and this prohibition seems to have extended to those sick in quarters. Reading was permitted during certain hours only, likewise smoking, which was forbidden out of doors, and in all cases unless an ashtray was available. Whistling or singing was forbidden at all times; even conversation was barred while at work. Gatherings and assemblies for any purpose were forbidden, with occasional exceptions found in the case of recreational or entertainment projects permitted by a few more lenient commanders; with the same exception, all lectures, classes, or other group study was barred. The possession of paper or other writing materials was limited and in some cases forbidden, and, above all else, outside contacts with civilian or native personnel was prohibited on pain of death. Only one exception to this last regulation is reported; Lt. Suzuki during the early days at Bicycle camp Batavia appears to have permitted the purchase of augmented food supplies, fruit, etc., from local vendors, though the methods of making such contact are not described, and may well have been through camp officials.

The treatment accorded those who by design - or more frequently by accident - violated any of the above rulings (or the countless variations and refinements of them created by individual guards) has been fully reported in detail by the War Crimes investigations. Criminality was their outstanding characteristic. Most usual was physical violence, - beatings with the hands, closed fists, rifle barrels or butts, bamboo poles, metal rods, or any other handy weapon, and leading to bruises, open wounds, fractures, severe internal hemorrhages, and ruptures of spleen, kidneys, testicles, and other organs. Ulcers and wounds were often chosen as the target for further abuse, being beaten or lightly flicked with bamboo slivers, to prevent healing. Ingenious methods were devised to use the victim's physical structure against itself, the most common being to kneel him with a rod placed behind the knees, and then either load his upraised arms with rocks or other weight, or to jump on his shoulders, so as to strain or dislocate the knee joints. The victim would be forced to drink water or waterlogged thin gruel until his stomach was distended, and the guard would then force him to lie down, and would jump on the distended parts of his body. If, during a beating, the victim fainted or fell to the ground, he would be kicked with heavy boots in the face, stomach, and ribs, or jumped upon. Mass punishment was common, including in its mildest form the closing of the canteen (reported as no great loss) for periods of several weeks, and, more serious, mass beatings and reduction of the always inadequate rations either by fifty percent or in some cases entirely, over periods of several days or even weeks. Execution by both shooting and beheading was reported; in one case a Japanese officer using a Burmese sword is reported to have felt chagrin that he required three strokes to sever the head from the body. The mildest punishment used was to require the victim to stand at rigid attention for a period of from three hours to several days, occasionally with beatings while so standing, and in the hot tropical sun, bareheaded, and without food or water. This punishment was meted out to both individuals and mass groups.

Treatment of these types can perhaps be distinguished from normal camp conditions, since it technically constituted punishment. Such a distinction, however, is academic, useful only in presenting an ordered report. In fact, such "punishment" was so common as to be an integral part of normal living conditions. There is no reported case of an individual who by "good conduct" escaped any part of the usual history of degradation and abuse. There were no special privileges for "good behavior". Occasionally, cooperation on the part of a PW group as a whole, in the form of increased output of work, would lead to some improvement of conditions, but this was entirely at the whim of the camp commander. In general, as one evencee put it, it was "continual nerve-wracking petty annoyances punctuated regularly with beatings."

B. LIVING CONDITIONS

In the appended list of internment camps (Exhibit "I") are notes showing all reported information which was ascribed to specific and separate camps on the subjects of general conditions and also food, shelter, medicine and health, recreation, pay and personal property, mail, packages, and Red Cross supplies, with which this subsection is concerned. No attempt will be made, therefore, to detail individual examples here save insofar as they are representative of conditions generally encountered.

1. Shelter:

Specific reports on the types of buildings in which internees were housed are rare, except where conditions were so bad as to insist on notice. A few general observations, however, may be made. Most important is to distinguish between two major types of housing: one, where previously constructed buildings, either jails, warehouses, or other structures, were adapted for use as internment camps, and the other, where new construction was required. Conditions differ sharply between these two types of camps.

In those camps which were housed in previously constructed buildings of a permanent nature, the major defect seems to have been overcrowding, with bad sanitation as a concomitant. Thus in Changi Jail, built to house 600 oriental prisoners, as many as 3000 were crowded at one time; in the Tjideng Civilian internment camp in Batavia, one hundred women and children were crowded into space originally designed for a family of six. At LGG Camp, Bandoeng, 3750 military prisoners were crowded, with floor space of about 14" x 42" per man, in a camp built for 300 and a total of 40 latrines available for the entire camp. It should be noted, moreover, that these were not transient camps where such conditions might occasionally be expected--and of course were encountered, as e.g., at Serang Jail and Banten Park Theatre--but were in permanent camps where they had to be endured over substantial periods of time.

Housing at specially constructed camps was of a different order, though usually far worse rather than preferable to the conditions encountered in permanent structures described above. There was less crowding; occasionally the space allotted was fully adequate for the numbers housed, but other factors operated to render conditions as bad or worse. At Changi, for instance, the Jail was a permanent structure, and as such badly overcrowded; the need for hospital facilities then forced the construction of huts to supplement the Jail. This hospital was constructed of thatched atap huts, poorly designed to shelter against wind or rain, and the "patients" were forced to sleep on the ground. In other areas, construction was usually of bamboo, and generally of the most flimsy type. Many were without adequate roofing, and rain poured in unchecked during the wet season; some had little by way of walls other than posts to support the framework on which the roof thatching was laid.

Nor was any apparent attempt made to select areas proper for camp construction. In many cases water supply was short or nonexistent; it was frequently limited to jungle streams which were completely dry for long periods during the dry season. The area in which the new camp at Macassar in the Celebes was built, south of the MIL Camp, was highly malarious. 100-mile camp on the Burma railroad was built in a swamp, with six inches of water covering the dirt floor almost constantly during the rainy season. Locations were also selected with a bland disregard for the proximity of military objectives, being placed near roads, railroads, bridges, gun emplacements, and airfields; in some cases this may have been deliberate, in the light of reports from the Saigon dock camp that,

immediately after the air alarm was sounded, all locomotives in adjacent yards were brought up near the prison camp. No camps were reported as being marked as P.I. camps for protection against air attack.

The above discussion refers entirely to permanent or base camps. It is clear that bad as these were, they were infinitely superior to the transit camps, jungle camps, and work camps, to the extent that after a period of time in the work camps, personnel regarded the base camps as good. In the work camps, construction was done by the prisoners themselves, under extreme pressure, limited in personnel, and, in one reported case, by those too sick to be taken out to work on the railroad without other assistance. These camps were built in a matter of hours, and the result was only the sketchiest excuse for shelter--in some cases merely bamboo poles set in the dirt and supporting matted roofs, with little or no available water supply, and open latrines.

The only relief that was ever experienced from the above evils was in those cases where, after transfer out of work camps, personnel were temporarily housed in permanent structures from which sufficient personnel had been removed to reduce the over-crowding. Thus at III Camp, Macassar, Celebes, which was for some time badly over-crowded, successive shipments of work parties to other areas reduced the number housed there to the point where conditions were fairly good. No serious over-crowding was reported during the time that Tandjoengprick Naval Base was used as a collecting point, and conditions there were likewise found good. The officers' camp and enlisted camps at Manchanaburi were apparently well constructed and designed as rest camps; to men coming off the railroad in Burma, these areas and the Saigon camps were literally reported as "heaven."

2. Sanitation:

Specific reports on sanitation and sanitation facilities are few in number, but again the general report is that it was bad. It is evident that what facilities there were, and what improvements were made, were without exception the work of the internees themselves.

Sanitation facilities in transient camps were, as were other conditions, the worst. The usual provision was a slop bucket in the individual cell, for the use of whatever number were crowded therein. There were no facilities what soever in Banten Park Theater, buckets in Serang Jail, and even in Tandjoengprick Naval Base, where food and treatment were on the whole fairly good, the sanitation was reported bad. At Macassar Jail, the crowded conditions led to bad sanitation; early and widespread dysentery was reported as a result.

In regular internment camps, the distinction between permanent structures previously built and new construction for the express use of internees is again significant. In the temporary structures, along the Burma railroad, the Pakan-Baroe railroad, and in the Celebes, sanitation was impaired chiefly through the location selected for the camp, or because of haste in constructing it, as, e.g., the swamps chosen as campsites in the jungle, with a water line as close as six inches below the surface, and during the rainy season above it--which made effective waste-disposal impossible. In these camps, however, sanitation discipline was reported high; it was usually possible to boil at least small quantities of water with available equipment; at one camp along the jungle a number of oil drums were discovered and appropriated by the prisoners for this use, and there was constant cooperation on the part of all personnel to see that sick prisoners unable to provide for themselves were taken care of. Even in those cases where no equipment for boiling water was provided, means were improvised to do so with whatever was at hand. Insect-control was, of course, a practical impossibility, but every effort was apparently made to improve latrine construction and disposal facilities for other waste to minimize pollution of this type.

Specific reports indicate execrably bad conditions without exception in the jungle camps in Burma, particularly at 80-Kilo, 85-Kilo and 100-Kilo camps, with similar but less pronounced reports from 18-Kilo and 62-Kilo camps. In this area, open latrines seem to have been common, facilities for proper cooking or boiling water almost non-existent, water scarce during the dry season, and flooding during the rains to the point that excrement from the latrines floated freely under the beds in barracks areas. Lack of manpower in the hospital camps reported at these points made it virtually impossible for any remedial action to be taken. Similar conditions are less specifically reported at the new camp at Macassar Celebes, south of KIL camp, at Ambarawa in Java, and at camps on the Sumatra railroad between Paki Baroe and Moearapantai. Emphasis in the reports of the new Macassar camp in the Celebes was laid on the filth in the latrine area, these were open and thick with flies, and frequently overflowed to spread filth over wide areas.

Where permanent previously-built structures were used, the sanitation varied directly with the number housed. At Outram Road camp in Singapore, the situation was reported as typical; there were no reports of serious overcrowding, and it was possible to maintain some degree of sanitation. One report specifies the facilities as consisting of a slop-bucket kept in each cell, with the internees allowed three to five minutes out of the cells to wash, empty the buckets, and get what exercise was possible in the remaining time if any. The individual reporting, however, added that for one three-months period, this freedom was permitted only twice a week.

Conditions at Changi Jail were far more serious. Constant epidemics of dysentery were reported here caused by short water supply and bad sanitation. It will be remembered that five times the number for which the jail was built were quartered here; there was one "scout" (Indian type) water closet per cell, and the water flushing into the pan provided the only water supply available for all purposes including drinking water. Some improvements in these conditions were reported made by the prisoners themselves, but the nature of this improvement could not be learned, and apparently was not sufficient to relieve the seriousness of existing conditions. Other camps in the Singapore area seem to have been less crowded, and reports on sanitation hence run from fair to good.

A similar picture is found in Java in those cases where existing camps or other structures were used for internment. The best reports come from the 10th En (Bicycle) Camp at Batavia, which from available information appears to have been the cleanest Camp in Southeast Asia. Although used as a transient camp, it was apparently large enough to provide reasonable sanitary facilities for those quartered there. By contrast, the assignment of 3750 men to the LOG Camp, Bandoeng, where there were provisions for a camp of 300, including 40 latrines, resulted in seriously bad conditions. The Depot camp was reported fair, and Landsdorpvoordingesticht bad. The civilian camp at Tjideng, Batavia, gives a like report; overcrowding resulted in one hundred women and children being forced to share a single latrine in a house designed for a family of ~~five~~^{six}, and the water supply was extremely short.

The summary of sanitation conditions can be brief; what facilities existed were provided through the internees' own efforts, and other than this, there was nothing. Nothing but choked up and overflowing latrines, polluted water, and clouds of insects free to spread disease once started like a prairie fire.

3. Food:

It can hardly be said for the food provided internees in Southeast Asia that ~~it was equal to the standard ration for Japanese personnel.~~ The plain fact is that malnutrition was the direct cause of more deaths than any other factor in a situation where the death rate

occasionally reached fifty or sixty percent. This, of course, would not show on official records; it was flatly reported that the Japanese prohibited the entry of malnutrition as a cause of death on any birth certificate. One POW managed for a short time to keep a record of the precise quantities of food issued to him along the Burma railroad, this with other material on camp conditions is appended as Exhibit "O" to this report.

Unquestionably the worst conditions were those encountered on the Bump railroad, where food was consistently and seriously inadequate, the more so for men engaged in manual labor. Food there consisted of rice and stew composed chiefly of lily roots and watermelons, with some sweet potato. A little meat was reported issued daily to a camp force of about 1500 men. Water was obtained from nearby streams and like sources, and equipment for boiling water or preparing food was extremely scarce. During the dry season, water was also extremely scarce. One report lists the following as the official ration in Burma:

| | |
|------------|---------|
| Meat | 50 grs |
| Rice | 500 grs |
| Veget.bles | 500 grs |
| Sugar | 15 grs |
| Salt | 15 grs |
| Oil | 20 grs |

The report giving these figures adds the cryptic statement, "Seldom issued in full." From other statements it is evident that the above ration was probably never issued in full after March or April 1943; from that time onward there was steady reduction in the amount of all components issued. It might be added that from other sources, the caloric value of rice is indicated to be about 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ calories per gram.

The deterioration in rations issued was a marked and serious one. At 18-Kilo camp, in February, it was reported that 500 lbs. of dressed meat were available for 1782 men; this dropped steadily, until at 100-Kilo Camp in May, June, and July of 1943, there was practically no meat at all. There was a canteen at 18-Kilo camp, where some supplies of duck eggs, brown sugar, onions, and oil could be obtained; by 15 March these supplies had almost completely run out. On June 9th, the report at 100-Kilo indicated no canteen, and a spoonful of meat per man per day. All meat was gone by 26 June. On the 4th of July, one cow was obtained, providing 130 lbs. dressed meat for 1916 men, or roughly one ounce each. At that time, the men reported that they were eating snakes, lizards, rats, lizards, and insects; there was great celebration on one occasion when a dog was caught and eaten. One report tells of catching fish in the water under the bunks at 80-Kilo camp during the rainy season when the barracks areas were flooded. In some camps, what meat there was was issued by the guards, with the result that the better cuts were taken by them, and little but entrails left for the prisoners. On other occasions the meat rotted in the tropical sun for two days or more before being distributed. These, it should be remembered, were rations for men doing ten to fourteen hours of heavy physical labor per day.

It appears to have been standard Japanese policy to feed the sick on half rations, since they were unable to work and hence "earn their keep." This practice is known to have been officially approved by Colonel Nagatani, commanding Thai Branch 3, and Captain Mizutani, of Branch 5, is reported as having publicly announced his intention to abandon the sick to starvation. Thus, the large numbers in sick camps at 18-Kilo, 62-Kilo, and 80-Kilo camps were supplied with rations running on the average 100 to 150 grams per day--and in many cases these personnel were nevertheless required to perform all housekeeping labor about the camp, or to assume a substantial portion thereof.

No other area reports conditions as serious as those in Burma, with the exception perhaps of Changi, Outram Road, and Kranji Hospital camps in Singapore, Ambarawa in Java, and the railroad work camps in Sumatra. In Singapore, while it is clear that food supply was bad, still it did not approach that in the railroad camps; fish was available, chiefly whitebait and also some salt fish, and a low grade of coffee made chiefly from coco beans, together with some curry powder, black flour, vinegar, and a fair quantity of palm oil were reported available. Changi and Outram Road, however, were in some reports shown as issuing as little as 100 grams of food per day. Another report on Outram road indicates one pint of food, consisting 70% of rice and 30% of watery soup, was the issue per meal. Some food was available through Red Cross stores; at Changi, as of 9 November 1942, it was reported that 2 oz canned meat, 4 oz vegetables, 2 oz sugar and 2 oz fruit were available per week from this source. Later on, however, the ration here was reported as consisting solely of rice.

At Kranji Hospital camp, the rule again was half rations for the sick; it consisted of one pint of rice, three rice croquettes, a little whitebait, a pint of stew, and two pints of weak tea per day. This, however, could apparently be supplemented by the other supplies mentioned above, which were on sale at the hospital canteen at high prices, e.g. \$2.80 per pound for palm oil, \$18.50 per pound for the synthetic coffee, \$55 lb. for whitebait, and \$36 for salt fish. Tobacco was occasionally reported available, at prices ranging from \$3 to \$4.20 an ounce.

At camps on the Sumatra railroad, the ration was probably as bad or worse than that in Burma but reports are so few that it is impossible to make a certain conclusion on the point. One statement showed rations "only enough to keep one alive", consisting of a small amount of rice, kotula leaf, and occasional small amounts of meat, stated to be some sort of caribou. Grasses, ferns, trapped snakes, and iguanas were used to supplement this food; again, stray cats and dogs were immediately caught and eaten. Another report indicated that breakfast consisted of one cupful of boiled tapioca flour; this the only nourishment before leaving for a day's work on railroad construction. There were no canteen supplies reported with which to supplement the ration in Sumatra.

Food supply in the transient camps in Java has already been briefly noted in the section on capture. It will be remembered that, save where personnel had rations with them at the time of capture, the official supply was extremely bad, and nourishment was gained catch-as-catch-can from native trading, by picking wild fruits and coconuts, and from an extremely skimpy Japanese ration about on a par with that available in Burma. It was, however, possible to do considerable trading with the natives, and large quantities of supplies were purchased in Batavia and Bandoeng for consumption at Loen School, Tendjoengpriok, and Bicycle Camps. However, conditions improved somewhat as regards the official ration, and after the trading has been cut down by official order, when large groups of prisoners had been moved on to Singapore and thence to Burma. But personnel remaining at Bicycle Camp continue to report poor quality in the ration, and by the end of 1942 almost nothing was coming through in outside trade. Meat and vegetables were scarce, the meat consisting of the guts of an occasional bullock. There were some sweet potatoes available; the rice was often wormy, spoiled, or the sweepings from the godowns. Also reported were small quantities of spinach, weak tea, and a very bad quality of bread in small amounts. For the work parties later employed at the General Motors plant in Batavia, the ration was increased by fifty per cent, but it is stated that this increase was more than met by the long hours and heavy nature of the work required of the group employed there.

Although reports on other camps in Java are of necessity less detailed, a reading of all available reports taken together suggest that conditions at Arberuan were similar or worse, and in the rest of the Java camps slightly better, than those at Bicycle Camp. At Kikassar ("Kikassar") food was reported short, especially in vegetables and meat, but it was also reported possible to purchase augmented supplies, fruit and possibly other items, from the natives. At Tjinchi and at LOC Camp, Bandung, food was reported relatively good. At "Kassarbi" (not otherwise located) civilian camp, food was reported "coarse food, no proteins, fats, nor fruit." At St. Vincent's hospital and clinic in Batavia, food was reported poor, and also in all camps in the Soerabaja area; at Keling, the report on the Klooster School camp indicated bad food with insufficient meat and vegetables. Reports of fair to good food came from the Glodok area in Batavia, at Tandjoengpriok, and at Ngadi jail.

In the Colibus area, the picture seems to have been substantially similar. At transient quarters in Kikassar Jail, privation was extreme; issue of one handful of rice per man per day was reported. Then, as in other areas, conditions improved with the move to permanent quarters at MIL camp, and food there was reported fair, improving, as work drafts from the camp to other areas, and the removal of all civilians to other internment centers, reduced the numbers in camp. At no time could the food be called good, however, and there was no means of supplementing it either from Red Cross stores or from the market.

Although the physical conditions resulting from the scanty food issue in the camps will be discussed in greater detail in a subsequent section on Health, it may be noted here that there was no single item in the long array of miseries imposed by the Japanese that rendered the internees more helpless. Living quarters could be and were given all possible attention and effort; even punishment and physical mistreatment was to some extent avoidable if the individual was willing to undergo the humiliations necessary to that end. But, save for the ceaseless watching for snakes and stray dogs, there was little that could be done to gain more food. Some officers' camps instituted gardens, but these were a small minority. Fundamentally, the prisoners were dependant on the rations issued by their captors. Even where the full ration was issued, it was hardly sufficient for the types of labor assigned. Whether by design or by accident, and certainly with indifference on the part of those responsible, food provided was substantially less than that required to maintain health, provide any resistance against the constant exposure to disease, or prevent the drain that inevitably occurred on the physical reserves of these men.

4. Clothing:

There are no reports specifically directed to the availability or supply of clothing in Southeast Asia camps, since the form of questionnaire given did not cover this topic. From all available material, however, it may be gathered that clothing was one of the lesser problems of men interned in this area; there are no great numbers of complaints on the ground of inadequate clothing, and in the light of other topics, these would be expected if any difficulty has been experienced. It is definitely known that some clothing was issued by the Japanese; one specific report indicates the issue of some 350 pair of captured army shoes at Kinkensuri in January of 1944. The large number of reports indicating use by PWs of clothing as means of barter for food and medicine suggests that at no time was clothing seriously short, although there are also reports of men having nothing but shoes and shorts to wear for work in the jungle.

5. Medicine and Health:

The foregoing discussions of the shelter, sanitation, and food supply at Southeast Asian camps indicates, if nothing else, an area in which the best-equipped medical section would find itself busy. The reports, on the other hand, indicate that there was not even the amount and kind of medical supplies provided for prisoners that were available to the Japanese troops--that, with little exception, what few medical supplies could be had were stolen from the Japanese or brought from the natives--and, as previously noted, that Japanese policy was to starve the sick to death as being unable to pull their weight in assigned work.

The hospitals on the Burma railroad were death traps. The reports on this fact achieve a consistency above and beyond any other topic in the entire investigation. The commanding officer of IO' Branch 3 has been consistently quoted as announcing that it was his direct intention to let the sick die, and he, with his subordinates, effectively created conditions conducive to this end.

In addition to the cut to half-rations for sick personnel, already discussed, we find that there was literally no provision for trained medical personnel in the hospital camps, save where by accident a prisoner himself was a doctor. The only reported instance of Japanese medical personnel in this area was one report indicating an inspection of the condition of the sick at 80-Kilo Camp by a dental student of three weeks' experience. It is clear that what medical personnel were numbered among the prisoners themselves did heroic work; this was true without distinction between American, English, and Dutch personnel. Commander Epstein, of the U.S. Navy, was reported as having performed major surgical operations with equipment consisting of one small scalpel, a syringe with a broken needle, and a few drugs. An Australian medical officer was reported as having performed amputations successfully with similarly limited equipment, to the amazement of Colonel Nagtzaam.

Medical supplies reported available in limited or small quantities included quinine, (one five-grain tablet per man per day or alternate days - for men on working parties only), some charcoal for dysentery, hot water for ulcers, and a little iodine, some aqueous flavin, and some ring-worm ointment, together with occasional rolls of bandages. It should be noted, however, that not all of these were available to all camps; most camps reported had charcoal, perhaps half had the quinine--none of which was ever issued to a person not well enough to work, and only occasional camps reported any of the other supplies. The use of clothing, rags, and other materials for bandages was common.

It is impossible to compile at this point any tabulation of disease frequency or rate in these camps; there has been no reported case of an evacuated prisoner who did not at one time or another suffer at least one (and usually several) of the following: malaria, dysentery, dengue, tropical ulcers, beri-beri, oedema, pellagra, and possibly others, with dysentery apparently the most common, and intensified by the serious malnutrition already discussed. In addition to disease, of course, consideration must be taken of the numbers who at one time or another suffered injuries at the hands of the guards.

Occasional trading with the natives made some medicines available in addition to the limited quantities reported above; a digest of the reports suggests, however, that it was more than compensated for by the fact that medical supplies were frequently looted by the Japanese under the pretext that "medicine was for the troops." Such, for instance, was the almost invariable fate of the medical supplies included in Red Cross packages.

No reports from other areas (except on the Sumatra railroad) even approximate the extremes of the "death camps" on the Burma railroad in these respects. Yet the fundamental principles remained the same in all areas. In Singapore, the medical facilities reported as good or fair were those in which there were medical personnel among the internees; the work of the English and Dutch doctors at Changi Hospital was highly praised in all reports touching on the subject. At Outram Road, it was reported that tests were given for dysentery by the Japanese at one time, but no further action taken. The drugs reported available in the Singapore area seem to have been even more limited than in Burma and Thailand; the principal source of supply seems to have been those stores which they had at the time of capitulation and which they had succeeded in retaining despite the Japanese tendency to remove them for troop use.

In Java, some medical supplies seem to have been available, though no itemized reports were received. The hospitals in Batavia were stripped of their X-Ray equipment and much of their other facilities immediately after the Japanese occupation, and the reports indicate small and poorly equipped hospitals, always overcrowded, but in general cleaner and better supplied than elsewhere in Southeast Asia. This was certainly true of the hospital at Bicycle Camp; St. Vincent's Hospital was reported fair to good; the CBZ Hospital in Soerabaja reported fair. There were no reports on conditions at Hater Dolorosa Hospital in Meester Cornelis, nor on the CBZ Hospital in Batavia.

The KIL Camp in Macassar, Celebes, appears to have been about on a par with the less extreme of the Burma railroad hospital camps, with some quinine reported available, and occasionally salves. The group here appears to have developed the art of stealing medical supplies from the Japanese to a fine point; a number of enlisted personnel were reported engaged in this activity and were the subject of commendation by the last commissioned officer in charge at Macassar, Lt. Fisher, USI.

The hospital camps in Sumatra, on the Paken-Baroe railroad, were reported also as being substantially in a class with those in Burma. Chinchona bark and charcoal were the only medicines reported available.

One miscellaneous item in scope of this section is the fact that, in some of the camps in Java, compulsory physical exercise was reported required, and required even of those who were ill. It has already been noted that one who would be an ambulatory patient in an American hospital was required to work in Burma and Sumatra, and elsewhere if located in work camps, but here we have the same principle carried to a new extreme. It thus seems to have been a universal policy to prevent any but those too ill to stand from remaining in bed or otherwise recover their strength.

The conclusion has already been made inescapable; the Japanese policy toward the sick was to let them die. Die they did, in increasing numbers.

6. Morale Factors: a. General:

It is readily evident from the reports that the factors listed in the four preceding sections were, despite all detrimental to health and well-being, despite even a high casualty rate, none the less almost universally ineffective in dampening the high morale of American personnel, both prisoners of war and civilians. No comparison with the morale among other groups was received, no comparison is here intended. It is sufficient that American morale was of the highest throughout all phases of internment. There were some reports of discouragement and despair in the camps on the Burma railroad, but these were a small minority, and none were reported permanent. There was no report of a morale loss among American personnel leading to self-destruction, and surprisingly few (perhaps 3 or 4) cases of mental breakdown.

The factors reported as contributing to this high morale were not chiefly matters on which action could be taken either by the internee or his captors. They include such matters as "confidence in the outcome of the war" (most frequently reported); "the fact that we were Americans"; and news of allied successes gained either through outside contacts or by a judicious reading of Japanese news sources. Next in importance was the appearance of allied bombing planes; although the PBX attack on the NATAHEI MARU and sister ships had placed many prisoners in grave danger, and thus there was often some concern for personal safety involved, nevertheless this was reported as a source of high morale in a large number of cases. A fifth factor reported, again in a substantial number of cases, was the retention of the individual's sense of humor. Other than these, there was a very small number of reports crediting religious belief, mail, recreational facilities, and the like with a helpful effect on morale, but these were scattered and represent at best two or three percent of the total cases.

Factors reported as lowering morale were less often given; the total number is under five percent of reports on morale, suggesting that those matters which would depress or discourage were because of their very nature not dwelled upon nor milled over by the individual. The few reports that were obtained refer to lack of mail and contact with home (most frequent), ill health, and the living conditions. One or two referred to bad relations with prisoners of other allied nations, one specifically mentioning the decision of the senior allied representatives at Changi to discourage the escape committee formed at that camp.

b. Recreational facilities:

Reports of any material provision for recreation of any kind are almost nonexistent throughout the Southeast Asia P.O. internment camps. The one outstanding fact is that such facilities, whether canteens, lecture and education facilities, music, entertainment, sports, or religious services, did not exist and were in fact flatly and openly forbidden in the camps along the Burma railroad. It does appear, however, that some facilities of these types was made available later, in other areas.

Canteens were reported at Changi, Kranji hospital, Depot Camp in Bandung, and at the #2 camp at Poken Baroe, Sumatra. These were not, however, reported as of any very high standard, and probably charged what amounted to black market prices. Thus, when the canteens at Depot Camp, Bandung, and at Poken Baroe were, on different occasions, closed as a punitive measure against the internees, those reporting this fact invariably added the comment that it was no great loss--that the canteen had never amounted to much. The one report giving prices is that made by AG13c Fowler, already referred to in the discussion of food; other than the exorbitant prices noted for supplements to the ration, there noted, i. e., for curry powder, synthetic coffee, tapioc flour, vinegar, whitebait, and salt fish, the following miscellaneous items are given:

Charcoots 21¢
 Cigarette papers 50¢, also 25 sheets for 25¢
 Tobacco 3¢ an ounce
 Tobacco stalks 15 (??) an ounce
 Soap @ 60¢ a pr (probably 360)
 Washing soap @ 5.50 a bar
 Tooth powder @ 75 (probably 75) an ounce (reported
 punice, poor)
 Thread @ 25¢ per 10 yds (reported canvas thread of
 poor quality)
 Talcum powder @ 75 24.20 a box (quantity "about a
 handful")
 Candles @ 1.20 each
 Notepaper @ 30¢ per sheet

It should be added that these prices were highly unstable; some items were reported to have tripled in price within a week's time. As the above items were reported for a camp in the first headquarters, it may further be suspected that not all of the above items were available in the other centers reported in more distant areas. Outside the camps under the jurisdiction of Malay Branch P.O. Headquarters, and Java, there were no centers whatsoever reported.

Educational facilities, including lectures or availability of books, are reported only at Changi. Here there was a library reported. As has been noted, lectures seem generally and perhaps universally to have been forbidden. Other information on the supply of books and other reading material is limited to the general availability of newspapers, both Japanese and underground, which were procured in most areas through clandestine contact with outside natives and civilians.

Music, concert parties, and other entertainments were forbidden in Burma, but seem thereafter to have developed in a number of areas, and had probably always been permitted in camps in Java and Malaya.

Positive reports were received from 10th Bn (Cycle) Camp, Batavia, 15th Bn Camp, Bandoeng, and at Changi, Singapore. In the rest camps in Thailand in and near Kanchanaburi, it was reported that Monday was regarded as holiday, and concert parties permitted on that day. The nature of these entertainments seems to have been approximately what one would expect, amateur minstrel shows and variety shows, with talent drawn from all nationalities and branches interned in the given camp. It is apparent that production presented some difficulties, particularly as regards obtaining instruments; among the types of talent reported were guitarists, a violinist, a large number of singers, a "hystic" and a female impersonator. It would appear that the productions achieved, however ragged, were extremely successful.

Reports of sports or athletic facilities come only from Bicycle Camp, where volley ball was extensively played, with some inter-service tournaments, and at Changi Jail during 1942. No other area reported any such items. The compulsory physical training reported in Java Camps, and also at Macassar in the Celebes, was the only case of its kind found, and there were one or two reports that the Japanese were seen using the athletic equipment which was shipped to the prisoners in P.O. relief packages. It would appear that labor was considered the only physical exercise necessary or desirable.

Religious facilities were also rarely reported. The prisoners were forbidden to hold services in camps along the Burma railroad, and they were also reported forbidden at 15th Bn Camp in Bandoeng. It is known, however, that a chapel existed at Tandjoengpriok, known as St. George's, a small permanent structure probably a part of the original, a well base. Whether or not services were permitted in this chapel is not reported. The only area in which religious gatherings were known to have been held is, again, at Changi, where a number of civilian missionaries were interned.

c. Mail, Packages, and Red Cross supplies:

A summary of the reports suggests that there was no effort made by the Japanese to provide any communication between prisoners and their families, nor to furnish Red Cross supplies, prior to May 1943, which is the earliest date reported for any distribution of such supplies. Mail began to be received in some areas in the summer of 1944; outbound mail is first reported permitted about one year before this time, in November of 1943. In all cases, the handling of mail and packages was reported accompanied by delay, inefficiency, and frequent rifling of the contents. There was no apparent real improvement in this situation in any area prior to May of 1945, when in this respect as in others the Geneva Convention seems suddenly to have become important to the Japanese.

As in other respects, the situation in Burma was exceedingly bad; not until the groups had left the construction camps on the railroad was any mail received. Thereafter, in Thai rest camps and in French Indo-China, reports indicate incoming mail in March, June, September, October, and November of 1944 as the first received by the individual reporting, this mail being from one to two years old. Thereafter, mail arrived irregularly and totals received by any one person were reported variously as, eleven, twenty, none, twenty, two and one cable, seven cards, three all over 1 1/2 years old, three cards, none, six, and one report of forty. The delay in this mail has been reported as caused in large measure by an inefficient Japanese censorship of POW mail. One report states that the censors used had only the most elementary command of English, and examined mail at a rate of "a few letters a day"--tossing those that could not be understood into a corner. At the end of the war, and after Japanese surrender of their camp headquarters offices, cases were reported of finding large quantities of undelivered POW mail stacked and lying in these offices.

Similar limitations seem to have governed the sending of mail. There are only two reports from Burma, Thailand and Indo-China prisoners, one stating that the individual was permitted to send three postcards in three years, and the other indicating that mail other than post-cards was forbidden in that area. No information was obtained on the handling or transmission of these cards, or whether any of them were ever received, though there were numerous reports by personnel whose families had not heard from them at all during the period of their internment.

The report on the disposition of Red Cross packages in Burma and Thailand is consistent, indicating that there was one issue of such parcels while the men were at work camps in the jungle, and that these were rifled extensively before issue. Entire packages were stolen, so that whereas men at base camps shared parcels in a 1 to 6 ration, men in outlying camps received 1 to 12 or 18. These ratios are consistently reported. Then, of those parcels issued, much of the contents had been taken, including in different cases the food, the cigarettes (frequently 1/2 can), the candy, and the medical supplies. Approximately 90% of the parcels were lacking one or more components. These items were also seen in use by guards and other Japanese personnel, and being sold by them to the natives. Nine ships were reported to have docked at Bangkok with supplies during this period, though this may have been rumor. A large amount of supplies marked as being of the stock sent to Tokyo during the 1923 earthquakes were reported seen. At the end of the war, large stocks of these supplies were finally released to surviving prisoners, and the rifling was reported at an end.

Reports on mail from other areas are less complete, but indicate substantially the same conditions. In Malaya, one prisoner reported receipt of one postcard during his internment; a civilian acknowledged receipt of fifteen letters on the Gripsholm in December 1943, and a few others later, at Changi. In Java, the situation was reported "exceedingly poor," with little or no mail received, and outbound mail forbidden until November of 1943. No mail was reported at any Sumatra camp, and none in the Celebes up to the time groups left there for Java in July of 1945.

The supply of Red Cross packages in other areas was inferior to that encountered in Burma and Thailand, in that distribution was apparently tardier, and with far more looting of contents. There was, however, apparently more than one distribution of such supplies in all areas save Macassar, Celebes, where none at all were reported. At Singapore, one civilian reported receipt of one personal package and two others, and an officer had shares in three, one-seventh, one-tenth, and one-twelfth, respectively. In Java, general distribution was reported as starting in May of 1944, although there was one report that, at Amberawa, a quantity of such packages were burned by the Japanese in May of 1943, after an

American had signed receipts for them, because of the Allied sinking of a Japanese ship on which they had been transported. It was not possible, however, to check this report against a similar one from Batavia, indicating that after the sinking of the Japanese relief ship ASA MARU in May of 1945, the Japanese threatened to destroy the supplies--but finally he relented and allowed distribution. One package, moreover, was reported received by a prisoner at Malakassura, Batavia, in May of 1943. It should be noted, however, that a substantial quantity of the supplies distributed in the Java area were out of stocks originally sent to Tokyo from America for earthquake relief in 1923, and still bore the original labels of that shipment. Some supplies were reported at the Soloban rubber estate, Loebok Linggan, Sumatra; with this exception, there were no reports of any supplies reaching men in Sumatra camps whatsoever.

In May of 1945, there appears to have been a loosening of distribution of Red Cross supplies in some areas in which these had previously been hoarded. The final decision to permit distribution in Batavia despite the sinking of the ASA MARU on her return voyage has already been noted; there is a like distribution reported at Kranji hospital camp, Singapore, of a substantial volume of supplies. Items in this distribution, and quantities issued per man, included meat (4 oz), chocolate (1 pt) or 4CU -- cubes?), fruit pudding (2 oz), cheese (3/4 oz), margarine (2 oz), bacon (2 oz), tomatoes (2-2 1/2 oz), soap (bar), jam (2 oz), and meat paste (3/4 oz)--three items being issued on any one day, issue four days a week, from 9 May until 25 May 1945.

Finally, at the end of the war, large stores previously held in warehouses were released and distributed, including food, clothing, and medical supplies. This distribution also was reported to include supplies originally sent to Tokyo in 1923.

d. Pay and Personal Property

Data on this topic was not specifically requested in the formal XIX-X questionnaires given to evacuees, but sufficient information on it is available so that a brief note may be helpful. It had originally been thought that personal property could probably not be retained by captured personnel, but this did not always prove to be the case.

As indicated in the capture histories in Section II, most personnel were stripped of such personal belongings as rings, watches, money, and other items at the time of capture; in none of the reported cases is there any indication of whether these were subsequently returned. Where this stripping was by native captors, the inference that no return was made is, it is submitted, justified; this may also be so in the case of reports, of which there are a fair number, that such belongings were stolen by the capturing troops or Kempei Tai personnel.

It is clear, on the other hand, that personnel of the 131st PI, and possibly a few other isolated cases including a substantial number of civilians, were not forced to surrender such possessions. This is evidenced by the numerous reports from such personnel of trading done with guards, with natives, and with clandestine civilian contacts made on working parties and in other ways (see Sec. V - Outside Contacts and PI Intelligence) to obtain food, medicine, news, and other items. One item frequently traded in this way, and outside the normal run of such matters, was clothing, of which the interned often had more than the natives with whom he dealt. Other items of trade included rings, watches, pens, pencils, and money. It is readily apparent from the reports that in many cases, particularly in Java and on the Sumatran railroad, where most frequent reports are found, the opportunity to effect such trading made a very real difference to the interned's chance of survival, and that items obtained thereby were an important addition to the small supplies of food and clothing.

Since the personnel of the 131st FA received only the most informal type of processing after arrival at Tondjongsprick, and since in many cases the same was true of civilian internees, it was not possible to gain any information on ways in which such possessions might be hidden or otherwise retained in the face of any real attempt to get them. There were occasional reports of items being taken by guards at different times during internment--cases in which the guard would notice pen, pencil, or ring, and forthwith confiscate it for his own use, and in such cases, of course, it is evident that the loss of the property could have been avoided through greater care.

The other source of "barter goods" was, of course, the prisoner's pay. Here again, information was not specifically requested, the following general facts, however, are known. Pay was in extremely small amounts, and, in the case of officers' pay, was subject to at least three deductions (a) for mess, (b) for supplements to the general--unlisted--mess, and (c) for a savings account. One report from Java indicates that the pay scale was at one time cut; this cut was the subject of a representation by the senior Allied POW Representative, but no action seems to have been taken. After the cut, the scale at Batavia was f35 for field grade officers, and f25 for company grade officers. The regulations promulgated by Colonel Nagatowa, commanding Thai Branch 'B, indicate a pay scale as follows:

| | |
|-----------------------|--------|
| Commissioned officers | 25 sen |
| Higher grade NCO's | 25 sen |
| Other NCO's | 15 sen |
| Other enlisted | 10 sen |

(Maximum limit: No higher than 35 sen for any officer) and also limit the amount of money any person may have in his possession as follows:

| | |
|------------------------|--------|
| Commissioned personnel | 50 yen |
| Higher NCO's | 40 " |
| Other NCO's | 30 " |
| Other enlisted | 20 " |

and these regulations indicated a pay day on the 5th of the month.

Payments, however, were apparently highly irregular, and there is some indication that the scales were subject to change from time to time. It is not known by what authority such changes were made, but reports are definite that there was considerable "horse-trading" over the amounts to be paid in cash as against the amount put into the general mess fund in some Java camps.

Specific reports of payments include one made 22 September 1942 at Bicycle Camp, Batavia, when officers received 20 (probably guilders, though dollars are mentioned), sergeants 15, and other enlisted men 10. On 10 October at same camp, a payment of 120 cash to officers was reported, with 90 being banked for them. Another payment on 16 February 1943 was reported at 18-Filo Camp, "Alepuk," officers getting Rs. 20/-, 1st three grades 40¢, other NCOs 30¢, and privates 25¢. It is at least clear, then, that there was not a regular pay day on the 5th of each month as prescribed by Japanese regulations.

e. Summary:

The foregoing reports may briefly be summarized with the observation that in general, prisoners of war and civilian internees were entirely dependent on themselves for the support of their morale; in the face of a bad situation and with no facilities provided for recreation or self-improvement, the high morale found can be attributed only to the character and ingenuity of those interned. That recreation there was developed by themselves; mail was nonexistent for almost a year, and always bad, until at the very end of the war impending defeat made their captors conscious

of their obligations in this respect. Finally, contact with personnel outside the camps, and the opportunity to barter with them for supplies, and to get news reports from the army will have been the decisive factor in the survival of these prisoners.

C. WORKING CONDITIONS

The work assigned to American internees in Japanese hands was, almost without exception, of a military nature, occasionally of a hazardous military nature, and always work of types normally assigned to coolies or other low grade laboring personnel. In most cases, little distinction was made between officers and enlisted men, and all sick personnel were required to work unless too sick to stand up. Hours were long, and conditions atrocious; the supervision was by guards whose concern was primarily to hustle the men with whom they worked, secondarily to complete the assigned job, and never to protect the health or efficiency of his labor supply.

1. Types of Work: Railroad construction:

By far the greatest number of internee man-hours were spent in construction work on the railroad from Bangkok to Maulmain. It is impossible accurately to estimate that number; large work parties of British, Australian, and Dutch prisoners were employed on it, including Indian and other native troops, and some groups of coolies. The road was one which had been surveyed by the British before the war, and had not been considered impossible. Its route ran through the thickest of jungle, long rivers that were mere trickling streams in the dry season, and roaring torrents in the wet, and through sea-level swamps up to about in places rising to approximately 4000 feet altitude. In addition to clearing right of way, leveling and ballasting the road, laying, rigging, and spiking track, the work included all incidentals such as the construction of work camps, base camps, and bridges along the line, the movement of supplies by truck or on the man's back, and the construction of anti-aircraft defenses near the bridges and other strategic points. The total length of new construction on the line has been estimated at about 244 miles, and the work was completed in about sixteen months.

A similar construction project was also carried through to completion in Sumatra, where the existing railroad line from Padang through Padangpanjang to Sidjendjeng was extended on through Moearapantai (Moeara) to Pekan Baroe. Less detail is available on this job since the number of American personnel employed on it was approximately 100 men in contrast to over four hundred survivors of the Burma railroad. From available information, however, conditions here appear if anything to have been worse than those found in Burma. The terrain was far more varied through rugged country with peaks of six to ten thousand feet altitude which carried the right of way itself to altitudes of nearly three thousand, then down to nearly sea level again, rising to cross the shoulder of long knife-like country, reaching its worst in the Soengaipegar area south of Pekan Baroe. The road crew of which the American personnel were a part was taken from Padang by rail to Palembang, over the coast line by truck to Pekan Baroe, and from there started working down the line to meet another road crew, chiefly coolies, which had started at Sidjendjeng. The total length of new construction can be estimated as 164 kilometers, or slightly over 100 miles, of which the portion built by European and American prisoners constituted roughly two-thirds. Construction took approximately one year, with a final two-week drive in which personnel were worked twenty-two hours per day to completion of the line on 14 August 1945. In addition to the usual track incidentals to railroad construction, referred to above, there was on the construction of this line a far greater amount of work in overhauling the terrain, with large sections of swamp to be filled, shoring of shoulders, and many bridges over the streams which cut through the mountain tops. This line, moreover, followed a rural terrain far less than did the Burma construction, with additional labor and construction requirements as a result.

b. Other military work:

It is evident that by far the larger part of the tasks assigned to prisoners other than the railroad work were of a military nature. It is useful here only to summarize them.

In Thailand prisoners were employed in maintenance work along the railroad lines out of Bangkok, to Chiangrai, to Indo-China, to Hanoi, and to Burma. They were likewise employed on airfield construction and maintenance in the Bangkok area, with a large group at the Damang ("Tomang") field. They served as truck mechanics, built emplacements for anti-aircraft artillery and machine guns, dug tunnels for gasoline lines, built pillboxes and other fortifications, ammunition dumps, bridges, oil and gas dumps, and workshops. In Indo-China, similar reports are augmented by reports of work on the docks and harbor installations, construction, repair, loading and unloading of ships. All of these reports, in both areas, indicate that the men were subject to attack while engaged in such work, and in some cases attack and injury to American personnel did in fact occur, at Thanbyuzayat, The Mekong, and Saigon. One report was received of injury to American personnel who were actually left in range of defending Japanese anti-aircraft weapons.

The only military work reported in Singapore was on an airfield at the east end of the island. No details are reported. There was no military work at the Tavey civilian camp. In Java, there appears to have been a substantial amount; the work forced upon the crew of the USS HOUSTON in unloading invasion barges immediately after capture and moving the supplies, ammunition, and equipment so unloaded in carts to Serang has already been discussed in the section on capture. In addition to this, there was work on the docks at Tandjongpriak, on airports and in garages, and military work of an unspecified nature was reported at both Batavia and Malang. The outstanding work assignment in Java in the later period appears to have been the work party at the General Motors plant in Batavia; this was reported hard work of a cyclic type, and was apparently of a military nature, i.e., the manufacture and/or assembly of military vehicles. In Sumatra, apart from the railroad construction, the work in camps in southeast Sumatra and along Bank Strait is not specified other than as housekeeping duties; no military work was reported assigned. In the Celebes, military work included repair of vehicles, building gun mounts, blacksmithing including the arking of hand grenades, and construction work at a radio station. One unusual type of labor assigned here was the clearing of debris after air raids; although non-military, it was hazardous, and the death of one American seaman was reported as a result of premature detonation of a blasting charge.

c. Non-military work:

Non-military work in all areas was similar, consisting of housekeeping duties about the camps, cooking, LP, gardening, cutting wood, and other items of this kind. Medical personnel were apparently used invariably for medical work; the assignments of civilians appear to have been limited absolutely to housekeeping duties, with no reports of American civilian personnel (other than Merchant Marine) to duties of a military or semi-military nature.

2. Assignment and draft of work parties:

The construction of the railroads was on forced labor; with the exception of work at the General Motors plant in Batavia, all other projects appear to have been carried on by normal assignment of whatever man were available for work.

In Burma, the normal procedure seems to have been to require 80% of camp strength out on the work parties, with 10% left behind to care for housekeeping duties, and 10% considered too sick for work. At almost all times, however, the sick were far more than 10% of strength, running usually from 25% to 75%, with the result that the housekeeping details were composed invariably of the sick, and a large number of sick men were forced out on the working parties. Reports were frequent of men unable to continue work, falling to the ground, and being carried back by their comrades at the end of the day. All "ambulatory patients" including dysentery cases and all but the most severe malaria cases, were forced to work. The responsible Japanese commanders appear to have justified this procedure as a command of higher authority. Reported protests over this state of affairs continued; one officer, Captain Archie Fitzsimmons of the 131st FA, appears to have been exceptionally successful in exercising a combination of protest and diplomatic dealing in order to increase the "slack" in the number of men his party was required to provide for work details, so that gradually it became possible to permit increasing numbers of the sick to remain in camp. Where the sick were removed, and segregated in "hospital" camps, as at 62-Kilo and 80-Kilo camps, however, the net effect was to force all remaining personnel to work regardless of condition, and to leave the sick personnel with no fit men for such household duties as the carrying of supplies (including rice sacks weighing 220 lbs) and water, and the disposal of waste. At a still later date, Captain Fitzsimmons succeeded in persuading the Japanese authorities to experiment with a three-shift work basis; this proved successful, lightened the burden on the men, and was continued.

On the Sumatran railroad, the large majority of the labor consisted of coolies, and all personnel engaged in the work were so treated. The normal work day appears to have been 14 hours; this was extended to 22 hours during the final two weeks drive to complete the line. There was no indication that relief of any kind was extended to sick personnel; as a result, while the mortality rate cannot be computed, it was reported to have been far higher than in any other area.

Work drafts for the General Motors Plant in Batavia are not clearly reported. There was no indication, however, that those too ill to work were required to continue with the work parties, and it would appear that conditions here were not so extreme as those on the railroads. The working day was long, and the work heavy, but the job lacked the same type of pressure toward completion of a definite goal that existed with the railroads, and thus may well have eased the strictness with which men were forced to their tasks.

It has already been noted that medical personnel were permitted to serve the camps in that capacity, apparently in all areas. In some cases, conventional procedure was also followed in that officers were not required to do manual labor, but these are less frequent. With a large number of enlisted personnel and relatively few officers on the Burma railroad, it would appear that officers there were retained in supervisory capacities, although the reports are not specific on the point. No American officers were reported on the Sumatran railroad. In Singapore, officers were at first used to supervise forestry parties of 100 enlisted men, later withdrawing because the enlisted men were not American personnel. There was for a time a requirement that all officers in these camps work in the gardens if they wished, though once again the reports are not clear. It is certain, however, that both here and in Java, officers were required to work, and in Java, were forced to work with and at the same tasks as the men.

3. Supervision:

Supervision of work parties varied, as did guarding in the camps (which see, Sec. IV A2,) from indifference to inspired cruelty and bestiality. The guards on work parties are not reported as showing any

great concern over the progress of assigned work, at least not with the same zeal as that which they devoted to the humiliation of the men under them. Thus it was reported a fairly simple matter to leave the work party; a number of attempted escapes got their start through a casual walk off the job and out into the jungle. It may also be assumed that the guards experienced some of the same difficulty in distinguishing between one white person and another that occidentals usually have in making distinctions between people of the yellow or black races; as a result, it was often possible where work parties were divided into shifts for a well man to take the place of one sick and answer to his name without detection. These factors, coupled with the high frequency of contacts with the outside made while on working parties, suggest that supervision was at best a slovenly and carelessly handled affair.

But this should in no way suggest that contact with the guards was in any way a friendly or humane matter on work parties. It is quite clear that the same types of mistreatment - beatings, slappings, and occasionally more extreme injury - were practiced on the job as were in camp. It is not necessary to repeat the entire description of such practices here; suffice it that the guards, with a few exceptions among the Koreans and later among Indonesians in Java, carried out their program of planned humiliation and injury without distinction as to time or place. Supervision of the job could be careless, perhaps; supervision of the men on that job was not.

D. CHANGES IN CONDITIONS, REPRESENTATIONS TO COMMANDERS

A succinct report on this topic would state simply that there were substantially no efforts at improvement made by Japanese Camp commanders, and that representations to these commanders was a futile affair. In general, such was the case; by far the majority of those in a position to report on the matter so indicate. But there is good reason to believe that this would not be entirely accurate; the reports of at least two Senior American Representatives, Capt Archie Fitzsimmons of the 2d Bn, 131st FA, and Lt. Comdr. Thomas A. Donovan of the USS LANGLEY, indicate that some improvement of conditions through an adroit course of dealing was possible, and was effected. And as the two men were in different situations, a comparison of their reports may be useful. Captain Fitzsimmons was Senior Allied Representative, the ranking officer in his entire group; Commander Donovan was merely the senior American officer in a group composed of all branches of all allies.

In both cases, written representations to Camp commanders concerned, and also to Branch POW commanders, were made where conditions became so serious as to suggest that even these commanders might consider making changes and improvements. Such representations included, for instance, one made to Colonel Nagatomo by Captain Fitzsimmons when sick men were forced to work against the advice of the POW medical officers, and in direct violation of an order allegedly made by Colonel Nagatomo himself. Similar was one made on behalf of the group of which Commander Donovan was senior American officer, concerned with work parties and the rations issued them, working hours, and other matters relative to conditions at the General Motors Plant work project. Another was concerned with the pay and treatment of officer prisoners in Java. These two were signed by British officers as Senior Allied Representatives of the groups concerned. Copies of these are appended as Exhibit "P" to this report.

In none of these cases was the representation directly successful in accomplishing improvement, and might have been considered as futile as were most of the other representations made by allied officers. Yet in all of the above cases, improvements were eventually effected.

Two factors may be noted which render these cases different from others reported. In the first place, there were in the written representations allegations of a previous commitment on the subject either by the authority

to whom it was addressed (which would insure that the representation would at least reach the addressee, and would impress intermediate commanders with its importance) or by a higher Japanese authority (which would tend to bear weight with both addressee and those below him). Although this factor is at best vaguely expressed - "Nippon and Allied policy" - in #46, it is crystal clear in the other two. The use of this type of emphasis unquestionably was of at least some value in calling the attention of higher authority to the conditions in question, and also in raising at least some concern in the mind of the immediate commander responsible as to what action his superiors might take.

The second factor, one which seems to have been unique, and by far the more important, is that in both groups, it is clear that Captain Fitzsimmons and Commander Donovan personally followed up the matters in question with the camp commanders, and exercised both ingenuity and diplomacy in getting settlements of these matters. Thus, though Colonel Nagatani did order the requested inspection of the sick, and though the immediate result was that the inspecting officer also ordered the sick men out as fit for work, a wedge had been created which made subsequent "dickering" between the camp commander and Captain Fitzsimmons possible, and eventually most sick personnel were enabled to take advantage of the "slack" created in work-party figures. There are several reports, though less specific, of similar activity on the part of Commander Donovan, and it appears that, in the same way, he was successful both in relieving the working conditions of the enlisted men and in getting the officers taken off the work-parties in issue.

By way of contrast, reports from other areas and other groups suggest that often the representations were made, and the matter left at that. In other cases where further effort was made, there are indications of a haughty attitude, a "you can't do this to us" approach, and a refusal to trade concession for concession, which resulted in little or nothing being accomplished.

V - OUTSIDE CONTACTS AND PW INTELLIGENCE

A. CONTACTS

1. Nature, Location, and Methods.
2. Benefits Gained Through Contacts.
3. Japanese Countermeasures and Penalties.

B. NEWS

1. Japanese Sources.
2. Other Sources (Contacts, Concealed Radios).

C. PROPAGANDA

1. Japanese
2. Allied
3. Native Reactions to Allied Air Attack

A. CONTACTS

It is readily apparent from the discussions in previous sections (particularly those on Food and on Medicine and Health in Sec IV) that the contacts internees were able to make with persons outside their camps, and the fruits of these contacts, were of vital importance in maintaining both physical health and also morale. This section will deal with the methods used in making such contacts, specific benefits obtained, and the difficulties and penalties attendant on discovery while so doing.

1. Nature, Location, and Methods:

In the entire Southeast Asia area, there were almost no internees who reported failure to make contact with persons outside their camps, and those very few who admitted having made none themselves invariably reported knowledge of others who had succeeded, and of having received the benefits thereof themselves. In general, the methods used to make them, and the types of persons contacted seem to have been substantially similar, with only occasional differences brought about by the local situation.

Least frequent and least profitable seem to have been the contacts made with natives along the northern or Burma section of the Bangkok-Moulmein Railroad. That such contacts were made is clear, and there seems to have been no great amount of danger or difficulty attendant on the process, but as one internee reported, "they were in the same boat we were", i.e., subject to short supplies of food and under Japanese domination. These contacts seem to have been made both while out of camp on work parties and also at night. Contacts were made with natives direct and apparently also through Korean guards at some points. The internee-drivers of rations trucks appear to have been in a particularly favorable position to contact outside sources of news and supplies, and in particular were valuable in maintaining contacts between the different camps to which they drove. One report suggests that a POW chaplain was permitted likewise to travel from camp to camp with some benefit to inter-camp communication resulting. Later, when the practice of concentrating the sick at so-called hospital camps developed, these transfers themselves proved a source of contact, also primarily of an inter-camp nature rather than with outside agencies.

Contact with the outside improved markedly when the construction project moved down into Thailand. In that area, and later in the maintenance camps along the several railroad lines out of Bangkok, and at the airbase camps, contacts with Thai natives, Chinese, and even occasionally with allied agent appear to have been frequent and rewarding. Thus contact is reported with a Thai agent at "Chung Kai", that a Chinese agent at Bheiburi urged several internees to attempt an escape, and that a British Major succeeded in contacting an allied agent at Kanchanaburi. Contacts with natives and with Chinese seem to have been frequent and not excessively difficult; no use of extensive stratagem or plotting is reported.

In the Thai Government camps, such contacts seem to have been made with the active though, of course, unofficial consent of the authorities, and to have been unlimited; thus the OSS were reported to have had agents constantly in camp, and to have arranged for the "escape" of Lt. W. D. MacGarry, AVG, and Major D. N. Kellogg, USAAF. Contact was also made with the

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Swiss Consul, who loaned American internees money for living expenses. In view of the exceptional nature of this internment however, under a government which was sympathetic to and unofficially yet actively assisting the allies, no further references in this section will be made to the situation in the Bangkok camps.

Similar reports are gained from internees in Indo-China. Contacts appear to have been made with both the French residents and the natives, and to have occurred in great frequency prior to capture, with some continued contact after internment in that area, both while on work parties and at other times. Again there are no reports of devious or surreptitious method, although the necessity for this may have been somewhat greater, since it is clear that Japanese domination of the area was substantial. There are numerous reports of French offers of information or assistance being frustrated when Japanese pressure was applied, or when fear of Japanese detection made such contact dangerous; it is thought that to a greater extent than in any other area, the inhabitants both French and native were concerned for their own welfare, and their assistance seriously inhibited by such concern.

Possibly because of the more permanent nature of the major camps in the Singapore area, the difficulty and danger attendant upon establishing outside contacts is reported far greater in that area than anywhere else. Yet contacts were made, and with fair frequency, with both Malay and Chinese residents. The British camp authorities appear to have gone to some pains to "cover up" the existence of such contacts in their dealings with Japanese commanders. One Chinese named William Chew was specifically reported as a source of information, and other contacts were reported on work parties, and through the Chinese and Malay "Topas" who swept out in front of the cells at Outram Road. Other contacts included Eurasian or native wives of internees, and civilian reports indicate that it was possible to meet--under supervision,-- friends and others while attending Church service.

Outside contacts in Java were relatively easy to establish in the earliest days; Major Winthrop H. Rogers reported being permitted almost daily shopping trips from Bicycle Camp to markets in Batavia while that camp was under the command of Lt. Katagiri and Lt. Suzuki, for the purchase of food and supplies. The contacts of 131st PA men and survivors of the HOUSTON during the period shortly after capture are detailed in Section II, and seem to have been extensive and largely profitable in view of the fact that these men still had money and other articles with which to trade. They too were apparently carried on with the tacit approval of Japanese commanders.

At about the time Lt. Sonai assumed command of Bicycle Camp, however, a tightening-up occurred. Gradually such contact was reduced, and shortly was forbidden entirely, the camp purchases being made through official camp channels. All areas, however, report continued contact through surreptitious means, with resident Europeans (insofar as these were not interned), Eurasians, Malays, Indonesians, and Chinese. Such contacts were apparently frequent with natives employed in the shops, both camp shops, kitchens, and bakeries, and also outside shops where work parties were detailed.

A detailed account of some of the means for establishing such contact are found in the report of Maria K. McVay, who

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herself succeeded in avoiding internment throughout the war, and who made frequent contact with internees in Batavia, where she resided. An extract of this report is appended as Exhibit "Q" to this report. It suggests that a fair degree of ingenuity was required in order to avoid raising suspicion, and also indicates a fact thoroughly corroborated in the reports from the internees themselves, namely, that most contacts were made--and made most easily--by groups outside of the camps on work parties.

But from this report and also from other sources it is also clear that, with care and inventiveness on the part of the internee and his "contacts", it was possible to use native guards, Koreans, laborers, and some Japanese guards as a bridge in opening a channel to obtain news and supplies. At the same time it must be recognized that, perhaps more than in other areas, there was real risk of encountering treachery on the part of such contacts. Treacherous natives were frequently counted on for assistance by survivors of the USS HOUSTON, and at least during the earlier months, were widespread throughout western Java, with specific reports coming from Laboehan, Menes, Pandeglang, and Buitenzorg. It would appear that later, however, Japanese relations with the natives deteriorated substantially, and the number of Indonesians willing to assist in establishing contacts for internees increased. Positive contacts were reported at most camps at one time or another, with Timahi, Glodock, Bandoeng, and Sorabaja specifically confirmed.

Contacts with natives in Sumatra are reported to have existed, and appear to have been on much the same order as those existing in Burma. In view of the small number of Americans sent to this area, the reports are not considered extensive enough to form the basis for any conclusions, however.

In the Celebes, a situation much like that described in Java is described, limited, however, by the smaller numbers of persons concerned. Contacts with natives appear to have been made, particularly by men on work parties. There seems also to have been, on the part of the Japanese, concrete knowledge of the presence of allied agents on the island, and fear of what might be accomplished by them, together with stringent measures in the form of prohibitions and inspections, to prevent any contact. No cases were reported of any interned POW actually contacting such agents. The natives, where contacted appear to have been reliable; there are no reports of treachery in this area.

2. Benefits gained through contacts.

The items gained through contacts with natives and other varied but little throughout Southeast Asia, and varied only insofar as the limitations of supply or other factors in a particular area reduced their value. Generally, the main items procured included foods, medicines, tobacco, news in the form of newspapers, propaganda leaflets, and other papers, and occasionally, offers of assistance with escape projects.

In Burma, contacts were able to produce but little. The natives were under substantially the same short supply as the internees, and the items most frequently reported were those locally procurable, including fruits, sugar, duck eggs, medicine (not specified as to type), allied propaganda leaflets, and native tobacco substitutes, chiefly the leaf of the papaya and related plants. There were no reports of assistance with escape

projects in this area; by contrast, there were some reports of treachery in this respect, though none associated with American personnel.

In Thailand, commensurate with the greater number of such contacts, the benefits also increased. Clothing, rings, watches, pens, and pencils were traded for food and medicine, news, and newspapers including the underground printed BANGKOK CHRONICLE, leaflets, fruits, tobacco, sugar, oil, and money. One Japanese guard was reported as selling medicines obtained by him from official stores both to natives and to POWs. From other prisoners on trucks, or transferees from other camps, including hospital camps, was gained news of the conditions in those camps, and the welfare of acquaintances interned therein, and well as some supplies which these men had been able to obtain from outside sources enroute.

The French in Indo-China provided food, clothing, medical care, including medicines and treatment of wounds, news, and information on means of evading captivity, including shelter for periods of days or even several weeks. The consensus of the reports indicates that this assistance was seriously impaired by the concern the French were forced to take for their own safety under the Japanese occupation. After internment, these sources supplied food, medical supplies, news and newspapers, and money.

Singapore internees report gaining food and medicine from these contacts, and one radioman in the Merchant Marine, Jalet, reported obtaining radio parts from a Chinese, with which he was able to construct a secret radio at Changi. The Chinese in question was the wife of a British internee.

In Java, when open purchases in the Batavia markets were permitted by Katagiri and Suzuki in 1942, it is clear that anything could there be obtained that the market could offer. Many of the internees had substantial amounts of cash, and the rations at Bicycle Camp were strongly reinforced with available market supplies, including fresh meat, vegetables, fruits, oil, tea and coffee, eggs, and some amounts of dairy products. Other items procured included American tobaccos, watches, and, in one case, a ceiling fan which was installed by its owner to the envy of all his neighbors. Some supplies of wines, and liquor were also obtained.

Under Lt. Sonai, these supplies were cut off, Food, clothing, and news continued to be passed into camps in Java, however, consistently throughout the course of the war. One report adds the receipt of letters, presumably from local individuals, and another includes cigarettes and fruit. Camps in Sumatra and the Celebes give like reports, with supplies of chinchona bark reported received from natives along the Sumatra railroad.

3. Japanese countermeasures and penalties.

With the exception of the early administration at Bicycle Camp, it is evident that the Japanese in all camps actively endeavoured to prevent the establishment of outside contact. Measures taken to this end included investigations, searches, and severe penalties for discovery. In Burma and Thailand, the penalty for the internee was to be forced to stand at attention in the sun for periods ranging from a few hours to several days, without food or water. Sharp interrogations resulted, with beatings and other mistreatment when the expect-

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answers were not obtained. In some cases the natives with whom contact had been made was reported to have been executed; there are sufficient of these reports to indicate that this may well have been the standard penalty for the "outside" partner to such contacts.

In other areas, punishments for the internee were similar: interrogation, beatings, and periods of standing at attention. Collective punishment was added in some cases, punishment being meted out to the suspect's entire barracks, work party, or to the camp as a whole through closing the canteen or lessening the food ration. In Singapore, it was also reported that six years imprisonment was the official penalty, and that in accordance with this, periods of solitary confinement were meted out to those suspected of having contacts with outside persons. The extremes to which the Japanese carried their efforts to prevent such contact among the civilian internees at Changi have been described in the section on interrogation; there is no information on the nature of the causes for this action, but its severity was exemplary.

B. NEWS

1. Japanese Sources:

Although there are reports of speeches made by Japanese Camp commanders which suggest that there was some effort made to indoctrinate internees through the publication of Japanese news, there is very little information on the nature or scope of such material. Most reports take the Japanese news for granted, and regard it as propaganda worthy of no concern; thus it is difficult to determine exactly how much news was available in this way, or what its nature was, other than that it tended at least to indicate to the internee what the location of current combat areas was, and possibly a little of what was taking place in them. The reports indicate consistently a reluctance on the part of Japanese officers to discuss the war in any way, beyond the usual assertion that Japan would win it very shortly, and are equally consistent in reporting absolute ignorance on the part of Japanese enlisted men.

2. Other sources (contacts, concealed radios):

The availability of news through outside contacts, which furnished copies of allied leaflets, underground newspapers, and notes from persons having access to news, has already been discussed. In addition to these and to Japanese news sources, a large number of camps got news first-hand from concealed radios

It is not clear how these radios were obtained, save that such few persons as had technical skill and were not drafted to technical parties for shipment to Japan or Formosa seem invariably to have made them where possible, but it is quite definite that several camps along the Burma railroad and nearly all permanent camps elsewhere did, at one time or another, have at least one and occasionally several radios concealed in the barracks. They were hidden under floorboards, in mattresses, false bottoms to numerous types of containers, kit bags, and elsewhere as the situation permitted, and were in operation whenever the absence of the guard would permit this without detection. Such radios were specifically reported in Burma, Singapore, Saigon, Batavia, and possibly also at Bandoeng and at Macassar in the Celebes, and were known definitely not to exist only in Sumatra along the Pakan-Baroe railroad. From broadcasts from India and occasionally elsewhere, internees

were thus enabled to follow the progress of the war with reasonable accuracy, often knowing far more than did their captors.

C. PROPAGANDA

1. Japanese:

Although Japanese propaganda was apparently widely dispersed among the natives in occupied areas, it has already been noted that their news service was both slow and extremely poor. This appears to have impaired the value of their efforts to propagandize to a considerable extent. The earliest reports indicate a large bloc of natives in almost all areas as being favorable to the Japanese; both size and fervor of this group seem to have dwindled steadily throughout the course of the war, to the point where, during the final year, ridicule of the Japanese announcements was almost universal. The Thai peoples seem the least affected by Japanese propaganda; there are indications that from the very first, these were laughing at the reports put out by Nippon. In Indo-China, reports on the Annamites are mixed; some are reported unimpressed, and others pro-Japanese. The French people in that area apparently were at no time taken in by the Japanese stories.

In Java the most clear-cut picture is reported; here the Indonesian and Malay natives were actively engaged in assisting the Japanese at the time of the occupation in 1942, and as matters developed from there, they performed a complete about-face, showing outspoken contempt for the enemy during the closing months of the war. A number of the Dutch, however, were reported as believing the Japanese propaganda, and there were some reports of Dutch-given assistance to the Japanese.

This trend seems also to have occurred in a less defined pattern in nearly all other areas. No other area reported such extremes, either in the earlier collaboration nor in the later change of heart, but it is quite clear that, as time went on, Japanese claims and assertions became a laughing matter to all but themselves.

2. Allied:

Available information makes it evident that distributions of allied propaganda in the form of leaflets and possibly also broadcasts effectively reached native populations and Japanese alike nearly in all areas in Southeast Asia. The reports in this area, of course, less frequent from the outlying areas such as the Celebes and Sumatra, but the only area in which the effect of such material seems to have been seriously limited is among the Annamite population in Indo-China. In practically all other areas, native consciousness of the true status of the war seems to have developed steadily, and, coupled with the bad relations suffered under the Japanese conquerors, to have produced the gradual yet unhesitating swing to the allied cause which has already been noted. Some aspects of this will be further considered in the section next following, where reactions to allied air attack will be discussed.

Among the Japanese themselves, and the Korean guards whom they brought in, there is a wide disparity of reaction to allied bulletins. The Koreans seem to have been the first to admit knowledge of the true state of affairs, and for about

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one year before the end of the war are reported as having a gradually clearer and clearer picture of the facts, information as to allied victories, etc. This report is substantiated by (and also tends to explain) reports that treatment of allied internees by the Koreans showed sharp improvement during the last twelve or fourteen months of the conflict. By contrast, the Japanese of comparable grade, i.e., enlisted men, seem to have been thoroughly sheltered against any contact with the true facts pertaining to the war; there are no substantial or confirmed reports of Japanese enlisted men with a knowledge of the facts, and the number reporting amazement and disbelief when the final surrender was announced is fairly large.

To maintain this informational quarantine over his men, however, the Japanese officer of necessity encountered a substantial amount of such propaganda. The rules, of course, provided that all such material picked up either by natives or by prisoners and internees would be turned in to headquarters immediately and unread. It is doubtful, however, how well this was enforced, even among the officers' own ranks; one confirmed and emphatic report tells of an American army private who succeeded in stealing, from the trousers pocket of a Japanese officer, one well-thumbed allied leaflet.

The range of reaction to this material was, as might be expected, wide and varied. Many Japanese officers managed to retain the "Bushido" spirit until the war's end; their reactions to the leaflets included "indifference", occasional anger, and one quoted as saying they "would make good cigarette paper". Others were less sure of themselves and their country, and reports describe them as "excited", or "stunned", or "amazed". Finally, there were a few who were reported as gradually knowing the true state of affairs and, in some cases sullenly, in others gracefully, accepting the inevitable outcome of the war.

3. Reactions to Allied Air Attack:

It has already been noted that the appearance of allied planes over camp areas was, save only insofar as it was a threat to the safety of those there interned, a substantial source of high morale among the internees. As might be expected, the converse was generally true of the Japanese in the camps; the reports indicate that they became angry, and that they made much of allied "treachery"--this despite the fact that in many cases attack or near internment camp sites was more or less invited, as e.g., by the shifting of locomotives to sidings near the dock camp in Saigon. The only reports of reprisals taken against the internees for such attacks which are clear-cut, however, are those concerned with allied attack on and sinking of relief ships after completion of the relief mission and expiration of the previously-granted safe conduct. Withholding of supplies so landed was definitely reported in 1943 at Ambarawa, Java, and possibly also occurred at Singapore. In a similar situation in 1945, there was much protest and speechmaking by the Japanese, but the supplies were ultimately distributed nevertheless.

Reaction to allied air attack on the part of native groups varied directly with other attitudes already reported--their willingness to aid the internees, and their reaction to allied propaganda. Thus in Burma, the original attitude was reported as ranging from anger to puzzlement and indifference, with a swing toward greater understanding and acceptance of the need for such attacks as the war progressed. A

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like report, more strong in its swing from one extreme to the other, is found in Java, where there are few reports of bewilderment, and the attitude seems to have swung from fear and anger directly to understanding and acceptance. In this respect, it is interesting to note that in eastern Java, in the Soerabaja area, the trend was always in advance of that in the west; even from the start there were substantial groups of natives who appear to have accepted and approved of the attacks, though this was clearly not universal. Similar to the east Java situation are the reports from the Celebes; most natives accepted the attacks as necessary and showed some interest in the technical skill displayed.

There are no reports of substance on this point from the Singapore area; most of the reports suggest that the natives were "happy" or "they approved" but information is insufficient to determine accurately any concrete attitude or development of attitude. The reports from Sumatra are similarly inconclusive.

In Indo-China, in line with the matter already reported in relation to allied propaganda, there appears to have been a wide disparity of reaction at all times. Some natives are reported as approving of the bombings almost to the point of wild enthusiasm; others are described as sullen or furiously angry; still others are reported as puzzled and hurt, eager to know why they should have been made the targets of attacks which, they thought, were directed more or less personally at them. It is interesting to note that these factors, which are clearly reported, are in contrast to a far smaller volume of reports on allied propaganda and its effect; it may well be that allied propaganda was less successful in reaching this area than others, and that the confused and mixed reaction to subsequent air attacks was the result.

If the scant reports from Singapore and Sumatra may be taken as probably falling in with the reports from other areas, this section may be summarized with the comment that--where allied propaganda was effectively disseminated--allied bombings were accepted and understood, and finally even welcomed, by increasing numbers of the native population. It is probable, of course, that deteriorating Japanese relations with the native peoples they had conquered were also a substantial factor, but the reports from Indo-China suggest that definite propaganda material is needed even in areas where such deterioration is in progress, in order to crystallize public sentiment and enlist native support.

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VI -- ESCAPE

A. GENERAL. CAMP SECURITY MEASURES.

B. ESCAPE PROBLEMS IN PARTICULAR AREAS

1. Burma
2. Thailand
3. Indo-China
4. Singapore
5. Java, Sumatra, and the Celebes

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VI - ESCAPE

A. GENERAL. CAMP SECURITY MEASURES

Although the major problem in escape from P and Internment Camps in Southeast Asia was not one of getting out of camp, but rather of what could be done thereafter to regain allied forces without being retaken, it may be useful briefly to survey the measures taken by the Japanese to provide security within their camps against escape. This topic falls naturally into three divisions:-- the construction of the camp itself, the system of guards used to patrol it, and the regulations of a security nature imposed on prisoners and internees.

Camp construction varied widely, inas much as in a large number of cases existing military or civil construction was taken over and used for internment. Collecting points were in almost all cases city or town jails, with the exception of the Banten Park Movie Theater, the Keen School in Batavia, the Bali Hotel in Denpasar, Bali and possibly a few other buildings taken for such temporary use. Transit camps were also usually of existing construction, including the Naval Base and Warehouse areas in Batavia, the jails at Rangoon, Houlain, and Singapore, and the jails and warehouses in Saigon, Bandoeng and Soerabaja.

Where new construction was required, it appears to have been of a standardized nature, consisting of a square or rectangular camp, security was provided through ditching and fences, the fences in some cases being reported as a woven bamboo structure. One specific report tells of a system comprising first a bamboo fence, then barbed wire, then a water-filled moat, and then another bamboo fence. There was one gate.

Guard were both of fixed-post and patrol types, used together. The fixed posts appear to have been at the gate and in the barracks area; patrols covered the fences and also the barracks area, and Japanese Japs patrolled outside the outer moat fence. The period of time spent by a guard at his post has not been accurately determined, but appears to have depended on the type of post, and to have varied accordingly.

Regulations implementing the camp security comprised those forbidding contact with outside civilians or natives, forbidding the possession of leaflets dropped by allied planes, forbidding any insubordination to guard personnel or any attempt to escape or conspiracy to make such attempt. All carried a possible death penalty. This was implemented by the threat and frequent application of collective punishment, either on the whole camp, on the offender's barracks, or on his immediate neighbors in the barracks. Roll call was normally held twice a day, but when there had been any attempts to escape, roll calls as frequent as one per hour were reported. Finally, there was extensive use of the parole; in at least one reported case, at Changi, paroles were exacted under duress of the most extreme kind including increased overcrowding and starvation paroles were apparently zealously sought in almost all cases.

But the specific measures of this kind taken by the Japanese administration are actually of little importance to the problem. The camps, right for the most part have been left completely unguarded, and security would have been nearly as well maintained. There was some evidence that guarding on work parties was in fact of an extremely loose and slipshod variety; yet the security was adequate. The basis for this, of course, is the fact that in all of the areas under the scope of this report, internment was usually in isolated and jungle areas. Much of it was on islands populated by natives who, almost without exception, cooperated with the Japanese in returning to custody any who might escape. The others, in Singapore, Bangkok and Saigon particularly, were separated from any allied forces by thick and practically impenetrable jungle barriers which, again, were populated by hostile native groups.

Thus, though it was often a relatively simple matter to get out of camp at night, or to walk off the job on a work party, the real question was what to do next. It is this matter that will be considered in the following subsection. Since the problem was, as suggested, primarily a geographical one, geographical divisions have been adopted in its treatment.

B. ESCAPE PROBLEMS IN PARTICULAR AREAS

1. Burma:

A number of attempts to escape from work camps along the Bangkok-Bombay railroad have been reported; owing to the vague nature of some reports and the possibility of duplication, it is impossible to determine the exact number, but it is clear that there were at least three such attempts, and possibly as many as half a dozen. With one possible but not certain exception, these were all failures.

The best-reported incident is an attempt made in the earliest days of the construction work. This took place at 30-Kilo Camp, and was a carefully planned enterprise headed by a Captain Bull, who had had 18 years' experience in the Burma jungles with the forestry service, and who planned for the escape of himself and two Australian NCO's over a period of weeks, hoarded together food supplies and equipment with which to make the attempt, and finally left camp, heading north, with an Indian guide considered unquestionably reliable. The Captain and one Sergeant were shot on the spot near Salween by Burma Military Police, together with the guide, and the other Sergeant, wounded, was brought back to Thanbyuzayat and there executed by Lt. Maito on the direct order of Colonel Magatona.

This history characterizes nearly all other reports, so much so that it is not possible to determine how many of them are merely duplications of the same incident. Reports which clearly refer to other attempts, however, are found. One of the civilian internees at Tavoy reported the successful escape of four Gurkhas from Rangoon during the time he was there, escaping through a breach in the walls made by an allied air attack, and during the confusion of the attack. It is not known whether these succeeded in gaining complete freedom. In another attempt from the railroad camps, a party including one American and a Captain in the Indian Army were reported shot for an attempted escape. There is one report, unconfirmed, of successful escape by an American reported by Pvt C.N. Sherrill of the 131st FA., who admitted that he had no first-hand knowledge of the incident, but indicated that this American — whose name he could not remember — had merely announced that he was tired of work, threw down his tools, and slipped off into the jungle. Pvt Sherrill believed the attempt to have succeeded because, at some time later, a friend received a letter from the man who had escaped, indicating a successful journey back to allied territory. This incident was alleged to have taken place at the 18-Kilo Camp. No further information has been found on it, and no other report refers to it.

The above attempts appear all to have taken place during 1942 or the earliest days of 1943. After the death of Captain Bull and his companions (one of whom may have been named Bell), the senior allied representative for POW Branch #3, Brig. Varney of the AIF, is reported to have ordered no further attempts to be made. Lt (jg) Harlin of the U.S. Navy reports having dissuaded three individuals or groups from further attempts, in compliance with this order. The basis for the order was clear; a well-planned attempt to escape, made by persons better equipped than the average to succeed, had failed, with execution for the participants, and reprisals against all others in the 30-Kilo Camp, including reduced food rations, hourly rollcall, searches, and extensive interrogation of acquaintances of those concerned (with apparently full use of the mistreatment program attendant upon such questionings — see Sec III).

The situation in Burma can, then, be summarized very briefly. The men were geographical prisoners, with, as one internee put it, "a price on our heads." Terrain factors including mountainous country, thick jungles, and swampland, together with the language barrier and the high incidence of treachery on the part of the natives, combined with the certainty of death on recapture, operated to make escape attempts a foolhardy proposition for these men. It might well be that organized rescue parties equipped to transport Burma internees through the jungle, with adequate advance preparations by agents detailed to this duty, would have been successful; no contact with such agents in this area is reported.

2. Thailand:

It is evident from what has already been reported that escape from the camps operated by the Thai government at the jail and later in "Vachiravaud" College in Bangkok was scarcely a matter of escape at all, but rather normal evacuation, limited only by the need to shield this operation from the Japanese. Thai cooperation appears to have been discreet yet wholehearted, and in light of these facts, further consideration of these camps is not considered necessary.

In the camps maintained by the Japanese in Thailand, the severe conditions found in Burma appear to have been substantially alleviated as time went on. The contacts made by allied agents with internees at "Chung Kai," Bhejburi, and Kanchanaburi have already been discussed; the apparent reason that these contacts did not ripen into actual escape ventures was in all cases reported to be inadequate identification by the agent -- with the result that the internees contacted did not trust the offer of assistance made to him.

But, though specific successful attempts are not confirmed, some were reported and it is felt that escape was possible in this area, and some may have occurred. In the earlier stages of internment in this area, and some may have occurred. In the earlier stages of internment in this area, the Japanese continued to execute those recaptured, and there were reports of such executions at "Chung Kai" and Tah Soa ("Tharso"). Later, however, this punishment was apparently abandoned in favor of a stringent imprisonment; one report at Bhejburi tells of a supposedly half-insane prisoner who left that camp, was recaptured, and after considerable deliberation by the Japanese, was sent to a work camp in Burma. An Australian named Oliver is reported to have successfully escaped after this time, and two Americans, reported as Lance Harris and Hoffman, are said to have got away from "Tiang" (not located) in 1945. Another report, possibly of the same case, by Lt. Commander Epstein, USN, reports two Americans successfully out of Bhejburi.

The factors which seem to distinguish this situation from that in Burma are twofold; first, that the natives were far more cooperative is clear, and of considerable importance. Second, the gradual approach of the Japanese to authorized means of discipline and treatment, including the abandonment of execution as penalty for attempts to escape, meant that an individual who made the attempt would risk far less here in the event of recapture both to himself and his comrades, than in an attempt in Burma. The geographical problem, of reaching allied territory, was of course greater; it is apparent that outside assistance is necessary under the conditions encountered here.

3. Escape in Indo-China:

The one reportedly confirmed report of a successful escape is from Saigon, from which point 1st Lt. J.C. Hughett, AC, of Lubbock, Texas, is reported to have escaped with two companions on Christmas Eve, 1944. It is reported that these men had been interned for some time, and had made substantial contacts with persons outside their camp, and specifically that a M. Delrue and a M. Desplats of Saigon assisted them. They had made these contacts, and presumably others, while out on work parties, and escaped at night from a hospital camp, with transportation furnished by the French. The companions were reported to be British ORs, Pvt. Purcell, and Pvt. Bankraff.

In contrast to this report is an attempt on 1 July 1942, in which two British attempted to leave the Saigon docks, were caught by French collaborationists, and shot by the Japanese. No further details of this attempt have so far been recovered. A third attempt, also unsuccessful, was reported at St. Martin des Pallieres, but execution of these men, if contemplated, was apparently frustrated by the end of the war.

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From these fragmentary reports and from other information on the situation in Saigon, it would appear that the concern of the French for their own safety (which, as noted in previous material, had made their assistance in evading capture very limited), the presence of collaborators among them, and the generally hostile attitude of the natives, created a situation no more favorable to escape than that existing in Burma as far as the average internee was concerned. If, however, loyal French could be contacted, -- and there are several reports of such contacts being made, -- it is equally clear that escape from Indo-China was possible where properly planned and assisted by these outside contacts.

4. Escape in Singapore:

Of all the areas in which internees were quartered, the Singapore camps presented the most complete bar to successful escape. Here the security measures taken by the Japanese were most thorough; the camps were chiefly permanent structures, and in all cases were well-guarded, with work parties relatively limited and under none of the pressure to complete a construction project that occurred in Burma. Here, too, there was complete isolation, most of the camps being on Singapore Island, with a high preponderance of hostile natives inhabiting the area. One successful escape, of a S/Sgt. Brunley of the 19th Bomb Group to Australia, is reported by Sgt. Hess of that organization, but from the report it is felt that this was actually a successful evasion of capture while in Java rather than an escape after capture and from Singapore. There are no other reports of attempts being made. Though there was an escape committee at Changi (this being the only locality where such an organization was reported) it was discouraged in its activities by the senior allied representatives. Failure was reported as carrying with it either execution or a life sentence at Outra Road jail as penalty. Some eagerness to attempt escape was reported among American ranks; there was serious difficulty with the Japanese over their refusal to sign a parole (this has been reported in detail in war crimes investigations made by the CIC); and there were reports of extreme bitterness over the discouraging attitude taken by the senior allied representatives. Nevertheless, there is, in view of experiences of internees in other areas, no evidence to suggest that anything short of a well-organized rescue party from the outside could have brought internees in the Singapore area to freedom.

5. Escape in Java, Sumatra and the Celebes:

In Java, a report similar to that in Burma is found; the unreliability of the natives and the absence of any means of getting off the island joined to render escape virtually impossible. Most positive reports concern Dutch and Eurasian personnel, and of these, only the latter were reported successful in escaping. One Dutch half-caste was reported to have succeeded in getting out of Bicycle Camp, when a friend replaced him on a work party so that his absence was not discovered until a considerable time later. He was recaptured, however, and in view of the almost universal report of execution as the penalty for attempted escape in Java, must be presumed to have suffered this fate. His barracks commander and non-commissioned officer were also punished for complicity (or at least alleged complicity) in this attempt by being beaten before a parade of the work camp. Six Dutch were reported executed at Tjinahi, Bandung, for an attempted escape, and two others were reported to have got out of Tjihpit, Bandung, by crawling through a hole in the fence at night. These were retaken, and their heads shaved, but apparently there was no other punishment in this case, and no reprisals against others. The thorough system (which employed both Japanese and natives assigned by districts for the purpose of maintaining a close watch on all people in the area), for a white person to pass unnoticed for very long. This difficulty would, of course, not be shared by the Eurasian internees. One exception to the above picture, as yet unconfirmed, is the report by Mrs. McVay that she had sheltered two Australians, Campbell and Wilson, in the course of their escape. In the light of the substantial underground activity reported carried on by Dutch and Australian

personnel in that area, it is considered possible that these two may have been able to make contacts that would get the transportation out of Java. That problem, it is clear, represented the major obstacle to any successful escape by American personnel in Java.

Similar reports are received from the Celebes. The penalty there was beheading; three Dutch were reported caught and beheaded after escape attempts, and their barrack mates were confined and beaten. Threats of death for all barrack mates left behind were apparently very vivid, since most American personnel seemed to feel that it would be extreme selfishness on the part of any one or any small group to risk the welfare and lives of his comrades through an attempt to get away. As one internee put it, "we would kill ten men left behind if we tried to escape." Here, too, of course, the insular geography was an added factor in rendering escape impractical.

In Sumatra, there is only one clear-cut report, which can scarcely be considered a planned escape. In this report, an Indo-Dutch internee seized a guard's sword and slashed his way out of camp, only to be cut down by rifle fire as he reached the nearby river bank. This individual, however, apparently went berserk as the result of goading and mistreatment by the guards, and the matter was only remotely one of conscious escape attempt. Other than this, there are no reports, but with conditions similar to those in Burma, it is felt that, had a greater number of internees from Sumatra been available for questioning, a story similar to that reported elsewhere would have been obtained.

VII - CASUALTIES

1. Casualty Rate
2. Cause of Death
3. Burial, location and marking
4. Summary

VII - CASUALTIES

It is not within the purview of this report to present a complete roster of all casualties which occurred in the internment camps in Southeast Asia, nor to attempt to provide graves registration information. All personnel interrogated were questioned on these points, both as to deaths witnessed, and also as to persons rumored dead, or considered as missing. This information together with what unit rosters of casualties and other information could be gained from the evacuees, has in all cases been forwarded to the AG Casualty Branch, Headquarters, USF, IET, and also where applicable to the U.S. Naval Liaison Office, at 6 Church Street, Calcutta. This information, moreover, is as yet necessarily incomplete pending the reports of RAP, I teams from SACG Headquarters who are at present making a survey of all areas in which military or civilian personnel were known to have been interned. A few observations, however, from material at hand, may be helpful in presenting a complete picture of internment in Southeast Asia. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that figures, where given, are merely the best available at this time, are not the result of final tabulations in any area, and are not to be taken as conclusive.

1. Casualty Rate:

The casualty rate in Burma along the Bangkok-Moulmein railroad appears to have been approximately 25%. This was the area in which the heaviest death toll was reported, and the figure is probably a higher one than will be found elsewhere. 429 members of the 131st FA are reported to have been sent to that area (this excludes work parties sent to Japan and/or Formosa totalling 117) and 311 of these were evacuated to Calcutta in September 1945, leaving 118 or 27.5% not recovered. As of 31 March 1944, 61 of these were definitely reported dead on organizational rosters. A similar report is had of survivors of the USS HOUSTON, of whom 307 were sent to Burma (again excluding 61 in technical parties to Japan and elsewhere) and 228 evacuated in 1945, leaving 79 or 25.7% not accounted for. Of these 66 or 21.5% were definitely reported dead on organizational rosters.

In Macassar in the Celebes, best available rosters list 216 internees, survivors of the USS POPE, USS PERCH, and other units. Of these, 126 are reported evacuated by other headquarters, and 21 were evacuated to Calcutta, leaving 69 not accounted for, or 32%. Of these, 33, or 15.4% were reported dead on rosters kept at Macassar.

2. Cause of death:

The only groups consistently reporting cause of death were the 131st FA and the HOUSTON survivors. Of the total of 127 definitely reported dead in these two units, the following cases were ascribed:

| | |
|--------------------------|----|
| Tropical Ulcer | 52 |
| Dysentery | 42 |
| Beri-Beri & Malnutrition | 16 |
| Malaria | 7 |
| Heart diseases | 3 |
| Cholera | 1 |
| Tuberculosis | 1 |
| Misc or not given | 5 |

Of these, eight cases were specifically reported as having additional and

complicating causes, chiefly ulcers in addition to reported dysentery, and there is ample evidence to show that a large number of all types of cases were aggravated by extreme malnutrition which rendered the patient too weak to resist the specific disease ultimately contracted. In this connection, it should further be noted that it was apparently Japanese practice to forbid the entry of "malnutrition" as such as cause of death; cases of this type of falsification of death entries have been consistently reported.

Since all official unit records were kept under Japanese supervision it is scarcely remarkable that there are no death entries listed as caused by injuries, torture, or execution. Analysis of the numbers lost in this manner must, of course, await the completion of pending war crimes investigations.

Finally, the above analysis, while probably a fair picture of the death rate in work camps over the entire southeast Asia area, is specifically pertinent only to the Burma railroad construction camps, since all but four of the deaths included in the above breakdown were reported as occurring in that area.

3. Burial, Location and Marking:

It will be a considerable time before the location of all Americans dead and buried in Southeast Asia can be determined; in view of the wide area and the large number of casualties, it is possible that such information may never be made 100% complete. The following locations, however, are those in which American personnel are reported to have died or been buried:

a. Along the Bangkok-Moulmein railroad:--

At Thanbyuzayat, 30-Kilo, 62-Kilo, 80-Kilo, 100-Kilo, 105-Kilo, 114-Kilo and 133-Kilo Camps, and at The Makam ("Tamarkan"), Tah Sa ("Tarsa"), and Kanchanaburi ("Kanburi");

b. In Thailand:--

In addition to the above, at "Chung Hai" and Nakhon Pathon;

c. In Indo-China:--

At Chi Hoa cemetery, Saigon, also possibly elsewhere in that city, at Ple Tonan, and possibly Cholon;

d. In Singapore:--

At Bididari missionary cemetery, and also other points on the island including the Changi area;

e. In Java:--

At Batavia, including possible burials in one allied cemetery at Djati Petambeeran 59, at Tjimahi, Bandung, Malang, and Soerabaja, and at Tjilatjap;

f. In Sumatra:--

Only certain graves are at Pkan Baroe;

g. In the Celebes:--

At Macassar Camp, either KIL Camp, or the new camp or both.

The burials were reported usually to have been in regular cemeteries, though some reports of executions indicate that these were carried out at graveside in unspecified areas, after the victim had been forced to dig his own grave. The cemetery graves were reported as being marked with unpainted teakwood crosses on which name, rank, serial number, branch

nationality, and dates of birth and death were carved. These markers were reported as extremely vulnerable to the ravages of white ants and possibly also termites, with complete obliteration of the carved information reported occurring in some cases within two weeks of burial. It is understood that all cemeteries are now being resurveyed and re-marked by graves registration and RAFCI teams.

4. Summary:

The inconclusive nature of the above information is all too apparent; detailed casualty information has been available only where the unit concerned has been able to furnish this on evacuation. Where information has been forthcoming, moreover, it has varied widely in quality. The casualty reports of the 131st FA and the USS HOUSTON survivors included rosters showing all pertinent data as to identity, next of kin, and cause and date of death, with place of burial, and in some cases were accompanied by charts showing locations of individual graves which will in the charter areas largely eliminate the problems arising from the originally provided and inadequate markers. But such details were received from these two groups only. No such data has so far been located for casualties in Indo-China, Singapore, Java, Sumatra, or the Celebes. It is submitted that training in the importance of such information, if incorporated at least in the training of all officer personnel, to include officers of the Merchant Marine, would accomplish much to alleviate this type of situation in the future.