

Wartime Exile

The Exclusion of the Japanese Americans
From the West Coast

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Denison University Library

OCT 26 '46

22691091X

Wartime Exile

The Exclusion of the Japanese Americans From the West Coast



United States Department of the Interior

J. A. KRUG, *Secretary*

War Relocation Authority

D. S. MYER, *Director*

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C.

Price 45 cents

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE..... 1

PART I

THE WEST COAST'S LEAST KNOWN AND MOST MISREPRESENTED MINORITY 2

CHAPTER--

I. EARLY VOYAGERS FROM JAPAN TO THE NEW WORLD..... 3

II. THE IMMIGRANT GENERATION AND THE CALIFORNIA RACISTS. 7

III. THE POPULATION MYTH..... 17

IV. THE BIRTH RATE..... 23

V. DUAL CITIZENSHIP..... 30

VI. JAPANESE LANGUAGE SCHOOLS..... 44

VII. DISTRIBUTION OF JAPANESE AMERICANS..... 51

Early Japanese Railroad Laborers..... 61

Work in the Sugar-Beet Fields..... 63

Japanese in the Hop Fields..... 64

From Migratory Laborer to Independent Farmer..... 65

Concentrations of Japanese in Major Cities of
the West Coast..... 69

San Francisco..... 69

Los Angeles..... 78

Sacramento..... 80

Portland, Oregon and Vicinity..... 81

Seattle and Tacoma, Washington..... 85

VIII. 1941: PRE-DECEMBER 7..... 88

PART II

INTERIM: DECEMBER 7, 1941 - FEBRUARY 19, 1942..... 97

CHAPTER--

I. IN THE BEGINNING..... 98

II. THE RALLYING OF THE RACISTS..... 104

III. FIRST ROUND TO THE RACISTS..... 128

PART III

TRIUMPH FOR THE RACISTS..... 138

CHAPTER--

I. "AT THE DISCRETION OF THE APPROPRIATE MILITARY
COMMANDER"..... 139

II. THE CASE FOR THE GOVERNMENT..... 149

REFERENCES QUOTED; Key to Citations..... 160

PREFACE

At the time when the United States of America entered World War II, there lived on the western rim of our continent a small group of quiet, hard-working and thrifty people; as a group they had been living in the Pacific coastal region for upward of 50 years. They comprised only one-tenth of 1 percent of the Nation's total population. Indeed they were so few, so concentrated in that narrow coastal strip, that few Americans in other parts of the United States had ever encountered one of them or had ever given any thought to this small segment of the population--until the surprise attack upon Pearl Harbor by Japan suddenly and spuriously identified this minute oriental-American minority with the enemy whose ancestry it shared.

During the first year of the war this West Coast minority, consisting of approximately 110,000 people ranging from 90-year-old immigrants who had lived here for perhaps 60 years to third-generation citizens in arms, was excluded from home and source of livelihood by a series of military orders which were issued under authority conferred by the President of the United States. These wartime mass exclusion orders affected only persons of Japanese ancestry. Without being charged with any specific crime, without hearings, these people were evacuated under military guard to isolated barrack camps in the interior, where the majority of them lived as wards of the Government for nearly 3 years. After January 2, 1945, the effective date of the rescission of the exclusion orders, all except the comparatively small number of evacuees who had lost faith in American democracy and so wished to repatriate or expatriate to Japan were permitted to return to the Pacific Coast.

This study is an attempt to explain how American democracy, at a time when it was engaged in a death struggle against the forces of totalitarianism across the seas, came to deal in this manner with one of its own minorities, a minority composed of two-thirds citizens by birth and one-third aliens denied naturalization under the law of our country.

Note: This report prepared by Ruth E. McKee, Historian.

THIS REPORT IS
FOR THE INFORMATION OF
THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS

PART I

**THE WEST COAST'S LEAST KNOWN AND MOST MISREPRESENTED
MINORITY: An Account of the Life and Problems of the
Japanese Immigrants and their American Children on
the Pacific Coast of the United States Prior to
World War II.**

CHAPTER I

EARLY VOYAGERS FROM JAPAN TO THE NEW WORLD

In August of 1610, 10 years before the Mayflower crossed the Atlantic Ocean to deposit the Pilgrims on the northern part of the east coast of North America, the first Japanese ship known to have crossed the considerably wider Pacific Ocean reached the Mexican port of Acapulco on the southern part of the west coast of North America. The voyage was part of a plan to establish direct trade between New Spain, or Mexico, and Japan. The ship carried, in addition to 23 Japanese merchants under the leadership of 2 Japanese noblemen, the Spanish Governor of the Philippines, Don Rodrigo de Vevero, who had been shipwrecked in Japanese waters and entertained by the Shogun while a ship suitable for the long and hazardous voyage was being constructed.

During the months of their stay in Mexico City, the merchants learned what they could of western practices and methods of conducting life and business and one of the nobles was baptized a Roman Catholic with the name of Francisco Velasco. He took at baptism the family name of the Viceroy, who stood his sponsor. The ship carried the Japanese safely back to Japan.

In 1613 another Japanese ship took a larger number of Japanese, delegates from a Christian colony, to Acapulco, whence they proceeded to Mexico City for confirmation. Some of them were taken to Spain to be presented at court; the rest awaited the return of their friends in Mexico for a period of 2 years. Some members of this group of Christian Japanese, possibly a dozen, chose to remain in Mexico when the ship returned to Japan. It seems probable that those few Japanese who reached the New World in 1613 and decided to stay were the first Japanese immigrants to America. No more is known of them, a fact that suggests their successful assimilation into the life and culture of Mexico with consequent loss of racial identity.*

It has been pointed out that Japan, for a period of more than a century and a half after these two voyages had been successfully accomplished, had a golden opportunity to take over California. It was 1769 before the Spanish fathers established the first mission in Alta

*This whole interesting period that preceded Japan's voluntary withdrawal from the world is treated in detail and from official documents of both Japan and Mexico in Zelia Nutthall's The Earliest Historical Relations between Mexico and Japan, published as Vol. 4, No. 1, in University of California Publications on American Archaeology and Ethnology.

California, at San Diego. Explorers of other nationality had not yet reached the West Coast. However, instead of expanding her empire and utilizing her advantage, Japan in 1638 embraced a policy of strict exclusion and inclusion, forbade the construction of any more seaworthy vessels and destroyed the ones already in existence, and retired from the world until Commodore Perry forced an opening of the country. The self-isolation of Japan was the result of a growing conviction on the part of the early Tokugawa Shoguns over a period of years that the political activities of foreign missionaries—especially the Jesuits—constituted a menace to the safety of the Empire. The immediate occasion of the edict of 1638, however, was an uprising in 1637 of the large Christian colony at Shimabara. Converts to the Roman Catholic faith numbering 15 or 20 thousand, waving red cross flags and shouting "Jesus, Maria and St. Iago!" gave battle to the Imperial troops. This incident ended in the wholesale massacre of the militant Christians and convinced the Shogun that Christianity was a menace to national security.* It was 1884 before mass emigration of Japanese nationals was permitted by the Imperial Government, which in that year yielded to the often reiterated pleas of Hawaiian sugar planters for labor.

Thus it was that, historically speaking, the Japanese were late among immigrants to the United States. Prior to 1860, when Japan sent forth her first embassy to the United States, such Japanese as Americans had seen had been a few castaways who had been picked up in midocean by western ships and brought to America—usually to California—until passage to Japan could be arranged for them. The rescued were not too eager to return to their native country, for they knew that they stood a good chance of losing their heads for having visited a Christian country, however blameless they might have been of intent to do so.

The Americans viewed these castaways with friendly curiosity, and, in the days when the United States was becoming aware of the need of a fueling station in Japan, certain politicians saw in the rescued mariners a potential wedge to open Japan to trade. Thus it happened that the few Japanese who reached our shores before diplomatic relations were established between Japan and the United States were petted and exhibited and made much of. Commodore Perry's interpreter on the expedition to force the opening of Japan owed his knowledge of the Japanese language to a castaway named Sentaro, who was a member of the expedition. A child castaway, Hikoze Hamada, was a protégé of the collector of customs at San Francisco and also the latter's patron, Senator Gwin, of California. Young Hikoze was taken to Washington and introduced to President Pierce, who offered him an appointment to West

*The Nutthall study covers this situation in detail; it is briefly treated in "How Japan Lost her Chance in the Pacific," by George Kennan, in The Outlook, June 27, 1914, Vol. 107, No. 9, pp. 489-493.

Point. Hikoze refused the appointment, preferring to attend the Catholic University in Maryland. Shortly before he was 18, Hikoze was naturalized as an American citizen in Baltimore, having previously been baptized in the Roman Catholic faith with the name of Joseph Heco. At that time—June 30, 1858, was the day of Heco's naturalization—America was less sensitive than in later years to gradations in skin color, and in scattered instances individuals of oriental race who applied for naturalization were granted it.

Aside from members of the embassies that came and went during the sixties, there appeared in California toward the end of that decade two small colonies of Japanese. One was composed of possibly a dozen farmers—the newspapers of the time were in disagreement as to the number—and settled on land purchased at Gold Hill, not far from Sacramento. A Dutch adventurer who was a naturalized Japanese citizen and married to a Japanese woman had smuggled this little group of farmers out of Japan to help him make a fortune out of a tea and silk venture in the Sacramento Valley. Fortune was against him—and perhaps he was too far from his base of supplies. After a year or so, he returned to Japan presumably to get more plants and to raise more funds. He did not return. There was a later report that he had been executed in Japan, doubtless for having broken the inclusion law. The destitute Gold Hill farmers appealed to Charles W. Brooks, then the honorary consular agent at San Francisco, and through his efforts found work in American families.^{1*}

The other colony was composed of a small group of Japanese intellectuals and liberals. Some of them had been members of various embassies; one was a former governor of Yedo (Tokyo). All of them, according to a contemporary report in the San Francisco Chronicle, were "gentlemen of refinement and influence in their own country, from which they were compelled to flee, almost destitute, because their travel in civilized countries had made them too liberal in their ideas to suit the Mikado. These Japanese gentlemen, who speak English and French, offered to work for nothing for a year with any gentlemen who would learn them a useful occupation, but could get none to accept their services. By the advice of Mr. Van Reed they leased a farm in Alameda county, and hired a few intelligent white men to instruct them."²

Until 1884, California, so shortly to become a seething caldron of anti-Japanese prejudice, had very few Japanese of any description. After 1871 the Emperor had encouraged the youth of the gentry to travel and study in the western world, and a number of Japanese students appeared on the American scene. The more prosperous of these tended to go to the more impressive and longer established eastern universities;

*Numbered references are listed at end of report.

the impoverished stopped off in California to work their way through such young and obscure institutions of higher learning as they could find close to their port of entry. The Japanese consul in San Francisco reported in 1884, just prior to the authorization of general emigration by Japan, that there were 80 Japanese in California.

To summarize: until general emigration of the masses got under way, with the exception of the farmers of Gold Hill, the Japanese in California were of the educated and upper classes. It is apparent that the press and the bulk of the population were kindly disposed toward these strangers in their midst.

CHAPTER II

THE IMMIGRANT GENERATION AND THE CALIFORNIA RACISTS

The friendly reception accorded the few Japanese who reached the United States before general emigration was authorized by the Japanese Government was scarcely indicative of what awaited the bona fide immigrants of later years in the land of their choice. These newcomers were predestined to trouble by the location of their port of entry to the new world, by the timing of their arrival, and above all by the fact that they were of oriental race. It is true that for a few years after 1884 the immigrants from Japan passed through the Golden Gate almost unnoticed, but that not unpleasant anonymity ended as soon as they began to arrive in considerable number.

It was natural enough that general emigration from Japan should have been slow to gather momentum. In Japan the initiative required to uproot oneself from the familiar, and undertake life and work in a foreign country halfway around the world, had been somewhat anaesthetized by more than 2 centuries of a rigidly enforced stay-at-home policy. At first only a few resolute and daring individuals took passage for the United States—or elsewhere. These pioneers were conspicuously youthful. For years it was rare to find a Japanese immigrant who was above 30 years of age, and many came to America as teenage boys. These male immigrants came alone. Some of the older ones left wives and children behind. The teen-age boys were single. The average immigrant had his passage and possibly as much as \$25 in cash with which to start life in the new world. The immigrants arrived at San Francisco, which consequently developed the first substantial concentration of Japanese. After a year or two of authorized emigration, the strangers were met at the pier by Japanese hotel or boarding house keepers who served also as employment agents to recruit labor for railroads and for agriculture. The young immigrants took whatever work was offered at any wage named because they had to earn a living. They could not afford to be particular or fastidious. They had to sustain life in themselves, and most of them had obligations to dependents or semidependents back in Japan. They had to get along as best they could while they were learning the way of life and the language of the new country. Many of them were graduates of the middle schools of Japan, which were comparable to the American high school, and so had had a year or two of English. This required course in English was of about as much practical value to them when they were faced with Americans with various accents as a year or two of high school French would be to Americans who were suddenly dropped into a French village where no one could speak English.

It was not until the pioneers had established themselves in the United States and could write favorable reports of life and working

opportunities to old neighbors and relatives in Japan that the less venturesome Japanese felt disposed to try their luck in the United States. Thus it was 1891 before the annual arrivals of Japanese in the United States exceeded 1,000, and not until 1898 did the number reach the 2,000 mark. Contract labor, which was the basis of emigration from Japan to the Kingdom of Hawaii, was prohibited in the United States by Federal law at the time that mass emigration was permitted, and in 1900, with Hawaii a territory of the United States, contract labor was outlawed in the Islands.

Until after the turn of the century, movements of Japanese to the continental United States were on a small scale. However, in the first decade of the twentieth century, mass migrations reached their peak, dropping sharply after 1908, when the Gentlemen's Agreement to curtail the migration of Japanese nationals to the United States and Hawaii became effective.

The accompanying table serves to establish a picture of the volume of Japanese immigration as it affected the continental United States and its territories during the first decade of this century. The figures were compiled from the annual reports of the United States Commissioner-General of Immigration, 1901-1910.

ADMISSIONS OF JAPANESE TO THE UNITED STATES AND ITS TERRITORIES,
1901 - 1910

YEAR	TOTAL	CONTINENTAL U.S.	ALASKA	HAWAII
1901	5,249	4,908	3	338
1902	14,455	5,325	5	9,125
1903	20,041	6,990	6	13,045
1904	14,382	7,776	16	6,590
1905	11,021	4,319	10	6,692
1906	14,243	5,178	14	9,051
1907	30,824	9,948	11	20,865
1908	16,418	7,250	15	9,153
1909	3,275	1,593	5	1,679
1910	2,798	1,552	7	1,239
TOTALS*	132,706	54,839	90	77,777

* Japanese sources record the return of 25,536 nationals to Japan in this decade.

At this point in the chapter, it is well to consider the triple handicap under which this immigrant generation took up life under American democracy—or rather under that variant of it which maintained

on the West Coast of the United States--recalling that the handicap was composed of race, place, and time.

In the first place, these people were of oriental race, and they were seeking economic betterment along with the blessings of liberty in a section of the United States which was notoriously hostile to orientals. The pattern of West Coast color prejudice had taken its first crude shape as early as 1846. In that year a gang of greedy and socially irresponsible United States citizens hastened out to California, then Mexican territory, to await its annexation by the United States and to grab what they could in the way of booty when this event transpired. The annexation had been determined by the election of President Polk. These young Americans tired of waiting for the carefully planned bloodless conquest of California and fomented an incident which was known as the Bear Flag Rebellion. On this occasion the rallying cry of "California for the Americans" was first heard. The ill-advised action on the part of the young men converted the plan for peaceful conquest into a long, bloody, and quite unnecessary episode in United States history.³ These aggressive young men, themselves first or second generation Americans for the most part, defined the term American very narrowly. They excluded from the category by definition the Spanish and Mexican Californians, although the Spanish had arrived in the new world somewhat ahead of the Pilgrim Fathers, and the Mexicans were compounded of these Spanish and American Indians who might be considered genuine first families. The Bear Flag insurrectionists were convinced that it was improper for darker skinned people to own land which lighter skinned men--themselves, for instance--might use to advantage.

Up to the discovery of gold in 1848, these white pioneers persecuted the native Californians and the Indians. After the discovery of gold, they persecuted the native Californians, the Indians, the South Americans and the Chinese who by this time had appeared in small numbers. They were tolerant toward the Chinese as long as the latter tended babies, cooked, laundered, and performed other menial tasks that nobody else wanted to bother with, once the lure of the gold fields was felt. However, when some of the hardier Chinese ventured into the gold fields, their presence coupled with their industry was considered a menace to white supremacy.

One of the first acts of the California legislature was the imposition of an exorbitant miner's tax levied nominally upon foreigners but collected, after a short time, only from Chinese. The payment of the \$30 a month tax by a Chinese gave him the legal right to grub for gold dust; it did not protect him from the resentment of white rivals in the gold fields. Whenever the heavy-bearded young whites felt hilarious or depressed, they were likely to mob the thriftier Chinese who might have managed to amass a few more ounces of gold dust from poor pickings than their superiors had acquired from better pickings.

In spite of the indignities heaped upon them, the Chinese continued to come to California, and in the sixties their labor built the western half of the first transcontinental railroad, a task which had been offered in turn to every other breed of worker within the United States and promptly rejected by all. Nevertheless, since a depression followed hard on the completion of the railroad, organized labor became retroactively incensed over the fact that the Chinese had done this back-breaking job, and the real persecution began.

The heavily bearded young men who, back in the forties, had persecuted the Mexican and Spanish Californians and then the Chinese gold seekers were by this time fathers or even grandfathers, but their purpose of preserving California for the white race was unwavering, and they had indoctrinated their sons and their daughters with all their prejudices and phobias. Combined with organized labor the pioneers of the forties and the adventurers of the gold rush days made a group for any politician to take seriously. The cry of "The Chinese must go!" echoed from every sand lot and from every political rally. To prove that they meant what they said, the more impetuous staged a few massacres of Chinese. By 1882 these forces had put enough pressure upon the Federal Government to achieve the exclusion of all Chinese immigrants for many years to come and had, by various devices, persuaded a good many of the resident Chinese to ship back to China or at least to move on eastward in the United States.

The zeal of these crusaders had gotten the better of their common sense, since Chinese labor was highly important to the success of California agriculture—and it was rapidly becoming established that California's greater wealth was to be derived from agriculture rather than from the mines. Year by year the resident Chinese labor force dwindled, by departure to other States and by increasing age. As the remaining ones grew older they became less competent, less quick at the important work of harvesting California's varied and valuable crops.

By the time that the Japanese began to arrive in any number, there was a vacuum into which these newest immigrants naturally were sucked. As long as they stayed in the vacuum, they were welcomed even by the racists. However, the Japanese immigrants refused to stay in the vacuum; they began hauling themselves out of it. They were ambitious; they wanted to better themselves. They were willing to take unskilled labor while they were learning the language and the ways of America, but their whole effort was focused upon escaping from the migratory labor gangs to land of their own, either leased or purchased, so that they might import their families and lead a normal American life. California did not approve of this ambition on the part of Japanese immigrants. California farmers resented having their harvest hands suddenly become competing farm operators. This resentment was economic rather than racist in flavor. The out-and-out racists saw in the transition

from day laborer to farm operator another threat to white supremacy. To quote from this writer's California and her Less Favored Minorities [p.14]:

"The forces that had accomplished the exclusion of the Chinese had developed legends, techniques, and arguments which with little editing could be turned against the Japanese. Politicians and pressure groups served their apprenticeship in the anti-Chinese crusade. By the turn of the century these veterans were ready to launch a new offensive. In the campaign against the Japanese is found the most spectacular manifestation of California's rugged individualism, which Royce labeled 'social irresponsibility.'"

The offensive began in a small way on May 8, 1900: on that night, in the course of a mass meeting called in San Francisco to consolidate pressure for reenactment of the Chinese exclusion law--then about to expire--it was resolved to urge the adoption of a law to exclude all Japanese except members of the diplomatic staff from the United States. James Phelan, then mayor of San Francisco, later to be in turn Governor of California and United States Senator, played a prominent part at this meeting. In 1901 the California legislature appealed in a joint resolution to Congress to restrict the immigration of Japanese laborers. So persuasive were the legends and fantasies developed by the crusaders, even in 1900, the year when there were only 24,326 Japanese in the entire United States, that an investigator for the United State Industrial Commission was charmed into writing in his report of "great hordes of Japanese coolies who have already secured a monopoly of the labor in the agricultural industries of the Pacific States * * * and are as a class tricky, unreliable and dishonest * * *. The total number of Japanese coolie laborers in California today is greater than the total number of Japanese arrivals shown by the immigration records at all of the United States ports for the last 10 years. How, then, came they among us? This is another Asiatic mystery. The movement, the motives, the coming and going of these stoical, strange Mongolians are as a closed book to the white races. As with the birds of passage, today there may not be one in sight, tomorrow they may be with us in countless thousands!"⁴

"From 1870 to 1920," wrote Carey McWilliams, "anti-oriental agitation in California was fomented, directed, and financed by the powerful trade-union movement that, from the earliest days, had centered in San Francisco. It is, indeed, remarkable that in a pioneer nonindustrial State a labor movement of such strength had developed that by 1879 it was able, through the Workingmen's Party, to seize control of the State and enact a new, and in some respects quite radical, constitution. The secret

of the success of this early movement lay in the fact that Irish immigrants constituted one fourth of the large foreign-born element in the State. * * *

"Most of the leaders of the anti-oriental movement, in its early phases, were Irish and they were also the leaders of the San Francisco labor movement. * * * These leaders had been quick to realize the possibilities of uniting their notoriously clannish fellow countrymen around a negative issue, namely, 'The Chinese Must Go!' It was the political, rather than the economic aspects of oriental immigration that interested these clever and resourceful leaders. Scientific evidence has always been lacking to prove that oriental immigrants ever actually displaced American workmen in California or that they ever constituted a permanent threat to labor standards in the State. But given the chaotic state of affairs in California in the seventies, no shrewder slogan could have been devised than 'The Chinese Must Go!'"⁵

The new century had brought new faces and new names to political prominence in San Francisco, and the Union Labor Party had replaced the old Workingmen's Party, which had disappeared in the depression of the nineties. However, the tactics of the early Irish leaders were still effectively employed; anti-oriental sentiment was just as easily exploited in the new twentieth century in reference to the Japanese as it had been in the seventies and eighties against the Chinese. It was inconvenient, perhaps, that the antilabor forces, too, exploited anti-Japanese sentiment in the municipal election of 1901, but the Union Labor Party, strengthened by the recent formation of the State Federation of Labor and by an impressive teamster's strike, defeated Mayor Phelan at the polls and elected Eugene E. Schmitz mayor of San Francisco. Of Mayor Schmitz, Carey McWilliams wrote:

" * * * Formerly a bassoon player in a San Francisco orchestra, Schmitz was the henchman of Abe Ruef, an exceedingly able and corrupt politician. In the years following the victory of the Union Labor Party, San Francisco wallowed in corruption. * * * Although he had been reelected as mayor of San Francisco, Schmitz was facing indictment in 1906 for his many crimes. Hard pressed for an effective diversionary issue, Schmitz and Ruef saw an opportunity to save themselves by whipping up a Japanese pogrom."^{5-a}

Early in 1905 the victory of Japan over Russia gave impetus to the offensive of the California anti-Japanese crusade. Japan had demonstrated to the world that a small group of Asiatic islands was in

process of becoming a world power. From that time on, the anti-Japanese forces of the West Coast found it helpful to their cause to associate the growing racial minority in the United States with the rise of Japanese nationalism, to identify the hard-working, law-abiding immigrants on this side of the Pacific with Japanese militarists and jingoists on the other side of the Pacific. They began weaving into the elaborate design of their propaganda colorful threads to suggest a Japanese plot to effect a peaceful conquest of California by means of extensive colonization—and prodigious propagation.

On February 23 of 1905 the San Francisco Chronicle inaugurated the first press campaign against the resident Japanese with a series of scare stories. It has suggested that "the owner of the Chronicle, M. H. DeYoung, had been a candidate for the United States Senate a few years previously and some observers construed these vicious articles as a renewal of his candidacy."^{5-b} By March 1 the State legislature responded to these articles with a resolution, passed unanimously by both houses, demanding immediate congressional action to stop further immigration of Japanese laborers.

By June the anti-Japanese forces of the State had consolidated their strength by organizing the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League, in San Francisco. The formation of the league was promoted by the Union Labor Party, many of whose members were also members of the powerful bulwark of race prejudice known as the Native Sons of the Golden West. Carey McWilliams offered in *Prejudice* a partial list of prominent leaders of the anti-Japanese agitation. All of those named were members, most of them officials, of the Native Sons of the Golden West and political figures in the State. The list included Hiram Warren Johnson, who was Governor of California from 1911 to 1915 and United States Senator from California from 1917 until his death in 1945; James D. Phelan, also a Governor of California and a United States Senator; U. S. Webb, for some years State attorney general, co-author of the Alien Land Law of 1913—with Francis J. Heney—and zealous instigator of escheat proceedings against Japanese land owners; V. S. McClatchy, editor and publisher of the McClatchy Bee papers of Sacramento, Fresno, and Modesto, and the guiding light of the anti-oriental group for his entire life; J. M. Inman, State senator and at one time president of the California Oriental Exclusion League; Eugene E. Schmitz, Mayor of San Francisco and, with Abe Ruef, instigator of the move to segregate Japanese school children in San Francisco in 1906; Abe Ruef, powerful and corrupt political boss—in 1908 he was tried and convicted of bribery, with Hiram Johnson as prosecutor after Francis J. Heney, the first prosecuting attorney, had been shot down in court by one of Ruef's henchmen;* Aaron

*These details are included in the biographical sketch of Hiram Johnson in *Who's Who in America, 1940-1941*, p. 1400.

Altman, president of the San Francisco School Board in 1906 and Abe Ruef's brother-in-law—a fact that sheds some light on the exclusion of Japanese school children from the public schools at a time when Ruef and the Mayor were facing prosecution and so were desperate for a "diversionary issue;" James L. Gallagher, another member of the San Francisco School Board in 1906; and Anthony Caminetti, formerly a State senator and subsequently, in 1913, United States Commissioner-General of Immigration.5-c

In 1908, the year when the Gentlemen's Agreement went into effect, the Exclusion League met in its first annual convention at Seattle. By this time it had spread its membership over most of the Western States; California alone had 110,000 members.

The Gentlemen's Agreement, since it placed the responsibility for limiting immigration with the Japanese Government instead of with the United States, was violently protested by the exclusion league. Under the terms of this unwritten agreement entered upon by the Theodore Roosevelt administration and the Japanese Government, Japan agreed to issue passports only to nonlaborers, with the exception of those laborers who had established residence in America and wished to return there, and to the immediate families of such laborers. Japan voluntarily extended the terms to cover Mexico and Canada. In 1907 President Roosevelt had prohibited the admission of Japanese holding passports to Hawaii, Canada or Mexico. For the 16 years of its official life, the Gentlemen's Agreement was vociferously denounced by the exclusionists on the grounds that Japan failed to administer it in good faith. Conclusive evidence to the contrary was not forthcoming until after exclusion had become a fact, in 1924.

In 1909 the California legislature considered a bill to prohibit purchase of land by Japanese aliens, but President Taft intervened and the bill was dropped. In that same year the legislature instructed the State commissioner of labor to conduct an investigation of Japanese labor in California and make a formal report of his findings. By this time the crusaders against the Japanese had convinced themselves of the truth of their own fabrications; consequently when the commissioner of labor presented a careful and objective report which stated among other things that the Japanese were valuable to California agriculture, the legislature formally disapproved of and buried the report—because the commissioner's findings did not support the contentions of the legislators.

The year 1910 found all three political parties in the California general elections with anti-Japanese planks in their platforms. In 1913, although Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan hurried out to California in an attempt to dissuade the legislators from their course, the State legislature passed the first California alien land act, which

made it illegal for aliens ineligible to citizenship to buy agricultural land or to lease it for a period exceeding 3 years.

During the war years, from 1914 to 1918, the racists were restrained by injunctions from Washington from crusading with any effectiveness. Not only was Japan an ally of the United States but there was also need for the exercise of Japanese farming talent in California. No sooner was the armistice signed, however, than the lid blew off and the crusaders boiled over. An initiative land law of 1920 tightened the old law in three respects: (1) it forbade the leasing of land by Japanese aliens altogether; (2) it deprived them of the right to purchase stock in any organization which owned or leased agricultural land--the law of 1913 had permitted them to own stock as long as the total holdings of the Japanese did not exceed 49 percent of the whole; and, (3) it prohibited aliens from being appointed guardians of minor children whose estate consisted of real property--this because it had been discovered that some Japanese aliens were buying land in the name of their citizen children. In 1923 the land law was amended to prohibit Japanese aliens from entering share cropping contracts--for the vigilant anti-Japanese element had discovered that the Japanese were farming land in return for a share of the crops raised.

In 1925 the legislature passed a concurrent resolution urging investigation of alleged infractions of the alien land acts. The cases were instigated by State Attorney General U. S. Webb, who had co-authored the restrictive statutes and who was at this time a permanent member of the California Joint Immigration Commission, which had been organized to campaign for Federal legislation to exclude the Japanese from the United States. Elliott Grinnell Mears, in his preliminary report prepared for the July 1927 conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, in Honolulu, said of this organization:

"The most powerful single group in California * * * is the California Joint Immigration Committee, successor to the defunct exclusion leagues, whose Executive Secretary and driving force, Mr. V. S. McClatchy, was formerly Director of the Associated Press, when he was editor and owner of the Sacramento Bee. Largely the initiative and publicity skill of Mr. McClatchy had been responsible for the legislative acts against the Japanese since the World War. The Committee consists of the Deputy-Adjutant of the American Legion, the Secretary-Treasurer of the State Federation of Labor, Master of the State Grange, Grand President of the Native Sons of the Golden West, the State Attorney General, and V. S. McClatchy."

There can be little doubt that the persuasive and deceptively authoritative-sounding fantasies of Mr. McClatchy were instrumental in

persuading a sufficient number of Congressmen and Senators that they were justified in accepting the immigration bill of 1924 with its rider which excluded the Japanese. A "skeleton brief," in which the bones were well padded with ingenious fictions was prepared by Mr. McClatchy, filed with the secretary of state, and presented to the Senate by Senator Hiram Johnson, of California, on July 27, 1921, [Senate Document No. 55, 67th Congress, 1st Session]. The skeleton brief rested the case for excluding the Japanese on falsifications of the volume of Japanese population in California, the Japanese birth rate in California, the alleged failure of Japan to observe in good faith the terms of the Gentlemen's Agreement, and the excessive number and acreage of Japanese freeholds and leaseholds in the State.

In 1917 Japan and Korea had been excepted from the "barred zoning" clause of the immigration act of that year. Japan was protected at that time by the Gentlemen's Agreement and by the fact that she was an ally of the United States in the war. The Immigration Act of 1924, however, annulled the Gentlemen's Agreement by denying admission to the United States of all immigrants ineligible to citizenship and including in that category Mongolians, Polynesians and races indigenous to the Western Hemisphere--in other words, all Indians of South America and Mexico.

After using its influence to achieve the Federal measure of 1924, the joint immigration commission continued in existence to make sure that the exclusion measure against the Japanese was retained. In spite of the commission's efforts, toward the end of the twenties and up to 1931, when Japan invaded Manchuria, favorable consideration was being given the matter of extending the quota to Japan. It was in this period that the anti-Japanese forces of the West Coast developed their theses on the subject of Japanese language schools and the evils of dual citizenship. It was in this period that the Nisei, or citizen generation of Japanese Americans, began to come of age. It is true that not many of them were yet of an age to vote, but the fact that some were beginning to vote and that there would be more with each passing year pointed to the fact that the Japanese minority was developing a voice and voting power and hence would not make such a convenient political football in the years to come. Unable to deprive the American-born children of the Japanese immigrants of their citizenship without first changing the Constitution of the United States, the racists made every attempt to discredit the citizenship of the Nisei. It must be said that they were remarkably successful in undermining public and official confidence in the loyalty of the Nisei to the country of their birth. The racist arguments were highly articulated and widely publicized, and the voice of the racists was much more penetrating than the voice of the people of good will who were in a position to refute those arguments. It is improbable that the fulness of their success was realized even by the racists themselves--until the United States entered World War II.

CHAPTER III

THE POPULATION MYTH

The earliest myth developed by the racists to stir up anti-Japanese sentiment in California was the one revolving about the number of Japanese immigrants coming into the country—both before and after the Gentlemen's Agreement went into effect. The pressure groups never allowed themselves to be persuaded that the Gentlemen's Agreement was an effective curb on immigration. A circumstance that played into the hands of the agitators was the variation in methods employed by the Census Bureau and by the Immigration and Naturalization Service in listing statistics.

In 1901, the year in which the State Government of California made its first official anti-Japanese move, the Commissioner-General of Immigration began to lump immigration figures relating to the continental United States together with those relating to its territories. The Census Bureau continued to distinguish between the States and the Territories. Obviously there was a startling discrepancy between figures given in the Commissioner-General's tables and those quoted by the Bureau of the Census. Even scholars were misled, for there was nothing to indicate that the term "United States" as used in the reports of the Commissioner-General of Immigration, meant the United States together with the Territories of Hawaii and Alaska. An indefatigable research worker might have discovered a set of figures headed "Declared Destination Hawaii," and might then have subtracted those figures from the total, but for some years none of the writers on the Japanese question seems to have pursued the matter to such lengths. Certainly West Coast politicians and agitators, eager to substantiate their assertions that invading hordes of Japanese were about to crowd the white race from the Golden West, were not interested in seeking a reasonable explanation for the discrepancy and risk destruction of their thesis. A glance at the table on page 8 suggests how much better the lumped figures served anti-Japanese interests than could the broken down figures.

Another practice of the Commissioner-General of Immigration, begun in 1907, added to the confusion of the lay mind; this was the practice of differentiating between immigrant and nonimmigrant aliens and also between emigrant and nonemigrant aliens. Nonimmigrants and nonemigrants are people who enter or leave the country for business or pleasure temporarily, so that their movements are not presumed to have any permanent effect on population. This being the case, immigration reports did not use figures for nonimmigrant admissions and for non-emigrant departures in the tabulation of ordinary arrivals and departures.

The figures in the table on page 8, beginning in 1907, do not include nonimmigrant entries to the country. Although most writers were actually unaware that the figures which they quoted from the immigration reports combined Hawaiian immigration totals with those of the continental United States in the first decade of the twentieth century, certain writers discovered a separate listing of 4,336 arrivals of nonimmigrants and were careful to add that figure to the lumped total of 132,706, thus achieving the impressive number of 137,042 Japanese immigrants who were supposed to have come to the continental United States in the first 10 years of the century. Other writers on the subject, without intent to support current misconceptions, simply stopped at the first table which seemed to answer their needs and quoted the figures so erroneous in their implications. Whether they chose the figure 132,706 or the figure 137,042, there was a confounding discrepancy between the number of Japanese such writers decided should be in the United States proper and the number actually discovered by the census enumerators in 1910—which was 72,157, including 4,502 native-born citizen children.

It is important to remember that the first decade of this century was a highly significant period in the history of the Japanese in the United States: in the first place, this decade witnessed the rise of anti-Japanese agitation on the West Coast; in the second place, it produced the first curtailment of Japanese immigration as effected by the Gentlemen's Agreement in conjunction with the Presidential Proclamation of 1907, which refused admission to the continental United States to Japanese immigrants bearing passports to Hawaii, Canada or Mexico. The confusion arising from conflicting population statistics gave credence to a number of fantasies which were useful in drumming up support for the first alien land act of California.

By the time that the 1920 census figures were available, agitation against the Japanese in California was at its pre-World War II height. The initiative measure which tightened up the Alien Land Law of 1913 had been made law, and the anti-Japanese forces were rallying to push through Congress the Federal exclusion law. Nothing could have been more convenient for the agitators than the continued unexplained variation in the practice of treating statistics for Hawaii.

On June 19, 1920, the report of the California State Board of Control on the Japanese in California was issued and presented by Governor Stephens to Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby. This report, factual and objective in many of its parts, was an important document in the history of the exclusion movement. Unquestionably it shaped the opinion of many men who were in a position to enact their opinions into law. It is significant, therefore, that the board had fallen into the customary error when it made its estimate of the Japanese population of California as of 1920. The board became somewhat enmeshed in misleading

statistics concerning immigration under the Gentlemen's Agreement, but it became hopelessly entangled when it sought to determine the actual resident Japanese population of California. It arrived at the number 87,279 as of December 31, 1919, whereas the Census found only 70,196.

The first determined effort to wring sense from contradictory sets of statistics about Japanese immigration and population was made by Dr. Sidney L. Gulick, in an article that appeared in the January 1921 issue of *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. Dr. Gulick analyzed the State Board of Control's report and pointed out the errors which it contained. He was the first to explain clearly the different methods employed by Immigration Commission and Census Bureau in recording statistics for continental United States and its territories; he was the first to suggest that it was well to disregard the categories of those leaving or entering the country if one wished to get at the true facts of movements. His discoveries seem to have been ignored at the very time when they might have shed light upon the antidemocratic activities of the racists and prevented a shabby piece of Federal legislation.

As it was, Dr. Gulick's explanation passed unnoticed; Washington accepted as accurate the figures offered by the State Board of Control, and further immigration of Japanese was prohibited. It was not until 1929, 5 years after exclusion became a fact, that a full and logical explanation of the baffling figures and discrepancies was presented to the public. This explanation was the work of Dr. Romanzo C. Adams, of the University of Hawaii. His article "Japanese Migration Statistics" appeared in *The Journal of Sociology and Social Research* for May-June 1929. Dr. Adams wrote:

"According to the 1910 census there were 67,655 foreign born Japanese in the United States and the reports of the Commissioner-General of Immigration showed an excess of 67,109 admissions of alien Japanese immigrants over departures of alien Japanese emigrants in the ten years ending June 30, 1920. This excess was for both Continental United States and Hawaii, but there was no specific mention of Hawaii and it was natural that casual mainland investigators familiar with census practice should assume that the excess was for Continental United States.

"Allowing for an ordinary death rate, age considered, it appeared that the 1920 census should show approximately 127,000 foreign born Japanese in Continental United States. The actual census figures were 81,358—an apparent discrepancy of over 45,000.

"Considering the existing state of public opinion and suspicion, this was a serious matter. There was much fear that the Japanese were becoming so numerous as to jeopardize the interests of the White Race. It was charged that the Gentlemen's Agreement was ineffective and even that its express terms were being violated in an important degree. A picture of a horde of Japanese supplanting Americans was in the minds of many people and the immigration statistics were quoted in support of doctrines based on such fears. The more reassuring figures of the census were discounted by the theory that many Japanese had evaded the census agents in order to conceal their true numbers."

The lumping of figures for Hawaii and the continental United States by the Immigration Commission was a simple matter to grasp. The second source of error, involving "the classification of travellers and the classificatory terms and also the procedure through which the statistical data are secured," was far from simple. It began with the fact that nonemigrants and nonimmigrants were not counted, since their movement was not supposed to have any permanent effect upon the population.

As Dr. Adams indicated, if all actual emigrants and immigrants were properly classified, this practice would be legitimate, but since emigrants were rarely classified as such--with regard to Japanese leaving the United States for Japan--the practice was very misleading. His investigations led him to the discovery that about five-sixths of all Japanese going to Japan from the continental United States and more than nine-tenths going to Japan from Hawaii were classified as nonemigrants. Bona fide nonemigrants were those who visited Japan with a definite expectation of returning to America. The vast majority, however, returned to Japan without being at all sure whether they would stay there or return to America. If they said in America that they expected to remain in Japan, they lost the privileges of the legal residence which they had established in America and with them the right to return; in other words, they burned their bridges behind them. On the other hand, if they said they were going to Japan for a visit, they were classified as nonemigrants and retained the privilege of returning if they found conditions in Japan unfavorable. Many of these aliens took their citizen children with them, of course, and in that event the citizen children were classified with American citizens travelling abroad--with no indication of race, this being the practice of the immigration authorities. Since the figures for nonemigrants and citizens leaving the country were excluded from the tables of immigration and emigration, there was naturally a very imperfect picture of actual movements into and out of the country of the people of Japanese race. While a number of these uncertain travellers did come back to the United States to

live, a large number of them found that they could adjust to Japanese life and accordingly remained in Japan, keeping their citizen children with them. This latter group of aliens together with their citizen children were thus misclassified and were not included in the count of emigrants. According to Dr. Adams, the error due to this misclassification for the period of 1911 to 1920 was about 24,000 for the continental United States and about 17,000 for Hawaii.

Dr. Adams was painstakingly thorough. He checked statistics from all sources, Japanese, Hawaiian, the United States Census and the United States Immigration Commission, and it was only by doing so that anything like a complete picture of real movements—to say nothing of any comprehension of the conflicting and contradictory population figures—could be obtained. He found the discrepancy between his improved statistics and the census figures for 1920 to be only 2,189 for the States and 1,158 for Hawaii, a far cry from the figure of 45,000 which had been bandied about by pressure group writers and orators to point the need of a drastic exclusion law. He found also that Hawaii in that decade "lost over two thousand persons of the Japanese race or people by excess of departures over admissions while, for the mainland, admissions were only a little more than balanced by departures." In other words, in that decade more Japanese were leaving American soil, both continental and island, than were arriving upon it.

To continue with Dr. Adams' major conclusions, there was no evidence of any mysteriously achieved inrush of alien Japanese or that the Gentlemen's Agreement was not being maintained in good faith by Japan. The increase in population during the decade was a result of births, not of illegal entries into the United States. The number of married women had increased from 5,582 in 1910 to 22,195 in 1920, and these Japanese wives were young. Although about 14,000 citizen children had been taken to Japan before the 1920 census was taken, the census was able to show an increase from 4,502 in 1910 to 29,672 in 1920 of American-born citizens of Japanese ancestry in the continental United States.

The accompanying table shows the steady increase of citizens and the decrease with the passage of the years of the aliens in this minority group.

THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF JAPANESE POPULATION IN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES,
HAWAII AND ALASKA, 1900 - 1940, ACCORDING TO UNITED STATES CENSUS RETURNS

Year	CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES			TERRITORY OF HAWAII			TERRITORY OF ALASKA		
	Total	Alien	Citizen	Total	Alien	Citizen	Total	Alien	Citizen
1900	24,326	24,057	269	61,111	*	279	*
1910	72,157	67,655	4,502	79,675	59,786	19,889	913	895	18
1920	111,010	81,338	29,672	109,274	60,618	48,658	312	270	42
1930	138,834	70,477	68,357	139,631	48,446	91,185	278	205	73
1940	126,947	47,305	79,642	157,905	37,353	120,552	263	114	149 [#]

*No breakdown into alien and citizen groups was made in 1900 in Hawaii or Alaska.

[#]In Alaska the census enumeration was made in 1939 instead of in 1940.

(28)

CHAPTER IV

THE BIRTH RATE

Very little attention was given to the West Coast's rising generation of Japanese American citizens until after the close of World War I. The Alien Land Law of 1913 had prohibited further purchase of agricultural land in California by aliens ineligible to citizenship but had permitted such aliens to lease farm land for a 3-year period. During the war years, with Japan an ally of the United States and with the greatly increased demand for agricultural produce, Japanese farmers in California were allowed to produce food for freedom without hindrance. However, once the war had ended and election year was at hand, certain California politicians took stock of the situation and became aware of the fact that Issei parents were purchasing land for their citizen children, taking title in the name of the children. There seemed to be a good many little American citizens with Japanese faces, and the myth-makers quickly turned their attention upon the birth rate among the Japanese immigrants.

The advocates of the initiative measure to tighten up the first alien land act made dark predictions of a "yellow peril" menacing California, chiefly through the birth of innumerable Japanese American children. When the voters of California endorsed the initiative measure in sufficient number to make it a law of the State, the pressure groups campaigned with intensified fervor to obtain Federal legislation which would prohibit subsequent immigration of Japanese. Amazing statements about the fecundity of Japanese women were made and believed. "Peaceful penetration" was a phrase frequently encountered in the speeches and writings of California's superpatriots and yellow journalists in the years between the close of World War I and the enactment of the exclusion law. The term was applied to an ingenious theory of a Japanese plot to people California with hordes of Japanese. Wives and picture brides, it was said, were sent by the Japanese Government to California under orders from the Emperor to have a baby every year; these babies would grow up American citizens in name and loyal Japanese at heart; if every Japanese woman carried out the Imperial instruction faithfully, it was reckoned that within half a century the Japanese would outnumber the Caucasians in California and would seize control of the State.

The Japanese male immigrant, with rare exceptions, came to the United States alone. He was young and he had only enough money to get here. If married, he left his wife in Japan until he could win a little security in the new country and then he sent for her. Whether he worked on the railroads or in seasonal agricultural enterprises, he lived a migratory life of hard work and great discomfort. In several years, with luck, he might lift himself out of the migratory labor class and become

a tenant farmer—or perhaps he might open some small business in a city. Once he had a permanent roof over his head and had saved enough money to pay the steamship passage, he sent for his wife—or for his wife and children, as the case might be. If unmarried, he faced a problem in the total absence of unmarried girls of his own race in the United States. Had he inclination to marry outside his racial group, he was prohibited in both California and Oregon by laws against miscegenation. Very few of the Issei bachelors could afford to make the long trip back to Japan to find and bring back a wife. However, since marriage was a family affair in Japan, with the parents making all arrangements, it was possible and proper for a young man in America to ask his parents in Japan to select a bride for him. Photographs were exchanged—hence the term "picture bride"—and when these were mutually approved, the two families in Japan drew up the marriage contract and sent the bride to join the groom in America, quite in accord with Japanese ethics and law. In deference to American opinion, an American civil ceremony became an established part of the procedure.

With rather less formality, in the early days of our country, shiploads of young women were sent from England and various European countries to provide the early settlers of the eastern colonies with wives; however, West Coast nativists preferred to regard this only practicable course left open to Japanese immigrant bachelors as something unprecedented in the annals of American history, and as they developed their thesis, it became a "diabolical plot" on the part of Japan to penetrate peacefully the rich Coastal States by means of intensive propagation.

The first official comments on the birth rate among first generation Japanese occur in the report made in 1909 by agents of the United States Immigration Commission on immigrants in agriculture and industry in the Western States. At that time an increasing number of married Issei were finding themselves in a position to send for their wives. In Sacramento six-sevenths of the Japanese business men—an unusually high proportion for that period—had prospered sufficiently to have their wives with them. According to this early report, "Slightly more than a third of the married men investigated had no offspring * * * a few of the marriages took place only a year or two ago, but [the scarcity of children] is chiefly explained by the fact that most of the Japanese in this country have not been leading a normal life. Many of the husbands and wives have been separated for years, and a large percentage of the wives are gainfully employed."⁶ The agents commented also on the situation among those Los Angeles Japanese who had wives in residence: " * * * one-fourth of the families investigated where the marriage had taken place at least three years previous, were without children."^{6-a}

Ten years or so later, with agitation violent, it was customary for pressure group leaders to perform interesting legerdemain with statistics to suggest the possibilities to future population content of the Japanese birth rate. John S. Chambers, Controller of the State of California and chairman of the Japanese Exclusion League wrote just after the initiative measure had been adopted:

"California has gone as far as she could go under the federal and state constitution and the American-Japanese treaty. If she could have gone further she would have done so. The next development California seeks to bring about is the stoppage of immigration from Japan through action by Congress; and the third step, the amending of the Constitution of the United States to the effect that children born in this country of parents ineligible to citizenship, themselves shall be ineligible to citizenship."⁷

Mr. Chambers juggled statistics dizzily, snatching out of the air totals which had nothing to do with those officially established. He picked out 50,000, "or the bulk thereof" for the Japanese who entered the country under the Gentlemen's Agreement prior to 1920, stating that the majority of these immigrants were laborers, sent in violation of the agreement, and concluding that the picture brides were "brought here primarily so that the Japanese population of this state might be increased" and also so that they might work in the fields "as common laborers, frequently with babies on their backs. Their rate of birth is between three and four times that of our own race * * *. At this rate, in ten years there will be 150,000 Japanese born here, and by 1949 they will outnumber the white people."^{7-a} By census enumeration by the close of Mr. Chambers' 10-year period there were not 150,000 American-born children of Japanese parents but only 68,357 in the entire United States; in 1940 there were 79,642.

Dr. Gulick, in an article appearing in the same issue of the same magazine as Mr. Chambers', listed conveniently some of the brasher statements of prominent Californians on this subject:

"Governor Stephens [in his covering letter to Secretary of State Colby, sent with the Report of the State Board of Control of California in 1920] states that 'the fecundity of the Japanese race far exceeds that of any other people that we have in our midst.' Senator Phelan testified before the House Committee on Immigration in September, 1919 that every Japanese 'picture bride' has a child within a year after landing. Mr. McClatchy testified before the Senate Committee on Immigration, September 25, 1919 that 'the birth rate among the Japanese is five times as great per thousand as among the whites,' and 'that picture

brides usually give birth once a year, or nearly once a year to children, and this is one of the ways by which Japan deliberately and carefully [sic] violates the "Gentlemen's Agreement"! The Los Angeles Times well set forth the popular belief and anxiety over the situation in its prophecy that if the present birth rates are maintained for the next ten years there would be 150,000 children of Japanese descent born in California in 1929 and but 50,000 white children. And in 1849 the majority of the population of California would be Japanese, ruling the state."⁸

Further along in his article Dr. Gulick disposes of the "picture bride" legend:

"But the most convincing reply to the excited fable mongers is the Report of the State Board of Control as to the number of 'picture brides' admitted in 1918 and the number of their children. The name of each bride, of the steamer on which she arrived, of her husband and his address, and of the date of the birth of her child are all recorded. The period begins January 4, 1918 and ends February 29, 1920. The number of 'brides' named is 524; the number of children born in those two years and two months is 182. That is to say, only 34.8 percent of the brides became mothers in that period. How many American brides would become mothers in a similar length of time after marriage?"^{8-a}

In reality, as compared with the staggering numbers hinted at by agitators, there were not very many picture brides brought into the country. Between July 1, 1911, and February 29, 1920, when the last picture brides arrived--the Japanese Government issued no more passports to picture brides after January 25, 1920--5,749 brides entered California through the port of San Francisco.⁹ Whether picture brides or wives of longer acquaintance with their husbands, the Japanese women of these years were young married women at the height of fecundity.

In 1921, Professor Inui, then assistant professor of Far Eastern history and politics at the University of Southern California, had this to say on the subject:

"It is true that the Japanese birth rate in this country is large * * *. Why? 1. Because more than 60 percent of the Japanese are living in rural communities which usually have higher rate of natural increase. 2. Because of their economic well-being as compared with their former environment in Japan; but this is universally true of all immigrant races. 3. Because California's birth rate is

low, as the state is composed of many immigrants from the East, the majority of whom came here to spend their lives after they pass their middle age. The largest percentage of Japanese men in this state are between the ages of thirty and forty; women, between twenty and thirty. 4. Because they are young, their death rate is very small, while the increase is abnormal. 5. This increase will decline; as time goes on, those who are in the period of reproduction will pass into another stage, while it is too early for the second generation to take their place. As was stated before, the Japanese are human beings. They have no monopoly on perpetual youth. This accusation and its arguments is one of the best examples of the vicious and malicious means used by the anti-Japanese to vilify the Japanese."

The California Committee of Justice, which organized to oppose the Initiative Alien Land Act, warned:

"Only 2.2 per cent of California's total population is Japanese. In 1919 more white children were born in California than all the Japanese children born here in the ten years preceding. We should not be placed in the ridiculous position of 97.8 per cent of our population being in fear of 2.2 per cent * * *. The highest Japanese birth rate is only 7.4 per cent of the whole as against 90.8 per cent of American births. Within a few years Japanese births will become even less, because (1) immigrants, irrespective of race, have fewer children after the first generation; (2) the average of Japanese male adults now here is about 40; (3) the abolition of 'picture marriages' will make it more difficult for Japanese to marry; (4) the arrivals of Japanese will decrease as the result of present diplomatic negotiations."ll

That these statements of Dr. Gulick, the spokesman of the California Committee of Justice, Professor Inui and many other thinking persons of both races were well founded is borne out by the census figures. In 1920 the Japanese Government voluntarily stopped issuing passports to picture brides. Although the terms of the Immigration Law of 1924 permitted wives of established resident Japanese to enter American ports to join their husbands, the majority of men who had married before emigrating from Japan had by 1924 already imported their wives; if they had not yet done so, these women who had stayed on in Japan for 20 or 30 years were not very likely to produce children when and if they were reunited with their husbands in the United States. Study of the census figures shows that the number of Japanese American

births decreased steadily after 1921 and was still decreasing at the time of the 1940 enumeration. Ironically, the birth rate was declining at the very time when agitation against the phenomenal Japanese birth rate was at its height, and at the time when the Federal Government barred Japanese immigrants from the United States. By 1940 the census returns showed that the birth rate among Japanese Americans in every State on the West Coast was lower than the birth rate of the general population.

BIRTH RATES IN PACIFIC STATES, 1940 CENSUS

STATE	Birth Rate among Japanese Americans	Birth Rate of Total Population, All Ancestries
California.....	15.8 per thousand.....	16.1 per thousand
Oregon.....	15.5 per thousand.....	16.4 per thousand
Washington.....	11.7 per thousand.....	16.2 per thousand

ANNUAL NUMBER OF JAPANESE AMERICAN BIRTHS
IN PACIFIC STATES, 1920-1940 ¹²

STATE	1920	1930	1940
California.....	5,032	2,224	1,480
Oregon.....	219	75	63
Washington.....	1,160	375	171

After the wartime exclusion of all persons of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific Coast area had been ordered by the Western Defense Command, and as the last few contingents of this minority group were being rushed into assembly centers to await further dislocation of their persons and their lives, the Tolson Committee reported officially in May of 1942:

"Contrary to alarmist predictions about the reproductive tendencies of the American Japanese, their birth rate during the past decade has been insufficient to balance mortality and emigration. Since 1930 the Japanese population has decreased* by 11,887, or 8.6 percent.

"Future increases in the Japanese population will come largely from native-born parents. More than 90 percent of the foreign-born females are 35 years or older; more

*Underscoring not in original.

than 50 percent are 45 or older. Almost three-fourths of the foreign-born males are 45 years or older, and about 45 percent are 55 years or older. The births of the third-generation Japanese will fail for some time to offset the high mortality rates consequent upon the abnormal age composition of the alien Japanese. The total Japanese population, therefore, may be expected to drop substantially during the coming years.

"The advanced age of the alien Japanese is reflected in their length of residence in this country. More than one-fifth of the West Coast Japanese aliens have been settled here for over 30 years. Two-thirds entered the United States before the Exclusion Act of 1924. Those entering since that time have been mainly women, and certain limited categories permitted by law."¹³

CHAPTER V

DUAL CITIZENSHIP

Until the American-born citizens of Japanese ancestry began to come of age, the Japanese minority in the United States, because of the law which denied naturalization to oriental aliens, was without a vote, a fact that made the Japanese group a convenient political football. With the maturing of the citizen children of these Japanese nationals, however, this group began to have a voice. Each year, as more of the citizen children came of age, that voice would increase in volume. Nothing short of a revision of the Federal Constitution could deprive American-born children of any ancestry of their right to vote. It may be recalled that the chairman of the Japanese Exclusion League, who was also the controller of the State of California, stated openly in 1921 that the next objective to be achieved by his group, after further immigration should be prohibited, was "the amending of the Constitution of the United States to the effect that children born in this country of parents ineligible to citizenship, themselves shall be ineligible to citizenship."

The crusade to effect such a change in the Constitution depended for success upon its ability to discredit the citizenship of the Nisei. The crusaders argued that all American-born children of Japanese parents held dual citizenship; that dual citizenship of Japanese Americans implied dual allegiance, with first allegiance, not to the United States as the country of their birth, but to the Japanese Empire as the country of their ancestry. It was charged that Japanese law made every child of a Japanese father a citizen of Japan and that all such children were incontrovertibly loyal to the Emperor of Japan. It was made to appear that Japan was unique among the nations in holding as its subjects the children born in foreign countries to Japanese nationals, and that of all the varieties of second generation immigrant stock in the United States, only the Nisei suffered conflicting loyalties. Only was it rarely admitted that a conflict could trouble the minds and hearts of the Nisei, because it was asserted that the Nisei were born with a peculiar capacity for passionate and enduring loyalty to a country which they had never seen and which lay six thousand-odd miles removed from their homes, and it was maintained that the Nisei were born without that capacity, taken for granted in the offspring of non-oriental immigrants, for loyalty to the country of their birth. V. S. McClatchy, pillar of the exclusion leagues and executive secretary for life of the California Joint Immigration Commission, set forth these arguments in detail in his speech made before the Honolulu Rotary Club in 1921 and in even greater detail in his "Skeleton Brief," which was prepared for the indoctrination of Congress.

The campaign never achieved its ultimate goal, but it was remarkably successful in generating suspicion of the Nisei. By 1942 enough suspicion of the loyalty of these American citizens of Japanese ancestry had been generated by pressure group propaganda to obtain the signature of the President of the United States upon the executive order which allowed the wartime mass exclusion of all persons of Japanese ancestry from the Pacific Coast region. The logic and the facts which the racist campaign overrode in roughshod fashion demand serious consideration, belated though such consideration is. Earlier awareness of the over-looked facts might well have spared the United States a costly experiment with human lives.

In the first place, dual citizenship results from a conflict between the nationality laws of the country of a child's ancestry and the country of his birth. If the country of his birth claims him as a citizen regardless of his ancestry, and if at the same time the country of his ancestry claims him as a citizen regardless of his place of birth, the child involuntarily holds dual citizenship. Since the United States does not recognize the claim of any other nation to the allegiance of American-born children--with the exception of children born in embassies--the duality lacks substance and need not inconvenience the holder so long as other American citizens, many of whom have or have had dual citizenship themselves, refrain from making capital of this tie with a foreign country which, according to United States law, does not exist.

Countries of the modern world inherit their way of determining citizenship at birth from two sources. Some countries favor one, some another, but traces of both are perceptible in the nationality laws of most countries. One of these sources is Roman law of the ancient world; the other is the common law of the mediaeval world. By Roman law, the citizenship of the child followed that of the father. Common law, founded in this detail "on feudal considerations," claimed for the realm every child born therein. The Roman or civil law ruling on the determination of citizenship at birth is known as "jus sanguinis," the law of descent or blood, and the common law ruling as "jus soli," the law of the soil or place of birth.¹⁴

Durward V. Sandifer, formerly of the Department of State, made a thorough study of the nationality laws of the world, in 1935, and reported that no country relies solely on the rule of jus soli, for to do so would be to deny citizenship to the children of nationals unavoidably detained in a foreign country.¹⁵ Children born in foreign embassies have from ancient times been excepted from the application of the rule of jus soli, since embassies are not within the jurisdiction of the country in which they are located but are under the jurisdiction of the country which they represent. In the United States, the first

Congress, in an act of March 26, 1790, provided for the retention of citizenship by children born abroad to American citizens.

To quote from Mr. Sandifer:

" * * * it seems apparent that the rule of jus sanguinis is considerably more extensive and has much greater influence in the determination of nationality than the rule of jus soli. The validity of this statement becomes more apparent if the extent be recalled to which the countries with laws based principally on jus soli include provisions based on jus sanguinis. The problem created by this situation is rendered even more significant when it is noted that most of the jus soli countries are new countries, and until recently, countries of extensive immigration. As most of the countries of emigration follow the rule of jus sanguinis, the result is a multiplication of instances of dual nationality. Although the mere fact of a widespread status of dual nationality acquired at birth, with such a status continuing for a number of years during minority does not, in itself, present an especially serious problem, the urgent necessity to which this situation points is the development of sound rules for the termination of dual nationality at an age set or that at which competing claims by two countries to the allegiance of the same man may be calculated to cause serious friction."^{15-a}

His research into this subject showed that of 79 countries--not including the United States--48 followed principally the rule of jus sanguinis, 29 that of jus soli, and 2, both equally. The British Empire and the two Americas "form the stronghold of the law of jus soli."^{15-b} Up to World War II only 33 countries had provided a method for the termination of the status of dual citizenship for foreign-born children of nationals, and of these 33, 22 were countries whose laws are based principally on jus sanguinis. Japan was one of the 22 countries. Until 1940 the United States made no provision for the termination of the American citizenship acquired at birth by its foreign-born children of nationals.

Japan did not codify nationality laws until 1899. Mass emigration had not been authorized until 1884, and it was slow to gather momentum. It was not until women began to emigrate to join their husbands and establish homes that the question of the status of foreign-born children of Japanese parents arose. "Since most of her trade and political contacts were with European powers at that time, Japan

borrowed the Continental jus sanguinis rule, providing that 'A child is a Japanese if his or her father is a Japanese at the time of his or her birth.'**

It happened, however, that Japanese emigrants in general went not to European countries which operated under the same rule but to countries of the Western Hemisphere which operated under the jus soli. Thus their children were born to a position of duality as regards citizenship. The Nisei were particularly conscious of discomfort in this position because they were singled out from other second generation Americans who were born to the same involuntary duality, for the special attention of West Coast jingoists. As early as 1914 and 1915, the maturing Japanese Americans began to petition the Japanese Government to change the law.¹⁷

It was in response to these petitions that the Japanese Government, on March 15, 1916, made the first of two moves toward releasing its foreign-born children from the obligations of their involuntary Japanese citizenship. This was the promulgation of the Japanese law of expatriation, effective about a year later. The following translation of the law was made by Y. S. Kuno and Max C. Baugh.

"A.

"1. When a Japanese woman marries a foreigner and thereby obtains the right of citizenship or subjectship in the nation to which her husband belongs, she is expatriated.

"2. When a Japanese subject obtains of his or her own accord the right of citizenship or subjectship of a foreign nation, he or she is expatriated.

"Note.—A male subject of the Japanese empire who is over 17 years of age, will not be allowed to expatriate himself until he has completed active military service in the Japanese army or navy or he is known to be free from military duty (on account of physical disability, long residence in a foreign country, etc.).

*Law No. 66, March 16, 1899. Japanese Civil Code, Vol. III.

"3. Those who have been expatriated on account of marriage may be allowed to be repatriated through permission of the State Minister of Home Affairs, provided she or he domiciles in Japan after the dissolution of the marriage.

"B.

"1. Foreign born male or female Japanese subjects may be allowed to expatriate through the State Minister of Home Affairs, in the Imperial Japanese government, provided he or she domiciles in the country where he or she was born and thereby and therein obtains the right of citizenship or subjectship.

"Note 1—It is imperative that the step be taken by his or her legal representative when the applicant is under 15 years of age.

"Note 2—It is imperative that he or she, though over the age of 15 but under legal age, or a person adjudged incompetent, shall take this step only with the consent of his legal representatives.

"TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.—Because the Japanese government thus claims foreign born Japanese as subjects of the empire, though not so stated, it is reasonable to say that Japanese born in America must conform strictly to the provisions in the note under A.2. That is, unless such native son expatriate himself from Japan before the age of 17, he can not expatriate himself until he has satisfied the military requirements.

"C.

"1. Those Japanese who have expatriated themselves on the ground of being foreign born or of their own accord may repatriate when they establish their domiciles within the dominion of the Japanese empire.

"2. Foreign naturalized subjects, their children, or foreign males or females who have been naturalized by virtue of adoption by Japanese families, or who have married a Japanese man or woman and assumed the family name of said man or woman, will under no circumstances be permitted to again become Japanese subjects if they once forfeit the naturalization right thus obtained."9-a

Although this law constituted a step in the right direction, the procedures were cumbersome and time consuming. Japanese law required the presentation of a birth certificate before expatriation could be approved, and many of those of the right age to be eligible to expatriate at the time when the law went into effect could not meet the requirement.16-a Birth certificates were not a commonplace in the first decade of the twentieth century—or even in the second decade, for that matter—especially in rural communities. Even if a birth certificate existed, papers had to be sent to Japan for consideration and processing before approval or disapproval was official. According to statements made by Nisei who experienced these procedures, the time consumed between filling in the first form and receiving official approval of expatriation amounted to at least a year and frequently to as much as 2 years.

The California State Board of Control, treating the subject of dual citizenship in 1920, headed the section with the caption: "Once a Japanese, Always a Japanese." The first two paragraphs, not entirely accurate at the time, and definitely untrue after the 1924 revision of the Japanese nationality law, contain the essence of all arguments developed by the anti-Japanese element up to and including the present time.

"Every Japanese, wherever born, is a citizen of Japan unless expatriated. Every Japanese in the United States, whether American-born or not, is a citizen of Japan and as such is subject to military duty to Japan from the age of seventeen years until forty years of age, unless expatriated. The American-born Japanese holds dual citizenship: first, allegiance to Japan with compulsory military service; and second, rights of citizenship in America. Under such circumstances, a Japanese, though born in America and thereby acquiring all the rights and privileges of an American citizen, owes his first obligation of allegiance and military service to Japan. It is contended by writers on international law that because our country is cognizant of this dual citizenship with its requirement of compulsory military service to Japan,

the United States, in event of war with Japan, could not demand military service from the American-born Japanese but would be obliged to permit them to return to Japan, there to render military service in behalf of Japan. American-born Japanese would appear to be enjoying all the advantages of American citizenship without assuming the most important responsibilities of such citizenship.

"Once a Japanese, always a Japanese, unless each individual Japanese renounces allegiance in the manner prescribed by the Civil Code of Japan and his renunciation is accepted by the Japanese government. No matter how many successive generations of American-born Japanese there may be, none of the children born in America are relieved of allegiance to Japan unless the parent has renounced allegiance to Japan and had his renunciation accepted by the Japanese government."9-b

The above statement was followed closely by the comment: "So far as could be learned, none of these [renunciations] have been accepted by the Japanese government."

The implications of such statements disturbed a great many people back in 1920, when the United States was not in a state of war. They were understandably much more alarming when thrust upon the West Coast populace 22 years later from the front pages of West Coast papers, by courtesy of the Dies Committee, whose members, at this time when thoughtful people were reluctant to disavow the rights of American citizens on the basis of ancestry, felt moved to publicize the report which they had contrived before the United States entered the war against Japan and which Congress had refused to approve for publication at Government expense. In 1943 the report was finally published as an official document by the Government Printing Office. However, it was early in 1942, when officialdom was holding back from sanctioning the forced evacuation of the Japanese Americans from their homes along the Pacific Coast, that the committee released its more inflammatory conjectures to the press. Such details of the Dies Committee report on dual citizenship as have any relation to fact have it only in an anachronistic sense. The writers of the report juggled time and place, presenting as if they had bearing on conditions of the forties statements which had some application to conditions of the years between 1916 and 1925.

As background for appreciation of Chapter XXIII of the Dies "Yellow" Report—the chapter, one page in length, devoted to the subject of dual citizenship—the following factual and documented

account of what had happened to affect the dual status of the Nisei since the Japanese Government first revised its nationality law in 1916, is offered.

After the first modification of the Japanese nationality law, the Americans of Japanese ancestry were increasingly dissatisfied with their status and increasingly aware of the suspicions directed against their Americanism. As early as 1919 the rising generation began to petition the Japanese Government to make further changes in the law which, they protested, had been inadequately modified in 1916. The number of petitions mounted steadily until, in 1924, the Japanese Government responded with a liberalization of the expatriation law. A portion of one of these petitions offers a fair sample of the thinking of the young citizens of this minority group:

"We are all men of Japanese parentage, born on the soil of the United States, and who have been educated in the schools of that country. We wish to be considered citizens of the country in which we are now living, and to show that men of Japanese ancestry can be as loyal to the country of their adoption as men of other ancestry residing therein * * *. The question of dual citizenship and the criticisms which have been made against American-born Japanese have caused us to feel that some legislation should be passed by the country of our ancestors that will free us of any obligation to it, and allow those of us, who have located within the United States with the purpose and intention of remaining and interesting ourselves in the affairs of that country, to show that we can be good and loyal citizens of the country of our adoption * * *. We respectfully petition that at the coming session of the Japanese Parliament, a law be enacted, whereby those of Japanese descent can select their own citizenship without restriction of law, and, having once made such decision, can remain citizens of that country without any question of dual allegiance."17-a

In response to such petitions as the one just quoted,

" * * * the special session of the Japanese Diet in the summer of 1924 amended the Law of Nationality, and the amended law went into force on December 1, 1924. According to this new law, a child born of Japanese parents in the United States, Canada, and certain South American countries which hold to the principle of jus soli is not claimed as a subject

by the Japanese government unless it declares, within 14 days after birth, through its legal representative, its intention of retaining Japanese nationality. Moreover, even if such a declaration of intention to retain Japanese nationality has been filed, the person may abandon it at any time by making a simple notification. Furthermore, the law is retroactive, providing that even those who were born prior to the adoption of the law and who consequently possess dual citizenship, may at any time cancel their Japanese citizenship by a mere notification. Thus, Japanese born after December 1, 1924, automatically possess simple American citizenship, and those born prior to December 1, 1924, are enabled to cancel their dual citizenship in favor of simple American citizenship by mere notification."¹⁸

In view of the statement of the Dies Committee, to be quoted presently, it is pertinent to stress the fact that Japanese law did not, after 1924, require that children born to Japanese nationals in foreign countries operating under the principle of jus soli should be registered with the Japanese consul. It is true that parents who specifically wanted their American-born children to hold Japanese citizenship had provision made for permitting this retention. However, even before 1924, Japanese parents in America had begun to ignore or defy the older Japanese law which required them to register their children at birth with the consul. An investigation of Japanese American births in the State of Washington during the years 1915 to 1917 showed that of 2,345 Japanese births in that State, only 1,770 were registered with the consul. In other words, in the period when the Japanese nationality law was most rigid, the parents of 670 children in Washington alone defied that law.¹⁹

Professor Strong, of Stanford University, found in 1930 that two-thirds of the Japanese American children born since the ordinance of 1924 had never been registered with the consul and thus had American citizenship only. Of those born prior to the ordinance of 1924, 40 percent had divested themselves of their Japanese citizenship. The Japanese consular reports for 1930 for California showed that 22,027 Nisei of all ages had dual citizenship, while 24,263, more than half, had only American citizenship.²⁰

Because of interpretations put upon the law, and because older Nisei who had no birth certificates remained unable to divest themselves of their Japanese citizenship, Japanese Americans continued to petition the Japanese Government for further relaxation of the law. A paper prepared by the research branch of the Civil Affairs Division of

the Western Defense Command, on the subject, "Dual Citizens and the Japanese Draft Law" suggests some of the problems of the dual citizen:

"Nisei with dual citizenship who have reached the age of 20 years are subject to service in the Japanese Army under the provisions of the compulsory service law. If the Nisei lives on foreign soil, however, he may apply to the proper authorities, either the Japanese Consulate or the local Japanese Association, for deferment by reason of his foreign residence. Application for such deferment must be renewed every year until he reaches the age of 37 years. A deferment granted to a Nisei in a foreign country because of his residence is not valid if the Nisei goes to Japan for more than three months. New application for deferment must be made for some other reason, such as attendance at a school. Students are granted educational deferments if they are under 22 years of age and in high school, under 25 years of age and in junior college, college, or preparatory school, and under 27 years of age and in the university. The student who is over these age limits must report for induction regardless of his student status.

"During the 1930's the secretary of the Japanese Consulate in Los Angeles decreed that renouncement of Japanese citizenship could be made only by a person living on foreign soil. Early interpretation of this was to the effect that Nisei studying in Japan were legal residents there, and so could not expatriate. A later interpretation has allowed the acceptance of the address of the parents as the legal address of the Nisei, so that Nisei in Japan may now expatriate at any time before they reach legal draft age. Nisei permanently exempted from the draft for any reason may expatriate at any time. The same freedom of expatriation at any time applies to girls inasmuch as they are not affected by the draft laws.

"If the dual citizen residing for a time in Japan does not renounce his Japanese citizenship and is drafted, he will lose his American citizenship as a result of his service in the Japanese Army. To avoid this, Nisei coming to Japan are urged to expatriate their Japanese citizenship before leaving the United States. The feeling of the Japanese is that Nisei born in the United States have a greater job in the development

of Japanese welfare in the United States than in serving in the Japanese Army."²¹

Early in 1941, 20,000 Japanese Americans in the Hawaiian Islands petitioned the Secretary of State to request the Japanese Government to simplify further procedures for expatriation of its dual citizens. Lieutenant General C. D. Herron, then commanding the Hawaiian Department of the United States Army said in reference to this action:

"In the willingness of the younger Japanese to sign this petition and in their loyal and eager compliance with the draft, as in the attitude of the older generation in accepting the new order [selective service] for their children, there is complete refutation of the suspicion of their loyalty."²²

At this point, the Dies Committee's summing up of the dual citizenship of Japanese Americans is quoted in full:

"Dual citizenship is insisted upon by all the totalitarian governments. The Japanese Government has the following law on its statute books with reference to the citizenship of Japanese:

"A child is Japanese if his or her father is a Japanese at the time of his or her birth. (Civil Code of Japan, vol. 3, art. 66.)

"The Japanese Government requires that every child of Japanese extraction shall be registered at birth with the Japanese consulate if that child is born in a foreign country. The registration is then forwarded to Tokyo, and the Japanese Government considers the child to be just as much a Japanese citizen as if born in Japan.

"From the committee's investigation it would appear that the Japanese residing on the West Coast, to whom this law also applied, carried out not only the letter of the law, but the spirit of the law as well. This law operates among the Japanese despite the fact that all Japanese children who are born in the United States or its possessions are automatically American citizens. They are citizens by accident of birth.

"It is impossible to ascertain how many Japanese in the United States hold dual citizenship status. However, Shiro Fujioka, executive secretary of the Central Japanese Association, southern California branch, made the following statement with reference to dual citizenship:

'Of the 50,000 American-born Japanese who returned to Japan (Kibei), the great majority are dual citizens.'*

"This same percentage would undoubtedly hold true with reference to the Japanese Americans who did not go to Japan to be educated there.** It has been conservatively estimated that about 75 percent of the Nisei, or American-born Japanese, have dual citizenship.***

"The Committee has in its files a copy of a set of expatriation blanks which can be executed by American-born Japanese in order to become expatriated from Japan. The 'Statement of Expatriation' must be filled out in duplicate. Very pertinent questions are required to be answered regarding the prefecture from which the subject's parents came, name of father, reason for expatriation, by whom the application is made, etc. The applicant also must receive recent confirmation of date of birth from the Minister of State in Japan, where births of all Japanese children

*The WRA Historian wrote to Mr. Fujioka, residing at the time at Heart Mountain Relocation Center, asking him if he recalled making such a statement and if so, was the figure an estimate, and did it include Nisei from Hawaii. A letter written for Mr. Fujioka by his daughter Kaoru Peggy Fujioka, dated August 14, 1945, contained the following: "It is true that father did make such a statement. He points out, however, that the figure is an exceedingly rough estimate. Others have observed the number as more closely approximating 30,000. It is very difficult to say which of the two figures is more accurate as no official record was ever kept. Furthermore, this figure represents the number of those returning to Japan in the twentieth century from both the continental United States and Hawaii—with the greater majority leaving from the latter place."

**It should be observed that the basis for this assumption is not indicated.

***It would be interesting to know who estimated—let us omit the "conservatively"—this percentage.

throughout the world are registered through their local consular offices. In this connection, the committee learned that Japanese consuls and consular aides did everything in their power to dissuade applicants from expatriating from Japan. According to a Japanese informant there has not been a single instance where Japan has actually released an American-born Japanese from dual-citizenship status. The committee's investigation revealed that not many American-born Japanese ever made any attempt to become expatriated from Japan."23

Here, as in subsequent investigations, the committee was more interested in concealing than in revealing facts. In this instance their attempt moved them to quote without acknowledgment from the 1920 report of the State Board of Control that item referring to the Japanese Vice Consul's statement that as yet no application for renunciation of Japanese citizenship had been approved by the Japanese Government. In other words, the Dies Committee introduced a statement made in good faith of contemporary conditions by a vice consul in 1919, or possibly 1920, as evidence to support their misrepresentation of conditions existing 20 years later.

Finally, to bring common sense to bear on the question of Nisei dual citizenship, counsel for Korematsu said, in his brief presented before the Supreme Court of the United States in the Korematsu case:

"The United States disavows the claims of all foreign governments to the allegiance of our citizens. 8 USCA, Section 800. There is neither a legal nor a moral duty imposed upon a native-born American to divest himself of the citizenship which a foreign country may bestow upon him by virtue of its jus sanguinis. Why should he disavow that which he refuses to recognize? Should he spend time and money simply to notify a foreign government that he does not recognize its jus sanguinis and then take trouble to extricate himself from its futile claims by a complicated legal procedure? An American consul in Japan in peace time owes the American-born citizen there the full protection guaranteed by the jus soli of the United States under international law and this nullifies any claim Japan might assert as to jurisdiction over him arising out of its jus sanguinis. Why should we ask these people to go to the trouble of voiding a citizenship Japan confers when they do not even accept it? Refusing to recognize it or

ignoring it is in itself a repudiation. We do not ask the descendants of European aliens here to renounce citizenship arising from the jus sanguinis of European governments and we do not accuse them of disloyalty arising out of the fact of dual citizenship or failure to renounce it. Dual citizenship is not dual allegiance and does not create disloyalty to this nation. It is significant that Japanese descended persons have done more to shake off the dual citizenship they never solicited than have European descended citizens. Since 1924 the sole method by which an American-born Japanese can obtain rights to Japanese citizenship is by being registered within 14 days after birth with a Japanese consular official.* * * Such registration, however, could not constitute acceptance of Japanese citizenship by an infant who is not sui juris and is powerless to prevent the idle act.* * * If we are to suspect citizens of disloyalty simply because the country of their ancestors looks upon them as entitled to the benefits of citizenship under its law we must necessarily suspect all German and Italian descended citizens of disloyalty. We must also entertain serious doubts about the loyalty of all of our citizens of foreign stocks, which means of all our citizens, for we are all descended from foreign stocks * * *. All that the silly suspicion of these people arising out of the charge of dual citizenship proves is that there is a lot of nonsense in prejudiced skulls.#24

CHAPTER VI

JAPANESE LANGUAGE SCHOOLS

Considering the violence of the attack made against language schools in recent years, it is curious to discover that in the campaigns for the alien land laws and even the drive for exclusion, little was said of the language schools. Mr. McClatchy in his skeleton brief on Japanese immigration and colonization, which was presented by Senator Hiram Johnson to the Secretary of State in 1921, a document of 143 pages of fine print, devoted only a third of page 52 and a few lines on page 53 to the language schools, while the State Board of Control in its report dismissed the schools in a page and a half. Dr. Gulick, champion of the Japanese Americans, was moved to protest this cursory treatment of the subject by the State board, saying:

"There is no more important approach to the Japanese problem as it is and will continue to be through the decades, than through the school.

"The problem of the Japanese language schools is apparently being allowed to drift as was the case in the Hawaiian Islands. A wise policy in regard to them is much to be desired—a policy of proper supervision and regulation."8-b

Shortly after the Immigration Law of 1924 went into effect, a movement to have the Japanese exclusion clause revoked and to have Japan put under the quota system began to gather momentum. It was being argued that the quota basis of admission would permit somewhere between 125 and 185 Japanese to enter the United States annually, that more than that number were coming in under the categorical exceptions named in the law, and that there was no point in preserving a law that was obnoxious and insulting to a proud and powerful nation since its revocation would mean such a negligible volume of immigration. The question was being considered seriously by an increasingly large proportion of the people.

The California Joint Immigration Commission, whose continued existence was dedicated to preservation of the exclusion law, set forth to tighten up its defences and freshen its arguments. The language schools, heretofore passed over, were recognized as suitable material for exploitation. Yet at that particular time, there was an embarrassing obstacle in the way of a wholehearted attack on the Japanese language schools.

In 1921 the California Legislature—possibly under the influence of Dr. Gulick's article—had embellished its school law with Section 1534 under the Political Code of California. Under the authority of this section, all foreign language schools were placed within the jurisdiction of the State Department of Public Instruction. Standards were established and had to be maintained. All teachers had to pass examinations in English as well as in the foreign tongue used in the school, and furthermore they had to pass an examination in United States history. The law of California regulated the administration of the schools, decided what textbooks were suitable for the instruction of American children, and what hours were proper. This law was obviously a hindrance to any all-out campaign to calumniate the language schools. The Native Sons of the Golden West, the California American Legion, the State Grange, Mr. McClatchy, Mr. Hearst, and State Attorney General U. S. Webb were, for an interval, frustrated. The body politic of California's Joint Immigration Commission could scarcely launch a crusade against the Japanese language schools so long as these operated under the supervision of California's State Board of Education. To say that the language schools were subversive would be to imply that the State Board of Education was subversive too—or at best criminally negligent.

This period of inaction was not too protracted. Although no one among California's immigrant population was sufficiently bothered by the State's supervision of foreign language schools to contest the law, over in Hawaii a Japanese named V. T. Tokushige contested a similar law, and on February 21, 1927 won his case.²⁵ In Nebraska a German contested a law which placed foreign language schools under State control. He, too, won his case, and the court ruled:

" * * * evidently the Legislature has attempted to interfere with the calling of modern language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and with the power of parents to control their own."²⁶

On May 4, 1927, California Attorney General U. S. Webb, on the basis of the Hawaiian case and quoting from the Nebraska case which had involved a German parochial school, delivered an opinion to the effect that State control of language schools was invalid. On the strength of this opinion, legal requirements for language schools were waived.²⁷ This arbitrary removal of the foreign language schools from State supervision in California cleared the field for a major offensive against the language schools of the Japanese. It immediately became feasible for any superpatriot to declare from the platform or through the press that the Japanese language schools were subversive, anti-American, unholy, and that they taught Emperor worship. Neither the speakers nor their listeners were in a position to prove or disprove such statements. As was discovered early in World War II, persons in

the United States, barring the Japanese themselves, a fair number of missionaries, and a very few scholars and diplomats, who knew more of the Japanese language than the word "kimono" were not to be found. Some of the missionaries and scholars protested that the assertions of the racists were false, but their voices were not heard above the din made by the agitators, and the missionaries' word was generally discredited because so many of them were themselves conducting language schools.

At this point it is pertinent to summarize the history of these language schools. The first Japanese language schools in America were set up in Christian missions. They were established for two purposes: first, to help the newly arrived immigrant learn enough English to make his way in the new country; and second, to help the few children of that early period, whose parents might take them back to Japan to live and attend school, to learn to read and write their parents' tongue and to keep up with school subjects taught in Japan. The first Japanese immigrants, like many other immigrants, came to America hoping to make money and expecting to return to their native land to enjoy the rewards of their labor. Like other immigrants, once they had established themselves, once they perceived their children's future in America as American citizens to be advantageous, they began to doubt the wisdom of returning to Japan. It was with the rise of the second generation citizen stock that the Issei changed their ideas about going back to Japan to live.

The first Japanese language school in the United States was established in 1887 at San Francisco. This school constituted a symbol of nonsectarian Christian belief among the Japanese immigrant students, who had organized this mission school as a project of the Japanese Gospel Society. Two years later a Methodist mission for Japanese opened a similar school, and other Christian churches followed the example of these pioneers. It was not until 1899 that a Buddhist mission, patterned after the Christian, opened a school in San Francisco.^{6-b} In Los Angeles the Methodists were first in the field, organizing a mission and school in 1896. A Presbyterian mission school opened in 1902, and in 1904 the Buddhists established a mission and school.^{6-c}

Invariably these mission schools which had been organized during the period of mass migrations were used to teach the immigrants English, so that they might make a swifter adjustment to life in the United States. It was later, as families began to be reunited, as native Japanese children were brought to America and as American-born children reached school age, that classes were introduced which would help to bridge the gap between the generations, classes to familiarize the children with the language and culture of their parents.

Professor E. K. Strong, of Stanford University, who conducted one of the most intensive investigations of the life and ways of the second generation Japanese Americans, wrote in 1934 on the basis of his findings:

"What are the arguments in favor of the Japanese-language schools? First, the common language binds the first and the second generations more closely together. This is important, since the tendency among all races that have come to America has been for the second generation to break away from the control of their parents, looking down upon them as ignorant of American ways.* * * A second reason for the language school is that it serves as a unifying social organization in the community.* * * A third argument for the schools is that knowledge of the Japanese language is of help, in many cases a necessity, in securing vocational opportunities."

To put it baldly, Japanese American citizens, highly educated in American schools and promised full rights and privileges of American citizens, could rarely find employment in the lines of work for which they were fitted because of the prejudice against members of their race. Therefore, they had to resort to white-collar jobs in Japanese-conducted businesses or professions confined to the little Tokyo of a larger city. To work in importing businesses or in little Tokyos generally, where they dealt with either Japanese companies or old Issei customers, it was necessary for the Nisei to be able to speak, read and write Japanese.

After the language schools had been removed from State control and when the feeling against them was running high, various scholars investigated and reported on the schools. A Stanford University investigator made the following discovery:

" * * * although legal requirements were waived after 1927 as a result of the court decision, the local language school boards in most instances voluntarily retained the standards and requirements which had been set. He found that the approved textbooks were being used and that constant revisions to introduce new materials pertinent to the American scene were being made."16-b

Another serious investigator of the early thirties reported:

"The strongest objection which has been raised in this country toward the language schools of the Japanese has been that they foster anti-American ideas. This accusation is without basis. A thorough study has been made of all the textbooks to eradicate such possibilities."²⁸

H. A. Millis, a recognized authority on the Japanese American problem, wrote in 1932:

" * * * these schools are not intended to perpetuate the traditions and moral concepts of Japan. They are supplementary schools, and at the worst there is much less in them to be adversely criticized than in the parochial schools attended by so many children of South and East European immigrants."²⁹

The sharpest criticism of the schools comes from a first generation Japanese scholar, for many years prior to evacuation and currently a professor at Stanford University:

"As a result of * * * studies, observations, and experiences over a long period, the writer is willing to venture the conclusion that generally speaking, these schools have been unsuccessful in their primary function--that of imparting a knowledge of the Japanese language to American-born children of Japanese descent.* * * In support of his conclusion the writer wishes to present the following observations: In the first place, the Japanese language schools have not escaped the usual fate of all attempts at teaching the foreign languages--it has been impossible to overcome the fundamental obstacle arising from environment. The mother tongue of these children is English, which they use every moment of their life in work and play except when they are in the classrooms of the language schools and when they are absolutely forced to use Japanese at home or when school facilities are denied them. They receive their general education in the public schools, where their English vocabulary is easily built up, but not their Japanese vocabulary. The children are conscious of their mastery of English, and of their defective knowledge of Japanese; they are intelligent enough to use the language that they know, and have vanity

enough to conceal what they are ignorant of, and thus will not use the language of which they have only a defective knowledge. Bilingual success is yet to be at all generally achieved. In the second place, children of immigrant races generally dislike to use their parental tongues, concerning which they hear only derogatory remarks from their American classmates and playmates. Their one desire seems to be to lose their racial, national, or linguistic identities, and to become an integral part of the American people as soon as possible. In the third place, while spoken Japanese is relatively easy, having no complicated sounds, written Japanese is difficult for foreigners to acquire.* * * American-born Japanese are foreigners, and they find the foreigner's difficulty. * * * To those who are familiar with a Western language and with Japanese, it is unnecessary to stress the relative difficulty of the two tongues; the former is written in simple alphabets while the latter employs cumbersome Chinese ideograms. Primary school children of Japan are supposed to acquire from 1,500 to 2,000 of these characters, yet one who is able to read or write Japanese intelligently must possess the command of from 5,000 to 6,000 of them. Again, Japanese calligraphy is an art which requires many years of constant practice before one can execute it acceptably. * * * most of the American-born Japanese children are not able to attend the language school long enough to overcome the attendant difficulties. The relative failure of the Japanese language schools in this country to impart a knowledge of that tongue seems but natural; the achievement of real success by them is a hope beyond realization."18-a

The most telling refutation of the charges made by the West Coast racists against the language schools is to be found in the extensive use made of the graduates of these schools by the Army and Navy in the war against Japan. In the summer of 1942, while the Nisei were still being classified automatically as 4-C (registrants not acceptable for military training and service because of nationality or ancestry) the War Department relaxed its regulations to the extent of accepting qualified Nisei for special assignments. The Intelligence branch of the United States Army periodically sent recruiting officers to the relocation centers to interview and examine candidates. Loyal American citizens of Japanese ancestry were badly needed to teach the fundamentals of the Japanese language to officers of Military Intelligence and also to serve as translators and interpreters. The Kibei, perhaps the most commonly misunderstood group within the Japanese

American minority, suspect because they had part or most of their education in Japan, and the Nisei graduates of Japanese language schools in America answered this call and subsequently proved invaluable to the armed forces of the United States, both as instructors in the language schools conducted by Military Intelligence for its officers and as translators and interpreters with the fighting men in the Pacific Theatre. The Navy, while refusing to induct Americans of Japanese ancestry as enlistees, nevertheless used them as civilian instructors in its language school for intelligence officers at Boulder, Colorado, and later permitted the Marines to borrow Nisei in uniform from the Army to ease progress through enemy-held territory in the Pacific.³⁰

CHAPTER VII

DISTRIBUTION OF JAPANESE AMERICANS

At the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States, or shortly thereafter, much attention was given to the fact that Americans of Japanese ancestry and their alien parents were most heavily concentrated in those areas of the Pacific Coast states which had attracted the heaviest concentrations of the population as a whole.

Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, Commanding General of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, in a memorandum of February 14, 1942, addressed to the Secretary of War and recommending the "evacuation of Japanese and other subversive persons from the Pacific Coast,"³¹ presented one kind of thinking on the subject of the distribution of this small minority group.

"The area lying to the west of the Cascade and Sierra Nevada Mountains in Washington, Oregon and California, is highly critical not only because the lines of communication and supply to the Pacific theater pass through it, but also because of the vital industrial production therein, particularly aircraft. In the war in which we are now engaged racial affinities are not severed by migration. The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have become 'Americanized', the racial strains are undiluted. To conclude otherwise is to expect that children born of white parents on Japanese soil sever all racial affinity and become loyal Japanese subjects, ready to fight and, if necessary, to die for Japan in a war against the nation of their parents. That Japan is allied with Germany and Italy in this struggle is no ground for assuming that any Japanese, barred from assimilation by convention as he is, though born and raised in the United States, will not turn against this nation when the final test of loyalty comes. It, therefore, follows that along the vital Pacific Coast over 112,000 potential enemies, of Japanese extraction, are at large today. There are indications that these are organized and ready for concerted action at a favorable opportunity. The very fact that no sabotage has taken place to date is a disturbing and confirming indication that such action will be taken.^{*31-a}

*Italics not in original.

The Final Report on the Japanese evacuation, published under General DeWitt's signature, magnifies considerably the hazard to the internal security of the United States which the distribution of the Japanese population supposedly constituted. The more telling paragraphs of that report bear a significant resemblance to certain paragraphs contained in a statement presented to the Tolan Committee in the spring of 1942 by California's Attorney General Earl Warren. The following paragraphs are quoted from the former Attorney General's prepared statement for the record of the Tolan Committee:

"I do not mean to suggest that it should be thought that all of these Japanese who are adjacent to strategic points are knowing parties to some vast conspiracy to destroy our State by sudden and mass sabotage. Undoubtedly, the presence of many of these persons in their present locations is mere coincidence, but it would seem equally beyond doubt that the presence of others is not coincidence. It would seem difficult, for example, to explain the situation in Santa Barbara County by coincidence alone.

"In the northern end of that county is Camp Cook where, I am informed, the only armored division on the Pacific coast will be located. The only practical entrance to Camp Cook is on the secondary road through the town of Lompoc. The maps show this entrance is flanked with Japanese property, and it is impossible to move a single man or a piece of equipment in or out of Camp Cook without having it pass under the scrutiny of numerous Japanese. * * * Immediately north of Camp Cook is a stretch of open beach ideally suited for landing purposes, extending for 15 or 20 miles, on which almost the only inhabitants are Japanese.

"Throughout the Santa Maria Valley and including the cities of Santa Maria and Guadalupe every utility, airfield, bridge, telephone, and power line or other facility of importance is flanked by Japanese, and they even surround the oil fields in this area. Only a few miles south, however, is the Santa Ynez Valley, an area equally as productive agriculturally as the Santa Maria Valley and with lands equally available for purchase and lease, but without any strategic installations whatsoever. There are no Japanese in the Santa Ynez Valley.

"Similarly, along the coastal plain of Santa Barbara County from Gaviota south, the entire plain, though narrow, is subject to intensive cultivation. Yet the only Japanese in this area are located immediately adjacent to such widely separated points as the El Capitan oil field, Elwood oil

field, Summerland oil field, Santa Barbara Airport, and Santa Barbara Lighthouse and Harbor entrance, and there are no Japanese on the equally attractive lands between these points.

"Such a distribution of the Japanese population appears to manifest something more than coincidence. But in any case, it is certainly evident that the Japanese population of California is, as a whole, ideally situated with reference to points of strategic importance, to carry into execution a tremendous program of sabotage on a mass scale should any considerable number of them have been inclined to do so."13-a

Here are the paragraphs from General DeWitt's Final Report:

"It could not be established, of course, that the location of thousands of Japanese adjacent to strategic points verified the existence of some vast conspiracy to which all of them were parties. Some of them doubtless resided there through mere coincidence. It seemed equally beyond doubt, however, that the presence of others was not mere coincidence. It was difficult to explain the situation in Santa Barbara County, for example, by coincidence alone.

"Throughout the Santa Maria Valley in that County, including the cities of Santa Maria and Guadalupe, every utility, air field, bridge, telephone and power line or other facility of importance was flanked by Japanese. They even surrounded the oil fields in this area. Only a few miles south, however, in the Santa Ynez Valley, lay an area equally available for purchase and lease, but without any strategic installations whatever. There were no Japanese in the Santa Ynez Valley.

"Similarly, along the coastal plain of Santa Barbara County from Gaviota south, the entire plain, though narrow, had been subject to intensive cultivation. Yet, the only Japanese in this area were located immediately adjacent to such widely separated points as the El Capitan Oil Field, Elwood Oil Field, Summerland Oil Field, Santa Barbara air port and Santa Barbara lighthouse and harbor entrance. There were no Japanese on the equally attractive lands between these points. In the north end of the county is a stretch of open beach ideally suited for landing purposes, extending for 15 or 20 miles, on which almost the only inhabitants were Japanese.

"Such a distribution of the Japanese population appeared to manifest something more than coincidence. In any case, it was certainly evident that the Japanese population of the Pacific Coast was, as a whole ideally situated with reference to points of strategic importance, to carry into execution a tremendous program of sabotage on a mass scale should any considerable number of them have been inclined to do so."

In view of the charges implicit in these paragraphs, the strong insinuation that there was something deliberate and sinister in the distribution and concentration of the Japanese population, it is relevant to present some of the facts behind the distribution and concentration of the Japanese Americans. To begin with, we can borrow a convenient table from General DeWitt's report, compiled from 1940 census figures and showing the exact number of Japanese in each State contained within the Western Defense Command.

JAPANESE POPULATION OF THE WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AREA
BY STATES AND MILITARY AREAS: 1940

STATE	All Areas	Military Area 1	Military Area 2	Military Area 3-6
TOTAL WDC AREA	117,364	107,704	5,281	4,379
Arizona.....	632	362	270
California....	93,717	89,483	4,234
Oregon.....	4,071	3,843	228
Washington....	14,565	14,016	549
Idaho.....	1,191	1,191
Montana.....	508	508
Nevada.....	470	470
Utah.....	2,210	2,210

Interpreting these statistics, the DeWitt report contains the following:

" * * * It will be noted that the strategically important Military Area No. 1 /the coastal half of the three Pacific Coast States and the southern portion of Arizona/ had a total Japanese population of 107,704, which was 84.6 percent of the total Japanese population of the United States.

"Within Military Area No. 1 there were particularly heavy concentrations in or at the edge of almost all the important cities, particularly the port cities * * *. In Los Angeles County alone there were 36,866 Japanese. In the immediate San Francisco Bay Area (San Francisco, Alameda,

Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Mateo, Solano, and Sonoma Counties) there were 14,362 Japanese, and in the ring of nearby counties to the northeast, east and south (Sacramento, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, San Joaquin, and Yolo Counties) lived an additional 17,685 Japanese. San Diego city and county had 2,076; King and Pierce Counties, Washington (Seattle and Tacoma), 11,913; and Multnomah County, Oregon (Portland), 2,390. Thus even within Military Area No. 1, 67,607 of the 107,704 total Japanese population lived in or near the five principal cities and ports of embarkation."

The carefully considered explanation of the preevacuation distribution and concentration of the Japanese offered by the Tolson Committee in its Findings and Recommendations on Evacuation of Enemy Aliens and Others from Prohibited Military Zones did not appear until May of 1942, some weeks after General DeWitt had ordered the mass evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry from Military Area No. 1.

"Limited occupational outlets have discouraged dispersion of the Japanese from their initial ports of entry on the west coast. Indeed concentration has become increasingly marked. The percentages of Japanese living in the Pacific States, beginning with 1900 and for each 10-year period thereafter are as follows: 75.1, 80.0, 84.2, 86.6, and 88.5. * * * The newly-arrived immigrants found a demand for their labor in railroad construction and maintenance and in sugar beet work in the Mountain States. These sources of employment gradually disappeared as Mexicans and other groups gained preference. The Mountain States contained 21 percent of the Japanese population in 1900 and only 6.8 percent in 1940 (though in absolute numbers these States now contain more Japanese). The withdrawal of the Japanese is strikingly evident in Montana, where the number declined from 2,441 in 1900 to 508 in 1940. Except for the South Atlantic division, which contains a very small Japanese population, all geographic divisions have shown decreases between 1930 and 1940. As compared with the national decrease of 8.6 percent in the Japanese population [the total Japanese population reached its highest figure in 1930 with 138,834; by 1940 it had decreased by 11,887, leaving only 126,947 in the continental United States] the Pacific States show a decrease of 6.6 percent, and the Mountain States, 25 percent. Utah has lost almost one-third. California lost least among the Pacific States, 3.8 percent. The corresponding figures for Washington and Oregon are 18.3 percent and 17.9 percent."13-b

In view of the fact that a widespread public opinion had convicted the Japanese of establishing themselves in close proximity to strategic points, particularly air fields, power lines, military installations and oil fields, with espionage their objective, the finding of the Tolan Committee with regard to this serious charge is of considerable interest and significance:

"The main geographic pattern of Japanese population in California was pretty well fixed by 1910."*13-c

Percentages quoted by the Tolan Committee show clearly how true this statement was:

"The 7 counties, Los Angeles, Sacramento, San Francisco, Alameda, Fresno, San Joaquin, and Santa Clara in 1940 contained 67,137 or 71.64 percent of the State's Japanese population. In 1910 these counties contained 63.97 percent; in 1920, 67.49 percent; and in 1930, 71.22 percent * * *. This tendency toward geographic concentration is further evident within individual States, indicating that the main sources of livelihood for the Japanese are to be found among their own people * * *. In 1910, 2 counties in California contained no Japanese; in 1940 there were 11 such counties."^{13-b}

PERCENTAGE OF CALIFORNIA'S JAPANESE POPULATION FOUND IN 7 LEADING COUNTIES, IN 1910 AND IN 1940. ^{13-c}

COUNTY	1910	1940
Sacramento.....	9.37.....	7.22
Alameda.....	7.9	5.51
Fresno.....	5.4	4.83
San Joaquin.....	4.36.....	4.78
Santa Clara.....	5.56.....	4.32
San Francisco.....	10.9	5.63*
Los Angeles.....	20.46.....	39.34

*Percentages for San Francisco having been omitted from the paragraph of the Tolan Committee Report which supplied the percentages for the 6 other counties, the San Francisco percentages were worked out for this table from figures found in Table 6, p. 96 and Table 7, p. 97 of the report.

Los Angeles County was the only one to show a gain in percent during the 30-year period. That gain is approximately 100 percent, and

*Italics added.

on the face of the matter seems spectacular. However, it should be remembered that the general growth of population in Los Angeles city and county for the period between 1910 and 1940 was extraordinary. It was after 1910 that the harbor at Wilmington was developed to accommodate large craft and to make it an important seaport for transoceanic trade. It was early in that 30-year period that World War I brought great shipyards to the harbor area and also an influx of defense workers, most of whom elected to stay on after the war. It was after 1910 that the moving picture industry emerged from its embryo stage and Hollywood, within the city limits of Los Angeles, was transformed from countryside, supporting small citrus groves and farms, to the capital of the film industry. In order to see the growth of the Japanese population in Los Angeles city and county in perspective, it is necessary to consider it in relation to the over-all growth of population in that area; and then to compare the over-all growth and the growth of the Japanese population in that area with state-wide figures. [See table on next page.]

POPULATION FIGURES FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND FOR THE CITY AND COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
 SHOWING INCREASE IN NUMBER AND PERCENT FOR TOTAL POPULATION AND FOR JAPANESE, 1910 - 1940
Population figures from U. S. Census Reports.

AREA	1910			1940				
	Total	Japanese	%Japanese	Total	%Increase	Japanese	%J. Inc.	J.% of Total
CALIFORNIA	2,377,549	41,356	.013	6,907,387	290	93,717	226	.013
L.A. COUNTY	504,131	8,461	.016	2,785,643	552	36,866	435	.016
L.A. CITY	319,198	4,238	.013	1,504,277	473	23,321	560	.015

The table shows that in 1940 Los Angeles County alone had more people than had in 1910 lived in the entire state of California. In that 30-year period of 1910 to 1940 California had increased in population 290 percent, but Los Angeles County had increased 552 percent. The Japanese increase lagged behind the general increase with respect to both state and county, being but 226 percent for the former and 435 percent for the latter. Whereas 40 percent of California's entire population had settled in Los Angeles County by 1940, 39 percent of California's Japanese had settled in that county. However, whereas 53 percent of the general population of Los Angeles County lived within the city of Los Angeles, 60 percent of the county's Japanese population lived within the city limits. Seen in relation to over-all population increases and shifts, the growth of the Los Angeles Japanese colony falls into proper perspective and loses the sinister appearance it had when seen in isolation from the total picture.

The Tolan report suggested:

"The Japanese, as a whole, have become increasingly urbanized in keeping with the general population trend. About 55 percent of the Japanese now live in cities of 2,500 or more, as compared with 56.5 percent of the general population. The pattern differs, however, for individual States. In Washington, the Japanese are most highly urbanized (60.4 percent as compared with 53.1 percent for the state's total population; this proportion has declined somewhat since 1910). Oregon also shows a decline. In California the Japanese are much less urbanized than the general population, 56 percent as compared with 71 percent. The trend of the Japanese toward the cities is pronounced in California; this reflects in part the increasing general urbanization of the State."13-c

Remembering that it was found by the committee that the geographic pattern of the Japanese in California was "pretty well fixed by 1910," it is pertinent to mention that in 1910 the person who had seen an airplane, let alone an airfield, was a rarity, that utilities were few and far between, that the vast oil resources of California were largely undiscovered, and that the placement of military installations on the coast in any conspicuous number was a dream cherished only by the Native Sons of the Golden West* and a few militarists. It was not a question of the Japanese stealthily moving in on strategic installations, airfields, oil fields, and power plants, but of these modern phenomena moving in on Japanese who had by 1941 been cultivating their land, establishing their homes, rearing and educating their children, paying

*See The Grizzly Bear, official organ of the N.S.G.W., May 1907, p. 19, and August 1907, p. 8.

their taxes and attending to their own business, the great majority of them, for upward of 30 years.

Since, by the spring of 1942, it was generally accepted that there was a peculiar significance attaching to the concentration of the Japanese Americans near key points on the West Coast, it is appropriate to investigate the question of how these concentrations came into being, of what led the newcomers to these shores to the particular areas where their presence many years later was to alarm General DeWitt, the West Coast Delegation, and the component parts of the California Joint Immigration Commission.

In 1908 and 1909 the United States Immigration Commission sent its agents into the Western States to make a thorough investigation of immigrants in agriculture, industry, city employments and business. The reports made by these agents filled three substantial volumes and provide reliable information on the distribution of the immigrant generation of various races and nationalities found in the West at that time.

San Francisco was the first area of concentration of the Japanese immigrants for the simple reason that it was at first the only Pacific Coast port having direct steamship lines to and from the Orient. Because of that circumstance, Japanese immigrants entered the United States through the Golden Gate. Even after Portland and Seattle opened direct lines with the Orient, the majority of Japanese continued to land at San Francisco. In 1910 the Immigration Commission reported that from San Francisco

" * * * more Japanese laborers have been sent out by contractors to work in various employments than from any other place. Because of its position in this respect, San Francisco has always had the largest Japanese population, the largest amount of business conducted by members of that race and the largest number of them employed as wage-earners of all the cities of the West. * * * More recently, with the further immigration of laborers discontinued, the strong agitation against them in San Francisco, and a gradually diminishing number in the United States, the number of Japanese has decreased."6-d

In November of 1909 the Japanese population of San Francisco was estimated at 8,746, of whom 6,938 were adult males, 1,187 adult females, and 621 children under 16 years of age. The number varied from season to season because 1,500 or more fanned out from San Francisco during the spring and summer to work in agriculture or canneries. During the first decade of the century San Francisco Japanese were recruited in fairly large numbers to work during summer months in Alaska as fish packers. In 1909, 1,119 were taken to Alaska.6-o

Maintenance work on railroads, unskilled labor in factories and hand labor in the fields have always been the portion of the mass of new immigrants. Foreigners with little if any knowledge of the language of the new country, of its wage system or of its customs and practices have commonly been underpaid and exploited in their early years in America. Newcomers with only a few dollars in their pockets were obliged to take what work they could find and to accept whatever wages were offered. As they learned the ways of America, they could, if their services were in demand and if they had any talent for organizing their group, force wages upward and shorten working hours.

Whatever the nationality of the most recently arrived group of workers, these newly arrived immigrants have been condemned for under-bidding on wages. In the early days of California, the Chinese immigrants who then performed most of the menial and hard labor, were bitterly attacked by labor unions and by unorganized white labor for working for less than prevailing wages. When exclusion stopped the influx of Chinese and the resident Chinese were shifting from the migratory labor class to the tenant farmer class, the need for hand labor exceeded the number of Chinese workers available; when the supply was less than the demand, the wages paid the remaining Chinese laborers neared the level of those paid white farm laborers and section hands. Italians, Greeks, Armenians, Austrians, Germans and Russians have appeared and disappeared on the railroads, beet fields and fruit farms. As the Chinese were beginning to vanish from the scene, the Japanese began to appear upon it, and as had the longer-established foreign groups, the Japanese took over the only work available to them, accepting the low wages offered.

As the Immigration Commission agents repeated again and again in the course of their reports, the Japanese immigrants were almost completely unfamiliar with any wage system, the great majority of them having been independent farmers or small business men--or boys helping their fathers--in their native country. In general, only those Japanese who came to the continental United States from Hawaiian sugar plantations had had any experience in working for wages. A working day of 11 or 12 hours on the railroads, in the beet fields or in canneries, with a flat wage of \$1 a day was the first working experience of most Japanese in the United States. At the same time, the more experienced immigrants from other lands were making anywhere from \$1.10 to \$1.50 or even \$1.65 for similar work. Whatever the background of the worker or his monetary reward, this type of work was back-breaking, the hours unthinkable, and the condition of life migratory, offering the worker no possibility of family life so long as he remained in such employment.

Early Japanese Railroad Laborers

In 1909 when the Commission made its investigation, the Gentlemen's Agreement had been operative for a year, and already,

without a new crop of immigrants, the number of Japanese employed on railroads was dwindling. In 1906 Japanese employment with railroads reached its peak, there having been in excess of 8,000 working for various companies in that year. By 1909 employment rolls showed between 6,500 and 7,000. The Commission agents reported:

"The decrease is explained largely by the desire of the Japanese to find more remunerative and more agreeable employment. This they have sought in agriculture and the city trades. Though their wages have been increased in some instances this has not been effective in preventing the movement indicated."

The Japanese began work on the railroads at a lower wage than was paid at that time to any other group--except in some instances to the Chinese. With the withdrawal of many other workers from railway maintenance work during the prosperous years of the 'nineties, wages paid Japanese increased, rising in one instance to \$1.35 per day. Their wages were usually less than those paid any other race "except the Mexican, by whom alone they have been displaced to any extent," the investigators of 1909 discovered.

Superintendents of the railway companies fell into one of two categories: those who preferred Japanese laborers to those of other nationality, and those who objected strongly to the Japanese and employed them only if no other workers were available. Both types stated clearly the reasons for their attitudes. The former preferred the Japanese because they "need less watching to prevent them from 'soldiering'; they are very peaceable and tractable, while the Italians and Greeks are not; the Japanese camps are free from disturbance, while the Italian and Greek camps are scenes of frequent fights; and the Japanese are the most adaptable of all the races now employed." Compared with Greeks and Austrians, the Japanese were, in the eyes of the pro-Japanese railway superintendents: "more progressive and adaptable, require less supervision, and are more tractable * * *. They learn more quickly than any other race now employed; they are sober, tractable, and industrious."6-g The other school of thought gave reasons that were indubitably cogent with the employer: one employer had discharged Japanese because they were "more difficult to satisfy" than the other groups. Those on southern or southwestern railroads who had been able to get Mexicans preferred those to the Japanese because "the Japanese want too much, are likely to make organized demands. The Mexicans, on the other hand, are easily satisfied, and there is no fear of concerted action by them."6-h

Work in the Sugar-Beet Fields

Many of the Japanese immigrants first worked for wages in the sugar-beet fields of California. The industry dated from the 'seventies, the first permanent beet-sugar factory having been built at Alvarado in 1872. From the beginning, the Department of Agriculture took a scientific interest in the experiments with sugar-beet culture, and in 1897 new duties levied by the Tariff on imported sugar gave impetus to domestic sugar production. In 1908 there were vast areas in the State of California devoted to sugar-beets, and there were eight permanent factories, scattered from the Sacramento Valley in the north to Ventura County in the south.

Originally the work in both fields and factories was performed by Chinese. After a time, the Chinese were ejected from the factories by white labor, but they remained in the handwork of the fields until exclusion, after which they were gradually replaced by other races, principally the Japanese. In 1909 between 6,000 and 7,000 Japanese workers were employed in the beet fields of California. Of these "fully 4,500 were Japanese, about 1,000 were Mexicans, probably 600 East Indians and the remainder members of miscellaneous races, including some German-Russians and Portuguese and a few Chinese." Mexicans were at that time recent additions to the beet-sugar labor supply, and their presence was accounted for "chiefly by an extraordinary demand for labor or by the desire of employers to secure competition against the Japanese." The Mexicans were rarely found outside the southern California districts.

At that time wages were higher in the beet fields than on railroads, and consequently railroad section hands tended to desert the railroads for the duration of the beet season. In general, work in the beet fields, though dirty, uncomfortable and hard, offered more incentive to the ambitious worker. Normally, in these years as currently, the beet field worker was paid on a piece basis, and he could work as long as he wished each day. The Japanese earned the highest average of wages, more than half of them earning between \$1.75 and \$2 per day, while 37.4 percent earned more, as against 7.5 percent who earned less. In all 91.4 percent earned between \$1.75 and \$3 per day. The Commission agent had this to say of the superior earnings of the Japanese:

" * * * account must be taken of the fact that the Japanese commonly work longer hours than either the East Indians or the Mexicans. The Japanese, moreover, are quicker workmen and capable of closer and more continuous application than the other races. Their greater desire to adopt American standards of life and especially their greater eagerness to become independent farmers and business men, go far toward explaining their greater industry."6-j

In this field of labor as in others, while the Japanese began at a lower-than-average wage, they were quick to realize that they were essential to the industry, and to make organized demands for increased wages. Their employers in some instances praised them for "their industry, quickness, steadiness, sobriety, cleanliness, adaptability, and eagerness to learn American ways and customs," and in others condemned them heartily and somewhat ingenuously for "the pursuit of their own interests regardless of the cost to their employers." "In short," as the Commission writer commented, "the Japanese are accused of the tactics pursued by other monopolists; that is, of local price cutting to repress competition, and of exorbitant increases in price when, for the time being, competition is impossible."6-k

Investigation of 6 beet-growing districts showed that of an aggregate of 834 growers under contract in 1909, controlling in all 41,746 acres, 106 growers were of alien race. Of the 106 aliens, 74 growers were Japanese, all of whom had acquired land, chiefly on a share basis, within the years between 1904 and 1909; 17 were Chinese and 15 Mexican. No East Indians had taken to independent farming. Companies or large scale private owners were willing and indeed eager to have the Japanese become tenant farmers, as such tenants relieved the owner of the responsibility of procuring the labor. White farmers found it difficult to compete with Japanese farmers for Japanese seasonal laborers. Even though there was no difference in wages paid by the two classes of farmers, Japanese laborers preferred to work for members of their own race, who understood them and treated them with courtesy and consideration.6-1

Japanese in the Hop Fields

Hop culture, the third major source of livelihood for newly arrived Japanese immigrants, was introduced in California and Oregon in the late 'fifties, and its increase in importance was very rapid. In 1900 California produced 20.6 percent of the national crop and Oregon 29.8 percent. Hop farms are found in well defined areas: in Oregon, the Willamette Valley from Albany to north of Salem; in California, the lowlands along the Sacramento and American Rivers, in Sonoma County and in Yuba County near Wheatland.

The handwork of caring for the growing crop, pruning, stringing and training the vines, was never performed to any extent by white men. In most districts Indians were first used, then Chinese, and toward the end of the nineteenth century the Japanese. The investigators of 1909 learned that Japanese had just begun to find their way into the hop fields of Oregon, and were used substantially only near Salem, where 200 were found, a few of whom had become farmers in their own right. In California, on the other hand, the Japanese "practically monopolized the hand work and the picking," and on some farms they did the plowing and

cultivating as well. Along the American River, the Japanese had established themselves as growers, and it was estimated that in this district the Japanese controlled the production of 35 percent of the total output of hops.^{6-m}

Wages for picking hops were--and are--on the piece basis. In 1909 it was learned that the Japanese earned the highest wages paid to any race. About a third earned between \$3 and \$4 a day, about an eighth of them earned more than \$4 a day, and only one-fifth were found to be earning less than \$2 a day. Only five members of other groups were found who earned \$3 or more a day, and half of the non-Japanese pickers earned less than \$2. The Commission report suggests in explanation:

"Much of this apparent superiority of the Japanese is due to their ability and willingness to work intensively for longer hours than do the whites. They are in the hop fields primarily to make money and are not lured from work by the social attractions which appeal to the whites who come from the cities for a money-making vacation."^{6-m}

From the three basic fields of employment, railroads, sugar-beet culture and hop culture, the Japanese immigrants found their way into seasonal work in deciduous and citrus fruit, vineyards, berries, and vegetable farms. In every section of the Pacific Coast where the Japanese were found in any number, reports of the Immigration Commission show that the Japanese replaced the Chinese, beginning at a low wage, that they soon became dominant in the labor supply and necessary to the farm owners--at which point, the Japanese made timely, organized demands for higher wages and better working conditions.

"Though, so far as known, no union has been organized by them, concerted effort, occasional strikes, and regard for one another's 'jobs' have become almost as characteristic of the Japanese laborers as of a trade union," reported the Immigration Commission's investigators in 1909.⁶⁻ⁿ

From Migratory Laborer to Independent Farmer

There was a common pattern of procedure for the average Japanese migratory worker to follow. He began life in America as a seasonal worker; after a year or two, he remained in a vicinity where he had worked in the harvest, retained by some farmer to prune and care for the farm or orchard throughout the year; his next step was to operate an orchard or farm for a share of the crop; the next was the payment of cash rent; the goal was ownership of land. Whereas men who had passed to the stage where they could pay cash rent often paid higher rent than the owner could have extracted from members of other races, the Japanese who had not yet lifted themselves from the wage-earning class were

willing, for the sake of getting a lease on land, to clear stumpage after the lumbermen had felled timber, to clear brush from unreclaimed land, or to drain swamps, for in return for the general improvement of such lands, a man could often get land for a year or two without paying actual rent except in toil. He cleared a small area and planted it, cleared a little more and planted that section, and by the time he began to pay cash rent, he had harvested two or three crops. In Washington and Oregon, Japanese tenants of the early days commonly acquired the use of land in return for clearing it of stumpage. In California in the delta of the San Joaquin and Sacramento Rivers, in Placer County, in the Vaca Valley, and in the San Joaquin Valley they reclaimed much land and brought it to bearing. In the Florin area of the lower Sacramento Valley they converted hay land into berry farms and vineyards. Colonel John P. Irish* in 1921 paid tribute to the contribution made by Japanese farmers to the development of California lands:

"What influenced the two hundred and twenty-two thousand California voters to vote against the anti-Japanese initiative? [The initiative alien land act of 1920.] The truth was what they had seen, their experience and contact with the few Japanese who are here. They had seen the Japanese convert the barren land like that at Florin and Livingston, into productive and profitable fields, orchards and vineyards, by the persistence and intelligence of their industry. They had seen the hard pan and goose lands in the Sacramento Valley, gray and black with our two destructive alkalis, lie, cursed with barrenness like the fig tree of Bethany, and not worth paying taxes on, until Ikuta, the Japanese, decided that those lands would raise rice. After years of persistent toil, enduring heart-breaking losses and disappointments, he conquered that rebellious soil and raised the first commercial crop of rice in California. Due to the work of that great Japanese pioneer this state now has a rice crop worth sixty million dollars a year, and the land that he found worthless now sells for two hundred dollars per acre.

"Or these voters had seen the repulsive 'hog wallow' lands in the thermal belt of the west slope of the Sierra, avoided

*An editorial note attached to the article quoted above identified Col. Irish as follows: "President of Directors of the State Industrial Home for the Adult Blind for 30 years; Director for 35 years of the State Development Board, an organization devoted to the material development of the State; President of the California Delta Association, representing 250,000 acres of marsh land reclaimed by the skill and industry of the Japanese."32

by white men, so unproductive and forbidding that they defaced the scenery, reclaimed by the genius and toil of the Japanese Sakamoto, and now transformed into beautiful vineyards and citrus orchards from Seville to Lemon Cove. They had seen that 70 percent of the total seventy-four thousand acres owned by Japanese, was these lands that disfigured the state until they had been reclaimed by Japanese genius and industry."32-a

Of the Japanese in the rural parts of Los Angeles County, the Immigration Commission agents reported in 1910:

" * * * the Japanese have taken up for the greater part land theretofore not used unless for producing hay. This land they have improved and brought to a high state of cultivation * * *. It appears, too, that the Japanese, beginning early in the decade as berry growers and frequently beginning later on at other places, have taken up truck gardening after the fall in the price of strawberries or as the rotation of crops became necessary."6-o

Because of the large amount of land held for speculative purposes by nonresident owners in regions close to the city of Los Angeles, the Japanese did not at the time of the above investigation own as much land as in other areas. These speculative tracts were held in expectation of the boom assured by the rapid increase in population. In the interval of waiting, agents leased large tracts, installed an irrigation system and then sublet the land at a higher rent, charging extra for water used, and made considerable profit. Land held in this way "naturally passed into the hands of a migratory class who are willing to 'squat' for a time and live under the simplest conditions and with the fewest conveniences."6-p

The Japanese farmers of Los Angeles County, in this first decade of the country, like the rural Japanese found elsewhere on the Pacific Coast, had come to America as very young men. The majority of them had been well under 30, and those who had passed their thirtieth year were usually men who had emigrated first to Hawaii and spent some years there before continuing to the continental United States. Most of the men came to the United States in hopes of economic advancement and had very little money when they arrived. More than two-thirds of them had less than \$100 to their names. Beginning as ranch hands, section hands or houseboys--if they wished to attend school--they had progressed within a few years of their arrival to the status of independent farmers.

The investigators of 1909 found that most of the Japanese farmers in this county had decided to remain permanently in the United States, and that those who had not already brought their wives to America were planning to send for them in the near future. The Japanese who had had

bad luck with crops and lost their investments or had been obliged to go back into the labor gang after having emerged from it were the ones who were uncertain about staying permanently in the United States. The geographic pattern had been established in Los Angeles County; after that year, 1909, the increase was in terms of wives joining husbands in accordance with the terms of the Gentlemen's Agreement and of natural increase of American-born children.

Imperial Valley, in the southeastern corner of the State of California, was not opened to settlement until 1901. It received Japanese among its first pioneers. At that time settlers did not have absolute title to their land, and the Japanese, being aliens, could not file on land or buy up relinquishments. Thus, until there were citizen children in whose name title could be taken, the Japanese leased from resident owners. The entry of the first Japanese to Imperial Valley was unique in that the first three members of that race, who went in in 1904, went not as laborers but for the express purpose of leasing land. A few months later, more of their countrymen appeared, and these too leased farms.

By 1909 there were about 200 Japanese permanently located on leased land. Originally producing barley or vegetables, the Japanese were among the experimenters who first set out cantaloupes, in 1906. In 1909 Japanese farmers ventured into cotton production, pioneering in that crop. Because the first planting of cantaloupes was profitable, 1907 found 1,200 acres planted. This crop, too, was very profitable. In 1908 many other farmers turned to cantaloupe growing, with the result that 10,000 acres were planted. This mammoth crop put too great a strain on the marketing system then in use, and many farmers lost both their money and their enthusiasm for cantaloupes. By 1909 the acreage planted with cantaloupes had decreased to 3,000. As the Commission agents reported: "It was notably the white ranchers who abandoned the industry, for in 1909 approximately one-half of the acreage devoted to cantaloupe growing was land leased by the Japanese." It was these Japanese growers who first brought in laborers of their own race during the picking, grading and packing season which ran through June and July, and in 1909 they were requiring 400 seasonal workers for their cantaloupe acreage alone. All told, Japanese at that time leased 2,500 acres of farm land in the valley, practically all from resident farmers. Aside from producing about half of the valley's cantaloupe crop, the Japanese grew nearly all miscellaneous vegetables. The white farmers were not interested in intensive farming with its requirement of heavy, tedious stoop labor to be performed beneath a broiling sun; they preferred dairying and hay production.^{6-r}

Concentrations of Japanese in Major Cities
of the West Coast

San Francisco

As the oldest substantial community of Japanese in the United States, the San Francisco Japanese colony of 1909 has special interest. Although San Francisco at that time contained the largest segment of the Japanese population of the West Coast, the number was found to be decreasing--and thus the findings of the Immigration Commission once again affirm the correctness of the Tolson Committee statement that the geographic pattern of distribution of the Japanese was "pretty well set" by 1910.

The Commission agents found in 1909 that there were in San Francisco 482 Japanese business establishments, which employed between 1,800 and 2,000 persons. The establishments were varied: book, curio and art, drug, fruit and vegetable, importing and exporting, meat and fish, grocery, "sake," watch and jewelry, bamboo furniture, magazines, newspapers, photograph galleries, rice mills, shoe repair shops, "tofu" (bean curd) factories, tailors and dressmakers, cleaners and dyers, barber shops, bath houses, hotels and boarding houses, laundries, lodging houses, restaurants with Japanese meals and restaurants with American meals, banks, pool halls, and shooting galleries.⁶⁻⁸

Investigation of these early businesses produced some interesting factual information that has commonly been disregarded in most consideration of the Japanese question then and since:

1. Most of the Japanese businesses were conducted on a small scale.
2. Japanese were employed almost exclusively in these establishments.
3. Opposition encountered by the Japanese in some branches of business had made progress slow or had, in a number of instances, frozen out the Japanese altogether. At that time, 1909, for instance, the city licensing bureau refused Japanese proprietors permits to operate steam laundries. Hence all Japanese laundries were forced to remain in the hand-laundry class.
4. Except in restaurants serving American meals, shoe repair shops and laundries, the competition with white business was of little importance.

5. The majority of business establishments conducted by Japanese were patronized exclusively or principally by the members of that race.
6. Most of the wants of the Japanese minority were provided for by Japanese establishments and professional men; the shops and services were established in answer to a real need resulting from unwillingness of white establishments to serve members of another race.^{6-t}

Here as in the rural areas, it was discovered that very few of the Japanese immigrants had been wage earners in Japan. The older men had been in business for themselves, while the many very young men and boys had been in school up to the time of emigrating to the United States--or in some cases they had simply helped their fathers in the family business. The great majority of Japanese city dwellers in America, had been city dwellers before they emigrated.^{6-u}

In 1909 there were about two thousand Japanese women in San Francisco, most of whom had reached the United States after 1902. Very few had come with their husbands; it had been necessary for most wives to wait until their husbands had established themselves in business in the new country. Those married couples who had reached San Francisco together had usually not come directly from Japan but had migrated from Hawaii to California. Generally speaking, a man could not maintain family life in an American city unless he had the ability to establish himself in independent business. As a business man, he could maintain a house or an apartment suitable for family living. As a wage earner, he lived under conditions that would not permit family life. It was customary for the Japanese employer to shelter and feed his workers within his own house; if the employer were not able to do this, the employees conducted a cooperative household of 4 to 8 or perhaps 10 members, an arrangement that allowed them to exist within their meager financial means. Just as it was necessary for a field hand to acquire land and become an independent farmer if he wished to have a wife and family, so it was necessary for the city wage earner to get into business for himself before he could hope to enjoy family life.^{6-v}

The keeping of boarding and lodging houses and hotels was, in the days before immigration was curtailed, a peculiarly important branch of Japanese business enterprise in San Francisco. It began with the first immigration of the laboring class and expanded or contracted according to the current size of the city's Japanese population. San Francisco's position as the principal port of arrival and departure and as a distribution center for immigrant labor dictated the kind of system which developed around these institutions. In the winter of 1908-09 the Commission's agents found 35 hotels and boarding houses and about as many rooming houses, most of which were located in one of two districts,

either in the section west of Van Ness Avenue along Geary and Sutter and the intersecting streets, or on South Park Place, near the wharves. A few were in the business district, skirting Chinatown. The section beyond Van Ness Avenue had escaped the great fire of 1906; the boarding houses there had once been private residences. In the other locations, all of which had been swept by the fire, the buildings were post-fire in construction and had been designed for the purpose for which they were being used, with many small rooms. Even though the investigation was carried on in the winter months when the greatest number of Japanese were in the city between seasonal jobs, the agents reported that there were very few cases of overcrowding in these houses. They stated also that "the number of Japanese had already begun to diminish;" the dwindling of immigration under the Gentlemen's Agreement was being felt by boarding house and hotel keepers.

Proprietors of large boarding houses and hotels were organized as the Japanese Hotel Keepers' Association, which had existed since the late 'nineties. It had undergone reorganization into a permanent form and under a definite, if simple, policy in 1905. The Commission offered the following translation of the only written agreement or regulation of this association: 6-w

"We, the members of the Japanese Hotel Keepers' Association, will maintain in good faith the following agreement:

1. Patrons shall not be charged less than 25 cents per night for lodgings and not less than 15 cents per meal.
2. Storage: Trunks, 25 cents each per month; baskets and valises, 10 cents each per month.
3. Commissions to be charged as labor agencies: \$5 on each Alaskan laborer, \$3 on each railroad laborer, \$1 on each ranch laborer." 6-x

The association was in effect a trade union with its primary object the elimination of the strong competition which existed between large boarding house keepers whose patrons were transients and laborers available for employment.

Hotel keeping and contracting for labor were very closely related, each of the 12 contractors in business in San Francisco at that time being also a boarding-house keeper, and in most cases deriving the greater profit from the commissions received for supplying laborers. Of this business, the Commission reported in 1909:

"With the exception of the proprietors of the 'sailor boarding houses', the proprietors of the larger establishments have established connections with construction companies, railway companies, Japanese bosses supplying ranch laborers, and fish cannery companies. If the boarding-house keeper, who is a member of the Hotel Keepers' Association, receives an order for a given number of men and does not have them immediately at his command, he draws upon those at the command of other members of the Hotel Keepers' Association. In other words, the boarding-house keepers pool their men and cooperate in filling positions which come to them as labor agents. From this pooling arrangement the members of the association derive a gain not second to that resulting from maintenance of uniform rates and prices.

"The business of the Japanese 'contractors' is much less extensive and less profitable than formerly, however. Prior to 1907, when many Japanese were arriving in San Francisco from Japan and the Hawaiian Islands, their business was very extensive. Employment was found by the contractors for most of the new arrivals. In 1906 the several contractors supplying laborers for railroad work kept from 216 to 1,500 men each employed--several thousand all told. In 1909 the number of railroad laborers supplied from San Francisco varied between 200 and 800. The number of fish cannery hands and agricultural laborers employed through and controlled by these contractors is also smaller than before immigration was restricted. As a result of the restrictions which have been imposed, several firms have discontinued the contracting business. * * * Because of alliances with employers of different kinds of labor, the classes of laborers found in the larger boarding houses differ. Practically all the laborers found at some are sailors, at others Alaskan cannery hands, at others railroad laborers or ranch hands. Moreover, in many cases most of the patrons of the boarding houses were found to have come from the same provinces as the proprietors and labor agents.

"Besides the 'contractors' still in business, there are several employment agents * * * engaged chiefly in supplying Japanese domestics and in connection with their labor agencies frequently conduct billiard parlors and fruit and cigar stands."6-y

The Japanese cobblers of San Francisco were prompt to organize. The first cobbler shop opened in 1890. With rapid growth of the Japanese community and of the city in general, the number of cobbler shops increased until, in 1909, there were 72. As early as 1892 the cobblers organized as Nihojin Koko Domei Kai, or the Japanese Shoemaker's Association, with 20 members. By 1909 the association had on its lists

virtually every master journeyman, journeyman, and apprentice engaged in the trade. The stated objects of the association were "to promote a friendly association among the Japanese shoemakers, to provide means for their mutual assistance, and to limit and to control competition among themselves." The association maintained a supply house in San Francisco and a substantial business fund with which it assisted those needing capital to conduct their business and those of its members who met with accident, illness or other misfortune. The organization gave examinations to apprentices after the latter had had a year's experience, and determined on the basis of those examinations whether the apprentices were qualified to open their own shops. 6-2

The situation of Japanese restaurants which served American meals was significant in that these restaurants, after the great fire of 1906, became a focal point for agitation and considerable violence—a condition which led many Japanese to leave San Francisco and settle in Los Angeles. Restaurants serving Japanese meals appeared early in every locality where Japanese settled. The newly arrived immigrants craved familiar food, and it was up to their countrymen to provide it. The next step was the establishment of restaurants serving American meals; these were patronized by the mixed immigrant and low-wage earning class of whites. Of this latter type of Japanese restaurant, San Francisco had eight in 1904. After the fire, the number of Japanese restaurants serving American meals quickly increased to 30. These were scattered through the devastated area and catered to the great masses of laborers engaged in removing debris and in rebuilding the city. They served meals at 15 cents and up and were popular with the laborers of all races.

"At this time there was a strong agitation against the Japanese * * * directed largely by the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League and the various labor unions, many of which had laws forbidding their members to patronize Japanese or Chinese places of business. At a meeting of the Exclusion League, held June 25, 1906, complaints were made that many white wage-earners, including some union men, were patronizing Japanese restaurants, and the league requested the labor organizations to enforce the penalties imposed by their rules for violations of the prohibition mentioned. Among the unions at the meetings of which the members were urged or directed to refrain from patronizing the Japanese restaurants was that of the cooks and waiters. A boycott was kept in force by this organization from October 3 to 24, 1906, and the destruction of property of the proprietors of restaurants by rioters followed peaceable appeals to patrons by the representatives of the organization. The appeal took the form of a label bearing the words 'White men and women, patronize your own race.' (Senate Doc. No. 147, 39th Congress, 2d Session)" 6-A

The close of 1908 found only 17 of these restaurants left; these were located in the poorer residence districts of the city. Investigation revealed that while the employees received slightly lower wages than the union employees of white-staffed restaurants, the Japanese received in addition to wages both board and lodging, whereas white restaurant employees provided their own lodgings. It was discovered also that very few of the white employees were union members; those who were not did not receive union wages. The living quarters of the Japanese restaurant workers were found to be "adequate and satisfactory, save in one instance where the room occupied was poorly furnished and inadequately lighted and ventilated."6-B

To round out a picture of life in the Japanese community in the area of heaviest concentration in the early days of this century, it is necessary to consider their cultural and social life and their efforts to become assimilated.

It has been shown that a strong tendency toward organization was revealed early among the business men. The agitation of the American labor unions of the day would appear rather farfetched, since the Japanese always showed a strong inclination to organize and, having organized, to abide by the rules of the organization. Denied admittance to the regular American trade unions because of race prejudice, the Japanese lost little time in vain regret, but set about developing their own trade organizations which successfully performed the functions of the average American trade union.

In San Francisco as in other cities where the Japanese settled, the interest of the newcomers in learning or improving English was marked. In 1909 there were 15 schools for Japanese immigrants in San Francisco. Four of them, conducted by American women, were places where prosperous business men of considerable education or prospective college students were tutored. The others were designed for two types of students, adults needing to learn English and children whose parents wanted them to study the Japanese language. At this period there were usually a few classes for children recently arrived from the Orient and needing to learn English quickly so that they could attend the public schools.^{6-C} Some of these schools were maintained by private individuals, but most of them were conducted by missions. In 1909 the combined membership of the Christian Missions (the earliest of which was established in 1889) was between 700 and 800, while the Buddhist Mission had about 400 members within the city, the greater number of Japanese having been Buddhists in Japan.^{6-D}

Of 77 households surveyed in 1909, "all had at least 1 newspaper and 58 had from 2 to 10 papers and periodicals printed in the Japanese language, some printed locally, others in Japan." Roughly "one-third of the households had from 1 to 5 newspapers and periodicals printed in

English and published in San Francisco and other cities. Among the subscriptions to periodicals by those investigated were 3 to the Pacific Monthly, 9 to the Literary Digest, 1 to the Independent, 4 to Colliers' Weekly, 1 to The Outlook, and 1 to the North American Review. 6-E

In 1900 there was a threat of bubonic plague in San Francisco. The plague had struck the principal Chinese section of Honolulu, and the entire section had been burned by order of the health authorities. Fear of the plague drove a number of people from Honolulu to San Francisco, among these many Japanese. In San Francisco one Chinese plague victim was discovered in Chinatown. This was the only case to appear in the city, but the health officers became panic-stricken, assumed that orientals were peculiarly susceptible to the disease and likely to spread it, and set out on a campaign to inoculate every oriental on sight. The method employed was violent and brutal, the victims, whether men or women, being handled with rather less consideration than would be shown a herd of sheep in an anthrax epidemic. To combat this special treatment meted out to orientals, the Japanese Association of America organized and presented the grievances of the Japanese residents of San Francisco to the Consul, with the result that an injunction was obtained and the practice was discontinued. 18-b 6-D

Because of rising agitation against the Japanese in San Francisco and reverberations of that agitation in other West Coast localities, the Japanese Association continued in existence, reorganizing in 1905 and extending branches throughout the state. It gradually came to be a federation of local organizations that were formed wherever any considerable number of Japanese settled. Its constitution set forth the four objectives of the organization:

1. To elevate the character of the Japanese immigrants;
2. To promote association between Japanese and Americans;
3. To promote commerce, agriculture, and other industries;
4. To further the interests of the Japanese immigrants. 6-D

These objectives were quoted in the Immigration Commission report with the comment:

"The indefiniteness of this shows the general and elastic character of the association. It interests itself in whatever concerns the Japanese. In addition to this, the association has recently received recognition from the Japanese consulate, and has become an administrative organ of the consulate in issuing certificates of various kinds and in related matters. Its members number about 400." 6-D

The belief that the Japanese Association of America was an administrative organ of the consulate was readily subscribed to and exploited by the anti-Japanese pressure groups of the West Coast. Professor Ichihashi, who came to the United States close to the turn of the century and who might be said to have grown up with the organization wrote in 1932:

"At no time, as far as he [the writer] knows, have these [organizations] had any connection with the [Japanese] government. Moreover, these bodies have never enjoyed a membership sufficient to warrant such a statement as that 'these are the principal agencies through which the Japanese immigrants come into contact with the people of America.' [A statement made by a Nisei college student in a paper on Japanese organizations.]

"On the contrary, the Federated Association, by the very nature of its organization has been confronted with the numerous difficulties so commonly experienced by trade unions. There has been the difficulty of jurisdiction, that of sectionalism, manifested by the local associations, which in turn have never been free from serious internal dissensions caused by petty jealousies--to wit, the difficulties which have always attended the election of their officers. For a number of years even the annual convention of the member associations has failed to materialize; the position of the Federated Association has been precarious, although a number of local associations have been functioning very successfully in looking after the interests of their respective members.

"Another interesting aspect of the Federated Association is its finance. The sources of its revenue have been membership dues, paid by the local organizations, and voluntary contributions; but during the operation of the Gentlemen's Agreement it had an additional income from what are known as certificate fees. Dues have never proved sufficient and have been largely supplemented by contributions made by those who were willing to have an official status in the organization. Certificate fees require a word of explanation, for it was this source of revenue to the organization that caused misunderstanding as regards its alleged connection with the Japanese government."18-c

Japan's military conscription law required any of its nationals living abroad who were between 20 and 37 years of age to request deferment on an annual basis through the local consulate.

"The consulate," continues Professor Ichihashi, "finding this work too cumbersome because of the scattered residences of the Japanese in this country, delegated it to local Japanese Associations along with the right to collect the customary fee of fifty cents each in issuing the certificate of notification. When the Gentlemen's Agreement went into effect, which, among other things, permitted the re-admission of those formerly domiciled here, those who desired to visit Japan temporarily usually secured from the consulate 'the certificate of residence' needed to facilitate their re-admission into this country. This work, too, was turned over to the Japanese Associations, which were better informed on their local personnel, and the organizations, in turn, charged the regular fee in issuing the certificate. Beyond this there has been no official connection between the Japanese consulates and the Japanese Association."18-c

Japanese prefectural societies developed early in the new country. There were, in 1909, 27 different prefectures represented in the San Francisco Japanese community alone. This type of organization has been common in the motley population of California for many years. Whether the Japanese imitated the Iowans, Missourians, Ohioans and the many other groups who gather according to the place of their pre-California residence, or whether these groups imitated the Japanese, it would be hard to prove. The prefectural societies were created to bring together people of the same background for social purposes, and once formed they assumed the function of rendering assistance to those of their members who encountered hardship. 6-F

The Japanese Benevolent Society of San Francisco, organized in 1901, is another organization worthy of mention. The Immigration Commission commented:

"Its object was to make more complete provision for the care of the sick, injured, and unfortunate than had been made by the several missions, the Japanese Association, the prefectural societies, and trade associations. During the eight years, 1901-1908, its expenditures for the sick and for sending persons back to Japan amounted to \$7,000. This does not indicate the importance of its work, however, for in its methods it is more a charity organization than relief society. One of the more important branches of its work lies in securing reduced rates from steamship companies for those who are sick or in need in order that they may return to Japan. As a result of the efforts of this society and of the other institutions to which reference has been made, no Japanese become public charges in San Francisco."6-F

The pattern of life among the Japanese of San Francisco in that first important decade of this century has been described in detail because it was typical of the urban Japanese wherever they formed colonies on the West Coast; also San Francisco was the first Pacific coast city to receive any substantial number of this minority group. However, remembering the stigma placed upon concentrations of Japanese, conditions favoring the concentrations in certain other cities need brief consideration.

Los Angeles

Until 1899, when railway companies with terminals at Los Angeles began to employ Japanese in large numbers, the city of Los Angeles had only a minute Japanese population. After that date, several years were to pass before the Japanese became conspicuous among the agricultural laborers, tenant farmers or owners of farm property in the area surrounding Los Angeles.

The first Japanese to appear in the city drifted up from San Diego in 1885. These were a few men who had served as cooks on a sailing vessel, which they left at San Diego. Upon reaching Los Angeles, they opened a restaurant. Between working seasons in agriculture, some members of labor gangs stayed in Los Angeles, but very few of the immigrants settled there until the turn of the century. In 1897 the best Japanese sources could find no more than 500 Japanese in Los Angeles. However, with the increasing demand for Japanese labor on the railroads of Southern California and the increased use of them in agriculture in Los Angeles and neighboring counties, the Los Angeles colony knew a sudden and rather spectacular growth.

The Japanese American Year Book for 1905 estimated the Japanese population of Los Angeles at 3,358. At the end of 1906, the year of the San Francisco earthquake and fire and the first violent agitation against the Japanese in that city, as a result of a minor exodus of Japanese out of San Francisco to the southland, Los Angeles increased its Japanese population to more than 6,000. During the next two years the number decreased. Some returned to Japan; others found business unprofitable and sought employment elsewhere. The total number of Japanese in the stable population of the city at the end of 1908 was estimated by the secretary of the Japanese Association to be 4,457, representing a loss of nearly 1,500 in the two-year period. "Of these, 3,925 were adult males, 427 adult females, and 105 children under 16. The number of males had increased somewhat between 1904 and 1906, and the number of women and children had increased almost threefold." These figures were for the settled population; it was reported that there were "as many as 20,000 Japanese in Southern California doing seasonal work, and during intervals when many are unemployed they come to Los Angeles in large numbers, crowding the lodging houses with transients.6-G

Two colonies of Japanese developed in Los Angeles prior to 1910. The older and larger community spread out along East First Street and became known as "Little Tokyo." The other, which in future years was to be displaced by blocks of modern office buildings, took shape along West Sixth and Seventh and the interlocking streets of Hill, Olive, and Hope. While certain bazaars and curio shops operated by Japanese were located in the general shopping district, the majority of Japanese business houses were in segregated districts and were patronized almost exclusively by the Japanese themselves and by the Mexicans and Negroes of the vicinity.^{6-H} The Commission agents of 1909 observed:

"Practically all save domestic servants live in one of the two colonies, and in many cases are not welcomed in desirable places conducted by other races. This is true of hotels, lodging houses, restaurants, barber shops, pool-rooms and similar places."^{6-I}

In Los Angeles, too, it was found that the large majority of the Japanese business men had come from cities in Japan, where they had conducted their own businesses, while a comparatively small percentage had been wage earners in Japan. The average Japanese business man had been in petty trade, he had come to the United States when young, bringing little or no capital with him, he had had his first experience in America as a wage earner—only about 18 percent were able to go into business immediately after arrival—and rapidly lifted himself out of the wage-earning class, setting up in business for himself in from one to three years. They were able to do this because the amount of capital required was small, because of the phenomenal growth and development of Los Angeles and the consequent increase in opportunities for making profit, and because of their own powerful desire to get clear of the wage-earning system which kept them in migratory status, sheltering in men's bunk houses or cheap rooming houses with no possibility of maintaining a wife and children.^{6-K} Here, as in many of the communities investigated, the agents learned that Japanese were not allowed membership in American societies or fraternal organizations, were not welcomed in American churches but were consigned to segregated churches and missions, were not given personal service in American shops, and that, as a result of such conditions, the Japanese had organized among themselves for trade, for social life and for cultural pursuits, and finally, that, in spite of the fact that they had achieved a greater assimilation than could be found among the Mexicans, Russians, and some other races of recent immigration—because of the eagerness of Japanese to adopt American ways and their desire to improve themselves and their lot in life—"associations between the Japanese and white races are limited, and, with few exceptions, not upon the basis of equality."^{6-L}

Sacramento

Sacramento, the hub of the Sacramento Valley, was predestined to be a distributing point for the kind of agricultural labor needed for the crops produced on the rich farm lands of the valley. By 1889, when the Chinese labor force was diminishing because of exclusion and the increasing age of the resident Chinese, a demand for Japanese labor arose. A network of electric and steam railroads connected the state capital with towns to the east, north and northwest of Sacramento, Oroville, Marysville, Newcastle, Woodland and Vacaville, and with Stockton, Fresno and other towns to the south. River boats carried laborers as far south as Antioch and the islands of the San Joaquin River. Throughout this great area deciduous and citrus fruits, berries, grapes, vegetables, sugar beets and hops were produced in quantity, and in the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth, Japanese laborers were dominant in the labor force. Between jobs, the laborers spent their time in Sacramento, and to serve their needs and the needs of those who worked nearby, an increasing number of Japanese entered business in Sacramento. Gradually, in this city, the more progressive Japanese tradesmen entered lines of business which were calculated to secure the patronage of other races.

The Immigration Commission agents of 1909 reported that hotel and lodging house keeping was the most extensive single business of the Sacramento Japanese. They discovered that "almost without exception the buildings are painted and in good repair, and the premises are well kept." Furnishings were of good quality, the beds good, the bedding clean. "Both the exteriors and the interiors of these places are superior in appearance to those conducted by Orientals and most other foreign races in other cities investigated."6-M

By 1909 the Japanese business men of Sacramento had become highly organized and unionized, having seven local organizations. The shoemakers belonged to a State-wide organization. Locally effective were the Boarding House and Lodging House Keepers' Association, the Expressmen's Union, the Japanese Barbers' Union, two Japanese restaurant keepers' associations, the Watchmakers' Union, and the Carpenters' Union. The Barbers' Union was a powerful organization operating on a basis of monthly dues of 50 cents. It fixed time for opening and closing shops and set a scale of union prices, imposing fines for violation of regulations. It controlled apprenticeship. It also stood ready to give financial assistance to any member needing to return to his family in Japan because of ill health, paying his fare from the treasury. If a member was ill for more than one month, the other members contributed \$1 a month each toward his support. Upon the death of a union member, his family received from the union a sum equivalent to the fare from San Francisco to Japan. The white barbers complained bitterly of the Japanese barbers although the Japanese Barbers' Union fixed prices at a

higher level than prices charged by white competitors; the complaints were based on the assertion that the influx of Japanese barbers had ruined the chances of making a profit in this field of enterprise. The Commission's reporter commented: "It is interesting to note in this connection, however, that most of the shops conducted by white men have been established in recent years and while the Japanese shops were in process of becoming more numerous. Moreover the majority of them are being conducted with profit."6-N

As an indication of both stability and prosperity among the Sacramento Japanese business men in 1909, six-sevenths of them had been able to send for their wives and families. English classes for adults and recently arrived children from Japan were popular and were conducted principally by missions. The educational level of the business men was high, with eight percent of them belonging to a university club. One Japanese was a member of an association for industrial conciliation, three were members of the Sacramento Grocers' Union, and three more belonged to the Chamber of Commerce. Except for these few organizations, however, the general business and fraternal organizations of the city did not admit Japanese residents to membership.

Portland, Oregon and Vicinity

The first appearance of Japanese in Oregon antedated the mass migration era, and the first Issei was no merchant, student, or laborer but a woman, Miyo Iwakoshi. In 1880 she went to Portland as the bride of a Scotch sea captain, Andrew McKinnon. The couple took with them the bride's younger brother Rikigo and her adopted daughter Tama. The captain established a sawmill just east of Gresham, and "in honor of his bride he called it 'Orient Mill.'" The community that later replaced the mill is still known as Orient. In 1891 Tama's was the first Japanese wedding to take place in Oregon. Her husband had first reached Oregon in 1885, a boy of 18 charged with the responsibility of encouraging trade between Oregon and Japan. For several years he shuttled back and forth between Oregon and Japan, returning to Oregon permanently in 1889 and opening the first Japanese business establishment in Portland, a restaurant. This was Shintaro Takaki. The author of the article from which these details were gathered interviewed Shintaro and Tama Takaki in 1940. At that time they were living at Orient and looking forward to celebrating their golden wedding anniversary in 1941.³³

Aside from this family group of McKinnons and Takakis, the only Japanese to reach Oregon prior to 1887 were 40 or 50 cooks who were sent up from California to become domestic servants. In 1887 direct steamship service was established between Kobe and Portland, and immigrants began to arrive at Portland.

The Oregon Short Line was the first railroad in the United States to employ Japanese, beginning in late 1890 or early 1891.6-P

Consequently Portland became the earliest center of distribution for Japanese railway laborers, supplying considerable manpower to lines operating in the other Western States. Because of its proximity to centers of the salmon industry, Portland was the principal source of Japanese cannery workers employed during the summers from the Columbia River on north to Alaska. In 1909 the estimated number of Japanese in Portland was 3,872, a figure that included those who stayed in Portland during the winter but went to Alaska or Washington to work in the salmon canneries during the summer months. In that year about 500 had been sent out by corporations from Portland to Alaska and an equally large number had crossed the Columbia River to work in canneries on the Washington side. 6-0

While the city's importance as a distributing point for laborers unquestionably stimulated the expansion of Japanese business in Portland in the 'nineties and in the first decade of this century, the Japanese business men of that city showed early a tendency to compete for the patronage of other races. The Immigration Commission agents found the unusual number of white patrons served by various lines of Japanese business a distinctive feature of the Japanese business picture in Portland. They commented also on the fact that very few Portland Japanese had ever engaged in domestic and personal services. Fifty percent or more of the patrons of Japanese barber shops were non-Japanese, principally of the laboring class; one of these shops had 96 percent white patronage. The Japanese barbers were organized into a union which set the prices (25 cents for a haircut and 10 cents for a shave) at the figure charged by the majority of small shops conducted by Caucasians. It was found that practically all the patrons of Japanese restaurants which served American meals were Caucasians. These restaurant keepers, too, were well organized, and had been as early as 1896. The Japanese Association of Oregon was not organized until February of 1909. There were only two Japanese churches, one a Methodist Mission, established in 1893 and having in 1909 a membership of 70, the other a Buddhist Mission, established in 1903 and having in 1909 a membership of about 570—though only 270 of the members lived in Portland. 6-Q

Until the twentieth century was well underway, the majority of Japanese laborers who went to Portland engaged in maintenance work on the railroads in preference to farm work. Oregon, in a day when starvation wages were the rule in agriculture, was notorious for underpaying farm laborers. Japanese, if they worked for hire on the land, could not get more than 40 or 50 cents a day without board. As section hands on the railroads, however, they could earn \$1 or \$1.10 per day. As late as 1909, the Immigration Commission agents could discover only about 400 Japanese in agricultural work in the Portland vicinity; 150 to 200 were employed around Salem, 300 in Hood River Valley, 400 in the Dalles and perhaps 125 near La Grande, this in the busy summer season when much hand labor was needed. By this time the wages for farm labor had risen

to nearly the low level of railroad pay.^{6-R} At any event, wages in either line of work were lower than in other States, and perhaps because of the little incentive to work for hire, the first decade of the new century saw an increasing number of Japanese laborers taking up land on their own account, much of it unreclaimed and necessitating heavy labor to clear it of forest and brush.

In 1904 the first Japanese farmers "made good and stayed on the land" in Oregon. Before that year there had been a number of unsuccessful attempts. The first Japanese farmers to acquire land in Hood River Valley established themselves in 1907; in 1909 the Commission agents found eight operating their own farms in that valley, four of whom owned their land. Except Salem, where at that time hops were the principal crop, most of the Oregon Japanese farmers grew berries and vegetables.^{6-S} Italian vegetable growers complained of Japanese competition, but the agents were unable to find that increased production of vegetables and berries had had any perceptible effect on prices.^{6-T}

To show what developed from these small beginnings, the following excerpt from a survey of Japanese life and work in Oregon, made in 1940 by the first Nisei lawyer to be admitted to the Oregon bar is quoted:

"Most of the immigrant Japanese were youths of 16 to 20 when they came to this western world. To them it was a land of strange new faces, unfamiliar customs, foreign philosophies and religions and puzzling tongue * * * and for many years, no Japanese women. It was 1903 before the first Japanese women began to arrive in any considerable numbers.

"These were hardships to be expected. What may not have been expected were the outbursts of anti-Japanese feeling, often violent, which plagued the early Japanese, and even found expression in discriminatory legislation. Much of it sprang from race hatred, stubborn, bitter and unreasoning. And some of it, of course, was prompted by the fact that the early Japanese worked for less, lived on less, and, frequently, prospered more.

" * * * On July 12, 1925, anti-Japanese prejudice in Oregon flared into the famous Toledo incident. A mob of 300 Toledo townspeople routed Japanese sawmill workers from their homes, loaded them into trucks, and forcibly evicted them from the town. A group of loggers attempted to defend them, but it did no good. Many were denied even the opportunity to collect their personal belongings.

"But the Japanese are a tenacious people, and those of Oregon are no exception * * *. By industry and thrift and perseverance,

they made the most of the opportunities which contributed much to the building of a state. And we of the second generation are proud of them.

"We are proud, firstly of their contributions to agriculture, which claims 60 percent of all Japanese in Oregon. Mr. Takeoka /President of the Japanese Association of Oregon/ has assembled figures which show the Japanese accomplishment in this field by counties and communities * * * Hood River county—Here the Japanese engaged first in the raising of strawberries, and by 1920 they produced 75 percent of the total grown in the valley. In 1923, they developed the asparagus industry, which had been commenced earlier by John Koberg, and by 1928, they were shipping 50,000 crates annually to all parts of the country. Today the Japanese of Hood River county produce an annual crop of \$500,000. This includes 90 percent of the county's asparagus, 80 percent of the strawberries, 35 percent of the pears and 20 percent of the apples.

"Salem—The Japanese colony here played an important part in the development of the Lake Labish area into the 'richest farmland in the world.' In 1910 Roy K. Fukuda, an ex-section hand, cleared the first tract of land in the Lake Labish swamp. By 1913, he had developed 'Golden Plume' celery, forerunner of the choice varieties of today. Last year the Japanese marketed 625 carloads of celery in 33 states. By intensive cultivation they made 250 acres produce 200,000 crates of celery, 30,000 sacks of onions, 25,000 crates of lettuce and 5,000 crates of carrots. They used fertilizer to the extent of \$150 per acre, paid \$160,000 in payrolls, and bought materials worth \$100,000.

"Washington county—In 1939 Japanese farmers here cultivated about 1,400 acres on which they grew 2,800 tons of berries, which were sold largely to eastern markets for \$280,000. They paid \$190,000 for labor. Two-thirds of all berries in the county were grown by Japanese.

"Gaston—After heartbreaking failures, the Japanese here reclaimed 500 acres of the bottom lands of Lake Wapato, which last year produced 80,000 sacks of onions and a gross income of \$80,000.

"Multnomah and Clackamas counties—Seventy-five percent of the vegetables sold on the Portland markets now are produced by Japanese. In the two counties they now farm 4,500 acres, producing an annual crop of \$2,000,000. * * * It is estimated that Japanese of the two counties spent \$875,000 last year for labor.

"These figures are impressive enough when considered by individual districts, and even more impressive in the aggregate. * * * the total crop of Japanese farmers in Oregon averages \$3,500,000 annually, of which two-thirds is shipped to other states, bringing back to Oregon some \$2,000,000 per year. Total payroll of labor is around \$1,500,000. Total expenditure for farm supplies is around \$1,000,000.

"Oregon Japanese business men have had a major part in building up a large and profitable trade with Japan. In 1938, Portland imports from Japan amounted to \$226,301 while Portland exports to Japan totaled \$1,532,641. The Japanese trade in past years has been the lifestream of Oregon's lumber industry, and until 1937, Japan vied closely with the United Kingdom as the best customer of Portland.

"In Portland alone Japanese pay many thousands of dollars in taxes, but not a single Japanese ever has asked for a cent of relief from the state!"³³

Thus, just as the mass of the second generation Japanese Americans were reaching maturity, a Nisei summed up the contribution of the first generation in Oregon, concluding: "We of the second generation, we 'nisei', only hope that we can do as well. Undoubtedly our path in Oregon is going to be a great deal easier. Much of the old race prejudice has disappeared. In general this land which so reluctantly adopted our parents has been most friendly and cordial to us."²⁰

A year later war sentiment was to thrust this entire generation of Japanese American citizens, together with their alien parents, out of their hard-won holdings and behind the barbed wire fences of relocation centers.

Seattle and Tacoma, Washington

The state of Washington, eventually to become second in density of Japanese population in the whole United States, was slower than either of the other Pacific Coast states to acquire Japanese residents. In 1884, there were only four or five Japanese in Seattle; these were men, working in restaurants or hotels. By 1888, Seattle had 7 Japanese business establishments, but only 10 Japanese. The 1900 census reported 2,900 Japanese in the city and 50 places of business. By 1909 the number of Japanese business establishments had increased to 496.^{6-U}

During the 'nineties, Washington underwent a spectacular development and rapid increase in population. Previously there had been a very

limited market for agricultural produce. The limited market taken in conjunction with Washington's remoteness from the port of entry for Japanese immigrants accounted for the paucity of Japanese in the state. From 1895 until 1899 a Japanese consulate was located at Tacoma, Tacoma rather than Seattle drawing the consulate because it was headquarters for railroad laborers and sawmill hands. Accordingly Japanese shops and businesses sprang up in Tacoma to serve the needs of the consulate and of such Japanese laborers as worked in the vicinity. In 1899 the consulate was moved to Seattle.

Seattle's growth, once it started, was prodigious. In 1890, its population was only 42,837; by 1900, it had grown to 80,671, and in 1907, it was estimated at about 240,000. Tacoma had grown from 36,006 in 1890 to 90,000 in 1907. Neighboring Pierce and King Counties had more than trebled their population in the 17-year period.^{6-V} This phenomenal growth in population obviously created a market for agricultural produce which in turn drew Japanese to the State. However, other factors contributed to the marked increase in Japanese population.

In 1896 direct steamship connections were established between Seattle and the Orient, and a little later gold was discovered in Alaska. At about the same time railroad companies of the region began to employ Japanese. News of the gold discovery sent hordes of seekers to Alaska. Seattle became the port from which supplies--potatoes, eggs, butter, cannery produce--were sent to the gold fields and boom towns of Alaska. The sudden heavy demand for dairy and agricultural produce stimulated agriculture, poultry raising and dairy farming in the country adjacent to Seattle. In the first decade of the twentieth century immigrants constituted the greater part of the population of King and Pierce counties. The Immigration Commission agents discovered that an ever increasing number of immigrants, whether Japanese, Italian, Scandinavian or German, were farming in their own right.^{6-V}

The Japanese were engaged principally in growing strawberries, blackberries, potatoes and green vegetables, in dairying and poultry raising. The first leasing of a farm by a Japanese occurred in 1892. In 1909 the agents of the Commission, in the general district near Seattle, including South Park, Renton Junction, Orillia, O'Brien, Kent, Thomas, Christopher, Auburn, Fife, Sumner, Puyallup, Bellevue, Vashon Island and Green Lake, found 309 Japanese farmers with a total acreage of 6,346 acres, and holdings varying in size from 3 to 100 acres. Because Washington State law denied to aliens the privilege of buying land, the Japanese of that generation and period were all tenant farmers. It was learned that much of the land leased by the Japanese immigrants had had to be cleared of stumps and undergrowth or reclaimed from marshland before crops could be raised. The landowners generally preferred Japanese tenants because the latter required little outlay and were willing to drain marshes and clear stumpage to reclaim part of any land

they leased, or—in their eagerness to obtain land, those who could afford to lease improved land would pay higher rent than could be obtained from members of other races.

Complaints made against the Japanese by farmers of other origins were not on the score of underselling but were on the grounds that the Japanese increased the acreage devoted to small farming and made such enterprises unprofitable. Too, the Japanese of Washington had by 1909 organized farmers' associations wherever they had settled. These associations were formed for promotion of mutual interests and to facilitate the marketing of crops. They also included organized cooperative purchasing of fertilizers, seeds, plants and supplies. No such modern organization existed among the white farmers, who complained resentfully that the Japanese through their progressive cooperative were able to buy for less. 6-W

In 1942 the Tolan Committee reported that Washington Japanese had become more highly urbanized than the Japanese of any other State, 60.4 percent of them living in cities, principally Seattle. 13-c This urbanization was due in part to the fact that the alien land law of Washington was more consistently enforced than that of California, and in part to the fact that the oncoming second generation shared the common tendency of second generation stock to turn from rural to city life and occupations. Nevertheless, at the time of evacuation, Japanese operated 706 farms in the State, with a total acreage of 20,326. They specialized in truck crops, cherries, berries and potatoes, and the produce was estimated at \$4,000,000 annually. "According to the Agricultural Marketing Service, they operated 56 percent of the acreage devoted to truck crops in King County and 39 percent of the beets and carrots, 80 percent of the asparagus, cauliflower, onions, and late peas, and over 50 percent of the cabbage, celery, lettuce, spinach, strawberries, snap beans and cucumbers." 13-d

* * * * *

In the light of cold fact, the charges made in wartime mood by certain West Coast militarists, politicians and professional racists, impugning the motives of the Japanese immigrants in settling where they did, lose substance and credibility. The most intent and extensive examination of historic fact reveals that nothing more sinister than economic necessity determined the pattern of geographic distribution of the Japanese immigrants upon the West Coast of the United States, and that that pattern had been set in such commonplace fashion for more than 30 years when the country of their ancestry and the country of their adoption went to war.

CHAPTER VIII

1941: PRE-DECEMBER 7

The nation was moving toward war. Not very many Americans could bring themselves to admit that global war was inevitable and that the United States must soon become directly involved in it. A considerable number of Americans thought it probable that the United States might eventually be "drawn into the war" that was raging in Asia and in Europe, but not yet, not for quite a long time. Many Americans strung along with the isolationists, who at that time were considered respectable and even admirably patriotic members of American society, and believed that it was entirely unnecessary for the United States to get involved with the destruction and carnage then convulsing the older countries far across the oceans.

At the year's beginning, the men of the nation who were between the ages of 21 and 35 had already registered under the Selective Service Act, and thousands of them were being summoned from home and jobs or colleges to be trained for military service. Defense industries were mushrooming around the port cities of the United States. WPA began to shrink. It became easier to get jobs than it had been for a long time. The cost of living was rising. Lend-Lease was growing in volume, but there was heavy opposition to extending its full benefits to Russia. Defense appropriations were being asked of Congress which made the ordinary citizen's head swim, for the requests were for billions of dollars, even for hundreds of billions of dollars.

And what of the Japanese American population in these days before the attack on Pearl Harbor by Japan inaugurated war between the country of their choice and the country of their ancestry?

By 1941 the Issei were showing their age. As a matter of fact, they looked considerably older than they were. Most of the men had been in the United States for 30 years or longer. They had spent their youth in back breaking work, in drudgery, to be able to establish homes in the new world. When they achieved the land and the home, they had to work just as hard, just as long hours, to support a family, and they went on for years and years working very hard to provide their American citizen children with the education that could lead to all good things in the United States.

The Issei women were younger than their husbands, but they too had worked hard all their lives. If they were farmers' wives, they had kept house, tended their children, cooked, sewed, washed and ironed and at need had helped in the fields, especially in the seasons when a

year's labor could be lost if crops were not tended or harvested against time. If they were city wives, they had tended their houses and their children and in addition had helped their husbands in the small business that supported the family.

The citizen children of the Issei were coming into maturity: in 1941 the greatest number of the Nisei were in the 17-21 age group. A fair number had finished school and were beginning to take over family responsibilities from their parents, who were tired and willing now to take a rest and to let their grown children take over. There were fewer small children in the Japanese communities than there had been in 1920—or in 1930. By the close of the fourth decade of the century, there were not very many of the Issei women who were young enough to bear children, and not very many of the Nisei who were old enough to be establishing homes of their own. In 1940 the birth rate among the Japanese minority had been lower than that of any other group in the United States. Indeed the Japanese American group had lost more than 11,000 of its number since the 1930 census.

Where were the Japanese Americans, and what were they doing in this year? More of them lived in cities than had back in 1910. This shift could be accounted for partly in terms of the alien land laws and partly in terms of the natural tendency of young Americans, once they have been exposed to higher education and city living, to leave the farm for city life. However, about 45 percent of the people continued to live on the land.

An Issei, looking back upon the past 20 years, said in 1942:

"During the years 1913-20 there was considerable growth, from the economic view, for the Japanese. There was a shift from common labor to the small businesses; first these businesses catered primarily and solely to fellow countrymen. Soon they were expanding over to a Caucasian clientele * * *. For the Japanese who were already resident here in 1924 at the time of the Exclusion Act the years from 1924 through 1931 are marked as an era of Americanization, generally. There was no more immigration. Men had their families here. The Japanese were finding a place in society, maybe not an enviable one, but nevertheless a place. The Japanese were consciously beginning to assimilate into American life * * *. This was a period of the growth of Japanese democracy, of liberal government in Japan, of a general acceptance of the western spirit of democracy. This was reflected in the United States among residents here. Good evidence is found in the Japanese language newspapers. The labor movement, for instance, was treated with a degree of open-mindedness

and tolerance impossible to detect in later years.

"In 1931, a vitally significant event occurred, changing the tide and trend of immigrant Japanese development. This was the year of the Manchurian incident, when the Japanese military, breaking the bonds of liberal government, invaded Manchuria. This was the start of the aggression that was to eventually lead to Pearl Harbor.

"From 1931 on, the Japanese government launched a very active and pronounced campaign to indoctrinate colonists abroad. The military was again on the march * * *. Certain decided changes in strategically important facilities for indoctrination took place. This was the period when, for instance, the two major Japanese news syndicates (Rengo and Dentsu) were merged by the government into a single semi-official Domei Japanese News Agency. The differences in Japanese national attitudes soon expressed themselves in magazines and publications which reached overseas.

"Immigrant Japanese in America, ruled by law as ineligible to American citizenship, began to feel, 'Well, perhaps there is something to Japanese nationalism. Maybe Japanese destiny is written as the Tokyo government spokesmen, the extreme rightist military men, say.'

"There was also a revival of the emphasis upon ritual in connection with ancient Japanese sports—jiu jitsu, kendo, sumo, yumi. The Japanese virtues were endowed with halos * * *. The Nisei, or second generation, had come a long way toward assimilation into the American way of life through this all. Differences in degree of progress, of course, are recognized; but generally speaking they are more American than they are Japanese."³⁴

At the same time, a Nisei, who had been valedictorian of his high school class in Los Angeles, who had graduated from the University of California at Los Angeles and who, until evacuation was employed in the Los Angeles County civil service, explained to the new teachers at Manzanar Relocation Center something of the problem of his generation:

"To know something of us, probe our background. Our whole lives have been built around inconsistencies. Our early years, preevacuation, were centered in the public schools and in the home. At school we acquired everything American. We learned to talk, think, write, act as our playmates and classmates of Caucasian parentage. We

joined clubs, played baseball and football, went on picnics and hikes, acted in school plays, exchanged valentines, dressed up for Hallowe'en parties; in short, we did all the things that are a part of what we know as American life.

"At the same time, however, we always returned home to our folks and suddenly discovered each day the fact we were in the presence of Japanese customs, of Japanese ways and manners, Japanese traditions. We celebrated Japanese Girl's Day on March 3, Japanese Boy's Day on May 5; we spoke in Japanese to our parents.

"At an age when our college classmates were finding their place in the economic life of our country, we who were of Japanese ancestry again discovered a somewhat disillusioning thing. There were the unusual limitations of opportunities for job-finding--because of our race. Thus it was that a good number of the second generation Japanese with abilities, education and talent, turned westward across the Pacific for their life work. I never did.

"Most of us, please remember, have never been outside the United States. We have believed in American principles, had faith and confidence in the ideals which we learned in school. We've stepped out into the world about us--and there wasn't anything for us. Evacuation lent shocking confirmation to this.

"Before evacuation, our communities were a curious mixture of both American and Japanese influences. In our religious activities, we were divided equally between Christians and Buddhists. In political activities, we had both Democrats and Republicans. There were such organizations as the Japanese American Citizens League and the Young Democrats. The Japanese influence was marked in sports, language, customs, traditions. But equally there was the balance of the American influence.

"I have recently read a book, The Island Within, by L. Lewisohn. I feel that we at Manzanar and in all these relocation centers, are on an island within. I feel that you teachers are faced with some sort of a challenge to build planks back to the mainland from this island--back into American life."³⁴

The Japanese American minority divided into two major groups, each of which in turn fell into two categories. Primarily there were

the Issei, or aliens, denied naturalization by the law of the United States, and the Nisei, American-born children of the Issei, and hence citizens of the United States. Among the Issei were a few thousand people who were Issei in name only: these were the ones who had been born in Japan, usually during a visit of the mother, but who had been brought to America in infancy, who had no recollection of Japan, who had been educated entirely in American schools and were Nisei in all respects but land of birth, a circumstance which denied them American citizenship. These young people are known among the Japanese as the Hansai, a term meaning loosely "half-and-half." Among the Nisei are the Kibei, those who are American citizens by birth but who have had part or all of their education in Japan. Literally Kibei means "returned to America." Although the term may be applied technically to any American-born child of Japanese ancestry who has visited even briefly in Japan, the Japanese themselves reserve the term for those who stayed in Japan for some years and who returned to America thinking like Japanese rather than like Americans. The Government authorities reached the conclusion that the Kibei who required special investigation were those who had had several years or more of education in Japan after they were 13 years of age and after the year 1931, especially those who came back to America in 1940 or early 1941--as a group these last were known as the "1940-Kibei."

The War Relocation Authority was from the beginning averse to approaching human beings on a categorical basis; the entire experience of the agency served to justify this attitude. It has been found that Kibei responded in a variety of ways to their experience in Japan. Some who spent virtually their whole lives in Japan returned with a deep sense of loyalty to the United States. Some of course fell into the pattern of thinking that a military-minded Japan devised for them. The bulk of them, who had spent some years in recent times in Japan, returned to America psychological misfits; they knew a different Japan from the one their Issei parents remembered from experience 30 or 40 years old, and their views conflicted with the conceptions of their parents; they were rejected by the Nisei, their own generation, because of differences in education, ideas and language. Only about 9,000 of the entire evacuated population fell into the category of "real Kibei."

The Nisei generation is a highly educated one, their average level of schooling being higher than that of the general population and also higher than that of any other minority.

The most recent comparable data showing average years of school completed for persons of Japanese descent as compared with total population of the United States and the West Coast States are summarized below from U. S. Bureau of the Census material for 1940. Median years of school completed may be defined as follows: half of the population

have completed less than the median number of years and half of the population more than the median number of years.

Median years of school completed as of 1940 for persons of Japanese descent 25 years old and over is as follows:

	<u>AMERICAN-BORN</u>	<u>FOREIGN-BORN</u>
California	12.2	8.1
Washington	12.3	8.6
Oregon	12.2	8.3

This average is not available for the population of Japanese descent in the total United States, but since the overwhelming proportion of this population was in California, Oregon and Washington, the figures above are sufficiently complete to represent the entire group.

For purposes of comparison, the median years of school completed as of 1940 for the entire population 25 years old and over in the United States and the West Coast States is given below:

	TOTAL POPULATION (Including Non-White)	AMERICAN-BORN WHITE	FOREIGN-BORN WHITE
Total United States	8.4	8.8	7.3
California	9.9	10.8	7.8
Washington	9.1	10.0	8.1
Oregon	9.1	9.6	8.1

One Nisei doctor expressed the opinion: "The Japanese, like the Jews, have a bad tendency to overeducate their children. It's like having a Cadillac and not enough money for its upkeep. More Nisei should go where technical labor is required."³⁵

By 1941 the Nisei were getting to an age, some of them, to examine themselves and their status rather searchingly. An optometrist wrote:

"The Nisei are too idealistic, dreaming of success that comes only to the best—and only after years of hard labor; they are too confident and egotistical, plunging into studies without taking a personal inventory of themselves; they do not figure the mathematical chances for success in chosen vocations, especially those who plan to become psychoanalysts, play directors, etc. Engineers in particular fail to

take into account racial preference and discrimination. Parents seem to encourage sons beyond the point of absurdity, because they do not want them to follow in the line of domestic work."35

A Nisei personnel officer said:

"To my mind, one of the greatest obstacles which the Nisei must overcome is lack of self-confidence. Confidence can be gained only through a realization of his own ability—not necessarily ego—and through what I deem essential courses such as public speaking and English. * * * Frankly, the time-worn 'emotion-rouser'—racial discrimination—is very distasteful to me * * *. Too often, it is used to excuse one's own shortcomings. It is almost axiomatic that there is always room for those with the ability to 'produce the goods.' * * * The average employer who has his own welfare at stake is not going to let a bit of color prevent him from hiring a person, if he thinks that he can profit by it."35

The fact remained that the adult Nisei, fresh from college and fired with enthusiasm and such confidence as a good record in school had given them, found little use for their training and education in their chosen fields. A first class medical man could hope for nothing better than the limited practice of a Little Tokyo or of a slum district of mixed immigrants. A lawyer was no better off. Teaching was virtually a closed profession to qualified Japanese Americans, though at the college level there was limited opportunity in oriental civilization and history courses. It was a sore point with some Issei and Nisei scholars who had high qualifications in economics or philosophy or mathematics that they were shunted into teaching oriental civilization and language if they wished to teach at all. Graduate engineers found it almost impossible to get any sort of job in their own line—though, by 1941, with the National defense program advancing, there were possibilities in the Eastern States where anti-oriental prejudice was less strong than in the Western States. Scientists found the laboratories of the West Coast firmly closed to Japanese Americans. California State and County Civil Service boards were a little more friendly, but advancement was especially slow for the Nisei, and it was harder for them than for other candidates to receive appointments in the first place. A college graduate who had been forced by economic pressure into the laundry and dry-cleaning business, wrote of the civil service situation:

"For the nisei a civil service career for the present seems to be the least discriminatory. Such a career, if possible, affords him the most steady and best paid position. There may be a certain amount of discrimination against him in this field. For example, about two years ago I took a postal clerk-carrier exam in my hometown. With a grade of 92.2% I was notified I was number one on the eligible list. Up till now I have not received any offer of a position, and I am resigned to the fact that I have been passed by. Likewise, for the position of Lay Inspector I received a grade of 90.6% and was certified to three different federal positions. I may have an offer from one of these certifications. The lot of the nisei is not an enviable one but this is to be expected. For he is a minority and all minorities of every nation must undergo hardships unknown to the majority. There is this consolation, however: the hardships will either make him or break him; if he is strong they will make him."35

In the prewar era, the highly educated Nisei were with monotonous regularity forced back into the Little Tokyos which they had thought to escape. Political science and economics majors had to resort to jobs in the grocery and produce businesses, or in importing stores—if they knew sufficient Japanese to deal with old Issei customers and with representatives of Japanese firms. Farmers sons who turned out to be intellectuals had to go back to the farms to stoop labor. However, in 1941 the majority of the Nisei were still in school.

This generation of American citizens suffered additional embarrassment because of their imperfect bilinguality. Talking Japanese at home and English everywhere else was confusing. At least in their grade school years, many of them attended the Japanese language schools after regular public school hours. Most of them went reluctantly. The Japanese school was harder, with its complicated writing, and besides, the two hours spent there deprived them of the play time that their non-Japanese friends enjoyed after public school let out and before dinner time. The two-hour daily period was not adequate to give them a sound knowledge of the parental tongue. Their parents were often critical of the children's imperfect Japanese. Teachers and school fellows were critical of imperfect English—or in many instances laughed at the mistakes. The two languages warred against each other. The mistakes that the Nisei made in English were different from the errors common to careless average Americans. On the playgrounds or in the class room, other students rarely raised eyebrows or laughed at a fellow who confused number and tense of verbs or left off a final "g" or even said "ain't". But let a Nisei become understandably confused

over collective nouns, and there was considerable attention, often humorous, focused upon the confusion. Japanese has no differentiation between singular and plural. A Japanese learning to speak English quickly learns that in English an "s" is added to a singular noun to make the plural. It is a little hard to remember at first, but the principle of adding "s" to mean more than one is so deeply ingrained that there is no latitude left for exceptions. Consequently most of the Nisei, college-bred or otherwise say "machineries," "equipments," "furnitures," and even "popcorns."

By the time the Nisei finished college, they were handicapped by lack of funds. They had not the opportunity accorded lighter skinned graduates to acquire experience, and they lacked funds to set out in business for themselves. The majority of Japanese families had strained every resource to get their children through school; they had nothing to offer the graduate beyond the chance to acquire a degree, a certificate or a diploma. It was the exceptional family who could support a bright son or daughter for a year or so while he or she job hunted in his own field. Usually, then, the search ended in compromise. A political scientist became a dry cleaner; a would-be school teacher became an accountant; a plant pathologist got a job in a nursery; a trained secretary became a nursegirl or a housemaid. Those who had fathers in business or on farms dropped back into the family pattern. A few fortunate ones who had unusually prosperous parents were able to get financial assistance that would tide them over the first few years while they were establishing themselves in business, trade or a profession. Others, realizing that they must look to importing or other Japanese business, went to Japan to polish up their Japanese speech.

In 1941 it had occurred to very few of the adult Nisei that there were other parts of the country that might be more hospitable to them, offer them a better opportunity than the home town, the home city, or the little farming district on the West Coast. They were young, idealistic, sensitive to rebuff, some of them a little defeatist, but they were almost totally unaware, it seemed, that the West Coast was really a very small part of the United States, and that it was possible to get on a train or a bus and try a different state. The older Nisei who had Sansei, or third generation children, were growing philosophical about the future of this rising generation: the Sansei would be spared the handicaps that the Nisei had known, for the Sansei had English speaking parents, American style homes that were no different from the average home of Caucasian neighbors. The Sansei children would be accepted as real Americans. Hard work, education--and the future was bound to be bright. America promised all things to all comers, regardless of race, color or creed. The Constitution of the United States promised these things; so did the Declaration of Independence.

Such were the Nisei in 1941.

PART II

INTERIM: December 7, 1941 to February 19, 1942

CHAPTER I

IN THE BEGINNING

Promptly on December 7, 1941, in metropolitan areas of the Pacific States, representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation began a round-up of Japanese aliens thought to be dangerous to the Nation in time of war. As early as September 6, 1939, there had been an instruction from the President of the United States to the Department of Justice on the functions and obligations of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in relation to national security, covering surveillance of German, Italian and Japanese nationals. In accordance with the instruction, FBI officers in each district "educated" the local police and other law enforcement agencies in the conduct of their relations with enemy nationals in time of war. Lectures were given by FBI representatives to the various police departments, and formal classes were held in all police departments for the dissemination of detailed instructions. The FBI had approached the problem of Japanese nationals from a somewhat psychological angle, and, in classes for local law enforcement personnel on the West Coast, had emphasized the Bureau's decision that no physical force was to be used on Japanese suspects; it had been determined officially that "domination" of Japanese suspects must be on a "mental" plane. It had been anticipated that operation of the program would be on an individual basis for questioning or arrests, that there should be no mass raids.³⁶

Although there were intermittent raids and isolated single arrests throughout the period that preceded the mass evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry, the majority of the Japanese who were detained were picked up in the first few weeks of the war, some 5,000. In addition to gathering up all suspects whom the Federal agents had had under observation prior to the outbreak of war, the FBI representatives acted promptly on any report from any source that cast suspicion upon any Japanese alien, detaining the suspect for questioning and thorough investigation.

At the same time that the FBI launched its drive on aliens, borders were closed to all persons of Japanese ancestry. Japanese residents who were unable to prove their American citizenship were prohibited from transferring or registering motor vehicles; all assets of Japanese nationals were frozen; Japanese banks were closed; the Federal Government revoked all general and specific licenses issued to aliens to operate business establishments and placed guards around the places of business. The aliens were left with whatever cash they happened to have on hand as of Sunday, December 7.

As one result of this sweeping revocation of all general and special licenses that had been issued to Japanese aliens, the local produce markets by December 11 were reduced in volume to 30 percent of normal. On that day the Secretary of the Treasury under Executive Order No. 8389 of April 10, 1940, issued General License No. 77 and a press release, the former permitting certain Japanese nationals to engage, under strict banking controls, in "the production, marketing and distribution of food products in Continental United States," the latter advising the Japanese nationals to "bring their products to market as evidence of their loyalty to the United States and assuring them that these products would be received by American firms for marketing."³⁹ A day later volume of produce in the markets had increased to 75 percent of the normal and within a few days was back to normal. A further liberalization of regulations was granted on December 15 by the Secretary of the Treasury in General License No. 68a, which allowed a number of Japanese nationals to resume control of produce houses.^{39-a} By the first of the year it was possible for the Issei to draw a hundred dollars a month from his bank account to provide for the needs of his family.

In the early weeks of the war the West Coast population suffered hypertension, living in constant expectation of attack from the air or from the sea. Air raid alarms were frequent. Blackout materials were exhausted in most cities and towns the day after the attack on Pearl Harbor. It was discovered that air raid sirens could not be heard at the required distances. Civilian defense agencies, which had been organized during the previous summer, rushed into action, rapidly expanding the scope of their activities and in some instances duplicating work which had already been performed by the Red Cross or other agencies.

Genuine fear of attack and uncertainty about what had happened at Pearl Harbor bred rumors. A whispering campaign suggested that Japanese truck farmers in California were inoculating their produce with poison in order to dispose of their customers. The Los Angeles Times on December 11 captioned an article: "Vegetables Found Free of Poisons" and labeled "rumors of possible sabotage of California through poisoning or other means" as "simply malicious and unfounded," stating that more than 2,000 samples of Japanese-grown produce had been chemically analyzed and found to be pure. At a later date chemical analysis disproved a rumor that Japanese canned crab in stock in the markets had ground glass in it. The Seattle Post Intelligencer of December 11 carried the headline: "Fifth Columnists Set Plane Beacon Fires Near Pt. Angeles," and described flaming arrows pointing toward Seattle that had presumably been planted by "fifth columnists seeking to guide Japanese air invaders." On an inside page of the same edition was a small item in which the Assistant Governor stated that the fires had been set by white men who were clearing the land of brush and that the arrow shape

of the beds of coals was in all probability coincidental. Everywhere on the West Coast, brush fires, flashes of light of any description, and stray gleams in a blackout were given a sinister construction. Both officials and ordinary civilians saw signs and portents with increasing ease.

However, throughout these weeks of December there was no concerted move to oust the Japanese American minority from the West Coast. It is true that the San Louis Obispo Independent, a minor paper, was first in the field with a recommendation to evacuate the Japanese--on December 12--but the item was not picked up by other papers. On the whole the press was conservative in attitude toward the people who shared ancestry with the enemy across the Pacific. Many papers were inclined to use feature stories which, if not sympathetic toward the wartime situation of the resident Japanese, were at least objective. Radio commentators and the press, generally speaking, appeared to be under the influence of Attorney General Riddle, who on December 8 began his plea for fairness and the avoidance of witch-hunting,³⁷ and on the 10th stated: "The great majority of our alien population will continue to be loyal to our democratic principles if we, the citizens of the United States, permit them to be."^{37-a} On the same occasion he promised: "No alien was apprehended, and none will be, on the score of nationality alone." Every few days he issued statements to the press or spoke over the radio, assuring the public that the FBI had the disloyal elements identified and under control, warning that the defense of our country would be hurt, not helped by any persecution of noncitizens. Until Christmas the Pacific State governors echoed the sentiments of the Attorney General, affirming their confidence in the ability of the FBI to deal with all subversives. It might be said that at this time the voice of the Attorney General was the voice of reason, of faith in the democratic tenets, and for a short time that voice dominated public sentiment.

Even during those days, however, factors and figures and even a Cabinet member's verbal ineptitude were stimulating the racists to action and spreading the kind of confusion that was bound to enlarge the following of the racists and thus allow the voice of prejudice, hysteria and hatred to swell and soar above the voice of reason.

On December 15 Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox reached Washington, returning from a hurried flight to Oahu to inspect the scene of the December 7 attack. On the day of his return he held a large-scale press conference, in the course of which he stated that "the most effective fifth column work of the entire war was done in Hawaii, with the possible exception of Norway." On the same occasion he paid tribute to the heroism of workmen of Japanese ancestry at Pearl Harbor who "deserted their benches to help the marine defense battalion man

machine gun nests. Two of them with hands blistered from hot gun barrels required emergency treatment."³⁸

Under the date of December 20, 1941, Curtis B. Munson, Special Representative of the State Department, reported from Los Angeles in a final installment of the comprehensive report which he had been sent to the West Coast and to Hawaii to make on the Japanese question:

"We desire respectfully to call attention to a statement of the Secretary of the Navy evidently made to some reporter on his return to Washington after the Pearl Harbor attack as printed in the Los Angeles Times of December 18th and the Los Angeles Herald and Express of December 16th. This release was a U. P. and A. P. release.

"We quote, 'I think the most effective Fifth Column work of the entire war was done in Hawaii with the possible exception of Norway,' Secretary of the Navy Knox said. We suggest that this paragraph creates the wrong impression in that it uses the term 'Fifth Column.' This term is loose and has been widely abused. Should not the term 'complete physical espionage' have been used instead? 'Physical espionage' is supplied unwittingly by the gabble of Navy wives, by the gabble of loyal second generation Japanese, by the gabble of the postman and the milkman and classified by definite agents of a foreign government. To this may be added years of photographing, sounding and 'look seeing' by disloyal and paid American people for the last twenty years. Fifth Column activities, such as in Norway, impugn the loyalty of a certain large proportion of a population. Your observer still doubts that this was the case in Honolulu.

* * * * *

"Some reaction of an undesirable nature is already apparent on the West Coast due to this statement of the Secretary's. In Honolulu your observer noted that the seagoing Navy was inclined to consider everybody with slant eyes bad. This thought stems from two sources: self-interest, largely in the economic field, and in the Navy usually from pure lack of knowledge and the good old 'eat 'em up alive' school. It is not the measured judgment of 98% of the intelligence

services or the knowing citizenry either on the mainland or in Honolulu. * * *

" * * * Your observer suspects that Secretary Knox's comparison to the Fifth Column in Norway stems from either of two things: First, a very busy man being caught by the coattails by a reporter; and second, from the unknowing 'eat' 'em up alive' element amongst whom of necessity he was largely exposed in his hurried visit to determine responsibility."39-b

Slightly more than 4 years later, in the course of the hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor incident, Mr. Munson's report was introduced to establish the fact that the late Secretary Knox had meant, not "Fifth Column work" with its implication of deliberate and planned sabotage by resident Hawaiian Japanese, but "espionage," chiefly by paid consular agents.

In the 4-year interval between the Secretary's semantic slip and its official correction, 120,000 people were excluded from their homes and sources of livelihood under a cloud. The majority of these people lived for the better part of 3 years in barrack communities in the wastelands of the interior behind barbed wire fences that were patrolled by armed military guards. Roughly 35,700 of the people had left these barrack communities, by the time that the War Department revoked the mass exclusion order, for resettlement in midwestern or eastern communities or, in the case of more than 10,000 of the young men, to prove their loyalty to the United States by offering their intelligence and their lives in defense of the country of their birth. Then the War Department authorized the return to the West Coast of all except a few thousand who had rejected the American way of life.

Back in December of 1941, other happenings were influencing public sentiment away from reason. On December 20, Admiral Greenslade, of the 12th Naval District, in an appeal for the end of a welders' strike in the shipyards stated that Japanese submarines were attacking shipping off the West Coast. The very day of his announcement an American tanker, Agwiworld, was fired on off Cypress Point, near Monterey, but got to port on its own power, and a second tanker, the Emidio was sunk off Eureka. Five of the crew were lost, the remaining 32 survivors being picked up from life boats.40 On December 22 an enemy submarine fired on the freighter H. M. Storey off Point Arguello, near Santa Barbara, but missed.40-a On the twenty-third, the Union Oil Tanker, Montabello, was hit by a torpedo "off California," and the Larry Dohoney was shelled but escaped.40-b The West Coast residents were convinced that the coast was blockaded by a fleet of enemy submarines. However, after Christmas Day, when an Army bomber sank one

submarine off the California coast,⁴¹ the submarine attacks on coastal shipping ceased.

As Christmas Day approached, an uneasy feeling spread among the coast population that Japanese militarists might well think that the Christian holiday was an appropriate time for an attack on the West Coast. There was no attack, but the day brought news of the loss of Wake Island. It brought, too, the first shipload of wounded together with women and children refugees from Oahu to San Francisco, offering California visual evidence of the fact of war and some Hawaiian-bred rumors. The refugees from Hawaii brought unverified reports of sabotage performed by Island Japanese on December 7: it was said that on that Sunday, Island Japanese blocked the road to Pearl Harbor with trucks to prevent reinforcements and ambulances from getting through, that they had rammed planes on the flying fields, that they had entered Hickam Field in a milk delivery truck just before the attack, and when the first bombs fell they had let down the sides of the truck, revealing a machine gun nest, from which they shot down the American flyers as they tried to run to their planes. These stories circulated quickly, received widespread credence and produced a marked change in the public attitude toward the Japanese American population in California and the other coastal States. Too, they gave support to the interpretation which had been given Secretary Knox's use of the term "Fifth Column." In the last days of the year, with the darkening war picture, prejudice and suspicion increased. The day after Christmas the capture of Hongkong was confirmed by London. Daily the news from the Philippines grew worse. There were sporadic attacks upon local Japanese, chiefly by Filipinos. The first of these was reported by the Los Angeles Times on the day before Christmas. The victim happened to be a Nisei who had been honorably discharged from the United States Army Medical Corps earlier in the year; he was found stabbed to death in a Los Angeles street early in the morning of December 23. On Christmas Day a Japanese was killed in Stockton.^{41-a} In the next week or 10 days there were attacks upon Japanese in San Jose,^{41-b} Gilroy^{41-c} and Sacramento.⁴²

CHAPTER II

THE RALLYING OF THE RACISTS

By January the voice of the racists, the old pressure groups, lifted again in clarion fashion, with slogans and arguments and battle cries. Until war between the United States and Japan provided conditions favoring a reinterpretation of certain guarantees contained in the Constitution of the United States, the Exclusion Act of 1924 had remained the greatest victory achieved by the West Coast anti-Japanese forces. It was not that the anti-Japanese forces had been content after 1924 but that between dreams of depriving the Nisei of their citizenship and ridding the coastal States of the Japanese already in residence and the realization of those dreams stood the substantial obstacle of the Constitution. Certain organizations comprising the anti-Japanese front passed yearly resolutions recommending amendment of the Constitution to permit denial of citizenship to the American-born on racial grounds and to simplify procedures for deportation, but the resolutions were produced and reproduced without any real expectancy of their achieving their objectives--until war between the United States and Japan presented the racists with a golden opportunity.

It took the pressure groups of the West Coast approximately a month to recover sufficiently from the shock of the attack on Pearl Harbor to realize the advantage which the nature of that attack had given them. For so long, on so many occasions, they had cried "Wolf, Wolf!" without a wolf on the horizon, that the sudden materialization of one may have robbed them of speech. Whatever the reason, this usually vocal element was noticeably silent on the subject of the Japanese Americans until after Christmas of 1941.

On December 30, the General Hunter Liggett Chapter 100 of the Military Order of the Purple Heart "voted a letter to President Roosevelt asking that all Japanese be removed to inland points from California coast counties."^{41-d} On January 16, 1942, there began in the California Senate the first whittling away of State civil liberties guarantees. Senator John Harold Swan of Sacramento introduced a resolution urging special loyalty investigations of Nisei State civil-service employees. Mr. Swan stated that he believed that 50 percent of Japanese American citizens in the state were disloyal. He and Senator Jack Metzger of Red Bluff produced a photostatic copy of a payroll sheet of the Motor Vehicle Department which showed only Japanese names; Mr. Swan "contended this was a systematic plot to get Japanese on the state payroll and allow them to bore from within." Mr. Metzger, defending the proposed resolution, enlarged a little on the original milk-truck story, saying: "Japanese fifth columnists in milk wagons

drew machins guns instead of milk bottles out of 21 wagons in Honolulu the morning of December 7 and turned them on Pearl Harbor barracks."42-a

An editorial appearing in the Sacramento Union on January 18 was sharply critical of the plan to investigate the Nisei personnel:

"Nine months ago, however, when war was in the offing and Swan was still a great one for civil liberties, he voted in favor of a bill providing that in applying the State civil service act, 'it is unlawful * * * to permit or suffer any notation or entry to be made (in civil service records) indicating or in any wise suggesting or pertaining to the race, color, or religion of any persons whatsoever.'

"This bill was subsequently passed and became the law of the state—the law under which the State personnel board now administers the civil service act.

"Prior to December 7 that attitude was known as guaranteeing the civil liberties of all Americans. And since December 7 the President and the Justice Department have appealed urgently for tolerance among the people of the nation with those fellow-citizens who chance to be descended from the natives of the countries with whom we are at war.

"This appeal, of course, has fallen rather flatly on some ears that have been deafened by the hysteria of war.

"It is utterly deplorable, however, that this hysteria should be reflected in demands on the part of our elected representatives for legislative investigations of the racial background of American citizens.

"Senator Swan and all his colleagues know very well that citizens of California cannot be barred from state employment simply because their parents are Japanese nationals.

"So what good purpose could possibly be served by bringing the matter up and trying to launch

an investigation that could only stir up the prejudices of people whose emotions already are near the boiling point?

" * * * The Swan resolution, as finally passed was modified considerably. We hope the investigation it may touch off will not be a witch hunt.

"The idea of simply making an investigation into the racial composition of the state's personnel looks like a plain example of racial persecution.

"If Senator Swan, the ex-champion of civil liberties, still doesn't get the point, we might refer him back to a bill which he himself introduced in the regular session of the legislature last spring:

"'Every person who maliciously and wilfully harasses, disturbs, annoys, injures, or molests another person because of his race or ancestry is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine not less than \$200 or by imprisonment in the county jail not less than 90 days, or by both such fine and imprisonment.'

"In the present instance, it would seem that Sacramento's senator is fortunate that this great piece of civil liberties legislation which he introduced last year failed to get out of committee."42-b

However, the very day that this editorial appeared, the chairman of the State Personnel Board said that the board's hands were tied unless the legislature gave the board power to abolish civil-service lists, adding that it was his opinion that the legislature would be giving the board "too much power" in that event.42-c A feature story which appeared a few days later in the Sacramento Union contained the opinion that the Personnel Board probe into the loyalty of Nisei State employees was a "hot potato." The writer pointed out that the board, before it could act, had two preliminary steps to take: first, it would have legal sanction for employing such a measure against American citizens of Japanese ancestry who might hold dual citizenship; and, second, it would have to formulate a policy for determining the loyalty of such citizens and procedures for trying and dismissing those accused of disloyalty.42-d

On January 21, Congressman Leland M. Ford of Santa Monica, California, announced in Washington that he would urge Government officials to move all Japanese, whether native-born or alien, to

concentration camps.41-e He was the first of the West Coast Delegation to propose mass evacuation. From this time on demands from organizations, municipal authorities and individuals for evacuation or evacuation and detention of the Japanese American minority increased in number and urgency.

On January 25, the San Francisco Examiner, which since Christmas had been carrying more and more anti-resident-Japanese articles, stories and letters to the editor, warned of a new submarine menace.

"A grim warning that the West Coast be on the lookout for an attack on merchant vessels similar to that staged the last few days on the Atlantic coast, was sounded by the Navy yesterday.

"Enemy submarines have recently appeared off the Pacific coast and unidentified vessels off Alaska, the 13th Naval District announced in Seattle. Should the enemy strike, it would be the first resumption of hostilities off the Pacific Coast since Christmas week.* * *

"The thirteenth Naval District expressed appreciation for the action of British Columbia in removing all enemy aliens from the coast. It said that the province is extremely important in the defense of the 13th Naval District, which includes Alaska * * * the exodus of aliens will be of inestimable value in the defense of the Northwest."41-f

Further on the same item included rather vague hints of Navy reports of flares at sea and blinker shore lights. By January 26, Senator Hiram W. Johnson of California, announced in Washington that he was going to call an immediate conference of the Pacific Coast Delegation to survey the entire problem of West Coast defenses,4-g while Los Angeles County supervisors passed a resolution for the removal of the 13,000 Japanese aliens from the Los Angeles area and the California Department of the American Legion, in a more sweeping resolution, demanded that all of California's 93,000 Japanese, whether citizen or alien, be interned for the duration.4-h At the same meeting, the Los Angeles County supervisors ordered the discharge of the 56 Japanese American county employees, saying it was "impossible to distinguish between loyal and disloyal members and it is not feasible to detail Americans to shadow all the Japanese employees." The city of Los Angeles followed suit and dismissed its 39 American-born Japanese, but permitted them to apply for leaves of absence for the duration of the war. Within 24 hours of the issuance of these orders by Los Angeles officials, the State Personnel Board took action to bar, pending

loyalty investigation, all "obvious" direct descendants of enemy nationals from taking future civil-service examinations in California, and voted also to launch an investigation into the loyalty of current State employees, with emphasis upon cases of presumed dual citizenship--as soon as funds were made available to the Board.42-f Senator Metzger, an inaugurator of the legislative resolution behind the State board's action, promptly assured the board that the legislature would "reimburse the emergency fund for any sums spent in investigating the loyalty of state employees." The Sacramento Union commented:

"Officially, the board's orders will apply to direct and immediate descendants of Germans and Italians, as well as Japanese. Wide discretion will be given the board's administrative staff, however, and the use of the word 'obvious' made it apparent that the action will be concerned primarily with those of Japanese extraction, particularly since descendants of German and Italian nationals cannot be readily identified."42-g

Senator Metzger said sweepingly: "I do not believe there is a single Japanese in the world who is not pulling for Japan regardless of where born. They will spy, commit sabotage, or die if necessary." His friend and the resolution's co-author, Senator Swan, said that he believed that "most, rather than all, Japanese are sympathetic with Japan."42-g

There appeared on January 29 the first of a series of syndicated articles written by the eastern columnist, Henry McLemore, during his brief visit to California. In the San Francisco Examiner, the article was captioned: "Why Treat The Japs Well Here?" In the Sacramento Union, it was introduced by the statement: "AMERICANS ARE NUTS: They should move Japanese from California." Writing from Los Angeles, Mr. McLemore protested:

"The only Japanese apprehended have been the ones the FBI actually had something on. The rest of them, so help me, are as free as birds. There isn't an airport in California that isn't flanked by Japanese farms. There is hardly an air field where the same situation doesn't exist. They run their stores. They clerk in stores. They clip lawns. They are here, there and everywhere.

"You walk up and down the streets and you bump into Japanese every block. They take the parking positions.

They get ahead of you in the stamp line at the post office. They have their share of seats on the bus and street car lines.

* * * * *

"Everywhere that the Japanese have attacked to date, the Japanese population has risen to aid the attackers. Pearl Harbor, Manila. What is there to make the government believe that the same wouldn't be true in California? Does it feel that the lovely California climate has changed them and that the thousands of Japanese who live in the boundaries of this state are all staunch and true Americans?

"I am for the immediate removal of every Japanese on the West coast to a point deep in the interior. I don't mean a nice part of the interior either. Herd 'em up, pack 'em off and give 'em the inside room in the badlands. Let 'em be pinched, hurt, hungry and dead up against it.

"Sure this would work an unjustified hardship on 80 percent or 90 percent of the California Japanese. But the remaining 10 or 20 percent have it in their power to do damage--great damage to the American people. They are a serious menace and you can't tell me that an individual's rights have any business being placed above a nation's safety.

"If making one million innocent Japanese uncomfortable would prevent one scheming Japanese from costing the life of one American boy, then let the million innocents suffer.

" * * * There are sure to be some Americans who will howl and scream at the idea of inconveniencing America's Japanese population in order to prevent sabotage and espionage.

"Okay, let them howl. Let them howl timber-wolf type. Our government has told us we face war. All-out war. It has told us that we are up against the roughest days in our history. It has demanded of us sacrifice and sweat and toil and all of the other of Mr. Churchill's graphic words.

"That's all right, we will answer. But let us have no patience with the enemy or with any one whose veins carry his blood.

"Let us in this desperate time put first things first. And, who is to say that to the men and women of this country there is anything that comes above America?

"Personally, I hate the Japanese. And that goes for all of them.

"Let's quit worrying about hurting the enemy's feelings and start doing it."42-h

On January 29, 1942, the Attorney General of the United States, acting upon recommendations made by General DeWitt, began designating prohibited zones, small areas which surrounded electrical plants, dams, and other vital installations. These areas were known as "spots." In the course of a few days, 99 such spots were designated as prohibited zones for aliens of enemy nationality. The largest areas were along the water fronts of San Francisco, San Diego and Wilmington—the Wilmington area included Terminal Island, the Japanese fishing village. February 15 was set as the deadline for evacuation by enemy aliens of the prohibited spots, with the exception of a few of the larger and last designated areas, principally a 40-square-mile area which embraced a goodly portion of Los Angeles City and County. These exceptions were to be cleared by February 24.

The plan to clear strategic "spots" of aliens of enemy nationality had been shaping since the first week in January. During that week Lieutenant General DeWitt and his Assistant Chief of Staff, Major (later Colonel) Karl R. Bendetsen, conferred with Attorney General Biddle's special representative, Assistant Attorney General James Rowe, who had been sent out to San Francisco, and with Mr. N. J. L. Pieper of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The conferences, continuing from January 2 to 5, led to an exchange of identical memoranda on January 6, 1942.

These memoranda laid down specific principles and procedures for safeguarding the West Coast against espionage and sabotage which might be performed by aliens, and at the same time they showed, or implied, that the Attorney General did not in all instances see eye to eye with the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army. The first principle set forth was that of the designation of restricted or prohibited zones:

" * * * The Attorney General will designate restricted areas. He will entertain Army recommendations. He will require the Army to determine the exact description of each restricted area. What further requirements he will make will depend in large measure upon the nature of the area involved and the extent of alien enemy population in such area. Indications are that, should Army recommendations include areas in which there is resident a large number of alien enemies and evacuation will thereby be rendered necessary, he will also require the submission of detailed plans for evacuation and resettlement. The Army has expressed disinclination to compliance on its part with such a requirement for the reason that the Justice Department will undertake an alien enemy registration and will have in its possession all the information essential for planning purposes once the proposed restricted areas have been made known to that Department by the Army."31-d

The memoranda committed the Justice Department to registering alien enemies "with the least practicable delay," to acquire photographs, finger prints and full personal data on every alien of enemy nationality who was beyond the age of 14. The memoranda established the fact that alien premises could be searched and alien persons apprehended in emergencies without the formality of a warrant, and they established the fact that dwellings shared by citizens and aliens could not be searched without a warrant signed by a United States attorney. The sixth principle set forth the Attorney General's regulations for conducting broad scale searches:

"The term 'mass raid' will not be employed by the Attorney General. Instructions which have been or will be issued to United States Attorneys and to F. B. I. Special Agents will permit 'spot raids.' That is to say, if lists of known alien enemies with the addresses of each are prepared by the F. B. I. and warrants are requested to cover such lists, a search of all the premises involved may be undertaken simultaneously. Thus all of the alien enemy premises in a given area can be searched at the same moment."31-d

As military and popular pressure for mass evacuation of Japanese residents from the coastal region increased, the Chief of the Enemy Alien Control Unit of the Department of Justice recommended to the Attorney General that a spokesman for the Department of Justice should be sent to the West Coast to supervise the "spot" clearance program and to convince California officials that the security of the West

Coast was being safeguarded by the present system of FBI raids, seizure of contraband, and arrest of suspects, and that mass evacuation was undesirable and unnecessary. The Attorney General acted upon this recommendation, selecting Thomas C. Clark, of the Anti-Trust Division of the Department of Justice, to be his special representative to the West Coast.

Just arrived in Los Angeles, Mr. Clark was quoted in the press as stating on January 30, that all American-born Japanese would be placed under strict surveillance and those who fell under suspicion would be sent to concentration camps in the Midwest.⁴²⁻¹

Back in Washington, D. C., Attorney General Biddle, on Sunday evening, February 1, the eve of the alien enemy registration, broadcast over CBS a warning against the persecution of alien enemies, promising that the Department of Justice would "continue to be on the alert in protecting the internal security of the country," and concluding: "I want to point out that the persecution of aliens--economic or social--can be a two-edged sword. Such persecution can easily drive people, now loyal to us, into fifth column activities."^{38-a}

At dawn of February 2, the first day of the alien enemy registration program, the FBI launched a series of spot raids on the Japanese fishing village at Terminal Island. The Los Angeles Times gave the number of arrests made in the first raid of the dawn series as 336, and described the occasion in some detail:

"Armed with Presidential warrants--issued only in time of war, FBI, aided by Police and deputy sheriffs, launched the raid shortly after dawn, finding many of the aliens still in their beds. * * * Most of the Japanese taken into custody were sped to the U. S. Immigration Station on Terminal Island. Others were taken to outlying city and county jails. The aliens will be held for investigation. Those considered dangerous to the national safety will be interned for the duration, it was explained. The others are expected to be released.

" * * * Army patrol cars bristling with machine guns threaded the narrow streets throughout the congested Terminal Island residential district during the harbor raid. There was not a single instance of any resistance being offered the officers.

"As an additional precaution, however, soldiers were stationed at the drawbridge leading to the island, and at the ferry house, the only other means of entrance and exit.

"Operating with machine-like efficiency, the FBI agents, headed by J. W. Vincent, in charge of operations, had prepared lists of the names and addresses of all those for whom warrants had been issued.

"The entire island was divided into areas of one or two blocks, with a dozen or more men being assigned to each district. In each instance an FBI agent, accompanied by two policemen or deputy sheriffs, rapped at the door of a home of an enemy alien. After being admitted they informed the occupant he was under arrest and proceeded to take him to the Immigration Station."38-b

On February 2, too, the Los Angeles County Defense Council recommended that all dual citizens be interned, while the county manager urged the board of supervisors to "clear the way for use of temporary camps for interned Japs in Antelope Valley and other locations," and the board applied to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget in Washington for funds to care for the internees.38-b On the same day, in the Nation's Capital, Washington and Oregon members of Congress joined in the plea of their California colleagues for speeding up evacuation machinery. In San Francisco, on that day, State Attorney General Earl Warren opened a conference of 100 California law enforcement officers with the declaration that California was "wide open" to any kind of sabotage or fifth column activity, and the conferring officers voted to ask the Federal Government to remove at once all alien Japanese from a 200-mile-wide strip of California coastline for the duration of the war; they decided too to launch a fresh investigation of land titles and file civil suits for escheat to the State of land which they should consider to be held illegally by Japanese.* At the same time that the State attorney general was going on the record as favoring mass exclusion of Japanese aliens from virtually the entire state, the State Governor in Sacramento was working in conference with military and Justice officials to reach a solution of the problem of national security without resorting to mass evacuation of the Japanese.38-c The reports of the two conferences, appearing on the same page of the Los Angeles Times, highlighted the difference in attitude and objective of the two highest officials of the State of California.

*The question of the right of Japanese aliens to purchase land in the name of their citizen children had been threshed out in test cases during the 'Twenties, with court decisions affirming the right of alien parents unable to purchase land in their own right to buy it in good faith for their citizen children.

In addition to the prohibited spots, the U. S. Attorney General designated as Restricted Area No. 1, a 500-mile-long strip of coastline from the Oregon border southward, and varying in width from 30 to 150 miles, including Sacramento. Designated "spots" within the restricted area would be cleared of Axis aliens at the time prescribed, but the area as a whole was not to be cleared: Axis aliens could continue to live and work there, but after February 24 were to observe a 6:00 p. m. to 6:00 a. m. curfew, and could not, without special permit, travel more than five miles from their homes.

Tom Clark promised the people who were faced with eviction that everything would be "all right" and indicated that "farm colonies will be established for the evacuated aliens and their families." Governmental agencies were becoming aware of the problem of alien destitution, and were beginning to hold conferences on the subject.^{38-d}

In the Nation's Capital, Pacific Coast Senators and Representatives were becoming more and more agitated, and there was conflict in attitude and opinion among them. The Los Angeles Times representative in Washington wrote under dateline of February 3:

"Heads of the Army, Navy and Department of Justice today were asked to supply Pacific Coast Senators and Representatives with a full account of measures taken thus far to defend the West Coast against enemy attack and also to supply detailed information on steps that that have been taken to solve the alien and native-born Japanese situation.

"Divergent views of Coast members on both subjects became more pronounced as Senator Downey of California delivered a nation-wide broadcast tonight in defense of Justice Department plans for handling the Japanese evacuation problem and other Californians promptly took issue with his contentions.

"Regarding Downey's remarks as inspired by Justice Department spokesmen who are themselves unacquainted with the real issues presented by the Japanese dual citizenship situation, several members of Congress from the Pacific Coast States prepared to take public issue with his two principal assumptions.

"The first of these is that there is danger of popular uprisings against the Japanese of the Pacific Coast, and the other is the Senator's assertion that 'Attorney General Biddle has acted with speed and decision.'

"Representative Costello (D.) of Hollywood, was the first to challenge Downey's position.

"I have no fear whatsoever,' said Costello, 'that the people of California will take the Japanese situation into their own hands. But I do feel that the people on the Pacific Coast understand their peril and are absolutely justified in demanding prompt, intelligent and vigorous action from Washington authorities.'

"On the subject of the adequacy and expedition of Biddle's procedure, Costello was equally emphatic. 'I don't agree with Senator Downey that Attorney General Biddle has acted either with speed or decision.* * * Two months have passed since the Pearl Harbor incident, and only now, after two of the most critical months in our history, has any action been taken. The program of registering aliens, of barring aliens from certain prohibited zones, of attempting to maintain a watch on American-born Japanese who may or may not contemplate acts of sabotage, won't prevent sabotage.'"38-e

Two committees were appointed within the West Coast Delegation, one to investigate defense preparations, the other to examine the Japanese situation. On the latter committee were Senators Bone and Walgren of Washington, Senator Downey of California, Representatives Costello, Welch, Elliott, Anderson, Voorhis, Leland M. Ford, Gearhart, Sheppard, Thomas F. Ford and Rolph, all of California; Representative Pierce of Oregon, and Representatives Hill and Angell of Washington. Senator Walgren was made chairman of the committee and expressed the hope that American-born Japanese would aid in the solution of the problem, saying:

"As to the native-born Japanese, I know some people believe there are legal loopholes through which we can work to remove them from the zone of danger. I'm inclined to the idea of asking their cooperation on such a proposal. I think if we ask for it and put it in the right light, they will want to leave for their own protection."38-f

Paul V. McNutt, Administrator of the Federal Security Agency, in response to Senator Walgren's recommendation that the Government should provide dislocated Japanese with housing and work opportunities, announced that his agency was taking steps to meet this obligation.38-f

Representative Martin Dies, of Texas, a few days before the question of allowing his Committee on Un-American Activities to continue another year came up before Congress, released to the press detailed summaries of his "Yellow Report," which at that time had not been published. He maintained to the press that if the Administration had allowed him to publish this report on un-American propaganda activities of the Japanese Americans the previous September, thus disclosing his view of the operations of the Japanese espionage system, "Pearl Harbor couldn't have happened."^{38-g} From February 5 on, the Dies material provided scare stories for the yellow press and kept cropping up in many of the more responsible news sheets of the West Coast. The Los Angeles Times headlined the first disclosure of the Dies Committee findings: "DIES 'YELLOW PAPER' REVEALS JAP SPYING ATTEMPTS, PROBABLY SUCCESSFUL, TO LEARN LOS ANGELES AQUEDUCT SECRETS DISCLOSED."^{38-g} The next day the paper headlined: "WATER PLOT CONFIRMED BY VAN NORMAN; CORRESPONDENCE SHOWING JAPANESE ATTEMPT TO GET DATA GIVEN OUT." There followed a reproduction of a photostatic copy of a several-year-old letter from the Japanese consulate to H. A. Van Norman, chief engineer and general manager of the Los Angeles Water Bureau, asking information about the local water system.^{38-h} An editorial in that issue of the paper pointed out that there were some inaccuracies in the Dies Report, citing two:

"The committee implies that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was somewhat at fault, since it did not investigate the Japanese request to Van Norman but passed the buck to the Army, whose San Francisco office expressed disinterest in the matter as beyond the scope of the Army's peacetime functions. But the FBI had no specific duties in regard to national defense prior to 1939, though enforcement of the Espionage Act of 1917 was part of its work.

"The Dies committee is in error as to the official post of Kiyoshi P. Okura, whom it describes as chief examiner of the city Civil Service Bureau. He was merely one of 10 junior personnel technicians; but it is admitted he could have influenced the obtaining by Japanese of ratings entitling them to be considered for appointment to city jobs."³⁸⁻ⁱ

The Mayor of Los Angeles was advocating over the radio that all Japanese, alien and native-born, should be removed to a distance of several hundred miles from the coast and that they should be put to work raising food for freedom, with the final admonition:

"Every person of Japanese blood, wherever he be residing in this country, should be made to understand

that one single act of sabotage—anything that might assist the Japanese government in this time of war—will brand the entire Japanese population not only during the existence of a state of war but for at least a generation."38-j

On the same day the Los Angeles County grand jury "unanimously adopted a resolution to Federal authorities urging immediate ousting of all alien Japanese from the Pacific Coast combat zone to avert fifth column activities and sabotage," adding that "serious consideration be given to the removal of Japanese other than aliens * * * in the interests of safety * * * and protection of life and property and national defense."38-k

Back in Washington, D. C., Attorney General Biddle was still opposing the idea of interning all enemy aliens, protesting that such a step would be "profoundly unwise and profoundly un-American," and warning that it would cause retaliations on Americans caught in enemy-occupied territory.38-l

General DeWitt issued sabotage alert orders to all officers, on February 6, and the newspapers of the coast carried the message next day: "You are instructed to be on the alert for sabotage and subversive acts particularly in areas where defense activities exist. Report immediately to this office occurrences of a suspicious nature." The Los Angeles Times placed on the front page beside the news of the sabotage alert a summing up of the latest changes in the Japanese American situation:

"The alert came after Tom C. Clark, alien control administrator in San Francisco, announced that between 200 and 300 citizens of Japan, Germany and Italy will receive written notices by next Monday to leave prohibited areas.

"He said other groups totaling 10,000 in California and including 1,800 in the Los Angeles area must obey the Federal ouster order by February 24. Clark said that while it was not intended to impose additional evacuations from agricultural areas after February 24, the Army is resurveying city territory, indicating possible further movement from those zones.

"The notices the aliens will receive through the mail will instruct them to go to the Social Security Board offices in their communities. They will be given information and access to attorneys to learn their

civil rights, if they desire, and will receive funds if they cannot finance their enforced moves.

"Efforts will be made to get them jobs in the interior—perhaps in Utah, Clark said.

"Possibilities of detaining alien and other dangerous Japanese in the County's string of mountain road camps and the jail honor farm at Castaic were explored yesterday by Supervisor Roger Jessup and Sheriff Biscailuz."38-m

On an inner page of that February 7 issue of the Times there was the first sign of public awareness that Japanese residents were being victimized:

"Determined to halt asserted racketeering by junkmen and secondhand furniture dealers upon the confused and panicky families of alien Japanese seized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation at Fish Harbor, Captain Basil Starkey of the San Pedro police division assigned a detail of five men to the Terminal Island area.

"Starkey quoted K. Higashi, president of the Japanese-American Citizens' League, as complaining junkmen and used furniture dealers were telling wives of arrested aliens that the Federal government intended to seize their household belongings.

"Through this technique they were buying refrigerators, radios, stoves and other furniture costing from \$50 to \$200 for from \$4 to \$5, loading their purchases on their trucks and driving away, Higashi complained.

"The police were instructed to aid Higashi in warning his people not to sacrifice their belongings.

"Higashi was aiding Y. Sakamoto, head of the Southern California Japanese Fishermen's Association, to register aliens at the local post offices. They also were attempting to prevent hunger or destitution among families of aliens now in custody.

"Sakamoto said he was obtaining powers of attorney from alien owners of jigboats to permit their sale to provide funds to support the fishermen's families pending receipt of Federal aid. About 45 of the small fishing boats are involved."38-n

Personal attacks made upon Attorney General Biddle through press and radio were getting increasingly violent. The Los Angeles Times Washington representative reported that the delay in Government action to effect the removal of the Japanese population from the West Coast was caused by the Attorney General's concern for the guarantees contained in the fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution. This man wrote, under dateline of February 7, from the Capital:

"It [the question of American-born Japanese] is hung up in the Department of Justice and Mr. Biddle himself hung it there.

"The Attorney General of the United States is not only a lawyer, he occupies an eminent position as one of the country's foremost liberals. There are some who feel that his views extend slightly beyond the roseate horizons of America's traditional brand of liberalism.

* * * * *

"The Army and Navy want the Japanese removed from Terminal Island and from all other areas to which the security and the national defense of the country are related. Obviously Mr. Biddle represents a bottle-neck, so far as they are concerned.

"In the opinion of Mr. Biddle and in the expressed views of Secretary of War Stimson, the Attorney General has taken all steps necessary to control enemy aliens in the United States and to so circumscribe their activities as to greatly minimize the danger of sabotage by them.

"On the other phase of the problem--which realistic citizens and officials on the Pacific Coast regard as even more perilous--Mr. Biddle has not been content with his own refusal to act.

"He has sought to discourage those who demand prompt measures to effect the removal of the American-born Japanese; and other departments of the government

at the request of the Department of Justice have attempted to soft pedal the whole thing.

"Members of Congress who have their own duties and responsibilities to consider and who are also possessed of a knowledge of the humanitarian as well as the legal issues involved, say that the Attorney General can act at once in this matter if he chooses to act."38-0

Henry McLamore, after a week in California, wrote his column from San Diego crying out upon the Attorney General for giving alien residents of the larger "spots" until February 24 to move out; and concluded:

"Mr. Biddle is the Attorney General in Washington, but he could run for office in California and not even win the post of third assistant dog catcher in charge of liver spotted airedales.

"That's the way they feel about Mr. 'Bluesblood' Biddle out here.

"Maybe the feeling is all wrong. Maybe they have the man pegged incorrectly. I wouldn't know about that. All I know is that Californians have the feeling that he is the one in charge of the Japanese menace, and that he is handling it with all the severity of Lord Fauntleroy playing squat tag with his maiden aunt.

"I've been here a week now, and have traveled a few hundred miles up and down the coast, and have yet to meet a man, woman, or child who doesn't think that Mr. Biddle's handling of the bow-legged sons and daughters of the Rising Sun is mighty ridiculous."41-1

FBI raids continued, with more spot raids on communities in the Salinas Valley, the Vallejo area, and other parts of the northern district and in the harbor areas of Los Angeles and San Diego in the south. In the meantime General DeWitt and Attorney General Biddle had come to open disagreement on the designation of additional prohibited areas. In a memorandum addressed to Assistant Attorney General James Rowe, Jr., on January 5, 1942, General DeWitt stated that the "Army has no wish to undertake the conduct and control of alien enemies anywhere within continental United States. Impressions to the contrary notwithstanding, the Army would accept transfer of such responsibility and

authority with the greatest reluctance."31-e In reference to exclusion areas, he said:

"In order to avoid absolute confusion in the matter, Army authorities strongly urge that the Department of Justice undertake to establish immediate liaison and coordination with all appropriate relief agencies prepared to alleviate hardship resulting from compulsory change of residence on the part of alien enemies residing in Category A, restricted areas Those areas within, or through which no alien may be permitted under any circumstances. As the Department of Justice has requested permission to announce that the establishment of restricted areas has been made by the Attorney General only because the commanding General of this theatre has so requested, military authorities desire it to be unequivocally clear that they desire that everything possible be done to eliminate unnecessary hardship and the need for planning and coordination along this line is strongly emphasized."31-f

Some weeks later, after making recommendations for the establishment of prohibited spots in California--and these were accepted by the Attorney General--the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command made recommendations for the establishment of prohibited zones in Arizona, Oregon and Washington. To quote from the general's final report:

"Upon receipt of these supplemental recommendation * * * the Attorney General refused to act until further study. In the case of Washington State, the recommended prohibited zone included virtually all of the territory lying west of the Cascades. A general enemy alien evacuation from this area would have been required. More than 9,500 persons would have been affected. No agency was then prepared to supervise or conduct a mass movement, and the Attorney General was not convinced of the necessity."31-g

The Attorney General's reply to the Secretary of War on the subject of General DeWitt's large scale recommendations, dated February 9, 1942, contained the following:

"Your recommendation of prohibited areas for Oregon and Washington include the cities of Portland, Seattle and Tacoma, and therefore contemplate a mass evacuation of many thousands* * * No reasons were given for

this mass evacuation * * * I understand that * * * Lieutenant General DeWitt has been requested to supply the War Department with further details and further material before any action is taken on these recommendations. I shall, therefore await your further advice.

* * * The evacuation * * * from this area would, of course, present a problem of very great magnitude. The Department of Justice is not physically equipped to carry out any mass evacuation. It would mean that only the War Department has the equipment and personnel to manage the task.

"The proclamations directing the Department of Justice to apprehend, and where necessary, evacuate alien enemies, do not, of course, include American citizens of the Japanese race. If they have to be evacuated, I believe that this would have to be done as a military necessity in these particular areas. Such action, therefore, should in my opinion, be taken by the War Department and not by the Department of Justice."31-h

The DeWitt report comments:

"The Commanding General thereafter submitted a resume of the military considerations which prompted his recommendation for a prohibited zone in Washington and Oregon embracing virtually the westerly half of those states. The Department of Justice, however, concluded that it was not in a position to undertake any mass evacuation, and declined in any event to administer such general civil control measures."31-i

It states further that at this time there were "hundreds of reports nightly of signal lights visible from the coast, and of intercepts of unidentified radio transmissions. Signaling was often observed at premises which could not be entered without a warrant because of mixed occupancy. The problem required immediate solution. It called for the application of measures not then in being."31-i That statement was footnoted as follows: "It is interesting to note that following the evacuation, interceptions of suspicious or unidentified radio signals and shore-to-ship signal lights were virtually eliminated * * *"

Governor Olson of California, at that time in frequent conference with General DeWitt, began to share the latter's worry about

shore-to-ship signaling and radio diablerie as the day for clearance of Axis aliens from the designated spots drew near, but he continued to resist the idea of mass evacuation, over the radio and in press conferences; he appealed to young Nisei representatives in conference to cooperate in handling the evacuation of Axis nationals from the spots and to assist the war effort. He was quoted in the Sacramento Union as saying to the Nisei: "There isn't any middle ground for Japanese American citizens. Loyal Japanese will have to make sacrifices, but if you are not prepared to go all the way, you ought to be concentrated." He ended this conference by declaring that he was "quite heartened" by the attitude of the Japanese Americans.42-k

On February 7, Representative Martin Dies informed the press in Washington that he had "information" which he believed to be "reliable" that Axis forces would attempt to land simultaneously on the United States East and West Coasts within the next 12 months.41-j The announcement rated scare headlines in those days when the Nation was suffering a fairly bad attack of nerves. On the same day the same Congressman said that his committee had "decided tentatively to propose that all Japanese in Pacific coast states be removed at least 500 miles inland and interned," that Justice Department moves designed to protect the Pacific area had not been fully effective and that the Japanese had taken advantage of "protection of civil rights" to "promote systematic espionage such as prepared the way for the attack on Pearl Harbor," named the Central Japanese Association as an instrument of espionage and bestowed upon it 150,000 members, a number considerably in excess of the total number of Japanese and Japanese Americans in the entire continental United States of either sex and any age, and ended by an assertion that "when Pearl Harbor was attacked, Japanese truck drivers ran their machines into United States planes on the ground, others disabled automobiles of army and navy officers and still others threw furniture into the streets to blockade them."42-l

Tom Clark was assuring a jumpy populace that if the designated spots could not be cleared by the deadlines of February 15 and 24, he would recommend the establishment of restricted martial law.42-m

Representative Leland Ford, from Santa Monica, California, delivered a radio address on February 9 to advocate evacuation of both alien and citizen Japanese, assuring them and the public at large that their removal could be managed in orderly and humanitarian fashion, and called upon the American-born to take the initiative in this program, promising them that other citizens would applaud their loyalty and sympathize with them for their plight. He said:

"This inland placement and the handling of these people to be so placed, certainly would * * * be an exemplification showing the difference in the way people

are handled in a democracy, as against the way they are handled under Axis dictatorship.

"These people would be treated with the greatest consideration, kindness, justice, courtesy and humanitarian understanding. They would be well housed, well fed, well clothed and removed from any of the dangers of war activity whatsoever, with no possibility of being bombed or exposed to shell fire. In other words, they would be safe.

"If the loyal Japanese would voluntarily carry out the program as outlined above, they would surely be making some sacrifices, but certainly, this contribution and sacrifice, which I hope they will make voluntarily, is not nearly as great as the sacrifice and contribution that the man makes who gives his life, or the family makes, who give their closest kin * * *#38-r

On Tuesday, February 10, 1942, posters were put up on Terminal Island by Department of Justice order, warning all Japanese aliens that the deadline for their departure was the following Monday, February 16.38-p However, on February 11, without warning, a Presidential order transferred Terminal Island to the jurisdiction of the Navy, and Secretary Knox instructed Rear Admiral R. S. Holmes, Commandant of the 11th Naval District in San Diego to notify all residents of Terminal Island that their dwellings would be condemned and that they would be evicted within 30 days.38-q This arrangement automatically cancelled the orders of the Department of Justice, and on the face of the matter, it seemed to constitute a reprieve of eviction sentence. Before a week had passed, the residents of Terminal Island were ordered to be out within 48 hours of notification.

Aliens required to move out of a prohibited spot by Justice received individual mail notices which stated that they could get information and, if they needed it, assistance from their local Social Security Board. The Federal Government, using Tom Clark as coordinator, had arranged with the Social Security Board that the latter would loan to the Department of Justice, personnel from the Bureau of Public Assistance to register and assist aliens affected by the spot clearance orders. These people functioned in the USES offices within each county. They were supposed to be ready to serve at the time that the registration of aliens in the post offices began, but they were slow to get started, and the Los Angeles office was not set up until February 9. On request, they provided vans, transportation and even grocery orders to affected aliens. The spot evacuation of aliens was a comparatively simple if personally distressing matter, for in general only the

individuals left, moving over the line with friends or relatives; sometimes only the father of a family would be an alien, sometimes only the mother. If both parents were aliens but had a citizen child old enough to take over the responsibility of the home and business, only the parents went. According to the persons who worked in the hastily set up offices in the USES stations, very few Japanese asked assistance.

The case of the Terminal Islanders was different. Theirs was a small scale mass evacuation which involved everybody on the island, whole families. Because of the change in jurisdiction and the canceling of Justice orders, the evicted received no notices of instruction by mail to inform them where they could get help from the Government. They were simply told to get out within 48 hours. If they were aware that they might expect assistance from an office an hour-and-a-half ride from home, there was no time to go and spend more time standing in line and being questioned all over again. They packed what they could, and church groups which had been interested in the problems of the Japanese Americans took over, borrowing, renting and begging farm and delivery trucks to move out as much movable property as time allowed, and transferring the people with their belongings to hostels, quickly set up in churches and language schools in outlying communities. Much property was left behind, stacked on porches or in yards, because there simply was not time to get it out.

The Los Angeles Times on February 11 mentioned that Tom Clark and Mayor Bowron had gone to confer with General DeWitt and California Attorney General Earl Warren in San Francisco, "to try to get together on this business." This was on the front page, along with the announcement that the Congress group from the West Coast was suggesting that there should be a system of permits issued to all persons living in defense areas to allow them to continue living there; it was proposed that the defense areas be expanded to include the entire three coastal States and Alaska.^{38-s} Had this proposal been adopted, everyone living in the coastal States and Alaska would have needed a formal permit, whether he was lineal descendant of Pocahontas, John Alden, John Hancock, or even a California Bear Flag Riot hero. The program would have been time consuming, and little more was heard of it. After conferring with General DeWitt, the State attorney general announced that he felt that this was a "military problem, not civil," and Mayor Bowron said, "I feel that DeWitt is awake to the situation and doing all he can."^{38-t}

The Mayor of Los Angeles, back in time to make a Lincoln's Birthday address over the radio, posed the question: "If Lincoln were alive today, what would he do * * * to defend the nation against the Japanese horde * * * the people born on American soil who have secret loyalty to the Japanese Emperor?" And he answered his question in this fashion:

"There isn't a shadow of a doubt but that Lincoln, the mild-mannered man whose memory we regard with almost saint-like reverence, would make short work of rounding up the Japanese and putting them where they could do no harm.

* * * * *

"The removal of all those of Japanese parentage must be effected before it is too late. Those little men who prate of civil liberties against the interest of the nation and the safety of the people will be forgotten in the pages of history, while an executive in Washington who will save the nation against invasion and destruction will be entitled to a secure place beside Lincoln." 38-u

Wartime fear and hatred of the people associated in the eyes of other Americans with the enemy were not lessened by the news from the Pacific. By the end of the second week in February, the Allied forces in the Pacific Theatre had, with the single exception of a naval raid on the Gilbert-Marshall Islands, been continually on the defensive and might have been considered to be fighting a losing battle. Japan, on the other hand, in addition to inflicting heavy initial losses on both American and British forces, had taken most of the Philippines, Hong-kong, Thailand, Wake and Guam Islands, Sarawak, Tarakan, and other sections of Borneo, Moulmein in Burma, outlying Dutch and Australian possessions, and the Malay peninsula up to Singapore Island—and Singapore was to surrender on the fifteenth of February.

At this critical time, a nationally known and respected columnist, Walter Lippmann, had just arrived in California to look into the Japanese question. In the first week of his stay, his column written in San Francisco on February 12 and titled "The Fifth Column on the Coast" was syndicated throughout the Nation. The tone of the article was one of grave concern. His concern was so great, in view of the dangers he had been told about, that he advocated setting aside the civil rights of citizens of Japanese ancestry, and produced an argument that was used by General DeWitt, by State Attorney General Warren and many others. It was a convenient argument because it could not be disproved except in the event of actual invasion by the armed forces of Japan while the West Coast Japanese minority was in residence: " * * * since the outbreak of the Japanese war there has been no important sabotage on the Pacific Coast. From what we know about Hawaii and about the fifth column in Europe, this is not, as some have liked to think, a sign that there is nothing to be feared. It is a sign that the blow is well organized and that it is held back until it can be struck with maximum effect." He concluded with the paragraph:

"What Washington has been trying to find is a policy for dealing with all enemy aliens everywhere and all potential fifth columnists everywhere. Yet a policy which may be wise in most parts of the country may be extremely foolhardy in a combat zone. Therefore, much the best thing to do is to recognize the western combat zone as territory quite different from the rest of the country, and then to set up in that zone a special regime. This has been done on the Bataan Peninsula, in Hawaii, in Alaska, in the Canal Zone. Why not also on the threatened West Coast of the United States?"38-uu

After reading Mr. Lippmann's column on the subject of the West Coast Japanese menace, numerous other eastern columnists took up the issue, many of them referring to Lippmann's article, and stating outright that they had been keeping off the subject deliberately, on the assumption that the western agitation was just a further example of California's rugged anti-oriental spirit, but that if a man like Walter Lippmann said the menace was serious and that the Japanese population should be moved out of house and home, they would go along with him. Its effect was perhaps most pronounced upon Westbrook Pegler, who hammered home the points made by Lippmann, from Chicago on February 16, climaxing his column with the statement that if what Lippmann said was true, "the Japanese in California should be under armed guard to the last man and woman right now and to hell with habeas corpus until the danger is over."38-v

In the opinion of some persons who have studied the factors which brought about the evacuation, Walter Lippmann's article played an important role. After his brief investigation of the coast Japanese situation, Mr. Lippmann returned to the East and expressed no further views on the subject.

CHAPTER III

FIRST ROUND TO THE RACISTS

The West Coast Congressional Delegation, on February 13, formally recommended to the President "the immediate evacuation of all persons of Japanese lineage and all others, aliens and citizens alike, whose presence shall be deemed dangerous or inimical to the defense of the United States from all strategic areas." A Washington press correspondent reported:

"Members of the committee expressed confidence that they will be able to persuade President Roosevelt that the danger of disastrous sabotage operations in vital defense areas is so great that prompt action should be taken.

"We are aware of the gravity of asking a President of the United States to order the evacuation from any area of thousands of men and women who enjoy the rights of American citizenship," said a committee member, "but we feel the situation justifies our position and will warrant any action he may take."

"Lawyers on the committee, it is said, will go to the White House with arguments to substantiate their contention that the evacuation plans as recommended to the President today do not infringe the civil liberties of any person who may become subject to an evacuation order."38-vv

The day after this recommendation was delivered to the President, Tom Clark left Los Angeles by airline for Washington to confer with the Attorney General and to recommend the removal of "all persons deemed inimical to the defense efforts." The Associated Press story read:

"Clark pointed out that there are about 60,000 Nisei or American born to Japanese parents and that while the loyalty of many of them is unquestioned, it is difficult to determine who can be trusted. 'The fact that a citizen has rights under the constitution presents a legal problem,' he added, 'and means that the Nisei cannot be evacuated except under emergency orders.' He mentioned other problems such as housing and feeding.

"Declaring that all known dangerous enemy aliens already have been placed in custody, Clark said: 'I intend to further recommend that all persons who are deemed inimical to the defense efforts be removed from vital areas already designated, and from such additional vital areas as may be designated by the war and navy departments.'"42-am

On this same day, February 14, 1942, the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command forwarded, to the Secretary of War, his final recommendations on the subject of the "Evacuation of Japanese and other Subversive Persons from the Pacific Coast." After pointing out the probability of attack on shipping, coastal cities and vital installations in the coastal area, air raids, and sabotage of vital installations, he explained his convictions about the nature of Japanese Americans in this paragraph:

"The area lying to the west of the Cascade and Sierra Nevada Mountains in Washington, Oregon and California, is highly critical not only because the lines of communication and supply to the Pacific theater pass through it, but also because of the vital industrial production therein, particularly aircraft. In the war in which we are now engaged racial affinities are not severed by migration. The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have become 'Americanized', the racial strains are undiluted. To conclude otherwise is to expect that children born of white parents on Japanese soil sever all racial affinity and become loyal Japanese subjects, ready to fight and, if necessary, to die for Japan in a war against the nation of their parents. That Japan is allied with Germany and Italy in this struggle is no ground for assuming that any Japanese, barred from assimilation by convention as he is, though born and raised in the United States, will not turn against this nation when the final test of loyalty comes. It, therefore, follows that along the vital Pacific Coast over 112,000 potential enemies, of Japanese extraction, are at large today. There are indications that these are organized and ready for concerted action at a favorable opportunity. The very fact that no sabotage has taken place to date is a disturbing and confirming indication that such action will be taken."31-j

His formal recommendations were:

"(1) That the Secretary of War procure from the President direction and authority to designate military areas in the combat zone of the Western Theater of Operations, (if necessary to include the entire combat zone), from which, in his discretion, he may exclude all Japanese, all alien enemies, and all other persons suspected for any reason by the administering military authorities of being actual or potential saboteurs, espionage agents, or fifth columnists. Such executive order should empower the Secretary of War to requisition the services of any and all other agencies of the Federal Government with express direction to such agencies to respond to such requisition, and further empowering the Secretary of War to use any and all federal facilities and equipment, including Civilian Conservation Corps Camps, and to accept the use of State facilities for the purpose of providing shelter and equipment for evacuees. Such executive order to provide further for the administration of military areas for the purposes of this plan by appropriate military authorities acting with the requisitioned assistance of the other federal agencies and the cooperation of State and local agencies. The executive order should further provide that by reason of military necessity the right of all persons, whether citizens or aliens, to reside, enter, cross or be within any military areas shall be subject to revocation and shall exist on a pass and permit basis at the discretion of the Secretary of War and implemented by the necessary legislation imposing penalties for violation.

"(2) That, pursuant to such executive order, there be designated as military areas all areas in Washington, Oregon and California, recommended by me to date for designation by the Attorney General as Category 'A' areas and such additional areas as it may be found necessary to designate hereafter.

"(3) That the Secretary of War provide for the exclusion from such military areas, in his discretion, of the following classes of persons, viz:

- (a) Japanese aliens.
- (b) Japanese-American citizens.
- (c) Alien enemies other than Japanese aliens.

(d) Any and all other persons who are suspected for any reason by the administering military authorities to be actual or potential saboteurs, espionage agents, fifth columnists, or subversive persons.

"(4) That the evacuation of classes (a), (b), and (c) from such military areas be initiated on a designated evacuation day and carried to completion as rapidly as practicable.

"That prior to evacuation day all plans be complete for the establishment of initial concentration points, reception centers, registration, rationing, guarding transportation to internment points, and the selection and establishment of internment facilities in the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Corps Areas.

"That persons in class (a) and (c) above be evacuated and interned at such selected places of internment, under guard.

"That persons in class (b) above, at the time of evacuation, be offered an opportunity to accept voluntary internment, under guard, at the place of internment above mentioned.

"That persons in class (b) who decline to accept voluntary internment, be excluded from all military areas, and left to their own resources, or, in the alternative, be encouraged to accept resettlement outside of such military areas with such assistance as the State governments concerned or the Federal Security Agency may be by that time prepared to offer.

"That the evacuation of persons in class (d) be progressive and continuing, and that upon their evacuation persons in class (d) be excluded from all military areas and left in their own resources outside of such military areas, or, in the alternative, be offered voluntary internment or encouraged to accept voluntary resettlement as above outlined, unless the facts in a particular case shall warrant other action.

"(5) The Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, to be responsible for the evacuation, administration, supply and guard, to the place of internment; the Commanding Generals of the Corps Areas

concerned to be responsible for guard, supply and administration at the places of internment.

"(6) That direct communication between the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army and the Corps Area Commanders concerned for the purpose of making necessary arrangements be authorized.

"(7) That the Provost Marshal General coordinate all phases of the plan between the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, on the one hand, and the Corps Area Commanders on the other hand.

"(8) That all arrangements be accomplished with the utmost secrecy.

"(9) That adult males (above the age of 14 years) be interned separately from all women and children until the establishment of family units can be accomplished.

"(10) No change is contemplated in Category 'B' areas.

"3. Although so far as the Army is concerned, such action is not an essential feature of the plan, but merely incidental thereto, I, nevertheless, recommend that mass internment be considered as largely a temporary expedient pending selective resettlement, to be accomplished by the various Security Agencies of the Federal and State Governments.

"4. The number of persons involved in the recommended evacuation will be approximately 144,000. (This total represents all enemy aliens and Japanese-American citizens in Category 'A' areas recommended to date.)

"5. If these recommendations are approved detailed plans will be made by this headquarters for the proposed evacuation. The number evacuated to be apportioned by the Provost Marshal General among the Corps Area Commanders concerned as the basis for formulating their respective plans. It is possible that the State of California, and perhaps the State of Washington, will be able to offer resettlement facilities for a given number of evacuees who may be willing to accept resettlement.

"6. Pending further and detailed study of the problem, it is further recommended: (1) That the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, coordinate with the local and State Authorities, in order to facilitate the temporary physical protection by them of the property of evacuees not taken with them; (2) That the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, determine the quantity and character of property which the adult males, referred to in paragraph 2b (9), may be permitted to take with them; and (3) That the Treasury Department or other proper Federal agency be responsible for the conservation, liquidation, and proper disposition of the property of evacuees if it cannot be cared for through the usual and normal channels."31-k

Under the supervision of Assistant Secretary of War John L. McCloy an executive order was drafted which would grant the military such power over civilian life as was unprecedented in the history of the United States, and a bill was drafted which would implement the executive order with Congressional legislation and prescribe penalties for violation by civilians of any military rulings laid down under the authority of the executive order.

While the country awaited Presidential action on the evacuation issue, confusion was at a new high and acrid recriminations flew back and forth from the West Coast to Washington, and between departments and officials in Washington. West Coast Congressmen were heckled by their constituents because of the delay; the Congressmen complained angrily that their constituents were confusing the issue by making "conflicting recommendations and appeals;" they blamed the President for his refusal to give them a personal audience so that they could lay their views before him; the War Department resented the Attorney General's disapproval of the mass evacuation idea; Department of Justice spokesmen "laid responsibility for inaction at the Army's door, asserting that the War Department can't make up its mind concerning the disposition to be made of American-born Japanese;" a group in Los Angeles was hardly proposing that the Nisei should be excepted from any exclusion orders;38-w and "scores of American farmers" were reporting to the Los Angeles County agricultural commissioner, "seeking information on the ways and means of taking over lands left idle by evacuation of Japanese aliens from prohibited military areas."38-x

In Washington, D. C., the President was faced with the necessity of making a decision on such an issue as had never before confronted a President of the United States. He was being urged by the West Coast Delegation, by West Coast officials, by powerful organizations which were exerting pressure through the press and radio as well as by

resolutions and petitions, and above all by the War Department and the military commander responsible for the security of the West Coast, to exercise the broad powers that were his in time of war by delegating to the military extraordinary power over civilian life and liberty, a power unprecedented in American history except under conditions of martial law.

The President's Attorney General was opposed to such a delegation of authority. The Attorney General's attitude toward this issue was understandable on several counts: he was personally prominent among the Nation's liberals; in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States, he had a more than academic interest in keeping the actions of the Federal Government in line with constitutional provisions for the protection of citizens and resident aliens; since one of his wartime functions was the safeguarding of national security against espionage and sabotage, he could scarcely have relished the implications of the rising clamor for mass evacuation, as such a demand obviously constituted a criticism of the way the Department of Justice was performing one of its major wartime functions.

The careful and objective Munson Report on the Japanese situation in Hawaii and on the West Coast was available, and there was a memorandum prepared by three of the President's legal advisors. The latter gave the President assurance that it was well within his wartime powers to deal with the Japanese situation on the West Coast as necessity dictated, but it also warned against unreasonable assumptions, stating:

"The power to prohibit entry by the general public, citizens as well as aliens, into defined areas of especial importance to the national defense is clear. The legal power to prohibit entry into such areas by a particular class of persons or citizens rests upon the reasonableness of the classification. So long as a classification of persons or citizens is reasonably related to a genuine war need and does not under the guise of national defense discriminate against any class of citizens for a purpose unrelated to the national defense no constitutional guaranty is infringed."*

Having warned against unreasonable assumptions, the report straightway bogged down in a pitfall that catches many sincere persons who have never known or seen many orientals. The report reads:

*Underscoring added.

" * * * It is a fact and not a legal theory that Japanese who are American citizens cannot readily be identified and distinguished from Japanese who owe no loyalty to the United States. It is a fact and not a legal theory that the unrestricted movement of Japanese, American citizens as well as aliens, in certain defense areas may lead, and has led in some instances, to bloodshed and riot which cannot readily be controlled by police protection and which could be injurious to our defense effort at a most critical juncture. It is a condition and not a theory which confronts the nation.

"The number of persons of Japanese descent in the three Pacific states is less than 110,000, including both citizens and aliens. Persons of Japanese descent constitute the smallest definable class upon which those with the military responsibility for defense would reasonably determine to impose restrictions. No one can tell a resident citizen or alien from a Japanese soldier landed by parachute from the air or from small boats along the coast. Since the Occidental eye cannot readily distinguish one Japanese resident from another effective surveillance of the movements of particular Japanese residents suspected of disloyalty is extremely difficult if not practically impossible.*

"The Japanese problem is a special problem which must be met with a special remedy. Similar dangers of disloyal activities by citizens of other racial stocks cannot, and, in fact, need not, be handled in the same way. It would, for example, present an insuperable problem of administration, not to mention the consequent disruption of defense production, to bar the millions of persons of German or Italian stock from either seacoast area. Moreover, the normal Caucasian countenances of such persons enable the average American to recognize particular individuals by distinguishing minor facial characteristics. It is thus

*Italics added. With all respect to the good faith of the three legal advisors, the present writer contends that to anyone who has ever taken a good look at any two Japanese--barring identical twins--it is no more difficult to distinguish between them than it is to distinguish between George Washington and Abraham Lincoln.

more practical to leave the prevention of disloyal acts by citizens of European stock to the usual methods of police detection and surveillance.

"To meet this special Japanese problem on the West Coast, precautionary measures should be taken, but these measures should be reasonably adapted to need, and every effort should be made to relieve unnecessary hardship."⁴³

The suggested measures did not include a mass exclusion program, but did include a proposal for the establishment of Special Defense Areas which "persons of Japanese extraction should be allowed to enter only under special license," and Limited Defense Areas, in which designated persons would be subject to curfew, blackout and other restrictions. The measures suggested to alleviate hardship were drafting or enlisting American citizens of Japanese ancestry into the armed forces "and employing them where they can be of service to their country and where they are least likely to fall under suspicion, justified or unjustified." It was recommended that home guards under Army control "should be utilized to patrol rural districts inhabited by Japanese both for the protection of the Japanese and in the interest of the national defense * * * Every effort should be made to avoid compelling their migration, not only for humanitarian reasons but because of the serious effect it would have upon vegetable crops which are important both to California and the nation." The report recommended establishing special reservations at a "safe distance from the West Coast" where the citizens could go voluntarily and be "usefully employed and live under special restrictions," and special reservations within the coastal area where the population was predominantly Japanese, suggesting: "Such reservations might be roped off and all others than the registered Japanese inhabitants of such reservations might be debarred from entering such areas except under special licenses, while the Japanese inhabitants would be forbidden to leave such reservations without special permit."⁴³

At the eleventh hour in the period of waiting for Presidential action, Representative Elliott of California wired General DeWitt, demanding that all California be declared a strategic area and all persons of Japanese ancestry be evacuated therefrom,⁴²⁻ⁿ and the California Joint Immigration Commission, on the basis that the Pacific States were a combat zone and in danger, demanded that the Federal authorities move out of California "every Japanese in California, alien and citizen alike."^{42-o} The Attorney General bowed to the War Department's thesis that in time of war the person best qualified to determine what constituted military necessity in a given area was the commanding general of that area and notified the President that the Attorney General had withdrawn his disapproval of the proposed exclusion measure.

On February 19, 1942, the President signed Executive Order No. 9066, which, under the wartime powers granted the President, authorized the Secretary of War "and the Military Commanders whom he may from time to time designate * * * to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded." The order further authorized the Secretary of War to provide persons dislocated by exclusion orders with "such transportation, food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessary, in the judgment of the Secretary of War or the said Military Commanders."31-1

Executive Order No. 9066 cleared the way for a commanding general to exclude individuals or groups of individuals, regardless of their citizenship, from any region he might designate. The language of the order was devised to avoid the appearance of discrimination against any specific racial or national group, but there was no pretense on the part of Government officials or on the part of the press that the executive order was intended for any purpose other than to effect the exclusion of the Japanese from the West Coast. Attorney General Biddle, in announcing the President's action to the press, stated: "Of course the problem is mainly a Japanese problem," and admitted that it was unlikely that any persons other than those of Japanese blood would be affected. He assured Californians, worried by rumors that martial law was to be declared in their State, that the order did not constitute martial law and that civil courts would continue to function. He stated that persons ordered out of an area "might ask for writs of habeas corpus," adding, "I do not think the courts will go behind military judgment in the matter."41-k

It was, from that point, General DeWitt's prerogative to decide whether the entire minority or only the alien third of it should be excluded.

PART III

TRIUMPH FOR THE RACISTS

CHAPTER I

"AT THE DISCRETION OF THE APPROPRIATE MILITARY COMMANDER"

Most Californians were relieved when the President set his signature upon Executive Order No. 9066, but they were disappointed that the Japanese population failed to disappear over night. Before the announcement of the Executive Order was 24 hours old, the press was registering complaints about the delay in getting the Japanese out.

Representative John Tolan, of Oakland, California, Chairman of the House Select Committee on National Defense Migration, arrived with his committeemen in San Francisco to open hearings in that city on February 21. The purpose of the hearings was to explore the problems of evacuation of "enemy aliens and others from prohibited military zones." The Hearst press quoted Mr. Tolan as saying, on the first day of the hearings, that bombings in the coastal region were a "practical certainty."⁴¹⁻¹ California's Attorney General Earl Warren testified that the Japanese minority was concentrated about the points of greatest strategic importance; that the Japanese American citizens constituted the worst fifth column danger and should all be excluded from vital areas; he mentioned the approach of an "invisible deadline" when the Nisei fifth column--as yet pure of sabotage--would rise up and strike a shattering blow in conjunction with aerial attack from the Japanese enemy; he called attention to the fact that unsupervised migration of Japanese to the interior had already caused trouble, and recommended that a Federal agency should be put in charge to avoid exploitation of the Japanese.^{13-e}

Richard Neustadt, Regional Director of both the Social Security Board and the Office of Defense, Health and Welfare Services, stated that of the 6,500 alien enemies facing eviction under Department of Justice orders who had called at his information offices to learn what they should do and what rights they had, only 140 had asked for financial assistance. He said:

"However, that small number is not to be taken as a measure of their need. Rather, it is to be taken as a measure of their pride and their desire to understand the reason for this order and their desire to be as cooperative with the Government as possible. In other words, we know of many cases who will need money, who have strained every resource to move out of the prohibited area, but they prefer to exhaust their own resources before asking for any aid of any kind."

He pointed out, too, that the Japanese residents were sacrificing their property and that there had been "no provision for any custodianship of any kind."13-f

Mike Masaoka, national secretary and field executive of the Japanese American Citizens League testified at some length and made a statement on the attitude of his people toward evacuation. The first sentence of that statement has been quoted frequently to establish the willingness of the people to be evacuated, and the second sentence, which qualifies that willingness, has usually been deleted. Here is the full statement:

"If, in the judgment of military and Federal authorities, evacuation of Japanese residents from the West coast is a primary step toward assuring the safety of this Nation, we will have no hesitation in complying with the necessities implicit in that judgment. But, if, on the other hand, such evacuation is primarily a measure whose surface urgency cloaks the desires of political or other pressure groups who want us to leave merely from motives of self-interest, we feel that we have every right to protest and to demand equitable judgment on our merits as American citizens."

He made some recommendations for specific policies and procedures, among which was one "That, in view of the alarming developments in Tulare County and other communities against incoming Japanese evacuees all plans for voluntary evacuations be discouraged." He asked for the appointment of responsible, bonded property custodians, made a plea for "consideration and recognition of the Nisei's American citizenship status," and challenged the blanket accusation of disloyalty constantly being reiterated against this group which had a substantial representation in the armed forces of the United States.13-g

The testimony of Louis Goldblatt, secretary of the California State Industrial Union Council, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, offered the most forceful and reasonable opposition to the whole idea of evacuation on a national or racial basis that the Committee was to hear:

"We [the Union Council] naturally go along and concur with all the recommendations that the Government deems necessary to safeguard this territory. We feel, however, that a good deal of this problem has gotten out of hand, Mr. Tolan, inasmuch as both the local and State authorities, instead of becoming bastions of defense of democracy and justice, joined the wolf pack when the cry came out 'Let's get the yellow menace.' As a matter of fact, we believe the present situation is a great victory for the yellow press and for the

fifth column that is operating in this country, which is attempting to convert this war from a war against the Axis Powers into a war against the 'yellow peril.' We believe there is a large element of that particular factor in this present situation.

"I am referring here particularly to the attack against the native-born Japanese, an attack which, as far as we can find out, was whipped up. There was a basis for it because there has always been a basis on the Pacific coast for suspicion, racial suspicion, which has been well fostered, well bred, particularly by the Hearst newspapers over a period of 20 to 25 years.

"Well, the result is that during this present situation local authorities simply ran out on the problem. We are happy to see the Federal Government step in and handle it. We are happy to see your committee here, because, frankly, to date we haven't seen either civic or State leadership that is competent to handle the problem or that has shown a great enough degree of impartiality to merit being even assigned the problem.

"So that, in addition to the fact that this entire alien matter is naturally one that belongs in the province of the Federal Government, it is particularly important at this time because, frankly, I think the only people who have shown a semblance of decency and honesty and forthrightness in this whole situation are the second generation Japanese * * *

"What we are concerned with, Mr. Chairman, is this: That if this is to become the index of our dealings with the alien problem--in other words, that if we are not to deal only with aliens but also with the descendants of aliens--then there is no limit to this problem and the program, and this vitally affects our unions. It affects the principles upon which we stand, affects the nature of our work, our entire job in the administration of contracts and everything else, because once this policy of making distinctions or determining espionage or sabotage along racial, national lines has begun there is no end * * *

"So that we can expect, I think, that if this campaign of isolating the Japanese is successful the next step will be for several incidents to occur which involve Germans or Italians; then the whole of the wolf pack will scream to the moon again and this time it will be 'Evacuate all

Italians, evacuate all Germans.' The principle will have been set; the pattern will have been cut as it has been by the Hearst press, by the rabid, hysterical elements."

Mr. Tolan, as chairman, interposed: "Suppose you were General DeWitt or the head of the Justice Department on the Pacific Coast and you had 120,000 Japanese. How would you determine the loyalty and disloyalty of these Japanese?" And Mr. Goldblatt replied: "In exactly the same way I would proceed to tell who was a loyal or disloyal Italian or German." To the question "Where would you get the information?" Mr. Goldblatt suggested that the FBI and other Government intelligence services kept pretty good files, and so did his own union, and that his union had been in the habit of turning over information on espionage and on the activities of the German Bund to the FBI. At this point Mr. Tolan said:

"We had our F.B.I. in Honolulu, yet they had probably the greatest, the most perfect system of espionage and sabotage ever in the history of war, native-born Japanese. On the only roadway to the shipping harbor there were hundreds and hundreds of automobiles clogging the street, don't you see? There they sought to distinguish the Japanese in Pearl Harbor from our American Japanese. Do you think there is a distinction yourself? Do you think we can trust them?"

Mr. Goldblatt answered:

"I think that the second generation of Japanese in this Nation should not be distinguished from the second generation of any other nationality * * *. Unless the F.B.I. or the military authorities have documents and facts to indicate differently.

"Where is this to end, Mr. Tolan? Italians will be the next to be evacuated, then the Germans. Why stop with the Germans? According to the present Federal order Hitler could stay in San Francisco in a prohibited area and one of German nationality would have to leave because Hitler is an Austrian. So it will extend to Austrians. It will go to Hungarians, to Bulgarians, to Finns, to Danes. There are countries, many of them, which have declared war on us. Where is the mark to be drawn?"

"And, Mr. Tolan, if we follow such a procedure we can land in only one place. We will do a perfect job for those who want to sabotage the war effort. We will have the American

people at each other's throats. I know mining camps that are split right down the middle between nationalities, where you have a group of Poles at one end of the camp and a group of Germans at the other. You will have them fighting in the streets against each other. You have Italians in the mining camps alongside of Welshmen.

"Where is this going to wind up? This country is a nation made up of nationalities. The so-called American is only a product. He comes out of a crystal into which has been poured the peoples of all the world. We forget what was written on the Statue of Liberty. I have the words here. I would like to read them."

Mr. Tolan said: "I don't think you better. Did you ever intend to run for Congress?" Mr. Goldblatt said that he never had. Mr. Tolan commented: "I think you would make a very dangerous talker the way you are going here today. I think you are wonderful."13-h

The Tolan Committee hearings held up and down the West Coast between February 21 and March 12 of 1942 began and ended with the committeemen and the majority, if not all, of the witnesses believing that the injuries sustained during the Pearl Harbor attack were intensified by major sabotage committed by the Island Japanese.

The Japanese American Citizens League provided about the only leadership that emerged from the minority at this time. In 1942 it had a reported membership of 20,000, all citizens 18 years old or older, many of them recent members. The league was not actually representative of the Japanese minority, but its officials at this time appeared as the only spokesmen. These young leaders were articulate, well informed, and personable. They had a burden of staggering weight, in assuming responsibility for staving off the evacuation. There was a last-minute attempt to organize a "Co-ordinated, Representative Nisei" group as the United Citizens League, at Los Angeles on the very night of the signing of Executive Order No. 9066. More than 1,500 Nisei and some of their parents met for this purpose at the Mary-Knoll Auditorium. JACL members and others who were not members, produce men, business and professional people were prepared to make a last ditch stand for recognition of their rights as American citizens. But any attempt this preponderately school-age group of citizens could make against the forces bearing down upon them at that particular time was predetermined to be as ineffective as a rabbit's effort to stay the course of a bulldozer.

Lieutenant General DeWitt had the authority of the executive order behind him and the power to designate military areas and the people he wanted out of those areas, but for a time he delayed action. There remained a few individuals and a few groups of people on the West

Coast who questioned the propriety of exiling United States citizens, whatever their color, from their homes without individual appraisal. It was possible that, in the event of a test case, the Supreme Court of the United States might question the constitutionality of mass exclusion orders directed against citizens. General DeWitt was urging quick passage of the bill to implement the executive order. It was March 21 before the bill became law and gave congressional approval to the executive order, and provided that "whoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in any military area or military zone prescribed, under the authority of an Executive order of the President, by the Secretary of War, or by any military commander designated by the Secretary of War, contrary to the restrictions applicable to any such area or zone or contrary to the order of the Secretary of War or any such military commander, shall, if it appears that he knew or should have known of the existence and extent of the restrictions or order and that his act was in violation thereof, be guilty of misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be liable to a fine of not to exceed \$5,000 or to imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, for each offense."31-m

Certain organizations of people of good will were arguing against the application of the expected evacuation order to the Nisei. The majority of the Nisei themselves could not believe that, in the final analysis, their citizenship would be disregarded. However, two events took place at precisely the right time to deaden the sound of voices championing the Nisei, and to make it unnecessary for General DeWitt to wait further on Congress, and on what was to be Public Law No. 503.

On Monday evening, February 23, 1942, after the second all-day session of the Tolan Committee, and while President Roosevelt was making a fireside chat over the national hook-up, some kind of seagoing craft fired some shells at a piece of the California Coast, about seven miles north of Santa Barbara. The area included an oil refinery. Minor damage was done to one pumping unit and derrick. No tanks were hit; no fires were started; and nobody was injured. The first of 15 shells was fired at 7:10 p. m., Pacific war time, which would be 6:10 p. m. sun time; at that season dusk would have been well advanced by that hour. Nevertheless witnesses were not lacking to identify the craft, which was a mile offshore, as a Japanese submarine. One man declared that it was larger than any United States submarine he had ever seen. Witnesses also saw flares and signaling from shore and over the channel. The DeWitt final report describes the incident as follows:

"On February 23, 1942, a hostile submarine shelled Goleta, near Santa Barbara, California, in an attempt to destroy vital oil installations there. On the preceding day the shore battery in position at this point had been withdrawn to be replaced by another. On the succeeding day, when the shelling occurred, it was the only point along the

coast where an enemy submarine could have successfully surfaced and fired on a vital installation without coming within the range of coast defense guns."³¹⁻¹

J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, two years later commented on this incident in a memorandum addressed to the Attorney General and inspired by General DeWitt's final report:

"At approximately 7:10 p. m. on February 23, 1942, an attack was made on the Santa Barbara area by an unidentified vessel off the coast of California. Included in the area shelled was an oil refinery. The blackout in this area went into effect about one hour after the shelling had occurred and although there were reports of lights and flares in the vicinity, investigations were made with negative results. Subsequent to the shelling Army authorities had planes scouting for submarines all along the coast, and in connection with these searches the Army utilized numerous flares. There was no evidence of shore-to-ship signaling and no evidence of a landing in the area."⁴⁴

None of the available official or newspaper accounts of the incident mentioned the examination of shell fragments, as was the case when an incendiary bomb dropped in the woods of Oregon on September 9, 1942, and when the fragments bore Japanese markings.

The effect of this incident was immediate and pronounced. Representative Alfred Elliott, of Tulare, California, shouted next day from the floor of the House: "We've got to move all the Japs in California into concentration camps, somewhere, some place, and do it damn quick * * * Don't kid yourselves and don't let someone tell you there are good Japs. Perhaps one out of a thousand * * *"^{38-y} Representative Leland Ford, of Santa Monica, California, repeating rumors of signaling from the hills to ships offshore, declared to the House: "We've got to move Japs to areas where they can't do that kind of signaling," while Representative Rankin, of Mississippi, improvised in support of his West Coast fellows: "They're doing the same thing in Hawaii--signaling to their ships from the mountain tops."^{38-y} Back in California the district attorney of Santa Barbara County made a personal appeal to General DeWitt for action.^{38-y} The Veterans of Foreign Wars at Visalia, the county seat of Tulare County, demanded immediate removal of all Japanese, both alien and citizen, from the coast. Down in the southeastern corner of the State, the Riverside County Supervisors adopted a resolution on February 24, and forwarded it to General DeWitt, demanding immediate removal of the entire Japanese American minority and warning that farmers of the county might "take matters into their own hands" unless action was taken promptly by the Government.^{38-z}

In the small hours of February 25, Los Angeles had a blackout with antiaircraft guns brought into use. Five deaths resulted from traffic accidents or heart attack and were laid to what the newspapers called the "raid." The War Department stated officially that the alarm was real; the Navy Department stated officially that it was a case of "jittery nerves."^{38-A} Whether the "Battle of Los Angeles" was or was not a genuine raid, was still unsettled in the fall of 1945. An Associated Press story reported from San Francisco under dateline of October 28, 1945:

"As many as five unidentified airplanes, either Japanese, civilian or commercial, were over southern California the night of February 24-25, 1942, during the 'Battle of Los Angeles,' Fourth AAF headquarters disclosed today.

"Some three million people in the Los Angeles area shivered and trembled that night as antiaircraft fire ripped the skies and Army searchlights tracked unidentified airplanes over Beverly Hills through Long Beach and out to sea.

"The blackout and antiaircraft firing in the Los Angeles area on the morning of February 25, 1942, were caused by the presence of one to five unidentified airplanes,' reported Lieut. Gen. John L. DeWitt, then commanding general of the Fourth Army and the Western Defense Command. He added it was his belief that three planes appeared over Beverly Hills.

" * * * the officer said, 'My belief is that those three planes could have been launched from submarines somewhere close into shore under our detectors.'

"The officer said only 45 fighter planes were available for interception that night, and that if the unidentified aircraft preceded an attack 'we did not want to have our pursuit in the air, half out of gas when the attack came in * * *'

"Naval intelligence at Los Angeles advised the same evening an attack could be expected during the next 10 hours, following which the Pacific Coast from Monterey, Calif., to the Mexican border was on 'yellow alert,' indicating the enemy possibly was about 30 minutes away."⁴⁵

On November 1, 1945, comment on that statement came from Tokyo in the form of an Associated Press story, which appeared in the Washington Evening Star under the caption: "JAP 'AIR RAID' OF LOS ANGELES IN '42 WAS MYTH," and continued:

"The battle of Los Angeles was a myth. The Japanese did not send planes over that city the night of February 24-25, 1942, a Japanese Navy spokesman told the Associated Press today.

"The question was put because the 4th Air Force at San Francisco Sunday said planes, possibly Japanese, were overhead that night.

"Captain Omae of the Japanese Navy said, however, that a plane was launched from a submarine and sent over the Southern Oregon Coast on February 9, 1942, 'to attack military installations, but the lone plane was unable to discover any.'

"Omae denied the Japanese had any plan to land troops on Hawaii or the United States.

"He is liaison officer from the Japanese Navy records section, which is reassembling destroyed information for General MacArthur."46

The unidentified planes remain unidentified.

With these two incidents, the outcry for immediate removal of all persons of Japanese race from the coast rose to a deafening roar. On March 1, General DeWitt informed the press:

"Military necessity is the sole yardstick by which the Army has selected the military areas from which the exclusion of certain groups will be required.

"Public clamor for evacuation from non-strategic areas and the insistence of local organizations and officials that evacuees not be moved into their communities cannot and will not be heeded, for considerations of national security must come first."42-q

Both the general and Representative Tolan--then conducting hearings at Seattle--were deluged with telegrams from officials of inland states, protesting the "dumping" of the West Coast's Japanese population in their States. Only Governor Carr, of Colorado, said bravely that he would try to cooperate, and General DeWitt wrote him a note of appreciation. The general said:

"The appropriate agencies of the Federal Government are engaged in far-reaching preparations to deal with the problem, and a study is in progress by these agencies

regarding the protection of property, the resettlement and relocation of those who are affected."42-q

The general promised that an announcement of an evacuation program would shortly be forthcoming, and the next day, March 2, he issued Public Proclamation No. 1, designating Military Area No. 1, consisting of the western halves of Washington, Oregon and California, and the southern portion of Arizona; Military Area No. 2 was established as the remaining parts of the States named. The proclamation stated further:

"Any Japanese, German or Italian alien, or any person of Japanese ancestry now resident in Military Area No. 1 who changes his place of habitual residence is hereby required to obtain and execute a Change of Residence Notice at any United States Post Office. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to affect the existing regulations of the United States Attorney General which require aliens of enemy nationalities to obtain travel permits from United States Attorneys and to notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Commissioner of Immigration of any change in permanent address."

To the press the general said that enemy aliens would be excluded from Military Area No. 1 by future order, and soon; he promised that the Japanese, both alien and citizen, would be the first to go; and he advised aliens to move out with their families at once and voluntarily to "save themselves possible future trouble."42-r

Obediently a number of Japanese American families began moving from the coastal area, in cars, in trucks, seeking a refuge from the storm of hatred and fear which was ejecting them from California, and finding that the storm had preceded them across the state line.

5

CHAPTER II

THE CASE FOR THE GOVERNMENT

Writing in 1945 of the wartime evacuation of Japanese Americans, Eugene V. Rostow, professor of law at Yale University and formerly with the State Department, called his article which appeared in the June issue of the Yale Law Journal, "The Japanese American Cases--A Disaster." He titled a popularized version of the article which appeared in Harpers a few months later, "Our Worst Wartime Mistake." His condemnation of the whole program was sweeping. He wrote:

"Our war-time treatment of Japanese aliens and citizens of Japanese descent on the West Coast has been hasty, unnecessary and mistaken. The course of action which we undertook was in no way required or justified by the circumstances of the war. It was calculated to produce both individual injustice and deep-seated social maladjustments of a cumulative and sinister kind."

"All in all, the internment of the West Coast Japanese is the worst blow our liberties have sustained in many years. Over one hundred thousand men, women and children have been imprisoned, some seventy thousand of them citizens of the United States, without indictment or the proffer of charges, pending inquiry into their 'loyalty.' They were taken into custody as a military measure on the ground that espionage and sabotage were especially to be feared from persons of Japanese blood. They were removed from the West Coast area because the military thought it would take too long to conduct individual loyalty investigations on the ground. They were arrested in an area where the courts were open, and freely functioning. They were held under prison conditions in uncomfortable camps, far from their homes, and for lengthy periods--several years in many cases. If found 'disloyal' in administrative proceedings they were confined indefinitely, although no statute makes 'disloyalty' a crime; it would be difficult indeed for a statute to do under a Constitution which has been interpreted to minimize imprisonment for political opinions, both by defining the crime of treason in extremely rigid and explicit terms, and by limiting convictions for sedition and like offenses * * *"

Setting forth the evacuation as a triumph for the West Coast racists and pressure groups, he said further that the racists "were lucky in their general, for General DeWitt amply proved himself to be one of them in opinion and values. As events happened, he became the

chief policy maker in the situation, and he has caused more damage even than General Burnside in 1863, whose blunderings with Vallyandigham, the Ohio Copperhead, were the previous high in American military officiousness."⁴⁷

It is not the purpose of this chapter to challenge the essential soundness of Mr. Rostow's criticism, but to indicate that he had the advantage of hindsight when he made it. By 1945, when Mr. Rostow wrote his article, factual knowledge had replaced the misinformation and legends about the group that had been evacuated; the unknown and therefore easily misrepresented minority had become familiar to most localities of the United States, and to the fighting men on every battlefield of the war; by that time the Nisei of the 442nd Battalion had built up an enviable record in Italy and in France, proving to a war-minded America that they were not without devotion to the land of their birth.

In the dark and fear-ridden days of early 1942, the situation was very different. The West Coast was under threat of attack by an enemy that had given some reason for the belief that it could be everywhere at once. That enemy was rushing from triumph to triumph in the Pacific; our fleet had been crippled by the attack at Pearl Harbor; the West Coast was a strategic area. The people who were racially akin to the enemy were known to the vast majority of other Americans only in terms of a subtle propaganda invented by genuine racists and political or economic opportunists of the West Coast. War-generated fear, uncertainty, hatred and suspicion made it easy for people in high and low places to identify this unknown group on the West Coast with the enemy across the sea.

The Commanding General of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army was held accountable for the defense of the West Coast. With a war in progress, with national security at stake, civilians, including the Chief Executive of the United States, were not in a position to question the responsible military commander's judgment on matters of military necessity in his area. The chance a civilian administration would run in time of war, if it opposed the measures dictated by its military experts, of bringing disaster to the country is a chance that a civilian administration understandably prefers not to take. When the recommendations of General DeWitt for mass exclusion of the Japanese from the West Coast were before the Administration in Washington, certain beliefs were entertained there and elsewhere, beliefs that on the face of the matter justified the removal of the group from the West Coast.

At the time when the executive order was issued and for nearly two months longer, official Washington and the nation at large were convinced that the resident Japanese of Hawaii had aided and abetted the enemy on December 7, had by their activities increased the heavy losses in human life and in vital war equipment. The hysterical

believed that all persons of Japanese descent were treacherous, sly, dangerous and prepared to sell out the United States to their ancestral country at the first opportunity. The more thoughtful people, who avoided the racist approach, perceived that the group was indeed concentrated around the harbors, airfields and other vital points on the coast—and were not informed of the harmless reason for such distribution—and granted that the group of 112,000 men, women and children of Japanese ancestry unquestionably contained an unidentified and not easily identifiable number of individuals who, in the event of invasion, constituted a potential hazard to national security.

The military commander of the coastal area which held the concentration of Japanese Americans said that exclusion of the group was a military necessity, and as early as January 5, he was basing his conviction that their presence constituted a real hazard on charges that they were signaling to ships at sea, communicating with the enemy by radio, and behaving in a way calculated to make the course of an invading enemy smooth. In time of national emergency, and in the absence of concrete proof that the fears of the responsible general were based on fantasy or misinformation, it was logical to accept his judgment. That is what was done in the early part of 1942.

The common belief in that nonexistent sabotage performed by Hawaiian Island Japanese, held at a time when the West Coast was threatened with attack, was the pivot upon which the evacuation rotated. By the time that affidavits of Federal intelligence officers and Island authorities reached the Tolson Committee and established the fact that there had been no sabotage by Island Japanese on December 7 or since, the evacuation was well underway. The West Coast Japanese, their citizen children, and their grandchildren, were being rushed into hastily improvised assembly centers set up on fairgrounds and race tracks to live in former stables or tar paper barracks while they awaited further dislocation.

The Tolson Committee, in its Fourth Interim Report, issued in May of 1942, published the Hawaiian affidavits which cleared the Japanese in Hawaii of charges of sabotage, but the rumors persisted, and the official denials were never given the space and placing in the press that were accorded the rumors.

Once the wheels of the evacuation got rolling, it was to take time, reeducation of the public and positive demonstration of the loyalty of the evacuees to change the course of the vehicle. The Government-sanctioned exclusion from the West Coast of the Japanese American minority as a measure of military necessity appeared to the public at large as an official endorsement of the racists' contentions regarding that minority. There was no strong official interpretation of the evacuation enunciated by the President or the Secretary of War

or the Attorney General to prevent the general public from interpreting the evacuation order as a blanket charge of disloyalty for the affected group. All that was said officially was that it was in the interests of military necessity that the evacuation had been ordered.

C. B. Munson, in the last portion of his report to the Washington administration on the Japanese situation on the West Coast and in Hawaii, with the assistance of the intelligence officers who had been working closely with him, drew up some suggestions and recommendations, as of December 20, 1941. First of all he recommended that the Nisei "should be encouraged by a statement from high government authority," defining his underscored "high" as "President or Vice President, or at least almost as high," so that public attitude toward them would be "outlined."^{39-c} Secondly he stressed the fact that "their offers of assistance should be accepted through such agencies as: 1, Civilian Defense; 2, Red Cross; 3, U. S. O., etc., etc." He spelled out the matter of "assistance" further:

"This assistance should not be merely monetary, nor should it even be limited to physical voluntary work in segregated Nisei units. The Nisei should work with and among white persons, and (be) made to feel he is welcome on a basis of equality."^{39-c}

Before dark of the day of Japan's attack upon Pearl Harbor, the Japanese American Citizens League from its headquarters in San Francisco issued an official statement condemning the Japanese government and pledging loyalty to the United States. The statement was widely publicized over the radio and in the press of the nation. Had the appropriate "high" authority countered with a declaration of the Government's faith in the loyalty of the Nisei, there is reason to believe that the West Coast racists and superpatriots would at least have had harder going to achieve their objective of mass exclusion. Similarly, once the evacuation had been ordered, an administrative definition of the evacuation might have dispelled some of the confusion that was rampant in 1942.

During the early months of the war, the War Department had no clear-cut policy on the use of Nisei in the armed forces. At the outbreak of war there were about 5,000 Nisei already in the Army, either as volunteers or as subjects of Selective Service. Individual commanding officers devised their own policies for dealing with these men. Some officers retained them; some discharged them with blue cards and no explanation—the blue card signifying that the discharge was neither quite honorable nor quite dishonorable; a few officers became hysterical on December 7 and gathered up any Nisei in their units and put them in the guardhouse. General DeWitt said before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Naval Affairs: "At one time we had a great many

Japanese in military units on the west coast. They were all at my request transferred out by the War Department to other organizations."48

For some time there was no consistency in the treatment of the Nisei who sought to volunteer or those whose numbers came up in the draft. Generally speaking, the local Selective Service Boards of the West Coast rejected them, classifying them as 4-F or 4-C. However, a few of the boards processed the Nisei without prejudice. Some commanding officers refused to accept the Nisei who had passed the local board and had reported for duty. The War Department prohibited further induction of anyone of Japanese descent after March 31, "Except as may be specifically authorized in exceptional cases." Exceptions proved to be bilingual Nisei and Kibei who could qualify as language instructors and interpreters for Military Intelligence. It was not until September 14, 1942, that Selective Service regulations were adopted, implementing the ruling of the War Department and providing for the classification in Class 4-C of any registrant of Japanese ancestry, a class reserved for those considered unsuitable for service because of race or ancestry.⁴⁹ There was to be a long and spirited campaign before the privilege of fighting for their country was restored to the Nisei.

The Red Cross, while allowing the evacuees to participate in a monetary sense in the Red Cross program, steadfastly refused to allow the center residents to roll bandages or knit for the armed forces, even going so far as to deny members of the Junior Red Cross units at centers their right to fill game kits for the soldiers, and not allowing center Red Cross organizations to be called "chapters"---they were called "units" to differentiate between Japanese American branches of the organization and others.

The USO granted full participation from the first.

The first evidence made public that the evacuation might have been determined by other than objective considerations was provided by the man who ordered the mass exclusion, General DeWitt himself, in testimony before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Naval Affairs on April 13, 1943. Asked by the Chairman if he had any problem that he wanted to leave with the Congressmen, General DeWitt replied:

"I haven't any except one---that is the development of a false sentiment on the part of certain individuals and some organizations to get the Japanese back on the west coast. I don't want any of them here. They are a dangerous element. There is no way to determine their loyalty. The west coast contains too many vital installations essential to the defense of the country to allow any Japanese on this coast. There is a feeling developing, I think, in certain sections of the country

that the Japanese should be allowed to return. I am opposing it with every proper means at my disposal."48

Asked if he based his "determined stand on experience as a result of sabotage or racial history or what," the general replied:

"I first of all base it on my responsibility. I have the mission of defending this coast and securing vital installations. The danger of the Japanese was, and is now—if they are permitted to come back—espionage and sabotage. It makes no difference whether he is an American citizen, he is still a Japanese. American citizenship does not necessarily determine loyalty.

"You needn't worry about the Italians at all except in certain cases. Also, the same for the Germans except in individual cases. But we must worry about the Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the map. Sabotage and espionage will make problems as long as he is allowed in this area—problems which I don't want to have to worry about."48-a

It will be remembered that the general displayed his worry over illicit signaling and radio transmission on the part of Pacific coast Japanese in a memorandum addressed to James Rowe, Jr., of the Department of Justice, on January 5, 1942. In his final report on the evacuation, published in the latter half of 1943, the general repeated charges of illicit signaling and radio transmission against the Japanese population of the coast.

The Chief of the Federal Communication Commission's Radio Intelligence Division had reported a conference with General DeWitt and his staff, on January 9, 1942. In the course of this conference, the procedures of radio intelligence were explained to the general, and he was informed that there had been no illegitimate radio transmission or signaling from Japanese or other coastal residents.50

More than two years later, asked to comment on statements contained in the DeWitt final report, the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission wrote the following letter to Attorney General Francis Biddle, dated April 4, 1944:

"This is in reply to your letter of February 26, 1944 with reference to Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt's Final Report on Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, which was recently made public by the War Department.

"You state that you are interested in the accuracy of General DeWitt's account, in the first two chapters of the Report, of the events leading to his decision that military necessity required the evacuation, and you note that prevention of signaling by persons, presumably of Japanese descent, on shore to enemy surface vessels or submarines off the coast apparently was a very considerable part of the problem with which General DeWitt was concerned during the period between December 1941 and July 1, 1942, when the evacuation was substantially complete. You direct attention particularly to his reference to hundreds of reports of such signaling by means of signal lights and unlawful radio transmitters and state that investigation by the Department of Justice of great numbers of rumors concerning signal lights and radio transmitters proved them, without exception, to be baseless.

"You inquire, first, whether during the period from December 1941 to July 1, 1942, the Commission was engaged on the West Coast in monitoring and identifying signals reported to be from unlawful transmitters and in locating any such transmitters; and, if so, the number of reports received by the Commission during this period of unlawful or unidentified signals, with a detailed breakdown of the results of its investigations:

"Throughout this period on the West Coast as elsewhere throughout the United States and its territories, the Commission's Radio Intelligence Division was engaged in a comprehensive 24-hour surveillance of the entire radio spectrum to guard against any unlawful radio activity.

"Within the area on the West Coast from which the Japanese were subsequently evacuated, the Commission's Radio Intelligence Division had in operation two Primary Monitoring Stations, located at Portland, Oregon, and San Pedro, California, and Secondary Monitoring Stations, located at Seattle, Washington; Portland, Oregon; Arcata, California; Larkspur, California; Fresno, California; Los Angeles, California; San Diego, California; Yuma, Arizona, and Tucson, Arizona. During the period here involved, the Secondary Station at Larkspur, California, was moved to San Leandro, California, and was expanded to a Primary Monitoring Station; and the Secondary Station at Yuma, Arizona, was moved to Salinas, California. The Commission had additional stations at other places within the Western Defense Command.

"At all stations, there were special receivers and recorders for intercepting and recording signals throughout the entire radio spectrum. The Primary Monitoring Stations were equipped with extensive antenna arrays and Adcock high-frequency direction-finding apparatus for taking bearings upon sky-wave signals received from all over the world. They were tied in with other Primary Monitoring Stations on the continent as well as in Alaska, Hawaii and Puerto Rico, which together constituted a nation-wide direction-finding system for immediate coordinated action in taking bearings upon and establishing the fix of any suspected transmitter and for exchanging other information relative to identity of radio stations. At the Secondary Monitoring Stations were mobile units, equipped with loop direction finders, for going into the field and quickly locating an unidentified transmitter by taking bearings within its ground-wave range. Other devices enabled investigators to determine the exact house or even room in which a transmitter was located.

"Soon after December 7, 1941, at the request of General DeWitt, the monitoring facilities described above were supplemented by patrols of mobile direction-finding intercept units along the West Coast from Canada to Mexico. These patrols were instituted for the particular purpose of detecting any radio transmissions from shore to ships off the coast.

"In the early months of the war, the Commission's field offices and stations on the West Coast were deluged with calls, particularly from the Army and Navy, reporting suspicious radio signaling and requesting the identification of radio signals. In hundreds upon hundreds of cases, identification of the signal was made by Radio Intelligence Division personnel merely by listening to it right at the monitoring station. In no case was the transmission other than legitimate.

"In the case of 760 reports of unidentified or unlawful radio signals within the evacuated area during the period in question, which could not be heard or identified by listening at the monitoring station, a field investigation was conducted by mobile direction-finding units. In 641 of the cases it was found that no radio signaling at all was involved. Of the 119 cases remaining, 116 were found to involve lawful transmissions by following stations:

United States Army Stations	-	21
United States Navy Stations	-	8
Local Police Stations	-	12
United States and Foreign Commercial Licensed Stations	-	65
Japanese Stations in Japanese Territory	-	10
		<u>116</u>

"The final 3 were found to involve the very short-range transmissions of the ordinary commercial type phonograph oscillator used in playing recordings for home amusement.

"There were no radio signals reported to the Commission which could not be identified, or which were unlawful. Like the Department of Justice, the Commission knows of no evidence of any illicit radio signaling in this area during the period in question.

"You also ask the extent to which General DeWitt or his subordinates were informed of the operations of the Commission's Radio Intelligence Division. The General and his staff were kept continuously informed of the Commission's work, both through occasional conferences and day-to-day liaison. In the earlier part of the war, there was constant contact by telephone between Radio Intelligence Division stations and Army and Navy posts along the West Coast for the purpose of furnishing these agencies with bearings and other information pertaining to radio signals. And as the result of a request of General DeWitt in January 1942, the Commission established a Radio Intelligence Center in San Francisco for coordinating radio intelligence information collected by the Army, Navy and the Commission. This Center was tied in by teletype-writer circuit with the Primary Monitoring Stations on the West Coast, as well as with other Primary stations on the Continent through headquarters in Washington. As a result, it was an integral part of the Commission's nation-wide direction-finding system described above. As a part of the plan for coordinating activities, Army and Navy personnel maintained a liaison attendance at this Center. Both these services, moreover, had a direct telephone circuit from the Center to their headquarters.

"You direct attention, further, to the statement in General DeWitt's Report that following the evacuation, interception of suspicious or unidentified radio signals and shore-to-ship signal lights was virtually eliminated. You state it

was the experience of the Department of Justice that, although no unlawful radio signaling or any unlawful shore-to-ship signaling with lights was discovered, a great number of reports of such activity were received, and that these did not diminish in number following the evacuation. It is likewise the Commission's experience that reports of unlawful radio signaling along the West Coast-- which in each case were unfounded--were not affected by the evacuation. In fact, throughout the year 1942, the number of reports of unlawful radio operation requiring investigation by mobile units which were received in the States along the West Coast varied in close parallel with the number of such reports received throughout the whole country.

"Finally, you refer to General DeWitt's memorandum of January 5, 1942 to James H. Rowe, Jr., Assistant to the Attorney General, set out in the Report, in which concern is expressed over the action to be taken in a case where there should be strong evidence of shore-to-submarine radio communication, but the unlawful radio transmitter could not be located within an area more precise than a city block, or even a general area such as Monterey County.

"You note that the memorandum suggested that available means were inadequate to locate and seize any such radio transmitter, but state that if your understanding that equipment was available for locating such a transmitter is correct, the problem with which General DeWitt was concerned would not arise in practice. Your understanding is correct. As noted above, equipment developed by the Commission's engineers was on and after December 7, 1941 in the hands of its personnel on the West Coast, which enabled them easily to locate the individual house and even the exact room containing the concealed transmitter."51

The information, thus gradually acquired, was regarded as confidential; no public official refutation of the charges made against the Japanese Americans was offered. There was a war in progress.

By March 2, 1942, when General DeWitt issued Public Proclamation No. 1, it had become apparent to him that voluntary evacuation would not dispose of the entire West Coast Japanese population in any reasonable length of time or without disorder. Problems of property disposal, finance, employment and acceptance in other areas were constituting a block to this voluntary movement. The minor movements of Japanese aliens from prohibited "spots" in February had resulted for the most

part in bewildered individuals or families simply moving in with relatives or camping in the back yards of friends in other sections of the same town or city. Some families had moved as far as the interior valleys of California—to the dismay of many of the citizenry in those regions; very few had been able to migrate east of the State line. It was plain that a controlled evacuation would have to be inaugurated for the tens of thousands of people who could not plan or finance their own evacuation, and that provision would have to be made for the maintenance of a substantial part of the Japanese population for an indefinite period, until their resettlement eastward could be accomplished in orderly fashion.

Up to this point the Western Defense Command's sole concern in the matter had been with the physical evacuation, with clearing the designated military area of the Japanese residents. It was not considered feasible or proper that the military should assume responsibility for the future welfare of thousands of families or that it should administer an extensive resettlement program. The Department of Justice was unwilling to take on such responsibilities. Discussions between representatives of the Department of Justice, the War Department and the Bureau of the Budget ended in a decision to create a special civilian war agency to assume jurisdiction over the evacuated population.

What was most important of all in this stage of planning, the President requested the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to find him a man to head the new agency who was without political ambitions, a man of humanitarian principles with a grasp of the social implications of the evacuation, with administrative ability, and with skill to direct the extremely delicate program in public relations posited by the controversial nature of the issue of evacuation. The qualifications required by the President in the director of an unprecedented program were a determining factor in setting the key of the agency's future policy.

At this time and for some time to come the voice of the racists was dominating public sentiment toward the Japanese Americans, and it was clamoring for arbitrary detention of the entire minority for the duration of the war and deportation of the entire group to Japan at the close of the war. Had the President requested a different sort of director to head the new war agency, it is obvious that the evacuation story must have had a much grimmer ending than it has had.

REFERENCES QUOTED

Key to Citations

1. Gold Hill Colony. References consulted are as follows:

Yamato Ichihashi. Japanese in the United States; A Critical Study of the Problems of the Japanese Immigrants and Their Children. Stanford University Press, Stanford University, California. Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, London. 1932. pp. 106-107.

Historical Souvenir of El Dorado County. Oakland. 1893. p. 112.

Sacramento Union. June 19, 1869, p. 1; September 18, 1869, p. 1; December 31, 1870, p. 1.

San Francisco Alta. July 31, 1869, p. 5, col. 5.

2. Alameda Colony.

San Francisco Chronicle. June 17, 1869, p. 2, col. 1.

3. The Bear Flag Rebellion.

Josiah Royce. California, a Study in American Character. Crowell, New York. c. 1888. Chapter II.

Ruth E. McKee. California and Her Less Favored Minorities: War Relocation Authority. Washington, D. C. April 1944. pp. 2-3.

4. U. S. Industrial Commission. Reports. Vol. XV. GPO. Washington, D. C. 1901. pp. 754-755.

5. Carey McWilliams. Prejudice -- Japanese-Americans: Symbol of Racial Intolerance. Little, Brown and Company. Boston. 1944.

5 p. 20

5-b p. 19

5-a p. 21

5-c p. 22

6. U. S. Immigration Commission. Reports. Volumes XXIII, XXIV, XXV. GPO. Washington, D. C. 1910.

6 vol. 23, p. 267

6-e vol. 23, pp. 183-187

6-a vol. 23, p. 246

6-f vol. 25, p. 18

6-b vol. 23, p. 220

6-g vol. 25, p. 21

6-c vol. 23, p. 268

6-h vol. 25, p. 22

6-d vol. 23, p. 183

6-i vol. 25, pp. 85-97

6. U. S. Immigration Commission. Reports (Cont.)

6-j	vol. 25, p. 104	6-D	vol. 23, p. 220
6-k	vol. 25, pp. 108-109	6-E	vol. 23, p. 219
6-l	vol. 25, pp. 110-112	6-F	vol. 23, p. 221
6-m	vol. 25, pp. 158-169	6-G	vol. 23, p. 223
6-n	vol. 25, p. 186	6-H	vol. 23, p. 225
6-o	vol. 24, p. 391	6-I	vol. 23, p. 238
6-p	vol. 24, p. 392	6-J	vol. 23, p. 240
6-q	vol. 24, pp. 397-399	6-K	vol. 23, p. 241
6-r	vol. 24, pp. 233-238	6-L	vol. 23, p. 246
6-s	vol. 23, p. 188	6-M	vol. 23, p. 253
6-t	vol. 23, p. 189	6-N	vol. 23, p. 252
6-u	vol. 23, pp. 213-214	6-O	vol. 23, p. 303
6-v	vol. 23, p. 215	6-P	vol. 25, p. 17
6-w	vol. 23, pp. 202-203	6-Q	vol. 23, pp. 305-306
6-x	vol. 23, p. 204	6-R	vol. 24, p. 521
6-y	vol. 23, pp. 204-205	6-S	vol. 24, p. 522
6-z	vol. 23, p. 197	6-T	vol. 24, p. 529
6-A	vol. 23, p. 200	6-U	vol. 23, p. 273
6-B	vol. 23, p. 201	6-V	vol. 24, p. 495
6-C	vol. 23, p. 218	6-W	vol. 24, pp. 496-509

7. John S. Chambers. "The Japanese Invasion," in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. January 1921. pp. 23-29.

7 pp. 23-24

7-a p. 26

8. Sidney L. Gulick. Japanese in California; A Critical Examination of (1) Report of the California State Board of Control; (2) Letter by Governor Stephens to Secretary Colby; (3) "Hearings in California by the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization," in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. January 1921. pp. 55-69.

8 p. 37

8-b p. 65

8-a p. 63

9. State Board of Control of California. Report to Governor William D. Stephens. California and the Oriental. Sacramento. June 19, 1920.

9 p. 146

9-b p. 189

9-a pp. 186-187

10. Kiyo Sue Inui. "California's Japanese Situation," in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. January 1921. p. 100.

11. Quoted in: K. K. Kawakami. "The Japanese Question," in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. January 1921. p. 85.
12. War Relocation Authority. Myths and Facts about the Japanese Americans. Washington, D. C. June 1945. pp. 26-27.
13. House of Representatives. Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration. Hearings, Part 29, Problems of Evacuation of Enemy Aliens and Others from Prohibited Military Zones. GPO. 1942. Also, Findings and Recommendations on Evacuation of Enemy Aliens and Others from Prohibited Military Zones. Fourth Interim Report. GPO. Washington, D. C. May 1942.
 - 13 Report, pp. 91-92
 - 13-a Hearings, pt. 29, p. 10974
 - 13-b Report, p. 92
 - 13-c Report, p. 93
 - 13-d Report, p. 131
 - 13-e Hearings, pt. 29, pp. 10973-11023
 - 13-f Hearings, pt. 29, pp. 11024-11025
 - 13-g Hearings, pt. 29, pp. 11137-11138
 - 13-h Hearings, pt. 29, pp. 11178-11183
14. U. S. Reports 169. U. S. vs. Wong Kim Ark. p. 666.
15. Durward V. Sandifer. "A Comparative Study of Laws Relating to Nationality at Birth and to Loss of Nationality," in American Journal of International Law, Vol. 29, 1935. pp. 248-279.
 - 15 p. 250
 - 15-a p. 258
 - 15-b p. 256
16. Japanese American Citizens League. Brief. Amicus Curiae. Korematsu vs. U. S. Supreme Court of the United States. October Term, 1944. No. 22.
 - 16 p. 28
 - 16-a p. 33
 - 16-b p. 42
17. K. K. Kawakami. The Real Japanese Question. Macmillan. New York. 1924.
 - 17 p. 174
 - 17-a pp. 486-487

18. Yamato Ichihashi. Japanese in the United States; A Critical Study of the problems of the Japanese Immigrants and Their Children. Stanford University Press, Stanford University, California. Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, London. 1932. pp. 106-107.

18 pp. 323-324
18-a pp. 331-332

18-b p. 230

19. R. L. Buell. "Some Legal Aspects of the Japanese Question," in American Journal of International Law, vol. XVII, January 1923. p. 34.

20. Edward K. Strong, Jr. The Second Generation Japanese Problem. Stanford University Press. Stanford University, California. c. 1934.

20 p. 142

20-a pp. 202-203

21. Headquarters Western Defense Command. Civil Affairs Division. Research Branch. Presidio of San Francisco. October 1944. Japanese Organizations in the United States: Dual Citizens and the Japanese Draft Law.

22. Japanese American Review. San Francisco. January 25, 1941. p. 6.

23. House of Representatives. [Dies] Special Committee of Un-American Activities. Report on the Axis Front Movement in the United States: Second Section--Japanese Activities. GPO. Washington, D. C. 1943. p. 207.

24. Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu vs. U. S. of America, on certiorari, No. 22. Brief for Appellant, presented in the Supreme Court of the U. S., October Term, 1944. Wayne M. Collins, Counsel for Appellant. pp. 93-95.

25. Farrington, Governor et al. v. V. T. Tokushige et al. February 21, 1927. [Honolulu, T. H.]

26. Meyer vs. Nebraska. 262 U. S. 390.

27. Hirabayashi vs. U. S. 320 U. S. 81. p. 42.

28. Marian Svensrug. "Attitude of the Japanese toward their Language Schools," in Sociology and Social Research, January-February 1935. pp. 259-264.

29. H. A. Millis. The Japanese Problem in the United States. Macmillan, New York. 1915. p. 265.
30. Department of the Interior. War Relocation Authority. Nisei in the War Against Japan. Washington, D. C. April 1945.
31. U. S. War Department. Western Defense Command. [DeWitt] Final Report — Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942. GPO. Washington, D. C. 1943.
- | | | | | | |
|------|----------|------|-----------|------|-------------|
| 31 | p. 33 | 31-f | p. 20 | 31-l | pp. 26-27 |
| 31-a | p. 34 | 31-g | p. 7 | 31-m | pp. 30-31 |
| 31-b | pp. 9-10 | 31-h | pp. 7-8 | 31-n | p. 28 |
| 31-c | p. 79 | 31-i | p. 8 | 31-o | pp. 107-112 |
| 31-d | p. 5 | 31-j | p. 34 | | |
| 31-e | p. 19 | 31-k | pp. 36-38 | | |
32. Col. John P. Irish. "The Japanese Issue in California," in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, January 1921. pp. 74-76.
- | | | | |
|----|-------|------|-------|
| 32 | p. 74 | 32-a | p. 76 |
|----|-------|------|-------|
33. Portland Oregonian. Sunday Magazine. February 4, 1940. As told to Jack Cramer, Oregonian Staff Writer, by Minoru Yasui. p. 5.
34. War Relocation Authority. Manzanar Relocation Center. Project Reports Officer. Report to Regional Director. Project Report No. 55, dated October 25, 1942. [Also numbered 66 in Historical Documentation Report Series, and dated September 25.]
35. George Yasukochi. A Study of the Vocational Experiences of University of California Alumni of Japanese Ancestry. National Youth Administration project sponsored by the Bureau of Guidance and Placement of the Japanese Students Club and the University of California Young Men's Christian Association. University of California. Berkeley, California. Spring 1941. [No page citations are given because the references are to a brief of the study, interlarded with quotes, made by the historian.]
36. Information contributed by N. Peiper, of the San Francisco District Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation during interview with the War Relocation Authority Historian, March 14, 1945.
37. New York Times.
- | | |
|------|----------------------------------|
| 37 | December 8, 1941, p. 6, col. 8 |
| 37-a | December 11, 1941. p. 24, col. 1 |

38. Los Angeles Times.

38 Dec. 16, 1941. pt. I, p. 1
38-a Feb. 2, 1942. pt. II, p. 1
38-b Feb. 3, 1942. pt. I, p. 1
38-c Feb. 3, 1942. pt. I, p. 6
38-d Feb. 4, 1942. pt. I, p. 1
38-e Feb. 4, 1942. pt. I, p. 6
38-f Feb. 5, 1942. pt. I, p. 5
38-g Feb. 5, 1942. pt. I, p. 1
38-h Feb. 6, 1942. pt. I, p. 1
38-i Feb. 6, 1942. pt. II, p. 4
38-j Feb. 6, 1942. pt. I, pp. 1,7
38-k Feb. 6, 1942. pt. I, p. 7
38-l Feb. 6, 1942. pt. I, p. 6
38-m Feb. 7, 1942. pt. I, p. 1
38-n Feb. 7, 1942. pt. I, pp. 1,6
38-o Feb. 8, 1942. pt. I, p. 13
38-p Feb. 10, 1942. pt. I, p. 1
38-q Feb. 12, 1942. pt. I, p. 1
38-r Feb. 10, 1942. pt. I, p. 7
38-s Feb. 11, 1942. pt. I, p. 1
38-t Feb. 12, 1942. pt. I, p. 8
38-u Feb. 13, 1942. pt. I, p. 6
38-uu Feb. 13, 1942. pt. II, p. 4
38-v Feb. 16, 1942. /Pegler Column/
38-vv Feb. 14, 1942. pt. I, pp. 1,5
38-w Feb. 18, 1942. pt. I, p. 1
38-x Feb. 19, 1942. pt. I, p. 7
38-y Feb. 25, 1942. pt. I, p. 1
38-z Feb. 25, 1942. pt. I, p. 8
38-A Feb. 26, 1942. pt. I, p. 1

39. Congress of the U. S. Report of Proceedings. Hearing held before Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Vol. 38. Report by C. B. Munson. January 17, 1946. Washington, D. C. pp. 7245 to 7299.

39 pp. 7275-7276
39-a p. 7277
39-b pp. 7270-7273
39-c pp. 7274-7275

40. Seattle Post Intelligencer.

40 Dec. 21, 1941. p. 1
40-a Dec. 22, 1941. p. 7
40-b Dec. 24, 1941. p. 4

41. San Francisco Examiner.

41 Dec. 26, 1941. p. 1
41-a Dec. 28, 1941. p. 5
41-b Jan. 10, 1942. p. B
41-c Jan. 3, 1942. p. 3
41-d Dec. 31, 1941. pt. I, p. 8
41-e Jan. 22, 1942. p. B
41-f Jan. 25, 1942. p. A
41-g Jan. 27, 1942. p. 1
41-h Jan. 28, 1942. p. 1
41-i Feb. 5, 1942. p. 9
41-j Feb. 8, 1942. p. 13
41-k Feb. 21, 1942. p. 5
41-l Feb. 22, 1942. p. 6

42. Sacramento Union.

42 Dec. 30, 1941. p. 1
42-a Jan. 17, 1942. p. 1
42-b Jan. 18, 1942. p. 8
42-c Jan. 19, 1942. p. 2
42-d Jan. 22, 1942. p. 6
42-e Jan. 28, 1942. p. 1
42-f Jan. 29, 1942. p. 1
42-g Jan. 29, 1942. p. 5
42-h Jan. 29, 1942. p. 10
42-i Jan. 31, 1942. p. 1
42-j Feb. 5, 1942. p. 1
42-k Feb. 7, 1942. p. 1
42-l Feb. 9, 1942. p. 1
42-m Feb. 9, 1942. p. 6
42-mm Feb. 15, 1942. p. 1
42-n Feb. 18, 1942. p. 8
42-o Feb. 19, 1942. p. 1
42-p Feb. 25, 1942. p. 1
42-q Mar. 2, 1942. p. 1
42-r Mar. 4, 1942. p. 1

43. Memorandum prepared by Messrs. Cohen, Cox and Rauh. The Japanese Situation on the West Coast. Provided by the Department of Justice. Alien Enemy Control Unit.
44. Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to Attorney General Biddle, February 7, 1944. Reported Bombing and Shelling of the West Coast.
45. Washington Post. October 29, 1945.
46. Washington Evening Star. November 1, 1945. p. A-3.
47. Eugene V. Rostow. "The Japanese American Cases: A Disaster," in Yale Law Journal, June 1945. pp. 496 et seq.

48. House of Representatives. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Naval Affairs. 78th Congress, 1st Session. Pursuant to H. Res. 30. A Resolution Authorizing and Directing an Investigation of the War Effort. Part 3. San Francisco, California Area. April 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17, 1943. GPO. Washington, D. C. 1943.

48 p. 739

48-a p. 740

49. Letter of June 17, 1942. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson to Major General Lewis B. Hershey, National Headquarters Selective Service System, Washington, D. C.

Letter of March 8, 1944. Harold M. Hayes, Captain AUS, Foreign Liaison Section, Manpower Division, to Mr. John Baker, Chief of Reports, War Relocation Authority.

Letter of November 5, 1942. Major General J. A. Ulio for the Adjutant General, to Mr. John F. Embree, Senior Archivist, War Relocation Authority.

50. Confidential Memorandum from the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, James Lawrence Fly, to the Attorney General. Subject: Lt. Gen. John L. DeWitt's Final Report on Japanese Evacuation from West Coast. Dated April 1, 1944. Contains quote from the report of the Chief of the Commission's Radio Intelligence Division on a conference with General DeWitt and his staff, on January 9, 1942.
51. Letter to the Honorable Francis Biddle, Attorney General, from James Lawrence Fly, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission. April 4, 1944.