


*Handwritten note:*  
 New road. N. B. is old. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.



Alangan River Position: Occupied from Right to Left by remnants of the following units: 4th Inf. (PC), 31st Inf. (PA), Prov. AC Regt., 803rd Engr. Bn. (US), 57th Inf. (PS), 31st Inf. (US), 14th Engr. (PS), 26th Cav. (PS).



MAP SHOWING SUCCESSIVE DELAYING POSITIONS AND MAIN JAPANESE ATTACKS DURING SECOND BATTLE OF BATAAN 3-9 APR 1942  
 TO ACCOMPANY REPORT OF OPERATIONS SOUTH LUZON FORCE, BATAAN DEFENSE FORCE AND II PHILIPPINE CORPS FROM 8 DEC 1941 TO 9 APR 1942  
 APPENDIX NO. \_\_\_\_\_

Scale: 63,360 or 1 inch = 1 mile  
 1 1/2 0 1 2 3 4 miles


TRAIL MAP OF BATAAN

Reproduced from Sketch by the 803rd Engrs. based on Maneuver Trail Map produced by 14th Engrs (P.S.) in 1939. Reproduced under direction of Col. M.H. Stiekney, C.E. (Dept Engrs) about Feb. 1942. Corrected 18 April 1942 by Col. Harry A. Skerry, C.E. Engr I Phil Corps while Prisoner of War in Taiwan on Feb. 1, 1944.

*See map. Tammenday, N. Britis is old & probably should be 5" old. How far is the river from the old line?*




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1 mile = 1.609 km  
1 km = 0.6214 mi

kilo

regimental reserve lines and to counter battery as the infantry attacked. The 42d Infantry pushed back to its regimental reserve line.

This attack developed into an all out offensive. Only minor actions took place on the front of the I Corps.

4 April 1942.

The enemy launched another fully coordinated attack, preceeded by a heavy bombing, strafing air attack along the entire front line and a heavy artillery preparation, through the gap created by the rearward movement of the 42d Infantry. The 42d Infantry and the 43d Infantry, which had also broken, completely routed by 9:00 AM. By noon the 21st Division (PA) had refused its left flank and had become partially disorganized.

The 2d Philippine Constabulary Regiment on the front of the I Corps abandoned a portion of its Main Line of Resistance under mortar shelling and bombing, but reestablished the line when enemy fire lifted.

The 31st Infantry (US), which had been moved to the vicinity of the junction of Trails 10 and 7 by the Commanding General, Luzon Force, released at 10:00 AM to the II Corps.

The Provisional Tank Group (less two companies) placed in direct support of the II Corps.

The 45th Infantry (PS) (less one battalion) relieved from assignment to I Corps and ordered to move east along Trail 8 to junction of Trails 8 and 29, where it was released to the II Corps.

The 57th Infantry (PS) ordered to move under cover of darkness to the vicinity of Lamao.

803d Engineer Battalion (less Company "A") and 14th Engineers (PS) ordered to assembly areas and to be prepared immediately for combat.

The I Corps refused its right flank by placing the 2d Philippine

Constabulary Regiment on a switch position extending to the southeast.

5 April: Hostile pressure continued, direction of attack southeast. The 21st Division which had withdrawn, broke in complete disorder and the entire Division ceased to exist as a unit.

The counter attack launched shortly after daylight in the vicinity of Trail 8 and 29 by 45th Infantry (PS)(less one battalion), the 33d Infantry (PA)(less one battalion) and the 31st Infantry (US) was unable to advance more than a few hundred yards. All contact with the 33d Infantry (less one battalion) lost and never regained.

The 57th Infantry (PS) released to II Corps.

The Commanding General, Luzon Force, ordered II Corps to hold the general line of the east bank of the San Vicente River.

The I Corps front inactive.

6 April: The enemy continued to push forward and advanced rapidly south up Trail 6. This forward advancement cut off the Commanding General and Headquarters Sub-sector "D", the 45th Infantry (PS)(less one battalion) and the remaining troops of the 41st Infantry (PA). The Commanding General, Sub-sector "D", ordered to attack east along Trail 8 and reestablish contact with the II Corps. After this attack failed, these units and Sub-sector "D" Headquarters ~~were~~ attached to the I Corps. The enemy attack had been in force with adequate reserves to keep advancing.

The Commanding General, Luzon Force, released the 803d Engineers (less Company "A") to II Corps and ordered the 26th Cavalry (PS) to move under cover of darkness to the vicinity of the junction of Trails 10 and 2. The hostile attack continued with particular heavy pressure to the east. The 51st Combat Team (PA) and the 31st Division (PA)(less 31st and 33d Infantry) disintegrated and disappeared into the jungle.

7 April: The hostile attack continued and struck the 201st and 202d Engineer Battalions, both battalions disintegrated and completely disappeared. The 57th Infantry (PS), enveloped from the left (west) flank, forced to withdraw to vicinity of the junction of Trails 10 and 2.

The 14th Engineers (PS) and the 26th Cavalry (PS) released to II Corps. All Philippine Army troops west of Sub-sector "B" were in complete rout or had disappeared.

The Commanding General, USFIP, at about 4:00 PM ordered the Luzon Force to attack with the 11th Division (PA) due east across the Pantingan River. After conference with the Commanding General, I Corps, the Commanding General, Luzon Force, telephoned the Commanding General, USFIP, and the attack was left up to the discretion of the Commanding General, Luzon Force. It was not executed as 11th Division troops were so weakened by sickness and malnutrition that it would have been impossible for them to walk across the Pantingan Gulch unopposed, and due to the rugged, forested terrain the attack could not have been given any artillery support. Hostile pressure continued against the Mamala River position by superior enemy forces, which enveloped the left (west) flank, necessitating a withdrawal under cover of darkness 7-8 April to the Alangan River line.

I Corps, because of its exposed right flank, ordered to withdraw to the Binaungan River.

All reserves of the Luzon Force, I Corps and II Corps had been committed by dark.

8 April: By 3:00 AM the 31st Infantry (US), 57th Infantry (PS), 26th Cavalry (PS), 14th Engineers (PS) and parts of the 803d Engineer Battalion and a few remnants of Philippine Army troops had occupied the Alangan River line. By 3:00 PM, the left (west) flank had been enveloped by a strong enemy column, the east center penetrated by infantry supported by tanks, artillery and aerial bombardment and our troops forced to withdraw.

The Commanding General, Luzon Force, placed the Commanding General, Sub-sector "C", in direct command of all front line troops on the Alangan River position, and ordered him to occupy and hold a defensive position along the Lamao River. He had at his disposal the 57th Infantry (PS) 500; 26th Cavalry (PS) 300; 14th Engineers (PS) 400; 31st Infantry (US) 160; total approximately 1360 officers and men.

1st Philippine Constabulary Regiment ordered to move immediately after dark from beach defense positions on the west coast to Cabcaben, where it was to be released to II Corps. The Provisional Coast Artillery Brigade (AA) ordered to destroy all anti-aircraft equipment not practical for use as infantry weapons, form as infantry and occupy and defend the high ground immediately south of the Bataan Air Field.

The I Corps attacked early in the morning east along Trail 8 with the 45th Infantry (PS) reinforced, but had been stopped by a double envelopment.

The Lamac River position, the last attempted defensive line in II Corps sector, turned and all units forced to withdraw in disorder. Organized resistance in II Corps sector ceased to exist.

At about 11:30 PM the Commanding General, USFIP, in compliance with a directive from General MacArthur, ordered the Commanding General, Luzon Force, to attack with the I Corps in the direction of Olongapo. The attack could not be launched. The I Corps had been in process of withdrawing and the half starved troops were physically exhausted.

The 45th Infantry (PS) and the 2d Battalion, 60th Coast Artillery (AA) (less batteries "F" and "H"), with Battery "C", 91st Coast Artillery (PS) attached, ordered to withdraw from Bataan and move by boat in time to arrive at Corregidor prior to daylight. The 45th Infantry could not be extricated from combat in time to comply with the order.

Battery Hearn at Corregidor fired upon call from the Commanding General, Luzon Force, road interdiction on Bataan roads along west shore of Manila Bay.

The Commanding General, Luzon Force, at 1:30 AM ordered the destruction of all artillery, tanks, ammunition, engineer material, radio

*8 April, 1942*

equipment, and other military supplies on Bataan. Destruction to be completed by 6:00 AM, 9 April, at which time a flag of truce was to be sent forward to the Japanese lines. The Commanding General, USFIP, informed of the action taken by the Commanding General, Luzon Force, immediately disapproved of the action and directed that there would be no surrender.

During the last hours of Bataan, the Commanding General, USFIP, knew, at least, that he had the support of his Commander in Chief. President Roosevelt radioed General MacArthur asking him to relay to the Commanding General, USFIP, an expression of his (President Roosevelt's) support, "If you (MacArthur) concur both as to substance and timing." The message received on Corregidor read:

"Am keenly aware of the tremendous difficulties under which you are waging your great battle. The physical exhaustion of your troops obviously precludes the possibility of a major counterstroke unless our efforts to rush food to you should quickly prove successful. Because of the state (over) which your forces have no control I am modifying my orders to you as contained in my telegram to General MacArthur February nine and repeated to you March twenty-three (the no-surrender note).

My purpose is to leave to your best judgment any decisions affecting the future of the Bataan garrison. I have nothing but admiration for your soldierly conduct and your performance of your most difficult mission and have every confidence that whatever decision you may sooner or later be forced to make will be dictated only by the best interests of the country and of your magnificent troops. I am still hopeful that the efforts of the Navy to supply you by submarine will be effective and in time and that at least one or more of the surface vessels attempting to run the blockade will reach you shortly.



Nevertheless I feel it proper and necessary that you should be assured of complete freedom of action and of my full confidence in the wisdom of whatever decision you may be forced to make."

Just before the Commanding General, USFIP, received the above message, he had transmitted to Mr. Roosevelt the dreadful news that Bataan had fallen.

Mr. Roosevelt promptly radioed back:

"I am hopeful that you will be able to hold Corregidor. However, you are assured of complete freedom of action and my full confidence in your wisdom in whatever decisions you may make. Franklin D. Roosevelt."

The following reply ~~was~~ radioed from Corregidor to the White House:

"The confidence Your Excellency places in my judgment in this desperate situation as well as the kindness of your message merit my heartfelt gratitude. I have done all that could have been done to hold Bataan, but starved men without air support and with inadequate field artillery support cannot endure the terrific aerial and artillery bombardment that my troops were subjected to. Enemy has emplaced heavy artillery on south shore of Bataan and now keeps Corregidor under constant artillery fire as well as air bombing.

Report received this morning that enemy is now landing in considerable force on the island of Cebu. Due to difficulties of communication I have no further information on the progress of this landing. Obviously if hostile troops take the island of Cebu it will no longer be practicable to ship the supplies which have been assembled there. An unusually large number of hostile warships and transports have been reported operating in waters adjacent to southern islands during the past two days. It appears that the enemy will next direct his attention to other islands of the Visayan Group.

Communications with Bataan troops is severed so I have no information of terms arranged by General King."

The Commanding General, USFIP again requested bombers for the

specific mission of protecting a convoy of ships loaded with food in running the blockade from the Visayas to Corregidor.

Enemy artillery batteries in position on Bataan fired on Corregidor during the afternoon of 9 April.

The Commanding General, USFIP, informed of the large number of our own captured troops assembled on the Bataan roads, prohibited the Commanding General, Philippine Coast Artillery Command, from answering this fire until captured troops cleared Bataan.

#### E. THE DEFENSE OF CORREGIDOR

Bataan captured, the enemy lost no time in moving artillery forward and into defiladed positions from which to pound Corregidor and Fort Hughes, and concentrated his entire air force on numerous daily missions against the Fortified Islands.

The Japanese utilized many artillery positions in the valley occupied by our Base Hospital No. 2, and proceeded to ring this hospital with artillery emplacements.

#### 10 April 1942.

Enemy observation balloon observed in the vicinity of Lamac.

The Japanese landed on Cebu, estimated strength, 12,000. Several ships loaded with food preparatory to running the blockade to Corregidor, under protection of bombers from Australia, burned to prevent their falling into enemy hands.

Corregidor subjected to six separate bombing attacks and shelled intermittently from vicinity of Ternate.

11 April 1942.

Enemy continued bombing Corregidor, striking Topside, Morrison Hill, Middleside and Bottomside. Five enemy landing barges, sighted near Hornos Point at about 5:30 PM heading for the inner bay, fired upon by Batteries Rock Point, Sunset and Hanna. The barges retreated out of sight around Hornos Point.

Enemy landed on Cebu at Cebu City, Toledo, Argao, Pinamungajan, Naga and Talisay, supported by naval craft and dive bombers.

The enemy continued to strengthen the Digos Front.

12 April 1942.

Nine separate bombing attacks on Corregidor, and continuous artillery fire from Bataan and Ternate.

Bataan appeared to be clear of our own captured troops, except for Base Hospitals No. 1 and 2, therefore Commanding General, USFIP, authorized counter battery fire against definitely located enemy targets.

General Royce arrived on Mindanao with bombers from Australia.

13-17 April 1942.

Seventeen bombing attacks on Corregidor, four on Hughes and two on ships in south harbor, which had been moved from anchorage off the southern tip of Bataan.

Artillery fire from Bataan almost continuous. One gun at Battery Kysor destroyed on the 15th. The remaining gun removed and emplaced with one from Battery Ordnance Point, in position defiladed from Bataan near Ordnance Point Cemetery. Batteries Morrison, James, Sunset, Rock Point and Hanna subjected to accurate artillery bombardment.

Several guns damaged but all repairable. Ordnance personnel maintained guns in firing condition with the greatest difficulty.

A special observation section, with officer observers, organized to locate enemy batteries in Bataan for counter battery fire targets.

Authority requested from General MacArthur's Headquarters to send to Australia on return trip of General Royce's B-17's, certain air corps pilots and key personnel and the General Staff journals covering the action up to the fall of Bataan. Request granted.

Journals and other data, addressed to Major General Richard K. Sutherland, Australia, turned over to the Adjutant General, USFIP, for transmission to General Royce in Mindanao.

11 April, Japanese force landed on the island of Panay.

The Visayan Force assigned to the control and command of Major General Sharp, Mindanao Force.

17 April, a flight of General Royce's bombers, three B-17's, bombed Nichols Field causing severe damage to buildings, personnel and planes.

Batteries Geary, Rock Point, Sunset, James and Morrison damaged by enemy artillery fire but repairable.

Ten seacoast batteries in action against enemy targets in Bataan, Cavite and Manila Bay fired effectively, two ammunition dumps hit, fires started in two enemy tank and truck columns and counter battery fire neutralized four enemy batteries.

Communication with our forces on Cebu out since 11 April.

A report received that an enemy cruiser, Waskuma class, had been sunk by PT boat off Cebu on 8 April.

Communications established with our guerilla forces in the Bontoc Area and Cagayan Valley. Instructions given them to restrict and hamper

enemy activities as much as possible.

Guerrilla activity from 9th to 14th very intensive. Raiding parties from Isabella Province, Northern Luzon, raided Natividad, San Nicholas, and Tayug and inflicted numerous casualties on the enemy. Enemy patrols occupied Sante Fe and Aritao. Colonel Horan in Bontoc requested additional ammunition. No means available to fulfill the request.

18-24 April 1942.

The enemy moved his 240mm howitzers on Ternate to the southern tip of Bataan. These howitzers had immediately fired on our 12 inch mortar pits.

Every installation on Corregidor, visible from Bataan, continuously subjected to heavy enemy artillery fire. Our counter battery fire brought overwhelming enemy retaliatory fire down on the firing battery. Roving gun batteries, 155mm guns, designated by name of officer commanding the battery, constituted and placed in defiladed positions and moved each night, proved effective counter battery weapons, and avoided hostile retaliatory fire.

The enemy shelling and air attacks continued daily on the Fortified Islands. Battery Crockett (two 12 inch guns) severely damaged by 240mm fire.

Reports received indicated that the enemy might be assembling a landing force on the east coast of Bataan. The Engineer Launch "Nighthawk", dispatched on night reconnaissance, searched for landing craft or concentrations of troops along Bataan Coast. Contacted a small boat off Lamao and took two prisoners, continued north and off Limay, contacted a 120 foot vessel. The "Nighthawk" opened fire immediately, set fire to the boat and apparently killed most of the crew, and had been forced to shoot the two Japanese prisoners, who attempted to jump overboard during this action. The "Nighthawk" attached a line to the burning vessel in an attempt to tow her back to Corregidor, but enemy boats approaching from the shore, forced the "Nighthawk" to cut loose and run for it. The "Nighthawk" returned to Corregidor at 5:00 AM.

Two navy boats directed to take station, one 3,000 yards east of Fort Hughes, the other 5,000 yards northeast of the east tip of Corregidor, in order to give timely warning of the approach of any landing barges or craft.

War Department requested a report on incendiary means and smoke used by the enemy, and a detailed report if gas was used at any time.

Our AA very effective, enemy bombers kept at high altitudes and heavy damages continually inflicted on Japanese Air Craft.

Del Monte, Mindanao bombed several times.

Our forces continued to resist the enemy advance on Cebu, and had destroyed military supplies and stores in danger of falling into enemy hands on that island. By 23 April, the enemy had occupied towns from Cebu City to Dalaguete on the east coast and from Toledo to Dumanjay on the west coast.

An enemy force, estimated at about 8,000, landed on Panay with cavalry and tanks. Japanese on Panay effected a junction of two columns, south of Dumarao. One column advanced south from Capiz and the other advanced north from Iloilo. Our forces continued to resist Japanese advances in the hills in northwestern Panay.

25 April 1942.

Continuous artillery fire from Bataan and Ternate directed against Corregidor. One 240mm shell exploding in the midst of a large group of personnel outside west entrance of Malinta Tunnel had inflicted approximately fifty casualties.

Our batteries fired against numerous targets in Bataan and Cavite. Truck convoys had been dispersed, ammunition dumps set on fire and at least seven enemy batteries silenced. Japanese patrols had been driven from the coves along the Cavite shore and dispersed by effective fire from Fort Frank.

Panay and Cebu areas remained quiet.

26 April 1942.

Harassing fire from enemy batteries in Bataan fell on Corregidor intermittantly during the night. No aerial activity over the Fortified

Islands.

Seacoast batteries from Corregidor and Fort Drum returned the enemy fire during the night and morning. Results undetermined.

The enemy started a systematic invasion of the Cagayan Valley. A force of about 1,500 pushed north from Santa Fe, while another force attacked southward from Tugaugarao.

All quiet on Panay. The enemy holding all road terminals and towns ~~has~~ made no attempt to push into the hills against our forces in northwestern part of the island.

Some slight enemy activity on the Digos front.

27 April 1942.

Intermittent fire from Bataan continued to harass Corregidor during the night and morning. Malinta Hill, 92d Coast Artillery area and roving battery Farris (155mm) heavily hit during four bombing raids.

Our AA still effective, keeping enemy bombers at high altitudes. One heavy and one light bomber hit.

The enemy apparently content to hold his gains in Panay.

In Mindanao our patrols entered Zamboango City which resulted in several sharp clashes. Our harrassing patrols continue to press forward on other fronts.

28 April 1942.

Corregidor experienced its 100th bombing since the fall of Bataan. Dive bombers also attacked boats in the harbor.

Cross fire from Bataan and Ternate harrassed Corregidor during the night and morning.

Battery Way, four 12 inch mortars, out of service for several years, manned by Battery "E", 60th Coast Artillery when that battery returned from Bataan, reconditioned and ready for action. Our seacoast batteries interdicted critical roads, fired on truck columns and executed counter battery missions. Three fires started in Bataan, a truck column destroyed

and at least three batteries silenced.

Quiet prevailed in Panay and Cebu.

Our patrols clashed with the enemy near Digos. Lebak, Cotabato, reported bombed by Japanese planes 27 April. Six hostile transports, escorted by two destroyers, moved east off Basilan Island.

29 April 1942.

Heavy attacks by enemy air craft and artillery against Corregidor and other Fortified Islands continued throughout most of the day, twelve separate bombing attacks on Corregidor alone. Enemy artillery fire, included all calibers, 75mm to 240mm. A number of our observing stations destroyed. The power plant for number "8", fixed searchlight, hit and burned. The 1.1 quadruple mount wrecked, three 75mm beach defense guns destroyed and two ammunition dumps burned.

Seacoast batteries on all the Fortified Islands effectively replied, neutralized four enemy batteries, fired one ammunition dump and interdicted critical roads and troop areas.

Two navy PBY's from Australia, via Mindanao Island, loaded with medicines and seven hundred forty (740) mechanical fuzes for 3 inch AA ammunition, landed in South Bay.

One seacoast battery secured five direct hits and set fire to the Coast Guard Cutter Apo near Cabcaben, which the Japanese had been trying to salvage.

Our AA shot down two light bombers, set one on fire and hit at least two others.

The PBY's, loaded with fifty selected passengers (including about thirty-eight American Nurses), took off for Mindanao.

Heavy enemy shelling had cut practically all lines of communication to beach defense troops and gun batteries; destroyed the power plant for AA guns; damaged height finder instruments, and put Battery Geary out of action.



The Japanese landing in Parang and Cotabato opened up another front in Mindanao.

30 April 1942.

The heavy air and artillery offensive launched against the Fortified Islands continued with undiminished intensity. The whole island of Corregidor raked with artillery fire until 10:35 PM, the heaviest concentration striking Battery Way, which received 100 hits. Battery Geary received additional damage. Battery Crockett damaged and Battery Byrne put out of action (155mm roving battery). One anti-aircraft gun damaged. Communication lines continually cut.

Our artillery batteries, seacoast and roving, answered with counter battery fire and defensive concentrations. A tug operating in Mariveles Harbor sunk; a boat or barge on the east coast of Bataan set on fire; an enemy ammunition dump blown up; heavy explosions caused in one artillery position; three batteries neutralized and truck columns dispersed. Anti-aircraft hit and damaged one bomber.

Our forces in North Luzon, at Mount Dafa, attacked 28 April and driven back to Mabaay Gate, where they held. An enemy force estimated at about five hundred (with pack trains and horses) moved east toward Baay, Abra.

In the Visayas: hostilities in Cebu reported to have ceased, with General Chynoweth in the mountains with three hundred men and a six months food supply.

Our force on the Parang-Cotabato front forced back several kilometers by hostile aerial and naval bombardment in conjunction with infantry attacks, reorganized a defensive line near Auba. The 102d Infantry (PA) formed a new line at KP 30 to prevent envelopment of the left flank. The 2d Infantry (PA) covered Buldun. The 61st Infantry (PA) formed its main line of resistance to the rear of the Malaban Airport. Japanese launched a new offensive on the Digos front.

No activity on Panay. The enemy bombed and strafed the airports at Ormoc, Leyte; Camp Carmen, Bohol, and Bacolod, Negros.

1 May 1942.

Corregidor and other Fortified Islands subjected to heavy pounding by enemy artillery from Bataan and Ternate. The enemy, firing from many new positions, had kept up a relentless cannonade in an effort to harass personnel, neutralize artillery batteries and destroy defenses.

Light and heavy bombers had also made thirteen separate bombing attacks against the Harbor Defenses. A total of 149 bombing attacks had been made against Corregidor during the twenty-three days since the fall of Bataan.

Seacoast batteries on all the Fortified Islands continued counter battery fire and interdiction of enemy truck columns. Several enemy light bombers hit and damaged by anti-aircraft automatic weapons.

A convoy of enemy troop transports, escorted by naval ships, reported off Pontevedra and Binalbagan, Negros, by the Visayan-Mindanao Force.

No activity on Panay.

The enemy reinforced the Cotabato front in Mindanao and advanced to Lake Dapao northeast of Mababang. Approximately 300 enemy troops in steel barges proceeded up the Palangui River to Dalawan. The Digos front bombed and strafed by the enemy.

The enemy had constructed bridges over Bato Ferry in North Luzon, nine kilometers south of Bayombong. No report had been received from Colonel Horan for several days.

2 May 1942.

Corregidor and the other Fortified Islands subjected to continuous shell fire, the heaviest concentration yet experienced by Corregidor, as the enemy covered the entire island with 240mm fire. During a five hour period, twelve 240mm shells had fallen per minute for a total of 3,600 hits in the

Geary-Crockett area at Topside. In addition the enemy made thirteen distinct and separate bombing attacks on Corregidor, using heavy and light bombardment planes.

Our seacoast batteries replied with counter battery fire, neutralizing at least three enemy batteries. Our antiaircraft hit and damaged one light bomber.

This intensive bombardment extracted a heavy toll on the defenses of Corregidor. Battery Geary completely destroyed; the number 2 gun in Battery Crockett permanently put out of action; Battery Craighill, two mortars damaged and put out of action; Battery James, one gun severely damaged and put out of action; seacoast searchlight number 1, 2 and 3 put out of action and the mine command group number 24 permanently put out of action.

Our antiaircraft defense severely crippled with five 3-inch antiaircraft guns put out of action; one height finder destroyed and two severely damaged; three caliber .50 antiaircraft machine guns put out of action; many data transmission cable cut and all communication lines over the entire island damaged.

The beach defenses, which had been severely pounded, had four machine guns, one 37mm gun, and the engineer dock pill box destroyed. Beach wire, and beach obstacles considerable damaged.

No reports received on the situation in Northern Luzon.

The enemy appeared to be content with his gains on Panay. Situation in Imao remained critical. An attack on Del Monte appeared to be imminent. Two destroyers and six transports headed for Macajalar Bay.

3 May 1942.

Corregidor experienced its two hundred eighty-seventh bombing since the beginning of the war.

Artillery shelling of Corregidor and the other Fortified Islands

continued with unabated intensity. Our antiaircraft defenses, already seriously crippled suffered additional loss of guns, height finders, and personnel.

Our roving 155mm batteries continued to fire counter battery fire.

At 10:00 PM the last submarine departed from Corregidor with the following personnel: Colonel Doyle, 45th Infantry; Colonel Irwin, G-3, USFIP, with complete rosters of all Army, Navy, and Marine Corps personnel who were alive; Colonel Jenks, Finance Officer, USFIP, with all money accounts; Colonel Hill, Inspector General, USFIP; Colonel Savage, Air Officer, USFIP; Colonel Ramsy, Veterinary Officer, USA; five Naval Officers; thirteen or fourteen nurses, Army Nurse Corps; many USAFFE and USFIP records, orders, and several bags of mail. This was the last outgoing mail, personnel or orders to leave Corregidor.

At 3:00 AM, the enemy landed between Bugo and Tagoloan, in Macajaler Bay in Northern Mindanao. The enemy also effected a major landing at Cagayan, Mindanao. Our forces desperately opposed this landing and inflicted severe casualties on the enemy. The enemy's activity in Mindanao indicated preparations to launch an offensive on all fronts.

Our forces in Northern Luzon, except for resisting advances of the enemy, practically ceased activity due to the scarcity of ammunition.

4 May 1942.

The enemy continued to pound Corregidor and other Fortified Islands. At 3:00 PM the heaviest general artillery bombardment of the campaign, consisting of all calibers, including 240mm, came down on Corregidor, literally a continuous drum-fire of bursting shells. The bulk of the enemy fire directed against beach defenses, especially at James Ravine, Powder Plant Ravine, and the beach between North and Cavalry Points. Machine Gun emplacements and machine guns damaged and some 75mm guns put out of action.

Corregidor subjected to its 294th bombing attack.

Our AA defenses had been so severely crippled that very little AA fire was available to oppose these bombing attacks.

Fort Drum and Battery Gulick (roving 155mm) fired counter battery at enemy positions near Cabcaben. Batteries Monja and Wright (roving 155mm, D-91st) opened fire against Gorda Point.

Our communication and ordnance units constantly attempted to repair damages to materiel and communication lines.

All our forces kept on the alert for a possible enemy landing during darkness.

Our forces in the vicinity of Cagayan, Mindanao, withdrew to the vicinity of Dalirig, blowing all bridges to delay the hostile advance. Our forces on the Digos and Cotabato fronts forced back, but delayed the hostile advance by destroying all bridges and using all possible delaying tactics. On the Digos front, the enemy advanced to Kilometer Post 103; troops organized a second position at Kilometer Post 125. On the Cotabato front, the enemy reported in Midsayap and Pikit. All forces in Mindanao depleted by desertions and sickness.

The Commanding General, USFIP, in reply to a radio from General Marshall 3 May 1942, asking for a frank estimate of the situation in the Philippines, sent the following estimate of the situation to General Marshall in Washington:

"Hostile air force has bombed Corregidor relentlessly since March 24, 1942. Enemy immediately emplaced artillery on south shore of peninsula following fall of Bataan on 9 April 1942 and since then has subjected our defenses to artillery fire."

"Beginning 29 April 1942, the Emperor's birthday, hostile artillery fire increased in intensity and has continued at that tempo to the present. Hostile bombing has been relatively ineffective but artillery fire from large-caliber guns, 240mm, has destroyed large percentage of coast and beach defense artillery and small arms."

"Since 9 April 1942, continued bombardment has caused about six hundred casualties and has lowered the morale of troops. Difficult to maintain morale at best because troops have been under or subject to artillery or air attack constantly since 29 December 1941 and have received half of poorly balanced ration since 5 January 1942. Morale however, is amazingly good considering conditions under which troops are presently operating."

"Persistent reports from operatives indicate that the enemy plans to launch an assault against Corregidor. He has prepared a large number of motor boats with mounted weapons and constructed large number of smaller boats for troop transport. I have nothing on which to base an estimate of present hostile strength of troops on Luzon. However, the enemy, in taking Cebu and Panay, used about 10,000 men in each operation. He is now engaged in attack on Mindanao. I estimate that at least 10,000 men are engaged at Mindanao."

"Unless Japanese troops have been withdrawn from the Philippines, I believe sufficient force is left on Luzon to undertake an operation against Corregidor. In my opinion the enemy is capable of making a assault on Corregidor at any time."

"Success or failure of such assault will depend entirely on the steadfastness of beach defense troops. Considering the present level of morale, I estimate that we have something less than an even chance to beat off an assault. I have given you, in accordance with your request, a very frank and honest opinion on the situation as I see it."

5 May 1942.

Corregidor bombed, the 300th bombing attack since 8 December 1941.

The enemy continued heavy, relentless artillery fire, pounding all of the Fortified Islands. On Corregidor, James Ravine, the North Shore, and the tail of the island pounded terrifically. Communication lines cut, numerous beach defense guns and beach defense searchlights put out of action,

and a large number of beach defense land mines exploded.

USFIP Headquarters received a message from a G-2 agent on Luzon stating that: "The Japanese are planning to land on Corregidor tonight". For the past ten days, since the start of the extraordinarily heavy artillery and bombing attacks, all forces had been alerted to guard against a landing. Not satisfied with this, the Commanding General, USFIP, had personally gone to Harbor Defense Headquarters and talked over the situation with Major General George F. Moore, Commanding General, Harbor Defenses, and had investigated conditions of the defenses; the feeding of troops; the morale of the troops; the priority plans for rapid counter attacks in case a landing was effected and had satisfied himself that everything that could possibly be done to defeat the impending Japanese attack had been done.

Beach defense installations on the Northside of the island had become practically non-existent. Barbed wire entanglements and personnel shelters and most of the 75mm guns had been destroyed. Trees and vegetation on the entire side of the island had been destroyed and the ground had been literally churned to powdered dust. All wire communication had been shot away. Command could be exercised and intelligence obtained only by use of foot messengers, which medium was uncertain under the heavy and continuous artillery and air bombardment.

A message received at 10:30 PM from "H" station to Beach Defense Commander C-1, and AACP stated: "Enemy landing attack indicated".

A runner arrived at 11:50 PM at "H" station from North Point and reported the enemy landing at North Point. No warning had been received from naval vessels on watch. As nearly as can be determined the 1st wave of the Japanese landing attack hit the beach at North Point at 11:30 PM, 5 May 1942.

The seaward defense commander ordered to send personnel from

B, C, D, E, 59th Coast Artillery, manning Batteries Cheney, Wheeler, and Crockett, to positions in beach defense reserve; other Coast Artillery troops, manning several AA armaments, released to Beach Defense Commander in accordance with prearranged plan of priorities.

Very little activity on Cagayan front, demolitions effected by our forces prevented the enemy from a rapid advance.

No change in the situation on the Cotabato front.

No report received from Northern Luzon Forces.

6 May 1942.

A messenger from Lieutenant Colonel Biggs, 92d Coast Artillery, received at about 12:50 AM, stated that he had formed a line across Kindley Field Water Tank Hill with batteries E and F, 92d Coast Artillery (PS), and that he was cooperating with marines in defense of the east sector.

One 75mm gun battery (2 guns) in position near the tail end of the island had not previously disclosed its position. It opened fire on the enemy landing force in a complete surprise attack and sunk a number of landing barges and inflicted many casualties.

The few remaining searchlights attempted to go into action, but had been quickly shot out by enemy artillery fire from Bataan.

However by 1:50 AM the moon had risen so that effective fire could be placed on the landing party. All available artillery on the Fortified Islands opened fire and destroyed numerous landing barges and inflicted heavy casualties on the landing force.

The enemy landed in two waves. Information, received from Japanese officers after cessation of hostilities, indicated that the first wave consisted of 2,000 infantrymen, 800 of whom got ashore; the second wave of 10,000 and that enemy losses totalled about 4,100.

Uncoordinated fighting continued generally throughout the night. Battery Way (12 inch mortars) at Fort Mills; remaining 3-inch



AA batteries; Battery Craighill (12 inch mortars) and 2 - 75mm beach defense guns on Fort Hughes, continued to fire on landing barges.

The Commanding General, USFIP, received the following message from the President of the United States of America at about noon:

"During recent weeks we have been following with growing admiration the day-by-day accounts of your heroic stand against the mounting intensity of bombardment by enemy planes and heavy siege guns.

In spite of all the handicaps of complete isolation, lack of food and ammunition you have given the world a shining example of patriotic fortitude and self-sacrifice.

The American people ask no finer example of tenacity, resourcefulness, and steadfast courage. The calm determination of your personal leadership in a desperate situation sets a standard of duty for our soldiers throughout the world.

In every camp and on every naval vessel soldiers, sailors, and marines are inspired by the gallant struggle of their comrades in the Philippines. The workmen in our shipyards and munitions plants redouble their efforts because of your example.

You and your devoted followers have become the living symbols of our war aims and the guarantee of victory. Franklin D. Roosevelt."

A third assault wave of landing boats, approaching Corregidor at dawn, broken up and practically annihilated by artillery fire from Fort Drum, Battery Stockade (A-91st), Battery Wright (D-91st), Battery Gulick (G-91st) and roving 155mm gun batteries on Corregidor. Fire from these same units repulsed another landing attempt headed for Bottomside dock area and Power Plant Ravine.

The Beach Defense Commander reported the situation under control but that landings which had been made behind our lines, near Infantry Point, necessitated withdrawal toward Malinta Hill.

The Beach Defense Reserve Battalion reinforced with personnel from Batteries B and C, 59th Coast Artillery, and all other available troops counter attacked at dawn in the East Sector, drove the enemy back for some distance and effectively stopped his advance toward Malinta Hill. However, the early morning light enabled the enemy to bring effective artillery fire from Bataan to bear on our counter attacking troops, this in conjunction with attacks by dive bombers and heavy strafing by large numbers of enemy fighter planes, drove some of our troops back into Malinta Tunnel and pinned all other units to the ground on the final defense line east of Malinta Tunnel. Enemy artillery fire saturated the entire area of the island between Malinta Hill and Kindley Field Water Tank Hill (the latter held by the Japanese), and also thoroughly covered Bottomside and Topside. Our reserves suffered some casualties in passing through these barrages going to the East Sector.

The Commanding General, USFIP, made a clear cut estimate of the situation, sensed the seriousness of conditions on Corregidor and dispatched a radio message to Major General Sharp which released the Visayan-Mindanao Force from under the control of USFIP, and directed Major General Sharp to take all further orders from General MacArthur's Headquarters in Australia.

The enemy had landed and assembled by 10:20 AM a sizable tank force in the vicinity of Kindley Field. The Commanding General, USFIP, realized the hopelessness of the situation and that although he could hold during the day, the defending forces would certainly be over powered and over run during the coming hours of darkness. He called Generals Moore and Beebe and informed them of his heart breaking decision to surrender the Fortified Islands at noon, and directed Brigadier General Lewis C. Beebe, Chief of Staff, to broadcast at 10:30 AM a surrender message, which had been prepared in the event the Commanding General, USFIP, lost his life and could not be present when the broadcast had to be made, to

General Homma or the commander in chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, as follows, Quote:

"Anyone receiving this message please transmit it to the commander in chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces on Luzon.

For military reasons which General Wainwright considers sufficient to put a stop to further sacrifice of human life, the commanding general will surrender to Your Excellency today the four fortified islands at the entrance to Manila Bay together with all military and naval personnel and all existing stores and equipment.

At twelve noon, local Daylight Savings Time, 6 May 1942, a white flag will be displayed in a prominent position on Corregidor, at which time all firing from the harbor forts will cease unless a landing by Japanese troops in force is attempted without flags of truce, in which case they will be taken under fire.

If all of your firing and aerial bombardment has ceased at twelve noon local time the commanding general will send two staff officers by boat, flying a white flag, to the Cabcaben dock to meet a Japanese staff officer, whom the commanding general requests that Your Excellency have there, empowered to name the time and place for the commanding general to meet Your Excellency in order that he may make the formal surrender and to arrange all details.

Upon the return of his staff officers the commanding general will proceed by boat, accompanied by some of his staff, to such place as may be designated by Your Excellency. The commanding general's launch will fly a white flag and his party will consist of five or six persons. He requests that motor transportation meet his party at the landing point designated by you." Unquote.

The destruction of all armament ordered in accordance with secret orders and plans which had already been given to regimental and Fort Commanders,

destruction to be accomplished by noon, and if not completed by noon, nothing to be destroyed after that time. Plans called for the destruction of all armament above 45 caliber. The command instructed to lay down arms at noon. The flag on Corregidor ordered lowered and burned at noon and a white flag displayed. These instructions relayed to all concerned as rapidly and insofar as disrupted communications permitted. All units received the order in time to comply with instructions, except Fort Hughes.

USFIP General Staff sections and unit headquarters destroyed all current documents, maps and other papers of military importance.

All gold bullion had been previously transported by submarine to the United States. Serial numbers had been taken on all paper currency, transmitted by radio message to Washington and the currency cut up and burned. Silver bullion had been crated, moved out into the bay and sunk, and its location transmitted by radio message to Washington. General Staff journals, orders and various official records had been sent out by submarine on night of 3 May 1942. A number of other documents not considered of historical value, of importance to the War Department, or of any value in continuing the campaign had been previously destroyed.

The surrender message broadcast repeated at 11:00 AM, and again at 11:45 AM.

The Commanding General, USFIP, transmitted by radio the following messages, the first to the President of the United States of America and the second to General MacArthur in Australia, Quote:

"With broken heart and head bowed in sadness, but not in shame I report to Your Excellency that today I must arrange terms for the surrender of the Fortified Islands of Manila Bay.

With many guns and anti-aircraft fire control equipment destroyed we are no longer able to prevent accurate bombardment from the air. With numerous batteries of heavy caliber emplaced on the shores of Bataan and

Cavite the enemy now brings devastating crossfire to bear on us, outranging our remaining guns.

Most of my batteries, seacoast, anti-aircraft and field, have been put out of action by the enemy. I have ordered the others destroyed to prevent them from falling into enemy hands. In addition we are now overwhelmingly assaulted by Japanese troops on Corregidor.

There is a limit of human endurance and that limit has long since been past. Without prospect of relief I feel it is my duty to my country and to my gallant troops to end this useless effusion of blood and human sacrifice.

If you agree, Mr. President, please say to the nation that my troops and I have accomplished all that is humanly possible and that we have upheld the best traditions of the United States and its Army.

May God bless and preserve you and guide you and the nation in the effort to ultimate victory.

With profound regret and with continued pride in my gallant troops I go to meet the Japanese Commander.

Good-bye, Mr. President." Unquote.

The same message to General MacArthur, with these exceptions;

Quote:

"I feel it is my duty to the nation and my troops to end this useless slaughter. There is apparently no relief in sight. American and Filipino troops have engaged and held the enemy for nearly five months.

We have done our full duty for you and for our country. We are sad but unashamed. I have fought for you to the best of my ability from Lingayen Gulf to Bataan to Corregidor, always hoping relief was on the way.

Good-bye, General, my regards to you and our comrades in Australia.

May God strengthen your arm to insure ultimate success of the cause for which we have fought side by side." Unquote.

The vigor and intensity of the Japanese attack continued.

The flag, which had been shot down and replaced twice under fire during the seige, lowered and burned at 12:00 noon by Colonel Paul D. Bunker, Coast Artillery Corps, the seaward Defense Commander, and a white flag raised immediately thereafter.

The enemy disregarded the flag of truce, artillery fire, machine gun fire and dive bomber attacks continued unabated.

Brigadier General Beebe repeated the surrender message again at 12:30 PM.

Captain Golland L. Clark, USMC, accompanied by First Lieutenant Allen S. Manning, USMC, with a flag of truce proceeded at about 1:00 PM toward the Japanese lines, contacted Japanese troops who conducted them to the senior Japanese officer. The Marine Corps officers returned in about thirty minutes to Malinta Tunnel with a message directing the Commanding General, USFIP, to come to the Japanese Commander if he desired to discuss terms.

The Commanding General, USFIP, accompanied by Major General Moore, Lieutenant Colonel Pugh, Major Dooley and Major Brown proceeded at 2:00 PM under a white flag by car to the foot of Kindley Field Water Tank Hill, where the party left the car and walked up the hill to meet the Japanese Commander. Arrangements, promptly completed, provided for the Commanding General, USFIP, and party to be taken to Bataan to meet General Homma. A Japanese Colonel, an English speaking Japanese Lieutenant, and the Commanding General's party started on foot for the north dock, but heavy Japanese ground fire suddenly opened up on the area just ahead of the party, and dive bombers strafed the area between the group and the dock.

The Japanese Colonel declined to proceed any farther in that direction, and accompanied by his interpreter, the Commanding General, USFIP, and Major Dooley returned to the rear of the Japanese lines. The remainder of the Commanding General's party returned to Malinta tunnel. General Beebe, Lieutenant Colonel Pugh, Major Lawrence and Sergeant Carrol immediately left the tunnel and proceeded to the dock, secured a motor launch and departed for Cabcaben, Bataan.

The Japanese moved into Malinta Tunnel and occupied Bottomside, at 4:00 PM, then advanced to Middleside and along South Shore Road. Topside bombed relentlessly throughout the afternoon.

The Commanding General, USFIP, reached Cabcaben at 4:00 PM. Brigadier General Beebe's party joined him and the entire party continued by automobile to a house about three quarters of a mile north of Cabcaben where they waited about a hour for the arrival of General Homma.

The Commanding General, USFIP, seated at a table facing General Homma handed him the formal signed surrender document, and, although he could read and speak English, General Homma did not look at the document, but handed it to Lieutenant Nakamura, his interpreter, who read it aloud in Japanese.

General Homma replied thru his interpreter that no surrender would be accepted unless it included all the United States and Philippine Troops in the Philippines.

After a very heated discussion and much bickering over the status of the forces in the Philippines, other than those on the Fortified Islands, General Homma replied very sharply:

"Hostilities against the Fortified Islands will be continued unless the Japanese surrender terms are accepted."

Again the Commanding General, USFIP, tried to confine the surrender discussion to the Fortified Islands, but General Homma jumped up from the table, strode angrily and haughtily to his car and drove off.

The party then got up and walked slowly down the steps. After some discussion, the Japanese Colonel who had brought the Commanding General, USFIP, to Bataan was asked, "What do you want us to do now?" He replied: "We will take you and your party back to Corregidor and then you can do as you damn please."

In a further attempt to continue the discussion, the Japanese Colonel brusquely replied: "General Wainwright was given his opportunity and he refused it. We will continue our offensive against Corregidor."

The Japanese Colonel, asked if an American Staff Officer could be sent by Japanese plane to General Sharp's Headquarters in Mindanao, apparently assumed that this was the complete surrender replied: "I am not authorized to accept your surrender. Now that General Homma has gone you can surrender only to the Commanding Officer of the Japanese Imperial Forces on Corregidor."

The party, driven back to Cabcaben, embarked for Corregidor, and landed at North Point after dark at about 7:30 PM. The Japanese shelling still continued on parts of the island. The enemy line had advanced to within 100 yards of the east entrance of Malinta Tunnel.



Additional landings had been made and the Japanese controlled the area between the west entrance of the tunnel and Morrison Hill.

The Commanding General, USFIP, asked the interpreter to take him to the Japanese commander. The party, led around Malinta Hill to the west side and down to a little settlement named, "Barrio San Jose", entered a partially destroyed Filipino market building to meet another Japanese Colonel, the senior Japanese officer on Corregidor.

The surrender document, drawn up and signed by midnight, and typed in stiff Japanese version of English read: Quote,

"Imperial Japanese Army and Navy are only prepared to accept surrender of all forces under your command. To troops operating in other part of the Philippine Islands the order shall be given to disarm voluntarily immediately and to take the understipulated steps.

Those remaining in Northern Luzon to assemble at Bayombong or Bontoc and the commanding officer to present himself to Japanese Army in Baguio and notify him of their surrender. Those remaining on Panay Island to assemble northern environs of Iloilo City, on Negros Island in the vicinity of Bacolod City, and the commanding officers of both regions to present themselves to Japanese Army in Iloilo and notify of their surrender.

Those remaining on Bohol Island to assemble in the vicinity of Roai and the commanding officers to present themselves to Japanese Army in Cebu and notify of their surrender. Those remaining on Leyte Island and on Samar Island to assemble in the vicinity of Tacloban and Catbalogan respectively and the commanding officers to present themselves to Japanese Army in Legaspi and notify of their surrender.

Those remaining in the district of Lanao and Zamboanga in Mindanao Island to assemble in the vicinity of Iligan and those remaining in the district of Malaybalay and Agusan Basin to assemble in the vicinity of Malaybalay and Butuan and their commanding officers to notify of their surrender.

Those in other islands not mentioned above to assemble at any convenient place and notify the nearest Japanese Army of their surrender.

The order shall be carried out within four days."

"(A) It is strictly prohibited to destroy, burn, or disperse arms, materials, vessels, and any establishments, either part or whole.

(1) Portable and easily movable weapons to be gathered all together in the vicinity of the assembling places of the troops.

(2) Heavy arms, materials, and equipment to be kept intact and the location thereof to be reported with a sketch.

(3) Vessels in waters other than Manila Bay to proceed to the port of Cagayan.

(B) Defense measures, specially those areas wherein land mines or sea mines were laid, to be reported with a sketch, and the actual position to be distinctly indicated by suitable means, if such is at all possible.

(C) Japanese prisoners of war, if any, to be handed over immediately.

(D) Further orders will be given if such is found necessary.

Japanese Army and Navy will not cease their operations until they recognize faithfulness in executing the above-mentioned orders.

If and when such faithfulness is recognized, the commander in chief of Japanese Forces in the Philippines will order "Cease Fire" after taking all circumstances into consideration." Unquote.