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1963

Instructions of War Minister
Hideki TOJO to the Newly-Appointed Commanders of the
Prisoner of War Camps

"It is very pleasing to me to hear that you who have been newly-appointed as commanders of prisoner of war camps are going to leave for your respective new posts very soon.

Our country has a different conception of prisoners of war and consequently has different methods of treatment compared with those of American and European nations.

So, in treating the prisoners of war at home and abroad, you must abide by the laws and regulations and apply them fairly and properly so that it will enhance and exhibit the prestige of our Empire. But on the other hand, you must supervise them rigidly insofar as you do not become inhuman, and not let them remain idle even for a single day, so as to utilize most effectively their manpower and technical ability for the expansion of our industries and to contribute to the execution of the great Eastern Asia War.

Moreover, considering the characteristics of the various localities, you must make the local people recognize the superiority of the Japanese people through the treatment of prisoners of war as well as make the local people conceive it as the greatest honor that they are able to collaborate with the Imperial Army in establishing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Considering the importance of the aforementioned points and your great responsibility, you must lead your subordinates strictly and properly and execute your duty to the utmost."

Hideki TOJO
Minister of War

July 7, 1942

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. _____
 I.P.S. No. 1630 A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Masanori Yotsumoto hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: former member of the War Prisoner Supervising Bureau and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 2 pages, dated 7 July, 1942, and described as follows: address of instructions given to the newly-appointed heads of PW camps by War Minister. I further certify that the above attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): _____
War Ministry

Signed at PW Information Bureau on this
2nd day of July, 1946.

/s/ Masanori Yotsumoto
 Signature of Official

Witness. S. Naranishi/s/

SEAL

 Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard H. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
30 day of Aug., 1946

/s/ Richard H. Larsh
 NAME

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis
2nd Lt., MI

Investigator, IPS
 Official Capacity

"Extract from interrogation of Hideki TOJO,
25 March 1946, p. 5-6.

"Q When did you first learn of the complaints concerning or facts indicating that there had been mistreatment of American and British prisoners of war?

"A The only complaints that ever came to my notice were in connection with food and so forth. Atrocities were not brought to my notice at all. I am astounded at the truth regarding atrocities that is now being revealed in the newspapers. If the Japanese had followed the Emperor's instructions, these atrocities would never have happened.

"Q Was there any other personal investigation made of complaints made by the United States and Great Britain after 7 December 1941 with respect to the mistreatment by the Japanese Government of their captured American and British prisoners other than the one that you have just mentioned?

"A I myself heard rumors of mistreatment of prisoners of war at Bataan and when I was in the Philippines, I inquired of the Chief of Staff who informed me that the 'march' was due to the lack of transportation and there were no cases of atrocities.

"Q Just what did you say to the Chief of Staff in connection with this 'Bataan March' and the mistreatment of American prisoners?

"A I mentioned that there were rumors of this description and wanted to have his explanation.

"Q What explanation did the Chief of Staff give?

"A The Chief of Staff explained that due to lack of transport facilities, the prisoners of war had to march long distances in the heat and that there was some suffering, and deaths resulted.

1 "Q Were you not responsible for the rules, the
2 orders and the action taken which led to the sentences
3 of execution or imprisonment of American fliers since
4 7 December 1941?

5 "A Of course I am responsible for army orders
6 and regulations.

7 "Q You mean for such orders and regulations?

8 "A Well, I am not just sure what ones you
9 refer to. I don't remember any regulations par-
10 ticularly directed against fliers before 18 October
11 1942 when Japan was raided by American fliers.
12 There may have been some before that, but I don't
13 remember clearly. I do remember that there were
14 some after that.

15 "Q For what actions taken at that time or
16 afterwards in this connection were you responsible?

17 "A The raid on 18 October 1942 was contrary
18 to international law. It was not against troops but
19 against non-combatants, primary school students, and
20 so forth. We knew this and, since this was not
21 permitted by international law, it was homicide
22 (satsu-jin). Japan acted on this concept and I
23 ordered (kaketa) courts martial (gunritsu kaigi), or
24 at least they were just about like courts martial.
25 You probably won't be able to understand this

1 unless you understand something about Japanese
2 feelings at this time. This was the first time
3 Japan had been bombed, and it was a great shock.
4 Public feeling ran very high. Now, of course, since
5 the indiscriminate bombing of medium and small
6 cities which were undefended and the use of the
7 atom bomb, all things which are not permitted under
8 international law, the tragic spectacle of this
9 country today makes this first raid look like a
10 very small thing, but it was a great shock to the
11 people at the time.

12 "Q And the extreme punishments meted out to
13 these first fliers were mainly given as a deterrent
14 to prevent future raids, were they not?

15 "A Yes, they were for that reason. There was
16 a demand from Imperial Headquarters. The Army
17 Chief of Staff came to me directly and demanded
18 severe punishment for the fliers.

19 "Q Who was the Army Chief of Staff?

20 "A SIGIYAMA.

21 "Q What did you say in reply, and what did
22 you do as a result of this request?

23 "A I issued this order. It was an order for
24 military administration. As to the form, I am not
25 positive whether the order was issued over my name

1 or by Imperial Headquarters, but no matter who
2 issued it, I am responsible for it.

3 "Q Who else from Imperial Headquarters was
4 the Chief of Staff speaking for when he made the
5 request that he did of you for this punishment?

6 "A He came on his own responsibility, not
7 representing anyone else. I remember this because
8 the Chief of Staff didn't often come to me directly
9 about things.

10 "Q Did you receive any order from the Emperor
11 in this connection, or discuss the matter with him
12 or report to him before taking the action that you
13 did?

14 "A The Emperor is not related at all to this
15 problem. When the report of the court martial
16 came from China to the Chief of Staff and to myself,
17 the verdict, as I recall it, was that all eight men
18 were to be executed. The Chief of Staff came to
19 me and demanded that the findings of the court be
20 carried out. I knew, however, of the Emperor's
21 benevolence and, with that in mind, and because of
22 his feelings, wished to have only the minimum
23 number of men executed. Therefore, it was decided
24 that only the three who had killed primary school
25 students would receive the death penalty. This was

1 discussed with the Emperor, since the Emperor in
2 Japar is the only one who can commute a sentence,
3 and it was decided that way. That one point was
4 the Emperor's only relation to the thing.
5

6 "Q So the Emperor reviewed all ei ht cases and
7 commuted the death penalties from eight to threes?

8 "A No, he didn't review them. In Japan,
9 courts martial have only one hearing. That is be-
10 cause of their military character. Ordinary
11 trials have three hearings.

12 "Q On what basis did the Emperor take this
13 action? Did you propose it?

14 "A Yes, I did. It was on my responsibility as
15 adviser to the Throne, but the commutation was the
16 Emperor's because of the fact that the Emperor is
17 invariably benevolent.
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Excerpt from
Interrogation of Hideki Tojo
25 March 1946
p. 5 - 6

- Q When did you first learn of the complaints concerning or facts indicating that there had been mistreatment of American and British prisoners of war?
- A The only complaints that ever came to my notice were in connection with food and so forth. Atrocities were not brought to my notice at all. I am astounded at the truth regarding atrocities that is now being revealed in the newspapers. If the Japanese had followed the Emperor's instructions, these atrocities would never have happened.
- Q But you, as Minister of War during the period when those atrocities were committed, are the responsible party for their commission. are you not?
- A Yes.
- Q What explanation can you give for the fact that you did not learn of them when they were so wide-spread and of such a serious nature?
- A I was always under the impression that army commanders in the field who were responsible for the treatment of prisoners understood what was required of them in this connection.
- Q During this entire period from 7 December 1941 on, you were aware of the fact, were you not, that the United States and Great Britain, through friendly nations, had warned the Japanese Government that Japanese officials and the Japanese Government would be held responsible for violations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions and for violations of the rules of war with respect to the treatment of prisoners of war?
- A Yes, and if these atrocities are true, treaties have been violated.
- Q During this same period, were you not aware that the United States and Great Britain, through friendly nations, had made numerous and repeated complaints, giving specific date and charging that there had been, in each instance, violations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions and of the rules of war in connection with the mistreatment of prisoners of war?

p. 5 - 6 cont'd

- A I do not remember details, but I think these came through the Prisoner of War Information Bureau.
- Q Such complaints would first come to the Foreign Ministry and then be routed to the Minister of War's office, would they not?
- A Yes.
- Q How many of these complaints were made, that you recall, of your personal knowledge?
- A I cannot recall just now how many were received.
- Q What, if anything, did you do with respect to those which were received?
- A These were passed on to the various army commanders through the Prisoner of War Information Bureau.
- Q Were reports then made back by those bureau heads or individuals to you, as Minister of War, relative to these complaints?
- A No, no replies or reports were sent back. These complaints were sent to the various people concerned calling the matter to their attention.

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Extract from
Interrogation of Hideki Tojo
25 March 1946
p. 7

- Q Were these complaints, which were made during this period by the United States and Great Britain through friendly nations with respect to the mistreatment of their prisoners by the Japanese Government, taken up at the weekly meetings of the Prisoner Bureau that you have referred to?
- A Yes. These matters were taken up at the bi-weekly meetings.

. . . .

Extract from
Interrogation of Hideki Tojo
25 March 1946
p. 8 - 14

Q Did you or anyone for you go to the scene where the mis-treatment of the prisoners was alleged to have taken place to make an investigation of any of these complaints?

A Yes, there are many instances. There was a case of mistreatment of prisoners of war during the building of the Burma-Thai Railway and I ordered a court martial in this connection.

Q Was there any other personal investigation made of complaints made by the United States and Great Britain after 7 December 1941 with respect to the mistreatment by the Japanese Government of their captured American and British prisoners other than the one that you have just mentioned?

A I myself heard rumors of mistreatment of prisoners of war at Bataan and when I was in the Philippines, I inquired of the Chief of Staff who informed me that the "march" was due to the lack of transportation and there were no cases of atrocities.

Q Who was the Chief of Staff at that time?

A Lieutenant General WACHI.

Q What was the approximate time that you were in the Philippines and made this inquiry of the Chief of Staff?

A This was 5 May 1943.

Q What was the approximate date that the "Bataan March" took place?

A I do not remember the date, but it was in the early part of 1942.

Q How long after the "March" was it that you heard of the mistreatment of American troops?

A These rumors came to my notice late in 1942 or early in 1943.

p.8 - 14 cont'd

Q Through what sources did you hear these rumors of the mistreatment of American troops at Bataan?

A It would be difficult to say from whom I heard these rumors.

Q Where did you hear these rumors?

A I heard these in Tokyo.

Q Regardless of what the sources of these rumors were, from how many sources did you hear them - how many occasions did you hear them?

A It would be difficult to say how many times I have heard these rumors.

Q What was the nature of the rumors that you heard in this connection?

A The rumors were to the effect that prisoners from Corregidor and Bataan had been mistreated.

Q In what respect had they been mistreated, according to the rumors?

A They had been made to walk long distances in the heat. Deaths due to mistreatment were usually referred to as death by sickness.

Q Did not the rumors also state and indicate that many of the troops who were forced to march in the heat were in no physical condition to march at all and should not have been forced to march because of their physical condition?

A No. The rumors mentioned nothing of this.

Q According to the rumors, what was the cause of the death of the American prisoners in this connection?

A All deaths were ascribed to sickness.

Q What kind of sickness caused the death of the men on that march?

A These details did not come to my notice.

p. 8 - 14 cont'd

Q But it did come to your notice from the rumors that deaths occurred as a result of the march, did it not?

A Yes.

Q How many deaths had occurred, according to the rumors?

A This was not mentioned in the rumors.

Q Did not the rumors indicate that the deaths were caused by the physical condition of the troops who had been requested or forced to march?

A The rumors only stated that the prisoners were marched long distances in the heat.

Q How long before you discussed this matter while you were in the Philippines with the Chief of Staff was it that you had heard these rumors?

A Perhaps two or three months before this date, but I do not recall.

Q How much time did you spend discussing this march and this matter with the Chief of Staff while you were in the Philippines?

A This was not the main subject of my meeting with the Chief of Staff. I had many other important matters to discuss with him and this was one subject that was involved.

Q How much time was spent discussing this matter with the Chief of Staff?

A I cannot say definitely how long we discussed this as it was one of many subjects.

Q Have you no idea whatsoever as to the amount of time you spent discussing it with the Chief of Staff?

A I am unable to say definitely how long.

p.8 - 14 cont'd

Q Prior to the time that you discussed it with the Chief of Staff, had not the American Government made a written complaint through a friendly nation to the Japanese Government about this very matter, setting forth the details in connection with this march and in connection with the deaths of several hundreds of American troops?

A I do not remember well but perhaps a complaint was received.

Q Was that matter discussed at all at any of the bureau meetings that were held weekly or bi-weekly, that you recall?

A I do not remember, but if a complaint was received, it would be discussed at the meeting of bureau chiefs.

Q Had this matter of the "Bataan March" and the deaths of American prisoners as the result thereof been taken up with the Chief of Staff prior to the occasion when you discussed it with him in the Philippines, as you state?

A It was the first time that I took it up with him, but if a complaint was received from the United States, I am sure it must have been sent to the Chief of Staff through the Prisoner of War Information Bureau.

Q Do you know, of your personal knowledge, that this matter was taken up with the Chief of Staff on any other occasion than when you took it up with him during your visit to the Philippines?

A I was acting as Prime Minister and War Minister and I was not able to attend to details of this sort. These are left to the discretion of the chiefs of departments concerned.

Q Do you know, of your personal knowledge, that the matter had ever been taken up with the Chief of Staff other than the time you took it up with him?

A I have no recollection of this having been transmitted.

Q Did the Chief of Staff indicate whether it had been taken up with him before when you discussed it with him?

A No, as I asked him about this.

Q But just what do you mean by that - it had been taken up with him?

A The Chief of Staff said nothing about this matter ever being taken up with him before I mentioned it.

p.8 - 14 cont'd

- Q So that, as far as you knew personally or he indicated to you, this is the first time it had been taken up with him by any official of the Japanese Government?
- A I am not able to state definitely if this is so or not.
- Q Was there anything said by him to indicate to the contrary?
- A I am not able to answer this definitely and I cannot speak for the Chief of Staff.
- Q Just what did you say to the Chief of Staff in connection with this "Bataan March" and the mistreatment of American prisoners.
- A I mentioned that there were rumors of this description and wanted to have his explanation.
- Q What explanation did the Chief of Staff give?
- A The Chief of Staff explained that due to lack of transport facilities, the prisoners of war had to march long distances in the heat and that there was some suffering, and deaths resulted.
- Q Did the Chief of Staff state during this conversation with you what distance the prisoners had been forced to march?
- A General HACHI was not there at the time of the march and did not give me any details. He was not responsible for this march.
- Q Who was responsible for the march?
- A General HEMMA would naturally be responsible.
- Q Did you see General HEMMA while you were in the Philippines?
- A No. HEMMA had returned to Japan.
- Q Had you seen General HEMMA in Japan at any time after the war started and before you went to the Philippines and spoke to the Chief of Staff on this matter?
- A No. I did not meet him when he returned to Japan.

g. 2. 19 cont'd

Q How long prior to the time you discussed this matter with the Chief of Staff in the Philippines was it that HOMMA had returned to Japan?

A I do not remember when he returned to Japan.

Q Were you aware of the fact that HOMMA was in Japan during the period that he came to Japan and remained here?

A Yes.

Q Did HOMMA report to the War Department here in Tokyo during the time he was in Japan after the beginning of the war with the United States?

A Perhaps he did report at the War Office, but I did not meet him.

Q Did you or anyone else discuss with HOMMA while he was here or at any other time, the rumors of the deaths of the American soldiers in the "Bataan March"?

A I did not know of these rumors at the time he returned to Japan and I do not know of anyone else having discussed these matters with him. When he returned to Japan, it was merely said that he had returned after a very successful campaign.

Q Did you or any official of the Japanese Government ever discuss with General HOMMA the matter of the deaths of the American soldiers resulting from the "Bataan March"?

A I do not know if this matter was ever discussed.

. . . .

Extract from
Interrogation of Hideki Tojo
26 March 1945

c. 1 - 3

A Yesterday there was some interrogation about prisoners and there is something I would like to say about that.

Q I was about to bring that question up and ask if you didn't have something you wanted to say.

A Since the end of the war, I have read about the inhumane acts committed by Japanese army and navy personnel. These were certainly not the intention of those in authority, that is, of the General Staffs, or the War or Navy Departments, or myself. We did not even suspect that such things had happened. The Emperor especially, because of his benevolence, would have had a contrary feeling. Such acts are not permissible in Japan. The character of the Japanese people is such that they believe that neither Heaven nor Earth would permit such things. It will be too bad if people in the world believe that these inhumane acts are the result of Japanese character. The preceding portion of the answer was read back to the witness who agreed as to its correctness.

The second point with regard to prisoners: The treatment of prisoners is the responsibility of various army commanders, hence I relied upon them to have regard for humane considerations and to follow the terms of international treaties and rules. Of course, since I was the supervisor of military administration, I am completely responsible.

The third point is that Japanese manners and customs are different from those of Europe and America and the standard of living is also different. These things affected the treatment of prisoners. There are some things I want to explain about this.

a) In regard to inhumane acts, these are not permitted under Japanese manners or customs either.

p. 1 - 3 cont'd

b) In regard to the difference in the standard of living, the treaties provide that prisoners are to be given the same rations as the troops of the detaining nation. That was also directed in orders that were issued. Because of the difference in the standard of living, the American and European prisoners thought when they were given the same rations as Japanese troops that the rations were very very unappetizing. Particularly, on the battlefields, this feeling was very strong, I believe. In regard to life in the barracks (shuto), the barracks, for example, at Onori, which are field barracks (meichi), they would not be thought had by the Japanese troops, but the European and American prisoners thought they were very poor.

c) The Japanese idea about being taken prisoner is different from that in Europe and America. In Japan, it is regarded as a disgrace. Under Japanese criminal law, anyone who becomes a prisoner while still able to resist has committed a criminal offense, the maximum punishment for which is the death penalty. In Europe and America, it is different. A person who is taken prisoner is honored because he has discharged his duties, but in Japan, it is very different.

d) I want to say something now about the feeling with regard to sleeping on the side of the face. In Japanese families where the educational standard is low, sleeping is used as a means of training. In the Japanese army and navy, although this is forbidden, it continues in fact because of the influence of the customs of the people. This, of course, is a custom that ought to be corrected; it ought to be stopped; but I don't think it is a crime. It is something that comes from custom. That is all I want to say on this.

There is a correction I would like to make regarding yesterday's interrogation. Yesterday, I was asked if I had met Lieutenant General HONMA. I said that I had not met him, but this year when I was in Onori Prison, I met him. One other point. When an army commander came back to Japan during the war, he would make a situation report to the Emperor. On such occasions, he would be accompanied by the Chief of Staff and the War Minister. I do not well remember, it it may be that I met HONMA on such an occasion since he was an army commander. That is all I wanted to say.

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Extract from
Interrogation of Hideki Tojo
28 March 1946

p. 4 - 5

Q Do you not recall that the Japanese Government informed the United States, through the Swiss Government on or about 30 January 1941, that Japan would follow, in the war then pending: (1) The various international conventions, including those signed at The Hague and Geneva; (2) International law; (3) The rules and customs of law as to prisoners and civilians?

A I don't recall it, but I think it is very likely.

Q You state that you are not aware of the fact that that promise was not kept or carried out. Why was it not complied with or kept? Do you understand the question?

A I understood it as regards the inhuman acts towards prisoners that we have talked about. It was the Government's intention to follow these conventions, and it was mine. The fact that these things happened is very much to be regretted. The responsibility for them is mine.

Q You mentioned today that you did not even suspect the occurrence of these atrocities and the inhuman treatment of prisoners. How can you say this when the United States and Great Britain, through the Swiss and other governments, made numerous written and detailed complaints to your Foreign Office about these very matters?

A The matter of responsibility for humane considerations and the following of treaty provisions was the responsibility of the various army commanders. I believed that they were following them. That is my answer.

Q So that, although these numerous complaints were made on these matters, you still trusted the commanders in the field and did not believe the complaints. Is that true?

A As I said before, when a protest would come in, I would forward it to the responsible army commander involved for action which I thought was taken. I could not tell whether the protest was appropriate or not, and I presumed that investigations were made, followed by courts martial or other suitable action.

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p. 4 - 5 cont'd

Q Did you hear of any courts martial or suitable action taken in connection with the atrocities and inhuman acts against American prisoners in the "Betrayal March" that we spoke about yesterday and today?

A I think that the commanding officer took legal measures.

Q On what do you base that statement?

A The facts of that case would have gone to the commanding officer who had the responsibility for taking appropriate action.

Q Then, it is only your speculation that such action was taken?

A Yes, but I think it was taken because it was his responsibility.

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Extract from
Interrogation of Hidoki Tojo
26 March 1946

p. 6 - 7

Q You state that when complaints were made by the United States and Great Britain about the inhumane treatment of their prisoners of war, the complaints would come to the Foreign Ministry and then to the War Department. Were copies of these complaints sent to the Emperor, or was the Emperor informed in any way of them?

A No, he was not. I handled them on my own responsibility.

Q Why was not the Emperor, as Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese army and navy, advised of these complaints?

A I thought it was all right to handle them on my own responsibility.

Q Since the Emperor had ordered that prisoners of war should not be mistreated, did he not have the right to know of these protests.

A I understood the Emperor's feelings very well. On my own responsibility, I sent these protests to the responsible field commanders for investigation as to the facts. The Emperor was busy and had a great deal of work so I did this on my own. Consequently, the Emperor is not responsible in connection with this matter. I am responsible.

Extract from
Interrogation of Hideki Tojo
27 March 1946

p. 3 - 7

Q What was the purpose of your visit to the Philippines, that you have referred to, when you spoke to the Chief of Staff in connection with the "Bataan March"?

A Let's see, the independence of the Philippines was on 14 October 1945. It was in connection with the independence of the Philippines and conditions in the Philippine Islands. The purpose of it was chiefly in regard to matters related to the independence of the Philippines. I principally wanted to talk to important Filipinos in connection with independence matters.

Q How long were you in the Philippine Islands at this time?

A About three days, I think.

Q During the war, that is, from 7 December 1941 until the end of the war, was that your only visit, or were you there on other occasions?

A No, I went twice during the war.

Q What was the approximate date and purpose of that visit?

A I arrived in Thai on 4 July 1943, I believe, and stayed there, I think, for three days - the 4th, 5th and 6th. That was the principal objective of the visit, but on the way back, I spent two or three days in Malaya, one night in Sumatra, one night in Java, and one night in Manila; then I came back by plane via Formosa to Japan.

Q How many times were you in Formosa and Thai from 7 December 1941 until the end of the war?

A I was only in Thai the one time that I have mentioned. I was in Formosa twice, that is, going and coming, on the trip to the Philippines in May 1943; and again twice going and coming on the trip to Thai in July 1943.

Q What was your purpose in speaking to the Chief of Staff, on your visit in May to the Philippines, about the "Bataan March"?

A There were various matters in connection with the independence of the Philippines. They were the principal

things. I spoke to the Chief of Staff about this other matter, but it was not a principal matter of discussion.

Q Why did you discuss this matter at all with the Chief of Staff?

A As I said before, there were various rumors of the sufferings that prisoners had experienced and I inquired of the Chief of Staff because I wanted to find out the facts about it.

Q Just what did you ask him in this connection?

A I said, "I have heard these rumors about the sufferings of the prisoners. What are the facts?" He replied that it was in the broiling sun, and that means of transport were lacking and so they walked them a long ways, and that it was a fact.

Q What was a fact?

A That it was a fact that they had walked them this long distance.

Q Did you ask him or did you find out how long the distance was that the men were marched?

A I have an impression about the main conversation, but I don't remember the details beyond that.

Q Were you not interested in finding out what distance the men had been marched in the broiling sun?

A It is difficult for me now to recall to just what degree of detail the conversation extended.

Q Do you know how far it is from Betan to San Fernando?

A I don't remember.

Q Do you recall whether you learned from the Chief of Staff how many men had either fallen out, being unable to finish, or died during the March?

A No, I don't remember details like that, but I got the impression that the responsible commander, who was Lieutenant General VOLPA, did what he could under the circumstances then prevailing.

Q What led to your belief that General VOLPA had done what he could under the circumstances prevailing?

- A It is a problem of responsibility. As Supreme Commander in the Philippines at that time, he had a great responsibility to the Emperor. This responsibility was, on the one hand, to conduct the fighting and, on the other, to establish peace and order; as to prisoners, I think that, as the responsible commander, he did what he could. It is Japanese custom [tatemae] for a commander of an expeditionary army in the field to be given a mission in the performance of which he is not subject to specific orders from Tokyo, but has considerable autonomy. (This is called the heavy responsibility of an expeditionary force commander [kongai no junin].)
- Q The protest of the United States Government, which was made to Japan, charged that the prisoners in the "Bataan March" were beaten, bayoneted, and shot. Did you discuss that with the Chief of Staff during your visit?
- A No, I didn't talk to him about those things. I thought that if the responsible army commander knew about those things, he would take proper action. I thought that the responsible army commander would take appropriate measures if things contrary to international law had happened.
- Q Did you inquire on either of your trips to the Philippines to find out if any action whatsoever had been taken in these matters?
- A No. As I said before, since the responsible commander had the authority I relied upon him in this matter. I only asked about the main points. Everyone thought that the Japanese character would not permit acts of an atrocious nature. This little booklet which I have here was issued on 8 January 1941 in connection with the China Incident. The title of it is "Teachings for the Battlefield" [Senjin kun]. It was issued by me as War Minister and at the time of the Greater East Asia War, officers and men had the same instructions. I will quote only briefly. Properly, it is a book on fighting, but if you will translate the pages I have marked in blue pencil, I will appreciate it. I thought that these were being carried out. [The booklet was given to the interpreter with the pages marked which will be translated and inserted in the record. See attached translation of booklet which is being made a part of this interrogation.]
- Q During your two visits to the Philippines, that you have referred to, did you visit and inspect either Camp O'Donnell, or any other prison camp?

A No, I didn't. I had no time for it. The only one I visited was Omori Prison Camp, here in Japan.

Q While you were in the Philippines on those two occasions, did you visit any camp where civilians were interned?

A No, I didn't. I am not too sure, but it seems to me I visited one camp for civilians in Malaya, I think it was. I am not sure about it.

Q During either of those visits to the Philippines, did you look into or inspect the treatment that wounded American soldiers and Filipinos were receiving?

A I visited a hospital where there were wounded Japanese, but I don't know whether there were wounded Filipinos or Americans in it or not.

Q And your purpose in going there was to visit the Japanese wounded, was it not?

A Yes, that was the main thing.

Q And you did not go to that hospital looking for either Filipinos or American wounded, did you?

A No, not specially. As I said, I did visit the hospital, but I don't know whether there were any wounded Americans or Filipinos there or not.

Q During your visits to Thai and Formosa, did you visit any prison camps at which American and British prisoners were interned?

A No, I didn't. In Formosa, I stopped at Taiboku. I think the prison camp was at Karenko, which was a long distance away. But I went to Taiboku.

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Attachment: Partial translation of booklet entitled "Teachings for the Battlefield" [Senjin Kun.]

NOTE: The witness produced a 32-page pamphlet entitled "Teachings for the Battlefield" Senjin Kun issued on 8 January 1941, over his own name, several passages of which were underlined. The underlined passages are translated as follows:

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Page 2 and 37. "When within the surroundings of the battlefield, one is apt to be absorbed by what is immediately before one's eyes and stray from principles and occasionally these acts may be contrary to one's duty as a soldier. Much discretion is needed."

Page 5 and 67. "To obey Imperial commands, to be brave as well as just, to be humane as well as brave, and to realize the grand harmony of the world - such is the spirit of the Emperor Jimmu, first Emperor of Japan. Bravery must be stern and charity must be far-reaching. If there is any enemy resisting the Imperial troops, we must destroy him with our tempestuous military power. Even if we succeed in subduing our enemy with our unrelenting power, if we lack the grace of refraining from attacking those who have laid down their arms and of treating kindly those who obey us, we can hardly be called perfect soldiers."

Page 24 and 257. "Care must be taken in the protection of property and materials owned by the enemy. Requisition, confiscation and destruction of materials, etc., must always be effected in accordance with regulations and invariably in conformity with orders by commanding officers. In view of the basic principles of the Imperial Army, we must be magnanimous of heart and treat innocent inhabitants with kindness."