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ARMY SERVICE FORCES MANUAL

M 354-18E

CIVIL AFFAIRS HANDBOOK

JAPAN

SECTION 18E: JAPANESE ADMINISTRATION
OVER OCCUPIED AREAS - THAILAND



RESTRICTED. DISSEMINATION OF RESTRICTED MATTER.—The information contained in restricted documents and the essential characteristics of restricted material may be given to any person known to be in the service of the United States and to persons of undoubted loyalty and discretion who are cooperating in Government work, but will not be communicated to the public or to the press except by authorized military public relations agencies. (See also par. 18b, AR 380-5, 28 Sep 1942.)

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES 15 DECEMBER 1944

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Headquarters, Army Service Forces 15 December 1944

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NUMBERING SYSTEM OF
ARMY SERVICE FORCES MANUALS

The main subject matter of each Army Service Forces Manual is indicated by consecutive numbering within the following categories:

M1 - M99 Basic and Advanced Training
M100 - M199 Army Specialized Training Program and Pre-Induction Training
M200 - M299 Personnel and Morale
M300 - M399 Civil Affairs
M400 - M499 Supply and Transportation
M500 - M599 Fiscal
M600 - M699 Procurement and Production
M700 - M799 Administration
M800 - M899 Miscellaneous
M900 - up Equipment, Materiel, Housing and Construction

* * *

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES,
Washington 25, D. C., 15 December 1944.

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By command of Lieutenant General SOMERVILL.

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MILITARY GOVERNMENT DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
by the
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS BRANCH, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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INTRODUCTION

Purposes of the Civil Affairs Handbooks

The basic objectives of Civil Affairs Officers are (1) to assist the Commanding General by quickly establishing those orderly conditions which will contribute most effectively to the conduct of military operation, (2) to reduce to a minimum the human suffering and the material damage resulting from disorder, and (3) to create the conditions which will make it possible for civilian agencies to function effectively.

The preparation of Civil Affairs Handbooks is a part of the effort to carry out these responsibilities as efficiently and humanely as possible. The Handbooks do not deal with plans or policies (which will depend upon changing and unpredictable developments). It should be clearly understood that they do not imply any given official program of action. They are rather ready reference source books containing the basic factual information needed for planning and policy-making.

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CIVIL AFFAIRS HANDBOOKS TOPICAL OUTLINE

1. Geographical and Social Background
2. Government and Administration
3. Legal Affairs
4. Government Finance
5. Money and Banking
6. Natural Resources
7. Agriculture
8. Industry and Commerce
9. Labor
10. Public Works and Utilities
11. Transportation Systems
12. Communications
13. Public Health and Sanitation
14. Public Safety
15. Education
16. Public Welfare
17. Cultural Institutions
18. Japanese Administration Over Occupied Areas
18E - Thailand

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SUMMARY

Nominally Thailand is a sovereign nation in which the Japanese exercise only treaty rights. Actually the Japanese compel the Thai government to do their bidding in all matters except domestic affairs.

Japanese military domination of Thailand began 8 December 1941 when their forces crossed the Thai border en route to Malaya and Burma. The Japanese military wrung from the Thai government the right of transit, and later the right to station 50,000 troops within Thailand. They also imposed an Offensive-Defensive Alliance, 21 December 1941, which compelled Thailand to declare war on Great Britain and America and to defend its borders and the Japanese bases within them.

Japanese political domination of Thailand is complete in foreign affairs. The Thai government has had to recognize Japanese puppet governments and to support Japan's Greater East Asia program. The Japanese ambassador to Thailand is an important figure because many of Japan's controls are effected by diplomatic agreements. The Thai have retained the right to form their own government, however, and in July 1944 they exercised this right by voting down the collaborationist government and by setting up one more anti-Japanese in temper.

Japanese economic domination results from Japan's encirclement of Thailand and its control of shipping and railroad transportation. Since the invasion Japan has been practically the sole purchaser of Thai rice, tin, and rubber, and the sole source of Thai imports of munitions and civilian goods. Japanese importers largely control foreign trade; Japanese retailers distribute imported wares, and Japanese bankers and manufacturers monopolize new Thai industries.


Japan's attempts at cultural domination, however, have achieved little success, due in part to the mounting resentment of the Thai to Japanese control.

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I. FOREWORD

Thailand has more freedom of action than any other country under Japanese control. Nevertheless Thailand is dominated by Japan militarily, politically, and economically, under the guise of treaty agreements entered into by two sovereign nations.

According to the diplomatic fiction which clothes Japanese-Thai relations, Thailand was not invaded — the Japanese obtained the right of transit across the country; Thailand is not patrolled by Japanese garrisons — fifty thousand troops have permission to remain there to fight the common foe; Thailand was not forced to declare war on Great Britain and the United States she did so voluntarily under the terms of the Offensive-Defensive Alliance made with Japan; Thai economy is not controlled by Japanese shippers and manufacturers — Thai banking and industry are merely participating in Greater East Asia co-prosperity. Japanese controls, therefore, have an air of correctness and legality which preserves for the Thai much of their self-respect.

Because these controls are based on agreements they are to some extent limited. For example, the Thai have retained their autonomy over international administration of government and therefore have preserved their political structure intact. This enables them to offer collective although sometimes ineffectual resistance to Japanese demands. In general, Japan has obtained nominal Thai collaboration at the price of nominal recognition of Thai sovereignty.

Three factors have influenced Japanese-Thai relations: Japan's military power, Thailand's previous status of complete independence, and smoldering Thai resentment at forced collaboration. The Japanese have had difficulty explaining their forced entry into an orderly, self-governing, Asiatic kingdom, and they have had to negotiate with a government they did not set up. The disadvantage of this position to the Japanese became apparent following the fall of the Tojo cabinet in July 1944. The Thai National Assembly, emboldened by the Japanese cabinet change and the defeats which preceded it, on 22 July repudiated their own collaborationist cabinet and chose a new premier of strong anti-Japanese sympathies. But this cabinet change has produced no immediate effect upon Japan's control of Thailand. Japanese troops still dominate Thai airfields and railways, the Japanese Foreign Office still controls Thailand's foreign affairs, Japanese cultural agents and propagandists continue their attempts to indoctrinate the Thai by radio, press, and education, and Japanese business firms daily become more deeply entrenched in Thailand. Some of the controls may be indirect but they are nevertheless effective, and nearly all of them have been planned on a long-term basis.

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II. JAPANESE OBJECTIVES, PROBLEMS AND METHODS

A. JAPANESE OBJECTIVES IN THAILAND

1. Immediate Objectives

Japanese forces entered Thailand in the early hours of 8 December 1941 after issuing a midnight ultimatum demanding the right of passage across the country. Their immediate object was to use Thailand with its ports, airfields, and railways as a base of attack against Malaya and Burma. Thailand was to be made an ally which would supply the Japanese army with food such as rice, meat, and vegetables, with equipment such as planes, vehicles, and boats, with facilities such as repair shops and means of communication, and, if possible, with troops. As an ally Thailand would be expected to defend her borders and the Japanese installations within them.

2. Long-term Objectives

Japan wished to include Thailand within the Greater East Asia sphere. By so doing Japan would exclude from Thailand all competition by western powers, monopolize raw materials such as rubber, tin, and rice, limit Thailand's imports to such goods as Japanese firms and ships made available, and control Thailand's foreign policy, military affairs, industries, and finances. To obtain these controls in the easiest way and to place them on a permanent basis the Japanese launched a campaign of indoctrination designed to absorb Thailand culturally, spiritually, and politically.

B. THE PROBLEM OF THAILAND'S INDEPENDENCE

In 1941 Thailand was an Asiatic, self-governing kingdom intensely proud of her independence, bolstered by treaties of friendship with all the great nations, and with no need of "liberation" by Japan. On the contrary the Thai were aware of Japanese plans for southward expansion and therefore endeavored by friendly and appeasing gestures to forestall an invasion. Thus Thailand refrained from voting against Japan in the League of Nations, February 1933, over the Manchurian question, and in August 1941 gave official recognition to Japan's puppet state of Manchukuo. In return, Japan posed as the friend of the Thai and the helpful arbiter in the 1940-41 Thailand-Indochina border dispute. Therefore Japan could invade Thailand only by breaking treaties and pledges of friendship and by destroying Thai sovereignty, an act which would incriminate Japan before Asia and the world. Moreover Japanese troops might meet resistance by fifty thousand Thai troops assisted by British forces, and thereafter face long-drawn out opposition from Thai guerrillas. However Japan could enter Thailand no way except by force; it was certain she would not be invited.

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C. JAPANESE METHODS

1. Manner of Obtaining Control

Shortly before midnight 7 December 1941 Ambassador Tsubogami presented an ultimatum to the Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs demanding transit for Japanese troops anywhere in Thailand. In the absence of Thai Premier Pibul Songgram the Thai cabinet met under Luang Pradit Manudharm, Minister of Finance, and voted resistance to Japanese demands. In the meantime Japanese troops were entering Thailand from Cambodia and from the sea, and there were sharp skirmishes in the southern provinces, with casualties. Premier Pibul appeared in the early morning of 8 December and gave the "cease firing order" and in the truce which followed agreed to the Japanese demands. By 11 December he had further agreed to sign an Offensive-Defensive Alliance, explaining to his countrymen, "The Government ... holds such a step to be the best that could be taken for the benefit of the country and nation during such a situation."^{1/} The Thai Premier's one solace was the Japanese assurance that Thai sovereignty was being respected.

Japanese controls were disguised as "mutual cooperation in all fields whether it be military, political, economic, or cultural." Actually cooperation gave way to forced Thai collaboration in these four fields, and the controls tightened with the passage of time. Thus when Premier Pibul was asked why he declared war on the United States and Great Britain he replied, "Because we have entered into an offensive-defensive alliance with Japan."^{2/}

2. Relative Importance of Controls

Japan's military domination of Thailand has netted her little in the way of Thai military support, but it has given Japan control of Thai bases, communications, and supplies. By her political domination of Thailand, Japan is able to operate within a country of sixteen million population without having to by approaching the head of the government. By controlling Thailand economically Japan obtains supplies for her army, a monopoly of Thai raw materials, a market for her exports, and a stranglehold on Thai industry. Japan's efforts to dominate Thailand culturally have been varied, persistent, ingenious, and insidious, but have yielded small returns because of Thai animosity. Japanese gains in Thailand have not included public esteem.

^{1/} The Bangkok Times, 12 December 1941

^{2/} The Bangkok Times, 3 February 1942

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III. MILITARY CONTROLS

Japan's control of Thailand rests upon military domination. This began 8 December 1941 when, it was reported, fifteen Japanese divisions backed by five hundred bombers entered the country, some to stay, some to go on to Malaya and Burma.

A. MANNER OF SEIZING CONTROL

Thailand's government, commerce, industry, transportation and military command were centered in Bangkok, therefore the Japanese had only to seize the capital in order to control the country. On the night of 7-8 December 1941 a Japanese division landed below the city and moved in, aided, according to a report, by Japanese civilians who received arms for the occasion. European internees reported that the Japanese leaders at once immobilized certain Thai army and air corps units to prevent opposition. The invaders searched the houses and offices of Thai officials, threw guards around foreign business firms and their warehouses, and took possession of airfields and public property.

It became evident at once that the Japanese military dominated the Thai government. On 9 December the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces issued a declaration which revealed that he intended not merely to send troops through Thailand, as agreed, but also to arrest and detain all who were not Thai citizens if he chose to do so. On 10 December the Thai government issued a communique designed to curb public apprehension and resentment, which said,

There is a committee ever present to cooperate with them [Japanese] in a harmonious manner. For the present when no formal agreement exists, there is bound to be some sort of encroachment which all compatriots are requested to overlook. It is advisable that the matter should be left to the members of the committee to settle.... 1/

On 6 January 1942 the Thai Minister of Defense notified the public, "At present the Japanese army is centered in the Kingdom of Thailand to combine with the Thai army for both offensive and defensive purposes. You are expected to respect and refrain from violating Japanese military regulations...." 2/

The Japanese military leaders set up their headquarters in Bangkok's Chinese Chamber of Commerce, stabled their cavalry mounts in the Royal Bangkok Sports Club, quartered infantry in Lumbini Park and in college grounds, and occupied Don Muang airfield, the Bang Sue airplane assembly plant, the National Stadium, and the Sam Sen Rifle Range. Very quickly Japanese troops took up quarters in provincial centers and airfields throughout Thailand, and everywhere they received gifts of food from bewildered Thai officials.

1/ Thai Communique, Bangkok, 10 December 1941

2/ The Bangkok Times, 6 January 1942

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In a matter of days Thai docks, warehouses, railway and river transportation, and the postal and telegraph systems were at the service of the Japanese army, with the Thai government helplessly "collaborating."

B. JAPANESE TROOPS IN CONTROL

At present from twenty to forty thousand Japanese troops are estimated to be on garrison duty in Thailand, enough to guard landing fields and other facilities and to insure cooperation from the Thai army. An attempt has been made to keep Japanese troops in the background because their presence is unwelcome to the Thai. This is difficult in view of the additional troops in transit which use Thailand's railways and stop at temporary camps while en route to Burma and Malaya. No matter how unobtrusive they try to be they nevertheless occupy Thailand and by their presence restrict the freedom of the Thai army, citizens, and government.

Efforts of the Japanese to minimize the presence of their troops in order to lessen Thai irritation have surrounded Japanese officers with more than usual secrecy.

Available names of high-ranking Japanese officers mentioned in connection with the forces of occupation in Thailand are:

Lt. General Aketo Nakamura	Commanding Officer of Japanese troops in Thailand.
Major General Kunitaro Yamada	Second in Command.
Major General Hideo Iwakuro	
Major General Ishida	

C. FORMS OF CONTROL EXERCISED BY THE JAPANESE MILITARY

1. Apparently the Japanese have had little success in controlling the Thai army directly or by means of Japanese officers. The controls have been indirect, such as by intimidation, by withholding materiel such as oil, planes, and munitions, and by negotiations. In connection the Offensive-Defensive Alliance, signed 21 December 1941, the Thai army agreed to defend Thailand's frontiers while the Japanese carried out offensive operations elsewhere. By giving Kengtung and Mongpan states to Thailand in October 1943 the Japanese enlarged Thai defense responsibilities with the result that a large part of the Thai army has had to take up quarters in the north and to face recurrent border attacks by Chinese forces. Moreover, to please the Japanese the Thai have had to increase the size of their army and to call up labor battalions to assist the troops. It was reported that Japanese troops took up positions behind the Thai lines to insure adequate defense of the northern border.

2. The Japanese occupy nearly fifty landing fields in Thailand. Moreover they control many Thai installations and facilities in the process of using them to maintain garrisons, train raw troops, and tranship reinforcements to Burma and Malaya. Thai railways are patrolled, controlled, and used by the Japanese military to the exclusion or severe limitation of Thai civilian traffic. The

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Japanese also occupy the principal docks and many of the larger buildings of Bangkok. They maintain officers' clubs, garrisons, transit camps, labor camps, depots, and prisoner of war camps. Japanese gendarmes and supply organizations control and operate these units independently of the Thai. There is reason to believe that Japanese gendarmes freely made arrests of aliens, principally Chinese, and restricted the jurisdiction of Thai police to supervision of Thai civilians. In Bangkok Japanese officers serve with Thai officers on a joint military court to try cases involving Japanese or aliens.

3. The Japanese army controls certain areas in Thailand completely and has obtained the right to build roads, railroads, and landing fields. In some cases they brought prisoners of war within these areas as laborers. The most notable instance occurred in the rainy season of 1943 when the Japanese used such labor to complete the railroad to the Three Pagoda Pass on the Burma border. The Thai government was unable to exercise sovereignty in this area, hence could do little to help British, Dutch, and Australian prisoners of war who died by the thousands of dysentery, cholera, malaria, and harsh conditions in Japanese construction camps during that period.

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
IV. POLITICAL CONTROL

The pattern of Japanese political control was laid down by Japanese Ambassador Teiji Tsubogami and Thai Premier Pibul Songgram. Collaborationist Pibul and his cabinet were forced to resign 22 July 1944; nevertheless, the succeeding premier, although strongly anti-Japanese, could do no other than affirm that he would keep all existing treaties and agreements with Japan.

A. JAPANESE-THAI RELATIONSHIPS

1. Chart of Governmental Relationships

Political collaboration between officials of the Japanese and the Thai governments is maintained by an organizational relationship which can be depicted thus:



The Japanese ambassador to Thailand has direct access to the Thai premier. The Thai-Japanese Liaison Bureau or Department of Coordination apparently contains army officers with governmental affiliations who are chiefly concerned with cooperation in military matters.

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2. Japanese Diplomatic and Consular Officials

Available names of Japanese diplomatic officials in Thailand: 1/

Ambassador	Kumaichi Yamamoto (appointed August 1944)
Counselor	Ko Ishii
First Secretary	Nobuo Yokota
Intelligence	Reitetsu Iwata
Intelligence	Major General Hideo Iwakuro
Commercial Secretary	Takeo Tazawa
Naval Attache	Captain Shinji Ogura
Military Attache	Major General Kunitaro Yamada
Military Attache	Lieut. Col. Kiyoji Funami
Military Attache	Col. Hiroshi Tamura
Consul General, Bangkok	Minoru Ishikawa
Consul, Pharatabong	Ikusaburo Watanabe
Consul, Chiangmai	Chichiro Harada
Consul, Songkhla	Toshio Katsuno

Teiji Tsubogami was the first diplomatic representative of ambassadorial rank to be sent by Japan to Thailand. He held this post from his appointment in August 1941 until August 1944. On 20 November 1941 he prepared for his future duties by establishing within his embassy the divisions of General Affairs, Intelligence, Political Affairs, and Economics. The following month he set up a Commission for propaganda. As the highest representative of the Japanese government and of Japanese military and economic interests in Thailand, he strongly influenced Thai governmental policies, actions, and statements. It was his custom to hold conferences with the Thai Premier and then to make pronouncements on Thailand's collaboration, both present and future. Tsubogami persuaded the Thai government to acquiesce in the Japanese occupation of Thailand, 8 December 1941; to form the Offensive-Defensive Alliance, 21 December 1941; to declare war on the United States and Great Britain, 25 January 1942; to accept the ten-year Cultural Exchange Pact, 21 December 1942; and to yield to various demands such as the right of Japan to control landing fields and military areas and to build and operate railroads on Thai soil. Ambassador Yamamoto may be expected to follow the precedent set by Tsubogami as far as Thai intransigence and Japan's waning fortunes will permit.

1/ All lists of personnel must be considered subject to error because changes in personnel are made frequently and without wide publicity. A list of other Japanese officials connected with Thailand is given in the Appendix.

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3. Personnel, Thai

a. Staff of the Thai Embassy, Tokyo

Ambassador	Wichit Wichit Wathakan
Counselor	Sanga Nilkamhaeng
Secretary	Chan Samittavet
Secretary	Phian Varanond
Secretary	Charoon Ratanadip
Secretary	Sri Yuvanasiri
Military Attache	Col. Norm Sakda Pholaraksa
Financial Attache	Mom Chao Prasobsukh Sukhevasti
Ass't. Financial Attache	Darun Issarangkul
Supt. of Thai students	Prasert Thumrong Navasavat
Ass't. Naval Attache	Commander Phian Nimnuae
	Wing Commander Korn Kosiyaakat
	Captain Ratanadip
	Lt. Col. To Seniwong
	Suchitr Hiranyapruks
	Chor Chittavet
	Svasti Kanithevast

Wichit Wichit Wathakan, the most pro-Japanese of all Thai officials, took up residence in the imposing Thai Embassy in Tokyo 12 November 1943. During his official visits to Japan in 1941 and again in August 1943 he made addresses flattering the Japanese; later he wrote extensively on Japanese history, and made frequent radio broadcasts praising Japanese friendship and help. He is a poet, novelist, and composer, and a former Director General of the Department of Fine Arts of the Thai Government. Prior to becoming Ambassador to Japan he was Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs. His appointment pleased Tokyo because the Japanese Foreign Office knew him to be their spokesman as well as Thailand's representative. Ambassador Wathakan's position is strategic in the control of Thailand because he is within call of the Japanese Ministry which dictates Thai Foreign Affairs.

b. The Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Minister	Phya Sisena Sombatsiri
Adviser	H. R. H. Prince Wanwaitayakan
Undersecretary	Siddhi Sayamkar
Chief of Central Division	Thawi Tawetikul
Eastern Political Dept.	Wisut Athayukati
Section of Minister	Kuad Sucharithkul
Chief of Protocol	Riem Virajbhak

Phya Sisena Sombatsiri assumed the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs in August 1944. He was Ambassador to Japan at the outbreak of the war but resigned in January 1942 after the Japanese invasion of Thailand. Although his personal sentiments are anti-Japanese his official attitude toward the Japanese has been correct and conciliatory. He early assured the Japanese

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that he would make no changes in Thailand's foreign representatives and that he would observe existing treaty agreements.

The chief adviser of the Thai Foreign Office is Prince Wanwaithayakan. He is prevented by Thai law from occupying a political post other than adviser because of his proximity to the throne. His ability, training, experience, and interest in diplomacy make him an influential figure. He acted as ex-Premier Pibul's personal representative at the GEA Conference in Tokyo, November 1943, and he has figured prominently in various treaty negotiations. Because of his English education and his background his sympathies were pro-Ally. But thinking that Japan would win, and being an opportunist, he endeavored by speech and action to play Japan's game for Thailand's benefit.

c. The Collaborationist Thai Cabinet

Until 22 July 1944 the more important collaborators with Japan on the Thai cabinet were:

Premier	Marshal Pibul Songgram
Minister of Education	Major General Prayoon Phamon Montri
Minister of Defense	Lt. Gen. Kriangsak Phichit
Minister of Public Health and	
Vice Premier	Lt. Col. Chawengsak Songgram
Vice Premier and Police Chief	Police Major General Aduldet Charat
Minister without Portfolio	Major General Chai Prathipasen

Marshal Pibul Songgram, ideologically in sympathy with the Japanese military leaders, evidently had capitulated to them prior to 8 December 1941. At the hour of the invasion the Premier was elusive and indecisive, but at last appeared and gave the "cease firing" order to the Thai forces. Thereafter he very largely assumed personal responsibility for admitting the Japanese, for the Offensive-Defensive Alliance of 21 December, and for the declaration of war against England and America 25 January 1942. The Japanese continued to make demands upon Thailand through him, and he, using the pretext of a national emergency, assumed more and more dictatorial powers. He compelled the National Assembly to delegate most of its powers to him; he took direct control of the national gendarmerie; and in addition to his responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief he assumed at times the duties of various cabinet posts, such as Minister of Defense and of Foreign Affairs. Pibul struggled with considerable success to maintain Thai autonomy in internal affairs but was forced to yield more and more to Japan's demands for support of her Greater East Asia program. By 1943 Pibul's policy of collaboration and his regimentation had become so unpopular with the Thai that he was able to maintain himself in power only by the use of troops; in July 1944 he was forced out of power by the Thai National Assembly.

B. INDIRECT POLITICAL PRESSURE

The Japanese government has used indirect political means such as conferences, courtest missions, gifts, and decorations in order to flatter and

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indoctrinate the Thai and to evoke from them a greater measure of cooperation.

1. Diplomatic Missions

Ex-Premier Pibul Songgram postponed a visit to Tokyo on the grounds of ill-health, an excuse which the Japanese probably interpreted rightly to mean political insecurity. But Pibul sent such representatives as elder statesman Phya Bahol Balabayuha, Political Adviser Prince Wanwaithayakan, cabinet ministers Wanit Pananonda, Wichit Wichit Wathakan, Major General Thamrong Nawasawat, Lieut. General Kriangsak Phichit, Major General Chai Prathipasen, and various lesser officials on reciprocal good-will missions. Such missions were especially numerous during the latter half of 1943 when Japan felt the need of cultivating Thai respect and cooperation in the interests of Greater East Asia solidarity.

2. Conferences and Tours

The Thai government was constrained to send a delegation of six to the GEA Conference in Tokyo 5-6 November 1943, two representatives to the GEA Press Conference held eleven days later, a number of youths to a GEA Students' Rally held the following month, and two doctors to a GEA Medical Conference in April 1944. Although all Japanese conventions have political implications the GEA Conference of 5 November was the most significant. There the delegates signed the six-point GEA Joint Declaration which committed them to the defense of Japan's GEA Sphere.

Thai government officials visiting Japan have followed a definite pattern of indoctrination. They have been flattered with official dinners, given glimpses of Japan's presses, factories, and military forces, taken to industrial centers in Manchuria, sometimes sent to Manila and Singapore, and then asked for a statement on Japan's resources and leadership to be given to the Domei News Service.

3. Titles and Honors

For the most part Japanese-Thai relations have been carried on with a great show of deference and good manners. An exchange of medals and honors has accompanied official visits and audiences. The Japanese emperor bestowed the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun upon Wichit Wichit Wathakan, Direk Yayanama, and Ex-Premier Pibul, and to Lt. General Kriangsak Phichit he gave the First Order of Merit and the Order of the Sacred Treasure. In return the Thai government presented the Order of Chula Chom Klao to former Premier Tojo, and the Order of the White Elephant and the Order of the Crown of Thailand to members of his 1943 entourage.

4. Gifts of Funds and Territory

The Japanese government has increased Thailand's feeling of obligation by means of expressions of sympathy and by gifts. It reportedly gave 4,000,000

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yen in commodities and 1,000,000 yen in cash to the Thai government for flood relief in the autumn of 1942, and 380,000 yen for air-raid sufferers in the spring of 1944. The Thai government reciprocated by giving an alleged 50,000 baht to the Japanese Red Cross Society and 100,000 baht to Japanese earthquake victims in September 1943.

On 18 October 1943 Japan turned over to Thailand four Malay states: Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, and Trengganu, and two Shan States: Kengtung and Mongpan. Thereafter on formal occasions Japanese officials called attention to Japan's friendship and generosity and implied that Thailand should be duly grateful. Thai expressions of gratitude were restrained because the Thai had seized malarious and unfruitful Kengtung State by their own efforts and because the Japanese in the four Malay States retained the principal railroad and other facilities, bickered over the boundary and the use of Thai currency, and left "Liaison" officers resident in Alor Star, Kota Bharu, and Kuala Trengganu. The Japanese were still in position to exploit the resources of these states while to the Thai fell the responsibility of administering and defending them. Nevertheless Thailand was put under great obligation for this spectacular transfer, a gift which cost Japan relatively little and from which she continues to reap diplomatic returns.

5. Diplomatic Observances of Anniversaries

The Japanese Foreign Office reminds the Thai government of its treaty pledges and of its connections with Japan by means of elaborate state dinners and exchange broadcasts on all anniversaries that serve their purpose. These occasions enable Tokyo spokesmen to express or imply the measure of collaboration they expect of Thailand. For example, the Japanese have attached great importance to 6 June 1944, the Buddhist holiday of Visakha Bucha, and to such anniversaries as 8 December, when Japan entered Thailand, and 21 December, date of the Offensive-Defensive Alliance Pact, to the same date which marks also the ratification of the Cultural Exchange Pact, and to 25 January, the anniversary of Thailand's declaration of war against England and America. Such lesser anniversaries as the date of the founding of the Japan-Thailand Association and the transfer of the Malay States to Thailand also receive recognition. On these occasions the Japanese government endeavors to have the Thai Foreign Office and the Thai Embassy say and do the appropriate things. Any deficiencies are filled in by the Domei reporters. In addition, the Thai Ambassador is asked to attend conferences held by GEA associations to consolidate Japanese control of Asia.

6. Pressure Exerted through the GEA Sphere

Thailand's border "incident" with Indochina was terminated in May 1941 with the aid of Japan. In return for her services Japan assumed the right to move Japanese troops to Thailand's eastern boundary and to manifest a proprietary interest in Thailand's foreign relations. As a result Thailand recognized Manchukuo in August 1941. After the invasion, Thailand recognized the puppet governments of Nanking, Burma, the Philippines, and the provisional government of Free India under Subhas Chandra Bose. In some instances the

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recognition was markedly tardy, and to none of these puppet governments except Manchukuo did Thailand send a Minister.

Japan evidently obtained recognition for these puppet states by a variety of pressures, in part by assuming control over aliens in Thailand. For example, Japan fostered the Free India movement among the Indians of Thailand, brought Indian prisoners of war from Malaya to drill as Free India troops in Bangkok, and encouraged or made it possible for the Indians to give over 180,000 baht to the Thai government and the Thai army "in appreciation of the assistance being extended by the government." It was reported that Japan compelled the Chinese in Thailand to fly the Japanese flag above the main entrance of their houses, and at the same time courted the good will of the Chinese by allowing them to become Japanese subjects and thus escape the legal and economic disabilities which the Thai government had imposed upon them.

By recognizing the puppet governments of the different GEA states Thailand had in effect endorsed Japan's aims for them and placed her own government upon their level. These "independent" governments, by pretending to support voluntarily Japan's GEA program, tended either to isolate Thailand or to compel her to conform to Japan's wishes. Tokyo thus addressed Thailand through spokesmen of other lands.

G. DIPLOMATIC TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THAILAND

Japan's domination of Thailand is disguised as collaboration and given an air of correctness by a series of treaties and agreements which originated in Tokyo. The Japanese have endeavored to allay the fears of the Thai by renewals of their pledge to respect Thai sovereignty, but at the same time they have increased their demands for collaboration by additions to or fresh interpretations of Thailand's formal agreements. To illustrate:

1. By the treaty of 12 June 1940 Japan and Thailand affirmed respect for each other's territories and pledged that neither would assist an enemy of the other. Thus Japan initiated a kind of defensive alliance.

2. Japan mediated the treaty of 9 May 1941 between Thailand and Indochina, and in a protocol inserted Article 2 which reads, "The government of Thailand declares that it does not intend to enter into an agreement or alliance with any third power, whether politically, economically, or militarily, which will be in opposition to Japan either directly or indirectly."

Moreover, the Japanese guaranteed that the provisions of the treaty between Indochina and Thailand would be carried out, and stipulated that any future disputes arising from the treaty between the two countries would be mediated by Japan.

3. In consequence of the Japanese invasion, 8 December 1941, the Thai government formally agreed to Ambassador Tsubogami's demands that the Japanese forces be allowed to cross Thailand.

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4. On 11 December 1941 the Thai government agreed to a ten-year Offensive-Defensive Alliance with Japan whereby the Thai would accord to Japan all assistance politically, economically, and militarily, and in return Japan would respect the independence and sovereignty of Thailand. The pact was signed 21 December 1941. That the provisions of this Alliance compelled Thailand to declare war on Great Britain and the United States is shown by a Japanese communique of 26 January 1941 which reads, "on the 25 January, Thailand declared war on England and America as expected, and this action of Thailand proves to the world that Thailand cooperates with Japan, and that we are unable to conceal our delight and pleasure." In effect the foes of Japan became the foes of Thailand, and the latter became cut-off from diplomatic relationships with nearly all the United Nations.

5. On 17 November 1942 representatives of the Japanese and Thai governments signed an agreement whereby the Japanese would construct a railroad on Thai soil connecting Bangkok with Burma. "Its control and operation upon completion for the time being will be under Japanese military authorities in Thailand in accordance with the spirit of the Japan-Thai joint offensive and defensive pact." When work began, Thailand was unable to interfere with Japan's harsh use of prisoners of war.

6. By the agreement of 20 August 1943 Japan ceded to Thailand the four northern Malay States and two Southern Shan States. This treaty was preceded by Ex-Premier Tojo's assurance on 9 August that "Japan will ever respect Thailand's sovereignty," and his hope "that all Thailanders will exert their utmost efforts ... for the realization of our mutual aims in war." The mutual aims were made increasingly specific.


7. The Joint Declaration signed by Thai representatives in Tokyo 5-6 November 1943 committed Thailand, like Burma and Manchuria, to the defense of the status quo in Asia, which meant Japan's hegemony.

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V. ECONOMIC CONTROLS

Japan prepared to exercise economic control over Thailand long before her occupation of that country, and she explained her invasion on economic grounds -- to bring co-prosperity by ending western exploitation. At present Japan largely determines the nature and extent of Thailand's imports and exports, the development of Thai industries, and the course of Thai fiscal and economic policies.

A. JAPANESE COMMERCIAL EXPANSION

In 1934 there were 256 Japanese males in Thailand. At present in Bangkok alone there are nearly two thousand Japanese, most of whom are agents of importing-exporting firms, or retailers of Japanese goods. It has been reported that Japanese shopkeepers have largely replaced the Chinese and Indians as cloth merchants. Japanese merchants are more than entrepreneurs; they are in large measure agents of their government. A Tokyo broadcast of 14 September 1943 stated that "Japanese immigrants and company employees in Thailand, other than those nominated by the army and certain other organizations, will be selected by the Ministry of GEA Affairs through the Federation of Overseas Immigration Guilds, and certificates will be granted by the army." Thus the economic controls of Japanese merchants in Bangkok reflect the will of their government. Early in 1943 it was reported that most Japanese firms in Thailand had joined Thai branches of the Trade Control Association, one of the official Japanese bodies interested in trade between Japan and the occupied areas.

In Bangkok the merchants are organized into a Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which existed before the war, and a Japanese Traders Association, which was formed 18 March 1942 by forty-one Japanese importers and exporters. Most Japanese banking is handled through the Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd. ^{1/} Old Japanese firms have expanded greatly; the Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha, for example, sent 1,800,000 yen for the construction of a new warehouse in Bangkok, and the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha has made plans for four such buildings. The two companies sent in over one hundred agents to buy rubber alone, and they have enlarged their activities to include the handling of factory equipment and the construction of wooden ships.

These and other companies are linked to the Japanese military and therefore deal in army materials as well as civilian goods. The Nomura East Indies Development Company, for example, provides supplies

^{1/} A partial list of Japanese business firms in Thailand is given in the Appendix.

for the Japanese army in Thailand, and the Kato Industrial Trust Company does the same for the Japanese navy. Japanese military leaders endeavor to obtain from Thailand such commodities as castor oil, alcohol, gasoline (made from rubber), cement, rope, shellac, leather, soap, and canned goods. The Thai government, faced with a shortage of all kinds of processed goods normally imported, fosters the local manufacture of such military and civilian supplies as munitions, yarn, cloth, paper, sugar, matches, nails, tires, shoes, medicines, and small utensils. The quickest way, and in some cases the only way, to get such goods under production, is to order the necessary machinery from Japan through Japanese firms, and to use Japanese technicians to set up and run the factories. Japanese companies that can supply and run factory machinery thus flourish the more as shipping dwindles and the demand for military and civilian goods increases.

B. VARIETIES OF ECONOMIC CONTROLS

1. By Agreements

On 22 April 1942 a Thai communique announced that the Japanese government had proposed and the Thai had accepted an agreement whereby the baht was to be reduced to parity with the yen. This devaluation of the baht by 35.8 percent worked to Japan's advantage. The yen was adopted as the medium for all international payments and Thailand was brought completely within Japan's financial orbit. On 18 June 1942 Japan agreed to lend Thailand 200,000,000 yen for five years at 3½ percent interest in order to bolster Thai currency. Prior to the invasion the Thai government's financial position was sufficiently strong to have been able to pay off its total foreign indebtedness at any time. Six months of war and co-prosperity had emptied the treasury and made Thailand's solvency dependent upon Japan. Nevertheless, despite the official parity of the yen and the baht, the black market exchange gave 61 baht for 100 yen at the close of 1943. At the same time the devaluated baht would purchase but 18 percent of the gold it could buy twenty months earlier.

Following the major financial and trade agreements came a series of lesser ones. For example, there is evidence for believing that Thailand, in the name of joint enterprise, had to relinquish export duties on rice, tin, and rubber to Japan, and waive import duties on Japanese goods other than foods and liquors. Because Thai exports have exceeded imports, there is also reason to believe that Japan has arranged for considerable Thai credits to be held in Tokyo in special yen which are good only after the war.

2. By Force

On the day of their invasion the Japanese entrenched themselves commercially as well as militarily in Thailand by taking over the offices, mills, warehouses, stock piles, and docks of Dutch, American,

and British firms, e.g., the Borneo Company, the Bombay Burma Trading Corporation, Barrow, Brown & Company, the International Engineering Company, Butler & Webster Company, and the Anglo-Thai Corporation. The Japanese also seized the new government dock area of the port of Bangkok, and acquired the use of the Bangkok railway facilities. By landing goods on their own docks the Japanese avoided paying customs fees.

The Japanese obtained ready cash by confiscating the currency in the Mercantile, the Chartered, the Hongkong & Shanghai banks. Furthermore they disrupted Thai currency by providing Thai banknotes without serial numbers, and by forcing the recall of Thai nickel, silver, and copper coins in order to get the metal. The ensuing lack of confidence in Thai currency led people to hoard commodities.

In the Malay territory transferred to Thailand (October 1943) the Japanese retained control of premises and railways, and appointed officials to carry out their wartime economic program.

3. By Control of Shipping

After the invasion Thailand was practically reduced to one customer, Japan. Because the Japanese controlled the railways and sea lanes out of Thailand, the Mitsubishi Company was able to monopolize the export of Thai rice. It was estimated that Japan, granted that she had the tonnage, could use only 13 percent of Thailand's rice available for export, 33 percent of her rubber, and 40 percent of her tin. But Japan's shipping situation has steadily deteriorated, and for this reason she could take even less of Thailand's exports. At the beginning of 1943 the Thai had a million tons of surplus rice and large stock piles of rubber and tin.

By controlling the sea Japan also became Thailand's chief source of processed goods. The Thai are largely dependent upon Japanese industries for clothing, medicines, oil, electrical supplies, machinery — in fact almost everything which requires technical skill to manufacture. Therefore Japan can set the prices and determine the amount of Thai imports. It was reported that the prices on some commodities exported to Thailand were ten times the normal peacetime rate. At the same time Japan has so restricted her exports that Thailand has accumulated a credit balance in Tokyo.

4. By Control of Equipment

The Japanese can control to a large extent Thai military action and Thai industrial production by withholding equipment and dictating the terms of sale. The Thai army is dependent upon Japan for airplanes, gasoline, lorries, ball bearings, batteries, heavy armor, and artillery.

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The navy must look to Japan for practically all replacements from submarines to switches.

Factory machinery and industrial chemicals and explosives must come almost entirely from Japan. The Thai Industry Company, for example, purchased its soap-making machinery from the Mitsui Company; the Thailand Weaving and Spinning Company bought materials from the Kanebo Weaving and Spinning Company, and other Thai mills purchased large numbers of spindles and looms from the Dai Nippon Textile Company. Likewise Japanese companies have set up machinery in Thailand for sugar, rubber, paper, shellac, alcohol, rubber, and caustic soda factories.

5. By Joint Control of Thai Industries

The Thai government consented to collaborate with Japan economically as well as politically. The Japanese have held the Thai to this agreement in the name of co-prosperity, and as a result there is abundant evidence that the Japanese exercise joint control if not full control of many Thai state and private industries. The Thai government could not resist this form of economic domination because Japan had (a) the machinery, (b) the necessary capital, (c) the technical skill, (d) the shipping, and (e) military control. It has been reported that the semi-state Thai Rice Company, capitalized at 10,000,000 yen, the Thai Rubber Company, capital 1,000,000 yen, and the Thai Tin Company are all under Japanese-Thai joint control. At least two joint Japanese-Thai textile companies have been formed, one of which has a capital of 6,000,000 yen. In 1943 a joint-control company was organized to manufacture paper; the Japanese were to furnish machinery to the value of 300,000 yen; the Thai were to put up an equal amount of capital. The Thai Steamship Company of Hongkong, formed in 1943 with a capital of 1,000,000 yen, may likewise be a joint company inasmuch as its sailing vessels are to ply Thai waters.

It should be observed that the Japanese strengthened their economic controls by negotiating with compliant Thai officials, of whom Wanit Pananoda was the most notorious. He was in their pay prior to the invasion and through him the Japanese sold Thailand an oil refinery. After the invasion he became a cabinet minister, head of the foreign Trade Bureau, and Chairman of an Economic Mission to Japan. In the latter capacity he negotiated the 200,000,000 yen loan with Japan. Thereafter he became Deputy Minister of Finance and in this position was able to make commercial deals with the Japanese and to secure for himself such offices as manager or director of the semi-Japanese Thai Rice Company and Thai Rubber Company. He exercised additional power as chairman of the board of directors of the Bank of Thailand. The Japanese lost their key financial collaborator when he committed suicide 21 May 1944, following his arrest on charges of

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illegal transactions in gold bullion. At his death, Japanese assistant managers may have risen to full control of the companies he directed.

Another form of Japanese economic entrenchment was indicated in a report of July 1943 that "Mitsubishi wishes to invest more money in Thai government bonds than the Thai government approves."

6. By Control of Railways


The Japanese control most of Thailand's railways and rolling stock and have restricted their use largely to military traffic. By so doing they have imposed a kind of control or limitation upon Thai economy. Internal trade in Thailand languishes and farm products perish because freight cars have been taken over by the Japanese. It has been reported that Thai river steamers and launches also have been appropriated by the Japanese military. Traders in the canal-laced delta area around Bangkok would be seriously affected by such a move. Shortages which result from inability to move goods from areas of production have been aggravated by Japanese purchases of food, medicines, and various commodities for the army of occupation and their labor battalions. Expenditures for such purchases where shortages exist have greatly increased inflation in Thailand and further upset its economy.

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VI. CULTURAL CONTROLS

A. CULTURAL CONTROLS TO AID MILITARY CONQUEST

The Japanese attempted to shape public opinion in Thailand for nearly a decade before the military invasion, 8 December 1941. Their technique involved the employment of Japanese political agents, journalists, artists, educators, technicians, and religionists who visited Thailand singly or in good-will missions, and the use of films, the press and radio, and various Japanese-Thai societies and groups meant to bring about a political, educational, and cultural rapprochement. To influential Thai, especially young journalists, they gave conducted tours of Japan with much attendant publicity.

In one sense the three thousand Japanese in Bangkok on invasion day were all cultural agents prepared to sell collaboration and coprosperity to the Thai. Among them was Prof. T. Byodo, of the Japanese Language School, who backed up the Japanese troops by saying:

"My dear Thai comrades should realize that the Japanese and Thai belong to the same nation, and hence it is necessary that they should share each other's sorrow and happiness....All my Thai friends....should adhere to the wise teaching of Buddha, 'Be satisfied with your lot'....The Japanese army at present in Thailand is made up of those who have left their homes for a considerable time past and hence they cannot be expected to be too clean or tidy....All these soldiers have been selected men who have received good education all of them, while all of them are Buddhists as well. That being so you should evince no fear against these men at all. It is because you are not able to converse with them through the common ignorance of each other's language that you are liable to misunderstand one another on certain occasions. Now that you know the truth you are requested to forgive some of the shortcomings of the Japanese troops henceforth."^{1/}

Japanese propaganda was designed to continue after the military invasion and to result in the final cultural assimilation of the Thai. Since 1941 Japan has vigorously pushed her cultural penetration. As a result many Japanese ideas and social patterns may remain in Thailand long after their authors have been expelled.

B. THE TREATY BASIS OF CULTURAL DOMINATION

The Japanese considered their culture program for Thailand to be of sufficient importance to warrant a formal treaty. The Japan-Thailand Cultural Agreement was accordingly prepared in Tokyo, signed by officials of both countries 28 October 1942, and ratified by Thailand 21 December 1942. This pact has had the effect of strengthening and legalizing the existing campaign of cultural penetration. The agreement is to remain in effect for ten years, or longer if desired. Most of the fourteen articles are detailed and specific regarding the types of cultural activities to be promoted, and the manner of

^{1/} The Bangkok Times, 24 December 1941

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their support; for example, each country is to supply the other "in as large quantities and as frequently as possible" publications, films, photographs, and musical scores. They shall exchange, send, or invite research workers and students, and shall establish scholarships for these. 1/

Itaro Ishii, former Minister to Thailand, stated that this treaty is "very comprehensive and effective." It requires Thailand to repeat Tokyo Broadcasts, to grant facilities for an unspecified number of Japanese agents, and to assist in the display or utilization of unlimited amounts of propaganda material so long as the term "culture" is used. That Japan interprets "cultural exchange" to mean a one-way transaction is evidenced by the Tokyo broadcast on Thai National Day, 24 June 1944. It announced that on the second anniversary of the treaty a 5,000 yen prize would be given for the best essay on the subject "The Mission of Japanese Culture." The contest would be held in Japan and sponsored by the Society for International Cultural Relations and by the Thai Embassy. The prize money may have come from the Japanese government's appropriation for "cultural education," an item in the national budget which amounted to 150,000,000 yen in 1943.

C. JAPANESE ORGANIZATIONS PROMOTING CULTURAL PROPAGANDA AMONG THE THAI

1. Organizations in Japan

Many associations and agencies have been organized, solely or in part, to influence Thai visitors and students in Japan, or to spread Japanese culture in Thailand by means of emissaries, radio, and press. The following list is suggestive rather than exhaustive. 2/

- a. The Japan-Thailand Association (Nippon Tai Kyokai)
- b. The Japan-Thailand School (Nittai Gakuin)
- c. The Tokyo Bureau of Thai Information (Tai-shitsu Tokyo Jinukyoku)
- d. The Tokyo Institution of International Students
- e. The Resident Students Housing Society
- f. The International Buddhist Association
- g. The GEA Bureau of the Dai Nippon Buddhist Association
- h. The Society for International Cultural Relations (Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai)
- i. The Southern Science Research Society
- j. The Greater East Asia Science and Education Liaison Council.
- k. The Association for the Promotion of Friendship and Amity within GEA
- l. The Music and Culture Association
- m. Overseas Educational Association

A glance at the activities of the Japan-Thailand Association indicates the general purpose and functions of all of them. This organization, established in Tokyo in 1927, by 1939 had a membership of two hundred. Its object is to

1/ See Appendix for a complete text of the Treaty.
2/ See Appendix for list of prominent Japanese officials who have fostered cultural relations with Thailand.

promote cultural and economic relationships between Japan and Thailand. Its activities are listed as: the investigation of conditions in Thailand, research on economic relations between the two countries, arranging the exchange of students, directing sight-seeing and inspection tours, managing living quarters for Thai students, and publishing books and periodicals. Men like Prince Fumimaro Konoye, Marquis Yorisada Tokugawa, and Viscount Nagakage Okabe, the principal officers, gave prestige to the organization and enable it to extend hospitality to visiting Thai dignitaries.

2. Japanese Organizations in Thailand

The principal organizations for spreading Japanese cultural ideas in Thailand are, the Japanese Cultural Institute, the Japanese Language School, and the Japan-Thailand Association. 1/

a. The Japanese Cultural Institute, in Bangkok (Nippon Bunka Kaikan)

This active institution, with a staff of thirty or more directed by Ken Yanagizawa, was opened 29 September 1942, a month before the Cultural Relations Treaty was signed. Immediately upon the ratification of the treaty, 21 December 1942, Tokyo broadcast that the Japanese government had allotted nearly 3,000,000 yen for the exchange of culture with Thailand. The following year the Japanese announced plans for a 3,000,000 yen cultural center in Bangkok which was to be patterned after the oldest temple in Nara and to be completed by the end of 1944.

Japan's war reverses evidently hampered construction but did not end the cultural program. As an earnest of Japanese intentions, 350 leading figures in Tokyo's official and cultural circles attended an exhibit of architectural drawings at the Peers' Club, 29 May 1944. His Imperial Highness Prince Takamatsu, Count Chisuke Kibiya, Viscount Tadashiro Inouye, Ex-Minister of GEA Kazuo Aoki, and Ex-Minister of Education Nagakage Okabe were among those who viewed the prize-winning design for a 7,000,000-yen Cultural Institute to be erected on a twelve-acre site in Lumpini Park, Bangkok. The Library of this Institute was formally opened in August 1944.

Director Yanagizawa indicated the purpose of the existing Institute in a broadcast on 11 November 1943 entitled "The Cultural Relationship between Japan and Thailand." He said:

"Because the cultural relationship among the nations of the GEA sphere are not yet well established, these nations must cooperate. Our ties must not be political and economic alone, but also spiritual....There is no country like Japan which has digested all the cultures of the world and made them her own...she adopted the cultures of others but was not influenced by them. Only Japan could do this....The cultural relationship between

1/ See Appendix for names of cultural agents

Japan and Thailand is being promoted at the moment. The government is willing to spend several tens of thousands of yen in this undertaking, which indicates Japan's sincerity of motive....Asia is for the Asiatics and our mission is to find the right path for Asiatic culture."

b. The Japanese Language School

The Japanese Language School was probably the first organization to inculcate Japanese ideas on a full-time basis in Bangkok. Prof. T. Byodo and his staff held graduation exercises in March 1942 for those who had finished the three-year course. The school reported more than five hundred pupils studying Japanese at that time. The Japanese failed, however, in their efforts to substitute Nipponese for English in foreign language courses in Thai middle schools.

c. The Japan-Thailand Association (175 members, 1941)

This organization arouses little enthusiasm among the Thai. It was set up to please the Japanese and it carries on a perfunctory social program under Japanese prodding.

D. OTHER JAPANESE CULTURAL AGENTS AND EXPEDIENTS

1. Newspapers, Periodicals, and Books

In Bangkok the Japanese publish the Chung Yuan Pao — one of the two Chinese dailies — and the Bangkok Nippo, a Japanese daily. In addition they exercise surveillance, if not control over one or more Thai newspapers.

Two thousand copies of the Japanese periodical Japanese-Thai Culture are sent to Thailand. In addition Japanese-Thai dictionaries and conversation books are published. The International Buddhist Association announced in December 1941 that it would send the Thai government five thousand copies of Special Traits of Japanese Buddhism by Dr. Yoshiteru Yakabi.

2. Conferences

By means of conferences not primarily political the Japanese have indoctrinated Thai delegates along with chosen representatives of other GEA lands. For example, on 13 December 1943 Tokyo broadcast that 1,500 students from various countries of Greater East Asia including Thailand attended a GEA Students' Rally. This was in keeping with an earlier announcement that the Dai Nippon Youths Association would engage in "systematic guidance of the GEA youths."

A GEA Press Conference attended by eighty-two editors and journalists was held in Tokyo, 17-19 November 1943. Thailand sent two delegates, one of whom was chosen to sit as a director on the board of the newly formed GEA Press Federation. The chairman of the board was Tokichi Tanaka, former president of the dissolved Nippon Press Association. The first duty of the delegates was to

publicize the Joint Resolution of the GEA Conference, 5-6 November. Thereafter they were given extended tours of Japan and conquered territories, so arranged as to guide their impressions and viewpoint.

3. Exchange Students

In February 1942, eight months before the Japan-Thailand Cultural Treaty was signed, Yasukishi Yatabe negotiated an agreement with the Thai government whereby five students were to be exchanged "for the enhancement of the cultural understanding between the two countries." In April 1942 two Japanese students were appointed to Thailand on an allowance of 250 baht per month from the Thai Ministry of Education, and soon after three more exchange students from Japan were named.

But the Japanese are more interested in attracting Thai students, especially sons of officials, to their own institutions such as the Peers' School. In August 1943 Tokyo reported 156 Thai students in Japan. Much publicity attended the arrival of each Thai contingent: what they saw en route, their trip past the Imperial Palace to bow from afar to the Emperor, the manner in which they were cared for by Cultural Clubs, International Students Clubs, and Japanese officials, and how they were received in private homes. In a weekly program Domei radio broadcasts personal greetings from Thai students to relatives in Thailand. To illustrate the use made of students to influence relatives — Tokyo radio announced that two films depicting the Japanese as seen through the eyes of GEA students in Japan would be distributed throughout Asia.

4. Japanese Buddhists

The International Buddhist Society announced a decision to establish a publication in Bangkok "in order to promote the interchange of Buddhist culture between Japan and Thailand." From Hibiya Hall, Tokyo, the Society broadcast an elaborate Buddhist program to Thailand, Burma, and India in order to create "a feeling of international unity among the nations where Buddhism is the form of religion." As a bid for Thai good will the Society gave seventy copies of the Buddhist Tripitaka in Japanese to Thai Ambassador Wichit Wathakan, and it presented a decoration, "The Supreme Suture of Buddhism of the South," to Thamrong Nawasat, former Minister of Justice.

The Dai Nippon Buddhist Association has furthered a program of cultural indoctrination by sending monks to Thailand "to propagate the introduction of Japanese Buddhism." Soon after the invasion of Thailand the Japanese military placed soldiers of the Buddhist faith in Bangkok monasteries as monks or novices. Twelve Japanese soldiers were reported to have been sent to the Bangkok Temple of Wat Suthat and twelve to Wat Pho.

In June 1943 the Dai Nippon Buddhist Association sent four monks led by Baron Koji Kibe on a good-will mission to Thailand. There they received a gift of some relics of Buddha. The fragments of bone were taken to Japan and enshrined at the Toshogji Temple, Tokyo, to the accompaniment of considerable publicity. Thereafter, the Tokyo radio broadcast to the Thai careful descrip-

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tions of the homage paid the relics at the time of state and religious festivals. Even the Japanese Emperor wrote "letters of respect" to be read before the shrine. The Dai Nippon Buddhist Association, moved by this gift from the Thai, decided to build a Buddhist Hall and a five-story pagoda at the Japanese Cultural Institute in Bangkok. As a final gesture of amity, the Japanese deferred to Thai opinion in choosing the date of Visakha Bucha (6 June 1944), and on that day joined with the Thai ambassador in celebrating this holiest of Buddhist anniversaries.

5. Japanese Residents in Thailand

Japan's cultural program receives considerable indirect support from Japanese residents in Thailand such as merchants, officials, and professional men, together with their families. The Japanese Cultural Institute and the Japanese Embassy can count on them to attend all official functions and ceremonies, to display Japanese posters and flags, to hold parades—the men as members of the Reservist Association, to distribute Japanese literature, to exemplify Japanese culture at home and at Shinto Shrines, and to express Japanese thought at teas, dinners and entertainments.

This demonstration of the Japanese way of life, made with a conscious purpose, is to the Thai informative if not appealing. Its influence is over and above the political and economic influence which Japanese diplomats, bankers, and shippers exert upon Thailand during the ordinary conduct of affairs.

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VII. ESTIMATE OF THE SUCCESS OF JAPANESE AIMS IN THAILAND

A. JAPAN'S SUCCESS IN USING THAILAND AS A MILITARY BASE

1. Facilities.

The Japanese have succeeded in making Thailand a base for military operations in Burma and for carrying supplies to Malaya. As her shipping is driven from the seas Japan is more and more dependent upon Thai railroads to carry materiel and troops from Indochina to ports along the Indian Ocean. So dependent is Japan upon this overland route that she built two additional lines, one across the Kra Isthmus and one across the mountains to Burma, connecting Bangkok with Moulmein. Thai ports, rivers, and highways are likewise used by the Japanese military. They find Thai airfields especially valuable as bases for servicing and regrouping aircraft used in Burma. In addition the Japanese have drawn large supplies of food and some materiel from Thailand for their garrisons and their troops in the field.

2. Thai Military Co-operation

On the other hand, the Japanese have received practically no support from the Thai navy and air force and very little from the army. Thai troops have undertaken to defend the Kengtung border against the Chinese, but they have not done so in the spirit or with the intention of fighting Japan's war. In fact the Thai army has reacted so coolly to Japanese overtures and aims, and has shown such indifference to sabotage directed toward Japanese communications and installations that the Japanese had to take over control of Thai railways, and request the right to increase their garrison troops from ten thousand to fifty thousand. Of late Japan has decreased the equipment furnished the Thai army and has increased her suggestions that Thailand prosecute the CEA war more vigorously. The Japanese evidently fear that the unresponsiveness of the Thai military will in time develop into open hostility directed against them. If that time comes Japan will be faced with the alternative of relinquishing Thailand without a struggle, thus giving up a base of great strategic importance, or of fighting the Thai and by so doing lose yet more goodwill on the continent of Asia.

B. JAPANESE POLITICAL SUCCESS

In spite of the protests and even the resignations of a few cabinet members, the Pibul Songgram government acquiesced in Japan's demands for entry into Thailand and signed the Offensive-Defensive

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Alliance Japan presented. Thereafter it adopted a pro-Axis policy in the belief that Japan's power in Asia was supreme and would be likely to continue so, and that it was to Thailand's best interests to collaborate. But the Thai government never gave Japan the full cooperation she desired; although it yielded to Japan on foreign affairs it contrived to retain control of Thailand's internal administration. The high point of Thai collaboration was probably reached in November 1943 after the transfer of Shan and Malay territory to Thailand, and after the impressive GEA Conference in Tokyo which secured the adoption of the Joint Resolution signed by the puppet governments of Asia.

But privately the majority of the Thai people, including the officials, remained anti-Japanese and totally unreconciled to the invasion of their land, Japan's successive naval defeats and the fall of Mussolini shook the confidence of the Thai government as well as of the people in the wisdom of a pro-Japan policy. Pibul Songgram became increasingly unpopular because of his appeals for closer collaboration with Japan and because of his totalitarian rule. On 22 July 1944, following the fall of the Tojo cabinet in Japan, the Thai National Assembly overthrew the Pibul government by an adverse vote on a domestic issue. On 29 July the Assembly replaced Premier Pibul with strongly anti-Japanese Kuang Aphaiwong, who thereupon formed a cabinet of officials who shared his political views. At the same time vacillating Prince Aditya resigned from the Council of Regency of which he was head. This left able Pridi Phanomyong (Luang Pradit Manudharm) the sole regent and power behind the cabinet. He had resigned from the Pibul cabinet in December 1941 rather than approve the alliance with Japan, and he had steadfastly refused to collaborate with the Japanese by accepting a political post thereafter. The Assembly representatives effected this change of government by constitutional means and they acted within their treaty rights; nevertheless they exhibited unexpected boldness in overthrowing the militaristic, Japanese-sponsored Pibul regime and setting up in its stead a civilian, democratic, liberal government made up of officials of known anti-Japanese sympathies.

Because the Japanese dominate Thailand militarily the new Thai government must observe existing treaties and meet most of Japan's demands, lest the Japanese take over the administration of Thai civil affairs. The Japanese wish to avoid this contingency, not only because they are hard-pressed elsewhere and short of administrators, but also because they do not want a break with the only non-puppet government in eastern Asia. So they tolerate the change of government although it constitutes a political defeat for Japan; they know that the Thai people through their representatives replaced officials who collaborated with Japan from policy with those who collaborate from necessity. Japan has attained her political goals in Thailand, but her political controls

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will last only so long as her imperial troops can dominate the Thai army.

C. JAPAN'S COMMERCIAL GAINS

Japan profited most from her monopoly of Thai exports and imports during the year 1942 when her shipping was as yet little impaired by the war. Thereafter Japan's commercial gains were in nature of increasing control over Thai industries by direct ownership or by joint-company arrangements. In some respects Japan's economic domination of Thailand is more sinister than her military or her political control.

But it should be borne in mind that Japan's commercial gains in Thailand do not represent an ideological or spiritual victory. Those Thai who have collaborated commercially with the Japanese have done so for reasons other than sentiment. Patriotic Thai must view with alarm Japan's financial, commercial, and industrial entrenchment which has been planned as no temporary expedient but for all time.

The Japanese will evidently retain a strong economic hold upon Thailand even after the War unless excluded by discriminatory legislation.

The treaty of March 1938 gives them permission to own, lease and occupy houses, factories, warehouses, and shops in Thailand, and to lease land for commercial, industrial and other lawful purposes. Other nations have similar commercial rights but most of them do not have Japan's advantages of cheap labor and proximity to Thailand. In the post-war period, Thai industries, although government-fostered, will not be able to exclude Japanese goods by open competition. Over-populated Japan will be able to put into manufacturing and trade a range of skills and an amount of sweatshop labor impossible for the Thai to equal. The Japanese firms which leave Bangkok with the retreating army may return to their holdings after the war, and Japanese shipping, unhampered by submarines, bring manufactured goods to Thailand and take away raw materials in much the way envisaged in plans for Greater East Asia co-prosperity.

The new Thai government which came into power in August 1944 has proclaimed a policy of fostering private ownership of industry and commerce. If this is done, the dissolution of semi-state monopolies and companies set up by the Pibul government may make it easier to loosen Japanese monopolistic controls in Thailand by legal rather than by violent means.

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D. JAPAN'S SUCCESS WITH CULTURAL PENETRATION

Japan has made a serious effort to indoctrinate the Thai with her culture and to win their respect if not their affection. In this attempt Japan has spent large sums of money on propaganda through her embassy and her Cultural Institute in Bangkok, in relief funds and gifts to gain goodwill, on conducted tours, and on radio programs. A few Thai hirelings have assured radio audiences that the Japanese are men of superior virtues and abilities, that they are altruistic, that they are true Buddhists, and that they will be victorious. One of the most blatant commentators attempted to introduce a Shinto concept by praying that the souls of dead Thai heroes might protect Thailand, and utter impossibility according to the strict tenets of Thai Buddhism.

But in spite of Japan's best efforts at cultural penetration her efforts seem to have had no more success in Thailand than elsewhere in the regions mentioned by a Mainichi editorial writer:

"It cannot be said that the cultural enlightenment of the southern regions has reached a satisfactory point...No matter how we have striven so far in this respect, our cultural activities, especially in the southern regions, are only a beginning."

Japanese cultural agents were up against the almost insuperable barrier of Thai animosity resulting from Japanese aggression. The efforts of the Japanese to absorb Thailand culturally seem to have backfired and to have stimulated counter-measures on the part of the Thai. The Pibul government organized the Institute of National Culture and through it launched a Thai culture program designed to stimulate patriotism, racial consciousness, and solidarity, and to preserve Thailand's history, language, customs, and religious faith.

In general the Thai are attracted to whatever is new and they quickly adopt that which they deem useful, whether it be ideas, customs, gadgets, medicines, or modes of dress. Therefore it is highly probable that they will continue to use certain ideas, techniques, and goods from Japan just as they have done from other lands. European dress, for example, has long been the approved grab for Thai men and women. But it is extremely unlikely that the Thai will adopt Shintoism, or a Japanese form of Buddhism, or in any way identify themselves with Japan's culture or dreams of empire in the days to come.

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IX. APPENDICES

A. Japanese Officials and Officers

Japanese officials whose responsibilities are or have been connected with Thailand and whose names received mention as persons of influence:

Aoki, Kazuo, Ex-Minister of GEA Affairs, who seeks to strengthen Thai collaboration.
Asada, Shunsuke, First Secretary to the Japanese Embassy in Thailand, 1942.
Hirota, Koki, special envoy to Thailand, June 1942.
Ikeda, Shoichi, Lt. Col., Assistant Military Attache, 1942.
Inouye, Vice Admiral, on mission to Thailand, 1942.
Iwata, R., Embassy Spokesman, 1942.
Katayanagi, Interpreter, 1942.
Kimura, Saburo, brought the Cultural Pact from Japan to Thailand for signature, 16 December 1942.
Moriya, Seiji, Col., Military Attache in Bangkok, 1942.
Nakamura, Aketo, Lieut. General, acting Ambassador to Thailand during Tsubogami's absence in 1942.
Okamoto, Lt. General, on mission to Thailand, 1942.
Oki, Takeo, Counselor at Manchurian Legation in Bangkok, 1944.
Sankonji, Naomasa, Rear Admiral, Naval Attache in Thailand, 1943.
Shigemitsu, Mamoru, Foreign Minister, dominates the Thai Foreign Office.
Shiragai, Jiro, Major, Assistant Military Attache, 1942.
Takasuka, Tadao, Naval Attache, 1941-42.
Tanaka, Third Secretary to Embassy, 1942.
Tojo, Hideki, Ex-Premier, visited Bangkok 3-4 July 1943 and proposed the transfer of four Malay States and two Shan States to Thailand.
Torigoe, Shinichi, Capt., Naval Attache.
Tsukada, Osamu, Lt. General, visitor, 1942.
Tsurumi, Ken, Consul-General, 1942.
Yamashita, Chairman of the Southern Boundary of Thailand Commission, 1943.
Yano, Makoto, Chief of the Thai-Indochina Border Demarcation Commission, 1942.
Yasusato, Futami, Minister, 1942.
Yatabe, Yasukichi, former Minister to Thailand.

Japanese Officers:

Chida, Major
Funami, Kiyoji, Lt. Colonel
Iino, Matsuichi, Major

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Kobayashi, Colonel
Matsumoto, H., Colonel
Mori, Lieutenant
Nakata, S., Colonel
Obata, Colonel
Ogura, Shinji, Captain
Sakata, Colonel
Tamura, Hiroshi, Colonel
Tanaka, H., Lieutenant
Yamamoto, Colonel

B. Japanese Commercial Agents and Agencies in Thailand

1. Commercial Clubs

a. Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry
(in existence before 1941)

K. Setoya, President
A. Hidaka, Director
Y. Kato, Director
J. Moritani, Director
M. Umemoto, Director
E. Yasuda, Director

b. Japanese Traders Association (organized 18 March 1942 by 41 Japanese importers and exporters)

Shunsuke Otada, President^{1/}

2. Business Firms and Agents

a. Principal Pre-war Companies

Ataka & Co., Ltd.	M. Ikejiri, Ltd.
Dai Nippon Koku Kaisha, Ltd.	Y. Kojima, Supt. K. Shibata, Ass't. Supt. K. Shimada, Ass't. Supt.
Daido Boeki Kaisha, Ltd.	Y. Kato, Mgr.
Y. Ebata & Co., Ltd.	Y. Ebata, Prop. S. K. Ebata, Mgr.
Hidaka & Co., Ltd.	H. Hidaka, Mgr. K. Kashimoto, Ass't. Mgr.

^{1/} The names of commercial agents here mentioned came from a source dated 1941.

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Hosho Yoko, Ltd.

K. Nakamizo, Mgr. Prop.
S. Miyaichi, Ass't. Mgr.

Itochu Sheji Kaisha, Ltd.

M. Umemoto, Mgr.

C. Iteh & Co., Ltd.

Iwai & Co., Ltd.

Kanebo Service Co., Ltd.

J. Moritani, Mgr.

Marine and Fire Insurance
Companies (eight firms)

Mataichi Kabushiki Kaisha

Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha, Ltd.

Yoshiji Mita, Mgr.
M. Kawabe, Ass't. Mgr.
H. Kawai, " "
S. Mori, " "
K. Takeshita " "

Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, Ltd.

T. Takahashi, Mgr.
S. Isobe, Ass't. Mgr.
S. Kotani, " "
K. Mano, " "
E. Yasuda, " "

Nanyo Soko Kaisha, Ltd.

S. Ueno, Mgr.
M. Sato, Ass't. Mgr.

Nippon Menkwa Kabushiki
Kaisha, Ltd.

S. Uyeda, Mgr.

Okura & Co., Ltd.

B. Saga, Mgr.
Bompei Uchigaki, Ass't. Mgr.

Osaka Shosen Kaisha, Ltd.

K. Setoya, Mgr.

Otani & Co.

C. Otani, Mgr., Partner
K. Miyakawa, Mgr.

Yokahama Specie Bank, Ltd.

J. Fukuda, Mgr.
K. Masaki, Ass't. Mgr.
S. Watanabe, " "
S. Tsuboi, " "

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Yoshido Yoko, Ltd.

T. Sunaga, Mgr. Prop.
M. Okuda, Ass't. Mgr.

b. Some Japanese Firms Mentioned Since the Invasion

Asano Bussan, Ltd.
Dai Nippon Textile Co.
Dainankoshi
East Asia Sea Transport Co.
Itoh Kanzo
Iwasaki Petroleum Co.
Kanematsu Co.
Kato Industrial Trust
Kita Trading and Industry Co.
Nazaki, Ltd.
Nichimen Co.
Nippon Menka
Nippon Yusen Kaisha
Nishimaki
Nomura East Indies Development Co.
Nozaki Co.
Saito Marine and Insurance Co., Ltd.
Sanko Co.
Tazuko Co.
Toya Menka Co.

c. Agents Promoting Japanese Propaganda in Thailand

The following fragmentary list of names indicates in some measure the number of Japanese engaged in influencing Thai cultural and religious thought. For example, the Japanese Cultural Institute in Bangkok was reported to have a staff of thirty, but the names of only three members are available.

1. In Japan

a. GEA Bureau of the Dai Nippon Buddhist Association

Dr. Tetsujiro Inouye President

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b. Japan-Thailand Association (Nippon Tai Kyokai)

Prince Fumimaro Konoye	President
Marquis Yorisada Tokugawa	Vice-President
Viscount Nagakage Okabe	Chairman, Board of Directors
Michiharu Mishima	Managing Director
Chonosuke Yada	" "

c. Japan Thailand School (Nittai Gakuin)

Ex-Premier Pibul Songgram Honorary President

d. Resident Students Housing Society

Viscount Kiyoshige Yoshida Founder

e. Society for International Cultural Relations (Kukusei Bunka Shinkokai)

Professor Noritake Tsuda Writer

f. Tokyo Bureau of Thai Information Office (Tai-shitsu Tokyo Jimukyoku)

Takeo Miyahara Chief of Bureau

g. Tokyo Institution of International Students

H. E. Yasukichi Yatabe (former
Japanese Minister to Thailand) Director

h. Japanese Officials

Eiji Aman	Director of the Board of Information
Koki Hirota	Special Emissary to Thailand
Itaro Ishii	Former Minister to Thailand
Prince Kasato Kasa	Head of the Japanese Cultural Mission to Thailand
Tanizo Koyama	Member of the Diet, visitor to Thailand
Rentaro Mizuno	Chief of the Southern Business Affairs Bureau, GEA Ministry
Mamoru Shigemitsu	Minister of Foreign Affairs
Prince Kosaku Yamada	Member of Japanese Cultural Mission
Mr. Yoshida	Chief of Religious Section of Ministry of Education

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1. Others

Dr. Chuta Ito	Judge of Cultural Hall plans
Sugugi Kugisa	Japanese painter, member of
	Japanese Cultural Mission
S. Matsumoto	Chief Editor, Domei News
	Agency, visitor to Thailand
Dr. Zensetsu Oya	Author of a Nippon-Thai
	dictionary
Yaso Saijo	Poet, member of Japanese
	Cultural Mission

2. In Thailand

a. The Japanese Association

K. Tani	President
Mr. Otani	Chairman of Executive
	Committee
T. Chin	Member of Executive Committee
A. Hidaka	" " " "
K. Mano	" " " "
T. Matsuo	" " " "
Y. Takei	" " " "

b. Japanese Cultural Institute in Bangkok (Nippon Bunka Kaikan)

Ken Yanagizawa	Director
Ekewa Yamada	President
Professor T. Byodo	Director of Japanese
	Language School

c. The Japan-Thailand Association (founded 4 November 1935--
officers in 1941)

Luang Chawengsak Songgram	President
Phra Phiphit Sali	Vice-President
Phra Pramoh Panya	Secretary
Professor T. Byodo (Japanese)	Assistant Secretary
Phra Waiwithikarn	Treasurer

Committee of Seven

Mr. Rokuro Amada (Japanese)	
Captain Phra Chakranukonkit	Recorder of Guests
Ekiyo Hidaka (Japanese)	Librarian
Y. Niiseki (Japanese)	
Y. Nitta (Japanese)	
Major General Phya Aphai Songgram	
Dr. Prawat Transurat	Registrar

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d. Buddhists

Baron Koji Kibe	Head of a group of four priests on
	mission to Thailand

Sankoku Kokei	Priest
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Sasan Kyogo	Priest
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e. Exchange Students

Tochio Abe	from Tohoku University
Jiro Miyake	Osaka Foreign Language School
Yoshio Omori	Kyushu University

f. Journalists and Reporters

Syuji Wakabayashi	Editor-in-Chief, <u>Bangkok Nippo</u>
Mr. Ikuta	Chief Secretary, " "
Mr. Hase	Editorial Staff, " "
Mr. Nishi	" " " "
Mr. Sassamori	" " " "
Mr. Yasatune	" " " "
S. Fujii	Reporter, <u>Asahi Shimbun</u>
Mr. Iriyi	" " " "
H. Kawai	" " " "
Senichi T. Subokawa	" " " "
S. Suzuki	" " " "
Mr. Takase	" " " "
K. Uchiyama	" " " "
J. Oyamatsu	Reporter, <u>Yomiuri Shimbun</u>
Ashiro Satsumi	" <u>Tokyo Nichi Nichi Shimbun</u>
Hidaka Suguira	" <u>Osaka Mainichi</u>
Aastaro Sakai	" " "
Masao Takakura	" Domei
Mr. Umemoto	" "
John Nagahama	Journalist

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D. CULTURAL RELATIONS TREATY BETWEEN JAPAN AND THAILAND 1/
(Signed 28 October 1942)

- ARTICLE I. Cultural Consolidation. The high contracting parties shall endeavor to deepen the mutual knowledge and understanding between the two countries by consolidating the foundation of cultural relations between them and shall collaborate most closely for this purpose in all cultural fields.
- ARTICLE II. Convening of Conferences. The high contracting parties shall from time to time convene cultural conferences for the purpose of deliberation on the progress of the development of the culture of the two countries and shall endeavor to extend assistance to conferences organized for the said purpose.
- ARTICLE III. Development of Institutions. The high contracting parties shall endeavor to establish, maintain and develop institutions contributing to the promotion of culture between the two countries and shall mutually afford every possible facility in respect thereof. The institutions referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include other scientific organizations, institutions, libraries, museums, educational institutions and sanitary institutions for charitable purposes.
- ARTICLE IV. Chairs of Culture. Each of the high contracting parties shall give particular consideration to the establishment, maintenance and development in universities of the country of chairs on the culture of the other. Each of the high contracting parties shall give particular consideration to periodical exchange, sending or inviting professors, scholars and specialists for the purpose of conducting courses or delivering lectures on the culture of the two countries. The high contracting parties shall mutually afford every possible facility for the execution of the provisions in the preceding three paragraphs.

1/ Japan's Program of Cultural Relations, 1942, by Department of State, Division of Cultural Relations, 30 January 1943, p. 39.

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- ARTICLE V. Research Workers. The high contracting parties shall by mutual accord periodically exchange, or shall send or invite research workers, students, and pupils for the purpose of studying the culture of the two countries. The high contracting parties shall endeavor to exchange, send or invite apprentice-students and short-term students.
- Scholarship Funds. The high contracting parties shall mutually afford every possible facility for the execution of the provisions of the preceding two paragraphs and shall give consideration to the establishment of scholarship funds. Each of the high contracting parties shall afford similar facilities to scholars and specialists of the other coming for the purpose of studying the culture of its own country.
- ARTICLE VI. Authors and Artists. The high contracting parties shall encourage the activities of authors, artists and religionists who they deem contributory to promotion of cultural relations between the two countries and shall endeavor to exchange, send or invite such persons.
- Plays, Dances, Music. The high contracting parties shall encourage the performance of plays, dances and music which they deem contributory to the promotion of cultural relations between the two countries and shall endeavor to exchange, send or invite individuals and parties engaged in these pursuits.
- ARTICLE VII. Exchange of Publications. Each of the high contracting parties shall endeavor to supply the other, in as large quantities and as frequently as possible, with publications, cinematographic films, lantern slides, photographs, gramophone records and musical scores of its country which it deems contributory to promoting the mutual understanding and knowledge between the two countries, and the other shall give special consideration as to their preservation, distribution, presentation and exhibition so that these may be utilized effectively in its country.
- Works of Art. The high contracting parties shall exchange lists, publications and works of art of each country deemed to be worthy of being introduced to the other and shall endeavor to introduce and diffuse them by appropriate means.

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Books and Exhibits. The high contracting parties shall endeavor to extend their necessary good offices and assistance for the translation and reproduction of the above-mentioned publications and works of art. Each of the high contracting parties shall endeavor to extend the collection of books and exhibits concerning the other in libraries and museums in its country and shall afford every possible facility to nationals of the other in regard to the utilization of these.

ARTICLE VIII. Organization of Exhibitions. The high contracting parties shall from time to time organize exhibitions for the purpose of promoting the mutual knowledge and understanding of sciences, fine arts and industrial arts of the two countries and shall endeavor to extend the necessary good offices and assistance in organizing exhibitions held for such purpose.

ARTICLE IX. Radio Broadcasts. Each of the high contracting parties shall have radio organizations in its country make periodical broadcasts to the other and shall have them relay periodical broadcasts from the other. Each of the high contracting parties shall from time to time have radio organizations in its country broadcast lectures, entertainments and music concerning the culture of the other.

ARTICLE X. Athletic Contests. The high contracting parties shall endeavor to exchange, send or invite parties of youth and juvenile athletic teams in order to promote amicable intercourse between their nations. The high contracting parties shall endeavor to exchange, send or invite sight-seeing parties and educational tour parties in order to promote the mutual knowledge and understanding of the two countries, and high contracting parties shall mutually afford every possible facility for the execution of the provisions of the preceding two paragraphs.

ARTICLE XI. Cultural Institute. The high contracting parties shall endeavor to establish a cultural institute each in the capital of the other for the purpose of contributing to the promotion of cultural relations between the two countries and every possible facility to the activities of said institutes.

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ARTICLE XII. Cultural Committee. The high contracting parties shall establish a cultural working committee in Tokyo and Bangkok respectively in order to maintain liaison between the two countries regarding the execution of the provision of the present agreement. Diplomatic authorities of the high contracting parties shall decide by mutual accord details concerning the organization and function of said committee.

ARTICLE XIII. Diplomatic Duties. Diplomatic authorities of the high contracting parties shall decide by mutual accord details concerning the execution of the provisions of the present agreement.

ARTICLE XIV. Ratification. The present agreement shall be ratified and the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at Bangkok as soon as possible. The present agreement shall be enforced from the date of exchange of the ratification and shall remain in force for 10 years from that date.

Year's Notice for Abrogation. In case neither of the high contracting parties shall have given notice to the other one year prior to the expiration of said 10-year period of its intention to terminate the present agreement, it shall continue in force until the expiration of one year from the date on which either party shall have given such notice.

Affixing of Seals. In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present agreement and have hereunto affixed their seals. Done in duplicate in the Japanese and Thai languages in Tokyo this 28th day of the 10th month in the 17th year of Showa, corresponding to the 28th day, 10th month, in the 2,485th year of the Buddhist era. Signed. Masayuki Tani
Direck Chayanama. (December 22, F2-4)

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