




NOTEBOOK

Fall 1914

Oct 1914

Nov 1914

C

At 6:30 am Dec 8, 1941 (Manila time),
the phone in Quarters 39, Fort Mc Kinley -
where I occupied with Col. Harrison C.
Browne, Chief of Staff, Philippine Division -
rang. It was "Bick" (Hueston) Wynkoop
asking to speak to Lt. Col. K. L. ^{came} Benj. I
told him that "K. L." was not in and, noting
a tone of excitement in ^{his} Wynkoop's voice,
asked him if anything was wrong. It was
then he told me that Pearl Harbor had
been bombed by the Japanese early that
morning (Manila time). The question we'd
been asking ourselves for months was answered.

I phoned my regimental commander, Lt.
Col. George S. Clarke and found that he had
also received the same news and had given
orders to alert the regiment (57th Infantry P.S.).
A few minutes later my car rolled up and
my driver, Pvt. Abern ^{Hedges} was ringing the door
bell. Things in my quarters were in
something of a mess, as I was in the midst
of packing up all my belongings except those
I would need in the field. Boxes and
crates were all over the place.

⑤ who had arrived Nov. 20 on the "Coolidge" and was stopping with
us temporarily.

and Juan Peñas, my horseboy

It took Abern, only a moment to put my bedding roll in the car while I threw a couple of last minute articles into my clothing roll which I habitually kept hanging up and ready to roll. The same was true of my other field equipment, so it only remained for Abern to close my roll and put it in the car. I got into my field equipment, took one last look around and headed for regimental headquarters. There were many things I hated to leave behind but were out of the question to take with me. Many times during the campaign I was to kick myself for not bringing along those lovely ^{color} photographs of Toni and the children, but, as I write this in a Taiwan prison camp, I know that had I done so I should have lost them just the same. So, it wasn't in the cards for me to have them in prison camp.

Less than twenty minutes after talking to Col. Clarke, I arrived at regimental headquarters. Here everything was proceeding in a business like manner. Transportation was being spotted for each organization and equipment was being loaded just as had been done dozens of times in the short time I had been with the regi-

ment. In other words, there was no fuss or excitement. Every body knew exactly what he was supposed to be doing and, after reporting my arrival to the Regimental Commander, I took occasion to see that they were doing it. It occurred to me after a while that I had had no breakfast, so I stopped in at one of the company kitchens and got a cup of coffee.

In September of 1941, Colonel William E. Broughs, who was in command of the 57th when I arrived on the "Helmway Grant", was ordered to Baguio on the staff of the Philippine Army General Staff School. Lt Col. Clarke, who had been Regimental Exec. when I joined, but who early in September was at Camp Ord (near San Miguel, Pampanga) on duty with the Philippine Army, was ordered back to assume command of the 57th. He had not arrived when we had our farewell review for Col Broughs and I'll never forget the thrill I got out of commanding the regiment at that ceremony. Little did I think then that I would inherit the regiment and command it during more than half the campaign on Luzon.

I saw Col. Clarke for the first time since

his return when we both attended a cocktail party at the Fort McKinley Officers' Club - he that arrived late that afternoon. I will remember how cordially he greeted me and how he told me he was looking forward to having me as his Executive. We had been very good friends before he left for duty with the P.A. and it made me feel especially good to have him speak to me as he did. I then and there resolved to give him everything I had (which, of course, I'd have done anyway) and then some. I make this rather long digression merely to show the very happy and close relationship which existed between Colonel Clance and me from the outset.

To return to the events of the morning of the fateful 8th of December, it was a matter of a very short while before all battalion Commanders, Captain Royal L. Reynolds (1st ^{major}), Robert D. Scholes (2nd), and Captain Paul D. Wood (3rd) and Commanders of special units reported ready to move. Soon the regiment was in bivouac on the outskirts of the post. Regimental Headquarters and Headquarters Company were located on the western edge of the post between the radio intercept station and the line of

officers quarters, the Service and Anti-tank Companies in the vicinity of the 57th Infantry Stables. The 1st Bn. Livonacel near the Post Cemetery, the 2nd near the little barrio of PINAGKAISAJAN on the streetcar line between McKinley and Manila - and about a mile west of the northern part of the post, while the 3rd Battalion was located in the vicinity of the barrio, GUADALUPE, between the 2nd Battalion and the post of McKinley.

Some time during the morning (Dec. 8), the Commanding General, Philippine Division, Brigadier General Maxon S. LOUGH, called a conference of unit Commanders at Division Headquarters which at that time had not been moved to the field. Col. Clance, Captain Harold K. Johnson, regimental S-3 and I attended. Also present were the corresponding officers of the 31st Infantry (US) - Lt. Col. Charles L. Steel, C.O., Lt. Col. Edwin A. Doane, Exec., and I forget who the regimental S-3 was, or actually, whether or not he was present - and the 45th Infantry (PS) - Lt. Col. Thomas H. Doyle, C.O., and his S-3 Capt. Wright (Class of '29, at USMA). In addition, Capt. Frederick Saint, CO 14th Engineer Bn (PS) was there and, of course, Col. Harrison C. Browne and Lt. Col. Robert J.

Hoffman, the Chief of Staff and Asst. C of S, G-3, respectively, of the Philippine Division^①. As I recall, the only order issued by General Langle was that all units would move into the field at once and provide protection against aerial attack. The 57th Inf. was already in the field, so we could go over to return to our bivouac area, or fight and keep in touch with Division.

Well, here we were, away out on the end of a long line. The question of the defense of the Philippines had been the subject of many discussions. We were now to find out the real answer.

In the afternoon, we heard that Baguio and Fort John Hay (Commanded by Lt. Col. John P. Norton, a former member of the 57th) had been bombed at 8:24 AM, Tarlac at 11:30 am - and that Clark Field, just off the post of Fort Stotsenberg on the DAV side, had received hits, with great loss in heavy bombers, at 12:45 pm.

Phil Fry (Lt. Col. Philip T. Fry) who had arrived on the November 20th GOOLIDGE and who had received no assignment up to Dec 8th asked Philippine Division to assign him to his old regiment, the 57th. His request was readily granted. I well remember my surprise and

^① There were probably others present - the C.O. 12th Inf. for example - but I cannot say definitely.

delight at seeing him coming across the field between our Command Post and Fort Stotsenberg. Phil and I were born and raised in the same North Carolina town (Fayetteville); we went to school together and played together as boys. Our paths diverged about the time I went to college in 1911 and never crossed again until 1935 when we met in Atlanta, Ga, where Phil was on ROTC duty with "Boys" and "Tech" High Schools and I was on the same typing duty at "Georgia Tech". Aside from my personal feelings, I knew we were lucky because Phil had a fine record with the 30th Div in World War I and would have been a "find" for any outfit.

When he reported to Col. Clarke, he was asked if he would object to being assigned to command a battalion since Col. Conner did not want to relieve me as Regimental Exec. Phil is senior to me and automatically became second in command upon his assignment to the regiment (the Regimental Exec. is usually the officer next in seniority to the Commanding officer). Phil's reply was characteristic - he told Col. Clarke that

anything would be agreeable to him. Consequently, he was assigned to command the 3rd Bn and did a grand job of it, under conditions which were extremely deficient, until he assumed command of the regiment at Abreay, Bataan, on Jan 21, 1942.

Lt Col. Frank E. Braxton who had ^{also} arrived in the Philippines on November 20, 1941, had been assigned to the 51st Inf almost a year before the war broke. He had come from duty with the National Guard in the Fourth Corps Area and for several years while I was on duty at Georgia Tech, Atlanta was his headquarters. I knew him there and had been in the same class with him (1925-6) at the Infantry School. I did not know him intimately then, as I did not know him later, but knew he was a highly trained officer - a leader with the production and that one were lucky to have him. On Dec 8th Frank was assigned to command the 2nd Bn. The only other assignment of Dec 8th was that of Major Frank Halland sometime during the afternoon. He was given no specific assignment at once. Later he was to become G-2, Luzon Force on Bataan.

Incidentally, we learned that the report about the bombing of Tarlac at 11:30 am. had been incorrect. Actually, she was bombed between 2 and 3 am on Dec 9 by the same flight of planes, presumably that bombed Nichols Field a few minutes later.

In the afternoon, we saw our first enemy planes at close range. They came flying low - several of them over our C. P. - ~~They were flying over Nichols Field again, southward.~~ ^{See page 8} How many times during the course of the campaign were we to see these aluminum-colored planes with the red circles underneath their wing-tips flying at any and all altitudes - entirely unmolested. Some of our men opened fire but no perceptible damage was done. When they fired on and damaged one of our own planes late in the afternoon orders were issued to hold their fire until ordered by an officer.

At the time of the war outbreak I had been president of a board of officers charged with conducting experiments leading to a recommendation on the proper length of stock on the Springfield rifle which was best suited for use by the Philippine Army. We had just agreed, as I remember, that the normal issue stock was about 1 1/4" too long, and

it was this afternoon that I received and signed the completed board proceedings - and sent it on to our 1st Battalion for Roy Reynolds signature. That was the last I saw or heard of the whole thing, of course. It all seemed rather funny and ironical.

All the 9th was spent in the same location and the men put in their time completing their fox holes. Of course, as a matter of routine, air guards were on duty from the outset - machine guns were sited for anti aircraft defense and the men and officers impressed with the necessity for avoiding unnecessary exposure and the wearing of paths to and from their bivouac areas. Similarly, the morning of the 10th was spent awaiting orders.

On page 21
In the afternoon we received orders to dispatch one battalion to the vicinity of ARAYAT, Pangasinana, to investigate a reported landing of paratroops. The 2nd Battalion was designated and got away in a very short time.

⊗ Soon after the 2nd Bn had left, the commander of the regiment was ordered to move on ARAYAT. The 1st Bn moved out at 6 pm. - and the 3rd followed after a short interval. Johnnie Olson (1st Lt. John E.), our regimental Adjutant, and I went with the 1st Bn serial in my car.

About 5 pm, Johnnie and Abern, my driver, and I went on to the service road back of my old quarters (#44) where found the buses (PAMBUSCO and PANTRANCO, I think) spotted and the 1st Bn getting ready to load. These buses were all as red as the proverbial little old school house and each one could, of course, be seen for miles by an airplane. As there was little our best cover, I was very apprehensive. If I had known as much about the Nips then as I came to know later, I should not have worried so. Their planes, apparently, go out on certain prescribed missions and, under those conditions, targets of opportunity mean nothing.

There were a number of things that had to be attended to before we could move. Some of our buses burned gas, some diesel oil, and some alcohol - and many of them had insufficient fuel for anything like the distance we were going; therefore it became necessary to transfer fuel from one bus to another and discard several of the buses. At 6 pm - on the nose - the column moved out. My car was in the lead. Just before we left, Col Harrison C. Brown, Chief of Staff, Philippine Division, came over to see how we were getting along. He was really having a busy day, but was everywhere, seeing that units were doing what they should - yet never bothering anyone as some staff officers are apt to do. He asked me if everything was O.K. and I told him the situation was under control. I began to comment on my apprehensions over the beautiful target these red buses would make - and to tell him about our

having to transfer fuel etc. but I could see he didn't want to listen to a lot of details, so I shut up. Sam he was off to do about other things that were on his mind. That was the last time I saw him for some time.

As the light was pretty good, Ed (Col. Edmund E.) Aldridge, Fort McKinley Post Exchange Officer and, formerly, 2nd Bn. 57th Inf (PS), came out and snapped some pictures. It was February '42 before I saw him again.

We headed out the Eagle Gate (down on the Pasig River by the Commissary) and turned left into the main road. We turned north after entering the environs of Manila and continued on to Quezon Blvd where we turned left. From there we followed the main highway which runs through San Fernando ^{Pampanga}. It grew dark about then - time our column entered Manila. We were driving without lights, of course, and at least all drivers were so intimidated. The black out light with its pinpoint of bluish light was permitted, however. Now and then the drivers would snap on their bright lights for an instant. Drastic threats had to be made before this was stopped. On the whole, however, I cannot say too much in praise of the little fellows who drove our buses. They left homes and families on the shortest kind of notice, to be gone for weeks, knew how long - and none knew where he was going until he reported for instructions. Many of these men were killed by enemy bombs, others

entitled in the Philippine Army and the Scouts. Most of them never saw their families again. They ate with the organization they transported and lived right in their buses.

On the way through Manila we were frequently guided along the dark road, warned of obstructions, and given other helpful information by members of some National Volunteer Corps who were very nice on the job. We would be warned of their presence by a whistle and soon one of their number would hop on the running board of our leading vehicle. Thus we proceeded northward toward ARAYAT without serious mishap. At one point one of the bolobolin trucks, carrying, among others, Cpl. Quencia, the battalion clerk, ran a small low bridge. I remember Quencia's presence in the truck because he was a heart and had to be hospitalized.

The highway passes through San Fernando, but a couple of kilometers northward a secret road branches off at a very small angle, passes the outskirts of San F and goes on to ARAYAT. This latter road was the one we took. On arriving at a point just east of San F where an east-west road crossed the ARAYAT ROAD we met the 2nd Bn returning from Arayat where the peace troop report had been proved false. It was very dark and it had been drizzling for about half an hour. While I was talking to Frank Poonow, getting the lowdown on the local situation, Phil Fry, camp up the column had closed up on the 1st Bn in the darkness.

We turned left (west) here and proceeded toward San F.
 On driving at the junction your road with the main high
 way, we met Col. Clarke and ^(Major Starick) Johnson, ^{regt S-3.} Here we
 were told that the 1st Bn would proceed to Guagua, the
 2nd to Ponce, and the 3rd to Florida Blanca. The 1st and
 2nd would organize a defensive position along the
 Guagua-Ponce Road; the 3rd being held in regimental
 reserve. I was directed to proceed to the Del Carmen
 Sugar Centrale and select a regimental C.P. for my
 Headquarters Co. with me. After a little groping around
 we found our destination, put the transportation under cover,
 and proceeded to get some sleep. Next morning I went into the
 office of the Sugar Centrale and told them why we were there. We
 were treated with every courtesy. I looked over the guest
 house which was on the edge of a little more-hill golf
 course and not far from a very nice swimming pool,
 picked a nice suite for Col. Clarke and some very nice
 accommodations for myself and other Headquarters staff
 members. The set-up looked pretty good. There was a phone
 lots of books, and a photograph with several books of records
 — also some nice showers which all the officers provided
 to use. This done, we went back to where we had left
 the troops and had breakfast. One of the Filipino employees
 of the Centrale brought us some eggs and one or two chickens
 that were welcome — among them, a bottle of tomato
 ketchup. After breakfast, Col. Clarke and Johnson

Johnson having failed to show up, I got in a ¹⁵headquarters
 Co. "Jeep" and proceeded down the road on the look-out
 for them. I spotted Col. Clarke's Ford after it had gone about
 2 Km south. It was parked under a tree near a
 nipa shack which was built on rather tall supports
 leaving room enough underneath for a man to walk
 without bending over. Under the house seated on an
 improvised bunk I found Col. Clarke and his S-3. No
 amount of urging on my part could lure them to the Sugar
 Centrale or move them from their determination to estab-
 lish the Regimental C.P. at that point. I went back to
 Del Carmen, thanked the people there for their courtesy, and
 started Headquarters Co. moving down the road to a
 location more accessible to our new C.P.

The 1st Bn, 24th FA ^(PS) Commanded by Lt. Col. Charles B.
 Leinbach, and Co C, 12th Med Bn (PS) Commanded by Major
 John L. Raulston soon moved into the near vicinity. So,
 with the exception of Co A, 14th Engr Bn (PS), Capt. Charles
 W. Dampwulf commanding, which was being used on
 other work at the time, the 57th Combat Team was all to-
 gether.

This nipa shack — or perhaps I had better say, house
 since it was far superior to those in the vicinity — was
 owned and occupied by a Filipino family named Poño.
 There were several cacao and palm trees surrounding
 the house while in rear there was a small banana
 grove. ^{As soon as} ^{8 Sept 39} communication with Philippine
 Division had been effected, we set about the preparation

19 of fox holes. Each individual was assigned a fox hole or a place in one, so as to eliminate any confusion. Air guards were posted, as well as a line of lookouts along the bank of a small stream which passed the house about 300 yards in rear - the same stream, incidentally as that which ran through Del Carmen.

The next few days were spent in going over our line from GUAGUA to PORAC and doing all we could to ensure the carrying out of our mission, namely, to cover the withdrawal of the North Luzon Force whenever necessary. Our 1st Bn was on the right, in the general vicinity of GUAGUA, with Co B in Santa Rita a little farther about 1 km to the west on the GUAGUA-PORAC ROAD. The 2nd Bn occupied the line in the vicinity of PORAC.

On Dec. 11 word came from P.D. that paratroops had been reported in the vicinity of ABUCAY HACIENDA, Bataan, and regiment was directed to dispatch a Bn to that locality with the mission of investigating the report and, if it was true, destroying the enemy. The 3rd Bn was selected and Frank (Capt Franklin O.) Anders, regt S-2, carried the instructions to Phil Fry at Florida Blanca. According to Phil's subsequent account, the Bn was near Ilog and it was only a few minutes before they were on their way, with Charlie Haas's (Capt Charles W. Haas) Co K in the lead.

On the night of Dec 12 (my note book says it was 8:25 pm.) while going, from Guagua to Porac in my Govt Chevrolet (W-11275) driven

by Put Abernethy, Hq Co. we had a head-on collision with a 1/2 ton pickup truck (W24345) of Co D driven by (17) a Put Arciaga. In my car, in addition to the driver and me, was our Chaplain, Capt Thomas J. Scocina. We got shaken up a bit but, as both cars were moving slowly, no one was hurt - at least not today. A Put Dagan, Co D received a small cut behind his left ear which I bandaged. Both vehicles were proceeding with out lights - Chevrolet on left of road, 1/2 ton pickup on right. This happened (according to note book) 3.4 miles west of Guagua.

A day or two later, after I reported the accident to George (Major G.F.) Fisher, regt S-4, I got a nice shiny blue, right hand drive, Chevrolet in replacement. George told me it had formerly belonged to a Catholic Priest (Filipino) of Lubao.

The 3rd Bn found the paratroop rumor false and was ordered by P.D. to remain at the hacienda.

On Dec 17, Roy Reynolds brought Vic (Capt. Victor F.) Crowell, C.O. Co D, by regimental C.P. and reported that Vic had been making remarks to the effect that he didn't want to have any part in this war - remarks which (Vic having proved on several occasions that he wasn't yellow) reflected upon either his loyalty or his sanity. He asked that arrangements be made for Vic to be sent to a hospital for "observation". These arrangements were soon made and Vic was sent back to Div C.P. for disposition. This was the last

any of us saw of him alive.

On Dec 19, by order of P.D., 3rd Bn 57th Inf (PS) moved to OLONGAPO for the purpose of stopping a threatened enemy landing in SUBIC BAY.

On Dec 20, by order of P.D., the 57th Inf (PS) moved from the Gueaga Porac position to a similar position with the same general mission on an east-west line extending through ANGELES, Pampanga. The 2nd Bn was on the right of the line with its right about 1/2 Km east of a point on the Subic Bay - San Francisco Rd. where rd changes turns off of Angeles. 1st Bn extended the line to the west, etc. Responsibility including the "back area" to Fort Stotsenberg. The regimental C.P. was located in a little palm grove on the east side of the PORAC-ANGELES ROAD and about 2 Km north of Porac (on the north bank of a dry stream bed). ^{Sup p 26}

[Insert on page 9] From all reports, Nichols Field took a real pounding. A few bombs fell near the Carabao Gate. These were evidently intended for the Pan American Radio Station located between the B Range Road and the McKinley - Coolie Coolie Rd about 3/4 Km west of the post. That afternoon Top bombers came over our C.P. escorted by fighters in another attack on Nichols Field. We had a few fighters in the air and there was a rather one-sided fight, the Tops having all the advantage. The field was smashed and our few fighters scattered. A good part of the time the planes were directly over head. We were literally sprayed with small (about .30) and large (about .50) machine guns, but miraculously, none of our men

^{and p 91} was hit. Phil Tellone that he and Frank got into the same fox hole at Regt C.P. where they had come to receive some instructions. Frank seemed to impress Phil (as he impressed me many times later when he was Right as Off) as having a fatalistic view of the whole thing. Frank said he was going to get it. Well Phil cheered him up as best he could. Says he was so busy watching the fight over head and trying to buck Frank's morale, that he "didn't have time to be scared."

[Insert on page 18] During the nine days we spent at this place, there had been very little to do. A few patrols over into the hills west of the river to investigate some very suspicious lights, resulted in nothing we could put our fingers on. This section of Luzon is noted as a hot-bed of Sakdaka activity, and as this is seldom loyal to the U.S. we thought we had better keep on our guard. Several times each day we see flights of 27 or more Japanese bombers, ^{flying at about 30,000 feet} headed a little east of south - obvious by bound for Manila. At the first sight of them the air guards would sound a whistle about and we'd all make a dash for our fox holes. After we'd done this several times when the passing planes were at a considerable angle from us laterally, I spoke to Col. Clarke about it and expressed some doubt of its necessity. That was the first time he ever seemed to lose his patience with me. We were playing it safe, he said, and the officers were setting the men an example. In this way we would save ourselves a lot of casualties. Several times I noticed that he remained in his fox hole for an unduly long time after the planes had passed over. However, I thought nothing of this. He was a second section and the veteran of all the actions of the famous First Division in the First World War. Still, I don't think he stayed a little too close to the C.P. and requested his staff to do the same. If there's one thing that bucks the morale of troops in the line, it's to see the C.O. and staff frequently. Another suggestion I made

20) (Insert p. 18) was that we arrange for the officers to go up to Del Carmen in small groups and bathe. We had telephonic connection with the Canale and it looked to me like the common sense thing to do. As it was, we were bathing in the cans which is all right if the conditions warrant, but I'm sure behind in making myself more uncomfortable than necessary. This suggestion was summarily disapproved and rather put a damper on my bright ideas for the time being. I began to notice after that, that as Executive, I was being shot at. I remember Johnnie and the C.O. were dealing direct and many times I'd know nothing of what had been done until I'd find it out myself. So I had a talk with Johnnie and he'd tell me everything that went on. Finally, I thought I'd better mention it to Col. Clarke. He was surprised and assured me that nothing had been further from his mind than to leave me out. At this point, I thought it best to mention my views on the Staff's getting around a little more. I didn't get much response from that.

On or about December 25, the 3rd Bn joined the regiment as Regimental Reserve in a small barrio several Km. South of ANGELES. This position was as quiet as the PORAC-GUAGUA position, the only thing that broke the monotony was the daily flights of planes headed for Corregidor and Manila.

The 2nd Regular Philippine Infantry (later designated as the 3rd R.P.I.) was on our right ^{another in Mexico.} It was part of the 1st Regular Philippine Div. under General Fidel Segundo. ^{See page 25} This regiment was raw and untrained, having been mustered into the service on December 17, 41. After we had been in position for a day or two this regiment was placed under the command of the C.O. 57th Inf (PS). At this time, we had our Combat Team together with the exception of our

engineer Company. The 1st Bn 24th FA^(PS) was just South of Angeles with several guns covering the Angeles-Mabalacat road as a protection against tanks. Our Collecting Co (C, 1st M. Bn PS) was located in the South Eastern outskirts of PARAC.

About Dec 26 & 27 we could see large clouds of smoke rising from Stateanberg. Frank Birkow and Roy Reynolds sent up to find out what was going on and discovered that stores were being burned preparatory to abandoning that post. Trucks were then sent up to salvage everything possible. This was done by all battalions and units your combat team except our Headquarters Company. Col. Clarke vetoed this. It was discovered that almost everything was available there for the taking - the entire PEX stock, Medical Supplies at the hospital, and food and clothing at the Qm. - to say nothing of ammunition at the Ordnance warehouse. Much valuable "loot" was brought in - "loot" which proved valuable many times later on. [X] [Insert page 10] We learned

later that on this date the enemy was landing troops at Aparri, Vigan, and Legaspi. They were opposed, due to their overwhelming victory over our aircraft. Claude Fied (our bomber officer there) - and, of course, our pursuit ships (mostly P-40's) were downed by fuel in the Nichols Field and Nielson Airport bombings. I'll never know why we weren't caught en route to Araway that day. If the Japanese air force only knew it, a little enterprising activity on their part this date would have cut a month or more off the duration of the Philippine Campaign.

22 On or about Dec 24 we were joined by two (2) medical officers - 1st Lt Donald W. Robinson who went to the 1st Bn, and John E. Lamey, who went to the 3rd Bn - and one (1) dental officer 1st Lt McCurdy - who was assigned as a regular medic to the 2nd Bn. On this same date we received three (3) young ^{sergeants} lieutenants; graduates of the Class of 141 at USMAH. They were Alexander R. Nittinger, assigned to Co A, Cheany, assigned to Co B, and Naator J. Palla assigned to Co C.

About this time Staff Sgt Flaviano Balantong 1st Lt G. was accidentally shot in the upper leg by a Col. 45 pistol in the hands of a F.B. sentry. He was taken to the hospital in San Fernando, Pangasinana, and in spite of repeated efforts to locate him, he was never heard of again.

23 ^{See page 23} ^{See page 36} Anticipating a move to the rear, the regiment had reconnoitered the back road from PORSC to DINALUPISAN (just west of Laya Junction).

On Dec 31/41 the regiment moved from its position to ARUCAY. We did not move by the back road to Dinalupisan as anticipated due to a heavy and persistent rain. Our route was via PORSC, GUAGUAS, LUBAO, LAYAC JCT. etc. The move was made at night. The 31st Inf (US) had done some work on the OPLR through SAMAL and the MTR through Mabatang, but not nearly enough. There hadn't been time. I'll never forget the disgust of some of Frank Borkow's force (it was too dark to see his face) when he and I were trying to locate his OPLR about midnight. I didn't know any more about the situation than he did. Just trying to keep him get oriented. It was on this date, though we didn't know it.

23 ⁽²³⁾ ^(Insert on page 22) One incident which in the Angeles position will bear recording here. About the 27th or 28th of December, Col. Clarke left the C.P. for a visit to Angeles. About 10 minutes after his departure, Frank Borkow phoned from Angeles and told me that, a few minutes before, a hysterical Filipino came rushing into Angeles from Mabalacat announcing to all who might hear that the Japanese had broken through and were in Mabalacat. Frank said he had notified Ray Reynolds and was investigating the incident. ^{that, personally, he took little stock in it.} I told him Col. Clarke was heading his way, and suggested that he get on with his investigation and keep me informed. He did this - and I tried to get the 2nd Regular Phil. Inf. Neither group had any luck. Their division was also inaccessible to us by phone at the moment. I called Hq 3rd Bn, got Col. Clarke on the phone and told him the report - also Frank's and my reaction to it. He said "Oh my God" and hung up. Later Phil told me the story. Hearing this "Oh my God" at the end of the conversation, Phil said "What's the matter, Colonel?" to which Col. Clarke replied "I can't tell you." Phil then said "Colonel Clarke, after all, I'm Decord in command of the regiment and I think I should have your entire confidence in this matter. If anything should happen to you, I'm next you know." Well, Col. Clarke calmed down and told Phil what it was about. The report proved false, of course. A couple of 26th Cav (PS) shagbills had decided they wanted to fire their pistols.

at the time, that Vic Crowell was accidentally shot and killed at Hq. Phil Div. while enroute from the hospital back to the Regiment. About Jan 1 or 2 '42 I attended his funeral in the little Abucay cemetery. Chaplain Secunda and I were the only ones there outside the grave digging detail. Other graduates USMA (one being a classmate) were not yet in time.

One platoon Co G plus 1 Section machineguns (also from Co G) were left to man the OPLR through Samal under the command of Lt Paul Shure.

About 2 Km south of Samal there was another barrio called KALAGUIMAN. South of this, still another barrio called MABATANG lay on the East Road at a distance of about 2 Km. Mabatang was on the Databitan River and about 3 Km north of ABUCAY on the Labangan River. The MLR extended east and west through Mabatang. Regimental CP and reserve battalion were located in Abucay, and the whole position was known as "The Abucay Position". How that name was to be engrained on all our minds! The 1st Bn occupied the right of the MLR beginning on the east with Manila Bay. Co C (Capt Lloyd E. Mills, commanding) on the right, Co A (Capt Frederick J. Yeager, commanding) on the left - a little school house about 100 yards west of the East Rd. ^(Hq. No. 2) Co B (Capt Eugene H. Anthony, commanding) was in Bn reserve about 500 yards to the south and on the east side of the main (East) road.

The left of the MLR was held by the 3rd Bn. ^(with replacement Co M) Col (Capt Charles W. Hoag, commanding) was on the

right; Co D (Capt Herman J. Garth, ^{also with replacement Co M} commanding) was on the left. Col (Capt Ernest L. Brown, commanding) was in Bn reserve 500-600 yds south west on the east side of the Engineers road which led in to the western edge of Abucay. ^(Mentioned page 25) On the only visit I ever made to this regiment, I stopped in at Hq. and saw Cols. Kearie L. Berry (abson to the Div Command) who commanded the Div from about the middle of February to the end, and Albert Hugh Dumas (abson to Co. 2nd Reg Phil Div) who ended the war in command of this regiment under its new designation as the 3rd R.P.I. I also met a Major Gaveria whom I had met before, but who had been one of my predecessors in charge of the Filipino schools at McKinley and whose signature I had often seen.

The left of our 3rd Bn tied in with the right of the 4th Div (PA) - BG Vicente Lim commanding, Col. Malcolm V. Fortier advisor - and detailed plans for mutual exchange of machine gun fire with the 4th Div (PA) (Col. Loren A. Wetherby, abson) had been made. The 2nd Bn (less 1 platoon + 1 MG Sect Co G) was in regimental reserve on the RRL (east of Hq 7) which extended through the north edge of Abucay.

Kalaguiman was on a small stream. About 1 1/4 Km west of this barrio there was a large cane field which extended south and a little east to a point near the left of 3rd Bn 57th Inf (PS). This field was the source of much trouble to us as it was from it that most of the enemy attacks were launched. We realized it to some extent but not fully. There was not time to cut it, and it was far too green to burn. The result was that we had to be and the thing became a night mare before we were through - (Turn to page 26 below line)

26 [Insert on page 18] with the exception of the 26th Cav (PS) and a few species troops, none of the Philippine Division had been engaged in the fighting so far. The Philippine Army, that been fighting a series of guerrilla wars from one phase line to another, and used [57th Inf (PS), 40th Div (PS) and 31st Div (US)] constituted a coming force, the scheme of maneuvers being a series of delaying actions to allow the North Luzon Force (Maj. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright Commanding) to face down the 'Bataan Peninsula' - the old WPO 3 - which course was focal upon us by the incompetence of our Air Corps leaders in allowing the Clark Field Fiasco and the failure of our Naval units to do anything at all to prevent enemy landings. As known about the Air Corps, but the failure of the Navy to do anything to even discourage these landings is still a great big mystery to most of us. Surely, a few submarines at the mouth of Lingayen Gulf on Dec 21-22 '41 could have done something. All we know is they didn't. But, both sides wanted to work in earnest getting ready for whatever might come. Phil Foy's efforts were similar those of Ray Reynolds. Here's what Phil says about the 3rd Bn at this time: "Called off on the Engineers for tools, wire for entanglements and the construction of a continuous mine field across my front. They came through in a big way and furnished everything we needed. and started work on the mine field (Co A 14th Engr Bn (PS) was commanded by Capt. Charles M. Sempson). At the same time we were putting up our barbed wire entanglements. Had no trouble getting equipment and help because everyone knew the Japs would hit here first in attempting to break the position. The ground was abominable hard, so first we started on individual fox holes and gradually tried to connect them. Also started on

communication trenches to the rear, but to have completed the job would have required at least three (3) months. We had only a few days so did the best we could. When the fight finally started we had a partially completed mine field - one bank of barbed wire entanglements, good fox holes, partially connected, and almost no rear communication trenches. The mutual exchange of fire was arranged by C.O.s on 12th and 3rd Bns. "In Cox area were placed our two .50 Cal. A.T. machine guns. They were covering the highway and possible tank approaches." Co M (less 2 platoons) was back in the general vicinity of Cox on BRL. The modern anti tank guns of our A.T. Co. were located on 14th Engr (in 1st Bn Sector). "The mortar platoon was almost in the center of the sector and about 500 yards from the front lines. They had an excellent position in a dried up stream bed and were so disposed as to be able to fire on a cane field" - the cane field required to above - "on our left flank". The 3rd Bn position had one great weakness. We discuss it now. The cane field was in the 41st Inf sector - was an immense affair with the nearest edge only about 500 yards from the front. The Engineers tried to burn it, even using parachute flares, but the cane was too green. Working parties tried cutting it down but the time was all too short and almost no impression was made. It was a constant threat and danger point. It finally became a huge grassy field for the Japs."

The situation in the 1st Bn was quite different from that in the 3rd. East of the main road were a series of fresh ponds (used by the natives in peacetime for raising "BANGOS" - a very edible species of thick fish) so the MLR and RRL of this Bn were confined to the dikes separating these ponds. These dikes were wide enough to accommodate fox holes and the presence of water in its front rendered the 1st Bn less likely to be attacked (frontally at least) than the 3rd. They had to fight courageously against

28 Landings from Manila Bay and, of course, the porting of its M.R. in the Co A Sector west of the main road was just as liable to forestall attack as any point in the 3d Bn Sector.

About Jan 1st a prewar romance between Capt. Garnett H. Francis, Dental Surg. 57th Inf (PS) and Miss Erlene Allen, DMC was culminated in their marriage at the 57th Inf (PS) Command Post Abucay, Batangas, P.I. Col. Clarke was there and "gave away" the brides. A good many others, including my self, were present. I feel that Chaplain Saccina performed the wedding ceremony, but since he is Catholic and I don't think they were, I can't say for sure.

* [Insert on page 18] while here we met several of the young aviators from Det. Carman Airfield. Two were particularly nice to us, bringing us fresh bread from time to time. One was Capt. Jack Chiles' brother in law (I think his name was Brown - anyway he was the brother of Jack's wife, Lucy (as I remember her name). Incidentally, Chiles was S. & 57th Inf (PS) and returned to the US prior to the war. The other officer was a non-flying Captain named Manton.]

On Jan 2'42 all officers of the regiment except Lt. Col. Liles, Regt. Exec., Fry (Co 3d Bn), and Borrow (Co 2d Bn), Major George F. Fisher and 2d Lt. Cheaney, Nunniger and Palla, were promoted one grade ^{dated from Dec 1941} the first of which already having grades commensurate with their duties, and the the three 2d Lts that joined too late to be included in the promotion recommendation. Palla and Cheaney were promoted later in January. Nunniger's promotion came through after Jan 12'42, the date he was killed.

On Jan 4, I read that Major Buck ^(JE) Pyrell lost Co G (then PA Brauner) HPD that died of a heart attack during the night.

On Jan 2d Bn joined a provisional regiment under the command of Col. Charles Steel at Laya, Jct.

No action. Returned to regimental control. ⁽²⁹⁾ Word was received that the morale of the OPLR troops was low. Capt. Wermuth, Co C Co D was sent up to investigate about Jan 9th.

On Jan 9, Gen. MacArthur with some members of his staff, I forget which ones, visited our C.P. One good intelligence patrol had just behaved very well in a brush with the enemy to the north. He was all enthusiastic - wanted lots of recommendations for decorations submitted. He stayed less than 5 minutes. This was the only time I ever saw him during the war. The second time I ever saw a USAFFE staff officer, Maj. Gen. Sutherland, USAFFE C of S came up to Abucay some time between Jan 14 and 21 when Col. Armit J. Farnsworth was in command.

At dawn Jan 9th Lt. Shure and his OPLR troops returned to the 2d Bn at Abucay, at dawn. They had been hard pressed, he said. Looked like a poor piece of leadership to me. He was sent back as far as Kalaguman at 10 am. On same date Capt. Arthur W. Wermuth, Co C Co D was sent up to Kalaguman to assist Lt. Shure in bolstering the morale of the OPLR troops and to render a report on conditions. See page 43.

On Jan 10, Abucay received a very heavy shelling and was set on fire. That night, on Capt. Wermuth's recommendation, Lt. Harry J. Stampin moved forward to Kalaguman with the remainder of Co G plus 1 Squad Co E, 1 Squad Co F and relieved Lt. Paul Shure and his OPLR troops. He remained on OPLR one night.

That night at 10:30 (approx) the 3d Bn Sector received a determined attack by well equipped and specially selected troops. Story of this attack follows:

About 10:30 pm, I heard rifle and machine gun fire coming from Co I Sector. Called Capt. Gerth on the phone and was informed that he was on the front line. Called Haas, Cox and Haas stated his sector was quiet except for a few intermittent bursts, probably influenced by the more general fire from Co I. Started for the front line myself and had just arrived at the Bn front OP when I heard.

Munich and a general cry of 'BANZAI'. Know them, of course, that it was an attack. Our boys opened up with rifle and machine gun fire. There was a hell of a noise and then heavy fire broke out which was answered along the entire front. Talked with both Geste and Haas and was sure then that a heavy attack was to be expected very shortly. Both of them were eager and anxious for a show down. By this time the tank dunes (which were home-made) were exploding and a few tanks could be heard coming up. The noise was not only by human contact. The tanks were still a good half a mile from the front. The artillery liaison officer was with me, so quickly gave him two prearranged targets (Cane field) and asked for immediate fire on them. Capt. Sheldon Coe, 24th FA, the liaison officer went to work with a great deal of enthusiasm. I could hear him giving fire data over his phone. Capt. Rutger K. Grimes, the 1st Heavy weapons commander, was also present so ordered him to search as much of the Cane field as possible with our mortars. By this time Capt. Coe reported that his artillery had orders from the Combat Team Staff (57th 1st Hqs) not to fire a round without permission from the C.T. Well - I knew something was wrong - got S-3 (Major Harold K. Johnson) on the phone. Explained the situation - asked for artillery support and was turned down. Yelled for a connection with the C.O., (Col Geo S. Clarke), made some explanation and same request with same result. By this time the 1st was heavily engaged. The Japs were getting more + more into the fight and I was needed at the rear so hung up after a furious exchange between Col. Clarke and myself.

"Many messages were coming in at this time, mostly from Geste and Haas, both asking for artillery support and neither one satisfied with the explanation that we were trying to get it for them. By now the Japs had filtered through the 4th Div and parts of my line - a few snipers with Tommy Guns. They weren't a serious menace but it is hard on the morale of unseasoned troops to be fired on from the rear. By this time artillery was coming in for plenty! My phone line to all units was in danger of being cut. Not the

Reserve Commander (Capt Ernest L. Brown) with me so (31) ordered him to send a small force to deal with the snipers. Johnson (S-3) and Phil (Major Paul D) Woodbury, Evac) hours later were having a hot conversation over the phone regarding the artillery support, so lost patience and cut in. Told Johnson to either authorize artillery fire or we would give Regt. a big hole in the line by morning. Really got action then. The artillery called for very certain targets and my voice had barely died on the line when they started coming - the most beautiful music I have ever heard was the scream of shells as they passed over our heads headed for the Jap lines. Later learned every gun in our sector had been loaded and laid on the targets and the gun crews in battle positions for hours, every one understanding the need (but not the delay) except our regt. The Japs were caught flat footed as the slaughter was terrific. This, the 1st phase, had cost them about 400 men. It cost me about 16% enlisted casualties and three (3) officers - two (2) dead and one (1) seriously wounded. The first night was over."

I here, I would like to present a justification. I write for myself about that artillery fire. In the first place, I knew nothing of the order that artillery fire would be furnished only on order of CO 57th CT. In the second place, since feeling my self somewhat short circuited by Col. Clarke in his dealings with S-3, and since I was occupying a separate digout from that of Col. Clark + Major Johnson, I had made it a point to have my phone plugged in so I could listen in on all conversations by C.O. and S-3. So I heard Phil's request for artillery, Johnson's reply, and the rather heated conversation between Phil and Col. Clark. I don't blame Johnson so much, somehow, for after all he's inexperienced. A brilliant mind far beyond his years and service, but, after all said and done, he lacked experience and you couldn't blame him for that. But I did blame Col. Clarke for throwing an officer with Phil's service was going off half cocked and one for artillery fire on some enemy reconnaissance patrol. So I went over to the C.O.'s digout and

32 modern self plans. Johnnie was at the phone then - looking like a man who has had his troubles. Col. Clarke was lying on the show covered floor. He looked rather ghostly with several days growth of his heavy black beard and was repeating over and over to himself "Oh my God! Oh my God!"

Well, for the first time since Dec 8/41 I think I really understood the situation. But what in hell could I do. If I had any guts I have got the artillery on the phone and ordered it to Col. Fry. But that's a drastic step to take at, well, I just won't reach to take it. I did tell them what I thought and almost took the words out of Phil's mouth in guaranteeing him a big hole in the line by morning if he didn't do something about it.

To continue with Phil's story: "About Jan 11/42" Set out with Pete Wool for a check up on the front lines. Went to Co K first, as they were the closest. Haas actually in the front line engaged in the bloodiest sort of a exchange shot for shot and playing hide and seek with the Jap snipers out front. He knew he was caught doing something he shouldn't and tried pointing out all the Japs dead in an effort to get me interested in anything except what he had been doing. Guess you pretty apt. Didn't have the heart to say a word. Off as it was his first experience in combat and what a man!! He had me by his collar with tears in his eyes. Mine burned a little too. Made our way down to the Co I Sector.

Everything quiet. So perhaps we became careless. Heard someone yell but paid very little attention until a sniper's rifle cracked. Mussel about it was close. Crawled about 50 yards farther and found Capt. Smith down - a bullet in his hip. Didn't realize he was so badly hurt although he was bleeding quite a lot. Had to drag him to cover and then to Pon Art Station. Galt told me that 1st Lt David L. Maynard had been shot by snipers only a short while before, so back to him one to find that he was dead. Turned Co I over to 1st Lt Arthur W. Galen.

Did everything I could to strengthen the front line and visible with all of the Scouts that I could. Had nothing but words of praise for them. One old Scout said 'Colonel, they can't fight as good as the Can.' Finished my inspection and went

back to the C.P. to make my report to Regt. Estimate (33) we had been hit by a reinforced battalion. My conclusions were about as follows: They had expected no serious opposition, they had been prepared to fight an organized position with wire entanglements. Masses of them had been caught in the cane field by the artillery. Many were blown to bits by the mine fuel. The rifles and machine guns had exacted a terrible toll. That they had lost place by the withdrawal and would try to regain it by a determined attack by a much larger body of troops the next night. Snipers on both sides were active for the rest of the day. Otherwise "the calm before the storm".

"About 10 pm" on the 11th of Jan '42 "the show started. Enemy preparations, including the clearing of roads getting into position, were heard prior to this hour and reported. 1st Johnnie (1st John M.) Compton had prevailed upon me to allow him to go to Co I and assist Green who was without an officer. Johnnie was a natural fighter and one of the most likeable youngsters I have ever known. His loss was a personal affair to all of us. I looked upon him as one would a younger brother." I'd like to add my voice to these remarks. I had Johnnie in the 3rd Bn before the war and knew him intimately. Our friendship lasted while I was Regt. Exec before and during the war. "The Japs opened up with their light mortars (one of their most effective weapons). Our front lines were smothered for about 10 minutes. I called for the artillery battery at once and down it came. Every weapon unit went into action as soon as they came within the now familiar cry of "Banzai". Once again they tried getting things. We of course were ready further more and no quarter was given by either side. The winning of this battle had become a personal matter to every individual on both sides - the Japs to save face and the Scouts to give to the Philippine people and the Americans. An example of courage and fighting ability in the face of superior weapons - and finally, outnumbers that would go down in Philippine history. Green's Haas kept in constant touch with me. Haas reported a Jap tank destroyed and others withdrawn in a rapid state. Both the Jap tanks and infantry had hit our mine field again and they didn't like it! Especially in the foreground machine guns and Barrett rifles. Co K was doing all right. Green reported Co I in trouble. The Japs, in force, had

34/ pierced his line. He had used everything he had. All
of a sudden he said "They got Johnnie". There he
was. I told him to hold on, that I was sending
help. Turned to Capt Brown and ordered a couple ahead.
(The above conversation with Grier was my last with
him) against Co. I's sector. Told him about Johnnie and
the condition of Co. I in a few words. Brown's face was
white, but with a look that looked no good for the Japs. He
was on his way up with Co. L for the attack almost immedi-
ately. Another youngster, unseasoned - yes - but for sheer courage
I've never seen their equal. Haas that he his life plan was
on the air - that Co. I had been shot to pieces. Expelled
him Brown was on the way up - for him to kick on but to
refuse his left slightly. Co. L, under Brown, hit the hole but
all joint forces with Haas on his right, but failed to estab-
lish contact with the 41st Inf (Inf) on his left. The Jap was still
here, but covered by fire. It was a stalemate! A Jap
reinforced regiment had failed to get through. Now bright daylight
and we were both pinned to the ground. Had already called upon
the 41st Inf (Inf) for an Inf Co. and Capt. for a rifle Co. and a
platoon of machine guns (heavy). The Japs had followed the
request flank of Co. K and L during the above plan.
to hit. (Never will understand why the Jap command allowed
this to happen). About 1 PM the P.A. Co. reported under com-
mand of Capt. Webb. Assigned him a position very favorable
to the prevention of Jap with drawal, and he went with his
Company. Capt. (Donald T) Childers, Commanding, Co. E
reported. Had him go with me to the O.P. and there pointed
out on the ground the entire set up. "The Benning problem could
have been designed with a more perfect set up! Childers and my-
self didn't thing anything was planned down to the smallest
detail. All units were victims of the impending attack and the
time it was to be launched. All units were ordered to assist
by fire and join as Co. E came at least. Well, the attack was
beautiful and inspiring sight due our side! The Scouts had
been trained for years - mostly on the parade ground, in the
Company in attack and it was a model of precision and
exactness. If it had been put on at Benning to show the
mechanics of a Company in attack for the visiting foreign
it could not have been improved upon. Well, the Japs
were caught. They fought bravely until the machine guns
under Capt Scholz came into the fight (a separate story in
itself - he was awarded the DSC) and the attacking Company came
up on a Co. L weapon carrier.

35
on line with the request flank and the advance became
general. The Japs tried to give ground orderly but they were hard
pressed. The fight was over. All your positions regained. A
Japanese regiment defeated with a loss of about 2000 men.
It was the first time the Japs had been stopped and whipped.
My losses about 40% of enlisted men - Lt Compton, Wilson,
Green died or missing in action. Phil, for some
reason omits to mention Lt Majors (killed on the morning
of the 11th). "Outgoing eleven officers, there were only six
left." These were Major Paul D. Wood, Pon Ex; Captains
Thos G. Hulst, Pon Surg, Rudyard K. Grimes, C/O Co. M.
Charles W. Wade, C.O. Co. K, and Ernest L. Brown, C.O.
Co. J; and Lieutenant Robert L. Fleetwood, Pon S-1.
Captain Herman J. Gault had been hit in the buttocks and
a severe injury - with the result that he was never to
do duty with the regiment again. ^{See page 36} ~~Whisper~~ regiment of
my casualties and was informed later that we would be
relieved that night by the 2nd Pon and placed in regimental
reserve for a little rest. Told regiment to make the relief
early as my men in their exhausted condition could not be ex-
pected to stand another attack by a fresh regiment. This they
agreed to do and then failed to carry out, the result being
a relief about midnight - made while we were fighting
of rocky parties. With draw to vicinity of ABUCAY and constituted
regimental reserve."

During the past two days' fighting, the 1st Pon had received
no attack. The only company to become involved at all
was Co. A - on Co. K's right - which suffered few casual-
ties. One light tank was knocked out by one of the
PT guns on Hg 7 - one two (2) shots being fired.
The 1st Pon had had some trouble with artillery "shots"
but, aside from getting the men's nerves on edge, no damage
was done.

On the morning of Jan 11th it was considered advisable to
burn the barrier of Kabaquiman. Capt Weimuth volun-
teered to do this. He went up, provided with some
gasoline. An arrangement with our artillery had
been made as follows: As soon as the first wisp of

36) Smoke from Kalegusman was observed by the artillery. They were to wait ten (10) minutes and then put down a concentration in that barrio. The purpose of the 10 minute wait, obviously was to allow Lacerata and the men from the OPLA who were helping him to get back and under cover. at 10 am.

Everything went off as planned. Weimuth began firing the village from the north edge as the wind was blowing from the north at the time. When he returned to Abuca, Stumpen and the personnel of the OPLR were with him. They had been notified in advance to abandon the outpost and were all ready to move. Weimuth was given the DSC for this. (Cont on p. 38)

④ [Insert on page 35] During the fight many of the cream of the Regiment were killed, both the companies on the M.R. losing their first sergeants — Capt. Co. I and Ricos, Co. K. ^{both fine men} [Cause backed off from M.R. and lay hidden in woods.]

Ricos, CoK. ⑤ [Insert on page 22] There was little excitement during our stay in this position. We were ready at all times to function in our assigned roles. Covering force to NEF if they should reach us. We were well provided with fox holes, in which we were required to spend all too much time. We had a mess table under a thick overhanging growth of palm fronds. Over this, extending well beyond the dogs was a large tarpaulin. Even then, no smoking was allowed after nightfall. On the only occasion that I saw saw USAFFE G-3 Col Constant L. Brown and G-4 Col Lewis C. Beebe during the entire war, the two of them, on a tour of the front, dropped into our CP one night about dark. It was about supper time. Anyway one of them sat under the tarpaulin and lit a cigarette - at which Col Clarke advised them of the practice with reference to smoking and

requested that the cigarette be extinguished. This was done, but not until after the atmosphere had become charged with unpleasantness. Regardless of how needless I may have thought the regulation, I recall feeling at the time that our visitors might have made inquiries as to local conditions before striking a light. Col Clarke knew he had been recommended for promotion and felt a very natural curiosity as to when promotions would be made. Both staff officers were wearing their eagles, but when Col Clarke inquired about the date he could expect to receive his, all Col. Beebe could say was "I don't know. I got mine." This was several days after the effective date of most of the earlier wartime promotions - Dec 19 '41.

The lights in the neighboring hills continued to look very suspicious, but in spite of numerous patrols we were never able to pin anything on any one.

any one.
Routine matters including cabbage with the
regt surgeon, Captain Edwin R. Luermitzky, a little
emergency dental work by 1st Lt Garnett H. Francis
our regt dental surgeon — and the occasional
luxury go both at the local homes lucky
enough to have showers.
One incident I remember very well.

One incident I remember very well. We weren't advertising the location of our C.P. but it was impossible to write back information gets whereabouts from every one - we were in back of several occupied Nipa shacks. One evening, we were sitting down to supper a little before dark, Capt. H. J. Colman, who was Commander Regt. Hq. Co. and ran our ^{shop} store,

Came into the CP followed by a Filipino boy who was pushing a bicycle. There was a basket on the bicycle's handle bars and in it were a dozen or more bottles of Coca-Cola and enough ice to ensure its being just right for drinking. Colman's face was weathered and smiling. We found out later that he'd stumbled onto this Coca-Cola and the whole thing but involved considerable trouble to him. Well, he was pleased at being able to bring a little added cheer to the men.

Col. Clark began taking him to town for bringing the Filipino into the C.P. whereupon Colman sent the boy away after telling him where he could expect his bicycle to be delivered to him. But this would not go. By this time Col. Clark was thoroughly incited. The Coca-Cola had to go too — and it did. I often wondered what became of it, and I feel rather sorry for Colman.

The Japanese soldiers who had picked through our lines came prepared to stay a while. They were apparently well trained as marksmanship (the only Japs we ever ran into who could hit the broad side of a barn) and furnished with concentrated food and lots of the special equipment including a little rubber hose with a flange at the end of it. ^{See page 15} They took them too in casual files, selecting as their victims the men who were unaccompanied. Then the air corps began a practice which didn't do our morale one bit of good that was dropping strings of small firecrackers behind our lines. These sounded like automatic rifles or light machine guns and it was several days before the mystery was solved. So between the

firecrackers and the snipers the morale goes down (39) suffered considerably. We organized a Sniper Company from volunteers out of the various rifle Companies. The original strength was 87 men. Capt. Bennett who had done some very good work looking for petrol, and had brought up a good deal of equipment and clothing which were valuable sources of enemy information, was placed in command in addition to his duties as C.O. Co D.

However, it took one 2nd Lt Alexander Ramsey, Minniger, Co A — USMA '41 — to pave the way in anti sniper work. On Jan 18, sensing the need for some counter-sniper work in order to restore morale, ^{and entirely on his own initiative} he took a number (34) of volunteers from Co A, and several men from the 3rd Pan ant. worked the line of trees along the T.R. in the left of the Regimental position. He and his men were successful in picking the area of a number of those snipers and he was shot and killed while performing this valuable service, later in the morning. ^{See page 40} He was recommended for, and posthumously awarded, the Congressional Medal of Honor for extraordinary heroism in combat above and beyond the call of duty. As far as I know, this was the first Congressional Medal of Honor awarded in the entire war.

(Insert on page 15) The Poños were a family of very funny, Filipino Ruler with an iron but kindly hand by an 80yr old matriarch. Her sons were constantly dropping in. All were intelligent, seemingly, and employed on some sort of jobs in cooperation with us — vigilance work etc.

(Insert on page 16) Our defenses here was run by Headquarters Co, 1st Lt Horro, J. Colman, commanding. Hqs Co was about 1/2 mi north of us on the road to Del Carmen. One of the cooks, Summott by name, took quite an interest in us. He soon a young man, his team used to come with him and keep some. The meals were prepared at the Co. and brought down by whatever transportation was available — a truck sometimes, but more often an animal drawn conveyance such as a Carabao cart or a pony drawn Carabao. Our evenings were spent quietly and for the most part, in the dark, often with out around playing games. One of the most

Popular was a word spelling game called "Third ya Ghost". Johnnie Johnson, Col. Clark, Johnnie Olson, Frank Anders and I used to kill the enemy with that very successfully. At some point, it fell out and wandered down to the river and see how our look outs were doing. No matter when I showed up - and I seldom went the same time two days running. I found them on the alert.

During this time, Col. Clark insisted that we not only wear our side arms and carry our gas masks slung under our left arms at all times while awake, but he issued an order that we sleep with them in the same position. I guess he was getting a little tired of hearing me come off, but I told him I thought it would be better if we were allowed to place these items within reach and get a better night's rest and that at the same time the request I knew he desired would be achieved. I got nowhere with that.

If I am creating the impression that there was friction between us, I am sorry - for that was not the case. He was always most friendly and courteous to me - and let a way of disapproving my suggestions in a very pleasant, friendly way. Almost invariably he thanked me for my suggestions and told me to be fair with others for there must be no lack of pardon between us. ② [Insert on page 39] "Pete" Wool, Browne

and Charlie Haas were engaged in doing pretty much the same thing. They locate a sniper and blow him out of his tree or other vantage point with grenades. They noticed him again and were impressed by the fact that he was engaged in this work out orders. They worked with him a while and, after he was killed, submitted a report to regimental headquarters.

③ [Insert on page 38] There were assassin troops and highly trained in this specialized work, being especially chosen for their courage. They were adept in the art of camouflage. Their work nets over their helmets and their uniforms as well as their helmets were a uniform with foliage which make them blend with the grass and trees and becoming difficult to see.

On Jan 12th we were rejoined by Capt. Thomas F. Chelate who had been in S.D. with the M.P. detachment prior to the war at M'Kinty and since the outbreak of war, had remained on that duty in Port-au-Prince. Tom's big trouble had been beer. He never got drunk, but it only took a few bottles to make him sort of silly and irresponsible, so when he showed up at about 9:50 a.m. to my camp, "Oh, Oh! we've got him on our hands now and with benefits for a year for him". Little did I realize what a lucky day it was for us when Tom came back to us. Well, we didn't

know what to do with him, so kept him around tag 10. (41) he for several days using him for odd jobs until the 3rd Bn began to take for an S-4. This looked like a good spot for Tom so we sent him to Phil Fry. It would long before Phil was telling us all what a "go-getter" Tom was and how lucky the 3rd Bn was to have him.

After the 2nd Bn relieved the 3rd Bn on the night of Jan 12-13, the Japs pushed a salient into their line in the left company sector. This was the old C.I. position and was a perfect set up for something like this. The cane field afforded an ideal conceal approach and it was in this sector that the little stream with the dignified nose of Dalatutan River crosses the road which ran along our M.R. This crossing afforded the enemy this opportunity to send small groups given through our lines - an opportunity which he took fullest advantage.

On Jan 14 the 2nd Div (P.A.) - Col. Graham H. McCarty, Senior Instructor - was placed under Col. Clark's command - and at 7:00 am the following day, after a short preparation by the 1st Bn 5th P.A. (P.D.) they moved forward and restored the M.R. There was no Japanese resistance at the position which was found unoccupied but they suffered about 50 casualties during the first hour - mostly from mortar and machine gun fire. ④ See page 43

Our artillery fire brought forth a sharp reply from the Japanese artillery, besting about an hour and a half. It wasn't pleasant as most of it (as I should say, a great deal of it) was coming down in a long narrow funnel just south of our C.P. It was right then that our decision was made to move the C.P. We were all pretty tired. I was in my dug out about 75 yards from the one occupied by Col. Clark and Johnnie Johnson. Johnnie Olson, ^{our S-1} and "Pork" (Captain

42 Stueston (R) Wynkoop, who for several days had been on liaison duty at our C.P. for III Philippine Corps, were with me and got quite a laugh when I bogged off for about a 30 minute nap during the shelling.

When the shelling had subsided, I went with Charlie (Captain Charles M.) Dempwolf, C.O. Co A 14th Engr Pon (PS), at Col Clarke's direction, to look for another location for our C P. We went back along one of the engineer roads for about 1 1/2 Km and every place that looked good to me was either occupied by or too near to some Philippine Army unit. Finally, we came to the position of a 155 mm battery located in the grounds of a small hacienda.

I had about given up my service as a bot. job when the enemy artillerly began to shell this position. Charlie and I decided then and there that we ought to leave that locality when we found ourselves in back of a big red bus which ^{had} stalled on the narrow road where it led out a gate in the fence surrounding the hacienda grounds. Charlie, who was driving, got out of his car, looked at the big red bus, and exclaimed "Oh Fiddle dee dee!". I had expected an outburst of anger, profanity, and was surprised to find myself laughing ^{at his misadventure} which was heading up a gentle rise, got in behind the wheel and let off the hand brake which had been firmly set. The bus began to roll backward, so I checked it for the ditch. When it finally ceased rolling, there was just room on its right for our car to squeeze by. Needless to say, Charlie was on the job and soon we were headed back to Abasco - after a pretty close call. And I've never heard "Fiddle dee dee" again without thinking of Charlie Demingwolf.

I made my report when I returned and we decided to move our C.P. into the Abasco church about 600 yds east of the present C.P. location and on the East Road (by 7).

We received another offer 10 place more for the

3:30 PM on this date, which I had almost forgotten (43) was my father's birthday. He was 1st Lt. Otis E. Salmon and had been on duty with the II Philippine Corps M.P. detachment under Major Montgomery McKee. We assigned him to Co. M. ^{an collecting station operated by the 12th M.P. Bn.} Our Right Air Station, ^{an collecting station operated by the 12th M.P. Bn.} was ^{an collecting station operated by the 12th M.P. Bn.} in the Olney Church - so all we had to move was our Switzer board and Command Post personnel with records and here we were. The tower, or steeple, of the church was a very sturdy brick structure terminating on the ground floor in a circular room about 12 or 15 ft in diameter. The walls were 6 or 7 ft thick so we weren't too worried about the effect of a direct hit.

② [Insert a page 41] Col. McCaffery had the following American officers with him: Major Alex. Kaplan (I don't know him when, as Capt Alex Kaplan, the commander of B, 57th Inf (PS) during the war), Copts. Wiggins, Foster and Stonecipher (none of whom I know), 1st Lt. P. Porter and 2nd Lt. Brown. All these were good men.

On this same date the 1st and 2nd Pns, 21st Div (PA) were also placed under Col. Clark's command. This outfit took over the Regimental Reserve line - and for the time being our 3rd Pn was relieved of all responsibility as a reserve battalion. In the 1st Pn 21st Div (PA) were two (2) former members of the 57th Div (PS) - Copts. Jim (Edward L) Norton, Jr, and Al Peyton. In their 2nd Pn were Captains Bob Pennell and Grover C. Richards, also formerly of the 57th Div (PS). Jim Norton, Al Peyton and I had come over on the Feb '41 "GRANT" and I knew the other two equally well. Grover Richards had coached the 57th Div (PS) baseball team before the war.

② [Insert on page 29] While here, Co A, 14th Eng Bn (PS) ^{part of 5th SPECT} commanded by Capt Charles M. Dempewolf, gave us great ^{not only} dealing assistance. They built a number of splinter proof dug outs at Regimental C. P., ^{and} constructed a camouflaged bridge and roads of tactical importance, but also furnished and installed barbed wire, mines and other obstacles in front of our M. L. R.

44/ Right now, I should like to say a word of praise for the 12th Pz 74th Field Artillery (PS). Whenever we needed fire from them we got it - even under the most trying conditions for them. It should be remembered that we had no "air". Whenever the artillery fired a round it was only a few minutes before the observation plane ("Photo Toe" as we called him) was over head. Then the Nip counterbattery work began - so the artillery was taking a chance every time it opened fire. But this was a campaign of chance taking by all guns. Lt Col. Charles B. Leinbach, Commanded the outfit. Major Harry B. Packard was Pz Ex, and the batteries were Commanded as follows: A - Capt. Daniel Barry, B - Capt. Henry Doughty, and C (2.955) - Capt. Miller.

Late in the afternoon of the 13th Col. Clarke got a 'phone call. I don't tell by the tone of his voice that he was talking with some very high ranking officers. After he had hung up, he called me out into the main part of the church and told me he had been talking to Gen. Parker (Major Gen George M. Jr), Commanding II Philippine Corps - that Gen Parker had told him he (Col. C.) was being summoned to Corregidor on the following day for a conference in connection with an offensive action in which the Philippine Division was to take part. He also told me that he had been promised that a few P-40s would make their appearance over our lines the next day. I was instructed to treat this information as confidential. Col. Clarke told me he would return in two or three days.

Next day, Col. Arnold J. Frank came up from Corregidor and relieved Col. Clarke as C.O. 57th Div (PS). Most of us knew him already and were mighty glad to see him. He had been in the C.P. only a very few minutes when the tension relaxed. Johnnie Johnson, whose nerves were literally near the breaking point, caught my eye, gave me a wink and the thumbs up "agree". I knew then that every thing was all to the good, as far as he was concerned and breathed a sigh of relief. Immediately, the staff began to get around and the troops

soon found out that the regimental commander and his (45) staff were flesh and blood people - not just voices on the other end of the telephone. The morale throughout the regiment went up by leaps and bounds. Col. Frank was with us just one week. After about three days passed ^{during} which we saw no P-40's - and heard nothing about any proposed offensive action on the part of the Philippine Division, I decided to tell Arnold Frank just what Col. Clarke had said to me. After all, Arnold had come to us from Corregidor where he was on USARP. Staff and might know something about it himself. Well, I did tell him. Arnold smiled and said he had been almost at General Parker's elbow during the telephone conversation and that he was not to be uttered about offensive action on the part of the Philippine Division.

On January 21, '42 Phil Fry assumed command of the 57th Div (PS) - this was undoubtedly done on Col. Frank's recommendation. Col. Frank reported to 14th Corps when he became C.O. of S. for a short time - until the organization of Luzon Force.

On or about Jan 15 we had two very welcome additions to the regiment - and suffered one serious loss. Lt Col. Hol C. Cranberry reported joining from Service Command where he had been Signal Officer - He was USA 173 I think. The other addition was Capt. William S. Priestley, who came at his own request for duty as Aide de Camp to the High Commissioner to the P. I. Mr. Francis Sayre. The serious loss I refer to was our S-4 Major George F. Fisher. When Rapper was brought up about dusk, "Sut" Fendall's face told me at once that something was wrong. There were tears in his eyes - and mine too in spite of as he told me that George had met his death that afternoon. Several of them, "Sut", Shady Longdon and Jack Alworth were taking showers then when a fight of bombs came over. All but George took to their fox holes without delay but George either ignored the bombs or would not fort enough. When they got to him there was hardly enough of him left to bury. Therefore the art had been quick and painless.

14th Cranberry was assigned to duty as S-4 at once. One other valuable addition to the regiment was made on this date (Jan 15). A young American substituted man named William O. Berry had attached himself to Co K. and almost before we realized he was with us,

46 Charlie Haas was beginning to rely on him, as he was starting officers. It was not difficult to secure authority to keep Berry - and he was subsequently commissioned 2nd Lieutenant, remaining with Co K throughout the Philippine Campaign and proving himself to be a very fine young officer.

Tom Chieche was assigned to the 3rd Bn, as S-4, and it won't long before Phil Fry was telling us what an asset Tom was to the battalion.

On Jan 16, Lt McCurdy, the young dental officer who had joined us at Porac and been assigned as dentist surgeon 2nd Bn was killed by an aerial bomb just outside the church at Abucay. He'd only been with us a little over three weeks so we hadn't gotten to know him too well.

(Insert on page 42) 1st Lt George Hennessy, Co F, a former air corps enlisted man ~~at the air corps~~ at Nichols Field before the war, and who had joined us soon after we arrived at Abucay, was sent out in charge of a patrol whose mission was to report on the dispositions of our troops on the left of the line (the artillery having temporarily interfered with our telephone line). He accomplished his mission and his second in command returned with the desired information but George ^{was caught in a line and was} hit by a sniper's bullet (the bullet severing his aorta). He lay where he fell for some time. According to his story, he fainted from loss of blood and as he was coming to, he was discovered and thoughtly stopped by a Japanese personage by a Jap patrol. During this time George was playing possum - a little later and before he could be brought in, he said the ants got into his wound and gave him a pretty bad time. He was taken to the hospital and never did duty with the regiment again. The last time I saw him - in Hays No 2 about the last of March '42 - he was in pretty bad shape. He, incidentally, had been engaged to be married to the daughter of Bong San Lukit Stevens.

On Jan 20, Tom Chieche was relieved of his duties with the 3rd Bn and assigned to command Co G.

(Insert on page 45) Price Priestley was assigned to the 1st Bn as Executive Officer. Ray Reynolds had never had a Bn before and needed one badly. Though, due to the nature of the terrain it occupied, the 1st Bn had never been heavily

(Insert on page 46) enjoyed his location but exposed his left flank to constant harassing activities of the Japs and the situation ^{must have been} rather trying on Ray's nerves (though he never showed it). We were mighty glad to be able to free him a second in command who had no other duties than to keep him with his battalion. (47)

CASUALTIES OFFICERS, 57th INFANTRY (PS.)

Killed in action (8)

Maynard (Abucay)
Wilson (Abucay)
Thinninger (Abucay)
Cheamy (Quinanuan Pt.)
Fisher (Balanga)
Meier (Abucay)
Wood (San Vicente R.)
McCurdy (Abucay)
Green, Arthur W. (Abucay)

Wounded in action (9)

Gerth (Abucay)
Hennessey (Abucay)
Wermuth - twice ^{Abucay 1st} _{Amoyan Pt. 2^d}
Ramsey (Salasim Pt.)
Kuncl (Atangan)
Childers (Jct. Trails 6+8)
Spainhower (Salasim Pt.)
Brokaw, J.C. (Longoskawayan)
Haas (Salasim Pt.)

Killed - not in action (1)

Crowell (Hq. HPD)

Died since April 9, 1942 (5)

Berry (Cabanatuan)
Grimes, R.K. (Cabanatuan)
Fleetwood (O'Donnell)
Fortner (O'Donnell)
Haas (Cabanatuan)

Missing in action (5)

Green (Abucay)
Compton (Abucay)
Brokaw, F.E. (Atangan)
Reynolds (Atangan)
Dosh (Atangan)

Tabulation

a) Killed + missing in action	13	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Killed } 8 \\ \text{Missing } 5 \end{array} \right.$
b) Killed - <u>not</u> in action	1	
c) Killed and missing (a+b)	14	
d) Wounded in action	9	
Total Killed + missing in action (a+d)	22	
Total Killed + missing (a+b+d)	23	

Col. Wm E. Proogher - promoted to BG - Commander 11th Div. (PA)
Lt Col John W. Thompson - promoted to Col. - Cgs Mindanao Force.
Lt Col Edwin E. Aldridge - promoted to Col. - Cgs W. Subsector (I Corps)
Lt Col Lewis C. Beebe - promoted to Col + B.G. - Cgs, USFIP.
Major Dennis Moore - " Lt Col. - G-2, II Corps
Lt Col Rolf J. Hoffman, " " Col. - G-3, Phil. Div.
Lt Col Theodore J. Sledge " " Col. Adm. Asst to Cgs, USFIP.
Major James Ivey " " Lt Col. G-3, W. Subsector, I Corps.
Major Martin Moses " " Lt Col + Col.
Capt Alex Coplan " " Major, Asst to Sr Instr. 221st (PA)
Capt. Richard I. Jones
Capt McChish
Capt Robert Pennell }
Capt. Al. Peyton }
Capt. James Horton }
1st Lt Eric Davis
1st Lt Fouret
Capt. Helmut J. Duisterhof, promoted to Maj, Bn Comdr, 11th Inf (PA)
Major Pembroke A. Pavauner, promoted to Lt Col + Col
Lt Col John P. Hovan, promoted to Col. Comd. "North Luzon Force" assigned at Baguio.
2^d Lt Paul Justo - to Baguio about Nov. '41 - Left Baguio with a cpl in attempt to join NLF - never heard from since.
1st Lt Arthur P. Murphy - went to Baguio about Oct '41. Left Hovan's force Dec 31 at CARANGLAN in effort to get around enemy flank to join NLF.

57th Inf losses (approx)Abucay

140

1 st Pn	20
2 nd Pn	20
CoE 10	}
Others 10	
3 rd Pn	100

Hq	5
Co I	40
K	25
L	10
M	20

Longoskawayan Pt
(2 Pn only)

35

Quinawan Pt
(Co B only)

40

Angosan } Pts
Satanin }

160

Total	[Killed, missing in action - and wounded who had not rejoined by March 15 th 42]	375
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US Casualties for entire war

1,070,138

572 Dry losses
J 40

K 25

2 Pon

~~E~~ 10
other 10

L 10

1/2 Pon.

M 20

20

1/2 2 Pon 5

100 Killel + King
Abney (Vol 140)

35

~~275~~ Longkawayan

195

~~Longkawayan~~ 46 Quinava

~~241~~
210

165

Ampan
Silatim

