

Pr 32.5407: 943

PAM HISTORY

SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT

January 1 to June 30  
1943

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Washington, D. C.

i26681602

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## SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

January 1 to June 30, 1943

Viewed as a whole, the first half of 1943 was undoubtedly the most eventful and decisive period the War Relocation Authority has yet experienced. It was high-lighted by six major developments: (1) greatly increased progress in the relocation of evacuees outside the relocation centers, (2) widening public discussion of WRA aims and policies, (3) a somewhat turbulent registration of adult evacuees carried out jointly by WRA and the Army at all centers in February and March, (4) investigation of the relocation program by two special subcommittees of the Congress, (5) steady improvement and refinement of techniques used in determining evacuee eligibility for indefinite leave from relocation centers, and (6) the development of a policy under which all evacuees found ineligible for leave will be segregated in one center apart from the majority of the evacuated population.

During the first six months of 1943, WRA gradually arrived at a fuller realization of the nature of its essential task and a sharper definition of the steps that would have to be taken for its accomplishment. Under the influence of close public and Congressional scrutiny, the agency gained a more mature understanding of the difficulties involved in maintaining and resettling a dislocated people in time of war. Through the registration experiences of early spring, it acquired new insights into the temper of the population at the centers. With the decision to segregate, it resolved one of the most difficult policy questions inherent in the program. When the period ended, it could be said for perhaps the first time that the WRA program had now been laid out in all its main contours and that the probable course of future operations was better defined than ever before.

### Progress of Relocation

Relocation of evacuees in private life, which became the prime objective of WRA in the early fall of 1942, began to gather its first really significant momentum shortly after the turn of the year and increased sharply in tempo throughout the months of spring. In January more evacuees left the centers on indefinite leave than had departed with this type of permit during the two previous months combined. In March the January figure was nearly doubled; in April it was almost sextupled; and by May people were going out of the relocation centers to establish residence in normal communities at the rate of approximately 500 a week. Despite a slight recession in June and a few returns to the centers throughout the half year, the total number of net departures on indefinite leave for the six-month period was over 7,000 or more than ten times the total number for 1942.

Three basic difficulties had been largely responsible for the meager rate of relocation progress in the fall months of 1942 immediately following adoption of the leave regulations:

1. The evacuees were seriously hampered in locating suitable jobs. Deprived as they were of the opportunity for face-to-face contact with potential employers, most of the residents in the centers had no effective way of knowing where jobs could be found, what types were available, or how to go about making an application. Despite the widespread and acute need for workers of nearly all kinds, there was a definite gap between the evacuated people and the many shops, farms, and factories where they might have been employed.
2. The process of handling leave applications was too slow and complicated. Evacuees sometimes had to wait weeks for indefinite leave permits to be issued.
3. Having lived for several months in the centers without real opportunity to build up financial reserves, many of the evacuees lacked the necessary cash to travel out on indefinite leave and establish their families in new communities.

In the early months of 1943, as these retarding influences became increasingly apparent, WRA took action on a number of fronts to eliminate bottlenecks and accelerate relocation. The first move in this direction was the establishment of field relocation offices in a number of key cities throughout the Middle West and the East to facilitate contact between private employers and evacuee workers at the centers and determine the likelihood of community acceptance of evacuees. The second step was a large-scale registration carried out at the centers in February and March to speed the process of leave clearance by collecting in one operation personal background data on all evacuee residents 17 years or over. Third was the adoption in mid-March of a policy providing for limited cash grants to needy evacuees going out of the centers on indefinite leave for private employment. And fourth was the gradual decentralization of the leave-clearance machinery so that in the majority of cases, indefinite leaves could be granted at the relocation centers without referral to the Washington office. The effect of all these moves is clearly reflected in the following monthly table of net departures on indefinite leave.

January	346
February	351
March	618
April	1,815
May	2,181
June	<u>1,847</u>
Total	7,158



By the end of June, over 9,000 former residents of relocation centers were back again in private life. But these people of Japanese ancestry who lived before the war in a comparatively narrow strip along the Pacific Coast were now spread out clear across the remainder of the country -- all the way from the farmlands of eastern Oregon and Washington to the coastal cities of New England. They had found new homes and new jobs in all but 7 of the 48 states and in every major region of the country except the South Atlantic coast.

The focal areas for relocation, however, were the Great Lakes region and the inter-mountain West. Nearly 2,000 people from the centers had settled in Illinois alone; over 1,300 in Colorado; just under 1,000 in Utah; and more than 700 in Idaho. Lesser numbers were scattered throughout the neighboring States of these two regions, across the farmlands of the Great Plains, and in the larger population centers of the East. There was also a small amount of relocation in the South, chiefly in the Gulf Coastal States.

Each of the following 12 cities received more than 100 people from the centers:

Chicago	1,466
Denver	548
Salt Lake City	403
Cleveland	243
Spokane	179
Minneapolis	146
Detroit	133
Ann Arbor	130
Ogden, Utah	128
Boulder, Colo.	121
Cincinnati	110
Laramie, Wyo.	103

The overwhelming majority of those who relocated prior to July 1 were American citizens, many of them under 30 and unmarried. Exactly 800 were students continuing their studies at some 205 institutions of higher education; nearly 600 were men who had entered the armed forces; and the remainder were nearly all workers and their dependents. Of this latter group, the great bulk were actual breadwinners since relocation of entire families was the exception rather than the rule. The usual pattern was for a son or daughter to go out on indefinite leave while alien parents remained behind at the relocation center.

Nearly half of the relocated workers were in domestic service or agriculture (approximately evenly divided) and the others were engaged in a variety of occupations ranging from unskilled labor to technical and professional work. Because of the widespread need for household workers in the larger cities, residents of the relocation centers received far more job offers in domestic service than in any other single line of activity. The demand, however, quickly outran the supply. By June there were extremely few people left at the centers with previous domestic

TABLE 1

Reported Absences on Leave by Centers  
June 30, 1943

Center	Seasonal Leave	Short Term Leave	Indefinite Leave				Total Absences on Leave
			General (Employment, etc.)	Education	Armed Forces	Total <sup>1/</sup> Indef. Leaves	
Central Utah	412	84	780	84	23	887	1383
Colorado River	1102	108	1149	95	85	1329	2539
Gila River	251	17	688	97	69	854	1122
Granada	579	95	698	84	91	873	1547
Heart Mountain	861	67	848	63	26	937	1865
Jerome	71	28	658	31	19	708	807
Manzanar	487	24	668	37	36	741	1252
Minidoka	934	67	1121	158	184	1463	2464
Rohwer	164	22	669	42 <sup>2/</sup>	14	725	911
Tule Lake	1121	29	593	109	49	751	1901
TOTALS	5982	541	7872	800	596	9268	15791

<sup>1/</sup> Includes conversions from seasonal to indefinite leave.

<sup>2/</sup> One Selective Service induction.

experience and proper qualifications for indefinite leave. Placement in agricultural jobs, on the other hand, maintained a fairly even pace and was still going forward unabated as the period closed.

Nowhere was the impact of relocation more profoundly felt than at the centers themselves. Over the six-month period the population of the 10 centers dropped from 106,775 to 96,222 and was significantly altered in other ways. By the start of the fiscal year, on July 1, many of the younger, more energetic, better educated, and more thoroughly Americanized evacuees had been drained off. The older people, the aliens, the extremely young children, and those of doubtful loyalty loomed somewhat more prominently in the total community at the centers than ever before. For obvious reasons, these changes brought new complications to the job of administering the centers. At the same time they also pointed up the dual need for a segregation program and for increasing emphasis on relocation of entire family groups.

#### Establishment of Relocation Offices

Almost immediately after the turn of the year 1943, WRA began effectuating plans developed in the late fall of 1942 for the establishment of a field organization to handle local contacts in connection with relocation. The first relocation office was opened in Chicago on January 4. Then, in the weeks and months that followed, similar offices were set up in Cleveland, Des Moines, Milwaukee, Salt Lake City, and numerous other key points throughout the Middle West and the East. By mid-June a total of 42 offices had been established from Spokane, Washington to Boston, Massachusetts.

These offices were of two kinds: principal and subordinate. Each of the seven principal offices -- established at Chicago, Cleveland, Denver, Salt Lake City, Kansas City, Little Rock, and New York -- was headed by a relocation supervisor and was generally responsible for relocation work over a rather broad geographic area (see map). The 35 subordinate offices, on the other hand, were directed by relocation officers and functioned (under general supervision of the principal offices) primarily in the immediate vicinity of the cities where they were located.

Both types of offices were assigned essentially the same basic functions. They served to provide the public in local areas with information about evacuees and the WRA program. They acted as clearing houses where job offers from employers were received, analyzed, and sent forward to the relocation centers. They provided WRA with important information on public attitudes toward Japanese-Americans in communities where evacuees were contemplating relocation. In collaboration with volunteer local committees composed of citizens interested in relocation, they helped the resettling evacuees, in a variety of ways, to become satisfactorily established in their new locations.

In the early months of the year the relocation offices were primarily concerned with determining community acceptance and with finding suitable jobs that evacuees might fill. Despite the widespread manpower shortage, many employers were initially reluctant to hire evacuees because of fears




TABLE 2

Reported Monthly Population at Relocation Centers  
January 1 to July 1, 1943

Center	Jan. 1	Feb. 1	March 1	April 1	May 1	June 1	July 1
Central Utah	7910	7948	7931	7984	7728	7525	7349
Colorado River	17620	17731	17661	17429	16784	16004	15679
Gila River	13341	13331	13294	13244	12990	12549	12360
Granada	6822	7223	7199	6833	6646	6380	6183
Heart Mountain	10721	10687	10658	10470	10252	9794	9304
Jerome	7817	8246	8472	8399	8238	8002	7800
Mansanar	9916	9878	9606	9497	9170	8688	8687
Minidoka	9091	9274	9375	9138	8351	7801	7669
Rohwer	8447	8460	8438	8379	8121	7828	7649
Tule Lake	15090	15015	14899	14534	14141	13750	13484
Isolation Center (Leupp, Ariz.)		16	39	34	49	55	58
TOTALS	106775	107809	107572	105941	102370	98376	96222

PRINCIPAL RELOCATION OFFICES OF WRA  
AND AREAS COVERED BY EACH



regarding their loyalties and misapprehensions concerning their status. And so the relocation supervisors and officers were faced at the beginning with the problem of clarifying these misapprehensions and furnishing employers with accurate information on the leave-clearance procedures.

As summer approached and these efforts began to take effect, however, the emphasis in most relocation offices was gradually shifted. Except in a few of the more recently established offices, it was no longer necessary for the WRA field representatives to go out in search of employers who would accept evacuees as workers. The problem was, rather, to fill the employment offers already on hand and to find vacancies of a type that would more actively attract the people still remaining at the centers.

#### Army Enlistment and Leave-Clearance Registration

When the history of evacuation and relocation is recorded in future years, the enlistment and registration program carried out at all relocation centers in February and March of 1943 will doubtless go down as one of the most significant chapters in the entire operation. In a very real sense, this program was a fork in the road for the evacuated people -- a testing of fundamental loyalties and democratic faiths in an atmosphere of high emotional tension. It brought to the surface grievances that had accumulated over a period of months and laid bare basic attitudes that had previously been submerged and indistinct. On the whole, it was one of the most exacting experiences WRA has ever undergone. But its net results were unquestionably beneficial both for WRA and for the great bulk of the evacuated people.

The military background of the program traces back to the early days of evacuation when the Selective Service System was advised by the War Department to discontinue inducting registrants of Japanese ancestry until further notice. At that time there were nearly 5,000 Japanese-American soldiers in the Army who had been inducted from the Hawaiian Islands and the mainland of the United States in 1940 and 1941. But, as a result of this War Department order, the young men of military age in the group actually evacuated were, for all practical purposes, ineligible for service in the armed forces during the first nine or ten months of their life in assembly and relocation centers. In the late fall of 1942, about 160 male citizens at the centers with particular skill in the Japanese language were recruited as instructors and translators in the intelligence branch of the Army. But it was not until the early months of 1943 that men from relocation centers were inducted into the Army for actual combat duty.

On January 28 the Secretary of War announced that the Army had decided to form a special Japanese-American combat team and that recruits would be accepted from the relocation centers, from the Hawaiian Islands, and from points outside the centers on the mainland of the United States. In the near future, the Secretary added, a special enlistment program to recruit personnel for the team would be carried out simultaneously at all relocation centers. Four days after this announcement, the President wrote to Secretary Stimson approving the combat team plan and

calling it a step toward restoration of the evacuated people to their normal status. By February 6 ten recruitment teams were on their way from the War Department in Washington to the relocation centers, and the 21,000 male citizens of military age in the centers were facing one of the most crucial decisions of their lives.

The administrative background of the program can be more briefly stated. In early January, when WRA was first informed that plans for a large-scale Army recruitment program at the relocation centers were nearing realization, the Authority itself was developing plans for a mass registration of all adults to speed up the leave-clearance process -- the process of determining leave eligibility from the standpoint of national security. As it happened, both the Army and WRA needed much the same type of background information on the people in the centers. The Army needed it for induction purposes on the male citizens of draft age; WRA needed it for leave-clearance purposes on all residents 17 years or over. And so the decision was made to combine Army enlistment and leave-clearance registration in one massive operation to be carried out jointly by the Army and WRA.

Two basic questionnaires were developed: one (DSS Form 304A) for male citizens of draft age and the other (WRA Form 126 Rev.) for all other residents beyond the age of 17. The ten Army recruitment teams -- each headed by a commissioned officer and staffed by two Caucasian sergeants plus one sergeant of Japanese ancestry-- were swiftly organized; one representative from the WRA staff at each relocation center was brought into Washington; and this combined Army and WRA personnel was then put through an intensive course of training at the War Department in the details of handling the enlistment and registration at the centers.

The recruitment teams arrived at the centers during the first week of February and immediately arranged for a series of meetings to be held in designated messhalls throughout each community. At these meetings prepared statements were read to the assembled residents on the purpose and significance of the program and some effort was made to answer questions. Then, about February 10 at most places, the actual registration started.

Nearly everywhere, in the beginning, there was confusion, resentment, and widespread reluctance to register. At some of the centers, these initial difficulties were rather quickly overcome while at others they persisted and were even intensified as time went on. At Minidoka, for one example, the entire process was completed in less than three weeks and produced over 300 Army volunteers. At Tule Lake, on the other hand, the great bulk of the adult evacuees failed to register until the program had been under way for several weeks and some 3,000 were still holding out when the process was finally terminated during the first week in April. But despite the turbulence and the emotional atmosphere that prevailed -- for a varying length of time -- at all the relocation centers, the registration program produced important benefits both from an administrative and a military point of view.



The primary benefit in terms of WRA's administrative needs and ultimate objectives was the accumulation of extensive background information on virtually all adult residents of the centers. For the first time, data required in connection with leave-clearance determinations was readily available on practically everyone who might conceivably apply for indefinite leave. The ground work had been laid for faster processing of leave applications, for decentralization of leave procedures, and -- ultimately -- for a thoroughgoing program to segregate those whose loyalties lie with Japan.

The chief benefit for the Army was the recruitment of more than 1,200 carefully selected volunteers. Although this number was considerably lower than anticipated, those who did volunteer undoubtedly represented, from the standpoint of both loyalty and military fitness, pretty much the cream of the draft-age group at the relocation centers. Combined with several thousand volunteers of Japanese ancestry simultaneously recruited from the Hawaiian Islands and several hundred who enlisted on the mainland outside relocation centers, they formed the nucleus of a hard-hitting combat unit. By the end of June, the greater proportion of the volunteers from the centers had actually entered the Army and were in training at Camp Shelby, Mississippi in preparation for active duty overseas.

Number of Army Volunteers by Centers  
During Registration and Prior to June 30, 1943

Center	Number of Volunteers
Central Utah	116
Colorado River	236
Gila River	101
Granada	152
Heart Mountain	54
Jerome	42
Manzanar	100
Minidoka	308
Rohwer	40
Tule Lake	59
Total	1208

The most significant single question asked of the center residents during the enlistment and registration was one which appeared on both DSS Form 304A and WRA Form 126 Rev. as Question 28. Originally this question was substantially identical on both forms. All registrants were asked to swear unqualified allegiance to the United States and to forswear allegiance to any foreign power, specifically the Emperor of Japan. Before the registration had progressed very far at most centers, however, large numbers of the alien residents were protesting against the wording of Question 28. Since Japanese aliens are not eligible for naturalization as American citizens, they pointed out, they could not conscientiously answer "yes" to the question as it was worded without becoming virtually "men without a country." Realizing the logic of this position, WRA on February 12 instructed all centers to insert on WRA Form 126 Rev. -- for

all aliens but not for female citizens--the following substitute for the original Question 28:

"Will you swear to abide by the laws of the United States and to take no action which would in any way interfere with the war effort of the United States?"

As finally adjusted, then, Question 28 asked the citizen evacuees whether they would pledge allegiance to the United States and asked the alien residents of the centers to swear that they would be law-abiding.

At all ten centers there were 77,957 residents eligible to register and 74,466 who actually registered. Of this latter number, 65,078 or 87 percent answered Question 28 with an unqualified "yes", while the remainder either answered "no", qualified their answers, or failed to reply. In view of the highly significant difference in the wording of the question for aliens and for citizens, it is perhaps not surprising that the great bulk of the non-affirmative answers came from the latter group. Approximately 26 percent of the male citizens and about 15 percent of the female citizens failed to provide unqualified affirmative answers.

The other questions on the two forms were considerably less controversial but provided WRA with information which is only slightly less significant in the determination of eligibility for leave. They asked for information on topics such as education, previous employment, knowledge of the Japanese language, number of relatives (if any) in Japan, foreign investments, foreign travel, religious and organizational affiliations, and even sports and hobbies. As the mass registration was completed at the various centers and as the younger residents were subsequently registered upon reaching the age of 17, the forms carrying all this information were shipped into the Washington office of WRA for a check against the records of Federal investigative agencies. Under an agreement between WRA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the latter agency took main responsibility for this record check and provided WRA with such information--on each registrant--as was available in its own files and in those of the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Service. By the first of July, 73,900 cases had been submitted to the FBI and 61,200 had been returned with the available intelligence information.

Because of the confusion and the highly emotional atmosphere that prevailed at most of the centers during the registration, all registrants were given an opportunity to reconsider their answers during the spring and early summer of the year.

#### Evacuee Reactions to the Registration Program

Underlying the resistance to registration that prevailed--for a greater or lesser period--at all centers was an extremely intricate pattern of influences dating back to the time of evacuation. Two factors stand out as primarily important: (1) evacuee resentment against the government resulting from evacuation and detention in relo-

ORIGINAL REGISTRATION RESULTS - MALE CITIZENS  
 Original Replies to Question 28 on DSS Form 304- A  
 for Male Citizens of Japanese Ancestry 17 Years of Age and Older  
 At The Ten Relocation Centers September, 1943 <sup>1/</sup>

Center	Eligible to Register	Total <sup>2/</sup> Registered	Replies to Question 28					
			Yes	Qualified Yes	No	Qualified No	No Reply	Unknown <sup>3/</sup>
Central Utah	1,707	1,681	1,141	26	432	82	0	0
Colorado River	3,502	3,502	2,858	9	501	106	0	28
Gila River	2,588	2,588	1,637	- <u>4/</u>	951	- <u>4/</u>	0	0
Granada	1,580 <sup>5/</sup>	1,580	1,474	16	82	8	0	0
Heart Mountain	2,145	2,145	1,760	57	210	25	93	0
Jerome	1,615	1,615	1,078	125	308	88	16	0
Manzanar	1,907	1,907	918	1	977	0	11	0
Minidoka	1,419	1,393	1,294	0	61	25	0	13
Rohwer	1,615	1,615	1,324	106	101	41	6	37
Tule Lake	2,969	2,341	1,527	- <u>4/</u>	791	- <u>4/</u>	2	21
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>21,047</b>	<b>20,367</b>	<b>15,011</b>	<b>340</b>	<b>4,414</b>	<b>375</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>99</b>

- <sup>1/</sup> Includes answers of persons who reached the age of 17 and were registered between the completion of mass registration and the beginning of September.
- <sup>2/</sup> Discrepancies from "eligible to register" due to refusals or failures to register.
- <sup>3/</sup> Includes recent arrivals and persons just turned 17 who have not been interviewed to date and persons registered but for whom no records are available.
- <sup>4/</sup> No record of qualified answers available -- included in "yes" and "no" answers.
- <sup>5/</sup> Does not include 8 persons physically incapable of registering.

Original Replies to Question 28 on DSS Form 304A and Form WRA 126 Rev.  
 For All Persons of Japanese Ancestry 17 Years of Age and Older  
 In The Ten Relocation Centers September, 1943 1/

	Eligible to Register	Total <u>2/</u> Registered	Replies to Question 28					Unknown <u>3/</u>
			Yes	Qualified Yes	No	Qualified No	No Reply	
<u>NUMBER</u>								
TOTAL	77,957	74,466	65,078	941	6,733	1,142	426	146
Male Citizens	21,047	20,367	15,011	340	4,414	375	128	99
Female Citizens	19,262	18,449	15,671	376	1,919	210	226	47
Male Aliens	22,275	20,938	20,197	140	137	427	37	0
Female Aliens	15,373	14,712	14,199	85	263	130	35	0
<u>PERCENT</u>								
TOTAL		100.0	87.4	1.3	9.0	1.5	0.6	0.2
Male Citizens		100.0	73.7	1.7	21.7	1.8	0.6	0.5
Female Citizens		100.0	85.0	2.0	10.4	1.1	1.2	0.3
Male Aliens		100.0	96.4	0.7	0.7	2.0	0.2	0.0
Female Aliens		100.0	96.5	0.6	1.8	0.9	0.2	0.0

- 1/ Includes answers of persons who reached the age of 17 and were registered between the completion of mass registration and the beginning of September.
- 2/ Discrepancies from "eligible to register" due to refusals or failures to register.
- 3/ Includes recent arrivals and persons just turned 17 who have not been interviewed to date and persons registered but for whom no records are available.



cation centers and (2) administrative miscalculations and errors of judgment both in the explanation and the execution of the registration program.

### Evacuee Resentments

In the eyes of most WRA staff members, the registration and enlistment program appeared from the very beginning as a distinctly forward step for the evacuated people. The War Department's decision to accept Army volunteers from the population at the centers was regarded as an excellent opportunity for the evacuees to provide the American public with dramatic proof of their essential patriotism and loyalty. The registration was conceived as a highly practical administrative step taken to speed the return of qualified evacuees back to private life.

To many of the evacuees, however, both the enlistment and the registration appeared in a vastly different light. After undergoing the extremely trying experiences of evacuation and the rigors of several months' detention in a relocation center, a considerable minority--particularly among the citizen group--was deeply resentful against the Federal government and highly suspicious of any action it might take affecting their future status. This point of view is most sharply reflected in some of the qualified answers to Question 28, such as "Yes, if my civil rights are fully restored" or "Yes, if I can return immediately to my former home." And these are among the milder manifestations of the underlying antipathy. Some of the most thoroughly embittered citizens tended to regard the whole enlistment and registration as "just another government trick" and nearly 3,000 of them actually went to the point of requesting expatriation to Japan.

### Administrative Difficulties

With the advantage afforded by hindsight, certain facts are clear. At the time WRA was so absorbed in the mechanics of an enormous operation that it failed to appreciate the advantages that might have been gained from early consultation with key evacuee residents. There was not enough time for really adequate advance planning or for the formulation of wholly clear-cut instructions covering every phase of the operation. The confusion that arose about the wording of Question 28 for aliens is only one indication of the haste with which the plans were developed and instructions formulated.

Then, too, it was unfortunate in some ways that registration was linked with Army recruitment. From the very beginning, the recruitment phase of the operation, because of its more dramatic character, tended to obscure the real significance of registration not only in the minds of the evacuees but even in the eyes of many WRA staff members at the centers. And at some of the centers, this initial confusion was never entirely eliminated. It is probably literally true that hundreds of the evacuees went through the registration without any real understanding of the significance of Question 28 or even any adequate appreciation of the reasons why they were being asked to fill out the questionnaires.

The results of the registration must be interpreted in the light of these highly pertinent background facts and are being so interpreted by

WRA in its current operations.

#### Changes in Leave Procedures

During the early months of 1943, as the relocation field offices started functioning and the whole indefinite leave program began picking up new scope and tempo, it became necessary for WRA to make a number of changes in its basic leave regulations. The changes were made primarily to speed up and simplify the leave procedures by transferring to the field offices and the relocation centers several functions which had previously been exercised by the Washington Office.

Under the basic leave regulations, which had become effective on October 1, 1942, two actions were of central importance: (1) the application for leave clearance and (2) the application for an indefinite leave permit. The first of these applications was submitted on a form similar to the questionnaires used during registration. Its purpose was to provide personal background data that could be used in determining eligibility for indefinite leave from the standpoint of national security. The application for an indefinite leave permit was made at the time when the applicant was actually preparing to leave the center. It called for (1) information on the applicant's current financial status, (2) the specific destination and arrangements that had been made for employment or support outside the relocation center, and (3) an agreement to keep WRA notified of changes in address or employment.

Throughout the latter months of 1942 and the early part of 1943, both types of applications--whether made simultaneously or separately--were submitted to the Washington Office of WRA for final action. In processing applications for clearance, a careful examination was made of information collected on the applicant at the relocation center and then a check was made against the files of Federal intelligence agencies. If there was no evidence from either source that the applicant might endanger the national security or interfere with the war effort, clearance was granted. Processing of applications for indefinite leave involved (1) ascertaining that the applicant had a definite destination and some means of support and (2) checking on the prevailing public attitudes towards persons of Japanese ancestry in the community of destination. Prior to establishment of the field relocation offices, the check on public attitudes was generally made by writing to key officials and leading citizens of the community in question.

The first really important change in these procedures was made in tentative form on March 3 and clarified in greater detail on March 20. As finally spelled out, it provided essentially for a decentralization in the handling of applications for indefinite leave. The purely mechanical function of issuing leave permits--in cases where clearance had been granted--was transferred to the relocation centers. The more important function of checking on community attitude was placed in the hands of the relocation field offices. The net effect was to accelerate the handling of indefinite leave applications and to give the field offices an effective control over the influx of evacuees into the communities of their respective areas.

The second significant change was adopted on March 24. Designed to fill a long-felt need in the relocation program, it set up a system of providing financial assistance for evacuees going out of the centers on indefinite leave. Such assistance was limited, however, to cases of genuine need and was provided only to evacuees who were leaving the centers for the purpose of taking jobs--not to those going out on student leave or those with independent means of support. The scale of grants was established at \$50 for evacuees leaving the centers without dependents; \$75 for those leaving with one dependent; and \$100 for those leaving with two or more dependents. Later modifications adopted in April and May provided that grants would be made to the families of men in the armed services regardless of the purposes for which they were leaving the centers and that evacuees going out to live temporarily in hostels for the purpose of seeking employment after arrival would also be eligible.

The final major modification of the period came on April 2, after the registration program had been finished at all the centers, and was definitely related to the registration. The prime significance of registration was that it constituted the first and basic step in a mass leave clearance covering virtually all adults at the relocation centers. Once it had been completed and once all dockets had been processed through the intelligence agencies, WRA would be in position to eliminate clearance as a separate step in the leave procedures. The amendment of April 2 anticipated this development. It did not eliminate leave clearance, but it authorized the Project Directors to grant indefinite leave permits without referral to the Washington Office and in advance of leave clearance provided certain basic requirements were met. The most important of these requirements were: (1) the applicant must have answered Question 28 during registration with an unqualified affirmative and (2) the Project Director must be satisfied, on the basis of evidence available at the relocation center, that the applicant would not endanger the national security or interfere with the war effort. Issuance of permits in advance of clearance, however, was specifically prohibited in the case of (a) those who had applied for repatriation or expatriation to Japan, (b) those whose applications for leave clearance had previously been denied, (c) Shinto priests, (d) aliens released on parole from internment camps by the Department of Justice, and (e) those who were planning to relocate in one of the eastern seaboard States under jurisdiction of the Eastern Defense Command.

#### Seasonal Leave

With the arrival of spring in 1943 there was a renewal of the movement which had temporarily reduced the population of several relocation centers in 1942--the movement of evacuees out of the centers to take seasonal jobs in agriculture. The 1943 exodus of seasonal workers began on a really significant scale in March, increased sharply in April, levelled off in May, and then slowed down considerably in June. By the end of the half year, slightly more than 5,000 evacuees were outside the centers on this kind of work. The following table shows the monthly trend in net departures on seasonal leave. A negative figure is shown for January since there were more returns to the centers from seasonal leave during that month than there were departures.



January	- 128
February	103
March	912
April	1,940
May	1,759
June	532

The great bulk of the seasonal workers who left prior to June 30 went to jobs in the sugar beet sections of the intermountain West. Idaho, Colorado, Utah, and Montana received the heaviest contingents. But a considerable number took jobs in the Great Plains area; some entered seasonal farm work as far east as Michigan; and a few dozen went into railway maintenance jobs in several western states. A sizable percentage of those who left the centers on seasonal permits were expected to locate year-round jobs and apply for indefinite leave without returning to the relocation centers.

On March 16 the regulations governing seasonal leave were significantly modified for the first time since their adoption in May of 1942. During 1942, while the evacuee population was gradually being transferred to relocation centers from Army assembly centers, seasonal leave or group work leave (as it was then called) had to be handled jointly by WRA and the Army. Evacuees were sent out to work in a given area under a Civilian Restriction Order issued by the Western Defense Command and were restricted in movement by the terms of the order to the particular county or counties where the work was located. Under the new policy of March 16, 1943, however, WRA assumed full responsibility for handling the seasonal leave program. The amended regulations provided that seasonal leave was to be issued only for work in areas approved by the relocation field offices and that seasonal workers would be restricted in movement to the county or counties which the field offices had designated. Provision was also made that seasonal permits would not be granted to those who had applied for repatriation or expatriation, those who had been denied leave clearance, and those who had failed to answer Question 28 with an unqualified affirmative.

#### Senate Subcommittee Investigation

Prior to January, 1943 the War Relocation Authority had conducted its program with only a limited amount of public attention. Active and sustained interest in WRA activities during 1942 was confined largely to the Pacific Coast States and to communities in the immediate vicinity of the several relocation centers. But during the first half of 1943, as relocating evacuees began to fan out across roughly 75 percent of the country, the program moved for the first time definitely into the national spotlight.

One of the developments that contributed toward making the WRA program a national issue was the investigation conducted during January, February and March by a special subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs. This seven-man group, under the chairmanship of Senator A. B. Chandler of Kentucky, was appointed to consider the advisability of S. 444, a bill introduced by Senators Wallgren of Washington and Holman of Oregon for the purpose of transferring WRA activities to the War Depart-



ment. The subcommittee opened its investigation in late January with a series of hearings held in Washington. Then, the chairman of the subcommittee and a special investigator travelled to the field and continued the investigation at a number of the relocation centers. The last formal hearing was conducted by Senator Chandler at Phoenix, Arizona on March 6.

From the public relations standpoint, the investigation took on special significance from the fact that it occurred simultaneously with the registration program. Statements attributed to the subcommittee chairman and others regarding the percentage of negative answers at some of the centers were widely published without any indication of the background of registration or the climate of human emotion in which it was taking place. The impression was created in many minds that a heavy proportion of the people in relocation centers were actively disloyal to the United States and basically loyal to the Emperor of Japan. Once this erroneous premise had been established, a significant proportion of the Nation's public and press became increasingly critical of WRA's policies governing relocation of the evacuated people and operation of the relocation centers. And this criticism increased both in volume and intensity through the end of June.

The subcommittee itself, however, expressed only moderate disapproval of WRA activities. In its final report, which was approved by the full Military Affairs Committee on May 7, the group under Senator Chandler made three basic recommendations:

1. That the draft law be made to apply to all men of Japanese descent in the same manner as to other citizens and residents of the United States;
2. That those who answered "no" to Question 28 and those otherwise found to be disloyal should be placed in an interment camp at the earliest possible date;
3. That the loyal able-bodied evacuees be permitted to go out to work "under proper supervision" in areas where they will be accepted.

Although the bill (S.444) which stimulated the investigation would have transferred the WRA program to the War Department, the subcommittee did not recommend such a step.

#### Segregation

The idea of separating the evacuated people into two groups on the basis of their fundamental loyalties stems back to the very earliest days of the relocation program. From the beginning, however, WRA's position has been that such a separation would have to be made with the utmost care and only after painstaking consideration of each individual case. Obviously, this is a job of enormous scope and one which could be carried out with fairness only after all the evacuated people had been transferred to relocation centers and basic records had been developed on the entire group. To put the matter another way, once the registration program had been completed and the results had been tabulated, WRA was in position for

the first time to undertake a really sound and equitable program of segregation.

Several considerations indicated the desirability of such a program. In the first place, the disturbances at Manzanar and Poston during the final quarter of 1942, together with the manifestations at Tule Lake and other centers during registration, had clearly showed that serious social tensions at the centers would doubtless continue and perhaps intensify as long as people of sharply diverging loyalties remained quartered close together. Second was the fact that many of the people whose loyalties lay with Japan--those, for example, who had requested repatriation--wanted nothing so much as to remain secluded for the duration of the war. Thirdly--and most important--the admixture of a disloyal minority in the population at relocation centers was undoubtedly confusing the public mind about the loyalties of the entire group. Once the patently disloyal had been weeded out, the problem of gaining public acceptance for relocation of the remainder would likely be greatly simplified.

One of the initial problems faced by WRA in connection with segregation was to find a place where the segregants might be quartered. As far back as November of 1942, the Authority attempted to find a suitable site for housing the repatriate group apart from other evacuees. but the search was unsuccessful. By June of 1942, however, the population of the ten relocation centers had dropped to the point where it was possible to designate one of them as a segregation center and to transfer the non-segregant group residing in that center into several of the others. After careful consideration, Tule Lake in northern California was selected as the segregation center for four principal reasons:

1. It was one of the biggest of the relocation centers with a capacity of approximately 16,000;
2. It had a large acreage of land readily available for agriculture and thus could provide the segregants with sound work opportunities;
3. Its resident population contained a greater proportion of potential segregants than any other center;
4. It was one of the two centers lying in the evacuated zone and special restrictions imposed by the Western Defense Command made it less desirable than other centers for use as a relocation center.

Another problem of even greater complexity was the establishment of criteria for deciding which evacuees should be segregated. Since the ultimate aim was to segregate those to whom WRA would normally deny indefinite leave, the problem was basically one of sharpening up the criteria for making leave determinations. One group--those who had requested return to Japan--was clear; these people had indicated beyond reasonable doubt where their loyalties lay. In addition, WRA had decided by the end of June to segregate (1) those who answered "no" to Question 28 and were regarded after interview as disloyal, and (2) those who were denied leave

clearance from the standpoint of national security.

The plan was to start the segregation process in late July or early August and to complete the population transfers to and from Tule Lake, if possible, by the end of October.

#### House of Representatives Subcommittee Investigation

Starting around the first of the year, nationwide public interest in WRA activities increased steadily throughout the early spring and came to a heated climax in May and June. During the latter two months the program became the subject of extremely widespread discussion and controversy, largely as a result of the inquiry conducted under the auspices of the House of Representatives Special Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities.

This Congressional group, under the chairmanship of Rep. Martin Dies of Texas, began its inquiry of WRA activities on May 12 when two staff investigators of the Committee appeared suddenly and without advance notice at the Manzanar Relocation Center. On the previous day a spokesman of the Committee in Washington had announced to the press that an investigation was under way and had intimated that WRA was releasing "known subversives" from the relocation centers. From that point forward, a steady drumfire of criticism emanating from Committee spokesmen and directed against WRA and the evacuated people appeared in the Nation's press. On May 19, Rep. J. Parnell Thomas of N.J., a member of the Committee, wired to the President from Los Angeles calling for an immediate cessation of WRA's indefinite leave program pending completion of the Committee's investigation. On the same day, Rep. Thomas made this wire available to the press and simultaneously was quoted as saying that "certain government officials responsible for administration of the WRA have lost sight of the fact that America is at war, that America has enemies, and that the Japanese in and out of America are as much our enemies as any other Axis peoples." By June 2 the tide of public controversy had reached such heights--the waters of popular opinion had been so thoroughly muddied by misstatement and innuendo--that the Director of WRA wrote Chairman Dies asking for the privilege of supplying the Committee with accurate facts and urging that Committee spokesmen refrain from making further "irresponsible" public statements.

On the day after this letter was written, the Committee Chairman appointed a special subcommittee of three men to conduct a more formal inquiry into WRA activities. This subcommittee--composed of Rep. John M. Costello of California (chairman), Rep. Karl E. Mundt of So. Dakota, and Rep. Herman P. Eberharter of Pennsylvania--left Washington almost immediately for California. From June 8 to June 17, the group held hearings in Los Angeles taking voluminous testimony from three staff members of the Colorado River Relocation Center, from three former members of relocation center staffs who had been discharged by WRA for incompetence, and from other witnesses. On June 18 the subcommittee held another hearing at Parker, Arizona near the Colorado River Center. And by the end of the month it was back in Washington ready to continue the investigation at the national level.



While the investigation was going forward in the field, WRA began a careful analysis of the numerous press statements attributed to spokesmen of the Committee in order to determine the trend of the inquiry and prepare factual evidence for presentation at the Washington hearings. From this analysis, it became obvious that criticism was being directed primarily at four aspects of the War Relocation Authority program: (1) the policies and procedures governing indefinite leave; (2) the types and quantities of food being served at relocation centers; (3) the types of discipline used in dealing with evacuee residents; and (4) the type of personnel employed by WRA both in Washington and at the several centers. WRA faced the Washington hearings ready to support its policies on all four counts. It was thoroughly convinced (1) that its leave procedures included every reasonable precaution necessary to safeguard the national security, (2) that evacuees within the centers were being fed in strict accordance with rationing regulations, (3) that rigid discipline imposed upon a people merely because of the accident of ancestry was wholly un-American, and (4) that WRA personnel had been selected with all the care that could reasonable be expected of a Federal agency.

By the end of June, however, the welter of extravagant statements and factual distortions emanating from staff investigators of the Committee had already had a retarding effect on the relocation program. As previously indicated in this report, the number of evacuees departing from the centers on both indefinite and seasonal leave dropped rather sharply in June from the high levels reached in May. And there was every indication of further decline in July unless vigorous efforts were made to inform the public accurately concerning WRA aims and activities and regarding the true status of the evacuated people. As the period closed, plans had been formulated for bringing such information to the attention of the public immediately after the Washington hearings of the subcommittee.

#### Legal Developments Affecting the Evacuated Population

The issue of detaining American citizens in relocation centers, which was brought to the forefront of public discussion during the investigation conducted by the House subcommittee, has always been one of the most perplexing constitutional questions involved in the WRA program. WRA's position has been that, in the interest of the national security, it could legally detain the evacuated people in relocation centers until a proper screening of the potentially dangerous individuals could be made and that it could further detain the potentially dangerous while relocation of the remainder is going forward. The Authority has always felt, however, that it has no legal authority for indefinite detention.

In June of 1943 the Supreme Court of the United States for the first time handed down a decision dealing with the special wartime regulations developed by the Government for the people of Japanese ancestry who formerly lived along the Pacific Coast. In the case of Hirabayashi v. United States, the Court held that it was within the war powers of the President and the Congress to apply curfew regulations to these people before evacuation. No opinion was expressed on the validity of the evacuation orders or of detention in relocation centers. Two of the Justices, however, in their concurring opinions provided at least a hint of high



judicial thinking on some of the broader issues. Mr. Justice Murphy declared, "This (i.e. the Hirabayashi decision) goes to the very brink of Constitutional power." Mr. Justice Douglas was even more specific. "Detention for reasonable cause," he wrote, "is one thing. Detention on account of ancestry is another..... Obedience to the military orders is one thing. Whether an individual member of a group must be afforded at some stage an opportunity to show that, being loyal, he should be reclassified is a wholly different question.....if it were plain that no machinery was available whereby the individual could demonstrate his loyalty as a citizen in order to be reclassified, questions of a more serious character would be presented. The United States, however, takes no such position."

One other case decided during the spring by a Federal District Court actually and directly involved the issue of detention in a relocation center. This was the case of Miss Mitsuye Endo who, by writ of habeas corpus, sought to obtain release from detention at Tule Lake. Miss Endo had made no application for leave or leave clearance but had contended, rather, that she was entitled to release without the necessity of complying with the leave regulations. This reasoning was rejected by the Court which denied the writ on the ground that Miss Endo should have exhausted available administrative remedies before bringing suit.

#### Isolation Procedures

Following the disturbance at Manzanar in early December of 1942, WRA began an intensive study of methods for preventing and dealing with disorders at relocation centers. One rather obvious need was for procedures under which persistent troublemakers might be removed from the relocation centers and transferred to some place where their activities would be less disrupting and could be more effectively controlled.

In the case of aliens, the problem was comparatively simple. During the early months of the year, an informal agreement was negotiated between WRA and the Department of Justice covering transfer of enemy aliens from relocation to internment centers. Under this agreement, WRA was authorized to certify for transfer to an internment camp any alien resident of a relocation center found to be actually dangerous to the public peace and security. Since most of the persistently troublemaking aliens at relocation centers fell rather clearly into this category, negotiation of the agreement virtually solved the problem as far as aliens were concerned.

For the handling of troublemakers among the American citizen group at the relocation centers, however, special procedures had to be worked out and an isolation center had to be established under WRA supervision. In the early part of January a temporary isolation center was opened at the site of an abandoned CCC Camp near Moab, Utah. The first group of evacuees to be isolated there was a contingent of 16 men (including both aliens and citizens) who were suspected of being the ringleaders behind the December disturbance at Manzanar. This contingent was later joined by a smaller group from Manzanar and subsequently by scattered individuals from all but a few of the relocation centers. By the end of March the population of the Moab center stood at 34.

Meanwhile WRA had been carrying on negotiations with the Department of the Interior for the use of an old Indian Service boarding school at Leupp, Arizona as a regular isolation center. Arrangements were completed in mid-April and the isolated population was transferred from Moab to Leupp on April 27. By the close of the semi-annual period, all the aliens originally confined at Moab and later at Leupp had been transferred to internment camps and the population at Leupp consisted of 58 male citizens --many of them "kibei" or American-born Japanese who had received a substantial part of their education in Japan.

Procedures governing the removal of troublemakers from relocation centers were established tentatively in mid-February and later modified in early June. Under the system worked out, a clear-cut distinction was made between isolation and segregation. Project Directors were cautioned against confusing the two procedures and were advised that only persistent and incorrigible agitators should be recommended for isolation. In cases where removal seemed the only remedy, provision was made that complete dockets should be prepared at the relocation center and submitted to the Washington office for review by a special board and for final action by the National Director. The procedures also authorized the director of the isolation center to make periodic recommendations for return to the relocation centers in deserving cases and required him to review the records of all evacuees under his jurisdiction at least once every 120 days.

#### Admittance of Parolees to Relocation Centers

Concurrently with the negotiations carried on between WRA and the Department of Justice for the transfer of dangerous aliens to internment camps, agreement was also reached between the two agencies for the acceptance at relocation centers of paroled internees of Japanese ancestry. The people involved were mainly Japanese aliens who had been apprehended by the Department of Justice but whose detention in internment camps was found by the Attorney General not to be necessary. Arrangements for transferring the parolees provided that in each case a summary of the man's record would be forwarded to the Washington office of WRA for review prior to actual movement. Only parolees who met the basic requirements for indefinite leave were accepted.

#### Spanish Consular Visits

Ever since the start of hostilities with Japan, the Spanish Government has been serving as protecting power under international law for Japanese interests in the United States. In line with this responsibility, representatives of the Spanish consulates both at San Francisco and at New Orleans visited all ten of the relocation centers in company with representatives from the State Department during the period between December, 1942 and the end of June. In their visits the Spanish officials were concerned solely with the welfare of alien residents at relocation centers and not in any way with the American citizens. Although the Spanish Embassy presented no major criticisms regarding conditions at the centers to the United States Government during the period, a number of minor complaints--dealing particularly with food--were received by the State Department and forwarded to WRA for consideration.

### Evacuee Employment at the Centers

Throughout the months of spring, as hundreds of the more able and better trained evacuees went out on indefinite and seasonal leave, the evacuee work program at the relocation centers required considerable redefinition. Where the problem of WRA in early days had been largely one of providing employment opportunities at the centers for a sizable reservoir of available workers, the emphasis was now on stimulating relocation and on the operation of a simple maintenance program at the centers. A survey of the work requirements at the centers made in April revealed that many positions of doubtful or borderline value had been established during the earlier period of manpower surplus and that some tightening up was clearly in order. In May all centers were advised to eliminate jobs not actually needed in the interest of community welfare and, in this reduction, to remove from the payroll first those evacuees whose work performance was below commonly accepted standards. By the end of the period, the combined evacuee payroll at all centers had been reduced from the March 31 level of 50,505 down to 46,135 and reductions were still in progress.

The following table shows the reductions effected at each of the centers during the second quarter of the year:

Total Evacuee Employment at the Centers  
March 31 and June 30, 1943

<u>Center</u>	<u>March 31 Employment</u>	<u>June 30 Employment</u>
Central Utah	4,140	3,767
Colorado River	7,856	7,752
Gila River	6,786	5,989
Granada	3,207	3,060
Heart Mountain	4,558	3,871
Jerome	4,167	3,295
Manzanar	4,821	4,294
Minidoka	4,500 (approx.)	4,000 (approx.)
Rohwer	4,202	4,001
Tule Lake	<u>6,412</u>	<u>6,106</u>
Totals	50,505	46,135

### Food Production

By the early part of 1943, WRA had abandoned practically all thought of commercial food production at relocation centers and was concentrating its agricultural efforts almost exclusively on meeting the subsistence needs of the evacuee population. Plans made early in the program for extensive land development work and large-scale production of war crops had been steadily revised downward since the late summer of 1942. And this trend culminated in a new administrative instruction on agriculture, issued to the centers in mid-February of 1943, which formalized the gradual policy shift.

Plans for 1943 crop production at the centers, drawn up early in the year, reflected the increased emphasis on subsistence agriculture. They called for a total planting of 7,632 acres and an estimated yield of nearly 66 million pounds of vegetables. In addition, plans were made for 17,000 acres of feed crops to serve as the basis for an expanded livestock program. However, the only war crop production included was about 150 acres of flax, long-staple cotton, and castor beans at the Gila River Center in Arizona.

The 1943 vegetable production program for the ten centers is shown in the following table:

Planned Vegetable Production Program  
Crop Year 1943

Center	Acres	Estimated Production	
		For use on Center Lbs.	For shipment to other centers Lbs.
Central Utah	801	4,985,000	--
Colorado River	368	4,654,000	--
Gila River	1,653	9,024,000	6,608,000
Granada	469	3,367,000	--
Heart Mountain	1,063	4,932,000	650,000
Jerome	630	3,486,000	399,000
Manzanar	308	4,016,500	--
Minidoka	420	2,420,000	--
Rohwer	610	3,639,000	134,000
Tule Lake	1,110	10,396,000	5,496,000
TOTAL	7,632	52,719,500	13,267,000

During the first half of the year, considerable progress was achieved toward the realization of these goals. But a combination of unfavorable weather and other difficulties made it appear highly unlikely that production for the ten centers as a whole would actually reach the anticipated levels. At Minidoka and Heart Mountain, the immense work involved in preparing the raw land for production delayed planting until well along in the spring. At the two Arkansas centers, the production program was set back by extremely dry weather in late April and early May. Central Utah and Granada experienced some difficulties in getting the crop production work organized and in recruiting agricultural crews. At Manzanar and Colorado River, where the plans called for only limited production, no serious obstacles were encountered. But only at Tule Lake and Gila River did it seem likely that the production goals would actually be realized of perhaps exceeded.

Harvesting prior to June 30 was limited largely to the Gila River Center where vegetable production had gone forward through the winter months. This center alone accounted for approximately 72 percent of the 3,600,000 pounds of vegetables harvested and delivered to mess halls in the second quarter of the year.

Land development work moved forward nearly everywhere at an



encouraging pace. Much of this work was carried out under contract in order to avoid the necessity of purchasing heavy equipment, but evacuee crews were used wherever possible. At Manzanar  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles of concrete pipe were laid for irrigation purposes. At Tule Lake construction of laterals and irrigation structures was carried steadily forward. By the end of June, Gila River had its irrigation development 90 percent completed in one of the two communities and 50 percent finished in the other. At Minidoka, with the high school students lending a hand in their spare hours, over 80 acres of land was cleared of sagebrush and prepared for planting in slightly less than six weeks. At Granada repair work on the two main irrigation canals was practically completed and pumps were used for most of the spring crop production. At Central Utah 85 miles of irrigation ditch was cleaned and 48 turnout structures were installed. And at Rohwer in Arkansas a special irrigation system, based on pumping of water from a nearby bayou, was developed to meet the unusual drought conditions.

Meanwhile the livestock production program at the centers was greatly expanded. By the end of June, hog production was under way at all centers except Manzanar, and poultry production was being carried forward everywhere except Manzanar, Rohwer, and Jerome. Gila River was also pasturing a herd consisting of more than 1,000 beef cattle and 17 dairy animals. Smaller beef herds were being maintained at Central Utah and Granada. The combined production from all these projects delivered to the messhalls during the second quarter of the year totalled more than 200,000 pounds of pork, nearly 12,000 pounds of poultry meat, almost 16,000 dozen eggs, and (at Gila River alone) approximately 23,000 pounds of milk.

#### Mess Operations

Throughout the first half of 1943, the feeding of evacuees at relocation centers became one of the most widely controversial aspects of the whole WRA program. Public attention was focussed on this aspect of relocation center operations in late April and early May with the publication of a series of sensational and misleading articles in the Denver Post on food inventories at the Heart Mountain center. In June the issue received even wider publicity as a result of misleading charges made by investigators of the House Committee on un-American Activities regarding mess operations at Manzanar and other WRA centers.

Much of the misunderstanding arose from the fact that WRA has always purchased a large portion of its food requirements through the Quartermaster Depots of the Army, in order to avoid the necessity of setting up a separate food procurement staff of its own in the field. This arrangement had led to a widespread assumption that the quality and quantity of food served at the centers are above wartime civilian standards. Actually, however, WRA has always strictly observed all rationing requirements in feeding the evacuees and has taken every precaution to avoid depleting local supplies of items that happened to be short. In a few cases, particular food items have been served at the centers when they were practically unavailable in nearby communities simply because food for the centers is sometimes purchased as much as two months in advance of actual consumption and shortages could not always be foreseen.

In March of 1943, when rationing of meats, fats, and oils went into effect, WRA immediately registered with the Office of Price Administration as an institutional user. Under this system, the Authority received each month an allotment of points based on the current population of the ten centers and assumed full responsibility for providing the proper amount of food to the individual residents. At all centers effective controls were established to regulate the distribution of rationed foods to the various mess halls and evacuee stewards were held strictly accountable for amounts received.

Throughout the period all centers continued, in accordance with requirements laid down in 1942, to hold food costs to a maximum of 45 cents per person per day. And in June they were further required to observe two meatless days each week.

### Manufacturing Enterprises

In the early days of the WRA program two kinds of manufacturing enterprises were contemplated for relocation centers: (1) those to be operated under WRA sponsorship and (2) those to be conducted under contract with private manufacturers, primarily for the production of articles needed by the armed forces. The second type proved particularly difficult to manage under relocation center conditions, and only a few enterprises of this kind were actually established in 1942. The two chief ones were factories set up to garnish camouflage nets for the Army--one at the Gila River center and the other at Colorado River or Poston.

Toward the very end of 1942 WRA tightened up its previous policy on manufacturing enterprises so as to eliminate the privately sponsored type entirely from future consideration. This decision was formalized in an administrative instruction issued to the centers on January 26. Shortly thereafter, it was given concrete application by the cancellation of plans formulated during the fall for establishment of a tent factory at Tule Lake and a pottery plant at Heart Mountain. The two net factories already established continued in operation through completion of their contracts in the latter part of May. But all new manufacturing enterprises established in the first half of 1942 were under WRA sponsorship and most were set up to produce commodities needed by the evacuee population.

By the end of the period, manufacturing enterprises of one kind or another were providing a useful outlet for evacuee skills at all centers except Minidoka in Idaho and Rohwer in Arkansas. Furniture factories or cabinet shops were operating at Tule Lake, Manzanar, Colorado River, and Central Utah. All were turning out high quality items for office, school-room, or messhall use and were saving WRA a considerable sum of money that otherwise would have to be spent for commercially produced furniture. At Heart Mountain and Manzanar, sewing shops were producing and repairing uniforms and other types of garments for evacuee workers in hospitals, messhalls, and other lines of activity. At Colorado River and Manzanar, small establishments were processing Japanese type foods such as tofu (bean cake), shoyu sauce, and noodles. At Heart Mountain, a silk-screen poster shop was working on orders received from the Navy, and at Granada a similar shop was preparing to start operations. At Gila River 174 model warships were completed and shipped to the Navy Department in the second

quarter of the year. Especially noteworthy production records were achieved by the net factory at Gila River which garnished 80 million square feet of net prior to completion of its contract and by the sawmill at Jerome which turned out 140,000 board feet of lumber in the period from March through the end of June.

### Construction and Maintenance

Because of the difficulties experienced in obtaining lumber and other scarce materials, construction work at relocation centers in the first half of 1943 was somewhat limited. Attention was centered primarily on the repair and remodelling of previously constructed barracks, on the building of housing units at the centers for WRA staff personnel, and on structures such as brooder houses, hog pens, root cellars, and packing sheds which were needed in connection with food production work. Construction of high school buildings went forward at most of the centers but was limited chiefly to work on auditoriums, science and health units, laboratories and special shops. Remodelled recreation barracks and other buildings were used to the fullest possible extent for elementary schools and in meeting ordinary classroom needs of the high school pupils.

The status of construction on high school buildings and on staff housing at the close of the period is shown in the following table:

<u>Center</u>	<u>Percentage of School Construction Completed</u>	<u>Percentage of Staff Housing Completed</u>
Central Utah	1.6	56
Colorado River		
Unit I	60	0
Unit II	50	0
Unit III	60	0
Gila River	0	95
Granada	99	50
Heart Mountain	100	0
Jerome	0	50
Manzanar	0	90
Minidoka	0	20
Rohwer	15	80
Tule Lake	61	100

During the period, as continued use began taking a somewhat heavy toll of the original structures and installations at relocation centers, repair and maintenance work became increasingly important. Many of the hastily constructed evacuee barracks required new floors, roofs, underpinnings, and tarpaper coverings. Water lines developed frequent leaks due to poor grade of pipe, lack of expansion joints, or the corrosive action of chemicals in the water. Sewage plants had to be renovated and improved. Electrical lines and refrigeration facilities in the mess halls required frequent repair and occasional remodelling. At nearly all centers evacuee maintenance crews had to be enlarged during the period and chronic difficulties were still experienced in meeting the mounting demands for this type of work.

Business Enterprises

Although the population of all centers was significantly reduced in the first six months of 1943, the evacuee-managed business enterprises selling goods and services to the residents showed truly remarkable signs of growth. By June 30, there were 154 individual shops and stores operating at the ten relocation centers. From the time of their establishment through the end of June, they had done a gross business of over 6 million dollars and had earned a net profit of more than three-quarters of a million. In the first half of 1943 alone, gross business totalled nearly 4 million dollars and net earnings amounted to almost half a million. At all centers (except Colorado River and Heart Mountain) the enterprise associations, embracing the individual shops and stores, had been incorporated as cooperatives. At Colorado River and Heart Mountain they were organized as trusts. Six of these associations had a ratio of current assets to current liabilities of better than 2 to 1 and two of them had declared dividends or patronage refunds for distribution to the active members.

The following table shows the status of the enterprise associations at the end of the period:

<u>Center</u>	<u>No. of Shops</u>	<u>Gross Sales Through June 30</u>	<u>Net Earnings Through June 30</u>	<u>Ratio of Assets to Liabilities</u>
Central Utah	16	\$ 241,066.65	\$ 54,024.17	2.23 to 1
Colorado River	28	1,068,260.37	112,858.32	1.96 to 1
Gila River	17	831,329.12	114,021.93	2.34 to 1
Granada	11	297,897.90	32,215.21	2.76 to 1
Heart Mountain	12	654,783.46	95,495.75	1.67 to 1
Jerome	16	330,389.18	62,436.64	2.36 to 1
Manzanar	11	828,617.51	96,524.76	1.90 to 1
Minidoka	16	540,962.93	63,413.93	2.47 to 1
Rohwer	7	203,150.19	35,322.55	2.87 to 1
Tule Lake	20	1,350,814.21	119,006.39	1.84 to 1
	<u>154</u>	<u>\$6,347,271.52</u>	<u>\$785,319.65</u>	

WRA's connection with these associations was chiefly of an advisory or service character. At each center there was one staff member who worked closely with the enterprise directors on organizational problems and helped them in the development of educational programs to familiarize residents with the cooperative method of doing business. Assistance on legal problems was also provided regularly by the project attorneys. But for all practical purposes, the enterprise associations were, by the end of the period, mature and independent business organizations. As the period closed, they were contemplating the advisability of taking over management of the special purchasing office which WRA had established for their benefit in New York City and were also planning to make their own independent arrangements for auditing services which had previously been furnished by WRA.



The only serious difficulty encountered by evacuee business enterprises during the period was at Gila River. The Arizona Corporation Commission began proceedings to revoke the license of the Gila River cooperative (which was incorporated under District of Columbia law) to do business in Arizona. Because of this situation, the enterprise association at the other Arizona center--Colorado River--refrained from incorporating until the result of these proceedings had been ascertained.

#### Education

When the year began the schools at most relocation centers had been operating the better part of a half year, while those at the Jerome Center in Arkansas had not yet been opened. With the initiation of the elementary and high school programs at Denson, Arkansas in early January the educational program at the War Relocation Centers was finally rounded out.

By the end of March schools at the ten centers had a total enrollment of 25,585 (10,893 in the elementary grades and 14,692 in the high schools), and a combined teaching staff of 557 non-Japanese appointed personnel. The non-Japanese teaching staff of 557 was augmented by approximately 25 certified evacuee teachers. A number of other evacuees served as assistants to the certified personnel especially in cases where certified teachers were carrying teaching loads of 40, 50 or 60 children. Toward the end of this period the number of assistant teachers among the evacuees dropped considerably due to relocation, graduation, and the unusually heavy turnover in the appointed teaching staff. Plans were made, however, for a summer activities program at practically all of the centers after the regular school term closed.

At all centers the school program was developed with one eye on prevailing State standards and with the other on preparation for outside relocation. Special emphasis was laid in the high schools on vocational education and in the elementary schools on promoting an understanding of American ideals, loyalty to American institutions as well as responsibility for citizenship, for family life, and for economic independence. An effort was made throughout the whole school system to maintain contacts with American literature and with American thinking outside of centers. Another objective was to have the schools meet the needs and interests of individual students and to have them meet the group needs of the community; also to promote ideas that would prepare the students for later adaptation into the national life.

In the high school program it was possible in many cases to combine the vocational training with work, such as motor repair and agriculture, which was a definite part of the center maintenance program.

Adult education courses were given during the period at all centers with enrollment ranging from about 250 at Heart Mountain to nearly 3,000 at Central Utah. Courses in the English language and in various commercial activities proved particularly popular. Here too, stress was laid on preparation for relocation.

At Heart Mountain and Granada the high school buildings were finished

in time for the graduation exercises in June, while at Tule Lake and Colorado River they were expected to be ready for the opening of the new term in the fall. Elsewhere, as the period ended, construction was either just getting under way or not yet started.

The following table shows the total enrollment and the number of teachers at relocation center schools on March 31, 1943.

Enrollment

<u>Center</u>	<u>Elem.</u>	<u>High</u>	<u>Appointed Teachers</u>
Central Utah	649	1,051	37
Colorado River	2,047	2,824	76
Gila River	1,381	1,595	70
Granada	681	983	45
Heart Mountain	909	1,319	54
Jerome	930	1,251	40
Manzanar	1,024	1,080	63
Minidoka	770	1,309	44
Rohwer	894	1,123	63
Tule Lake	1,608	2,157	116
TOTALS	10,893	14,692	557

Health and Sanitation

The outstanding development in the medical field at relocation centers during the period was the steady growth of an almost critical shortage of qualified personnel. At the close of the period, the medical services available to evacuee residents at some of the centers were such that, if continued, they would not be adequate even when measured by wartime standards. And in view of the unprecedented demand for trained health workers throughout the nation, the prospects were that necessary personnel would be extremely hard to find. In general, however, health conditions at the centers remained reasonably satisfactory.

In the second quarter of the year alone, 15 evacuee doctors left the centers for positions in outside hospitals or commissions in the Army. By June 30, the number of evacuee registered nurses had been reduced through relocation from 72 to 20 and the number of student nurses from 79 to 24. Of the registered and student nurses remaining, moreover, practically all had plans for early relocation. Evacuees trained in X-ray and laboratory work, in dietetics, dentistry, and pharmacy--all left the centers in considerable numbers. In dentistry and pharmacy, the situation was less acute than in other lines because the original number of evacuees qualified in these fields had been somewhat above actual requirements.

During this period, for the first time, no center was without a qualified appointed chief medical officer, but at the close of the period one center still lacked an appointed chief nurse. The appointment of a qualified medical social worker at three additional centers established this service at half of the center hospitals, thus offering relief in part

to other personnel shortages.

During the early months of the year there was a mild epidemic of upper respiratory tract infections at Heart Mountain, and later in the period both Rohwer and Jerome reported slight epidemics of chicken pox. But at most centers the community health was maintained at a distinctly high level and encouraging progress was made in public health activities. Jerome, for example, conducted a systematic examination of all food handlers working in the messhalls. Gila River undertook a health survey of all the younger children. And at Tule Lake the public health staff made over 6,000 individual calls in the second quarter of the year.

In this period, water supplies at all centers, except Leupp, were brought into line with standards established by the United States Public Health Service for drinking water safety. The supplies at Rohwer and Jerome--the last centers to meet the standards--were made to conform during the first week of April. At these two centers also, intensive efforts were made to control the malaria mosquito. Early in May both centers started a regular program of malaria control that included weekly larviciding, drainage work, periodic checks of larvae and mosquitoes, screen upkeep, and public education. Just before the close of the period, a trained entomologist was assigned to head the work at the two centers. No actual cases of malaria were reported at either center among evacuees prior to the end of June.

#### Evacuee Government

From the beginning, WRA's policy has been to encourage the formation of evacuee governments at relocation centers in order to bring community sentiment sharply into focus on various issues and to provide the evacuees with first-hand experience in the workings of democracy. No attempt, however, has been made to force the idea of formal government on an unwilling community.

Interest on the part of evacuees in establishing a formal government has varied widely among the several centers. The two extremes, perhaps, are Central Utah where a vigorous community council played a continuously active role throughout the entire first half of 1943, and Manzanar where no attempt was made to organize a formal government following the disturbance of December, 1942. At all centers, however, the Project Directors made a systematic effort to consult with leading evacuee residents on all important issues.

At the beginning of the year, formal governments (as distinguished from temporary councils and informal advisory groups) were functioning only at Central Utah and Tule Lake. By the end of June, such governments had also been established at Granada, Colorado River, and Rohwer and were on the verge of probable formation at Gila River, Heart Mountain, and Jerome. The council at Tule Lake, however, resigned in a body during the registration crisis. Because of the strong possibility that Tule Lake would function in the future as the segregation center, no plans for a governmental set-up were being made as the period ended. At Minidoka a charter, which had been rejected in the spring by a referendum vote of approximately  $1\frac{1}{2}$  to 1, was being revised with a view to resubmission sometime in July.



WRA's original policy on evacuee government--formulated in August of 1942--provided that alien residents of the centers might hold appointive offices or serve in advisory capacities but restricted membership on the elected community council to the American citizen residents. In the early months of 1943, as the citizen population of the centers was steadily reduced through relocation, the need for liberalization of this policy became increasingly apparent. On April 19, the administrative instruction was revised to make alien residents eligible for elective office. Shortly after adoption of this policy, new elections were held at several of the centers. At Central Utah the reconstituted council emerged with a clear alien majority. But at Poston the membership was evenly divided between citizens and aliens, while at Granada only four aliens were elected. In early June, the policy on evacuee government was further modified by an amendment which specifically prohibited three groups--(1) those who requested repatriation or expatriation, (2) those who answered no or qualified their answers to question 28, and (3) those who were denied leave clearance for other reasons--from holding either appointed or elective office.

### Internal Security

Early in the year, as an aftermath of the flare-ups which occurred late in 1942 at Manzanar and Colorado River, WRA undertook a number of specific actions to strengthen the system for maintaining law and order at relocation centers.

The first move in this direction, actually initiated late in 1942 but carried over into the following year, was the organization of an internal security program for the ten centers as a whole. An Internal Security Section was established in the Washington office and numerous steps were taken throughout the spring to develop over-all standards and provide technical guidance for the work in the field. By the close of the semi-annual period, a considerable degree of uniformity in internal security procedures had been achieved and operating methods at practically all centers had been brought into closer conformity with up-to-date standards for law enforcement work.

In addition, WRA shortly after the turn of the year asked the Federal Bureau of Investigation to make a survey of the internal security problem at the centers and submit recommendations. In January one member of the FBI staff was assigned this responsibility and immediately left Washington for a tour of the centers. His report, complete with recommendations, was submitted to the National Director of WRA toward the middle of March. Although WRA had, in effect, anticipated many of the individual recommendations by changes instituted between the time when the FBI inspector visited the centers and the time when his report was submitted, careful consideration was given to the whole report and a number of further changes were initiated as a direct result.

In mid-February three administrative instructions on the general subject of internal security were issued to the centers. One dealt with the organization of a police force at the centers and provided--among other things--that at least one appointed internal security officer should be on active duty at all times of the night and day. A second one, covering the methods to be followed in making arrests, stipulated that no arrest might



be made without a warrant issued by the Project Director unless the offender had actually committed his offense in the presence of an internal security officer or had confessed his guilt. The third one set up a complete system for the trial and punishment of offenses against law and order in the centers: the types of offenses for which the Project Director could impose punishment, the offenses which should be referred to State or Federal prosecuting officials, the offenses which might be tried by evacuee judicial commissions, and the general standards for the conduct of proceedings against offenders. Provision was made for penalizing offenders where disciplinary proceedings were conducted in the centers, either by confinement or by suspension from work and pay privileges for a period of not more than 90 days or by a combination of the two. Cash fines were expressly eliminated from consideration.

Despite the difficulty of finding men with training in police work who would accept internal security positions at the relocation centers, the staff at most places was fairly well rounded out before the end of June. The average number of persons engaged in internal security work throughout the period for the ten centers as a whole was about 30 non-evacuee officers and roughly 700 evacuee patrolmen.

#### Fire Protection

Shortly after the close of the semi-annual period on June 30, 1942, WRA made its first comprehensive compilation of the fire record at relocation centers and found the results surprisingly good. Over a period of active operations ranging from about 15 months at Manzanar to approximately nine months at Jerome, the ten centers had experienced 388 fires and suffered a combined fire loss of slightly less than \$25,000. Figured on the basis of the June 30 population, this meant an average annual loss of about 26 cents per capita. In recent years, only two or three communities in the entire United States have achieved a better record.

The circumstances under which this record was achieved makes it all the more remarkable. Only a few communities in the whole country have such a high degree of fire hazard as the relocation centers. The buildings at the centers are all of simple frame construction usually covered with tarpaper. All but two of the centers are located in areas of extremely dry climate and frequent high winds. All of them were set up at a time when fire-fighting apparatus was extremely hard to obtain. And they were populated by over 100,000 people, only three of whom had had previous professional fire protection experience. Mitigating the achievement somewhat is the fact that the value of the buildings at the centers (roughly \$40,000,000 for all ten) is low in comparison with the normal American city. Everything considered, however, a fire loss of 26 cents per capita in these hastily built, closely packed and distinctly temporary communities can scarcely be ranked as anything but an accomplishment of the highest order.

Behind the record lay many thousands of hours spent in fire fighting drills, clean-up campaigns, and fire prevention educational work. Evacuee firemen had to be trained; equipment had to be procured, maintained, and repaired; alarm systems had to be installed; entire communities had to be made fire conscious and alert to the existence of fire hazards. At each center the work was headed up by a member of the WRA administrative staff

and was organized into a number of divisions or bureaus. Except for one or two appointed officers at each center, the fire protection personnel was recruited entirely from the evacuee population.

In the first three months of 1943 the ten centers experienced a total of 72 fires and suffered a combined loss of about \$6,300. During the second quarter, the number of fires was reduced to 63, but the combined fire loss was increased, largely because of one particularly damaging messhall fire at the Colorado River Center, to an all-time quarterly high of \$9,080. The following tables provide a detailed breakdown of fire and fire losses at the centers in the second quarterly period.

<u>Center</u>	<u>No. of Fires</u>	<u>Total Losses</u>	<u>Per Capita Loss</u>
Central Utah	3	\$ 90	\$.0122
Colorado River	1	8,000	.51
Gila River	6	30	.0024
Granada	18	5	.0008
Heart Mountain	15	633	.0675
Jerome	4	--	--
Manzanar	2	--	--
Minidoka	9	250	.0326
Rohwer	1	72	.0094
Tule Lake	4	--	--
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>\$9,080</b>	<b>\$.0934</b>

When the period ended, five of the centers had received their full complement of fire-fighting apparatus. Delivery of the items still outstanding at the other five centers was expected early in July. Most of the centers, however, still lacked a sufficient amount of hose of a really suitable type, adequate sprinkler systems in the hospitals, and telephone systems for the communication of alarms. Highly satisfactory telephone systems had been installed at Tule Lake and Heart Mountain but were still on order at the other centers.

#### Community Welfare

With the rounding out of an appointed staff in the welfare section at practically all relocation centers, welfare work took on new scope and impetus in the first half of 1943. In addition to providing council in connection with all types of family and social problems, the welfare workers arranged for shifts in housing assignments, played an active role in relocation guidance, and handled the distribution of clothing allowances to workers and their dependents and of public assistance grants to needy families and individuals.

During the period, as many families approached the limit of their pre-evacuation resources and as a considerable number of evacuee workers were dropped from center payrolls, the need for public assistance grants rose markedly. These grants are made in quite small amounts to residents whose income from other sources is insufficient to cover such minor necessities of life as soap, tooth paste, shaving cream, and similar items.

Grants of this kind were extended to residents of the ten centers during the first half of 1943 in an amount slightly less than \$200,000.

In March WRA completed arrangements with the Bureau of Public Assistance of the Social Security Board with a view to providing financial assistance for needy evacuees outside the relocation centers. Federal funds which had been previously earmarked for assistance to persons affected by restrictive action of the government were made available for this purpose. Under terms of the agreement, State and local welfare agencies undertook the responsibility for interviewing the prospective recipients and for handling actual distribution of the grants.

#### Recreational Activities

Perhaps the most significant development in the recreational field at relocation centers during the first half of 1943 was the rapid growth of membership in national organizations. By the end of June, Red Cross units had been formed at all centers except Heart Mountain and Jerome and were in process of organization at these two centers; Boy Scouts and YWCA groups were active at all centers; Girl Scouts everywhere except Manzanar; Parent-Teacher organizations at all centers except Colorado River where a unit was in process of formation; YMCA at six of the centers and USO-type organizations for the entertainment of visiting servicemen at five. At the 10 centers as a whole, Red Cross units (both Senior and Junior) had a total membership of nearly 26,000; the parent-teacher organizations had over 7,000 members; and the Boy Scouts numbered approximately 2,500.

The growing membership in these organizations was one of the most encouraging trends discernible during the period at the relocation centers. It served to give the evacuee residents an active contact with life outside the centers. It increased their interest in and understanding of American institutions. And, most important, it provided a powerful aid in and stimulus to outside relocation. The YMCA and the YWCA, in particular, were extremely active in preparing the way for local acceptance of relocating evacuees and in informing people at the centers regarding living conditions and employment prospects in various midwestern and northeastern communities.

The following table shows the total membership, by centers, in some of the principal national organizations:

Center	Boy Scouts	Girl Scouts	YMCA and Affiliates	YWCA and Affiliates	Red Cross	Parent Teacher Groups	USO-type
Central Utah	240	120	50	185	868 Sr. 100% Jr.	300	--
Colorado River	162	419	-- 1/	80	4,000 Sr. 4,600 Jr.	-- 1/	--
Gila River	432	305	53	375	450 Sr. --	1,025	82
Granada	315	125	-- 1/	232	840 Sr. 150 Jr.	500	150
Heart Mountain	360	280	406	450	--1/	38	15
Jerome	150	---	30	100	--1/	400	165
Manzanar	200	---	100	254	1,500 Sr. 1,294 Jr.	2,500	--
Minidoka	125	175	30	150	2,000	350	450
Rohwer	232	140	42	175	2,279 Sr. 1,635 Jr.	305	--
Tule Lake	375	22	41	132	900 Sr. 3,600 Jr.	2,000	--

1/ In process of formation.

On March 10 all centers were advised that future WRA expenditures for recreational equipment would be sharply limited and that the main cost of financing leisure activities would henceforth have to be borne by the evacuee residents. Accordingly, evacuee-managed organizations were established at several of the centers in the spring to provide the necessary financing for recreational programs. By the end of June, such organizations had been formed at Gila River, Granada, Heart Mountain, Rohwer, and Jerome and similar financing arrangements were being contemplated at Minidoka and Colorado River. At Tule Lake recreational activities were being largely financed by the residents but not through the medium of any formal organization.

Throughout the period, WRA continued to provide partial financing by making cash wages and clothing allowances available to leaders and instructors in the various recreational activities. In mid-June, however, the centers were advised to curtail the number of paid instructors engaged in Japanese-style activities--such as judo, goh, and sumo--so that not more than one instructor for each such activity would be carried on the payroll at any single center. Before the period closed, the necessary reductions had been made at most of the centers and were in progress at the others.

Among the highlights in the leisure activities at the centers during the period were (1) an art competition held at all centers in May and June under sponsorship of the Friends Meeting of Cambridge, Mass., (2) the growth of organizations at several of the centers for the entertainment of visiting servicemen, (3) the concerts given in nearby communities by the massed choir from the Minidoka Center, (4) the arrangements made by members of the Japanese-American combat team at Camp Shelby, Miss. to have contingents of girls from Rohwer and Jerome as guests at their dances, and (5) the Red Cross drive held at all centers toward the very end of the period.



The following table shows the results of the Red Cross drive at the several centers:

<u>Center</u>	<u>Total Contributions</u>
Central Utah	\$1,720.00
Colorado River	6,433.27
Gila River	2,156.86
Granada	1,840.00
Heart Mountain	(Drive still in process 6/30/43)
Jerome	(Drive still in process 6/30/43)
Manzanar	1,554.95
Minidoka	2,600.59
Rohwer	3,781.41
Tule Lake	2,300.00

In view of the extremely limited financial resources of most evacuee residents, these results were regarded as a highly creditable showing.

#### Religion

From the beginning, WRA has ruled that no religious workers among the evacuees would be paid from government funds for performance of their religious duties at relocation centers. This has meant that all denominational groups have had to work out independent arrangements for compensating their pastors. The Buddhists, by and large, have paid their priests with donations received from the congregations. Since there are no Catholic priests in the evacuee population, Catholic services have generally been held at the centers by priests from nearby communities. Many of the Protestant denominations, however, have received funds for the payment of their ministers from their national or regional organizations. The following table shows the number of ministers at the centers who were receiving compensation from outside church groups at the end of March:

<u>Denomination</u>	<u>No. of Ministers Paid</u>
Methodist	27 (4 retired)
Presbyterian	15
Baptist	11
Holiness	10
Congregationalist	9
Free Methodist	8
Episcopal	7
Salvation Army	6
Disciples of Christ	2
Evangelical Reformed	<u>2</u>
TOTAL	107

The stabilizing influence of religion at the centers became sharply apparent during the registration period when church attendance rose markedly at practically all relocation centers. At the same time there was a

considerable increase in auxiliary religious activities such as forums, fellowships, Sunday schools, women's societies, and Bible study groups. By the end of March, interfaith councils--composed of Protestant, Buddhist, and Catholic representatives--had been formed at every center.

#### Evacuee Property

Shortly after the turn of the year, WRA issued two formal administrative instructions covering assistance to evacuees in connection with their property problems. One, dealing with transportation and storage of personal property, provided that each evacuee might have his household goods and similar possessions stored at government expense or have them shipped either to a relocation center or to an outside relocation destination. Each evacuee, however, was entitled to only one such movement of property at government expense over and above the movement into a government warehouse. The other instruction dealt with assistance that might be rendered by WRA to evacuees in connection with real properties, farm equipment, business interests, and similar holdings. It set up a procedure whereby the evacuee property-holder might call upon WRA, through its Evacuee Property Office, to act as agent in negotiating sales, leases, debt adjustments, and other like transactions.

The work of aiding evacuees under both of these instructions was carried forward by evacuee property officers at the relocation centers and by field property offices of WRA stationed in the evacuated area at San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle, and Portland. By the close of the period, evacuee property officers were functioning on the staffs at all centers except the two in Arkansas where property problems were still being handled by the project attorneys.

In the second quarter of the year alone, WRA received 681 requests from evacuees for storage of personal properties and moved 647 individual lots of such property into government-leased warehouses in the West Coast cities. Approximately 2,700 evacuees requested shipment of their properties either to relocation centers or relocation destinations and 644 carload lots were actually shipped. Of the 1,137 individual lots included in these carloads, 1081 went to relocation centers and 56 to outside relocation points.

During the same period the four field offices handled a total of 338 urban and rural property transactions involving an aggregate amount of nearly a quarter million dollars. Of this total, 178 transactions were in the urban field and included 6 outright sales of hotels and apartments, 6 leases of similar properties, 7 sales of industrial equipment and fixtures, 4 leases of residential properties, 25 cases of debt adjustment, and many other similar negotiations. Of the 160 transactions of the rural type, 68 involved real property and 92 concerned farm equipment and machinery. They included sales of 50 automobiles, 7 trucks, and 20 other pieces of machinery; cash leases of eight farms totalling 187 acres; outright sales of 6 farms totalling 79 acres; 43 collections of rent and other obligations; and 11 cases of farm debt adjustment. In addition, the four property offices answered nearly 2,500 inquiries and performed over 3,000 miscellaneous services.

About half way through the semi-annual period, the Federal Government initiated action looking toward the acquisition by eminent domain of idle farm equipment, WRA conducted inventories at all centers in order to

inform the United States Department of Agriculture State and County War Boards (the agencies administering the legislation) regarding the nature and location of idle evacuee-owned equipment. By the end of June, 35 separate inventories of such properties had been compiled and forwarded to the California State and County War Boards. No evacuee-owned equipment, however, was actually requisitioned during the semi-annual period.

#### Legal Aid

At all centers the WRA project attorneys and their evacuee staff members continued to provide the residents with advice and assistance in connection with a wide range of legal problems. Assistance was rendered particularly in connection with business enterprises, evacuee government, and property matters. During the second quarter of the year, the legal staff at one center alone handled over 1,700 individual requests for legal aid.

One of the most important developments of the period in the field of legal aid was the progress made toward establishment of an attorney referral system in California for evacuees needing legal assistance from lawyers in private practice. Most of the work on this undertaking was done by the San Francisco field office of WRA in close collaboration with members of the California Bar. On the bases of the replies to letters written to a large number of lawyers who had previously evidenced interest in war work, a panel was compiled of attorneys who were willing to represent the legal interests of the evacuees under an agreed fee schedule which took into account the impaired financial status of most evacuees. A system for rotation of names on the panel, with evacuees always retaining the privilege of personal selection, was also worked out. At the close of the period, an administrative instruction setting forth the full details of the system was rapidly nearing completion and was expected to be issued sometime in July.

#### Repatriation and Expatriation

Throughout the first half of 1943, while negotiations continued between the United States and Japan for a mutual exchange of nationals, WRA worked in close collaboration with the State Department on details incident to the repatriation and expatriation of people in the relocation centers. At the beginning of the year, there were 3,396 people in the centers who had formally expressed a wish to be transferred to Japan. Of this number, 3,106 had simply requested such transfer on their own initiative while the remaining 290 were people whose transfer had been requested by the Japanese government and who had expressed a wish to go.

By the end of June, the number of potential repatriates and expatriates in relocation centers had practically doubled, primarily as a result of the registration program. During the registration period and immediately thereafter, hundreds of evacuees (including many American citizens, who had apparently become permanently embittered against the United States) filed applications and indicated formally a wish to be transported to Japan at the earliest opportunity. At the close of the period, arrangements were being made, as previously noted, to transfer these people to the segregation center at Tule Lake in the early fall.

The following table shows, by centers, the number of persons formally indicating a desire for repatriation or expatriation, either in response to



inquiries emanating from the Japanese government or on their own initiative:

Results of Inquiries to Persons Named for Exchange by Japanese Government  
and Repatriation Applications as of June 30, 1943

Letters of Inquiry to Persons Named for  
Exchange by Japanese Government

Center	No. Persons Contacted For Replies	No Reply	Declinations	Acceptances		Independent Applications 2/	Total Requests 6/30/43
				No.	%1/		
Central Utah	305	6	293	6	2.0	658	664
Colorado River	385	22	332	31	8.1	632	663
Gila River	248	13	182	53	21.4	942	995
Granada	335	16	275	44	13.1	46	90
Heart Mountain	305	12	265	28	9.2	669	697
Jerome	109	5	103	1	0.9	1511	1512
Manzanar	178	3	156	19	10.7	355	374
Minidoka	473	6	425	42	8.9	261	303
Rohwer	188	2	126	60	31.9	567	627
Tule Lake	276	5	265	6	2.2	454	460
TOTALS	2802	90	2422	290	10.3	6095 2/	6385

1/ Percent of number of persons contacted for replies.

2/ Does not include 626 persons who cancelled their requests for repatriation prior to June 30, 1943.

Statistical Work

Toward the very end of 1942 and in the early months of 1943, WRA began the organization of a formal statistical program. The aim was to institute a system of population accounting with the objective of (1) providing an accurate check on the number of persons in the several relocation centers, (2) providing necessary control and records of persons granted leave or transferred between centers, (3) establishing and maintaining a master file to show currently the location of all persons in relocation centers, and the geographic distribution of those returning address cards after arriving at their destinations on indefinite leave.

As a first step, a procedure was developed for maintaining daily population reporting of admissions to and departures from centers and for completing the record back to the initiation of each center. This was established by Administrative Instruction No. 76, effective February 1. As of June 30, all centers were reporting daily population changes currently and had completed the record back to the opening of the Centers.

A second phase of the statistical work concerned analyses of the evacuee population of the ten relocation centers. These data are based upon Form WRA 26, a questionnaire filled out for each evacuee by trained enumerators at each center. These questionnaires were filled out over a period extending from June 5 to November 30, 1942; were coded at the Tule Lake Statistical Laboratory during the six months from November, 1942, through April,



1943; and the data have since been transferred to IBM punch cards to permit detailed analysis. In addition to coding these records, the Tule Lake Statistical Laboratory made a number of special sample analyses based upon approximately 25 percent of the population of each center and covering a wide range of information including age, sex, marital status, religion, education, education and residence in Japan, and occupations of evacuees. The following chart and table give information concerning certain characteristics of the population of the centers as of January 1, 1943, estimated on the basis of these sample analyses:

**Primary Occupational Classifications By Nativity  
For Persons of Japanese Ancestry At the Ten Relocation Centers  
January 1, 1943**

Occupational Classification	Total	American Born	Foreign Born
<b>Agriculture</b>	<u>23264</u>	<u>9900</u>	<u>13364</u>
Farm Hands (vegetable)	5536	3033	2503
Truck farmers	4183	1632	2551
Farm hands (fruit)	3357	1369	1988
Gardeners & groundkeepers (parks, etc.)	2341	798	1543
Farm managers & foremen	1834	468	1366
Fruit farmers	1157	378	779
Nursery & landscaping laborers	940	578	362
Fruit & vegetable graders & packers	925	531	394
Farm hands (general farms)	948	283	665
Nursery operators & flower growers	807	236	571
Other	1236	594	642
<b>Managerial &amp; Official</b>	<u>6218</u>	<u>2097</u>	<u>4121</u>
Retail Managers	3250	1243	2007
Hotel & restaurant managers	1362	232	1130
Wholesale managers	638	248	390
Other	968	374	594
<b>Sales</b>	<u>5845</u>	<u>4440</u>	<u>1405</u>
<b>Domestic Service</b>	<u>4072</u>	<u>2753</u>	<u>1319</u>
Maids (general)	1869	1593	276
Cooks (domestic)	519	212	307
Housemen & yardmen	429	205	224
Other	1255	743	512
<b>Personal Service</b>	<u>3679</u>	<u>1467</u>	<u>2212</u>
Cooks (except private family)	1003	212	791
Barbers, beauticians, & manicurists	771	397	374
Waiters & waitresses (exc. private fam.)	673	484	189
Others	1232	374	585
<b>Clerical</b>	<u>3141</u>	<u>2815</u>	<u>326</u>

Professional	<u>1727</u>	<u>924</u>	<u>803</u>
Teachers & instructors	437	169	268
Doctors & dentists	154	75	79
Clergymen	141	31	110
Pharmacists	161	118	43
Other	834	531	303
Semi-Professional	<u>735</u>	<u>448</u>	<u>287</u>
Other Service	<u>575</u>	<u>87</u>	<u>488</u>
Fishery	<u>354</u>	<u>224</u>	<u>130</u>


Source: These figures are estimates based on hand tallies of approximately 25 percent of the WRA 26 records.

#### Future Outlook

When the fiscal year closed on the 30th of June, the most important task immediately facing WRA was to carry out the enormous and complicated program of segregation. Beyond that assignment lay the vastly more constructive job of restoring the non-segregants as rapidly as possible to private employment and normal life. Sometime before the period ended there were unmistakable signs that the great bulk of the younger evacuees who could be self-supporting had already been relocated and that future relocation plans would have to take increasing cognizance of the entire family group. There was also a tremendous job to be done in bringing the evacuees full and accurate information regarding employment opportunities and working conditions in all the many areas of potential relocation. Toward this end, a relocation guidance committee was established near the end of the period in the Washington office and similar committees were set up at the several centers.

Some thought was also being given to the possibility, as relocation proceeded, of gradually closing out the relocation centers. Since the closing of any one center would inevitably mean another shifting around for a people who had already been moved several times, WRA was proceeding on this matter with some degree of caution. At the same time, however, the need for strict economy indicated the desirability of closing one or more of the centers (if population reductions permitted) during the fiscal year 1944.

AGE-SEX-NATIVITY COMPOSITION  
FOR 106,775 PERSONS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY AT THE TEN RELOCATION CENTERS  
January 1, 1943



SOURCE: WRA 26 records. These figures are estimates based on hand tallies of a 25 percent (approximately) sample of WRA 26 records.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

January 1 to June 30, 1943

- January 4 - Field office opened in Chicago under Relocation Supervisor, Elmer L. Shirrell, to facilitate relocation program in north-central States. Job of office to explore employment opportunities for evacuees and check on public attitudes in communities where evacuees are planning to relocate. Plans made for establishment of similar offices at Denver, Cleveland, Salt Lake City, Kansas City, and New York.
- January 11 - Temporary WRA isolation center at Moab, Utah begins operations with arrival of 16 evacuees arrested in December for fomenting disturbance at Manzanar Relocation Center.
- January 18 - Senator Mon C. Wallgren of Washington introduces S. 444 providing for transfer of relocation program to War Department. Bill referred to Military Affairs Committee.
- January 20 - Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Military Affairs appointed to investigate WRA program in connection with S. 444 starts hearings in Washington, D. C. Subcommittee under chairmanship of Senator A. B. Chandler of Kentucky.
- January 23 - WRA procedures covering assistance to evacuees on property problems formally enunciated by National Director as Administrative Instructions 77 and 78.
- January 26 - Revised policy on industrial enterprises at relocation centers formally issued. New policy, which informally went into effect in November 1942, prohibits establishment of further enterprises -- such as camouflage net factories -- under private sponsorship; limits industry program at centers chiefly to manufacture of goods needed by evacuee community.
- January 28 - Secretary of War Stimson announces plans for formation of Japanese-American combat team in United States Army. Special enlistment program to be carried out at relocation centers in combination with registration of all adult evacuees for leave clearance purposes.
- February 4 - President Roosevelt writes to Secretary Stimson approving plans for Japanese-American combat team and for employment of evacuees in agriculture and industry.
- February 8 - Army enlistment and leave-clearance registration begun at most relocation centers.
- February 10 - Hearings resumed by Senate subcommittee investigating WRA program.