

330/141/559 (Cas. PW)



#### THE WAR OFFICE, Cas. Pa.

Hotel Victoria, Horthusberland Ave. . London, W.C.2.

January, 1947.

Memorandum for :-

The Theater Provest Marshal, Ho. Communications Zone (Forward), European Theater of Operations, A. P. 0. 887, U.S. Army.

> Attention :- Chief of Prisoner of War Division.

The unclosed documents, which were among a consignment of Far East records received in this office from Alfsea, are forwarded for your information concerning the American personnel mentioned therein.

ly acknowledge receipt.

HEADQUARTERS U.S. FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER Office of the Theater Provost Marshal

383.6-FMG

APO 757 6 February 1947

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Correspondence

TO


: War Department Office of the Provost Marshal General Washington 25, D.C.

1. The attached correspondence is forwarded as a matter

FOR THE THEATER PROVOST MARSHAL:

T. H. Dameron Kg T. H. DAMERON Colonel, CMP Chief, FW Division

Incl: Ltr fr The War Office, London, dtd 27 Jan 47, reference: SS/330/141/559 (Cas.PW) w/documents from Alfsea re American personnel (PWs)



KCJ/r1

1 DISPATCHED

13 - 14 - 13 - 12 - 11 - 10

18 6 - FEV. 1947

Death Roll of Americans, Ex-PSON

AGO, Casualty Section Rm 1E 512, Pentagon

PROPE

PHDO, PWDAv Hm 5E 475, Pentagon 4 March 1947

Hre. Klein 72931

Attached death roll of former American prisoners of war is forwarded to you for your information. It is requested that when you have completed your check, you will forward it to the Newy Department, Bureau of Neval Personnel, Washington 25, D. C., so that they may complete their records on those names listed who are members of the U. S. Nevy.

FOR THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL:


1 Incl List L. E. GRIFFITH Hajor, CMP Chief, Prisoner of War Division


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
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	DEATH ROLL	07 1	EX- # P. 0.	Ψ.			
	Nationality : AMERICAN. Burial-Ground : NATONPATON,	SIA	<b>x.</b>				
12	OHERRERA, Livorio Montoya. OBENDER, George Frederick J.	Pte Smn	38065444 31235 <sup>3</sup> 9	53	19.		27.
••••	Burial-Ground : KANCHANABU	RI, S	IAN.				
123456780	OWILLIAM, David Marvin. OHENSDRICK, Robert Harry. OSCHUELKE, John Harry. (HENRY) OBUSSEY, Sam Mann BOWLEY, Raymond J. DEASTWOOD, Howard Wade GERS, John William 20914169	Pte Sgt Cpl	2916350 3//3303 03/735362 3452882 20813346 20813346 20814103 204109	4033333333333	18. 19. 19.	1.	1. 30 18 26 28
8 9	OWILLIAMSON, Naberuth (CABER) OSIMPSON, Ward Helvey OCOLLINS, Columbus Marion JR OBLAIR, Kenneth Sutherland (480	Cpl Pto "	20813733 20814173 38038751 ) 214 85 78	3333	19. 19.	2.	28 30 29 23
1	Burial-ground: Neeke Station © CALLAHAN, Melvin Carl	Sailo	e, Siam. r 3601538 36009960	3		1. 4	
2	DALESIO, Frank Buriel-ground: Saigon, F.I. CTANBERG, Albert Neil Skm3	Pte Cpl(N				11. 2	
	Burial-ground: Lepoh, Burma						
12	O MUSTO, James William 5.24 O PFELL, Stanley A.	2Pte(N Pte	) 2237690 20815880			7.25 9.22	
	Burial-grounds Tanbizaya, B	arma.					
	O DUPLER, Harley Harold WILSON, Edwin P.	Sgt(N Pte		5 .		5.14 6. 1	
	Burial-grounds Fadong, Burs						
123	WHITE, James Henry Spic NONDZELA, Lawerence Francis LUSK, Joe Martin True Constant	Pte(N	3001106	5	18.	4.14 13 28	

ROLL OF EX - P. U. W. DEATH

Nationality: U. S. A.

Burial-ground: Aparong, Burma.

Ser.No.	<u>Names</u>	Rank	Reg. No. Gr.	Date of Death
1	HUTCHINSON, Martin Bill sac	Pte(N)	3114506 5	18. 7. 5
2	JAMES, Edward Richard Ema		4012918 5	21
3	GRAHAM, Richard Gresham Yac	B 4 - ( 11)	2916278 5	23
4	TREMONTE, Ted Joseph	Pte	36008820 5	29
5	DRAKE, S James Patrick		20813077 5	18. 8. 1
6	TUCKER, William Edward mos2	Pte(N)	3822234 5	9
6 7		P03(N)	3561015 5	12
8	HITTLE, Robert Glenn 5K3		3760386 5	17
9	PETERSON, Lennart Oley Gmg.		2998359 5	22
10		Pte(N)	3214300 5	22
11	REED, Clarence Oscar Rmat	P02(N)	3 5 6 1015 5 3 7 6 0 386 5 2 9 4 9 359 5 32 1 4 3 0 0 31 1 2 2 0 2 5 38060221 5 20813732 5	23
12	HOCH, Joyce Wesley	Pte	38060221 5	25
13	WATERS, Nelson Hugh	Cporl	20813732 5	18. 9. 2
14	BUHLMAN, Clarence Nelson SIC	Pte(N)		6
15		P03(N)	385 5087 5	8 8 8 11
16	GARWOOD, Edward Dering amac	P02(N)	2580301 5	8
17	FAULKNER, Harold Leon	Cpol	20812952 5	8
18		Pte(N)	2823123 5	11
19		Pte	37036059 5	11
20	DEATS, Louis Frank, Jr.	Cpl	20813180 5	11
21	GUY, James Andrew 524	Pte(N)	3288115 5	12
22	BAXTER, Bill Ray	Pte	208138 2081384	
23	DEMOIN, Achiel Rene cam		310 8452 5	14
24	CARTER, Fredrick Lester Gmc	P03(N)	3821422 5	16
25	GRAY, Harry	Pte	6750365 5	17
26	YELL, Archie Bill	Cpl	38036040 5	18
27	HOLSÍNGER, Frank Os Oscar	Cpl(N)	275077 5	18
28	WEN# WYNN, Marvin Anglous 5		3601106 5	19
29	IVEY, Dan Richard	Pte	20813154 5	26
30		Pte(N)	6750365 5 38036040 5 275077 5 36 allo6 5 20813154 5 36 03 04 9 5 20812924 5 4143526 5 20814097 5 36 313 773 5	26
31	ALEXANDER, James Garland	Sgt	20812924 5	26
32	BAERMAN, Donald George 524	Pte(N)	4143526 5	27
33	SEWELL, Dan Homer	Cpl	20814097 5	29
34	SEWELL, Dan Homer BATCHELOR, William Charles, Ju HALL, Ervin Leroy	r. Pte(N	) 3813773 5	18.10. 1
35	HALL, Ervin Leroy Sli	Pte(N)	3001094 5	26
36	WOLTZ, Donald Glenn	Pte	20813194 5	6
37	MORGAN, John ARMY-US/3252	Sgt	? 5	18
38	JOWELL, Johnnie Dudley	Pte	3001094 20813194 5 20813069 5 20812975 5 20813719 5	18
39	STOUT, George William		20812975 5	31
40	RICH, Robert Lee		20813719 5	18.11. 1
41	SPENCER, Mason Dale Syc	Pte(N)	3114343 5 2873503 5 0-397024 5 20813867 5 20813088 5 20813824 5	9
42	ABRAMS, Russell Eugene V3c	P03(N)	2873503 5	9
43	BOREN, Lemuel Maxey	Lieut	0-397024 5	13
44		Cpl	20813867 5	17
45	PARKER, Allard Thomas	Pte	20813088 5	17
46	OFFERLE, Irvin Oscar	Sgt		18
47	MORRISON, Clinton D.	Pte	20813326 5 3287018 5	18
48	FRELY, James John 524	Pte(N)	3287018 5	18
Buri	al-ground: Changaraya, Burma.			
1	BROTHERS, Frank Wheeler	L/Cpl(N)	2658173 3	18.11. 8
2	WILSON, James Raydell MAR		309529 3	17
3	MATTFELDT, William Fuller		19000197	
23456	DICKENS, William H.			
5	EKLUND, Rudolph Laroy	п	38027525 3	5
	PITTS, Gaston E.	L/Cpl	20813159 3	14
7	GOEDEL, Franklin_CIVILIAN	Pte	3	23
	al as want	acres a	and the second	1000 C

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DEATH ROLL OF BX - P. O. W.

Nationality: U. S. A.

Burial-ground: Anganaan, Burma.

Ser.No.	<u>Names</u>		Rank	Reg. No.	Gr.	Date of Death
1	LINDSLEY, Albert John	SIC	Pte(N)	2833355	5	18. 6. 1
2	WILLIS, Donnis Wayne	SIC	the second se	1916330	5	10
3	BENNER, Kelvin William		PO3(N)	3858575		
4	BOWEN, Glenn Marion		Sgt	20814091	8	18.12.11
56	TRIM, Donald Paul	COX	P03(N)	3417221	З	11
6	TIEMANN, Elton William		Pte	38051061	3	14
7	HATLEN, Edwin Arthur	Smil		3001001	3	21
8	YOUNG, Kenneth Asa		" (N)	3114650	3	22
9	PISTOLE, Frank Lyle Haro.	1dawwa		3001073	3	26
10	ARMOUR, Floyd		Pte(N)	3422332	5	18. 7.17
	RNEY, Wendell D.		Pte	208134764	5 <b>8</b> 333333555555555555555555555555555555	22
12	ANDERSEN, Julius Andrew			37021953	5	23
13 14	HAMPTON, Robert Wade		Lieut		5	29
15	LUMPKIN, Samuel Hugh HALL, Howard Lee		Capt		0	18. 8. 1
16	SILVA, Eugene John		Sgt Pte	20813668 39078080	0	4
17	DOMIT Tohn Mhaman		DOO(N)		5	6
18	PARISH, Bartow Harrison OMOTH, Robert Engman	nm2C	" (N)	3211967	5	2 3 6 16
19	OMOTH Robert Engman	mm 2 C	Pto(N)	274 3374	5	16
20	BRANHAM, Lawrence Randol	phil	" (N)	3858625	5	17
21	DEMPSEY, Austin Elmo	Pm 39	Pte	20813008	5	20
22	KELM, Albert Mason		Cpl	20812958	5	21
23	MANION, Tommy, Jr.	511	Pte(N)	3720785	5	22
24	KUNKE, (Szeslaus John G	mae	P02(N)	2830324	5	23
25		mac	m. 1 . 1	3721278	5	24
26	SHAW, Edwin Earl	10100507	Sgt	20813666	5	25
27	WHATLEY, Hiram Jefferson	, Jr.	Pte	20813002	5	26
28	DOIRON, Lloyd Walter	an sugar		38052155	5	27
29	PULLEN, Robert Harold	SIG	Pte(N)		55555	30
30	BUSHNELL, Edgar Wayne c	SK	POI(N)	3207140	5	30
31	KETMAN, Robert Earl, Jr.	SIC	Pte(N)			18. 9. 6
32	SHAVER, Harvey D.		Pte	20813898	5	6
33	RUSSELL, Charles E. Jr.			20813897	55	7
34	BRAY, Charles Bruce		Sgt	20813006		8
35	GUTHRIE, William Leo		Pte	38038681		10
36	KOELLING, Vernon Louis n	ius 2		3214437	5	11
37 38	SCHANDUA, James Edgar		Pte	20812840 16020064	5	14 16
39	KALOVS, Edward Burdette EBAUGH, Forest Vergil		Pte(N)	3422280	5555	19
40	JOHSON, Edward Irvin	520	PO3(N)	3933193	5	18
41	LEE, Earl Henry	SK3	Pte(N)		5	21
42	WARD, Frank Calvin	SIC	P03(N)	3285765	5	21
43	LUNA, Elton	mac	Pte	3721044	5	22
44	GILLIAM, Robert E.			34104921	555	23
45	FORGEY, Jed Dillmas		Cpl	20813594	5	27
	CPRIER. Dale Rogers	PHM 3		2415604	5	27
47	UPPERMANN, Max		Sgt	20813731	5	18.10. 4
48	COX, Charles Alexander		Cpl	208138284	5	4
49	GODFREY, Donald Francis	SIC	Pte(N)		5	6
50	KITCHINGS, Harry Anderso	n	Cpl	20812930	5	14
51	BROWN, Joseph Roy, Jr.	Carles .	DODIN	34083491	5	18.11.124
52	HIRSCHBERG, Louis	CIC	PO2(N)	2070114	5	26
53	ELLIS, Frank Dopson	WT	POI(N)	2678339	8	19. 2.24

# DEATH ROLL OF EX - P. O. W.

Nationality : Canada. Burial-ground: Tarmakam, Kanchanaburi, Siam.

Ser.No.	Names	Rank	Reg.No.	Gr.	Date of Death
1	DORVAL, Norman mR	Pte	6142762	ı	18. 2. 4
2	HASLETT, Howard nR	Gnr	863654	4	18. 4.23

DEATH ROLL OF EX. P. O. W. <u>Nationality</u>: Denmark, <u>Burial-ground</u>: Kanchamaburi, Siam. <u>Ser.No.</u> N a me <u>Rank Reg. No. Gr. Date of Death</u>

1 ANDERSEN, George Axel mc Sgt 5355 4 18. 9.12

	DEATH ROLL OF	EX- P. 0	. W.		
	Nationality:	New Zea	land.		
	Burial-ground: Village of Tagi	le, Siam.			
No.	<u>Name</u>	Rank	Reg.No.	Gr.	Date of Death
1	DUNNINGHAM, Albert Lawrence K	L/Cpl	7792	4	20. 7. 1

# Burial-ground: Tarmoang, Siam.

1 SUTHERLAND, Arthur Wemyss Gordon Capt 106132 2 20. 8. 8

HEAD UARTICS WITLD SPALLS FOROAS I DIA-BLIA THATAR

Report of Information Obtained in Interrogation of Prisoners of Mar and Civilian Internees Evacuated from Camps in Southeast Asia During the Period 25 August to 15 October, 1945

Short Title: SEAC PO' REPORT

#### Note:

The text of this report is not classified with the acception of Sections III, V, and VI, which are classified RETRICMD.

> Compiled at New Delhi, India 20 November 1945

> > n the meaning of the United States withat and 32, as amounted. It transmission or the revelation of its comparison or the weatherized person is conjusted by law.

Regrobel unclassificit 15 Sant 1955 The AGE RASTRICESD

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CG, USF, Singapore	(1)
Main Hq, "E" Gp, GHQ SEA & India	(1)

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SEAC PO" REPORT

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
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			given	to	all	ovacu	ated	personnel.	

- Exhibit "L" Form of IS-X questionnairs iven to all officers and selected other personnel.
- Exhibit "C" Alphabetical roster of all evacueea with rank, branch, evacuation point.

#### II - CAPTURE

Exhibit "D" - Roster of 131st FA kept at Singapore.

Exhibit "E" - Soster of USS HOUSPON kept at Singapore.

- Exhibit "F" Roster of Merchant Ship Crews drawn up by survivors, showin, disposition for those known. MS Sawokla. SS American Leader.
- Exhibit "G" Hap of Western Java shouing area covered by survivors of NUSION and Illat FA.

#### III - INTEROGATION

Exhibit "H" - Interrogation of Captain Albert Abraham.

#### IV - INTAGMENT CARS

Exhibit "I" - List of known and reported caups in which Americans were held, with commanders and other officers, and notes on conditions reported.


- Exhibit "J" Maps showing camp locations in Southeast Asia.
- Exhibit "K" Aerial photographs of some camp locations reported before the war's end.
- Exhibit "L" Bules for POWs in Branch #3.
- Exhibit "14" Compilation of Camp Rules made from Memory by two PON's, Pvt Teel and Cpl Jankhead.
- Exhibit "N" Copy of speech by Lt. Colonel Nagotana, Commander Branch 73, Thailand.
- Exhibit "6" Notes by AGASe C. P. Fowler, USN, on rations and canteen supplies.

- 4 -

Exhibit "P" - A selection of representations made by Allied representatives to Japanese Commanders on aspects of camp conditions.

#### V - CUTSIDE CONEACTS

Exhibit "Q" - Extructs from CIC report of Maria K. MeVey on mothod of contesting interuses employed by her in Java.



#### I - INTROJUCTION

#### 1. Personnel Svacuated:

On 25 August 1945, the first six Americans evacuated from internment in Southeast Asia after the cessation of hostilities arrived at the 142nd General Hospital in Calcutta. (A group of prisoners had previously been released from internment at Rangoon with the fall of that city but the interrogation of those man has praviously been the subject of a full r port and will not be considered here.) Shortly thereafter, the evacuation plan designated operation "Mainland" was in full operation, and by 15 Cotober 1945 all but a handful of the American personnel known to be in Southeast Asis chaps had been moved by Air Transport Conmand from Shejburi and Bangwok in Phailand, Saigon in Indo-China, Singapore and Batavia, Java to Caloutta. This svacuation was as follows:

	Asiavic Mainland na <u>, Jugi, FIC)</u>	From Singapore	From <u>Batavia</u>	Total (b)
U. S. Army	307	48	24	373
U. S. Navy	196	10	29	235
U. S. Marine Cor	ps 17	2	3	22
Morchant Marine	•	25	28	53
Civilians	<u>.26</u> (n)	21	38	85
TOTALS	546	100	122	786

#### Notes:

(a) Of these, 5 proved not to be Americans, and twre immediately transferred to RAPUT control at -slveders, Aligors, Calcutta. (b) The breakdown by asrvice branch does not agree with figures reported by 142nd General Hospital, which ports 244 Navy, 43 Merchant Marine, and 86 Civilians. The figures jiven above were drawn after a check of such evacues against available unit rosters, and is believed to be accurate.

At the time this report was written there were ap roximately 12 civilians reported being evacuated from camps on the Last Coast of Sumatra, and an unknown small number yet to be evacuated from Singapore, Saigon, and possibly other points including Goerabaja, Java, and Muching, worned. These reports are being investigated and the evacuation of further shall groups of civilians from time to thus may be expected. To large groups, however, is now anticipated.

#### Personnel evacuated included the following:

a. From Jurna, Thailand, and Indo-China were members of the 2nd Bat-talion, 131st Field Arthillery, survivors of the USS HOUSTON, some enlisted aircrew personnel originally interned in Baigon, and a few civilians.
b. Evacuess from Singapore included captured aircrew personnel origin-ally of the 10th, 14th, and 20th Air Forces, the 19th Bomb Group, GHQAF, a Naval Aircrew, some of these having originally been interned at Saigon, and also merchant Marine personnal from the ships AMARICAN LEADER, TILLAN HEADHREY, SANOKIA, AD HOVEY, civilians interned in Singapore, and at Tavoy Internment Camp, Burna.

c. From Batavia Java, were survivors of the USS FORE, USS EERCH, one officer from the USS LUGLAF, all of whom were originally interned at in-cassar in the Colebes, a rew of the crew of the HOUSTON, 131st FA, sirerew, and Merchant Marine personnel from casps in Java, and a group of Merchant Marine personnel who had been sent from Singapore to work camps in Sumatra.

#### 2. Intelligence Processin of Svacuses:

By directive of the Commanding General, India-Burna Chester, the agency designated for the intelligence processing of evacuated prisoners of war and civilian internees was MIS-X India, in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and h aded by Captain pror L. Schjonber, CZ. Ath the termination of censorship at the cessation of hostilities, an interrogation team was formed of former censorship personnel to conduct the interrogation at the 142nd General Hospitel in Calcutta. This team was composed of the following:

> ist Lt. Howard R. Patch, Jr., in charge ist Lt. Sem J. Corelis ist Lt. Alexander P. Ardlejohn ist Lt. John P. Hargas ist Lt. Nathaniel V. Horrisstte 2nd Lt. Malvin R. Hirick T/Sgt. Frank Gavalack S/Sgt. Luke J. Pandick

This organization was set up on or about 20 August 1945, and processing began 25 August, continuing until 20 October 1945, at which time the majority of evacuees had been processed, and the team was disbanded. Lt. Tatch proceeded to Headquarters, United States Forces, India-Durma Theater, at New Delhi under orders to draft the present report, and the processing of any further evacuees was assigned to the branch office of the Counter Intelligence Corps at Calcutta.

#### The following processing was given:

a. The contents of restricted letter AG 383.6 (24 Mar 45) CE-S-B-M, dated 29 Match 1945, TAGO, subject: "Publicity in Connection with Escaped, Liberated, or Repatriated Prisoners of Ear", and, when received, the amended contents of similar letter dated 4 October 1945, were read and explained to all evacuess save those too 111 for processing. Each evacues was then required to execute in duplicate a certificate of compliance and underst ading of above letter, as required by its terms. One copy of the certificate, ditnessed by the processing officer, was retained by the evacues; the other copy was forwarded by MIS-M India to the Captured Personnel and Material Aranch, Military Intelligence Pervice, Tachington.

b. All evacuees able to do so were jiven a short-form questionnaire on Mar Crimes, and were assisted in completing this where necessary. A copy of this form is appended as Skhibit "A" to this report. Then completed, these questionnaires were screened by the MIS-X officer to determine which evacuees had information warranting further interrogation. After screening by MIS-X, the War Crimes questionnaires were turned over to the Counter-Intelligence Corps. Those individuals who appeared to have specific knowledge of War Crimes and structives committed against Allied personnel were interrogated at length by CIC agents. Sworn statements and depositions were taken as deemed necessary to perpetuate the testimony for use in future war orimes prosecutions. Approximately 15 CIC A ents were engaged on this phase of the processing under the supervision of Major T. ". Staptos, Executive Officer, CIC, India-Durna Theater, and special agent R. ". Llise, Calcutta Dranch Office, CIC, India-Durna Theater.

c. All commissioned officers, and selected onlisted solisted men, marchant seamen, and civilians, were then given the full MIS-I questione nairs appended hereto as Schibit "B". Selection of chose other than officers the should be given this questionnairs was done on the basis of the screening of Tar Crimes questionnaires referred to above. Criteria were: the scope of the individual's experiences, the size of the group of Agericans of which he was a member, the locations in which he had been intermed, and his apparent intelligence and ability to report useful information.

In some cases, the individual was fully capable of filling out the jusstionnaire without assistance; in others, assistance was liven; in a few cases, the interrogating officer retained the questionnaire as a juide for questioning, filling out the form himself.

d. On complation, the HIS-X questionnaires ware collected, reproduced, and distributed to agencies requiring them. The following distribution was made:

(1)	Tar Crimes Board, JAG, Hq USF, IDT	-	2	copias	
(2)	Castured Personnel & Material Br. MIS	-	1	copy	
(3)	Casualty Br, AGO, Ho USF, IBT	-	1	copy	
(4) (5)	Asst. Chief of Steff, G-2, Hq USF, I'T Where Naval or Merchant Marine personnel, to U.S. Navel Liaison Office, 5 Church		1	сору	
(6)	Street, Calcutta. There Air Forces personnel, to Asst.	-	1	oopy	
	Chiof of Staff, A-2, Hq USAAF, IIT, APO 671.		1	copy	

6. On the besis of information in the questionnaires, further information was soucht and obtained from key personnel such as officers senior in their groups, other leaders, and personnel who were alone in or mambers of small groups of Americans in isolated areas. This further information included the preparation of extended narratives, further questioning where possible to clarify points raised in the questionnaires, and the collection of documentary material such as mays and rosters where these were reported. In some cases this collection of further material was hampered by the departure of the individual for the United States, but it was usually possible to complete all processing, including such supplementary items, within three or four days efter the arrival of the evacuess, and thus prior to complete networks reproduced and distributed with the questionnaires.

f. The following is a schematic representative of the interrogation given:

Branch	Evacuated to 15 Oct.	Security Ltr & Certificate	Mar Crimas Questionnairs <u>Givan</u>	Full MIS-X Interr.
U. S. Army	373	364	364	116
U. S. Navy	235	221	221	55
U. S. Marines	22	22	22	8
Marchant Marina	53	52	52	17
Civilian	_85	<u>_61</u>	<u>61</u>	
TOTAL	V68	720	720	227

Those not included in the above processing included three officers and twenty enlisted personnel too ill for interrogation, and given immadiate air evacuation to the United States, one derehant Seamen who departed from the hospital before he could be contacted and twenty-four civilians not processed for individual reasons, some being seriously ill, some non-Americans, and a large number of children.

#### 3. Scope of this Report:

This report is designed to present in topical form a summary of all material obtained in the processing described above. All matters which were the subject of interrogation will be covered, with two exceptions. The first excepted topic is that of War Crimes, which has been covered in the investigations conducted by the Counter Intelligence Corps and the War Crimes loard. The second excepted topic is that of detailed casualty information; all material relevant to this subject has been referred to the Casualty reach of the Adjutant Generals Office, Hq U.F. IBT, for

#### transmission to "ashington.

All material included in the report, with the exception of Section IV, A, 1 (Camp Locations) was gained in the course of the processing described. The material included in the section on locations of interment emaps has been taken from every available source, including available maps and gazetteers, the Breadsheets published by the British "2" Group, reports from Southeast Asia Command Readquarters, RAF/I, and other agencies in search for information on prisoners of war and internees. This has been done in order to provide the fullest possible summary of material on the identity of these places where American personnel have been interneed.

In order to assure as complete a coverage as possible, information was sought from at least two persons at every known interminent camp, with others where possible. As indicated above, full narratives were taken from the leader or other key personnel of all major groups of American intermess, and also from individuals in areas there there were so few American personnel as to limit the availability of information. It should be exphasized, however, that the proportionately shall number of Americans intermed in Southeast Asia, probably in the neighbourhood of one thousand all told, as compared to the larger numbers of Dritish, Dutch, American, and mative troops in the area, substinially reduces the coverage that can be obtained of conditions over the whole area.

#### 4. Form of the Report:

This report has been prepared in topical form, in order that separate sections may be made available where desired to a ancies interested in them who would not require the antire body of the report. As a result, there may be found to be a slight amount of duplication of information; it was falt that this was preferable to a draft which would require distribution in full to a large number of different agencies.

#### II - CAPTURE

This section will deal with the history of capture of personnel, relevant factors involved, evasion of capture, contact with natives and treatment at their hands, assembly at collecting points, transfer to permanent camps, preliminary interrogations, and treatment during this period.

- Personnel evacuated from Thailand and Indo-China. A

  - Personnel of the 131st FA Battalion.
     Survivors of the USS HOUSTON.
     Transfer of 131st FA and HOUSTON personnel to Juna and Zhailand.
  - 4. Capture of Aircrew and other personnel in Burna, Thailand, and Indo-China.
- B. Capture and Internment in Malaya.
  - 1. Aircrew personnol.
  - 2. Merchant Marine crews.
  - 3. Civilian Personnel.
- C. Capture and Internment of Groups recovered in Java.
  - 1. Personnel formerly at Macassar, Celebes.
  - 2. Other military personnel evacuated from Java.
  - 3. Merchant Marine and Civilian Personnel.

D. Personnel recovered in Sumatra.

E. Conclusion and Notes.

# A. Personnel Svacuated from Thailand and Indo-China.

1. Capture of 2nd Battalion, 131st Field Artillery (less 2 Battery):

At the time of its capitulation, this organization was fighting a rear-guard action, its mission the support of Australian infantry in the defense of Java against Japanese forces. The Battalion had left the United States on 21 November 1941 from San Francisco, colling at Honolulu, Brisbane, and Darwin enroute to Scerabaja, Java, at which point it disembarked 16 January 1942, moving to camp at Singosari Air Base, about 83 kilometers northwest of Malang (5 miles) and a 65 miles road march from the port, travelling almost due south. Here the unit had had its first contact with notive treachery when the Indonesians built fires on the airfield to attract Japanese aircraft to the positions. Other units based here included elements of the 19th and 22nd Bomb Groups, and also British, Australian, and Dutch forces. Air attacks were periodically sustained from proups of from six to seventeen or more Japanese bombers, usually during daylight hours, with some damage to aircraft and motor vehicles on the ground. Personnel casualties here were not reported.

On 27 February 1942, the Dattalion was divided. "Z" battery was left at Malang, and its further history up to the time of capture, when it surrendered on Madeera Island, is not known. The rest of the unit advanced, moving through Jogjakarta, fasikhalaja, and Dandeeng to Duitenzorg, where camp was made on a rubber plantation at 0200 hours 2 March. They had been designated part of the BLAGK force, a motorized shock force designed for quick hard thrusts against Japanese elements attacking Bandeerg. Road blocks were set up on 3 march, and the Japanese were reported to be within 15 miles of the position. On 4 March, the Battalion went into position south of Leuwiliang and engaged the energy at 1432 hours at 200 yards range, with tanks, artillery and personnel as targets. Although the fire mission had some reported success, the unit was twice forced to move its positions as a result of energy mortar fire. On 5 March, the Fattalion was ordered to move to Soekabeani to cover the threat on Bandeeng, with the understanding that the vacatel positions, but on departure, instead of assuming the Leuwiliang positions, the Diteh forces retreated. The Battalior thus was forced to continue its march to Bandeeng, which it resched on 6 March, taking cover in a rubber plantation 18 miles southeast of the city to await further orders.

After almost constant air attack, on 7 March, the Battalion prepared to retreat to the coast, but prior to departure, word came of the Dutch cepitulation of the entire island of Java. The cease fire order was offective at 1200 hours 8 March 1945, and the 131st moved from its bivouat in the woods to a race track in Garost, where areas were stacked and surrendered, together with most motor vehicles and equipment.

At this time, the Eattalion Commander, Lt. Col. Bluchsr S. Tharp, announced that any who wished to try to reach the seaccast to evade capture should do so. He did not, apparently, advise such procedure or recommond it. Several groups made the attempt, includin Major Winthrop H. Rogers, Its. T. J. Smith and R. J. Stansland, several American enlisted men, and a group of Australian thoops numbering, in one report, about 300. These mon arrived on the coast about 2100 hours 9 March, and maintained a constant watch along approximately 15 miles of constland for five days, living off what food could be procured locally, including chicken, goat, potatoss and tea. Reconnaissance parties were sent out over 30 miles of the coast, without success. On 14 March word was received that personnel not back by the 16th would be shot, and thus, after one more futile wconnaissance, the man returned to Garost, arriving at 2200 hours on 14 March. Some enlisted personnel did not rejoin the unit until a substantial time later -- several weeks, apparently -- but these reported a similar failurs on the part of all with when they were in contact. Hostility of the natives together with the lack of shipping in which to leave the island were ascribed as reasons for the failure of these evasion attempts. After five days at Gerost, the Battalion was moved to a ten plantation at "aspeda, about 8 miles from Gerost. Preparations were under way to establish a permanent base here when, on 22 march, the unit was moved to the rail junction at Tjibatos. From this point on an edwance party of 5 officers and 15 men left by rail for Batavia at 0630 hours 26 March, and were guartered together with a large number of allied troops in the Moan Chinese School in matavia. The last straighters une returned from the mouth coast were also guartered at the Moan School.

On 30 march, the main body of the Lattalian entrained at Tjibatce for Estavia, from which point they were marched 7 miles to a permanent camp at Tandjoempriok, the Dutch Naval Less mortheast of Jatavie. The men of the 181st remained at these two points until 15 May, at which time they were united at the Dutch 10th Lattalian Camp in Batavia, usually called Bicycle Camp.

During this preliminary period, the personnal of the 181st did not suffer severe heriships. The only contest with the depenase was with line units which had been engaged in the brief conbet near Handoang, and these were reported anicable and helpful. The Japanese cooperated with notor transport and with supplies; the officers, at least, were permitted to do aboyin, in Landoang, and were able to purchase tobacco and other supplies that were extremely welcome later on. The unit moved as a whole; it had its own supplies, and there was no contact with prison quarks until arrival at Batavia for the march to Tandjoempriok. Enlisted personnel were reported as having several days' rations in their own hands at the time of capitulation, and were able to supplement this by purchase of fruits and other itams from the matives. The only reports of mistreatment occur during the march to Tandjoempriok, where some beatings were reported.

There was a proliminary interrogation at Tandjoungprick, but it appears to have been cursory and in the nature of a registration. These personnel who had attempted to evade appears appear to have been questioned at greater length, but this appears to have been carried on largely by someat personnel of the snarp forces, covering general information resarding the unit and its supply situation, available material, and the location of supporting Air Force units. This was conducted without brutality or unpleasentness at the Keen Chinese School. In addition to these, a similar brief interregation was given some of the field grade officers, along approximately the mass lines. There was no further interrogation reported when all the unit's personnel, may for "A" Dattary, was collected at Bioyele Camp in datavis, totalling about 546 officers and mate.

### 2. Capiurs of Sirvivors of U.S. Hous Mills

This ship, a bisavy crusier, had already been crippled in a provious action, and was proceeding westward in the Java Ben toward Sounds Struits. It was attacked and sume by Japanese versaels and aircraft at a point reported about 8 miles north-morthemst of St. Tichelas' Point, the entropy northwestern tip of Java. It is understood that technical details of the entropy performed and sinking were gathered by personnel of the U.S. Naval Liaison Office in Calcutta from survivors. Abundon ship was sevented at or about 2400 hours of 28 February 1948, and ante same about 30 minutes later.

Survivors wars either picked up by Japaness craft and landed by thus in the Bauton Bay coast, or thenselves made their way to shore at points on Banton Bay, Pandjang and other islands in the bay, down along the western coast between Tjigading and Labouhan. There were no reports of mistroutaint of survivors in the water nor while on rafts, though none of the latter were apprehensive last they be subjectedets madeline gun firs. Those picked up in the water by the Japanese Navy were briefly interrogated, landed, and turned over to the Japanese Army for internment in Serang Jail. Treatment by Naval personnel was reported good; dry clothes, food, and tobacco were furnished these survivors.

The personnel was themselves reached land along the coast can be roughly divided into two groups, those who landed at points north or east of Anjer Hideel Highthouse, and these who drifted with the current four Sounda Straits to points between Anjer and Labeehan. Of these, the former attempted evasion by movin up into the hills either north of Milagon' or east of Serang, and were without exception betrayed by the metives into Represe hands. It appears that this cooperation was surchased by the Japanese; there were several reports of money being paid the metives by Japanese officers, some cases specifically stating that ten guilders per head was the res. While under native control, where were also reports of new being beaten, stripped of clothing, and robbed of money, jewelry, and other valuables. In nost cases, however, the Japanese appear to new taken control very promptly, and all of this group were rounded up and set to work on entended unloading supplies that were being Landed from Japanese transport.

This work continued for several days, under a broiling hot sun, with inade uste clothing, and almost no food and water. The work was coolie labor, the loads extreme, and the only relief was the occasional opportunity to steal a small wantity of rations from the supplies being lunded; as they ware closely watched, such opportunities do not seem to have been frequent. The working hours were free dawn until dark.

This the unloading was completed, the men loaded the supplies, which included food, medicine, ammunition, adgeneral supply items not spacifically reported, into wagens. They were then forced to haul these at bayonet point, barefoot on gravel roads, from the barches to Gerang, covering distances up to twent miles without relief from heat, hunger, and thirst. These carts were marked with Red Gross Markings, but there was some report of air attack during this operation despite the markings. The men were occasionally permitted to climb code palms, if their strangth would permit, and this was the only reported source of food or beverage. It is clear that the autire operation was carried out on forced labor tockniques. Finally, on arrival at Serang, the men were questered in the Serang Jail and also in the enter fork from the complete lack of senitary facilities, the men being horded into the bare complete lack of senitary facilities, the men being horded into the bare concretefloored audience and held there.

The second group, landing west and south of these in, attempted to make their way inland between Tjinanka and ectochem. Some Japaness petrols, shecountered, and the natives were universally hostile. One group was held bound to posts overnight in the two square in Menes. In all cases, discovery of their presence by the natives resulted in the appearance of Japanese troops within eight hours — which gave the natives emple the for a preliminary beating and robbing on their own — following which they were rounded up and moved to the mast torat, remardien, and lendogland, and finally collected with the other meniet Serang. Food during this preliminary period was only haphazardly obtained; at Penneglang Jail it was reported to consist of 3/4th pint of warm green water and a handful rotted rice per day.

At Sorang, systematic threats, beatings, humiliation and stervation were continued with no skeckening. One officer was reported to have and a daily inspection of the senter Park Theater during which he cursed at and threatened those held there, brandishing a pistel at them and kicking those too weak or ill to move. Here too the here were iven a preliminary interrogation; is with the 131st personnel, it was cursory and largely a registration. Save for these who, after rescue from the water, hid been questioned by Japanese Nevel personnel board ship, it was the only interrogation reported.

- 3 -

On or about 6 March, 8 Amorie a officers were moved out of Berang, prosumbly for Jepan, as a result of a further questioning of officers which was designed apparently to screen those with technical or tactical and strategic knowledge of value to higher headquarters. Some officers reported bein able to escape this draft through a assumption of stupidity and ignorance which was evidently not difficult to achieve.

The balance of the survivors, reported to number aperoximately 360 officers and men, were hold at Serang until 13 April 1942, it which time they moved to the Dutch Tench Lettalion Gamp (Micycle Gamp) in Matavia. Here there were already a large number of allied troops, and also three Americans. Here too, they were joined by the personnel of the 131st FA, as noted above, on 15 May 1942.

#### 3. Pronsfor of HCU3 ON and 131st FA personnel to Burma:

All of the abov personnal remained at Gyels Gamp from May until October 1942. Here they were joined by stragglers, evalues, and a few personnel left in Malang Hospitel at the time the lähst moved forward, and included some members of the 19th Bomb Group. One specific report mentions the arrival on 12 September of the roup composed of one officer and 65 chlisted ach from fimor; the branch or notion lity of this group, however, is not mentioned. The fact that it was specifically noted by Americans, however, takes some possibility that this group may also have been American, though there is nothing in evaluable restors or other materials to indicate the nature of the group if such were the case. Some of the others who arrived here during this interval had successfully evaded capture at Malang and continued to remain hidden in the jungles for periods of several months; in all cases final capture was the result of betrayed by natives who discovered their hiding places or with wheat they sought refuge.

Out of this consolidated group, labor drafts began to be formed in October 1942. On 3 October, a group including 191 Americans under Captain Archie L. Fitzsimmons was sont to burner via Singapore, where a five day stop was mide. On 11 October a second group including 68 Americans unfor Captain L. L. Biegler was shipped out via Singapore, leaving there 27 October presumably for wither Japan or Formosa. This group was composed entirely of technical specialists. Also on 11 October, a group under 4t. Col. Elucher S. Fharp, Commanding Officer of the 2nd Eattalion, 131st FA, doparted for surna, going by water to Sin apore, and on 7 January 1943 leaving Singapore by rail for Penang, and thence by water to Moulmein, Burna.

Conditions during these transfers depended directly on the size of the group being transferred. Copt in Fitzsianons' group found cool conditions from Estavia to Singapore, during which time there were only 400 PW's abound sip. At Singapore five days after arrivel there, 1500 Australians were added to the group, shipping on a transport of about 4000 tons. From there to Burma, conditions were of the worst, extremely limited space being available for the men below dacks where they were usually forced to remain; sanitation, food and water were shirply limited, and the suffering was reported intense.

Colonal Tamp's party experienced crowded and unsanitary conditions from the very first. Aboard the DAL FICHI LARD out of Latevia, a space per man of 80 square contineters was reported, 16 men being crowded into a compartment 8' x 8' x 4'. Food consisted of wormy rice and a watery vegetable stew without meat, and one pint of water per man per day was issued.

For both groups the temporary stay at Singapore was a relief; food there was better, and the growding at Changi Jail had not yet reached the proportions reported by later arrivals. There was a contean from which food stocks could be sugmented, and some issue of Red Gross stores, apparently holdovers from the shipments sent to Japan at the time of the Tokyo earthquake in 1923. Rice, spinach, and fish (whitebait, a shall minnow-like fish) were the basic ration. But this relief lasted a bare five days for Captain Fitzsimmons' roup, which departed 14 October, and barely two months for Colonel Larp's roup.

Enrouse from Singspore to Pennn, this party travelled in boxcars, leaving Singapore at 0200 hours 8 January 1943, passing Muala Lumpur at 2300 hours the same day, and arrivin at Frai 2000 hours on the 9th. Departure from Frai was on board the MOJI MARU on 11 January. Conditions aboard were at first somewhat less severe than on the DAI MICHI MARU out of EBatavia, but on 15 January, the convoy was attached by aircraft reported as American FEY's. Some damage and several Japanese casualties were reported on board the MOJI MARU; a sister ship in this convoy, the NATAMASI MARU, was sunk, with the survivors of this sinking being taken aboard the MOJI MARU. From this point onward, conditions were the worst encountered at any point; personnel were unable to obtain sufficient water of any kind, and rations were reduced. Bathing or shaving was imjossible. On 17 January, the men arrived in poor condition at Moulmein.

Captain Fitzsimmons' man had already arrived here on 26 October, and had left on 30 October, moving south to work camps below Thenbyuzayat along the Burna-Thailand railroad on which construction had been started in July of 1942. Late in January, Colonal Tharp's group also moved down to the work camps.

Work on the reilroad continued for all of these men until Novamber f 1943, the P''s bein split up into lobils Camp rougs and stationed along the line of construction in temporary camps. They were moved to base camps of a more permanent nature then illness or regrouping of perties required t is. Most of the camps in Durma were referred to by their distances from Thanbyuzayat; those in Insiland either by the names of nearby Thai towns, or by names iven them by the Japanese.

In January and April of 1944, the groups were reconstituted, some of the man being sent to rest camps near Monchanaturi and thence to new work parties on airfields and railroad maintenance work in Fhailand, and others toing to Indo-China for airfield and harbor work there. Railroad maintenance camps were located along the purma-Thai railroad and also the hangkok-Chiengmai, Hangkok-Doonrajthani and Dangkok-Saijon lines. Airfields were in areas near Thejburi and pangkok. During this time, these were joined by others captured in Durma and Indo-China, and officers ware largely segregated in officers camps, one being reported at Kanchanaburi, Thailand. With the enception of this transfer, and a transfer of Air Force officers and some others from Saijon to Singapore, personnel remained at these assignments until the end of the war. At that time they were collected at Bhejburi, Bangkok, and Saijon, and evacuated from these points by air to Calcutta.

## 4. Capture of Aircrew and Other Personnel in Bunna, Fhailand and Indo-Ching:

Personnel captured in these areas experienced widely contrasting histories. Military personnel captured in Juna were interned at Rangoon, and having been released in April 1945, have been the subject of a previous report. Givilians taken in burna were arrested by Aurase police or native troops, and taken by them to the Japanese authorities. All Americans recovered in this category were members of a mission in Akyab, and were held at the mission compound there. They were taken to Rangoon, held there under house arrest for four months, and then into jail at Rangoon. In April 1942, they were transferred to Tavoy, where they remained until the war's end and evacuation via Singapore to Calcutta. A brief interrogation of these persons was conducted by the Japanese, at the Office of the district Commissioner in Aryab. This does not appear to have been pressed with any force; the interneos were clorgyman, and their professions of ignorance of military latters was accepted. The only reports of capture in Theiland are from aircrew personnel. These are taken by Thai police to their own headquarters, and were at no time released to the Japanese save briefly for interrogation purposes. The details of their capture and subsequent treatment are thus of little importance to t is report; they were well-treated, and confortably interned. In one case, two men had some difficulty when their signs of surrender were apparently disunderstood, causing the Thai police to open fire on them, but this was without injury to them. No other difficulties of any kind were reported.

Personnel captured in Indo-China included Military and Naval aircrew personnal, and the crew of the armored boat GMAF of 5th Interceptor Squadron. In all cases, shalter and help in evasion of capture was sought originally from French residents, ranging from Lanoidown past Courane (where the GMAF was beached after engine failure) to Saijon. Initial cooperation seems to have been the rule, followed by 1 ser defection and failure them Japanese pressure made the French apprehensive for their own safety. Initial cooperation included supply of food, clothin, and shelter, together with directions for routes and means of avoiding capture. It is not clear whether there were any clear-cut cases of outrigh betrayal subsequently, though this is suggested in some reports. Other causes of capture ascribed include erioneous instructions received from Frinch or natives, misunderstandings between French and American personnal, treachery by the Annanites, inadequate briefing on the argas involved, and in one case, issue of evasion materials designed for a different area and lacking correct language materials.

Both the personnel in Thailand and those in Indo-China the were collected at Saigon, were interrogated by the Japanese. This interrogation seems always to have been long and thorough, covering the tactical missions involved, equipment used, and such other items as the possibility of invasion of Indo-China, and the dropping of arms and equipment by parachute both there and in Thailand. This interrogation was accompanied by threats and beatings in Indo-China; the presence of Thai authorities made such mistreatment impossible for those interned at Bangkok.

From these groups, the personnel enstured in Indo-China were noved to camps in the Saigon area, with the officers guartered in special officers' camps from which they were later moved to Changi Fail, Singapors. The men remained in Indo-China and the officers at Singapa e until the and of the war. The personnel captured in Theiland were interned by Thai authorities in well-maintained and confortable camps, chiefly civilian internment centers. Since with the tacit op roval of the Thei jovernment, arrangements were already under way for their "escape" from this area, when hostilities ended they were the first group ready for evacuation to Calcutta.

### B. CAPTURE AND INFERMENT IN MALAYA

#### 1. Aircraw parsonnal:

Evacuses from Singapore included aircrew personnel captured in many parts of Southeast Asia, including Luran, Indo-Caine, Maleys and Java. Recoveries included crews from the 10th, 14th, and 20th Air Forces. They were moved from Durma via Penang, or from Saigon or Batavia direct to Singapore, and spent most of their internment at Changi Jail. Capture histories will be found in those parts of this section which cover the area in which capture took place. Only two aircrews were captured in Malaya itself from which personnel were later evacuated to Calcutta, both being 1-29 crews of 20th Bomber Command.

Of these, one landsa in the water off singapore Island, after a mission over the warshouse area at the davy Yard on 2 March 1945, piloted by Lt. 3. G. Millar. The crew made their way to Raffles Lighthouse and thenes to Malacca Straits in one-man life-boats. At this point they encountered treacherous Malay natives, were taken to Johore Baru, fed, and their presence reported to the Japanese. A Kampei Tai patrol hoat was thus advised of their whereabouts and enabled to intercept when they resumed their journey by water.

The second .-29, with Lt. Colonel D. J. Humphrey in command, had a more spactacular history. On a mission over the singapore dock area on 11 January 1945, it was attacked by fighters and ultimately disabled. The ship came down in the area near the Rompin Miver just north of hilly country at 105.10' S. 2.40'N, after the #3 enjine had failed and win; tanks exploded. Some personnel aboard were clifted furing this engagement or died in the crash. Two were coptured by a Japanese patrol and taken to a police station at "Rembu" (possilly Rempkes, or Endau) and from there to Outram Prison Camp. Three, Clonel, Humphrey, Lt. William Duffy and Lt. S. C. Saltzman, svading capture by the same patrol, were able to escape to the northwest, unero they joined a force of Chihese Communist guerrilles ish whee they remained until the and of the war.

These three, on the approach of the patrol, were apparently successful in hiding themselves in the bush and off the read, and also seem to have been helped by the two who were concurred, in that these pave the patrol the impression that there were no others in the area. Assistance had already been obtained for all five men from the guerrilla forces, and their contribution to the evasion appears to have been a substantial one, aiding in the original concentment, and then indicating routes of evasion. After the encounter with the patrol, the guerrillas led Colonel Humphrey's group to a headquarters the hills, and from this point they led a nomadic existence, enjoying the status of guests mather than prisoners, passing through Johore, Negri Se bilan, and part of Pahang for a total distance of over 600 miles. A full report of this history and the subsequent moves and experiences of the group is, according to Colonel Tumphrey, being propared for 20th Air Force Headquarters in "ashington.

### 2. Morchant Marina Graws:

Mombers of the crows of four morehane vessels were also largely evacuated from Singapore, the MS SANCELA, the TILLIAM REFIRENT, the AMERICAN LEADER, and the RICHARD HOVEY. Of these, the first three were all sunk by a German raider, the sem raider #28, Captain Von Ricksteller consanding.

The HULFHREY was sink in August 1942, apparently in the South Atlantic. On 10 September 1942, the LAADER was suck by the raider about 800 miles west of Capstown, South Africa, and in both cases survivors were picked up by the raider after the sinkings. The exact date or location of the first sinking was not reported. The reider then proceeded to datavia, Java, there these survivors were turned over to the Japanese on 6 November 1942. Most were transferred thereafter to Singapore, where they were interned for the duration at Changi Juli.

Son raidor #28 then returned to the Indian Ocean, and mank the SANONILA at about 2037 hours of 29 November, at a point about 400 miles southeast of Madagascar. Survivors were again picked up, and were turned over to the Japanese at Singapore on 19 February 1943, it being reported that 39 out of a crew of 59 were landed at this time.

Survivors of these three sinkings were, on the whole, well tranted by the German crew. It should be noted, however, that the interrogation given these men, by an gent of the Gestape aboard the reider, was long, thorough, and expert, in contrast to later questionings by the Japanese when transfer of custody was made. After these survivors were all collected at Singapore, a few were went up to work on the Burma railroad. These all returned so far as is known, on completion of the work on the road, and were likewise evacuated from Singapore. Another group was sent by water to Sunatra, and suffered severe losses when their ship was torpedeed about 100 miles off the coast at Pedang. These surviving this sinking were employed on the Fedang-Pakan marks railroad construction, and were swacuated by LCI from Pakan bares at the end of the war. These not drafted for these work perties ramained in the Singapore area, with occasional transfers from one camp to another, until their evacuation.

The fourth merchant ship, the HOVEY, was such by a Japanese submerine on 29 darch 1944, nd its survivors leaded by the sub at Penang Naval dass in dalays. Some mistreations and hardship are reported by this group. They were interrogated by the Japanese apparently with some care, after being taken out of the water, information being sought on convoy operations and dir escort techniques. They were confined in solitary at Penang during this time, and thence were taken to 'an Indian Trison Camp" and to Singapore.

#### 3. Civilian Personnal.

A substantial group of civilian personnel was evacuated from Singapere; these had either been interned after capture in Malaya, or had been captured in Euras, interned at the civilian intermnent camp at Tavey, and thence transferred overland for evacuation. Experiences of this latter group have already been discussed (bottom, p.5).

Those taken at homes in Maleya were collected at the Roffles Hotel, at "atons, or at Karikal (about 5 miles from Bingapore) and, during most of the war, were interned at Changi Jail. The final year and a half of internment, however, was spent at Size Road Comp. to which point all civilians in Changi appear to have been sent in late April or early hay of 1944.

### C. CAPTURE AND INTERNIENT OF PERSONNEL RECOVERED IN JAVA

Capture of the 2nd Battelion, 151st FA, and of the survivors of the USS HOUSTON, both of which took place in Java, have already been discussed. Fow of these personnel remained in Java until the end of the war, although some were retained in electical or modical capacities at licycle Camp, Batavia, and a few were too sick to be moved when these units were transforred to Burma. Other personnel recovered in Java included personnel from the USS PERCH, the USS POPE, the USS LANGLEY, the 35 TALJUAN, a few morehant marine personnel from the SS HERPHREY and the AMERICAN LEADER (details of capture noted above) a few from "2" Bettery of the 2nd Battulion, 131st FA, and a small group of civilians.

#### 1. Porsonnal formarly interned at Macassar, Calobos:

Survivors of the crows of the USS FORM, the USS FARCH, the USS LANGLEY, and a few others, were for most of the war intermed at Macassar Camp in the Collebus. Details of the sinkin of these vessels and the subsequent cepture of survivors is not known in detail, since Macasser interness were evacuated to another area at the end of the war, believed to be Manila. Thus the only personnel available for interregation on the above points were those who had been transferred by the Japanese from the Collebus to Jave for work parties at bendeen, and atavia, and whe then were evacuated from Batavia to Calcutta. The POPE was enroute with HMS EXETER and HMS ENCOUNCER via Sounde Straits to Colembo or Tjilatjae, and was sunk in the Java Soa mergement 1 March 43 o/a 1000 hours. Almost all survivers are sold to have gathered in a group in rafts and lifebolts in the water, and were picked up by Japanese destroyers 3 March, stripped of their oil in diver-socked clothing, sprayed with a vile-smelling disonfoctant, officers and men promptly segregated, and sont below to emergency quarters. There seems to have been no avidence of mistreatment; they were transferred to another destroyer at sea, and taken to Macassar, landed and interned in the jail. From this point they were moved to an internaent camp a few miles outside Macassar, formerly the Dutch KIL Barracks, some weeks later.

The USS PERCH was depth charged by destroyers in the Java Sea 90 miles from some islands north of Scerebaja on 3 March 42. She surrendered, and was taken aboard a destroyer. Here there were some reports of slappings and other mistreatment, and it is charged that the Japanese destroyer crew took from these men all their personal belongings, including rings, watches, and other valuebles. These men were likewise taken and landed at Macassar.

The USS LANGLEY was engaged in ferrying P-40 sizeraft from Freemantls, Australia, to Christmas Island, and while borthed at the latter point, apparently was lost when the island was taken by a Japanese amphibious force on 31 March 1942. With the exception of Lt. Commander Thomas A. Donovan, USN, who were evacuated from Jave, the disposition of the rest of the crew of this ship is not known; Commander Donovan was briefly interrogated by the commanding officar of the landing force and sent aboard the Jap cruiser NATORI, to the Celebes.

During 1942 and 1943, work parties were made up at this camp and sent to Japan, to nickel mines in the Calabas, and, in a dreft of officers, to Java. Thereafter, all non-military internees were segregated in another camp in the Calabas, and on 5 June 1944, all remaining prisoners at KIL Camp were moved to a new location south of the original camp. Here they remained until, on 26 July 1945, a group of 200 were sent to Batavia via Scerabaja, Java. This trip was made on a small oil tanker under the worst possible conditions, overcrowded, and under a broiling tropical sun, with food consisting of a half-pint of water per day, a few ships' biscuits, and two spoonfuls of sugar. On arrival at Scerabaja, they were placed in a transit camp, then entrained for Datavia, where they arrived after a two day ride in August 1945. It is reported that 122 American PO''s remained in Macesser at this time, with A. C. Sewyer Cfd, USN, in commund, and M. O. Mattila, CSK, USN, in charge of administration.

#### 2. Other Military Personnel evacuated from Java

A small miscellaneous group of military personnel evacuated from Java included aircrew personnel forced down in that area, a few patients in Malang Hospital, formerly of the 131st FA, who were left there and who succeeded in evading capture for some substantial period of time, and a few members of Battery "E" of the 131st FA, which was taken in Madoera Island, but most of whose personnel were shipped to Japan.

The history of the capture of Battery "E" is substantially like that of the rest of the Battalien; it was stationed on Madoera, and capitulated there at the time of the general surrender of Java. One officer is quoted as reporting some disorder at the time of the surrender, with Dutch troops turning machine gun fire on the "merican personnel to force a capitulation. In the absence of any large group from "E" Battery, this report cannot be evaluated here.

The men of the battery were taken to "Karmal" Camp in bangkalang, Madesra, and from there to a number of camps in Gesrabaja including one at Jaarmarcht, the "HHS Camp" and one at Percek. They left Seerabaja on 15 October 1942 for Bandesng, were moved to Batavia, and thence to Singapore, where they arrived 2 November. On 7 November nearly all the battery save a few left behind in Batavia, Bendesng and possibly Singapore, were shipped out by sea, apparently for Japan.

Of the sireraw personnel, one pilot, Lt. C. L. Reagen, of the 20th PursuitGroup, made a crash landing in north central Java, another mircraw of the 91st Bomb Group came down near Waingapoe, on Sosmba, and a third plane, piloted by Lt. W. H. Calienne of Hq & Hq Sq, 35th Pursuit Group, CHLAF, was forced down on Bali. Finally, a few members of the 19th Bomb Group left behind when that unit evacuated Java, were captured and later evacuated from Java. In a history somewhat like that of Colonel Humphrey's group in Malaya, S/Sgt George W. Hess of 28th Boub Sq., 19th Bomb Group, with a small group of others attempted to evade capture by working back into the hills. The similarity is enhanced by Sgt. Hess' report that one of their number, S/Sgt Brunley, did succeed in gatting away to Australia. Sgt. Hess, however, was spotted by netives while out searching for supplies, and allowed himself to be taken by them. He reports that he could have ot away, but that in so doing he would have caused a search to be made which would have resulted in the probable capture of the antire group. After capture he was interrogated at Bandoeng, moved to Batavia, and from there to Singapore on 15 Cetober.

Lieut. Reagan of 20th Parsuit Group crashed on 29 February 1942, and succeeded in evading capture until 7 March by carefully avoiding roads, villages, and native Indonesians. On the latter date, however, he was caught by natives, tied to a tree, mobbed of all possessions, and held for the arrivel of the Japanese who took him to Blora, where he was bound, put in a warehouse, and interrogated several times. From there he was taken to Soerabaja, and from that point to work camps in central Java, including Madjakerta, Ngawi, Tjepinum, Soekuniskin, and finally to Ambarawa in February 1944. He and the Reverend John Bramen, a civilian internee, are the only American personnel reported as having been at Ambarawa, which is reported as one of the worst camps in Java.

Lt. W. D. Haines of 91st Bonb Group reports making A crash landing near Maingapos, on Soemba Island. The presence of this aircrew was reported to the Japanese by the natives, and they were badly treated by drunken guards who beat them severally during their interrogation at Waingapos. Lt. Heines himself was later transferred to Macassar Camp in the Celebes, and from there to Batevic. The only crewman, Pvt. J. A. Collins, went with him to Macassar Camp, and was last reported at that camp.

A similar history is reported by Lt. W. H. Gallenne of He and He Sudn, 35th Fursuit Group, GHQAF, who was forced down on Boli, taken to the Bali Hotel in Denpassar, and there interrogated. Conditions at this hotel, reported used as a collecting point for prisoners, were atrocious and filthy. From here he went to a civilian prison, was transferred to Soerabaja, and spent some time in the CHZ Hospital there as well as inter at Jaarmarcht. He was moved on 15 May 1943 to Bicycle Carp, Batavia, whore he spent the rest of his internment.

#### 3. Merchant Marine and Civilians in Java.

Details of the capture of most of the survivors of Merchant Marine sinkings have already been given; a substantial number of these crews appear to have remained in Java, principally in Batavia. Two ships, the SS TAIJUAN and the SS SISUNTHON NAVA, in Socrabaja harbor at the time of the island's capitulation, had been engaged by personnel of the U.S. Army for a relief mission to Bataan and Corregidor. Four of these men were evacuated from Java in September, 1945, all members of the trew of the TAIJUAN.

This ship was apparently very nearly ready for departure to the Philippines when the Dutch surrendered Java; loading and other proparations had been in progress for four days. Ship and cargo were blown up by the Dutch to prevent capture by the Japanese, and the crew members contacted so far were all arrested at their homes, after periods of varying success at evasion of capture. They were interned at various times at numerous different camps throughout the Scerabaja area, in control, and western Java, and at the end of the war were in Malang, Tjimahi (2), and Ngavi.

Civilians were arrested in their hones, and taken to civilian internee camps at many different points in Java, including six or seven reported in the Batavia area, three in Anbarawa, at least two in Dandoong-Tjimahi area, and a few which have not been located as yet. One civilian, Slikker, evaded capture until 6 July 1944, and two, a musician maned A. Castor and an American woman, Maria Kaminoff McVay, succeeded in avoiding internment for the entire war, though they were both arrested and questioned by the Kempel Tai on several occasions. In both cases, however, the success of this evasion appears to rest on an adroit assumption of neutral citizenship in various countries at various times to suit the changing political situation, though it is clear that knowledge of the areas involved and the availability of contact with friendly natives and others in those areas was a material factor in both cases.

### D. PERSONNEL RECOVERIES FROM SUMATRA

The capture of those personnel recovered in Sumstra at the end of the war has in all cases already been given, since these personnel were only fly survivors of merchant vessels drafted out of Singapore internment camps and Changi Jail to work on the Pedang-Paken Beros railroad. It should be noted, however, that this draft was on a ship which was attacked by allied forces, presumably submarines, and sunk about 110 miles south of Pedang and about 12 or 15 miles off the Sumstra coast on 18 September, 1944. The mane of this ship is not known, but it is referred to in records gathered from POW Headquarters in Batevia as the "F-2" shipmont.

Survivors were picked up in the water by Japaness craft if but only if they were not wounled or too veak to get themselves into the rescue vessels. Survivors found to be wounded after rescue were thrown back into the water. Those eventually handed were taken by foot to Pedrag under strocious conditions, and by rail to work emps on the railroad. The read constructions were carried on under forced conditions, and completed on 14 August 1945. Shortly after this time, surviving internees were evacuated by plane from Pakan baroo.

The only other evacu tion from Sumatra was of three civilians, a woman whose home was in Sumatra, at Pakan Herin, near Ran, t, who was interned at the women's civilian camp at Donkineng, and two correspondents who were on a Dutch ship sunk off Sumatra 7 March 1942. These two landed on Sumatra on 13 March, and were taken by a Jap patrol on 4 April, when they were taken by truck to Palenbang. They were interned here, at Boekit Beser, in the Muntok Jail on Banka Island, and finally at Loebock Linggan, on the belabum rubber estate in Sumatra, from which point they were evacuated. At the time this report was compiled, a further group of perhaps a dozen American divilians were reported awaiting evacuation from Sumatra East Coast Comps in the area mean whether and Tanijoengbalai, but this evacuation had not yet been accomplished.

#### E. CONCLUSION

The above histories are necessarily fragmontary and incomplete, particulerly in those cases where a single American internee or a very small group was involved. Complete records of both capture and subsequent transfers have been reported as existing at Jaganese PON Headquarters offices at Singapore, Batavia, and possibly other points. Some of these recovered in Japan itend are now in process of translation. Others may be recovered in Japan itself. Arrival of this material should clarify the fate or disposition of many Americans in Southeast Asia, perticularly with regard to the several shipments of work drafts and others made from Southeast Asia to points in Japan, and perheps to other points outside this Theater, about which little or nothing is now known.

# III - INTERUOGATION

This section will deal with interrogation of prisoners of war and civilian internees by the enemy, with me-thods used, times and places of interrogation, and the types of information sought.

A. Military Personnel.

- 1. General Comment.
- 2.
- 131st FA Personnel. USS HOUSTON Personnel. 3.
- Aircrew Fersonnel.
   Personnel Captured after Evasion.
   Miscellaneous Cases.
- 6.

B . Merchant Marine Fersonnel.

- C. Civilian Personnel.
- D. Summary.

he national defense of the United States withn the meaning of the E punper Act. 50 U.S.C. 31 and 32, as mented. It tratimission or the revelation of its concerns in any manner to an executionized person is -ohibited by law.

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# III - INTERROGATIONes comment contains information affecting the national defense of the United States with n the meaning of the Espi-mage Act, 50 U.S.C. d1 and 32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an insuthorized person is prohibited by law.

# A. (MILITARY PERSONNEL

1. General Comment:

As has already been noted, the Japanese did not usually interrogate enlisted personnel of either the Army or Navy to any extent sufficient to provide relevant facts or warrant extensive conclusions. Such interrogations as were given were largely in the nature of a registration of personnel at prisonerof-war collecting points; the few exceptions to this rule regported in the case of HOUSTON personnel rescued in the water and taken aboard Japanese Haval vessels for transfer to shore were interrogations conducted in large groups, in which the enlisted men participated rarely if at all, and the questions that were put were almost entirely directed to and answered by commissioned officers in the groups.

Exceptions to the above rule were, however, noted. One was in the case of aircrew personnel. These men were questioned at considerable length and with great pains to collect available information in all reported cases. Another exception comprised those persons who had succeeded in evading capture for any period of time; and it might be noted that factors relevant to this type of personnel would also apply in the case of persons receptured after a successful escape, although there are no reported cases of personnel surviving such recepture. A third exception comprises the occasional individual selected by the enemy interrogators apparently at randem, and questioned at length concerning his unit, its armament, supplies, disposition, tactics, and other factors; out of the entire number of military personnel evacuated from Southeast Asia, at most three or four cases of this kind are reported.

Officer personnel, by contrast, were almost invariably interrogated, regardless of wounds or other disability at the time of capture, and at considerable length. The one marked exception to this was in the case of the 131st FA Bn; here it is reported that only "senior officers" by which is apparently meant officers of field grade, were questioned.

There were two reported cases of "special" interrogations-both apparently pertaining to the maintanance of security in the internment camps. One was the interrogation of Captain William D. Parker, U.S. Army, at Fangtok Military Prison, three years after his capture, when a search of the prison showed him to possess copies of a local newspaper apparently printed by the underground, the EANGK'S CEROFICIE. Major Winthrop H. Rogers was likewise questioned for the same reason. The other was a most thorough and exhaustive questioning of all civilian internees at Changi Jail, Singapore, starting 10 October 1943, accompanied by a thorough search of the area. The cause of this investigation is not reported, but may be ascribed likewise to some incident giving rise to a suspicion that underground activities were being carried on in the Camp.

Interrogation was in all cases made at the earliest practical moment, and for this reason some indication of the time and place of the interrogation of every unit is noted in the histories of capture in the preceding section. The only case in which there seems to have been unexplained delay is in the case of the main body of the 131st FA, which was not contacted by Japanese authorities save to issue directives until their arrival at Tandjoeng Prick Camp almost a month after capitulation.

Segregation of ranks for interrogation purposes does not seen to have been systematically carried out. The survivors of the USS POPE were promptly segregated, though non-commissioned officers were not separated from other enlished men. In contrast, personnel of the FOUSTON, also about Japanese Taval vessels, were not only not separated in any way, but were questioned in groups, with both officers and men present at the same time. This, however, is the only case of group questioning of this kind which has been reported; it seems to have been general practice to interrogate one man at a time.

Treatment prior to interportion, where commented on, appears to have been good. Details are not available; the usual comment was that good treatment was received "until they got through questioning us". This, however, seems to have applied only in the case of personnel from whom the Japanese expected information of some value, i.e. those who, for one reason or another, had been selected for interportion on specific points and for specific reasons.

With the exception of naval run crew and marchant marine personnel captured by Raider #28, and who, as noted in Section II, were interrotated by a Gestapo officer aboard, all personnel were questioned by Japanese officers or non-connissioned officers, aided where necessary by interpreters either Korean or Japanese. The use of a substantial number of Japanese who had been educated either in Hawaii or the United States was reported, in most cases as interrotating officers and in one case as interpreter. Their contained of English, however, varied widely, and in teny cases was extremely poor. In one case of this kind, the interrotator was a Hawaiian Japanese who cpoke extremely poor English; in the same root was a Japanese officer who apparently spoke no English whatsoever. Later events proved the by-stander to be extremely fluent in English.

The topics of interrotation naturally varied with the person being questioned. One generality, however, can be made; in a substantial number of cases, the tonics covered were matters of which the grisoner d d not and could not have any knowledge whatspever. A large volume of questioning centered around such topics as the subject's home life in the United States, his profession, interests, and political views, with no immediate connection drawn to the situation at hand. This may be regarded, however, as simply a part of normal interrocation techniques, made with a view to drawing out the subject in harmless ways to open a way for further questioning. Yet the scope and technique of questions on the immediate fulltary situation and also on all other fulltary topics was, with a few exceptions in the case of aircrew personnel, reported as sketchy, elementary, inadequate, and, to use a word frequently found in the reports, childish.

The Japanese interrometer's response to replice given seems to have gone for beyond the bounds of traditional oriental impassive call. Two patterns may be indicated. In one, the attitude remained impassive, even shug, conveying the impression "Yes, yes, we know all that; go on !" The other was diametrically opposed, consisting of sharply expressed disbelief, shout d threats, and beatings or slappings with or without the assistance of attending guards. There seems to have been very little middle ground. The result of these technicues was that, on one hand, many felsehoods were accepted as truth, and on the other, truth was often branded as felsehood, in both cases disclosing the matching access of the interromator's previous knowledge of the subject. This extensive display of reaction

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the national defense of the United States with in the meaning of the Esplanage Act, 50 U.S.C., all and 32, as unerded. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an inventionized person is contented by law. thus is believed to have impaired seriously the effectiveness of the interrorations in extracting pertinent information.

### 131st FA Personnel: 2.

Enlisted men, with a few exceptions, were not interrogated 11. Senior officers interrogated at Fandbeng were well treated, offered citarettes, and questioned regar ing the location of Air Force units and other troops, and regarding materials and supplies held by the 131st. One of the few enlisted men questioned was asked concerning the location of strateric objectives and their defenses in the continental. United States; this was the only case of t is type of question-Answers to these questions were, on the whole, suarded; one officer referred to the Geneva convention pro-visions, and was not further pressed. The statement that there were no other U.S. Aray units on Java brought the query whether one battalion of field artillory could defind the whole islandapparently hoping to draw a statement of what other defenses existed -- a trap into which no reported subject fell. Questions regarding life in the United States were answered truthfully, and elicited some skepticish and considerable superiority of manner from the interrogator. Other questions on military subjects were usually answered, and answered by "telling the Japa what they already know"; in cases where subject refused to answer, there was an immediate display of hostility and threats of punishment, though with this group there are no threats of publishment, though with this croup there are no cases of serious distreatment during interrogation reported. The concensus of ominion expressed by members of this group was, "The Nips love long talks. Tell then what they know al-resov, and they nod wisely and think it is new information". The interrogations here may be summarized, then, as being superficial, inept, and cursory, with only very few persons questioned. questioned.

### USS HOUSTON Personnel: 3.

Topics included the size, corposit on, and strength of the Asiatic Fleet, the whireabouts of Admiral Hart (when the Japanese insisted was aboard), the nature and amount of sub-sistence supplies available to the naval units in the area, the location of minefields and channels through then, and the same intensive question ar regarding conditions in the United States Again, the tendency of the subject being questioned was, so far as he was sure the information was already possessed by the enemy, to talk, and talk as a libly as possible. Any other course of action produced intendiate and threats of worse. One wroup if ien in Serant Jall, were, while being marched over for a question no, startled to her screams, and were told that those were the screams of a man who wasn't telling the questioned, they were led past a futch missioner sitting in a chair, bound, with a metal and about his head, which was apparently being tightened by some sort of thumbscrew. This was the univ case of actual use of torture devices as a part of interregistion removed by this group, and was apparently not so the mine series of actual use of actions and was apparently part and was apparently being the being the screen as a part of interregistion removed by this group, and was apparently instructions of actual use of actual was apparently of interrogation reported by this group, and was apparently not applied to any American personnel.

# 4. Aircrew Personnel:

Interrogations of these men were universally long and therough, and, where conducted by Japanese Air Corps personnel, occasionally reported of an intelligent and high quality, otherwise stupid. Topics included location of lases, names tars soctament eshiates information affective

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of commanders, types of planes flown, and performance, armament missions, and such special matters as might be known by the subject being questioned, e.g., in the case of one crew ground-ed in Indo-China, details of the alleg d parachuting of guns, amnunition, and supplies, by American airforce units to underground organizations. Refusal to answer brought a response varving from superior indifference to brutality and beatings. One subject was asked to make a recording for broadcast to the United States, to deal with the hopolessness of resistance to the Japanese forces. This request was refused, and apparto the Japanese forces. This request was refused, and appar-ently led to no repr sals. Confessions of ignorance were with this group successful if a satisfactory reason for the ignorance could be offered, thus replies in the vein "I am a new man in the unit and unfamiliar with its organization" or "My rank is insufficient for me to be intrusted with that type of informati tion" or "I am a pilot and not told about administrative methods" were reported as successful eventions of questions natters" were reported as successful evasions of questions. In all cases, however, it was apparent that some answer was expected and would be insisted upon; as a general rule, that answer could be utterly remote from the truth and still be acceptable unless the falsehood were one on which the interroacceptable unless the falsehood were one on which the interro-gator believed that he had correct information already--in which case, regardless of the actual truth or falsehood of either the interrorator's beliefs or his subject's reply, harsh treatment including beatings could be expected. With this one qualification, however, it is readily apparent from the reports of this group of personnel that either evasion or outright falsehood were easier and safer than a flat refusal to answer, with the latter's invariable reward of brutality limited only by the whim of the interporator and the guards assisting him.

### Personnel Captured After Evasion: 5.

Of all different classes of military personnel, this group as such received the harshest type of treatment, and were, second only to the aircrew personnel, the most thoroughly questioned. One exception to this was found, in the case of personnel who attended to reach shipping in southern Java after the capitulation of the 131st FA at Garoet. These ren surrendered themselves in some cases to front-line combat troops, and were interrogated by them in a thoroughly humane and proper fashion. In such cases, the questioning of these persons did not appear to treat specifically of the issue of evasion--at least, there are no reports of questioning along that line--but were merely a more thorough and extensive cov-erage of the same material already reported for personnel of erade of the same material already reported for personnel of the unit. Where, as in nost cases, the evader was apprehended by or turned in to avents of the Tempei Tai, the matter was different; systematic abuse, beatings, starvation, chronic disbelief of any answer of any kind, characterized these inter-disbelief of any answer of any kind, characterized these inter-rotations. They were carried on for long periods, in one case for twelve hours, and lasted for as long as four to six weeks, for twelve hours, and lasted for as long as four to six weeks, covering the evasion attend in det il, and also general information of a military nature.

# 6. Miscellaneous Cases:

In the course of his interrogation, It. D. T. Austin, of the U.S. Navy, was forced under duress to make a writtin statement for the use of propaganda agencies on the subject of the attack on Pearl Harbor. This occurred at Fatavia; it was not possible to locate a copy of the statement, and specific de-tails on the nature of the duress employed were not obtained. Thus it is not specifically known what form of mistage ment was applied nor for how long it were continued. the United States with the national driverse of the Espinage Act, 50 US

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In the course of his interrogation, Capthin Fralick of the armored boat GNAT was likewise subjected to substantial pressure consisting in part of being shown other personnel (apparently natives) being tortured during shown other personnel (apparently natives) being tortured during questioning and warned of a like fate if he did not cooperate. His report states that he was able to avoid difficulty, however, by fabricating a long and complicated story concerning defenses and installations in the Eatman-Corregider area, and by drawing a map of that area--all of which information was in fact completely false. He states, however, that it was accepted by his interrogators at face value. It has not been possible to recover any copies of this map, nor any reports of the interrogation to determine exactly what Captain Fralick's answers contained.

MHZo Edward Dewberry, W.S. Navy, was interrogated at Malang Hospital, and the Japanese her prmitted interrotation by Indonesian political officials, reported to be members of the Nationalist Party. This questioning appears to have been wholl related to economic and social matters, covering life in the United States, subject's family life, interests, occupation, and other matters of a largely domestic nature. This ques-tioning was carried on on a friendly banis, without force or mistreatment, in the presence of Japanese personnel.

Cantain William D. Parker and Major Winthrop H. Rogers, both W.S. Arny, were interrogated at considerable length at Dangkok early in 1945 regarding copies of the PANGKOK CHRONICLI which were found in their possession. Captain Parker was very seriously mistreated, and badly be ten up; it appears that he was unable to furnish the Japanese with any explanation for his possession of this newspaper, which was printed by the under-ground, and suffered the fate usual in such cases. Major Rogers, by contreat, reports th t he samply indicated that as senior officer of his group he was required to keep up on the news, and suffered no further trouble in the matter.

Other miscellaneous items include the several types of "acreening" interrogations either to make up work parties of specialists or to select personnel for further questioning in Japan. Some reference to these has already been made in dis-cussion capture histories in Section II; it need only be added here that these questionings are reported to have been superficial, and easily ereded through an assumption of stupidity or ignorance.

# E. MERCHANT MARINE PERSONNEL

With the exception of the HOVEY, which was such by a Japanece submarine, all ships from whom any substantial number of prewsen were evacuated to Calcutta were suck by the German raider \$28, and were interrogated by an agent or officer of the Gestapo. This was clearly and by contrast with all other interrogations the one expert interrogator reported. The questionings were long, and thorough, running through several sessions, and covered in minute detail every possible point which such personnel could be expected to have knowledge, including all aspects of convey operations, ships, cargoes, routes, codes used, srmament, 11'e-saving equipment, escort and air cover, and other matters. Answers were accepted; refusal to answer or lying was taken with, as one subject reports, "threats and gestures". There was no report of brutality or physical mistreatment of any kind.

All of this class of personnel was, of course, reinterroga-ted by the Japanese on being handed over to them. Tonlodes covered there, and in the interroga terms manages from Sale Sale Sale FOV'Y, were the same as those gives substituting of the Esp safe Act, 50 0.5.C. BESTRICTED a the messing of the Esp safe Act, 50 0.5.C. a the messing of the Esp safe Act, 50 0.5.C. a the messing of the Esp safe Act, 50 0.5.C. BESTRICTED at the messing of the Esp safe Act, 50 0.5.C. a the messing of the Esp safe Act, 50 0.5.C. be and 32, as smeeded. Its base = roos of the softwired conset is any manage to an explained to be

used were the same as those in the interrogation of HOUSTON personnel, brutality and ineptitude.

The interrogation of the crew of the TAIJUAN, who were captured chiefly in their homes in Scerabaja, had two matters noted that were not reported in other cases. The Japanese, members of the Kempel Tai, apparently had information leading them to believe that these men had weapons in their possession, and a line of questioning was reported that was apparently designed to locate these weapons. It was, however, easily met by cocked-up stories regarding the disposition or loss of the weapons, which in fact some crewmen did possess, and had hidden by burying in or near their homes. The other matter was an apparently estnest effort by the Kempel Tai to persuade these men, both Filipinos and Americans, to take responsible jobs in the Scorabaja dock area under the Japanese. Lurid promises of soft living, good pav, women, and luxuries were made; the offers were refused, and the refusal led to severe bettings. This group were also cuestioned on the nature of the mission of their ship; reports on the interrogations did not disclose whether or not the interrogators were able to vain any knowledge of its true nature--the answers given were fabricated stories of fair consistency, and seened to satisfy the questioner.

## G. CIVILIAN PHRSONNEL

Questioning of civilian p rsonnel seems to have been a perfunctory check for possible 'nowledge of a military nature, easily avoided by any replies which would present a logical reason for ignorance of such matters on the part of the subject interrogated. Thus the three missionaries arrested at Akyab and interrogated by the Kempel Tai at the local District Commissioner's Office there--and reinterrogated later at Rangoon Jail--were able to avoid any difficulty by indicating that their work was religious in nature, and in no way concerned with amphibious or airborne operations.

Yet it is from civilian source that the most dotailed report of the use of torture as an aid to interrogation is cained--in material subsitted by Dr. R. A. Thompson and Dr. J. G. Hanna on the investigation of 10 October 1943 at Changi Prison. These reports indicate, in conformity with all others received, that matters would proceed smootily so long as the expected answers were received; where such answers were not forthcoming, it was reported that, in addition to the bettings, almost universally reported, two forms of water torture, two forms of electric shock torture, refined forms of twisting and maining of the subject's body, and threats of death to subject or his family carried to the near final stare with such realism as to cause, in two reported cases, the famiting of the victim. It was reported that, as a result of this interrogation of 57 persons, 20 were permanently disabled, and at least one was killed during interrogation, with twelve other deaths partially or wholly caused by the mistigation received.

No information is presently available on the nature of the investigation being conducted -- as to what information was sought, nor as to the reasons for its initiation.

Interrogation of civilians at the time of their internment is not well nor clearly reported, other than in the case of the Akyab missionary group. Questioning seems to have been directed toward the domestic affairs of the subject, home life, family, etc., and some clumsy attempts made to get information

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of a political nature, with reference perhaps to the problems of occupying the area in which the individual was taken. There are occasional reports of slapping, kicking, and other brutality Some use of notive assistants is reported in Indonesia.

## D. SUMMARY

It is readily apparent that Japanese interrogations are conducted with force rether than skill, that there was no substantial use of "catch questions" or other trickery, and that the guiding principle was to get an answer-in many cases to get an answer predetermined in the interrogator's mind by his concept of the facts--and that there was no effective limit to the brutality that would be employed to got that answer. The reports are unanimous in an agreement that the only possible method of coping with this type of questioning was the preparation, in advance, of a long and wordy and apparently consistent story, which need have only the most superficial relation to true fact--if any. In all cases where such a method was employed, the results appear to have been eminently successful; the interrogator was satisfied, and the true facts safeguarded without the inevitable injury and maiming that accompanied adherence to the provisions of the Geneva Convention and refusa' to reply.

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# IV - INTERNEENT CAMPS

### A. ADMINISTRATION

- 1. Camp identification, location, and area commands:
  - a. Camps on the Hurma Railroad
  - Other Japanese Camps in Burma, Thailand, and b. Indo-China
  - Thai Government Camps c.
  - d. Camps in Malaya
  - Camps in Java 6.
- Camps in Sumatra

   Camps in Sumatra
   Camp Commanders and Guards
   Camp Regulations and Discipline

### B . LIVING CONDITIONS

- Shelter 1.
- 2. Sanitation
- 3. Food
- 4. Clothing
- 5. Medicine and Health 6.
  - Merale Factors
  - a. General

    - b. Recreational Facilities
      c. Mail, Packages, Red Cross Supplios
      d. Pay and Personal Property
      e. Summary

### C. WORKING CONDITIONS

- Types of Work 1.
  - a. Railroad Construction b. Other Military Work

  - c. Non-Military Work
- 2. Assignment to Nork Parties
- 3. Supervision

### D. CHANGES IN CONDITIONS, REPRESENTATIONS TO COLLANDERS

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### IV - INTERMENT CAMPS

### A. ADMINISTRATION

# 1. Camp identification, location, and area commands:

A total of over two hundred internment camps in Southeast Asia were reported by American personnel, of which about one hundred and fifty can be located with a fair degree of accuracy, and forty more with some assurance. It is impossible to be absolutely certain of the identity or locations of all camps, since they were reported by names spelled phonetically, and by names in many cases assigned by the Japanese without regard to local villages or other identifiable landmarks. Thus there is a substantial possibility of duplication, though it is believed that the total extent of such duplication does not exceed ten per cent of the listings submitted as Exhibit "I" to this report. Included in the above are all locations where American personnel were known to have been held for an overnight period or longer.

These camps spread geographically from Rangoon in the northwest to Hanoi, Inde-China in the northeast, and Waingapee, Soemba, to the southeast, an area of roughly four million square miles. Conditions in them varied from the comparative luxury enjoyed in internment under the Thai government at Bangkok to the hell-holes of torture and starvation at 80-Kilo Camp at Apalon, Burma, Changi Jail in Singapore, Ambarawa in Java, and the camps south of Pakan Barce in Sumatra. For purposes of clarity, the following treatment has been divided geographically, and approximately similar order will be used in succeeding topics of this section. The phonetic names have been abandoned in this text save where no definitely ascertainable location has been ascribed to the camp, but the original phonetic apellings will be found in the listings in the appendix.

## a. Camps on the Burma Railroad:

This railroad, which was built by NOW labor augmented by coelie gangs, began at Thanbyuzayat, south of Moulmain, Burma, where it joined existing trackage between Moulmain and Ye, and extended southeast to join the Bangkok line to Malaya at Bangkok, Thailand, for a total of about 394 kilometers or 244 miles of new construction. Sixty camp locations were reported along its length, with possibility of duplication in four to eight cases. Most were work camps in the jungle, of a highly temporary nature, and abandoned when the particular section of the road nearby was completed. Base camps, of a more permanent nature, and usually including a base "hospital" were also spread along the line, and of these, some were retained as maintenance camps when work was completed. The designation for these camps in Burma was usually their kilometer distance from Thanbyuzayat; in Thailand the Japanese apparently ascribed names to them which only occasionally correspond to local townsites.

Base camps included these at Thanbyuzayat, 18-Kile, 80-Kile, and 100-Kile points in Burma, and Hin Tab, "Tarsea" (at either Tha Sea or Ban Wang Yai), Ta Makam and Kanchanaburi in Thailand. At Kanchanaburi were several camps designated as Rest Camps after completion of the road, as well as one officer's camp.

During most of the work on the railroad, the interned FWs were divided into groups known as Mobile Camps. These moved from camp to camp along the right of way as work progressed. Most reports from American prisoners come from groups which worked south from Thanbyuzayat along the Burma section of the railroad, although a few Americans were included in later work parties shipped up from Singapere who started work up from Bampong in late spring of 1943. Construction was begun in July 1942, before the arrival of any Americans, and was completed in November of 1943. The overall command charged with this operation was Prisoner of Uar Branch #3, originally headed by It. Colonal Magatema, with headquarters at Thanbyuzayat. It is not clear whether FW Branch 5, originally commanded by Captain Mizutani, was at first a subordinate or a separate command. As organization developed, the #3 Branch became the Thailand headquarters, located at 165-Kilo Camp, and a Colonel Ichi assumed command. At this time, FW Branch #5 moved to headquarters at 85-Kilo Camp in the Apalon area, probably near Tadein, under Colonel Magatema. Colonel Magatema's second in command was a Lieutenart Naito. This information, drawn entirely from the interrogation of evacuees, has not as yet been checked with Japanese records, since such records have not yet been reccived for this area.

In the appendix to this section, together with the exhibits comprising lists of known comps, will be found maps indicating the approximate route of the railroad and major camp locations.

### b. Other Japanese Gamps in Lurma, Thailand, and Indo-China:

Other Japanese camps in Burma, not connected with the railroad construction, included camps at Bangoon, the Jail at Moulmein, and a civilian interement camp at Tavey. It is not clear whether this last camp was under the FM Branch Headquarters at Rangoon or that at Singapere. There was also a camp reported at Ye in Burma, but no American personnel were found there at the end of the war, and none reported ever having been there.

On completion of the Bursa railroad construction, the Mobile Camp groups were broken up. Most of these men spent a period of time at rest camps in the Kanchanaburi-Ta Makamarea between November of 1943 and April of 1944. From this point, men were gradually returned to maintenance work along the Bursa line and also other railroads, to work parties on airfields and to dock work, in both Bangkok and nearby Thailand areas, and also in Inde-China in and near Saigon.

Must important of these camps were the maintenance camps on the Burma railread, and at Hnong Pla Duck, Makhom Pathon, and possibly Mangkant on the line out of Bangkok, with hospital camps reported at Kanchanaburi and Makhom Fathon. Maintenance camps were also reported on the Bangkok-Chiengmai railread, though it is less clear as to where these were located and whether any Americans were sent to work at them. Such camps are believed to have existed at Dan Maung (also an airfield camp) and possibly also Chung Ge and Lumpang. A camp on the line to Saigen was also reported at Frachinburi. Airfield comps were reported at Dam Maung, Nakhom Mayek (northeast of Prachinburi) and in the Bhejturi area, including one possibly at Lambhang.

FJ Branch commands reported in these Thailand camps include #2, with no definitely known location, and #7, with headquarters at Kanchanaburi. Colonel Ishi, Colonel Yamagota, and Colonel Sugasawa are reported as commanders of Branch #2, and it is possible that this branch may have had its headquarters at "Chung Eni" (either Sangkanai on the Burna HA or Jung Ge on the Bangkok-Chiengmai line) or at Nakhom Fathon, or possibly at different times both. It was apparently charged with the maintenance of railroad lines other than the Burma route. The function of Branch #7 at Kanchanaburi, if other than the administration of the several camps at that point and perhaps a share in the maintenance work charged to branch #3 on the Eurna line, is not known.

In Into-China, the large majority of samps were located in the Saigon area, and included a camp in the dock area and a French army barracks which may have been the samp referred to as St. Hartin des Fallieres. Outside of Saigon, camps were reported at Cholon, Dalat, Tuy Hea, "Funi", Hanoi, Ma Trang, Kanh Hea, and Tourane. There were other

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locations used perhaps as collecting points, such as town and village jails, but the small number of Americans captured in this area does not permit of extensive reporting or identification of these points.

### c. Thailand Government Interment Camps:

There were only two camps reported as being under direct control, of the Thai government, one apparently shared with the Japanese at the Bangkok Military prison, and the civilian internment camp at Vachiravaud (Vajiravudh ?) College. Aircrew personnel interned in the military prison seem to have been transferred later to the civilian camp, and all internment consolidated there at the college. All internment under the Thai government was under a Major Chakrabandhu, with a Captain Torsakdi Yemni as his assistant.

## d. Camps in Malaya:

There were approximately sixteen internment camps in Malaya, of which only three are definitely known to have existed cutside of the Singapore area. The outstanding camps were those at Changi Jail, "Selerang" Outram Road, Sime Road, and the Krangi Hospital Camp. Area commanders reported included Major General Fukyu, Generals Arimura and Saite, and Lt. Cel. Kawabe; commanders at Changi, which was the principle Singapore internment camp, included officers named (Rank unreported in most cases) Takahashi, Numari, Tominage, and Kobiyashe. Information received from other sources indicates that the commanding generals concerned were Major General Fukuei, who was in command in July, 1942, and later Major General Arimura, who replaced Fukuei in January 1943, and Major General Saite, who assumed command in March 1944 and retained it until the war's end. The Malaya FW Headquarters at Singapore had three branches, #1 being at Pakan Baree, Sumatra, #2 at Palembang, Sumatra, and #3 in Singapore City itself.

There are several references in the reports to temporary internment points cutside of the Straits Settlements, but with the exception of Butterworth Prison, at Butterworth on the Malay Coast near Penang Island, it has not been possible to locate these points from the information given. References to "an Indian PON Camp" are frequent; there is no indication as to the whereabouts of this camp.

### e. Camps in Java:

As with the Buran camps, it is difficult to determine the exact number of FN and civilian internment camps located in Java so long as dependence on phonetically identified places raises the possibility of duplication. It is clear, however, that there were camps located in at least fifty places, and possibly as many as sixty-five. The most important of these, from the standpoint of American personnel, were the 10th Bn. (Bicycle) Camp in Batavia, the Naval Base at Tanajoengprick, the Makassur, Gleiock, and Tjideng camps in Batavia, the St. Vincentes and Mater Dolorosa hespitals in Meester Cornelis, a suburb of Batavia, and the camps at Tangerang, Tjimahi, Bandbeng, Ambarawa, and Socrabaja.

Eranch TW Headquarters officers are reported at the Sobunhonsho offices at Betavia, and at Bandoong. None is reported at Soerabaja, but it is considered probable that such a headquarters was also located in that city. Commanders at Batavia include Lt. Col. Kawabe and, during 1943-44, a Colonel Takada; at Bandoong, Lt. Colonel Misso Anami; and, at Soerabaja, Col. Kawabe. One report, probably reflecting conditions in 1943, suggests that a Major General Saito was in command of all PW affairs in Java at that time. A Colonel Marchama may also have commanded a FW Branch in the Java area; this name is reported as a commander from an internee at Macasura Camp, Batavia.

# f. Comps 1. Sumtra:

I formation of Comps in Sum tra is limited by the extremely small number of Americans found in that area. Only twolve are definitely known to have been emplyed on the reilroad construction from Pedang to Pakan Barse, a project almost as great and fully as exacting and cruelly forced through as was the Burma reilroad construction, and the number of civilians in interament comps was small and scattered. It is definitely known that there were several camps in the Pakan Barse area, where Branch #1 of Malay PW Herdquarters was located. On the railroad running south to Medarapentai, and then east to meet existing line at Sidjeendjeeng there were a number of transient work camps much like the "Kile" comps in Eurma, on at least seven of which Americans reported, and there was apparently a base camp at Medarapantai as well as at Sidjeendjeeng and Pakan Barce.

# g. Miscellaneous;

American personnel were also reported held at Denpassar, Bali, and Whingapee, Soumba, and at least temperarily at "Karmal" and Bangkalang on Maddera Island. There were, of course, large numbers of personnel interned in the Calebos, but since nearly all of these were evacuated to Manila, the only information evailable is related to internment at Macassar Jail, Kil Gamp, and the new comp built south of Kil at Macassar. No information is presently evailable on the administrative organization of these areas nor the identity of commanding officers.

# 2. Comp Commanders and Guards:

Since relatively few internees had direct contact with comp commanders, their reports on this topic were fragmentary. Such contact, of course, was primarily the responsibility of the Senier Representatives, most of whom were British or Dutch. Thus familiarity with commanders was largely limited to hearsny, and this in turn the less reliable in that Americans do not easily grasp the spelling of criental names as a matter of course. For these reasons it has not been possible to compile more than a barely partial list of Japanese commanders and other responsible personnel in the individual camps. What information has been gathered is listed with the comps in Exhibit"]".

It will be noted that names of comp commanders recur as assigned to different compart different times. There is, of course, the probability of some duplication, particularly in the case of common Japanese names such as Suzuki; to the same time, it should be noted that the same commander would frequently be transferred from one camp to another with the transfer of the group of prisoners for which he was responsible. This practice was especially common along the Bangkok-Moulmein railroad in Burma and Thailand, where both commanders and guard personnel were moved with the Mobile Comp groups to which they were assigned.

Commanders of the camps in all areas ranged widely in rank, the highest reported being that of Captain, the lowest Private. In a few cases command was reported in the hands of Koreans; it has not been possible to distinguish between Japanese and Korean personnel with any certainty ponding the receipt of whatever documents may be recovered by RAFWI terms presently combing all headquarters areas in Southeast Asia.

Guard personnel, included Japanese enlisted men up to and including the rank of Sergeant and large numbers of intives and Koreans. The Koreans were found chiefly in the comps in Burns and Thailand. Sikhs were reperted at Changi Jail in Singapore, but not elsewhere. Indenesions (and possibly some Malayans, the reports merely specifying "intives") were used as guards at labor comps in Java and Sumitra, and native police are reported in Burna, Thailand, and, at least in the earlier periods, at Macassar, Celebes. This r port makes no attempt to list or identify guard personnel in detail; such a listing is germane only to the War Crimes investigations already fully covered by the Counter Intelligence Corps. The picture may be suggested by a quotation from one civilian internee, "A buck private had full authority to do as he pleased; a FON couldn't go any higher." And it is quite apparent that this authority was consistently abused.

The guards were illiterate and low-grade personnel. Their suddon rise to a position of command, directing the lives and labors of large groups of man quickly developed a latent and infectious cruch streak in their characters. Domination over men of races which had, in their eyes, traditionally asserted a superiority over them was a new and wonderful thing; it led to an unrelieved display of arrogance, cruchty, and bestichty. They speke no English, and made no apparent effort to learn it. Being largely treated as animals by their own superiors, they bettered their instructors, and showed an inspired skill in humiliating, degrading, and torturing these in their charge. Reports substantiating this analysis come from all setions of Southeast Asic without distinction.

While the reports vary widely in apprecising the conduct of active guards as compared with the Japanese, it has not been possible to draw from them only clearly valid general summary. Officers' reports suggest that the Sikh guards at Chingi treated prisoners as well or botter than did the Japanese; enlisted men seem to have found than the same as that reccived from the Japanese, possibly barsher in the carly stages of the war, and quite clearly less harsh than the Japanese toward the end. It appears that Koreans, and to some extent mitive guards, sensed the imminence of an Allied vietory in late 1944 or a rily 1945, and conducted themselves accordingly, whereas it is certain that Japanese enlisted personal had no suspicion of impending defect until the very last weeks of the wir if at all. It is interesting to note that in some encode both Koreans and Japanese definitely favored efficer personnel, providing than with oppertunity to bothe in jungle streams in Burm. This may parhaps be explained by other reports and other supplies to internees, in some encoder supplies looted by them from Japanese and Red Crose stocks. It is clear that officers would be considered the best customers for such sales.

Comp commanders regarded their guards' conduct with approval either tacit or expressed in almost all cases. There is no reported case of a guard's conduct being corrected or punished by his superiors; this, perhaps may in small part be because of the need to "save face", yet there are sufficient reports of officers and commanders participating in or encouraging the mistroatment of prisoners to indicate that little correction was ever sought. The only camp commander (outside of these under the Thei Government at Bangkok) reported as requiring any remotely decent standard of conduct on the part of his staff was a Captain Mariyama, who replaced it. Sonai at Bicycle Camp, Batavia. Of him, it is reported that he bettered the conditions found under Sonai's consistent stadiam and cruchy.

It. Sonai was probably the most universally remembered commander in the reports; it is evident that he gave cause to be remembered. Other commanders who are frequently reported include It. Wakamatsu at 100-Kile eamp on the Burma railroad, It. Naite as second-in-command to Colonel Negatome at FW Branch #3 in Theiland, It. Takahashi at Changi camp, Singapore, and one Okagawa (rank unknown) at Ambarawa, Java. All of these are charged with individual brutchity as well as with the command of camps in which mistreatment was widespread and apparently encouraged.

Reports of trantment which was at least indifferent rather than positively abusive, in addition to that on Capt. Mariyana, were received on a Lt. Suzuki, who was commander of Bicycle Comp prior to Sensi and up to 20 August, 1942 (and who may later have been in charge of some work parties in Burma, though there is nothing to show that this was the same individual, and the Burma Suzuki was for less favorably reported), and on his executive officer, It. Kategiri. Simil r reports were also received on a Captain Suzuki at Dam Maung, Thailand and on a Captain Maguchi commanding the officers' camp at Kanchanaburi. These individuals apparently made some slight effort to cooperate with prisoners in bettering conditions under the constant pressure of short supply and directives from higher heldquartars requiring the completion of assigned work projects regardless of cost in life or health. It must be noted, however, that these reports stress chiefly the negative - feilure to do herm - rather than any substantial amount of positive beneficence.

### 3. Comp Regulations and Discipline:

The regulations published for the conduct of prisoners were probably based on some general directive drafted by a central authority in Tokyo, since it is reported that officers were frequently seen thumbing books apparently containing such directives. No such books have as yet been recovered, however, and though all reported compilations of rules show a large number of someon topics and similar trends of intent, there is considerable variation in the local regulations reported, both as to phrasing and strictness or severity. With the catablishment of organized POW Branches and Branch Commands, compiled regulations were issued by these offices for their subordin to comps, and these too show sense degree of similarity, though they are not identical. One example of such a Branch Headquirters directive is appended as Exhibit "E" and wis issued by Colonel Negatema from Branch #3 in Thailand; a compilation from memory of local comp rules drawn up by two evacuated American POWs is appended as Exhibit "E".

Even after the publication of such directives, however, it must be stressed that local commanders had free rein in their interpretation, and even apparent authority to amend or extend them, or to make new rulings, for beyond the like power of any American commander. Thus, for example, a ruling that a latrine guard would be posted at each barracks with responsibility for all personnel who left it to use the latrine was established in all comps. In some, this guard was a fellow prisoner detailed to the duty. In others, it was a Karean or other native guard; and while in some cases the prisoner was merely required to report his number to this guard on larving the barracks, in others he was required to ask for and receive permission (which the guard apparently had power to withold!) before larving. In one reported case, a prisoner was beaten for fullure to request such permission - which had never before been required at that ecamp; on the next subsequent occasion, how a beaten for annoying the guard when he did request it. Although regulations appear to have been posted in English in all comps, changes were frequent and unannounced - often made individually by non-English-speaking guards.

With the verience between different guards in a given comp, between different periods in one comp, and invariably wide differences as between different comps (with transfer from one to mother a fairly frequent converse) it is apprent that a prisoner or internee required almost psychic sensitivity to avoid confusion, and the inevitable infringement of innumerable patty rules. Conditions under which these men lived did not tend to develop sensitivity.

The rules most frequently reported as supplementing the general type of directive appended to this report have one common characteristic, a pettiness and smallness of substance designed skillfully to inconvenience, irritate, and above all degrade the prisoner. All prisoners and internees,

regardless of rank, were required when covered to solute all guard personnel from a position of strict attention; when uncovered, they were required to bow in criental fashion. Officers were frequently and severely beaten for failure to honor guard privates and native guards in this way. When guard personnel entered a barracks, the first prisoner to see him was to call the entire barracks to attention; insufficiently rigid and braced attention was the excuse for much beating and mistreatment. Lying down during the daytime was prohibited, and this prohibition seems to have ex-tended to those sick in quarters. Reading was permitted during certain hours only, likewise smoking, which was forbidden out of doors, and in all cases unless an ashtray was available. Whistling or singing was forbidden at all times: even conversition was barred while at work. Gatherings and essemblies for any purpose word forbidden, with contaional exceptions found in the case of recreational or entertainment projects permitted by a few more lemient communders; with the same exception, all lectures, classes, or other group study was barred. The possession of paper or other writing materials was limited and in some cases forbidden, and, above all else, outside con-tacts with civilian or active personnel was prohibited on pain of death. Only one exception to this last regulation is reported; It. Suzuki during the early days at Bicycle camp Batavia appears to have permitted the purchase of augmented food supplies, fruit, etc., from local vendors, though the methods of making such contact are not described, and may well have been through comp officials.

The treatment accorded these who by design - or more frequently by accident - violated any of the above rulings (or the countless vurittiens and refinements of them created by individual guards) has been fully reported in detail by the War Crimes investigations. Criminality was their outst nding characteristic. Most usual was physical violence, - beatings with the hands, closed fists, rifle barrels or butts, bamboo poles, metal rods, or any other handy weapon, and leading to bruises, open wounds, fractures, severe internal haemborrages, and ruptures of spleen, kidneys, testicles, and other organs. Ulcers and wounds were often chosen as the target for further abuse, being beaten or lightly flicked with bamboo slivers, to provent healing. Ingenious actudes were devised to use the victim's physical structure against itself, the most common being to kneel him with a rod placed behind the knees, and then either load his upraised arms with rocks or other weight, or to jump on his shoulders, so as to strain or dislocate the knee joints. The victim would be forced to drink water or waterlogged thin gruel until his stomach was distensed, and the guard would then force him to lie down, and would jump on the distended parts of his body. If, during a beating, the victim fainted or fell to the ground, he would be kicked with heavy boots in the face, stemach, and ribs, or jumped upon. Mass punishment was common, including in its mildest form the closing of the conteen (reported as no great loss) for periods of several weeks, and, more serious, mass beatings and reduction of the always inadequate rations either by fifty percent or in some cases entirely, over periods of several days or even weeks. Execution by both shooting and beheading was reported; in one case a Japanese efficer using a Burnese sword is reported to have felt chagrin that he required three strokes to sever the head from the body. The mildest punishment used was to require the victim to stand at rigid attention for a period of from three hours to several days, occasionally with beatings while so standing, and in the het tropical sun, barchadod, and without food or w ter. This punishment was moted out to both individuals and mass groups.

Treatment of these types components be distinguished from normal comp conditions, since it technically constituted punishment. Such a distinction, however, is acadamic, useful only in presenting an ordered report. In fact, such "punishment" was so common is to be an integral part of normal living conditions. There is no reported case of an individual who by "good conduct" escaped ony part of the usual history of degradation and abuse. There were no special privileges for "good behavior". Considenally, cooperation on the part of a PM group as a whole, in the form of increased output of work, would load to some improvement of conditions, but this was entirely at the whim of the comp commander. In general, as one evacued put it, it was "continual nerve-wracking petty ennoy nee punctuated regularly with beatings."

## B. LIVING CONDITIONS

In the appended list of internment camps (Exhibit "I") are notes showing all reported information which was ascribed to specific and separate camps on the subjects of general conditions and also food, shelter, medicine and health, recreation, pay and personal property, mail, packages, and Red Cross supplies, with which this subsection is concerned. No attempt will be made, therefore, to detail individual examples here save insofar as they are representative of conditions generally encountered.

### 1. Sholter:

Specific reports on the types of buildings in which internees were housed are rare, except where conditions were so bad as to insist on notice. A few general observations, however, may be made. Most important is to distinguish between two major types of housing: one, where previously constructed buildings, either jails, warehouses, or other structures, were adapted for use as internment camps, and the other, where new construction was re-uired. Conditions differ sharply between these two types of camps.

In those camps which were housed in previously constructed buildings of a permanent nature, the major defect seems to have been overcrowding, with bad sanitation as a concomitant. Thus in Changi Jail, built to house 600 oriental prisoners, as many as 3000 were crowded to ne time; in the Tjideng Civilian internment camp in Patavia, one hundred women and children were crowded into space originally designed for a finally of six. At LOG Camp, Pandoeng, 3750 military prisoners were crowded, with floor space of about 14" x 42" per man, in a camp built for 300 and a total of 40 latrines swill ble for the entire camp. It should be noted, moreover, that these were not transient camps where such conditions might occasionally be expected....nd of course were encountered, as e.g., at Sarang Jail and Banten Park Theatro--but were in permanent camps where they had to be endured over substantial periods of time.

Housing at specially constructed camps was of a different order, though usually for verse rather than preferable to the conditions encountered in permanent structures described above. There was less erowding; occasionally the space allotted was fully adecuate for the numbers housed, but other factors operated to render conditions as bad or verse. At Changi, for instance, the Jail was a permanent structure, and as such badly overcrowded; the need for hospital facilities then forced the construction of huts to supplement the Jail. This hospital was constructed of thatched atap huts, poorly designed to shelter against wind or rain, and the "patients" were forced to sleep on the ground. In other areas, construction was usually of bamboo, and generally of the most flimsy type. Heny were without adecuate roofing, and rain poured in unchecked during the wet season; some had little by way of walls other than posts to support the framework on which the roof thatching was laid.

Nor was any apparant attempt made to select areas proper for camp construction. In many cases water supply was short or nonexistent; it was frequently limited to jungle streams which were completely dry for long periods during the dry season. The area in which the new camp at Macassar in the Celebes was built, south of the FHI Camp, was highly malarious. 100-Filo camp on the Humma railroad was built in a swamp, with six inches of water covering the dirt floor almost constantly during the rainy season. Locations were also selected with a bland disregard for the proximity of military objectives, being placed near roads, railroads, bridges, gun emplacements, and airfields; in some cases this may have been deliberate, in the light of reports from the Smigon dock camp that, immediately after the air alarn was sounded, all locomotives in adjacent yards were brought up near the prison camp. No camps were reported as being marked as Fi camps for protection against air attack.

The above discussion refers entirely to permanent or base campe. It is clear that bad as these were, they were infinitely superior to the transit camps, jungle camps, and work camps, to the extent that after a period of time in the work camps, personnel regarded the base camps as good. In the vork camps, construction was done by the prisoners themselves, under extreme pressure, limited in personnel, and, in one reported case, by these too sick to be taken out to work on the railread without other assistance. These camps were built in a matter of hours, and the result was only the sketchiest excuse for shelter--in some cases merely bamboo poles set in the dirt and supporting matted roofs, with little or no available water supply, and open latrines.

The only relief that was over experienced from the above evils was in those cases where, after transfer out of work camps, personnel were temporarily housed in permanent atructures from which sufficient personnel had been removed to reduce the over-croading. Thus at ULL Camp, Nacassar, Gelebes, which was for some time badly over-crowded, successive shipments of vork parties to other areas reduced the number housed there to the point where conditions were fairly good. No sericus overcrowding was reported during the time that Tandjoengprick Naval Base was used as a collecting point, and conditions there were likewise found good. The officers' camp and enlisted camps at Kanchanaburi were apparently well constructed and designed as rest camps; to non coming off the railroad in Burna, these areas and the Saigon camps were literally reported as "heaven."

### 2. Sanitation:

Specific reports on sanitation and sanitation facilities are far in number, but again the general report is that it was bad. It is evident that what facilities there were, and what improvements were made, were without exception the work of the interness themselves.

Sonitation facilities in transient camps were, as vere other conditions, the vorst. The usual provision was a slop bucket in the individual cell, for the use of whitever number were crowded therein. There were no facilities whatseever in Banten Park Theater, buckets in Serang Jail, and even in Tandjeengprick Naval Base, where food and treatment were on the whole fairly good, the sanitation was reported bad. It Hacassar Jail, the crowded conditions led to bad sanitation; early and widespread dysentery was reported as a result.

In regular internment camps, the distinction between permanent structures previously built and new construction for the express use of internees is again significant. In the temporary structures, along the Burna relified, the Fakan-Beree relified, and in the Colebes, sanitation was impaired chiefly through the location selected for the camp, or because of haste in constructing it, as, e.g., the stamps chosen as campsites in the jungle, with a water line as close as six inches below the surface, and during the rainy season above it—which made effective waste-disposal impossible. In these camps, however, sanitation discipline was reported high; it was usually possible to bell at least small quantities of water with available equipment; at one camp along the jungle a number of ell drums ware discovered and appropriated by the prisoners for this use, and there was constant cooperation on the part of all personnal to see that sick prisoners unable to provide for themselves were taken care of. Even in these cases where no equipment for beiling water was provided, means were improvised to do so with whatever was at hand. Insect-control was, of course, a practical impossibility, but every a fort was apparently made to improve latrine construction and disposal facilities for other waste to minimize pollution of this type. Specific reports indicate execrably bad conditions without exception in the jungle camps in Burns, particularly at 60-Kilo, 85-Kilo and 100-Kilo camps, with similar but less pronounced reports from 18-Kilo and 62-Kilo camps. In this area, open latrines seem to have been conson, facilities for proper cooking or boiling water almost non-existent, water scarce during the dry season, and flooding during the rains to the point that excrement from the latrines floated freely under the bads in berracks areas. Lack of manpower in the hospital camps reported at these points made it virtually impossible for any remedial action to be taken. Similar conditions are less specifically reported at the new camp at Macassar Collebes, south of KHL camp, at Ambarawa in Java, and at camps on the Sumatra railroad between Paka Baree and Mesarapantai. Nephasis in the reports of the new Breasar camp in the Collebes was laid on the filth in the latrine area, these were open and thick with flies, and froctuently overflowed to spread filth over wide areas.

There permanent proviously-built structures were used, the similation varied directly with the number housed. At Outral Road camp in Singapore, the situation was reported as typical; there were no reports of serious overcrowding, and it was possible to maintain some degree of sanitation. One report specifies the facilities as consisting of a slop-bucket kept in each cell, with the internees allowed three to five minutes out of the cells to wash, empty the buckets, and get what exercise was possible in the remaining time if any. The individual reporting, however, added that for one three-months period, this freedom was permitted only twice a week.

Conditions at Changi Jail were far more serious. Constant epidemics of dysentery were reported here caused by short water supply and bad sanitation. It will be remembered that five times the number for which the jail was built were quartered here; there was one "scuat" (Indian type) water closet per cell, and the water flushing into the pen provided the only water supply available for all purposes including drinking water. Some improvements in these conditions were reported made by the prisoners themselves, but the nature of this improvement could not be learned, and apprently was not sufficient to relieve the seriousness of existing conditions. Other caups in the Singapore area seem to have been lease crowded, and reports on sumitation hence run from fair to good.

A similar picture is found in Java in these cases where existing camps or other structures were used for intermaent. The best reports cone from the 10th Bn (Bicycle) Caup at Batavia, which from available information appears to have been the cleanest Camp in Southeast Asia. Although used as a transient camp, it was apprently large enough to provide reasonable sanitary facilities for those cuartered there. By contrast, the assignment of 3750 men to the LOG Camp, Bandoung, where there were provisions for a camp of 300, including AO latrines, resulted in serieusly bad conditions. The Depot camp was reported fair, and Landsdorpvoerdingesticht bad. The civilian camp at Tjideng, Batavia, gives a like report; evererending resulted in one hundred women and children being forced to share a single latrine in a house designed for a family of fire, and the water supply was extremely short.

The summary of sanitation conditions can be brief; what facilities existed were provided through the internees' our efforts, and other than this, there was nothing. Nothing but choked up and overflowing latrines, polluted water, and clouds of insects free to spread disease once started like a preiris fire.

### 3. Food:

It can hardly be said for the food provided internees in Southeast Asia that the plain fact is that malnutrition was the direct cause of more deaths than any other factor in a situ tion where the death rate occasionally reached fifty or sixty percent. This, of course, would not show on official records; it was flatly reported that the Japanese prohibited the entry of malnutrition as a cause of death on any birth certificate. One PC' managed for a short time to keep a record of the precise cuantities of food issued to him along the Burma reilroad, this with other material on samp conditions is appended as Exhibit "O" to this report.

Unquistionably the worst conditions were those uncountered on the human railroad, where food was consistently and seriously inademute, the more so for non-england in manual labor. Food there consisted of rice and staw composed chiefly of hily roots and watermalons, with some sweat potate. A little must was reported issued daily to a camp force of about 1500 men. Tater was obtained from nearby streams and hile sources, and orwipment for beiling water or proparing food was extremely scares. During the dry season, water was also extremely scares. One report lists the following as the official ration in Burna:

Heat	50 ms
Hico	500 ers
Vugat blas	500 grs
Sugar	15 grs
Selt	15 (rs
Oil	20 grs
	100

The report fiving these figures adds the cryptic statement, "Soldom issued in full." From other statements it is evident that the above ration was probably never issued in full after earch or April 1943; from that time onward there was standy reduction in the amount of all components issued. It might be added that from other sources, the caloric value of rice is indicated to be about 31 calories per gram.

The deterioration in rations issued was a marked and periods one. At 18-Kilo camp, in February, it was reported that 500 lbs. of dressed mean were available for  $17\beta2$  men; this dropped steadily, until at 100-Kilo C mp in May, June, and July of 1943, there was practically no mean at all. There was a canteen at 18 Hilo camp, where some supplies of duck eggs, brown sugar, onions, and oil could be obtained; by 15 march these supplies had almost completely run out. On June 9th, the report at 100-Kilo indicated no canteen, and a specified of mean per man per day. All mean was gone by 26 June. On the 4th of July, one cow was obtained, providing 130 lbs. dressed mean for 1910 mean, or roughly one cunce each. At that time, the mean reported that they were enting spakes, dee, rats, lizards, and insects; there was great collaboration on one constant the barracks areas were flooded. In some camps, what mean there was were taken by the guards, with the result that the batter cuts were taken by the motion of the take the batter cuts were taken by the mark of the transport of the take of the batter cuts were taken by the mark of the transport to be and and only on the day is about the bart of the batter cuts were taken by the more that the take the take areas were flooded. In some camps, what meant there was mas issued by the guards, with the result that the batter cuts were taken by the mark rotted in the tropical sum for two days or more before being distributed. These, it should be remembered, were rations for men doing ten to fourteen hours of heavy physical labor per day.

It typears to have been standard Japanese policy to feed the sid: on helf rations, since they were unable to work and hance "earn their keep." This practice is known to have been officially approved by Colonel Magatear, commanding Thai Branch [3, and Captain Hizutani, of Eranch [5, is reported as having publicly announced his intention to abundon the side to starvation. Thus, the 1 rgs numbers in side camps at 18-File, 62-File, and 80-kilo camps were supplied with rations running on the average 100 to 150 grade per day-and in damy cases these personnel were nevertheless re wired to perform all housekeeping labor about the camp, or to assume a substantial portion thereof. No other area reports conditions as serious as these in Burna, with the exception perhaps of Ch ngi, Outran Road, and Krangi Hospital camps in Singapore, Ambarawa in Java, nd the railroad work camps in Sumatre. In Singapore, while it is clear that food supply was bed, still it did not approach that in the railroad camps; fish was available, chiefly whitehait and lse some salt fish, and a lo grade of coffee made chiefly from code barns, together with some curry perder, black flour, vinegar, and a fair culnity of the oil were reported available. Changi and Outran Road, he ever, were in some reports shown as issuing as little as 100 grams of food per day. Another report on Outran read indic tos one pint of food, consisting 70% of rice and 30% of watery soup, was the issue per meal. Some food was available through Hed Cross stores; at Changi, as of 9 November 1942, it was reported at 2 of cannod meat, 4 of wegetables, 2 of sugar and 2 of fruit were available per weak from this source. Later on, however, the ration here was reported as consisting solely of rice.

At krangi Mospital chap, the rule again was half rations for the sick; it consisted of one pint of rice, three rice cronustes, a little whitebait, a pint of staw, and two pints of weak tea per day. This, however, could apparently be supplemented by the other supplies mentioned above, which were on sale at the hospital canteen at high prices, e.g. 02.80 per pound for palm oil, 018.50 per pound for the synthetic coffee, 055 lb. for whitebait, and 36 for salt fish. Tobacco was occasionally reported available, at prices ranging from '3 to '4.20 an ounce.

At camps on the Sumatra railroad, the r tion was probably as bad or worse than that in Burnt but reports are so few that it is impossible to make a certain conclusion on the point. One statement shared rations "only enough to keep one alive", consisting of a small amount of rice, kotele leaf, and occasional small amounts of ment, stated to be some sort of caribou. Gresses, forms, trapped smakes, and iguants were used to supplement this food; again, stray cats and dogs were immediately causht and eaten. Another report indicated that breakfast consisted of one cupful of boiled topics flour; this the only nourishment before leaving for a day's work on reilroad construction. There were no canteen supplies reported with which to supplement the ration in Sumatra.

Food supply in the transient caups in Java has clready been briefly noted in the section on cepture. It will be remembered that, save where personnel had rations with them at the time of capture, the o ficial supply was extrambly bad, and nourishment was gained catch-ascatch-con from native trading, by picking wild fruits and coconuts, and from an extremely skimpy dependse ration about on a per with that evaluable in Burger. It was, however, possible to do considerable trading with the netives, and large mentities of supplies were pur-chased in Batavi and Bandoeng for consumption at Loan School, Tendjoungprick, and Revels Camps. Horsever, conditions improved some-what as regards the official ration, and after the trading has been cut down by official orders that here around of emission a hid been could down by official order, when large groups of prisoners had been moved on to Singapore and thence to Burna. But personnel remaining at Bicyclu Comp continue to report poor rullity in the ration, and by the and of 1942 almost nothing was coming through in outside trade. Must and vegetables were scarce, the meat consisting of the guts of an occasional bullock. There were some sweet potatoes av ilable; the rice was often wormy, spoiled, or the sweepings from the godowns. Also reported were smill cushtities of spinach, weak tert, and a very bad cushity of bread in small amounts. For the work parties later employed at the General Motors plant in B tavia, the ration was increased by fifty per cent, but it is stated that this increase was more than met by the long hours and heavy nature of the work required of the group amployed there.

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Although reports on other comps in Juve are of necessity less datailed, a reading of 11 wiltble reports takin together suggest that conditions at Amberius were similar or verse, and in the rest of the Juve comps slightly better, then these at Bicycle Comp. At Hikessur ("Hibessure") food as reported short, especially in vegetables and meet, but it was also reported possible to purchase against as supplies, fruit ad possibly other items, from the actively good. At "Lesserbis" (not otherwise located) civili a comp, food was reported "coolie food, no proteins, fats, nor fruit." At 5t. Wincentes hespital and Adde in B tavit, food was reported poor, and less in all comps in the Secrebija are; at Polars, the report on the Elecstrant School carp indicated bud food with insufficient meet and vegetables. Reports of fair to good food care from the Glodeck and in B tavit, at Tindjoengpried, and at Bigwi jail.

In the Collebos word, the picture scales to how been substantially similar. At transiant our stars in Heersson J il, privition was extrane; issue of one handful of rice per samper day was reported. Then, as in other words, conditions improved with the move to permanent currents at MIL camp, and food there was reported fair, improving as work drafts from the camp to other trans, and the removal of all civilians to other internment conters, reduced the numbers in camp. At no time could the food be called good, however, and there was no mores of supplementing it with a from Red Cross stores or from the network.

Although the physical conditions resulting from the sounty food issue in the caups will be discussed in greater datail in a subsequent section on Health, it may be noted here that there was no mingle item in the long errory of miseries imposed by the J process that rendered the intermeds more helpless. Living our store could be and were given all possible attention and affort; even punishment and physical mistre tment was to some extent wordable if the individual was willing to undergo the humili tions necessary to that and. But, says for the consuless untaking for makes and stray dogs, there was little that could be done to gein more field. Some efficient' caups instituted gardens, but these untaking for makes and stray dogs, there was little that could be done to gein more field. Some efficient' caups instituted gardens, but these used is small minority. Fundment lig, the prime rescale dependent on the rations issued by their captors. Even there the full ration was issued, it us hardly sufficient for the tipes of 1 ber cauged. Thather by design or by accident, and cart inly the indifference on the part of these responsible, food provided us a substantiably less than that is accure to discuss, or provent the drain that invitably occurred on the physical reserves of these pane.

## 4. Clothings

There we no reports specifically directed to the well bility or supply of clothing in Southerst Add Graps, since the form of relationnairs given did not cover this topic. Free 11 available exterict, he swer, it may be have did that clothing was one of the lesser problems of non intermed in this rad; there we no great numbers of cash inteon the ground of in descript clothing, and in the light of other topics, these would be expected if any difficulty has been experienced. It is definitely known that some clothing was issued by the dipress; one specific report indicates the issue of some 350 prime of captured any shows at Kinchen buri in January of 1964. The large number of reports indic ting use by PMs of clothing as mouns of bartes for food ad medicine suggests that it no time was clothing seriously short, lithough there we have reports of men hing nothing but shows and shorts to not report in the jungle.

## 5. Hadieina and Hamlth:

The foregoing discussions of the shelter, senitation, and feed supply at Southeast Asia emps indicates, if nothing else, an area in which the best-e upped medical section would find itself busy. The reports, on the other hand, indicate that there was not even the amount and kind of medical supplies provided for prisoners that were available to the Japanese troops--that, with little exception, what few medical supplies could be had were stolen from the Japanese or brought from the mitives--and, as previously noted, that Japanese policy was to starve the sick to death as being unable to pull their weight in assigned work.

The hospitals on the Burner a ilrect were death traps. The reports on this fact achieve a consistency shows and beyond any other topic in the entire investigation. The communing officer of 10° Brench 3 has been consistently rested as announcing that it was his direct intention to let the sick die, and he, with his subordinates, effectively are ted conditions conducive to this end.

In addition to the cut to hilf-rations for sich personnel, slrandy discussed, we find that there was literally no provision for trained modical personnel in the hospital energy, save where by accident a prisoner himself was a doctor. The only reported instance of Japaness modical personnel in this area was one report indicating an inspection of the condition of the sick at 80-Kilo Cuep by a dontal student of three weeks' experience. It is clear that what modical personnel were numbered among the prisoners themselves did hereic work; this was true without distinction between American, English, and Dutch personnel. Commander Epstein, of the U.S. Nevy, was reported as having performed and/or surgical operations with or upment consisting of one and 1 scalpel, a syringe with a broken medle, and a few drugs. An Australian : medical officer was reported as having performed angles, a medical officer was reported as having performed and successfully with shall replicate or upment, to the management of Colonel Negation.

Modical supplies reported av if ble in limited or smill conntities included ruinine, (one five-grain tablet per man per day or alternate days - for men on working parties only), some charcel for dysentery, het unter for ulcers, and a little indine, some neur flavin, and some ringworn eintment, together with eccessional rolls of bendages. It should be noted, however, that not all of these were available to all carps; meet charps reported had charcel, perhaps ball had the cuining--none of which was ever issued to a person not well enough to tork, and only occasional camps reported any of the other supplied. The use of clothing, rags, and other actuals for bandages was conven.

It is impossible to compile t this point any tabulation of disease frequency or rate in these camps; there has been no reported case of an evacuated prisoner the did not stand time or another suffer at least one (and usually several) of the following: maleria, dysentery, dengue, tropical alcors, beri-beri, oudget, pellogra, ad possibly others, with dysentery apparently the most content, and intensified by the serious malnutrition already discussed. In addition to disease, of course, consideration must be taken of the numbers who it one time or mother suffered injuries at the hands of the guirds.

Gensional trading with the natives and some modicines available in addition to the limited curatities reported above; a digest of the reports suggests, however, that t is was more than compensated for by the fact that modical supplies were frequently looted by the Japanese under the protext that "modicine was for the troops." Each, for instance was the almost invariable fate of the modical supplies included in Red Gross prokages. No reports from other areas (except on the Sumstra railroad) even approximate the extremes of the "death camps" on the Burna railroad in these respects. Yet the fundamental principles remained the same in all areas. In Singapore, the medical facilities reported as good or fair were those in which there were medical personnel among the internees; the work of the English and Dutch dectors at Changi Hospital was highly praised in all reports touching on the subject. At Outrin Road, it was reported that tests were given for dysentery by the Japanese at one time, but no further action taken. The drugs reported available in the Singapore area seems to have been even more limited than in Burna and Theiland; the principal source of supply seems to have been those stores which they had at the time of capitulation and which they had succeeded in retaining despite the Japanese tendency to remove them for troop use.

In Java, some modical supplies soon to have been available, though no itemized reports were received. The hospitals in Batavia were stripped of their X-Ray equipment and much of their other facilities immediately after the Japanese occupation, and the reports indicate small and poorly equipped hospitals, always overcrowded, but in general cleaner and better supplied than elsewhere in Southeast asia. This was certainly true of the hospital at Bicycle Camp; St. Vincentes Hospital was reported fair to good; the CBZ Hospital in Sourabaja reported fair. There were no reports on conditions at Hater Delerosa Hospital in Meester Cornelis, nor on the CBZ Hospital in Batavia.

The KIL Comp in Macessar, Colobes, appears to have been about on a par with the less extreme of the Burna railroad hospital camps, with some cuining reported available, and occasionally salves. The group here appears to have developed the act of stealing medical supplies from the Japanese to a fine point; a number of enlisted personnel were reported engaged in this activity and were the subject of commendation by the last commissioned officer in charge at Macassar, Lt. Fisher, USM.

The hospital camps in Sumatr , on the Pakan-Baros railroad, were reported also as being substantially in a class with those in Buran. Chinchena bark and charceal were the only medicines reported available.

One miscellaneous item in scope of this section is the flet that, in some of the comps in Java, compulsory physical exercise was reported required, and required even of these who were ill. It has already been noted that one who would be an ambulatory patient in an American hospital was required to work in Burn, and Summtre, and elsewhere if located in work camps, but here we have the same principle carried to a new extreme. It thus seems to have been a universal policy to prevent any but these too ill to stand from readining in bed or otherwise recover their strength.

The conclusion has friendy been and inescapable; the Japanese policy toward the sick was to let them die. Die they did, in increasing numbers.

6. Horals Factors: a. General:

It is readily evident from the reports that the factors listed in the four preceding sections were, despite all detriment to health and well-being, despite even a high casualty rate, none the less almost universally ineffective in despening the high morele of American personnel, both prisoners of war and civilians. No comparison with the morele enong other groups was received, no comparison is here intended. It is sufficient that American morele was of the highest throughout all phases of internment. There were some reports of discouragement and despeir in the camps on the Burne relieved, but these were a small minority, and none were reported permanent. There was no report of a morale loss emong American personnel leading to self-destruction, and surprisingly few (perhaps 3 or 4) cases of mental breakdown.

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The factors reported as contributing to this high morele word not chiefly matters on which action could be taken either by the internee or his captors. They include such matters as "confidence in the outcome of the war"(most frequently reported); "the fact that we were emericans"; and news of allied successes grined eith a through outside contacts or by a judicious reading of Japanese news sources. Next in importance was the appearance of allied bombing planes; although the PBY attack on the NATABLE MARD and sister ships had placed many prisoners in grave danger, and thus there was often some concern for personal safety involved, nevertheless this was reported as a source of high morele in a large number of cases. A fifth factor reported, again in a substanti 1 number of cases, was the retention of the individual's sense of humor. Other than these, there was very sell number of reports crediting religious belief, shil, recreational facilities, and the like with a helpful effect on morele, but these were scattered and represent at best two or three percent of the total cases.

Factors reported as lowering morels were less often given; the total number is under five percent of reports on morale, suggesting that these matters which would depress or discourage were because of their very nature not dealled upon nor mulled over by the individual. The few reports that were obtained refer to lack of mail and contact with home (most frequent), ill health, and the living conditions. One or two referred to bed relations with prisoners of other allied mations, one specifically mentioning the decision of the senior allied representatives at Changi to discourage the escape committee formed at that camp.

### b. Rucrustional f cilitius:

Reports of any material provision for recretion of any kind are almost nonexistent throughout the Southeast asin PC and internment emps. The one outstanding fact is that such facilities, whether conteens, lecture and education facilities, music, entertainment, sports, or religious services, did not exist and were in fact flatly and openly forbidden in the caups along the Burna railroad. It does appear, however, that some facilities of these types was made while ble later, in other areas.

Conteens were reported at Changi, Krangi hespitel, Depot Camp in Bandeens, and tithe "2 camp at Paken Baree, Sum tra. These were not, however, reported as of any very high standard, and probably charged what amounted to black market prices. Thus, when the conteens as Depot Camp, Bandeeng, and it Paken Baree were, on difference occasions, closed as a punitive measure gainst the internees, those reporting this fact invariably added the comment that it was no great less-that the conteen had never amounted to much. The one report giving prices is that a deby AODSe Fewler, already referred to in the discussion of feed; other internets according prices noted for supplements to the ration, there noted, i.e., for curry powder, synthetic coffee, topics flour, vinegar, whitebuilt, and salt fish, the following miscell neous items are given:

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Cheroots 21¢ Cignratto papers 50°, also 25 sheats for 25¢ Tobacco 33 an ounce Tobacco stalks 15 (\$?) an ounce Soap 0 60 a pir (probably 060) Mashing scap 35.50 a bar Tooth powder 0 75 (prob bly 775) an ounce (reported pumice, poor) Thread 0 254 per 10 yds (reported canvas thread of poor quality) Talcum powder \$ 75 94.20 a bex (cuantity "about a handful") Candles 7 51.20 each Motopaper 0 30\$ per sheet It should be added that these prices were highly unstable; some items were reported to have tripled in price within a week's time. As the above items were reported for a samp in the area hard unstars, it may further be suspected that not all of the above items were available in the other conteens reported in more distant areas. Outside the comps under the jurisdiction of Malay Branch P' Hendeuarters, and Java, there were no conteens whatsoever reported.

Educational facilities, including lectures or availability of books, are reported only a Changi, Here there was a library reported. As his been noted, lectures seem generally and perhaps universally to have been forbidden. Other information on the supply of books and other reading material is limited to the general v ilability of newspapers, both Japanese and underground, which were produced in most areas through clandestine contact with outside a tives and civilians.

Music, concert parties, and other entertainments were forbidden in Burma, but seen thereafter to have developed in a number of areas, and had probably always been permitted in camps in Java and Malaya.

Positive reports were received from 10th Bn (Cycle) Comp, B. tavin, 15th Bn Comp, Bondoeng, and it Changi, Singapore. In the rest entrys in Thailand in and near Kanchamburi, it was reported that wonday was regarded as holiday, and concert parties permitted on that day. The nature of these entertainments seems to have been approximately what one would expect, anatour ministrel shows and variety shows, with talent drawn from all mation lities and branches interned in the given emap. It is apparent that production presented some difficulties, particularly as regards obtaining instruments; along the types of talentreported were guitarists, a violinist, a large number of singers, a "mystic" and a female impersentor. It would oppear that the productions achieved, however regard, were extremely successful.

Reports of sports or other facilities come only from Bicycla Comp, where volley ball was extensively ployed, with some inter-service tournaments, and at Changi Jail during 1942. No other area reported any such items. The compulsory physical training reported in Java Camps and also at Macassar in the Colebes, was the only case of its kind found, and there were one or two reports that the Japanese were seen using the athlatic e uipment which was shipped to the prisoners in FOT relief packages. It would ppear that labor was considered the only physical exercise necessary or desirable.

Religious facilities were also rarely reported. The prisoners were forbidden to hold services in casps along the Burar railroad, and they were also reported forbidden at 15th Bn C ap in B ndoeng. It is known, however, that a chapel existed at Tandjoengprick, known as St. George's, a small permanent structure probably a part of the original, n wellbase. Whether or not services were permitted in this chapel is not reported. The only much in which religious gatherings were known to have been hold is, again, it Changi, where a number of civilian missionaries were interned.

### c. Mail, Pack gas, and Red Cross supplies:

A summary of the reports suggests that there was no effort mide by the Japanese to provide any communication between prisoners and their families, nor to furnish Red Cross supplies, prior to Hay 1943, which is the earliest date reported for my distribution of such supplies. Hail began to be received in some cross in the summer of 1944; outbound will is first reported permitted about one year before this time, in November of 1943. In all cases, the handling of mill and pack ges was reported accompanied by delay, inefficiency, and frequent rifling of the contents. There was no apparent real improvement in this situation in any area prior to May of 1945, when in this respect as in others the Geneva Convention seems suddenly to have becaus important to the Japanese. As in other respects, the situ tion in Burne was exceedingly b dj not until the groups had left the construction camps on the reflected was any mail received. Therefore, in Their rest camps and in French Indo-Chine, reports indicate incoming mult in March, June, September, October, and Novamber of 1944 as the first received by the individual reporting, this mult being free one to two years old. There for, still arrived irregularly and totals received by any one person were reported variously as, cleven, twenty, none, twenty, two and one cable, seven cards, three ill over 1g years old, three cards, none, six, and one report of forty. The delay in this mult has been reported as caused in large measure by an inefficient dependent of the most elementary came of English, and exclined will at a rate of "h fow letters h day"-tossing these that could not be understood into a corner. At the and of the war, and the dependent surrender of their comp hondromators offices, cases were reported of finding large quantities of undelivered FON mult steled and lying in these offices.

Similar limitations seem to have governed the sending of stil. There are only two reports from Burnt, Theiland and Indo-Chine prisoners, one stating that the individual was permitted to send three posteards in three years, and the other indicating that mail other than post-ends was forbidden in that area. No information was obtained on the handling or transmission of these cords, or whether any of them were ever received, though there were numerous reports by personnel whose families had not heard from them at all during the period of their interment.

The report on the disposition of Red Grass preleques in Hura and Theiland is consistent, indic ting that there was one issue of such parelies while the men were at work camps in the jungle, and that these were rifled extensively before issue. Entire preleques were stolen, so that thereas men at base camps shared parelies in a 1 to 6 ration, men in outlying camps received 1 to 12 or 18. These ratios are consistently reported. Then, of those parels issued, much of the contents had been t ken, including in different cases the food, the eigeratuse (frequently \$ ken), the easily and the mode 1 sup lies. Approximately 90% of the parels were lacking one or more components. These items were also seen in use by guards and other Jop ness parsonnel, and being sold by them to the a tives. Nine ships were reported to have docked at Bangkek with supplies during t is period, though this may have been rumor. A large campant of supplies marked as being of the stock sent to Tokyo during the 1923 conthearks were reported seen. At the end of the war, 1 age stocks of these supplies were finally released to surviving prisoners, and the rifting was reported at an end.

Reports on shill from other means are less complete, but indicate substantially the same conditions. In Mally, one prisoner reported receipt of one posteard during his internant; - civilian teknowledged receipt of fifteen letters on the Gripsholm in December 1943, and a few others later, at Changi. In Java, the situation was reported toxecodingly poor," with little or no mill received, and outbound shill forbidden until November of 1943. No shill was reported to my Summary and none in the Colobes up to the time groups left there for Java in July of 1945.

The supply of Red Gross prektors in other treas was inferior to that encountered in Bural and Th iland, in that distribution was apparently tardier, and with far more looting of contents. There was, however, apparently more than one distribution of such supplies in the rans sive Macassar, Colobes, where none at all were reported. At Sing pore, one civilian reported receipt of one person 1 pick ge and two others, and an officer had share in three, one-seventh, one-teath, and one-twelfth, respectively. In Java, general distribution was reported as starting in they of 1944, although there was one report that, a taberawa, a quantity of such packages were burned by the Japanese in May of 1963, after an American had signed receipts for them, because of the illied sinking of a Japanese ship on which they had been transported. It was not possible, however, to check this report primest simil rome from Batavi, indicating that fits the sinking of the Japanese relief ship ASA MARU in May of 1945, the Japanese threatened to destroy the supplies--but finally as unessed and allowed distribution. One package, moreover, was reported received by a prisoner at Makassure, Batavi, in May of 1943. It should be noted, however, that a substantial quantity of the supplies distributed in the Java area were out of stocks originally such to Tokyo from America for earth who relief in 1923, and still bore the original labels of that shipment. Some supplies were reported at the Selab n rubber estate, Leebeck Linggan, Sumatra; with this exception, there were no reports of any supplies reaching men in Sumatra comps whatsnever.

In May of 1945, there appears to have been a bosoning of distribution of Red Cross supplies in some areas in which these had proviously been hearded. The final decision to permit distribution in Betavia despite the sinking of the ASA MARU on her return voyage has already been noted; there is a like distribution reported at Krangi hespitel chap, Singapore, of a substantial volume of supplies. Items in this distribution, and quantities issued per man, included meat (4 oz), chocolate (, pt) or 4CU -- cubes?), fruit pudding (2 oz), choose (3/4 oz), margarine (2 oz), baeon (2 oz), tem tees (2-2, oz), somp (bar), jem (2 oz), and meat paste (3/4 oz)--three items being issued on any one day, issue four days a week, from 9 May until 25 May 1945.

Finally, at the end of the war, large stores proviously hold in warshouses were released and distributed, including field, clothing, and modical supplies. This distribution also was reported to include supplies ariginally sent to Tokyo in 1923.

# d. Pay and Personal Property

Data on this topic was not specifically requested in the formal IIX-X questionneiros given to evacues, but sufficient information on it is available so that a brief note my be helpful. It had originally been thought that personal property could probably not be retained by captured personnel, but this did not always prove to be the case.

As indicated in the cepture histories in Section II, most personnel were stripped of such personal belongings as rings, watches, wency, and other items at the time of cepture; in none of the reported cases is there any indication of whether these were subsequently returned. There this stripping was by mative ceptors, the inference that no return was made is, it is submitted, justified; this may also be so in the case of reports, of which there are a fair number, that such belongings were stolen by the cepturing troops or Kempel T is personnel.

It is cheer, on the other hand, that personnel of the 131st F., Ind possibly few other isolated cases including substantial number of civilians, were not forced to surrander such personnel of trading domwith guards, with ratives, and with clandestine civilian contacts and on working parties and in other ways (see Sec. V - Outside Contacts and on working parties and in other ways (see Sec. V - Outside Contacts and P' Intelligence) to beam food, medicine, news, and other items. One item from only traded in this way, and outside the near 1 run of such matters, was clothing, of which the internet often hid more than the ratives with when he dealt. Other items of trade included rings, watches, pens, pencils, and manay. It is readily apprent from the reports that in many cases, particularly in day, and on the Burne railroid, where most frequent reports are found, the oppertunity to effect such trading made a very real difference to the internet's chance of survivel, and that items obtained thereby were an important idition to the small supplies of food and clothing. Since the personnel of the 131st PA received only the most informal type of processing after arrival at Tandjoungprick, and since in many cases the same was true of civilian internees, it was not possible to gain my information on ways in which such possessions might be hidden or otherwise retained in the face of my real attempt to get them. There were occasional reports of items being taken by guards at different times during internment-cases in which the guard would notice pen, pencil, or ring, and forthwith confiscate it for his own use, and in such cases, of course, it is evident that the loss of the propert could have been avoided through greater care.

The other source of "b rter goods" was, of course, the prisoner's pry. Here again, inform tion was not specifically requested, the following general facts, however, are known. Pry was in extremely shall mounts, and, in the case of officers' pay, was subject to at least three deductions (a) for mess, (b) for supplements to the general--emlisted--mess, and (c) for a servings account. One report from Java indicates that the pay scale was at one time cut; this cut was the subject of a representation by the senior allied FO' Representative, but no metion scenes to have been taken. After the cut, the scale at Batavia was f35 for field grade officers, and f25 for company grade officers. The regulations promulgated by Colonel Negatives, commanding Thei Branch '3, indicate a pay scale as follows:

Commissioned officers	25 sun
Highor grade NCO's	25 sun
Other NCO's	15 son
Other enlisted	10 son

(Maximum limit: No higher than 35 sen for any officer) and also limit the amount of money any person may have in his possession is follows:

if the month.

	Commissioned personnel	50	y_n	
	Highur NCO's	40		
	Othur NCO's	30		
	Other enlisted	20	14	
and these	regult tions indicated a pay day on	th	5th	

Phymants, however, were apprently highly irregular, and there is some indication that the scales were subject to change from time to time. It is not known by what authority such changes were ande, but reports are definite that there was considerable "horse-trading" over the amounts to be prid in cash as against the "mount put into the general mess fund in some Java camps.

Specific reports of pryments include one ands 22 September 1942 at Bicycle Camp, Bitavia, when efficers received 20 (probably guilders, though dell as are mentioned), sergeants 15, and other enlisted new 10. On 10 October at some camp, a phyment of 320 cash to efficers was reported, with 390 being binked for them. Another phyment on 16 February 1943 was reported at 18-Filo Camp, "Alepeula," officers getting ds. 20/-, lst three grides 40%, wher MOOS 30%, and privites 25%. It is at least clear, then, that there was not a regular play d y on the 5th of each month as prescribed by Jap meso regulations.

### d. Summerry:

The foregoing reports may briefly be summarized with the observation that in general, prisoners of wir and civilian intermees were entirely dependent on themselves for the support of their merels; in the free of a bad situation and with no facilities provided for recreation or selfimprovement, the high merels found can be attributed only to the character and ingenuity of these intermed. That recreation there was developed by themselves; shill was nonexistent for theost year, and charge bid, until at the very end of the ver impending defect mide their captors conscious

of their oblightions in this respect. Finally, contact with personnel outside the comps, and the opportunity to b stor with these for supplies. and to get nove reports from that my well have been the ducisiv. fact r in the surviv 1 of these prisoners.

#### "ORFING CONDITIONS C .

The work assigned to American interneos in Jap ness hands was, clost without exception, of a milit ry nature, we simily of the heardous milit ry nature, and shows work of types namely assigned to coolid or other los gradel baring parsenual. In most class, little distinction was a do botwarn officers and enlisted a.m., ad il sick personnel were re wired to work unless too sick to stand up. Hours were long, and conditions (tracious; the supervision was by guirds whose concern the principly to hundli to those with them ha worked, eacond rily to explate the seigned job, and never to protect the health or officiency of his 1 hor supply.

## 1. Typus of 'ork: Railro d construction: -

By for the groutost number of internet a n-hours were spint in comstruction work on the reilrood from Bingkok to could in. It is impossible courtaly to astingto that number; 1 mgs work parties of British, Austrilian, and Dutch prisoners were employed on it, including Indi a and other notive troops, and some groups of o lis. The rold was one which had been surveyed by the British before the v r, and decl red or main ly impossible. Its r ut, r a through the thickest of Jungle, long rivers that word more trickling streams in the dry season, and re ring t grants in the wat, and through somely I average up to mount in p sals running in the cost, and through ash-level at thes up to house in preservation to approximately 4800 fast altitude. In addition to all ring right of uny, levelling and ball sting the road, lying, aligning, and spiking track, the work included all incident is such a the construction of work compa, base comps, and bridges along the line, the seven at of supplies be truck or on the man's bloks, and the construction of ati- iror ft defines a near the bridges and at ther strategie points. The total length if now construction on the line has been estimated to be 244 miles, and the work was a apleted in about sixteen months.

A simil r construction project was las errid throw h to capition in Suntr, where the existing r ilred lin from Padang through Fadangpandjang to Sidjeendjeeng was extended on through Megrapantal (# "Mosara") to Fakan Barne. Los dutnil is will bl. on this jub since the number of An ricon personnal applyed a it is paroistaly dana in contrast to wor four hundred survivors of the Burn r ilred. av il ble inform tion, however, conditions har. pp. r if nything to have been usrae than those found in Bure. The terrein as for a reaval through rugted country with pocks of six to ten those nd for thittude which a rried the right of way itself to divide a for a rely three thousand, then down to nearly so level gir, rising to or as the shoulder of long knif--lik, country, reaching its worst in the Form signar area south of Poken Burss. The rood cross of which the service a pursonal terpart ware taken from Fiding by r 11 to Telekoemineh, over the count line by truck to Poken Borns, and from there started working dam the line to must noth r rold eres, chiefly coalies, which h d at rtid t Sidj and and The total length of new construction on be estimated a los kilometers, or slightly over 195 miles, of which the portion built by Surport and An rightly over 100 miles, of which the portion will by Surgers and An right prism as constituted roughly the-thirds. Construction to k opproximately one year, with a final two-task drive in which personal wars worked twanty-two hours per dry to explicit on of the line of the August 1945. In addition to the usual tasks incident 1 to rike of con-struction, referred to here, there was on the construction of this line for proter mount of work in overcoming the terr in, with 1 m sections of many to be filled, shoring of should read only bridges were the structure then us through the neutrine rate, This line, more ever, followed mount here in for least the mild the Person construction of year.

wor, followed m tur 1 torr in for less then did the Burns construction, with addition 1 labor and construction requirements as result.

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# b. Other military work:

It is ovident that by for the 1 rger part of the tasks assigned to primeners other than the relieved work were of a military a ture. It is useful here only to summarize them.

In Theiland prisoners were coployed in mainten new work doing the railroid lines out of Bingkok, to Chiengari, to Indo-Chine, to Filey, and to Burge. They were likewise asployed on irrield construction and maintenance in the Bangkok real, with a large group at the Lemang ("Terrang") field. They surved as truck much nice, built employments for anti-directify artillery and machine guns, dug tunnels for gradient lines, built pillboxes and other fortific tions, maunition dumps, bridges, all and gas dumps, and workshops. In Indo-Chine, similer reports are sugnanted by reports of work on the docks and harbor install tions, construction, repair, loading and unloading of ships. All of these reports, in both areas, indicate that the men were subject to attack while engaged in such work, and in some cases attack and injury to American personnel did in fact occur, at Thenbyuzeyst, The Bakas, and Stigon. One report was received of injury to American personnel who were actually left in range of defending Jap mase enti-circer ft weapons.

The only additory work reported in Singapore was on an arrival data the east and of the island. He details are reported. There was no military work at the Toway civili a case. In day, there appears to have been a substantial amount; the work forced upon the case of the USS HOUSTRY in unloading invasion barges insudiately after explore and naving the supplies, amountion, and equipment so unloaded in carts to 5 ming has already been discussed in the section on capture. In addition to this, there were each on the dacks at Tendjoungprick, on imports and in a regist, and military work of a unspecified a time was reported to be heaving and Milang. The outstanding work assignment in day in the later period opports to have been the work part of the General 2 tors plant in Batavie; this was a parted hard work of choice type, and was apparently of additory nature, i.e., the amoundates and/or assign/ of military vehicles. In Summer, part from the related construction, the work in compa in southeast Summer, and long dark Statis is not specified other than a housekeeping dutie; an utilitary work are reported assigned. In the Colebes, military work included repair of wohicles, building run meants, blackmithing including the arking of hand groundes, and construction work to a reduce statism. One up us type of 1 for assigned here was the due ring of debris after in-relide; a thread statisfied here was the due ring of debris after in-relide; a section was reported as a result of presenting detention of a blasting charge.

## c. Non-milit ry work:

Non-military work in all areas was mimilar, consisting of housekeeping duties about the comps, cooking, hP, gordening, cutting wood, and other items of this kind. Hedical personnel were app reatly used invertibly for modical work; the assignments of civilians appear to have been limited absolutely to housekeeping duties, with no reports of American civilian personnel (other than Herchant Herine) to duties of a silitary or such-military nature.

## 2. Assignment and droft of tori partian:

The construction of the relieveds was on forced labor; with the exception of work at the General dators plant in Stavi, all other projects appear to have been carried on by normal assignment of a batever menary available for work.

In Burns, the normal procedure seems to how been to require 80% of chap strength out on the work parties, with 10% left behind to else for housekeeping duties, and 10% considered too sick for work. At clmost all times, however, the sick were for more than 10% of strength, running usually from 25% to 75%, with the result that the housekeeping details were composed inv ri bly of the sick, and a large number of sick man were foread out on the vorking pirties. Reports very fromuent of men un blo to continue work, filling to the ground, and being carried both by their comrades at the end of the d y. All "unbul tory p tients" including dysentery cases and 11 but the most severe and ric cases, were forced to work. The responsible J p ness comminders pper r to h ve justified this procedure as a commind of higher authority. Repeated protests over this state of offairs continued; one officer, C pt in archie Fitzsimmens of the 131st FA, ppetrs to hive been exception lly successful in exercising a combin tion of protost and diplom tic do.ling in order to increase the "slack" in the number of non his party was required to provide for work details, so that gradually it becaus possible to parait incru sing numbers of the sick to remain in camp. "here the sick were removed, and segreg ted in "hospital" camps, as at 62-kilo and 30-kilo camps, however, the not effect was to force all remaining personnel to work reg ruless of condition, and to lo we the sick personnel with no fit non for such household duties as the carrying of supplies (including rice steks teighing 220 lbs) and matter, and the dispose 1 of master. At a still later date, C pt in Fitzsianons succeeded in persurding the J proceed authorities to experiment with a three-shift work basis; this proved successful, lightened the burden on the men, and v s continued.

On the Sumetry r ilro d, the large an jority of the 1 bor consisted of coolies, and all personnel engaged in the work were so treated. The normal work day appears to have been 14 hours; this was extended to 22 hours during the final two weeks drive to complete the line. There was no indic tion that relief of any kind was extended to sick personnel; as result, while the mort lity r to compute be computed, it was reported to have been for higher than in any other are .

Work drifts for the G north Motors Plint in B tovi into not cloirly reported. There was no indication, however, that these too ill to work were required to continue with the work pirties, nd it would ppe r that conditions here were not so extreme as these on the r ilroids. The working dry visiong, and the work he wy, but the job licked the same type of pressure the rd complition of ildefinite go 1 that existed with the railroids, in thus may well have ensed the strictness with which near were forced to their tisks.

It his already been noted that madic 1 personnel were permitted to serve the emps in that explaity, apprently in 11 reas. In some enses, convention 1 procedure was also followed in that officers were not required to do minul 1 bor, but these are less from ant. With 1 rgs number of enlisted personnel and relatively few officers on the Burm ratifierd, it would appear that officers there were not incd in supervisory of points, through the reports are not specific on the point. No American officers were reported on the Sum tratifierd d. In Sing pore, officers were at first used to supervise forestry parties of 100 inlisted ment work in the gordens if they wished, though once is in the separts are not cloir. It is certain, however, that both here and in Java, officers were as it is certain, however, that both here and in Java, officers were resulted to work, and in Java, were forced to vork with and at the same tasks as the non.

## 3. Sup rvision:

Supervision of work parties varied, as did guarding in the camps (which see, Sec. IV A2,) from indifference to inspired cruelty and bestinlity. The guards on work parties are not reported as showing av great concern over the progress of assigned work, it least not with the same seal as that which they devoted to the humiliation of the men under them. Thus it was reported a fairly simple matter to leave the work party; a number of attempted escapes get their start through a casual walk off the jeb and out into the jungle. It may also be assumed that the guards experionced some of the same difficulty in distinguishing between one white person and another that occidentals usually have in making distinctions between people of the yellow or black races; as a result, it was often possible where work parties were divided into whifts for a well man to take the place of one sick and answer to his name without detection. These factors, coupled with the high frequency of contacts with the outside made while on working parties, suggest that supervision was at best a slovenly and corclessly hundled affair.

But this should in no way suggest that contact with the guards was in any way a friendly or humans matter on work parties. It is quite clear that the same types of mistractment - beatings, slappings, and becasionally more extreme injury - were practiced on the job as were in camp. It is not necessary to repeat the entire description of such practices here; suffice it that the guards, with a few exceptions among the Kore as and later among Indenesians in Java, carried out their program of planned humiliation and injury without distinction as to time or place. Supervision of the job could be careless, perhaps; supervision of the man on that job was not.

# D. CHANGES IN CONDITIONS, REPRESENTATIONS TO CONGLANTERS

A succinct report on this topic would state simply that there were substantially no efforts at improvement made by Japanese Comp commanders, and that representations to these commanders was a futile affair. In general, such was the case; by far the majority of these in a position to report on the matter so indicate. But there is good reason to believe that this would not be entirely accurate; the reports of it least two Senier American Representatives, Capt Archie Fitzsinnons of the 2d Hm, 131st FA, and Lt. Comdr. Themas A. Denevan of the USS LANGLEY, indic to this some improvement of conditions through an adroit course of dealing was possible, and was effected. And as the two men were in different situations, a comparison of their reports may be useful. Captain Fitzsimmons was Senier Allied Representative, the ranking officer in his entire group; Commander Denevan was merely the senior American officer in a group composed of all branches of all allies.

In both cases, written representations to Camp commanders concorned, and also to Branch FeW commanders, were made where conditions bearme so serious as to suggest that even these commanders might consider making changes and improvements. Such representations included, for instance, one made to Colonel Nagatema by Captain Fitzsimmons when sick men were forced to work against the advice of the FOW medical officers, and in direct violation of an order allegedly made by Colonel Nigatema himself. Similar was one made on behalf of the group of which Commander Donovan was senior American officer, concerned with work parties and the rations issued them, working hours, and other matters relative to conditions at the General Motors Flant work project. Another was concerned with the pay and treatment of officer prisoners in Java. These two were signed by British officers as Senior Allied Representatives of the groups concerned. Copies of these are appended as Exhibit "P" to this report.

In none of these cases was the representation directly successful in necomplishing improvement, and might have been considered as futile as were most of the other representations made by allied officers. Yet in all of the above cases, improvements were eventually effected.

Two factors may be noted which render those cases different from others reported. In the first place, there were in the written representations allegations of providus committment on the subject either by the authority the state of the subject is the subject of to whom it was addressed (which would insure that the representation would at least reach the addressee, and would impress intermediate commanders with its importance) or by a higher Japanese authority (which would tend to beer weight with both addressee and those below him). Although this factor is at best vaguely expressed - "Nippon and Allied policy" -w MS. it is crystal clear in the other two. The use of this type of emphasis unquestionably was of at least some value in calling the attention of higher authority to the conditions in question, and also in raising at least some concern in the mind of the immediate commander responsible as to what action his superiors might take.

The second factor, one which seems to have been unique, and by far the mare important, is that in both groups, it is clear that Captain Fitzsiamons and Commander Denovan personally followed up the matters in question with the camp commanders, and exercised both ingenuity and diplomacy in getting settlements of these matters. Thus, though Calonel Negatime did order the requested inspection of the sick, and though the immediate result was that the inspecting officer also ordered the sick men out as fit for work, a wedge had been created which made subsequent "dickering" between the camp commander and Captain Fitzsiamons possible, and eventually most sick personnel were embled to take advantage of the "slack" created in workparty figures. There are several reports, though less specific, of similar activity on the part of Commander Denovan, and it appears that, in the same way, he was successful both in relieving the working a nditions of the anlisted men and in getting the officers taken off the work-parties in issue.

By w y of contrast, reports from other areas and ther groups suggest that often the representations were made, and the matter left at that. In other cases where further effort was made, there are indications of a haughty attitude, a "you can't do this to us" approach, and a refusal to trade concession for concession, which resulted in little 'r mathing being accomplished.





# V - OUTSIDE CONTACTS AND PW INTELLIGENCE

### CONTACTS A .

- 1.
- 2.
- Nature, Location, and Methods. Benefits Gained Through Contacts. Japanese Countermeasures and Penalties. 3.

#### Β. NEWS

- Japanese Sources.
   Other Sources (Contacts, Concealed Radios).

### FROPAGANDA C.

- 1. Japanese 2. Allied
- 3. Native Reactions to Allied Air Attack

RESTRICTION defense en taits internation attaction in meaning of the Espirate Act, 58 U.S.C. 31 and 32, as amended. His transmission or 45 evilation of its contents in any manner to an institutived person is philosted by Inc. ists auctimente envitains intermation atteours

# A. CONTACTS

It is readily apparent from the discussions in previous sections (particularly those on Food and on Medicine and Health in Sec IV) that the contacts internees were able to make with persons outside their camps, and the fruits of these contacts, were of vital importance in maintaining both physical health and also morale. This section will deal with the methods used in making such contacts, specific henefits obtained, and the difficulties and penalties attendant on discovery while so doing.

### 1. Nature, Location, and Methods:

In the entire Southeast Asia area, there were almost no internees who reported failure to make contact w th persons outside their camps, and those very few who admitted having made none themselves invariably reported knowledge of others who had succeeded, and of having received the benefits thereof themselves. In general, the methods used to make then, and the types of persons contacted seem to have been substantially similar, with only occasional differences brought about by the local situation.

Least frequent and least profitable seem to have been the contacts made with natives along the northern or Burma section of the Bangkok-Moulmein Railroad. That such contacts were made is clear, and there seems to have been no great amount of danger or difficulty attendant on the process, but as one internee reported, "they were in the same boat we were", i.e., subject to short supplies of food and under Japanese domination These contacts seem to have been made both while out of camp on work parties and also at night. Contacts were made with natives diment and encountly also through Veneon musice natives direct and opparently also through Korean guards at some points. The internee-drivers of rations trucks appear to have been in a perticularly favorable position to contact outside sources of news and supplies, and in perticular were valuable in maintaining contacts between the different camps to which they drove. One report suggests that a POW chaplain was permitted likewise to travel from camp to camp with some benefit to inter-camp communication resulting. Later, when the practice of concentrating the sick at so-called hospital camps developed, these transfers themselves proved a source of contact, also primarily of an inter-camp nature rather than with outside agencies.

Contact with the outside improved markedly when the construction project moved down into Thailand. In that area, and later in the maintenance camps along the several railroad lines out of Fangkok, and at the airbase camps, contacts with Thei natives, Chinese, and even occasionally with allied agent appear to have been frequent and rewarding. Thus contact is reported with a Thai agent at "Chung Kai", that a Chinese agen at Bheiburi urged several interness to attend an escape, and that a British Major succeeded in contacting an allied agent at Kanchanaburi. Contacts with natives and with Chinese seem to have been frequent and not excessively difficult; no use of extensive stratagem or plotting is reported.

In the Thai Government camps, such contacts seem to have been made with the active though, of course, unofficial consen of the authorities, and to have been unlimited; thus the OSS were reported to have had agents constantly in camp, and to have arranged for the "escape" of Lt. W. D. MacGarry, AVG, and Major D. M. Kellogg, USAAF. Contact was also made with the

- 1 -

RESTRICTED JOCLetent Seture information affecting he national delense of the United States with n the meaning of the Espi mage Act, 50 U.S.C 31 and 32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an southorized person is archibited by law.

Swiss Consul, who loaned American internees money for living expenses. In view of the exceptional nature of this internment however, under a government which was sympathetic to and unofficially yet actively assisting the allies, no further references in this section will be made to the situation in the Bangkok camps.

Similar reports are gained from internees in Indo-China. Contacts appear to have been made with both the French residents and the natives, and to have occurred in great frequency prior to capture, with some continued contact after interment in that area, both while on work parties and at other times. Again there are no reports of devicus or surreptitious method, although the necessity for this may have been somewhat greater; since it is clear that Japanese domination of the area was substantial. There are numerous reports of French offers of information or assistance being frustrated when Japanese pressure was applied, or when fear of Japanese detection made such contact dangerous; it is thought that to a greater extent than in any other area, the inhabitants both French and native were concerned for their own welfare, and their assistance seriously inhibited by such concern.

Possibly because of the more permanent nature of the major camps in the Singapore area, the difficulty and danger attendant upon establishing outside contacts is reported far greater in that area than anywhere else. Yot contacts were made, and with fair frequency, with both Malay and Chinese residents. The British camp authorities appear to have gone to some pains to "cover up" the existence of such contacts in their dealings with Japanese commanders. One Chinese named William Chew was specifically reported as a source of information, and other contacts were reported on work parties, and through the Chinese and Malay "Topas" who swept out in front of the cells at Outram Road. Other contacts included Eurasian or native wives of internees, and civilian reports indicate that it was possible to meet--under supervision,-friends and others while attending Church service.

Outside contacts in Java were relatively easy to establish in the earliest days; "Lajor Winthrep H. Rogers reported being permitted almost daily shopping trips from Bicycle Camp to markets in Fatavia while that camp was under the command of Lt. Katagiri and Lt. Suzuki, for the purchase of food and supplies. The contacts of 131st PA men and survivors of the HOUSTON during the period shortly after capture are detailed in Section II, and seem to have been extensive and largely profitable in view of the fact that these men still had money and other articles with which to trade. They too were apparently carried on with the tacit approval of Japanese commanders.

At about the time Lt. Sonai assumed command of Bicycle Camp, however, a tightening-up occurred. Gradually such contact was reduced, and shortly was forbidden entirely, the camp purchases being made through official camp channels. All areas, however, report continued contact through surreptitious means, with resident Europeans (insofar as these were not interned), Eurasians, Malays, Indonesians, and Chinese. Such contacts were apparently frequent with nativos employed in the shops, both camp shops, kitchens, and bakeries, and also outside shops where work parties were detailed.

A detailed account of some of the means for establishing such contact are found in the report of Maria K. McVay, who

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herself succeeded in avoiding internment throughout the war, and who made frequent contact with internees in Batavia, where she resided. An extract of this report is appended as Exhibit "Q" to this report. It succests that a fair degree of ingenuity was required in order to avoid raising suspicion, and also indicates a fact thoroughly corroborated in the reports from the internees themselves, namely, that most contacts were made--and m de most easily--by groups outside of the camps on work parties.

But from this report and also from other sources it is also clear that, with care and inventiveness on the part of the internee and his "contacts", it was possible to use native guards, Koreans, laborers, and some Japanese guards as a bridge in opening a channel to obtain news and supplies. At the same time it must be recognized that, perhaps more than in other areas, there was real risk of encountering treachery or the part of such contacts. Treacherous natives were frequently counted on for assistance by survivors of the USS HOUSTON, and at least during the earlier months, were widespread through out western Java, with specific reports coming from Laboehan, Henes, Fandeglang, and Buitenzorg. It would appear that later, however, Japanese relations with the netives deteriorated substantially, and the number of Indonesians willing to assist in establishing contacts for internees increased. Positive contacts were reported at most camps at one time or another, with Timahi, Glodock, Bandceng, and So rabaja specifically confirmed.

Contacts with natives in Sumatra are reported to have existed, and appear to have been on much the same order as those existing in Eurma. In view of the small number of Americans sent to this area, the reports are not considered extensive enough to form the basis for any conclusions, however

In the Celebes, a situation much like that described in Java is described, limited, however, by the smaller numbers of persons concerned. Contacts with natives appear to have been made, particularly by men on work parties. There seems also to have been, on the part of the Japanese, concrete knowledge of the presence of allied agents on the island, and fear of what might be accomplished by then, together with stringent measures in the form of prohibitions and inspections, to prevent any contact. No cases were reported of any interned POW actually contacting such agents. The natives, where contacted appear to have been reliable; there are no reports of treacher in this area.

# 2. Benefits gained through contacts.

The items valued through contacts with natives and other varied but little throughout Southeast Asia, and varied only insofar as the limitations of supply or other factors in a particular area reduced their value. Generally, the main item procured included foods, medicines, tobacco, news in the form of newspapers, propaganda leaflets, and other papers, and occasionally, offers of assistance with escape projects.

In Burma, contacts were able to produce but little. The natives were under substantial'y the same short supply as the internees, and the items most frequently reported were those locally procurable, including fruits, sugar, duck eggs, medici (not specified as to type), allied propaganda leaflets, and native tobacco substitutes, chiefly the leaf of the papaya and related plants. There were no reports of assistance with esca

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projects in this area; by contrast, there were some reports of treachery in this respect, though none associated with American personnel.

In Thailand, commensurate with the greater number of such contacts, the benefits also increased. Clothing, rings, watches, pens, and pencils were traded for food and medicine, news, and newspapers including the underground printed PANGKOK CHRONICLE, leaflets, fruits, tobacco, sugar, oil, and money. One Japanese guard was reported as selling medicines obtained by him from official stores both to natives and to POWs. From other prisoners on trucks, or transferees from other camps, including hospital camps, was mained news of the conditions in those camps, and the welfare of acquaintances interned therein, and well as some supplies which these men had been able to obtain from outside sources enroute.

The French in Indo-China provided food, clothing, medical care, including medicines and treatment of wounds, news, and information on means of evading captivity, including shelter for periods of days or even several weeks. The consensus of the reports indicates that this assistance was seriously impaired by the concern the French were forced to take for their own safety under the Japanese occupation. After internment, these sources supplied food, medical supplies, news and newspapers, and money.

Singapore internees report gaining food and medicine from these contacts, and one radioman in the Merchant Marine, Jalet, reported obtaining radio parts from a Chinese, with which he was able to construct a secret radio at Changi. The Chinese in question was the wife of a Fritish internee.

In Java, when open purchases in the Batavia markets were permitted by Katagiri and Suzuki in 1942, it is clear that anything could there be obtained that the market could offer. Many of the internees had substantial amounts of cash, and the rations at Elcycle Camp were strongly reinforced with available market supplies, including fresh meat, veretables, fruits, oil, tea and coffee, eggs, and some amounts of dairy products. Other items procured included American tobaccos, watches, and, in one case, a ceiling fan which was installed by its owner to the envy of all his neighbors. Some supplies of wines, and liquor were also obtained.

Under It. Sonai, these supplies were cut off, Food, clothing, and news continued to be passed into camps in Java, however, consistently throughout the course of the war. One report adds the receipt of letters, presumably from local individuals, and another includes cigarettes and fruit. Camps in Sumatra and the Celebes give like reports, with supplies of chinchona bark reported received from natives along the Sumatry railroad.

### 3. Japanese counterneasures and penalties.

With the exception of the early administration at Micycl Camp, it is evident that the Japanese in all camps actively endeavoured to prevent the establishment of outside contact. Measures taken to this end included investigations, searches, and severe penalties for discovery. In Burma and Thailand, the penalty for the internee was to be forced to stand at attention in the sun for periods ranging from a few hours to several days, without food or water. Sharp interromations resulted, with beatings and other mistreatment when the expect RESTRICTED RESTRICTED and the Language of the Language the La

RESTRICTED tional defeate of the United States with - 4<sup>d1</sup> and 32, as omended. To banamistion of the washing of its contents in any manner to an washing person is menifold by law. answers were not obtained. In some cases the natives with whom contact had been made was reported to have been executed; there are sufficient of these reports to indicate that this may well have been the standard penalty for the "outside" partner to such contacts.

In other areas, punishments for the internee were similar: interrogation, beatings, and periods of standing at attention. Collective punishment was added in some cases, punishment being mated out to the suspect's entire barracks, work party, or to the camp as a whole through closing the canteen or lessening the food ration. In Singapore, it was also reported that six years imprisonment was the official penalty, and that in accordance with this, periods of solitary confinement were meted out to those suspected of having contacts with outside persons. The extremes to which the Japanese carried their efforts to prevent such contact among the civilian internees at Changi have been described in the section on interroration; there is no information on the n-ture of the causes for this action, but its severity was exemplary.

B. NEWS

# 1. Japanese Sources:

Although there are reports of speeches made by Japanese Camp connanders which suggest that there was some effort made to indoctrinate internees through the publication of Japanese news, there is very little information on the nature of scope of such material. Most reports take the Japanese news for granted, and regard it as propaganda worthy of no concern; thus it is difficult to determine exactly how much news was available in this way, or what its nature was, other than that it tended at least to indicate to the internee what the location of current combat areas was, and possibly a little of what was taking place in them. The reports indicate consistently a reluctance on the part of Japanese officers to discuss the war in any way, beyond the usual assertion that Japan would win it very shortly, and are equally consistent in reporting absolute ignorance on the part of Japanese enlisted men.

# 2. Other sources (contacts, concealed radios):

The availability of news through outside contacts, which furnished copies of allied leaflets, underground newspapers, and notes from persons having access to news, has already been discussed. In addition to these and to Japanese news sources, large number of camps got news first-hand from concealed radios

It is not clear how these radios were obtained, save that such few persons as had technical skill and were not drafted to technical parties for shipment to Japan or Formoss seen invariably to have made them where possible, but it is quite definite that several camps along the Burma railroad and nearly all permanent camps elsewhere did, at one time or another, have at least one and occasionally several radios concealed in the barracks. They were hidden under floorboards, in mattresses, false bottoms to humerous types of containers, kit bags, and elsewhere as the situation permitted, and were in operation whenever the absence of the guard would permit this without detection. Such radios were specifically reported in Furma, Singapore, Saigon, Batavia, and possibly also at Bandoeng and at Macasser in the Celebes, and were known definitely not to exist only in Sumatra along the Fakan-Baroe railroad. From broadcasts from India and occasionally elsewhere, internees

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were thus enabled to follow the progress of the war with reasonable accuracy, often knowing far more than did their captors.

# C. PROPAGANDA

# 1. Japanese:

Although Japanese propaganda was apparently widely dispersed among the natives in occupied areas, it has already been noted that their news service was both slow and extremely poor. This appears to have impaired the value of their efforts to propagandize to a considerable extent. The earliest reports indicate a large bloc of natives in almost all areas as being favorable to the Japanese; both size and fervour of this group seen to have dwindled steadily throughout the course of the war, to the point where, during the final year, ridicule of the Japanese announcements was almost universal. The Thai peoples seem the least affected by Japanese propaganda; there are indications that from the very first, these were lauching at the reports put out by Nippon. In Indo-China, reports on the Annamites are mixed; some are reported unimpressed, and others pro-Japanese. The French people in that area apparently were at no time taken in by the Japanese stories.

In Java the most clear-cut picture is reported; here the Indonesian and Malay natives were actively entaged in assisting the Japanese at the time of the occupation in 1942, and as matters developed from there, they performed a complete aboutface, showing outspoken contempt for the enemy during the closing months of the war. A number of the Dutch, however, were reported as believing the Japanese propaganda, and there were some reports of Dutch-given assistance to the Japanese.

This trend seems also to have occurred in a less defined pattern in nearly all other areas. No other area reported such extremes, either in the earlier collaboration nor in the later change of heart, but it is quite clear that, as time went on, Japanese claims and assertions became a laughing matter to all but themselves.

### 2. Allied:

Available information makes it evident that distributions of allied propaganda in the form of leaflets and possibly also broadcasts effectively reached native populations and Japanese alike nearly in all areas in Southeast Asia. The reports in this are, of course, less frequent from the outlying areas such as the Celebes and Sumatra, but the only area in which the effect of such material seems to have been seriously limited is among the Annamite population in Indo-China. In practically all other areas, native consciousness of the true status of the war seems to have developed steadily, and, coupled with the bad relations suffered under the Japanese conquerors, to have produced the gradual yet unhesitating swing to the allied cause which has already been noted. Some aspects of this will be further considered in the section next following, where reactions to allied air attack will be discussed.

Among the Japanese themselves, and the Koresn guards whom they brought in, there is a wide disparity of reaction to allied bulletins. The Koreans seem to have been the first to admit knowledge of the true state of affairs, and for about

one year before the end of the war are reported as having a gradually clearer and clearer picture of the facts, information as to allied victories, etc. This report is substantiated by (and also tends to explain) reports that treatment of allied internees by the Koreans showed sharp improvement during the last twelve or fourteen months of the conflict. By contrast, the Japanese of comparable grade, i.e., collisted men, seem to have been thoroughly sheltered against any contact with the true facts pertaining to the war; there are no substantial or confirmed reports of Japanese enlisted men with a knowledge of the facts, and the number reporting amazement and disbelief when the final surrender was announced is fairly large.

To maintain this informational quarantine over his men, however, the Japanese officer of necessity encountered a substantial amount of such propaganda. The rules, of course, provided that all such material picked up either by natives or by prisoners and internees would be turned in to headquarters immediately and unread. It is doubtful, however, how well this was enforced, even among the officirs' own ranks; one confirmed and emphatic report tells of an American army private who succeeded in stealing, from the trousers pocket of a Japanese officer, one well-thumbed allied leaflet.

The range of reaction to this material was, as might be expected, wide and varied. Many Japanese officers managed to retain the "Bushido" spirit until the war's end; their reactions to the leaflets included "indifference", occasional anger, and one quoted as saying they "would make good cigarette paper". Others were less sure of themselves and their country, and reports describe them as "excited", or "stunned", or "amaged". Finally, there were a few who were reported as gradually knowing the true state of affairs and, in some cases sullenly, in others gracefully, accepting the inevitable outcome of the war.

# 3. Reactions to Allied Air Attack:

It has already been noted that the appearance of allied planes over camp areas was, save only insofar as it was a threat to the safety of those there interned, a substantial source of high morale among the internees. As might be expected, the converse was generally true of the Japanese in the camps; the reports indicate that they became angry, and that they made much of allied "treachery"--this despite the fact that in many cases attack or near internment camp sites was more or less invited, as e.g., by the shifting of locomotives to sidings near the dock camp in Saigon. The only reports of reprisels taken against the internees for such attacks which are clear-cut, however, are those concerned with allied attack on and sinking of relief ships after completion of the relief mission and expiration of the proviouslygranted safe conduct. Withholding of supplies so landed was definitely reported in 1943 at Ambarawa, Java, and possibly also occurred at Singapore. In a similar situation in 1945, there was much protest and speechmaking by the Japanese, but the supplies were ultimately distributed nevertheless.

Reaction to allied air attack on the part of native groups varied directly with other attitudes already reported--their willingness to aid the internees, and their reaction to allied propaganda. Thus in Eurma, the original attitude was reported as ranging from anger to puzzlement and indifference, with a swing toward greater understanding and acceptance of the need for such attacks as the war propresed. A

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like report, more strong in its swing from one extreme to the other, is found in Java, where there are few reports of bewilderment, and the attitude seems to have swung from fear and anger directly to understanding and acceptance. In this respect, it is interesting to note that in eastern Java, in the Soerabaja area, the trend was always in advance of that in the west; even from the start there were substantial groups of natives who appear to have accepted and approved of the attacks, though this was clearly not universal. Similar to the east Java situation are the reports from the Celebes; most natives accepted the attacks as necessary and showed some interest in the technical skill displayed.

There are no reports of substance on this point from the Singapore area; most of the reports suggest that the natives were "happy" or "they approved" but information is insufficient to determine accurately any concrete attitude or development of attitude. The reports from Sumatra are similarly inconclusive.

In Indo-China, in line with the matter already reported in relation to allied propagands, there appears to have been a wide disparity of reaction at all times. Some natives are reported as approving of the bombings almost to the point of wild enthusiasm; others are described as sullen or furiously angry; still others are reported as nuzzled and hurt, eager to know why they should have been made the targets of attacks which, they thought, were directed more or less personally at them. It is interesting to note that these factors, which are clearly reported, are in contrast to a far smaller volume of reports on allied propaganda and its effect; it may well be that allied propaganda was less successful in reaching this area than others, and that the confused and mixed reaction to subsequent air attacks was the result.

If the scant reports from Singapore and Sumatra may be taken as probably falling in with the reports from other areas, this section may be summarized with the comment that--where allied propaganda was effectively disseminated--allied bombings were accepted and understood, and finally even welcomed, by increasing numbers of the native population. It is probable, of course, that deteriorating Japanese relations with the native peoples they had conquered were also a substantial factor, but the reports from Indo-China succest that definite propaganda material is needed even in areas where such deterioration is in progress, in order to crystallize public sentiment and enlist native support.

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# VI - ESCAPE

- A. GENERAL. CAMP SECURITY MEASURES.
- ESCAPE FROBLEMS IN PARTICULAR AREAS в.
  - 1. Eurma

  - Burma
     Thailand
     Inde-China
     Singapere
     Java, Sumatra, and the Celebes

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### VI - ESCAPE

#### A. GEMERLL. CAP S CULITY IC SURES

Although the major problem in escape from P and Interment C: ps in Southeast Asia was not one of getting out of carp, but rather of what could be done thereafter to regain allied forces without being retaken, it as be useful briafly to survey the measures taken by the Japanese to provide sacurity within their camps against escape. This topic falls naturally into three divisions: -- the construction of the camp itself, the system of unris used to patrol it, and the regulations of a security nature is posed on prisoners and intermees.

Casp construction varied widely, inas uch as in a large nu bur of enses existing military or civil construction was taken over and used for interament. Collecting points were in al est all cases city or town jails, with the exception of the Banton Park lovie Theater, the Keen School in Batavia, the Bali Hotel in Denpassar, Bali and possibly a few other buildings taken for such temporary use. Transit cases were also usually of existing construction, including the Naval Base and Marchouse areas in Batavia, the jails at Rangeon, Feul ein, and Singapore, and the jails and warehouses in Saigon, Bandoong and Soerabaja.

Where non construction was required, it specars to have been of a standardized nature, consisting of a source or rectangular camp, security was provided through ditching and fences, the fences in some cases being reported as a woven balloo structure. One specific report tells of a syste comprising first a balloo fence, then barbed wire, then a mater-filled most, and then another balloo fence. There was one gate.

Guard were both of fixed-post and patrol types, used together. The fixed posts appear to have been at the gate and in the barracks area; patrols covered the fences and also the barracks area, and Japanese Ps patrolled outside the outer est fence. The period of time spunt by a guard at his post has not been accurately deter fined, but typears to have depended on the type of post, and to hive wired accordingly.

Regulations imple onting the carp sceurity corprised these forbidding contact with outside civilians or natives, forbilding the possession of leaflets dropped by allied planes, forbilding any insubordination to guard personnel or any attempt to escape or conspiracy to the such site pt. All carried a possible death penalty. This was i ple ented by the threat and frequent application of collective punishient, either on the whole camp, on the offender's barracks, or on his i mediate neighbors in the barracks. Roll call was normally hold twice a day, but when there had been any attempts to escape, roll calls as frequent as one per hour word reported. Finally, there wis extensive use of the parole; in at least one reported case, at Changi, paroles were exacted under duress of the lost extreme kind including increased overcrowding and starvation paroles were apparently zealously sought in almost all cases.

But the specific measures of this kind taken by the Japanese administration are netually of little importance to the problem. The caps fight for the most part have been left completely unguarded, and security would have been nearly as well saintained. There was so a evidence that guarding on work parties was in fact of an extre ely loose and slipshod variety; yet the security was added and. The basis for this, of course, is the fact that in all of the areas under the scope of this report, intern ont was usually in isolated and jungle areas. Each of it was on islands populated by natives who, all est without exception, cooperated with the Japanese in returning to custody any who might escape. The others, in Sin apore, Bangkek and Saigen particularly, were separated from any allied forces by thick and practically impenetrable jungle barriers which, a win, were populated by hestile native groups.

Thus, though it was often a relatively simple matter to jet out of carp at night, or to walk off the job on a work party, the real question was what to do next. It is this matter that will be considered in the following subsection. Since the problem was, as supested, primarily a geographical one, geographical divisions have been adopted in its treat ent.

# B. ESCAPE PROBLEMS IN PARTICULAR AREAS

# 1. Branst:

A number of attempts to escape from work caps alon the Bingkokoul win railroad have been reported; owing to the vague nature of scar reports and the possibility of duplic tion, it is i possible to dater into the exact number, but it is clear that there were at least three such attempts, and possibly as many as helf a dozen. With one possible but not certain exception, these were all failures.

The best-reported incident is an atto pt inde in the earliest days of the construction work. This too, place at 30-Kilo Chip, and was a correfully planned enterprise headed by a Captain ull, who had had 18' years' experience in the Burka jungles with the forestry service, and who planned for the escape of himself and two Australian MOO's over a period of weeks, hearded together food supplies and e uip out with which to make the attempt, and finally left carp, heading north, with an Indian guide considered unquestionably reliable. The Captain and one Sorgeant were shot on the spot near Salween by Burka Hilitary Police, tegether with the guide, and the other Sergeant, wounded, was brought back to Thanbyuzayat and there executed by Lt. Maite on the direct order of Colonel Magatema.

This history characterizes hearly all other reports, so much so that it is not possible to determine how may of the are merely huplications of the same incident. Reports which clearly refer to other attempts, however, are found. One of the civilian intermoes at Tavoy reported the successful escape of four Gurkhas from Rangoon during the time he was there, escaping through a breach in the walls had by an allied air ttack, and during the confusion of the attack. It is not known whether these succeeds in gaining complete freedom. In another attach from the relifered camps, a party including one American and a Captain in the Indian array were reported shot for an attempted escape. There is one report, unconfirmed, of successful escape by an American reported by Pvt C.N. Sherrill of the 131st FA., who addited that he had no first-hand knowledge of the incident, but indicated that this American — whose name he could not remember — had merely announced that he was timed of work, threw down his tools, and slipped off into the jumble. Pvt Sherrill believed the attempt to have succeeded because, at some time latter, a friend received a letter from the can who had escaped, indicating a successful journey back to allied territory. This incident was alleged to have taken place at the 18-Kile Camp. No further information has been found on it, and no other report refers to it.

The above attempts appear all to have taken place during 1942 or the earliest days of 1943. After the death of Captain ull and his companions (one of whom may have been named Bell), the senior allied representative for FOW Branch 33, Brig. Varney of the AIF, is reported. to have ordered no further attempts to be made. Lt (jg) Hallin of the U.S. Mavy reports having dissuaded three individuals or groups from further attempts, in compliance with this order. The basis for the order was clear; a well-planned attempt to escape, made by persons better equipped than the average to succeed, had failed, with execution for the participants, and reprisals against all others in the 30-Kilo Caup, including reduced food rations, hourly rolledly, searches, and extensive interrogation of accumintances of those concerned (with apparently full use of the distrest and program attendant upon such cuestionin s — see Sec III).

The situation in Burne can, then, be superized very briefly. The men were separaphical prisoners, with, as one internee put it, "a price on our heads." Terrain factors including nountainous country, thick jungles, and swa pland, to other with the language barrier and the tick incidence of treachery on the part of the natives, continued with the certainty of death on recapture, operated to make escape attempts a foolhardy proposition for these men. It is ht well be that or anized rescue parties eculpted to transport Burne internees through the juncle, with address reported to transport Burne internees through the juncle, would have been successful; no contact with such a cents in this area is reported.

# 2. Thailand:

It is evident from what has already been reported that escape from the camps operated by the Thai government at the jail and later in "Vachiravaud" College in Bangkok was scarcely a matter of escape at all, but rather normal evacuation, limited only by the need to shield this operation from the Japanese. That cooperation appears to have been discret yet wholehearted, and in light of these facto, further consideration of these camps is not considered necessary.

In the casps maintained by the Japanese in Taailand, the severe conditions found in Burma appear to have been substantially alloviated as time went on. The contacts made by allied agents with internees at "Chung Kai," Bhejburi, and Kanchanaburi have already been discussed; the apparent reason that these contacts did not ripen into actual escape ventures was in all cases reported to be innicquate identification by the egent -- with the result that the internet contacted did not trust the offer of assistance made to him.

But, though specific successful attempts are not confirmed, some were reported and it is felt that escape was possible in this area, and some may have occured. In the earlier stages of intermient in this area, and some may have occurred. In the earlier stages of intermment in this area, the Japanese continued to execute thos recaptured, and there were reports of such executions at "Chung Kai" and Tah Son ("Therso"). Later, however, this punishient was apparently abandoned in favor of a stringent imprisonment; one report at Bhejburi tells of a supposedly half-insame prisoner who left that camp, was recaptured, and after considerable beliceration by the Japanese, was sent to a work camp in Bur a. An Australian nu ed Oliver is reported to have successfully escaped fiter this time, and two Americans, reported as Lance Harris and Hoffman, are said to have got away from "Tiang" (not located) in 1.45. Another report, possibly of the same case, by Lt. Commander Epstein, USN, reports two Americans successfully out of Bhejburi.

> The factors which seen to distinguish this situation from that in Burna are twofold; first, that the matives were far one cooperative is clear, and of considerable importance. Second, the radual approach of the Japanese to authorized means of discipline and trantment, including the abandom out of execution as penalty for attempts to escape, meant that an individual who make the attempt would risk far less here in the event of recepture both to biaself and his conrades, than in an attempt in Burna. The ree raphical problem, of reaching allied territory, was of course greater; it is apparent that outside assistance is necessar under the conditions encountered here.

# 3. Escape in Indo-China:

The one repeatedly confirmed report of a successful escape is from Saigon, from which point let Lt. .C. Hughett, AC, of Hubbock, Texas, is reported to have escaped with two companions on Christmas Eve, 1944. It is reported that these wen had been interned for some tile, and had note substantial contrets with persons outside their camp, and specifically that a L. Delrave and a take - Desplats of Saigon assisted them. They had take these contacts, and presumably others, while out on work parties, and escaped at might from a hospital camp, with transportation furnished by the French. The companions were reported to be British ORS, Pvt. Purcell, and Pvt. Bankraff.

In contrast to this report is an attacet on 1 Jul 1942, in which two British attempted to leave the Sai on docks, were cought by French collaborationists, and shot by the Japanese. No further letails of this attempt have so fir been recovered. A third the pt, also unsuccessful, was reported at St. Partin des Pallieres, but execution of these .en, if conta plated, was apparently frustrated by the end of the war. From these fragmentary reports and from other information on the situation in Saigon, it would "ppair that the concern of the French for their own safety (which, as noted in previous material, had made their assistance in evading capture very limited), the presence of collaborators among them, and the unerally hostile attitude of the natives, created a situation no more favorable to escape than that existing in Burna as far as the average internee was concerned. If, however, loyal French could be contacted, -and there are several reports of such contacts being made, -- it is equally clear that escape from Indo-China was possible where properly planned and assisted by these outside contacts.

# 4. Escape in Singapore:

Of all the areas in which internees were cuartered, the Singapore camps presented the most complete bar to successful escape. Here the security measures taken by the Japanese were most thorough; the camps were chiefly per anent structures, and in all cases were well-guarded, with work parties relatively limited and under none of the pressure to complete a construction project that occurred in Burna. Here, too, there was complete isolation, most of the camps being on Singapore Island, with a high preponderance of hostile natives inhabiting the area. One successful escape, of a S/Spt. Brumley of the 19th Bomb Group to Australia, is reported by Sgt. Hess of that organization, but from the report it is felt that this was actually a successful evasion of capture while in Jav. rather than an escape after capture and from Singapore. There are no other reports of attaunts being made. Though there was an escape committee at Changi (this bein the only locality where such an organization was reported) it was discouraged in its activities by the senior allied representatives. Failure was reported as carrying with it either execution or a life sentence at Jutra Road jail as penalty. Some caporness to attempt escape was reported aron; A origan ranks; there was serious difficulty with the Japanese over their refusal to sign a parole (this has been reported in A tail in war crimes investigations mode by the CIC); and there were reports of extra a bitterness over the discouragin attitute taken by the senior allied representatives. Nevertheless, th re is, in view of experiences of internees in other areas, no evidence to sup est that anything short of a well-or an zed rescue party fro the outside could have brou ht interneos in the Sin spore area to freedo.

# 5. Escape in Java, Sumatra n. the Colebas:

In Java, a report si ilar to that in Bur a is found; the unrelinbility of the natives and the bacance of any means of ottin off the island joined to ren or use ... virtually i ossible. ost positive reports concern Dutch and Eurasian personnel, al of those, only the latter were reported successful in escapin . One Dutch half-caste was reported to h ve succeeded in ottin out of Bicycle Casp, when a friend replaced his on a work purty so that his absonce was not discovered until a considerable the later. We was read tured, however, and in view of the al est universal report of an out on as the penalty for attempted escape in Java, aust as press at to have suffered this fate. His barracks communicr and non-commissions officer where iso punished for complacity (or at least allowed complete) in this attant by being boaten before a parall of the much of a Six Butch were reported emecuted at Tjimahi, Banloon, for an attained accept, and two others were reported to have of out of Tjihopit, Banloon, by crashing through a hole in the sence at much. These more retainen, by crashing through a hole in the sence at much. These more retainen, and their heads shared, but apparently there was no other punish and in this case, and no regiments others. The thereau heyster, (which employed both Japaness on institues assi and by district for the purpose of an atalning a close water on all works in the treat), for a white person to pass unsoliced for very lon. This difficulty would, of course, not be shared by the Europin intermoss. One ex-ception to the above picture, as yet upconfirmed, is the report by this fate. His barracks communder and non-condissions officer three ception to the above picture, as yet unconfirmed, is the report by rs. . eVay that she had sheltered two Australians, Ca poll and Wilson, in the course of their escope. In the light of the substantial underground activity reported carried on by Duton and Australian

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personnel in that area, it is considered possible that these two may have been able to make contacts that would get the transportation out of Java. That roblem, it is clear, represented the major obstacle to any successful escape by American personnel in Java.

Similar reports are received from the Celebes. The pendity there was beheading; three Dutch were reported caught and beheaded after esc pe attempts, and their barrack mates were confined and beaton. Threats of death for all barrack mates left beaind were apparently very vivid, since most American personnel semmed to feel that it would be extreme selfishness on the part of an one or any small group to risk the welfare and lives of his courtles through an attempt to get away. As one internee put it, "we would kill ten men left behind af we tried to escape." Here, too, of course, the insular geography was an added factor in remiering escape impractical.

In Summira, there is only one clear-cut report, which can scarcely be considered a planned escape. In this report, an Indo-Dutch internee seized a guard's sword and slashed his way cut of camp, only to be cut down by rifle fire as he remched the nearby river band. This individual, horever, apparently went berserk as the result of goading and mistreatment by the guards, and the matter was only remotely one of conscious escape attempt. Other than this, there are no reports, but with conditions similar to those in Burne, it is felt that, hall a reater number of internees from Summira been available for questioning, a story similar to that reported elsewhere would have been obtained.

;	VII - CASUALTIES	
1.	Casualty Rate	
2.	Cause of Death	
3.	Burial, lecation and marking	\$
4.	Sunnary	

#### VII - CASUALTIES

It is not within the purview of this report to present a complete roster of all casualties which occurred in the internment camps in Southeast Asia, nor to attempt to provide graves registration information. All personnel interrogated were questioned on these points, both as to deaths witnessed, and also as to persons runored dead, or considered as missing. This information together with what unit rosters of casualties and other information could be gained from the evacuees, has in all cases been forwarded to the AG Casualty Branch, Headquarters, UGF, HET, and also there applicable to the U.S. Naval Lisison Office, at 6 Church Street, Calcutta. This information, moreover, is as yet necessarily incomplete bending the reports of RAP./I teams from SAAC Headquarters who are at present making a survey of all areas in which military or civilian personnel were known to have been interned. A few observations, however, from material at hand, may be helpful in presenting a complete picture of internment in Southeast Asia. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that figures, where given, are merely the best available at this time, are not the result of final tabulations in any area, and are not to be taken as conclusive.

#### 1. Casualty Rate:

The casualty rate in Burma along the Bangkok-Koulmein railroad appears to have been approximately 25%. This was the area in which the heaviest death tell was reported, and the figure is probably a higher one than will be found elsewhere. 429 members of the 131st FA are reported to have been sent to that area (this excludes work parties sent to Japan and/or Formosa totalling 117) and 311 of these were evacuated to Calcutta in Sectember 1945, leaving 118 or 27.5% not recovered. As of 31 March 1944, 61 of these were definitely reported dead on organizational resters. A similar report is had of survivors of the USS HOUSTON, of whom 307 were sent to Burma (again excluding 61 in technical parties to Japan and elsewhere) and 228 evacuated in 1945, leaving 79 or 25.7% not accounted for. Of these 66 or 21.5% were definitely reported dead on organizational resters.

In Macassar in the Celebes, best available rosters list 216 internees, survivors of the UCS POFE, USS PIRCH, and other units. Of these, 126 are reported evacuated by other headquarters, and 21 were evacuated to Calcutta, leaving 69 not accounted for, or 32%. Of these, 33, or 15.4% were reported dead on rosters kept at Macassar.

#### 2. Cause of death:

The only groups consistently reporting cause of death were the 131st Fn and the HOUSTON survivors. Of the total of 127 definitely reported dead in these two units, the following cases were ascribed:

Trepical Ulcer	52
Dysentery	42
Beri-Beri & Mainutrition	16
Malaria	7
Heart diseases	3
Chelera	1
Tubercolesis	1
Mise or not given	5

Of these, eight cases were specifically reported as having additional and

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complicating causes, chiefly ulcers in addition to reported dysentery, and there is ample evidence to show that a large number of all types of cases were aggravated by extreme malnutrition which rendered the patient too weak to resist the specific disease ultimately contracted. In this connection, it should further be noted that it was apparently Japanese practice to forbid the entry of "malnutrition" as such as cause of death; cases of this type of falsification of death entries have been consistently reported.

Since all official unit recor s were kept under Japanese supervision it is scarcely remarkable that there are no death entries listed as caused & by injuries, torture, or execution. Analysis of the numbers lost in this manner must, or course, await the completion of pending war crimes investigations.

Finally, the above analysis, while probably a f ir picture of the death rate in work camps over the entire southeast Asia area, is specifically pertinent only to the Burma railroad construction camps, since all but four of the deaths included in the above breakdown were reported as occurring in that area.

# 3. Burial, Location and Marking:

It will be a considerable time before the location of all Americans dead and buried in Southeast Asia can be determined; in view of the vide area and the large number of casualties, it is possible that such information may never be made 100% complete. The following locations, however, are those in which american personnel are reported to have died or been buried:

a. Along the Bangkok-Houlmein railroad:---At Thanbyuzayat, 30-Kilo, 62-Kilo, 80-Kilo, 100-Kilo, 105-Kilo, 114-Kilo and 133-Filo Camps, and at Tha Makam ("Tamarkan"), Tah Sao ("Tarso"), and Eanchanaburi ("Kanburi");

c. In Indo-China: --At Chi Hea cemetery, Saigon, also possibly elsewhere in that city, at Ple Tenan, and possibly Chelcn;

d. In Singaperc:--At Bididari missionary cometery, and also other points on the island including the Changi area;

e. In Java:---At Batavia, including possible burials in one allied cemetery at Djati Fetambeeran 59, at Tjimahi, Bandeeng, Malang, and Scerabaja, and at Tjilatjap;

f. In Sumatra:--- o Only certain graves are at Ekan Bares;

g. In the Celebes: ---At Macassar Camp, either KIL Camp, or the new camp or both.

The burials were reported usually to have been in regular cemeteries, though some reports of executions indicate that these were carried out at graveside in unspecified areas, after the victim had been forced to dig his own grave. The cemetery graves were reported as being marked with unpainted teakwood crosses on which name, rank, serial number, branch nationality, and dates of birth and death were carved. These markers were reported as extremely vulnerable to the rayages of white ants and possibly also termites, with complete obliteration of the carvei information reported occurring in some cases within two weeks of burial. It is understood that all cemeteries are now being resurveyed and remarked by graves registration and RAFAI teams.

#### 4. Summary:

The inconclusive nature of the above information is all too apparent; detailed casualty information has been available only where the unit concerned has been able to furnish this on evacuation. There information has been forthcoming, moreover, it has varied widely in quality. The casualty reports of the 131st FA and the USD MOUSTOM survivors included rosters showing all partiment data as to identity, next of kin, and cause and date of death, with place of burial, and in some cases were accompanied by charts showing locations of individual graves which will in the charter areas largely eliminate the problems arising from the originally provided and inadecuate markers. But such details were received from these two groups only. No such data has so far been located for casualties in Indo-China, Singapere, Java, Sumatra, or the Celebes. It is submitted that training in the importance of such information, if incorporated at least in the training of all officer personnel, to include officers of the Marchant Marine, would accomplish much to alleviate this type of situation in the future.