

RESTRICTED

CT 26 REPORT, COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS

PART V

COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS

Since the operation was hastily organized, and was characterized by speed of execution at the expense of careful planning, most of the faults and failures which occurred can be traced to that cause. Detailed comment is therefore omitted.

Principal faults were:

(a) Lack of adequate information about the objective, including aerial photo coverage, adequate maps, condition of roads, available billets, probable attitude of the natives, etc. This resulted in many last minute changes in plans and consequent confusion.

(b) An excess of supply of heavy weapons, equipment and supplies which were not needed, and a critical shortage of many badly needed items, particularly transportation, complete rations, and personal baggage.

(c) The operation was further handicapped by the continuous transfer of high point personnel to the United States for separation from the service. This stripped the regiment of many of its best and most experienced officers and non-commissioned officers, and caused a constant reassignment of duties at a time of intense operational activity.

The requirement to leave a rear echelon behind, thus separating organizations and individuals from their equipment and baggage was a particular disadvantage in this operation, especially in view of the large number of transfers of personnel. It is recommended that no rear echelon be left behind except in operations of a strictly combat nature, and when there is prospect of an early return to base, or when the rear echelon can follow shortly the advance elements.

CT 26 REPORT, COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS



CT 26 REPORT, APPENDIX NO. 1

File No. 0026A25745  
RESTRICTED (Reduced from SECRET)

CT 26  
In the Field  
2200, 14 September 1945.

Opn Plan )

No. 2-45 )

Map, Chart, Photos: See Annex BAKER (Intelligence) Div Opn Plan No. 25-45.

TASK ORGANIZATION: See Annex ABLE (Task Organization).

1. a. See Annex BAKER, Div Opn Plan No. 25-45, and G-2 Studies and Summaries, as issued.

b. V Phib Corps, consisting of V Phib Corps Troops, 2dMarDiv(Reinf), 32ndInfDiv(Reinf), and 5thMarDiv(Reinf), in conjunction with Amphibious Group Four, will, in operations commencing on "A"-day, land in NAGASAKI-SASEBO area, and rapidly occupy and establish surveillance over the SASEBO area, extending occupation and surveillance to include the NAGASAKI area as troops become available; then on "C"-day, by overland and amphibious operations occupy and establish surveillance over the SHIMONOSEKI-FUKUOKA area, prepared for further operations, in order to assist in imposing on the Japanese Armed Forces and civil population those prescribed terms of surrender requiring immediate military action. The 5thMarDiv(Rein) will:

(1) At NAN-hour on "A"-day land elements of BLT-328 on designated RED Beaches and secure the entrance to SASEBO WAN. Establish surveillance over IORI-SAKI and progressively occupy critical areas controlling SASEBO Harbor and the passage into OMURA WAN.

(2) When the entrance to SASEBO Harbor is secure, and on Division order, land CT 26 on designated GREEN Beaches and secure SASEBO Naval Air Station; then advance that CT rapidly overland and secure SASEBO Harbor and dock facilities and that portion of SASEBO necessary to the uninterrupted landing of the remainder of the Division.

(3) When the SASEBO Naval Air Station and the SASEBO Harbor and dock facilities are secure, land the remainder of the Division in SASEBO Harbor area and secure the remainder of SASEBO and approaches thereto.

(4) Be prepared on Corps order to initiate overland operations to occupy and secure OMURA and approaches thereto, including the OMURA Seaplane Base and Naval Airdrome.

(5) After occupying OMURA, be prepared for further overland operations to occupy and secure NAGASAKI area on Corps order.



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(6) Establish and maintain in assigned area of responsibility surveillance of the armed forces and civilian population and impose thereon the prescribed terms of surrender requiring immediate military action.

(7) At OBOE plus 30 land a Tank Group of 30 tanks on GREEN Beaches to support operations of CT 26.

(8) Be prepared for further overland and short range amphibious operations.

2. a. CT 26 land in column of battalions on GREEN Beaches at OBOE-hour, occupy and establish surveillance over the SASEBO Naval Air Station; send Reconnaissance Det to Aircraft Factory to reconnoiter and exercise surveillance over that area, report result of reconnaissance promptly and remain as security detachment until relieved by 13th Marines; then advance rapidly overland and occupy and establish surveillance over SASEBO Harbor and dock installations within assigned zone of responsibility. Occupy and establish surveillance over the approaches to SASEBO in assigned zone of responsibility. Establish Base of Opn in vicinity of (71.4-14.4). (See Annex BAKER).

b. NAN-hour--0800, OBOE-hour, PETER-hour, to be announced.

"A"-day- -22 September, "C"-day, to be announced.

c. For beaches, objectives, scheme of maneuver, zone of responsibility, billeting area, etc., see Annex BAKER (Operations Overlay).

3. a. LT-226 land at OBOE-hour on GREEN Beaches. Immediately occupy and establish surveillance in accordance with instructions contained in paragraph 3. x. (13) and (14) below, over all installations and buildings as directed in Annex LOVE of 5thMarDiv Opn Plan No. 25-45. Advance along the two main roads leading north from the Naval Air Station and occupy and establish surveillance over other critical areas and installations within the area of responsibility assigned LT-226. (See Annex BAKER).

b. LT-326 land on GREEN Beaches commencing at OBOE/45 minutes. Advance rapidly along the main road leading north from the Naval Air Station (extending from (79.20-08.45) to (79.35-10.50) to (79.55-12.10) ) and into the town of SASEBO passing through elements of BLT-226. Progressively occupy and establish surveillance in accordance with instructions contained in paragraph 3. x. (13) and (14) below, over the gun installations at (76.3-13.2), (76.2-13.1), (76.0-13.2) and (75.8-13.5), the naval installations in the vicinity of the Naval Basin, the Post Office at (77.1-14.1), and other critical areas and installations within the area of responsibility assigned LT-326. (See Annex BAKER).

c. LT-126 lands on order of CT 26 at about OBOE/85 minutes on GREEN



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Beaches. Follow immediately behind LT-326. Progressively occupy and establish surveillance in accordance with instructions contained in paragraph 3. x. (13) and (14) below, over the mine and torpedo storage installations at (78.3-12.2), the railroad yards at (78.3-12.9), the bridges at (77.6-13.4), the Naval Construction Battalion installations at (77.5-13.2), the SASEBO Navy Yard Commandant's Headquarters at (77.1-13.5), and other critical areas and installations within the area of responsibility assigned LT-126. (See Annex BAKER).

d. Reconnaissance Platoon land on GREEN Beaches at OBOE plus 20. Proceed to the aircraft factory at (81.2-10.7) to reconnoiter and exercise surveillance over that area; report results of reconnaissance promptly and remain as a security detachment until relieved by the 13th Marines.

e. Regtl Wpns Co land on Regtl order and support operations ashore as directed.

f. Co "A", 5thEngBn (less 3 plats) land on GREEN Beaches; be prepared to make a reconnaissance of the roads, bridges, and water supply; to repair and improve roads in zone of action of CT 26, and to execute other engineering missions as ordered.

g. 1stPlt, Co "B", 5thMTBn, land on order and support CT 26 as directed.

h. 1stBn, 13th Marines, land on order; be prepared to support advance of CT 26 to SASEBO town.

i. 1stPlt, OrdCo, 5thServBn, land on order at about OBOE/40; be prepared to support operations of CT 26 ashore.

j. Co "A", 3rd MP Bn land on GREEN Beaches on order at about OBOE plus 45, control traffic in Regtl zone of action and perform other duties as directed.

k. Det ASCO land on GREEN Beaches; support operations ashore.

l. Co "A", 5thMedBn will land on Regtl order and support operations ashore as directed.

x. (1) EEI's

- (a) Report conditions of roads.
- (b) Report all means of local transportation.
- (c) Report all arms or ammunition not previously destroyed.
- (d) Determine whether the Japs will passively submit to the



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initial landing of our occupation forces, offering no resistance, or offering disorganized resistance by military and/or civilian personnel in the form of sniping, booby traps, mines, etc., or whether the Japs will oppose our landing and occupation in force will all means at their disposal.

(c) Determine any difference in quality of resistance, active or passive, offered by naval personnel as compared to Army personnel.

- (2) Maintain patrols in zone of action.
- (3) Units report when important operations are initiated and objectives attained.
- (4) All units will be prepared for further operations to seize and occupy NAGASAKI or other critical areas.
- (5) All operations will be planned and conducted in such a manner that forces are constantly prepared for combat in event of a resumption of hostilities, treachery or sabotage.
- (6) Unless directly attacked, no unit or individual will open fire on any aircraft.
- (7) Unit commanders are responsible for the defense and control of occupied areas and installations within their assigned zones.
- (8) All units will enforce passive defensive measures, particularly dispersal of ammunition and Class III dumps.
- (9) Strict fire discipline will be maintained by commanders of all units. No firing will be executed except that requiring such military action in the imposition of the terms of surrender. The gravity of the premature use of fire power in the execution of occupation missions will be impressed on all individuals. Magazines will be filled, chambers empty.
- (10) RCT Commanders only are authorized to issue orders for artillery, tanks, M-7 weapons carriers and 81mm mortars to open fire. BLT COs are authorized to issue orders for 60mm mortar, 37mm guns and small arms to fire. COs of companies making initial landings on Beach RED-1 and Beach RED-2 are authorized to issue orders for opening fire. The above Commanders will not, repeat not, issue orders for opening fire unless his unit is being fired upon or attacked by the enemy, and then only after a thorough investigation of the incident.



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- (11) All commanders will insure that Japanese and friendly stores, installations and equipment are safeguarded against pilfering and looting by members of our forces and by local inhabitants.
- (12) Units report by fastest possible means any hostile use of fire-arms, or organized intervention in accomplishment of assigned missions.
- (13) The following tasks are common to the operations set forth in this plan:
  - (a) Receive the surrender from Japanese forces of all arms, as directed.
  - (b) Supervise the execution of policies relative to Military Government.
  - (c) Supervise the disarmament and demobilization of Japanese Armed Forces in accordance with specific orders to be issued by this Headquarters.
  - (d) Recover, relieve, and repatriate Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees without delay, as directed.
  - (e) Suppress activities of individuals and organizations which may be inimical to the operations and the occupation forces.
  - (f) Be prepared to protect and assume control of Japanese wire and radio communications facilities.
  - (g) Facilitate peaceful commerce, particularly that which contributes to the subsistence, clothing and shelter of the population.
  - (h) Destroy hostile elements which oppose by military action the imposition of surrender terms upon the Japanese.
  - (i) Prepare to impose terms of surrender beyond immediate military requirements as directed.
  - (j) Be prepared to extend control over the Japanese as required to implement the policies for a post-war occupation and government when prescribed.
  - (k) Take active measures to insure that adequate protection is afforded historical, cultural and religious objects and installations; impress all members of their respective .



commands with the fact that profanation of shrines and holy places, even if unintentional, will only prejudice our efforts to achieve a peaceful and firm occupation. The several Imperial palaces and all shrines will be especially protected from harm of any kind.

- (14) In partial implementation of the general missions assigned in paragraph 3. x. (13) above, commanders within assigned zones of responsibility will exercise surveillance over the following Japanese installations:

(a) Military.

1 Military

a. Defense Installations:

- 1'. CD and AA batteries
- 2'. Fortresses
- 3'. Harbor defenses
- 4'. Radio and radar equipment

b. Airfields and airfield facilities:

- 1'. Headquarters buildings
- 2'. Operational aircraft
- 3'. Air dumps, repair facilities, and depots

c. Supply and service facilities including arsenals and ammunition, engineer, QM, and signal dumps.

d. Major headquarters of all Army, Navy and Air units.

e. Residences of high ranking military personnel.

f. Internment camps for Allied PWs and civilians.

g. Headquarters of KEMPEI TAI (Military Police), TOKUMU KIKAN (Army-Navy Secret Intelligence Service), and similar organizations.

2 Civilian:

a. Headquarters of political, secret, and quasi-military societies and organizations actually or potentially inimical to the occupation forces including the following:



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- 1'. KOKURYU KAI (Black Dragon Society)
- 2'. DAI NIPPON SEJI KAI (Greater Japan Political Assn)
- 3'. KOKU SUI-TO (Extreme Nationalist Party)
- 4'. CHIZAKURA (Nationalist Party-Manchuria)
- 5'. NISSHO, and related extremist and terrorist societies.
- 6'. TEHOKU ZEIGO GUNJIN KAI (Imp. Reserve Assn)
- 7'. SOTEI DAN (Union of Able Bodied Men)
- 8'. SHONEN DAN (Youth Assn)
- 9'. SEINEN DAN (Young Mens Assn)
- 10'. Combat Corps
- 11'. Peoples Volunteer Corps
- 12'. GAKU DO TAI (Student Corps)
- 13'. Industrial Patriotic Service Assn.
- 14'. Agricultural Patriotic Service Assn.
- 15'. Patriotic Service Corps
- 16'. Mechanized National Defense Assn
- 17'. Maritime Transportation Total Superintendence Section.
- 18'. Shipping Management Assn.

b. Residences and offices of representatives of the Japanese puppet and subservient governments of:

- 1'. China
- 2'. Manchukuo
- 3'. The Phillipine Islands
- 4'. NEI
- 5'. Burma
- 6'. Siam (Thailand)

3 Critical strategic installations:

- a. Munitions and armament factories, assembly plants and depots.
- b. Governmental and private research and experimental laboratories.
- c. Headquarters of scientific institutions such as:
  - 1'. Technical Boards
  - 2'. Japanese Technical Societies
  - 3'. Science Mobilization Assn
  - 4'. All-Japan Science League

(b) Establish as necessary surveillance over and insure continuance in operation the following installations and instructions:



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1 Government installations:

- a. National government headquarters and buildings.
- b. Local and municipal government headquarters and bldgs.
- c. Police headquarters.
- d. HOKO headquarters (Neighborhood Control Organizations)

2 Transportation:

- a. Railway terminals, yards, stations, and equipment.
- b. Railway and highway bridges and tunnels.
- c. Airfields
- d. Bus transportation system.
- e. Port and shipping installations to include docks and warehouses.

3 Communications (See Annex HOW, Div Opn Plan No. 25-45)

- a. Telephone exchanges
- b. Telegraph and cable headquarters and installations.
- c. Radio stations.

4 Post Offices

5 Newspapers, periodicals, and publishing houses.

6 Public Utilities

- a. Dams
- b. Electric light and power plants
- c. Water plants
- d. Gas lines
- e. Fire fighting services
- f. Sanitation and public health facilities



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- 7 Such other factories, plants, storage warehouses, and similar installations as may be necessary to facilitate peaceful commerce, particularly that which contributes to the subsistence, clothing, and shelter of the population.
- (c) Safeguard, as practicable, all documents, records, materiel and equipment contained within the installations listed in (a) and (b) above, and effect their disposition as directed by G-2.
- (d) Locate and maintain intelligence surveillance over the leaders and key personnel connected with the installations and organizations listed in (a) and (b) above.
- (15) In carrying out the missions assigned in paragraph 3. x. (14) above, Unit Commanders, in their respective areas of responsibility will:
- (a) Be guided by the following general policy:
- The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will issue all necessary instructions to the Japanese Emperor or to the Imperial Government and every opportunity will be given to the Government and the Japanese people to carry out such instructions without further compulsion. If necessary, however, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will issue appropriate orders to his subordinate commanders indicating the action to be taken by them to secure obedience by the agencies of the Imperial Government or Japanese people within the areas of their commands. In other words, the occupation forces will act principally as an agency upon which the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers may call, if necessary, to secure compliance with his instructions to the Japanese Imperial Government.
- (b) Observe the obligations imposed on the occupation forces by international law and the rules of land warfare.
- (c) Take all necessary steps to protect and preserve the records of:
- 1 All governmental agencies and quasi-governmental agencies, particularly records concerning Japanese individuals.
- 2 All Japanese political, patriotic, and secret societies.
- (d) Register all nationals of countries with which any of the United Nations is or has been at War, except Japan and take



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into protective custody the diplomatic and consular officials of such countries. Prompt reports of such action will be made to this Headquarters.

- (e) Register all nationals of neutral countries and afford full protection to the persons, archives and property of the diplomatic and consular officials of such countries.
- (f) Take all necessary steps to protect and preserve the property of the United Nations and their nationals.
- (g) Arrange with the appropriate Japanese officials for the collection of all arms in the possession of the Japanese civilian population and their safe-keeping pending instructions as to their disposition from this Headquarters.
- (h) Identify and collect all property looted from the governments and citizens of any of the United Nations and submit reports thereof to this Headquarters.
- (i) Apprehend and detain, when directed by this Headquarters:
  - 1 The members of terroristic and secret patriotic societies, officially identified as such by the Counter-Intelligence Corps.
  - 2 Persons whose names or descriptions are contained in lists of actual or suspected war criminals.
  - 3 Personnel administering or guarding prisoners of war and internment camps.
- (j) Utilize Japanese military and civilian personnel and agencies to the maximum consistent with prescribed policies.
- (16) All parts of this order not required for operations ashore will be destroyed prior to landing.
- (17) Opn Plans for subsequent overland or amphibious operations will be issued later.
- (18) "A"-day - day of landings in SASEBO area.

NAN-hour - hour of first landings on "A"-day.

OBOE-hour - hour of landing at SASEBO Naval Air Station. To be designated.



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PETER-hour - hour of landing in SASEBO dock area. To be designated by Division.

- (19) This plan effective on Regtl order.
- (20) All vehicles will drive on the left side of the road in accordance with JAPANESE customs.
- (21) Personnel debarking from landing craft will not double time from boats in assault formations unless under fire.
- (22) Tracked vehicles will be run on JAPANESE roads only in case of actual operational emergency.

- 4. See 26th Regimental Administrative Order No. 1-45.
- 5. a. See Annex HOW (Communication), Div Opn Plan No. 25-45.  
b. Command Posts: Afloat:

5thMarDiv	WESTMORELAND (APA-104)
CT 26	GRAFTON (APA-109)
Tk Gp	CALUSA (APA-74)
Spt Gp	WESTMORELAND (APA-104)
5thSPRegt	WESTMORELAND (APA-104)
1stBn, 26thMar	KARNES (APA-175)
2ndBn, 26thMar	GRAFTON (APA-109)
3rdBn, 26thMar	BOWIE (APA-137)
1stBn, 13thMar	FALLON (APA-81)

All units will report to Regiment location of CP's ashore.

- c. Use zone minus nine (I) time, East Longitude Date.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL GRAHAM:

J. P. SAYERS,  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,  
Executive Officer.

ANNEXES: ABLE Task Organization.  
BAKER Operations Overlay.

For information on subjects other than the above refer to the Annexes of Division Operation Plan No. 25-45, shown below:



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ABLE	Task Organization
BAKER	Intelligence
CHARLIE	Naval Gunfire Support
DOG	Air Support
EASY	Operations Overlay
FOX	Embarkation
GEORGE	Landing Diagram
HOW	Signal Communications
ITEM	Landing Schedule
JIG	Password and Countersign
KING	Landing Instructions
LOVE	Concept of Operations Ashore
MIKE	Replacement Plan
NAN	Enforcement of Surrender Terms
XRAY	Distribution

DISTRIBUTION:

CO LT-126	(5)	CO APA-137	(1)
CO LT-226	(5)	CO APA-175	(1)
CO LT-326	(5)	CO AKA-75	(1)
CG 5thMarDiv	(10)	CO APA-81	(1)
CG VAC	(2)	COMTRANSRON	(1)
CG, FMF, Pac	(2)	COMPHIBGP 4	(1)
CMC	(1)	COMPHIBPAC	(1)
COMTRANSDIV 72	(2)	War Diary	(3)
CO APA-109	(1)	CO, 1st SP Bn	(1)
CO, 5thTkbN	(1)	CO, 1stBn, 13thMar	(2)
CO, 1stPlt, Co "B", 5thMTBn	(1)	CO, Wpns Co	(1)
Each LnO	(1)	CO, Staff & Files	(12)
CO, Co "A", 5thMedBn	(1)		

DISTRIBUTION OF ANNEXES OF DIVISION OPERATION PLAN NO. 25-45:

	PA-81	PA-109	PA-137	PA-175	KA-75
ABLE	2	1	1	1	1
BAKER	10	10	10	10	10
CHARLIE	2	15	15	15	1
DOG	10	10	10	10	10
EASY	3	2	2	2	2
FOX	10	10	10	10	10
GEORGE	10	10	10	10	10
HOW	10	10	10	10	10
ITEM	10	10	10	10	10
JIG	10	10	10	10	10
KING					
LOVE	5	5	5	5	5



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	<u>PA-81</u>	<u>PA-109</u>	<u>PA-137</u>	<u>PA-175</u>	<u>KA-75</u>
MIKE	3	2	2	2	2
NAN	2	1	1	1	1
XRAY	2	1	1	1	1

OFFICIAL

*Albert V. K. Gary*  
 ALBERT V. K. GARY,  
 Major, USMCR,  
 S-3.



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RESTRICTED (Reduced from SECRET)

File No. 0026B25745

CT 26

In the Field

2200, 14 September 1945.

ANNEX ABLE to CT 26 OPN PLAN NO. 2-45.

TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) CT 26(-)

Col GRAHAM

H&SCo, 26th Marines  
Co A, 5thEngBn (less 3 plats)  
Co A, 5thMedBn (less 3 Coll Sec)  
Det, 5th ASCO  
Co A, 3d MP Bn  
1stPlt, OrdCo, 5thServBn  
Plt, Co B, 5thMTBn  
WpnsCo, 26thMarines (less M-7 plat)

(b) LT-226

2ndBn, 26th Marines  
2ndPlt, Co A, 5thEngBn  
Det Coll Sec, Co A, 5thMedBn  
Det, 5th ASCO

Maj REA

(c) LT-326

3rdBn, 26th Marines  
3rdPlt, Co A, 5thEngBn  
Det Coll Sec, Co A, 5thMedBn  
Det 5th ASCO

LtCol DAVENPORT

(d) LT-126

1stBn, 26th Marines  
1stPlt, Co A, 5thEngBn  
Det Coll Sec, Co A, 5thMedBn  
Det, 5th ASCO

LtCol POLLOCK

(e) Artillery Group

1stBn, 13th Marines

Maj COADY

BY ORDER OF COLONEL GRAHAM:



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J. P. SAYERS,  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,  
Executive Officer.

DISTRIBUTION:

Same as for CT 26 Opn Plan No. 2-45.

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*for O. P. Sayers*  
ALBERT V. K. GARY,  
Major, USMCR,  
S-3







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1975  
RHW/tbm

HEADQUARTERS,  
27TH MARINES, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,  
IN THE FIELD.

30 November 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.  
To : The Commanding General, 5th Marine Division.  
Subject: 27th Marines Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

1. Forwarded, approved.
2. There was no real planning for the assault of Southern Kyushu, since up to the time of the surrender of Japan only two briefings of regimental commanders had taken place. At the time of surrender, maps were just becoming available.
3. Upon receipt of orders to load out at HILO for occupation duty in Japan, advance details were sent to the dock area as directed. Housing for this personnel was extremely unsatisfactory as were messing arrangements. In addition, very heavy rain, both the night gear was sootied on the dock and the night of loading, added to the unusual confusion.
4. Efforts were made to keep combat gear on the higher levels of the holds, however the loads could hardly be called "combat". All ships, other than the AKA, were loaded in an average of 24 hours. The pressure brought to bear to expedite the loading of ships seems unwarranted in view of the days subsequently lost swinging at anchor in PEARL HARBOR. The trip to SASEBO was uneventful except for numerous changes in orders which were caused by the continuous influx of valuable information. Upon landing, occupation proceeded as scheduled with only one or two isolated incidents.
5. From time to time zones of responsibility were shifted as the situation became clarified and the undersigned believes that all hands accomplished their tasks in an expeditious and completely satisfactory manner.
6. On 21 November, Colonel Thomas A. Wornham, who organized and commanded this organization, was detached on orders from Headquarters, Marine Corps, and on the same date the undersigned joined the organization as Commanding Officer.

*Robert H. Williams*  
ROBERT H. WILLIAMS

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HEADQUARTERS,  
27TH MARINES, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,  
IN THE FIELD.

30 November 1945.

ANNEX HOW TO 5TH MAR DIV OPERATION REPORT, OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

ENCLOSURES: (A) Overlay of original CT-27 Zone of Responsibility (SASEBO).  
(B) Overlay of expanded CT-27 Zone of Responsibility (SASEBO).  
(C) Overlay of CT-27 Zone of Responsibility (KURUME).

APPENDICES: (1) Administration.  
(2) Intelligence.  
(3) Supply and Evacuation.

PLANNING:

Insofar as this regiment was concerned, planning for the assault on Southern Kyushu was never begun, as hostilities ended prior to the receipt of the Division Operation Plan. Planning for the occupation of Japan was begun 19 August upon receipt of information that this regiment would be a part of the occupation forces. Various operation plans were received from Division from time to time giving this regiment its initial zone of occupation and instructions as to how to conduct the occupation. The plan ultimately used and the initial area of occupation finally assigned was received in dispatch form two days prior to landing at SASEBO.

Throughout the planning, battalions and attached units were kept informed as to their part in the occupation as information was received at this headquarters. The final plan called for this regiment to detach a reinforced company from the 1st Battalion, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Donn J. Robertson, as the OMURA Occupation Group. The combat team operation plan called for this combat team to land in the dock area in a column of battalions in the order 1st, 2d and 3d.

TRAINING:

Training of all hands in occupational duties was begun upon departure from the Hawaiian area on 1 September. Training consisted of classes in Japanese words and phrases, customs of the Japanese people, history of the Japanese empire, type of terrain and weather which might be expected, military forces expected to be encountered, intelligence targets known to be located in this combat team's zone of responsibility, and the enforcement of surrender terms.



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ANNEX HOWTO 5TH MAR DIV OPERATION REPORT, OCCUPATION OF JAPAN (Continued).  
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ORGANIZATION:

This combat team was originally organized for the occupation of Japan as follows:

BLT-1/27,

Major Gerald F. RUSSELL

1st Bn, 27th Mar  
1st 37mm Plt, RWpns Co  
1st Plt, "B" Co, 5th Engr Bn  
Coll Sect, "B" Co, 5th Med Bn  
Det ASCO, 5th MarDiv

BLT-2/27,

LtCol. John W. ANTONELLI

2d Bn, 27th Mar  
2d 37mm Plt, RWpns Co  
2d Plt, "B" Co, 5th Engr Bn  
Coll Sect, "B" Co, 5th Med Bn  
Det ASCO, 5th MarDiv

BLT-3/27,

LtCol. George R. STALLINGS

3d Bn, 27th Mar  
3d Plt, "B" Co, 5th Engr Bn  
Coll Sect, "B" Co, 5th Med Bn  
Det ASCO, 5th MarDiv

RCT-27 (-),

Colonel Thomas A. WORNHAM

Hq & Serv Co, 27th Mar  
RWpns Co (-)  
"B" Co, 5th Engr Bn (-)  
"E" Co, 5th Med Bn (-)  
Plat, "B" Co, 5th MT Bn  
2d Bn, 13th Mar  
2d Plt, Ord Co, 5th Serv Bn  
Det ASCO, 5th MarDiv  
"C" Co, 3d MP Bn



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ANNEX HOW TO 5TH MAR DIV OPERATION REPORT, OCCUPATION OF JAPAN (Continued).  
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MOVEMENT TO TARGET (SASEBO, KYUSHU, JAPAN):

Loading of ships began on 23 August and troops were embarked on 25 August. The convoy sailed from HILO, Hawaii, T.H., at 0200, 26 August, and arrived at PEARL HARBOR, Oahu, T.H. at about 1700, 26 August. The convoy departed from PEARL HARBOR, Oahu, 1 September 1945 and arrived at SAIPAN 13 September. Departed from SAIPAN 16 September and arrived at SASEBO Harbor, Kyushu, Japan, on 22 September 1945. JT-27 began debarking in the dock area and moving to initially assigned zone of responsibility the afternoon of 22 September 1945. Debarking of troops was completed 23 September.

OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS:

Immediately upon going ashore, each of the three Battalion Landing Teams proceeded to its assigned zone of responsibility (see attached overlay, marked Enclosure (A)) and placed under surveillance all known Japanese military and naval installations, plus such civil installations as post offices, police stations, telephone exchanges, railroad stations and terminals, etc. From 23 September to 4 October units of this combat team guarded and inventoried Japanese supplies and installations in their assigned zone of responsibility and patrolled the area north and west of the regimental zone of responsibility in search of additional Japanese installations. On 5 October the 2d Battalion, 27th Marines, was detached to Division control and the 27th Marines received an expanded area of responsibility (see attached overlay, marked Enclosure (B)) upon receipt of Division Operation Order No. 37-45. This same date "C" Company reverted to parent control from the OMURA Occupation Group. The period 6 to 21 October was spent in collecting civilian arms and ammunition and in continuing to guard and inventory Japanese military and naval supplies and installations. On 21 October, Division Operation Order No. 40-45 ordered the 1st Battalion, 27th Marines, to assume control of the entire regimental zone of responsibility and detach the 1st Battalion to Division control. The remainder of the 27th Marines, consisting of Regimental Headquarters and the 3d Battalion, was ordered to proceed to KURUME in order to extend surveillance of U. S. Armed Forces over that area, and to assume control of the SAGA Occupation Group and its assigned zone of responsibility at 0800, 25 October. The period 25 October to 23 November was spent patrolling our assigned zone of responsibility (see attached overlay, marked Enclosure (C)) in search of Japanese installations and caches of war supplies. Such Japanese supplies as were suitable for civilian use were turned over to Japanese Home Ministry representatives while such supplies and materiel which were of a strictly military nature were destroyed as rapidly.



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ANNEX HOW to 5th MAR DIV OPERATION REPORT, OCCUPATION OF JAPAN (Continued).  
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as possible. On 17 November 1945, instructions were received to prepare to turn over the regimental zone of responsibility to relieving Army and Marine units upon receipt of Division order. This was accomplished on 25 November, at which time the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, assumed responsibility for that part of SAGA KEN previously assigned to 27th Marines, and the 121st Field Artillery Battalion, 32d Infantry Division, assumed responsibility for that part of FUKUOKA KEN previously assigned to the 27th Marines.

The exchange of personnel between the 2d Marine Division and the 5th Marine Division began 23 November and was completed by 2400, 25 November. On 24 November 1945, 27th Marines commenced train and motor movement into the immediate vicinity of SASEBO; Regimental Headquarters and 3d Battalion moving from KURUME to HAIKI, and the 2d Battalion moving from SAGA to AINOURA. All movements were completed by 25 November 1945. On 30 November 1945, initial preparations for movement by ship to the United States were commenced.

COMMENTS:

1. Japanese compliance with surrender terms in the various zones of responsibility assigned to this regiment has, on the whole, been excellent. However, minor instances of unreported installations, and unreported caches of Japanese military supplies have been discovered.
2. It is felt that the initial use of occupational forces for guarding of civilian stocks of dynamite intended for coal mining resulted in unwarranted dispersal of occupational forces and a distinct hinderance to the Japanese civil economy.
3. Telephone service over Japanese cables was frequently interrupted and never good. From 5 November to 12 November, the one direct trunk to Division was completely inoperative. The trunk via 2d Battalion at SAGA to Division Headquarters had crosstalk from regiment to division. This caused undue traffic on the radio.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. In the future, zones of responsibility should be assigned so as to include entire political subdivisions of the area being occupied, as splitting of political subdivisions between two commands of the occupational forces results in needless confusion of the civilian population and doubles the number of contacts and interviews necessary for the occupational forces.
2. Once occupational forces are ashore and the bulk of enemy troops are disarmed, small arms ammunition should be the only ammunition in the hands of the occupying troops.



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ANNEX HOW TO 5TH MAR DIV OPERATION REPORT, OCCUPATION OF JAPAN (Continued).  
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3. Where a unit is assigned a large zone of responsibility, additional motor transport is required to thoroughly and efficiently conduct the necessary patrols.

4. A Marine infantry regiment is not equipped to handle wire communications over a distance of 75 miles (Marine Camp, AINOURA -- KURUME). It is recommended that a radiotelephone or teletype be made available when a unit is sent out such a distance.

*Bill C. Bond*

BILL C. BOND,  
First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve,  
S - 3.

-----



27th Marines  
In the Field  
30 November 1945.

*Bill C. Bond*  
BILL C. BOND,  
1st Lt, USMCR,  
S - 3.

BILL C. BOND,  
1st Lt, USMCR,  
S - 3.

1290

1130

Overlay of original Zone of Responsibility (SASEBO)

327  $\leq$  227

127

27  $\equiv$  26

125¢

-1100

5  
X  
2

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1342



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27th Marines  
In the Field  
30 November 1945.

To accompany map: Central Japan, Scale 1:250,000.

*Bill C. Bond*

BILL C. BOND,  
1st Lt, USMCR,  
S - 3.

1260  
1140

ENCLOSURE (B)

Overlay showing expanded Zone of Responsibility (SASEBO)

27 = 26

327  
127

1290

1110

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


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
27th Marines  
In the Field  
30 November 1945

To accompany map:  
Central Japan, Scale 1:250,000.

*Bill C. Bond*  
BILL C. BOND,  
1st Lt., USMCR,  
S - 3.



ENCLOSURE (C)  
Overlay showing Zone of Responsibility (KURUME)



CONFIDENTIAL 1344



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HEADQUARTERS,  
27TH MARINES, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,  
IN THE FIELD.

30 November 1945.

APPENDIX (1) (ADMINISTRATION) TO ANNEX HOW

A. PLANNING:

1. The only planning for the assault operation accomplished by the one section was the preparation of an initial embarkation plan, such plan becoming obsolete upon the cessation of hostilities and the subsequent assignment of this regiment to an occupation mission.

2. Planning for the occupation operation progressed as information was received from higher echelon. Planning consisted of the preparation of the Regimental Administrative Plan and the annexes thereto, with particular emphasis on the preparation and submission of reports. A regimental provost marshal was appointed and an SOP covering provost marshal activities was published.

B. OCCUPATIONAL OPERATIONS:

1. During the early phases of the occupation, there was little in the way of operations by the one section. All military government and provost marshal activities were under division control, with the exception of a portion of the area assigned to BLT-3/27. The work of the one section during this period consisted of bringing up to date all records and reports, preparation of drafts of personnel to be transferred to the United States for discharge and doing everything possible for the health and comfort of the troops.

2. On 5 October 1945, BLT-2/27 was detached to Division control and ordered to SAGA in an expansion of the area assigned for the enforcement of surrender terms. A military government team was assigned to BLT-2/27 on that date and proceeded with their assigned missions in SAGA KEN with little difficulty. A battalion provost marshal was appointed and a platoon of military police was attached to handle provost marshal activities.

3. On 21 October, BLT-3/27 and CT Headquarters were ordered to KURUME, FUKUOKA KEN, and BLT-2/27 reverted to Regimental control on 25 October. Another military government team was attached to BLT-3/27 for work in KURUME and vicinity.



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APPENDIX (1) (ADMINISTRATION) TO ANNEX HOW (Continued).  
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Page 2

C. JAPANESE COMPLIANCE WITH SURRENDER TERMS:

1. Excellent cooperation from the Japanese in compliance with the surrender terms was received. The Japanese Civil Police, Home Ministry representatives and Liaison Committees made every effort to comply with our directives. A few scattered cases of non-compliance occurred, but it is felt that these were due to a misunderstanding of our directives rather than an attempt at thwarting our plans.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That zones of responsibility be assigned on the basis of political subdivisions.

2. That an entire company of military police be assigned permanently to the combat teams.

3. That sufficient military government personnel be attached to allow for a liaison team with regimental headquarters.

4. That reports be kept to a minimum and that duplicity of reports be avoided.

E. MILITARY GOVERNMENT:

1. During the early phases of the occupation, all civil affairs and military government were under division control. One military government team was assigned to BLT-2/27 on 5 October for duty at SAGA and another military government team was assigned to BLT-3/27 on 21 October for duty at KURUME.

2. Upon the arrival of a team to their assigned area, the required surveys were completed and the procedure for the procurement of civilian labor was accomplished. Some difficulties were encountered because of the confusion existing within the Japanese Liaison Committees and because of their inability to maintain proper records.

3. It was noted that military government officers were somewhat hampered by a misunderstanding of command channels in Division and Corps Headquarters and by a lack of specific directives from those Headquarters.



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APPENDIX (1) (ADMINISTRATION) TO ANNEX HOW (Continued).  
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Page 3

F. PROVOST MARSHAL:

1. During the early phases of the occupation, all provost marshal activities were under division control.

2. Upon the assignment of BLT-2/27 to SAGA and BLT-3/27 to KURUME, each of these organizations appointed a provost marshal and augmented attached military police with line troops.

3. The following activities were handled by the various provost marshals:

- a. Traffic control --- by use of signs, motor patrols and traffic control posts.
- b. Military law and order --- by use of shore patrol, both motorized and on foot and enforcement of the 1800 curfew.
- c. Civilian law and order -- by directives to the Civil Police and by supervision over same; and by a civilian curfew.
- d. Enforcement of safeguards and off limit areas --- by periodic inspections during each period of 24 hours.

G. SPECIAL SERVICES:

1. The first program begun by special services was a regimental movie. Our projectors were unpacked, serviced and a movie was shown on the fifth day ashore. When organizations were detached from the regiment, Japanese projectors were rebuilt and put into operation. Movie theatres were used at KURUME and SAGA.

2. Athletic programs of all types were inaugurated and encouraged. Both indoor and outdoor basketball courts were used and in addition, badminton, volleyball, baseball, softball, and touch football fields were constructed.

3. On 10 November, the Marine Corps birthday, a beer party was held for all enlisted personnel.

4. It is suggested that a quantity of 16mm movies could be used to better advantage than a few 35mm.



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APPENDIX (1) (ADMINISTRATION) TO ANNEX HOW (Continued).  
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Page 4

H. ADJUTANT:

1. During the occupation period, the work of the adjutant consisted mainly of routine administration, preparation of reports and records for demobilization and the transfer of personnel to the United States for discharge.

2. The main difficulties encountered were a lack of sufficient typewriters and poor communication and mail service due to the various areas in which the lower echelons of this regiment were stationed.

I. POST OFFICE:

1. Upon the arrival of this regiment at the Marine Camp, AINOURA, sufficient space was available in a centrally located position to enable adequate receipt and dispatch of mail and postal supplies. Upon the movement of the regiment to KURUME, another excellent building for the Regimental Post Office was available and used.

2. Some difficulty was encountered after first arriving at KURUME in the receipt of mail, in that there was a confusion in the orders issued regarding train schedules. However, this situation was eventually rectified and for the latter period of the occupation, the mail service was very good.

*Frank L. Howard*

FRANK L. HOWARD,  
Warrant Officer (PD), U. S. Marine Corps,  
AS - 1.



CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS,  
27TH MARINES, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,  
IN THE FIELD.

30 November 1945.

APPENDIX (2) (INTELLIGENCE) TO ANNEX HOW

A. PLANNING:

1. Planning for the invasion of Southern Kyushu was never begun because of insufficient material.

2. Maps, photographs, hydrographic, waather, terrain, and other information for the occupation of Japan was received only in time to deliver it to lower echelons and some of it never was received in time to be distributed before reaching the target.

3. Advance Reconnaissance of the objective:

One staff NCO from this combat team accompanied the Division Inspector in his advance reconnaissance of the objective. Other than to give us a general idea of how the Japanese Liaison Committee was cooperating with us, this man brought back no information to aid us in setting up in our sector because our assigned zone of responsibility was changed after the advance party had left for the target.

B. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION:

1. Training consisted of indoctrinating troops as to Japanese customs, way of living, etc., and a brief study of the geography of Japan. Assigned language officers gave a 4-lesson course in the Japanese language to all officers while enroute to the target, which proved to be very beneficial. Picked enlisted men also received instruction in the language.

2. a. Provisional intelligence platoons were organized by the battalions to aid in locating and reporting intelligence targets during the occupation.

b. The two language officers and four enlisted linguists regularly assigned to a combat team were attached for the occupation to this Headquarters. Three of the enlisted men were then assigned, one to each Landing Team, the fourth remaining with CT Headquarters.



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APPENDIX (2) (INTELLIGENCE) TO ANNEX HOW (Continued).  
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Page 2

C. INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONING DURING OCCUPATION:

1. Battalions went ashore with lists of known intelligence targets. These were immediately checked, reported on and taken under surveillance. By contacting the Japanese officer in charge of each area, installation, or unit in the area, and receiving from him information on strength of units, diagrams of installations and inventories of equipment, the process of locating and checking targets was simplified. Nearly all installations were under guard by Japanese troops when we arrived and these troops remained there until relieved by our troops who took them under surveillance.

With the exception of inventories of equipment, all documents of Japanese Naval and Army units were burned during the period 15 to 20 August 1945, by orders of the Naval and Army Ministries respectively, at TOKYO, making it impossible to check on histories and TO's of units. Commanding officers of all units contacted concurred on the dates and orders for burning.

2. In almost every case, the Japanese had made complete inventories of all equipment. The equipment was segregated and labeled with amounts and names of each item. It was merely a case of checking these, giving them a receipt and taking over.

3. All new equipment encountered was covered by JICPCA and NAVTECHJAP Intelligence teams who handled such materiel.

4. The liaison committees set up by the Japanese, in the cities of SASEBO, SAGA and KURUME, handled all necessary liaison, both of military and civilian natures.

5. Civilian attitude has proved to be cooperative in general with only incidents of several policemen in SASEBO area being arrogant toward Marine sentries on 27 October; discharged soldiers under the influence of liquor giving our outpost sentries trouble in the 1st Battalion zone of responsibility on 4 October; and numerous instances of people attempting to steal food, clothing and building materials from warehouses under our surveillance.



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APPENDIX (2) (INTELLIGENCE) TO ANNEX HOW (Continued).  
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Page 3

6. Language personnel assigned were never of sufficient number to handle all work requiring interpreters. The Japanese Liaison Committees had interpreters which were made use of and additional interpreters were picked up as English-speaking persons were encountered.

- a. Very few documents were encountered, thus no special system was devised nor were difficulties encountered.
- b. Interrogations, as were necessary, were conducted to gain specific information regarding units and installations. These were conducted by Marine linguists or Japanese interpreters as were available.

D. JAPANESE COMPLIANCE WITH SURRENDER TERMS:

1. No specific instances of failure to comply with surrender terms have ever been reported. Several instances were encountered in which it was at first thought the Japanese were giving us incomplete information and in other cases certain officers or officials denied knowledge of installations and units in their area. It was later found that the Japanese did not understand exactly what we wanted or actually were unaware of certain installations.

*C.F. Beach*  
for KARL W. BERG,  
First Lieutenant, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve,  
S - 2.



CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS,  
27TH MARINES, 5TH MARINE DIVISION,  
IN THE FIELD.

30 November 1945.

APPENDIX (3) (SUPPLY AND EVACUATION) TO ANNEX HOW

Movement of supplies and equipment of CT-27 from Camp Tarawa to HILO, HAWAII, T. H., commenced on 21 August 1945. Ships were combat loaded, and sailed from HILO on 26 August. During the loading phase, the weather conditions were anything but agreeable. During the night of 23 August the rainfall was approximately 7 inches and the following night approximately 4 inches. This resulted in the loss of valuable records and equipment.

Unloading at the target, SASEBO, KYUSHU, JAPAN, commenced on arrival 22 September and proceeded in a normal fashion until completed. Again, adverse weather conditions hampered the work. Units landed with one unit of fire for organic weapons and sufficient emergency rations for four meals. Regimental dumps were set up and unit distribution began on 25 September.

On 4 October galleys were in operation and "B" Rations and fresh bread were available. Cold-wet weather clothing were also made available by the Division.

On 5 October the 2d Battalion, 27th Marines, were detached to Division control and moved to SAGA. On 24 October the 3d Battalion, 27th Marines, and Regimental Headquarters proceeded to KURUME. Supplies for both SAGA and KURUME were moved by Division via rail and this method functioned very smoothly.

A bakery was set up at KURUME on 27 October and fresh bread was made available from this date. "B" Rations were supplemented by fresh meat on 8 November and every second or third day thereafter.

The Medical Department embarked combat loaded with adequate supplies. While enroute to the occupation area, an epidemic of catarrhal fever or mild influenza was encountered with a total of approximately 225 cases. Recovery of these patients was normal and rapid and all hands were able to disembark by the time of actual landing.

In the occupation phase, the water and food supplies were well controlled and inspected and there were no cases of contagious or infectious diseases encountered. The venereal rate was very low except for a moderate number of gonococcus infections in one battalion.



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APPENDIX (3) (SUPPLY AND EVACUATION) TO ANNEX HOW (Continued).  
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Page 2

Upon arrival at KURUME on 24 October disposition proceeded according to Annex FOX to 5th Marine Division Administrative Order 1-45.

Both the 2d Battalion at SAGA and the 3d Battalion at KURUME began transferring control items immediately to Division. Over 50,000 rifles and over 5,000 swords were sent to Division.

As rapidly as inventories could be made of warehouses and installations containing goods of use to the civilian population, these were turned over to the Home Ministry representative of this district.

Both battalions set up incinerators for burning small arms ammunition and over ten million rounds have been disposed of in this manner.

All airplanes at the KURUME and METABARU Airfields, which were in the 2d Battalion zone of responsibility, have been destroyed, with the motors blown up with dynamite and the planes piled together and burned.

Light and heavy machine guns were destroyed by using acetylene torches and over 300 have been destroyed in this manner.

Over 168 Japanese materials which meet the United States requirements for War Memorials and Museum pieces were found in the regimental zone of responsibility and are being held pending further instructions.

Disposition is proceeding at this date and inventories, disposition reports, and stock record cards are being completed.

*Francis J. Lutz*  
FRANCIS J. LUTZ,  
Captain, U. S. Marine Corps,  
S - 4.



ANNEX ITEM

TO 5<sup>th</sup> MAR. DIV. OPERATION  
REPORT

OCCUPATION of JAPAN

28<sup>th</sup> MARINES OPERATION

REPORT, OCCUPATION OF

JAPAN

22<sup>nd</sup> SEPT. 45

TO

30<sup>th</sup> NOV. 45



C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS, 28TH MARINES  
5TH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,  
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

30 November, 1945

Annex ITEM to 5th Marine Division Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN

28th Marines Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN

From: The Commanding Officer.  
To : The Commanding General, 5th Marine Division.  
Subject: 28th Marines Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN.  
1. The subject report is respectfully submitted herewith.

*H. B. Liveredge*  
H. B. LIVEREDGE.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

1355



C O N F I D E N T I A L

HEADQUARTERS, 28TH MARINES  
5TH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,  
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

30 November, 1945.

BASIC REPORT

1. PLANNING

a. Assault Operation.

Planning for the assault operation against southern KYUSHU was started on 1 August, 1945. Maps, photographs, intelligence summaries, and a tentative operation order were received at this time. During the period 1-12 August, intensive study was made of all available material on the beaches, terrain, and enemy forces in Southwestern KYUSHU. However, on 12 August, planning was halted because of the imminence of the Japanese surrender.

b. Occupation Operation.

On 20 August, 1945, preliminary plans for the occupation of KYUSHU were received. Early sailing orders made necessary a concentrated planning period. All plans and preparations were made with the view of possible combat upon landing in JAPAN.

Much planning, of necessity, was carried on enroute to the target and during that period three plans were evolved. All personnel were thoroughly briefed on all plans and on the surrender terms. Division Operations Plans 25, 25A, and 25B-45 were used as a basis for this planning. Necessary distribution of planning material to subordinate units was effected at various stops between HAWAII and JAPAN.

2. TRAINING

a. Assault Operation.

After returning from the IWO JIMA Operation, a training program was commenced with the view to bringing the regiment back to normal fighting efficiency. This program commenced with individual training and carried through regimental combat team training.

The 28th Marines, having been designated as a reserve unit for the assault operation on KYUSHU, had no definite objective assigned for that operation. Consequently no special training or rehearsals were necessary. The regiment merely had to be maintained in top fighting trim, prepared for any eventuality. The regiment did however participate in several field exercises involving movement over long distances and considerable maneuver of subordinate units.

b. Occupation Operation.

Inasmuch as little time was available between the time occupation orders were received and the sailing date, no special training was carried out in HAWAII. However, aboard ship debarkation drills were held at frequent intervals, and personnel were thoroughly briefed on surrender terms.

1356



C O N F I D E N T I A L

Classes in basic Japanese were available to all hands.

3. ORGANIZATION

a. Assault Operation.

RCT-28 was organized as follows for the assault on Southwestern KYUSHU:

28th Mar (less M-7 Plat, Regt'l Wpns Co)  
Co C, 5th Engr Bn  
Plat, Co C, 5th MT Bn  
Co C, 5th Med Bn  
Det, 3d Prov Rocket Det  
3d Plat, Co C, 72d Gml Mort Bn  
3d Sec, 6th Mar War Dog Plat  
3d Plat, Ord Co, 5th Serv Bn  
3d Plat, Sup Co, 5th Serv Bn  
Det, ASCO, 5th Mar Div

The planning period for the assault operation was so short that the final task organization for BLT's had not been evolved at the time the Japanese surrendered.

b. Occupation Operation.

RCT-28 was organized as follows for the occupation of JAPAN:

BLT-128

Lt Col BUTTERFIELD

1st Bn, 28th Mar  
1st Plat, C Co, 5th Engr Bn  
1/3 Coll Sec, C Co, 5th Med Bn  
Det ASCO, 5th Mar Div  
Ln Pty, 5th Tk Bn  
Det, 3d Bn, 13th Mar

BLT-228

Lt Col McDONOUGH

2d Bn, 28th Mar  
2d Plat, C Co, 5th Engr Bn  
1/3 Coll Sec, C Co, 5th Med Bn  
Det ASCO, 5th Mar Div  
Ln Pty, 5th Tk Bn  
Det 3d Bn, 13th Mar

BLT-328

Maj SMOAK

3d Bn, 28th Mar  
3d Plat, C Co, 5th Engr Bn  
1/3 Coll Sec, C Co, 5th Med Bn  
Det ASCO, 5th Mar Div  
Ln Pty, 5th Tk Bn  
Det, 3d Bn, 13th Mar  
Plat, D Co, 3d Prov MP Bn



C O N F I D E N T I A L

CT-28 (-)

Col LIVERSEGE

28th Mar (less 3 Bns & M-7 Plat)  
C Co, 5th Engr Bn (less 3 Plats)  
C Co, 5th Med Bn (less Coll Sec)  
Det ASCO, 5th Mar Div  
Ln Pty, 5th Tk Bn  
Det, 3d Bn, 13th Mar  
Co D, 3d Prov MP Bn (less 1 Plat)

4. ADVANCE RECONNAISSANCE OF THE OBJECTIVE

One NCO from RCT-28 accompanied the Division reconnaissance group in the SASEBO area. He rejoined the combat team aboard the headquarters ship about 1100, 22Sept45, and rendered his report to Col Liversedge. The report was of some value in that it outlined road conditions and condition of the billets assigned to the combat team upon landing.

5. OCCUPATION OPERATIONS

a. The S-1 and S-4 sections performed normal functions of administration and supply throughout the occupation. S-4 also handled procurement of Japanese materiel and labor.

S-2 and S-3 operated jointly in executing and supervising all occupation missions falling under the purview of those two sections. Coordination of patrols investigating military and civilian targets was one of the main duties. Complete overlays and files covering all targets within the regimental zone were maintained. In addition, cases involving compliance with surrender terms were investigated and liaison with Japanese Military, Naval, and civilian authorities was maintained with the aid of attached linguists.

b. Narrative Summary of Operations Ashore

1800, 21Sept to 1800, 22Sept45

CT Hq remained afloat.

LT-128 remained afloat.

LT-228 landed at 1400 at the SASEBO docks. They were ordered to reinforce the Shore Party Bn, and assist in unloading. The CP opened in a warehouse at the SASEBO Dock Area (77.6-13.4).

LT-328 remained afloat.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 22Sept to 1800, 23Sept45

CT Hq remained aboard ship in the SASEBO Harbor. Col Liversedge and representatives of all staff sections went ashore at 0915 to reconnoiter the AINOURA Naval Training Station.

1358

C O N F I D E N T I A L



C O N F I D E N T I A L

Col Liversedge and party returned to APA 114 at 1500.

LT-128 landed at 0825 on Green beaches and established its CP at the Naval Air Station, SASEBO.

LT-228 continued to assist the Shore Party.

LT-328 landed in the JIG Area at 0800 and moved to the AINOURA Naval Training Station (73.-13.).

No casualties for the period.

1800, 23Sept to 1800, 24Sept45

CT Hq and Wpns Co, landed at 1140 at JIG Area and moved to the AINOURA Naval Training Station. The entire CT was then ashore.

LT-128 moved to the AINOURA Naval Training Station at 1030.

LT-228 continued to assist Shore Party.

LT-328 sent a patrol to the MIYAZAKI, SONOGI, URESHINO, TAKEO, ARITA Area.

G Co, 5th Med Bn landed and moved to the AINOURA Naval Training Station.

Hq C Co, 5th Engr Bn landed with CT Hq at 1140 and moved to the AINOURA Naval Training Station.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 24Sept to 1800, 25Sept45

LT-128 remained in reserve.

LT-228 continued to assist the Shore Party.

LT-328 sent two rifle platoons to guard ammunition dump (64.-19.).

No casualties for the period.

1800, 25Sept to 1800, 26Sept45

LT-128 remained in reserve.

LT-228 continued to assist Shore Party in unloading ships and handling supplies ashore.

LT-328 remained at the AINOURA Naval Training Station with two platoons guarding ammunition dump (64.-19.).

No casualties for the period.



C O N F I D E N T I A L

1800. 26Sept to 1800. 27Sept45

CT Hq recieved orders to send Col Williams, Major Wood and party on reconnaissance to FUKUOKA preparatory to occupying that area.

LT-128 remained in reserve.

LT-228 was detached from the Shore Party and commenced movement of troops to the AINOURA Naval Training Station.

LT-328 remained at the AINOURA Naval Training Station with two platoons guarding ammunition dump (64.-19.).

No casualties for the period.

1800. 27Sept to 1800. 28Sept45

CT Hq recieved verbal orders to prepare one LT and Wpns Co to move to FUKUOKA about 30Sept45. LT-128 was warned to be ready to move on this date.

LT-128 remained in reserve at AINOURA Naval Training Station.

LT-228 completed movement of troops to AINOURA Naval Training Station. Their CP opened in Bldg #46.

LT-328 remained at AINOURA Naval Training Station with two rifle platoons guarding ammunition dump (64.-19.).

No casualties for the period.

1800. 28Sept to 1800. 29Sept45

LT-128 remained in reserve at AINOURA Naval Training Station prepared to move to FUKUOKA. Billeting Detail of FUKUOKA Advance Occupation Force left by train for FUKUOKA.

LT-228 remained in reserve at AINOURA Naval Training Station.

LT-328 remained in reserve at AINOURA Naval Training Station with two platoons guarding ammunition dump (64.-19.).

Wpns Co 28th Mar(-) prepared to move to FUKUOKA.

No casualties for the period.

1800. 29Sept to 1800. 30Sept45

LT-128 moved to FUKUOKA with one platoon Wpns Co and a detachment from H&S Co, 28th Mar. The LT passed to control of the FUKUOKA Advance Occupation Force.

LT-228 remained in reserve at the AINOURA Naval Training Station.

1360



C O N F I D E N T I A L

LT-328 remained in reserve at the AINOURA Naval Training Station with two platoons guarding ammunition dump (64.-19.).

No casualties for the period.

1800, 30Sept to 1800 10Oct45

CT Hq received orders to alert one Co to move by rail to SHIMONOSEKI about 4Oct45.

LT-228 remained in reserve at the AINOURA Naval Training Station.

LT-328 remained in reserve at the AINOURA Naval Training Station with two platoons at SASA (64.-19.). Alerted KING Co for move to SHIMONOSEKI about 4Oct45.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 10Oct to 1800, 20Oct45

CT Hq recieved orders to be prepared to move by rail and truck to FUKUOKA on 5 and 6Nov45. All units remaining at AINOURA NTS were alerted for this move.

LT-228 remained in reserve at the AINOURA Naval Training Station.

LT-328 remained in reserve at the AINOURA Naval Training Station with two platoons guarding ammunition dump (64.-19.).

1800, 20Oct to 1800, 30Oct45

CT Hq made preparations to move to FUKUOKA on 5 and 6Oct45.

LT-228 remained in reserve at the AINOURA Naval Training Station.

LT-328 remained in reserve at the AINOURA Naval Training Station. The two platoons at SASA (64.-19.), ammunition dump, were relieved by elements of ITEM Co, 27th Marines at 1200.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 30Oct to 1800, 4Oct45

CT Hq continued preparations for move to FUKUOKA on 5 and 6Oct45.

LT-228 remained in reserve at the AINOURA Naval Training Station.

LT-328 (- KING Co) remained in reserve at the AINOURA Naval Training Station. KING Co left camp at 0430, 4Oct45 enroute to SHIMONOSEKI.

No casualties for the period.



C O N F I D E N T I A L

1800, 4Oct to 1800, 5Oct45

CT Hq left SASEBO 5Oct45 with these elements; 2d Bn, 28th Mar, C Co (less 1 plat) 3d Prov MP Bn, and Wpns Co, 28th Mar.

LT-328 remained in reserve at the AINOURA Naval Training Station.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 5Oct to 1800, 6Oct45

CT-28 (less I and K Cos and LT-128) arrived at KASHII Station, FUKUOKA, JAPAN on the 5th and 6th of Oct, and the CT CP opened on 6Oct45 at the Ippotei, East Park, FUKUOKA. CT-28 was placed under FUKUOKA Occupation Force for operational control.

CT-28 had the following units attached: C Co (less 1 plat) 3d Prov MP Bn, C Co, 5th Engr Bn, 3d Plat, Ord Co, 3d Plat, Serv Co, 3d Plat, Sup Co, B Co, 12th Force MT Bn, 2d Plat Auto Repair Co.

LT-128 had been under FOF control since 30Sept45 and was now billeted at the KYUSHU Airplane School (48.9-74.0).

LT-228 was billeted at KASHII Station (49.5-73.5) and their CP opened there on 6Oct45.

LT-328 was billeted at KASHII Station (49.5-73.5) and their CP opened there on 6Oct45. LT-328 received verbal orders to prepare to move to MOJI on the 10th of October, 1945.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 6Oct to 1800, 7Oct45

CT-28 assumed control of LT-128 at 0800I.

LT-128 sent detachment of 1 officer, 31 men to maintain law and order in three Chinese FW Camps in the vicinity of IIZUKA (1370.4-1170.4), and one intelligence patrol to WAJIRO and CHIKUZEN-SHINGU.

LT-228 supervised movement of Japanese material in KASHII Warehouse Area.

LT-328 (less I and K Cos) continued preparations for movement to MOJI.

Wpns Co, 28th Mar was released to FOF to act as MP for the area.

C Co, 5th Engr Bn, commenced improvement and maintenance of facilities in LT-128 and 228 billeting areas.

C Co, 5th Med Bn, began operation of hospital at the HAKATA Seaplane Base. (41.2-74.8)

No casualties for the period.



C O N F I D E N T I A L

1800, 70ct to 1800, 80ct45

LT-128 sent two (2) groups (1 NCO and 9 men each) to the vicinity of IIZUKA to take over two (2) additional Chinese POW Camps.

LT-228 continued improvement of KASHII Station.

LT-328 continued preparations for movement to MOJI.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 80ct45 to 1800, 90ct45

LT-128 sent out four (4) motorized patrols. Two (2) patrols were intelligence patrols in the SHINGU, KOGA, YAMADA, HOKOKAN School, KASHII Fort area (46.7-78.5). The other two patrols were sentry patrols, one in the northern sector of LT's zone of responsibility, and one in southern sector. The LT sent 1 officer and 47 men to reinforce the IIZUKA Chinese PW Camp Detachment. This group to maintain law and order in five (5) additional camps in the NOGATA, ORIO, TAGAWA District.

LT-228 sent two (2) intelligence patrols in the FUKUOKA, SUMIYOSHI, MINOSHIMA, TAKENOSHITA, OHASHI, IJIRI, KOKURA Area. LT sent one sergeant and twelve (12) men to guard a new type Jap Plane located by CIC, three miles south of ITAZUKE (ZASSHONOKUMA District (53.0-61.3)).

LT-328 continued preparations for movement to MOJI.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 90ct to 1800, 100ct45

LT-128 sent patrols as follows:

Patrol #1 Intelligence patrol from HAKATA WAN peninsula to the northern edge of FUKUOKA city limits.

Patrol #2 Intelligence patrol in the YAMADA, FUKUOKA, MIZUMACHI Area.

Patrol #3 Sentry patrol in the northern sector of LT's zone of responsibility.

Patrol #4 Sentry patrol in the southern sector of LT's zone of responsibility.

Dispatched 1 officer and 12 men to exercise surveillance over Chinese PW Camp in the vicinity of UMI.

LT-228 sent two (2) patrols to reconnoiter new intelligence targets.

Dispatched 1 NCO and 10 men to assist in search of Western Army CP in the vicinity of FUTSUKAICHI (50.70-50.55).

LT-328 plus 3d Flat, C Co, 5th Engr Bn, 3d Flat, B Co, 12th Force MT Bn and a det, H&S Co, 28th Mar left KASHII Station 0956 by rail for MOJI. This LT was attached to FOF for operational control

No casualties for the period.

C O N F I D E N T I A L



C O N F I D E N T I A L

1800, 100ct to 1800, 110ct45

CT-28 Hq held conference with Police Chief and harbor officials to make arrangement for searching craft coming from ports outside the home island of JAPAN.

LT-128 sent two (2) intelligence patrols to the WAJIRO, MOTOMA, MINATO, SHINGU, MACHI, HIRA YAMA Area, and two (2) sentry patrols.

LT-228 sent three (3) intelligence patrols to the IMAJIKU, SUSENJI, DAIMORI, SHIMOKEGO, TANI, TAJIMA, NIIGA, ITAZUKE, KASUGA Area.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 110ct to 1800, 120ct45

CT-28 Hq conducted road reconnaissance to KURUME.

LT-128 sent two (2) intelligence patrols to the KOGA, MUSHINOCHI, HANAMI, HAMAO-DOI, KOMATA, TACHIBANAGUCHI Area and two (2) sentry patrols.

LT-228 sent three (3) intelligence patrols to the MEINOHAMAMACHI, HETA, KOTA, OHARA, YOKAHAMA, HIRATA, KASUGA, OKI, SAGU, OSA-MURA, MAEBARU, AKASAKA, KAFURI, YOSHI Area.

Sent 1 sergeant and 17 men to guard KYUSHU Aircraft Factory at ZASSHONOKUMA (53.0-61.3).

Sent 1 sergeant and 13 men to guard KASUGA Weapons Factory at KASUGABARU Station (53.0-60.5).

No casualties for the period.

1800, 120ct to 1800 130ct45

CT-28 Hq supervised and inspected Japanese troops arriving from KOREA.

LT-128 sent two (2) intelligence patrols to the KASHII, HAMADA, SHIMO, IGA, CHOJABARU, SHINMACHI Area, and two sentry patrols.

LT-228 sent three (3) intelligence patrols to the IHARA, MISAICA, HIAKE, HATAE, SETO, HARO, IKISAN, FUKAI, TORIKAI, ROJI, MINO-SHIMA Area.

Sent 1 officer and 13 men to the HAKATA Harbor to search Japanese troops arriving by ship from KOREA.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 130ct to 1800, 140ct45

CT-28 Hq supervised debarkation of Japanese troops arriving from KOREA. Organized Examiner Team for the purpose of "spot checking" Japanese personnel returning from ports other than those in the main islands of JAPAN. This team was organized as follows:



C O N F I D E N T I A L

- 1 Chief Examiner - 1 Lt to be in charge
- 1 Asst Examiner - 1 Lt to assist and provide relief for Chief Examiner.
- 2 Rifle Squads
- 2 Interpreters
- 1 CIC Det (2 special agents and 2 interpreters)
- 2 Medical Officers.

Also made preparations to send raiding parties to NAMAZNDA, HOJYO, and IIZUKA Prisons to arrive at 1600, 15Oct45 and determine if SCAP directive of 4Oct45, to Jap government had been complied with.

LT-128 continued routine guard duty.

LT-228 sent 1 sergeant and 4 men on train to MOJI as train guard. Left at 1430 to return on 15Oct45.

No casualties for period.

1800, 14Oct to 1800, 15Oct45

CT-28 Hq sent advance billeting party to KURUME. Left at 0800 and returned at 1900, 15Oct45. Continued inspection of Japanese arriving from ports outside home islands of Japan.

LT-128 sent two (2) intelligence patrols to HAMAO, KURAMOTO, and TAKATA Area.

Sent 1 officer and 15 men to NAMAZNDA Prison to guard and investigate records and prisoners. Left at 1100 to arrive there by 1600, 15Oct45. They were accompanied by 1 interpreter (FOF).

LT-228 sent one (1) intelligence patrol to the HARA, JIRO-MARU, TOCHI, NOKE Area.

Sent 1 NCO and 3 men to ABURA-YAMA (41.5-57.3) to guard FOF Radio Relay Station. Left 1000, 15Oct45.

Sent 1 officer and 6 men to IIZUKA Prison (1370.4-1170.4) to guard and investigate records and prisoners. Left 1100 to arrive there by 1600, 15Oct45. Accompanied by 1 interpreter (FOF).

Sent 1 officer and 11 men to guard and investigate records and prisoners at HOJYO Prison. Left 1100 to arrive there by 1600, 15Oct45. Accompanied by 1 interpreter (FOF).

1800, 15Oct to 1800, 16Oct45

CT-28 continued inspection of Japanese arriving from ports outside the home islands of JAPAN.

LT-128 sent two (2) intelligence patrols to the HAMAO, FUTSUKAICHI, KATANO, DAIBU, HOGZO, HAMAS, HIRAO, UMI, SUE, BEKA Area and 1 sentry patrol.

LT-228 sent two (2) intelligence patrols to the ROJI, KEYAGO, DOTEN-CHU, SHIMO, ON, HARUDA, TSUKO, WAKAE Area.

At 2330I, 15Oct45, IIZUKA Branch Prison patrol returned having been unable to locate said prison. This patrol to return to the IIZUKA Area when prison is located.



C O N F I D E N T I A L

No casualties for the period.

1800. 16Oct to 1800. 17Oct45

CT-28 continued inspection of Japanese arriving from ports outside the home islands of JAPAN.

LT-128 sent two (2) intelligence patrols to the MISHIRO, NOTOGI, NOGATA, VEKI, AKAMA, FUKUMA, YAMADA, IARA, HATSU, TARE, FUKUMA Area, and one (1) sentry patrol.

LT-228 sent two (2) intelligence patrols to the MAEBARU, OISHI, SAKUDA, BABA, MOTOOKA, ANTOKU, MATSUE, OURA, NEDA, NISHI, IRUBE Area.

Sent 1 officer and 1 man to IIZUKA to reconnoiter the area in an attempt to locate the IIZUKA Prison.

No casualties for the period.

1800. 17Oct to 1800. 18Oct45

CT-28 Hq continued inspection of Japanese arriving from ports outside the home islands of JAPAN. Confiscated 6931 yen from returning troops.

LT-128 sent two (2) intelligence patrols to the northern section of the LT's zone of responsibility and 1 sentry patrol

LT-228 sent two (2) intelligence patrols to the FUKUOKA Higher School Armory, IMAJIKU Seaplane Base, SUSENJI Naval Air Base, "Chitose" Unit #32620 Ammunition Dump at MAEBARU, HAKUDA Collecting Point and the KIDO Ammunition Dump.

IIZUKA Prison was located and the detail reinforced.

No casualties for the period.

1800. 18Oct to 1800. 19Oct45

CT-28 continued investigation of Japanese arriving from ports outside the home islands of JAPAN. Commenced impounding outgoing and incoming mail in HAKATA Harbor.

LT-128 sent one intelligence patrol to the KAWASAKI, HONJO, NOGATA, IIZUKA Area and one sentry patrol.

One platoon was dispatched at 2115 to the IIZUKA POW Camp to act as a mobile reserve in case of a riot at the Chinese PW Camp. Nothing developed and the patrol returned to camp at 1300, 19Oct45.

LT-228 sent two (2) intelligence patrols to the FUTSUKAICHI, YORII, SCHZU, AMAGI, SHITANI, HONGO, TACHIARA Area.

No casualties for the period.



C O N F I D E N T I A L

1800, 1900 to 1800, 2000 45

CT-28 Hq continued investigation of Japanese arriving from ports outside the home islands of JAPAN. Impounded one bag of outgoing Japanese mail (approximately 3 pounds).

LT-128 sent no additional intelligence patrols since those of the 19th were to be two day patrols. Dispatched one sentry patrol.

Sent two (2) billeting patrols to report to G-1 FOF for orders. These patrols left at 0800 and consisted of 1 NCO and 1 man per patrol.

LT-228 sent no additional intelligence patrols, since those of the 19th were two day patrols.

The Guard Detachment, having completed its mission returned to camp at 1500, 2000 from the IIZUKA Prison. No violations of the SCAP directive were found.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 2000 to 1800, 2100 45

CT-28 Hq assumed operational control of 126th Field Artillery Bn at 1200I. Continued inspection of Japanese arriving from ports outside the home islands of JAPAN.

LT-128 continued routine guard missions.

LT-228 continued routine guard missions. HOJYO Prison detail returned to camp at 2000. Found no violations of the SCAP directive.

126th Fld Arty Bn began improvement of KASHII Warehouse billeting area.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 2100 to 1800, 2200 45

CT-28 Hq continued investigation of Japanese arriving from ports outside the home islands of JAPAN.

LT-128 sent one intelligence patrol to the KNGU KOKE MIM KINRO Army Training School (1355.4-1197.5), and one sentry patrol.

LT-228 sent two (2) sentry patrols throughout their zone of responsibility.

126th Fld Arty Bn continued improving KASHII billeting area.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 2200 to 1800, 2300 45

CT-28 Hq continued inspection of Japanese arriving from ports outside the home islands of JAPAN.



C O N F I D E N T I A L

LT-128 sent out one sentry patrol.

LT-228 continued routine guard.

126th Fld Arty Bn continued improving KASHII billeting area.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 230Oct to 1800, 240Oct45

CT-28 (- B Co, 12th Force MT Bn, and 1st Flat VAC Bomb Disp Co) passed from FOF control to 32nd Inf Div control at 0800I.

Continued checking Japanese repatriates entering HAKATA Harbor from ports outside the home islands of JAPAN.

LT-128 sent out one sentry patrol. Continued routine guard missions.

LT-228 continued routine guard missions.

126th Fld Arty Bn continued improvement of billeting area.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 240Oct to 1800, 250Oct45

CT Hq continued checking Japanese repatriates entering HAKATA Harbor.

LT-128 sent one sentry patrol in northern section of LT zone of responsibility.

LT-228 sent one sentry patrol in southern section of LT zone of responsibility.

126th Fld Arty Bn continued improvement of billeting area. Sent one officer with each patrol from LT-128 and LT-228.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 250Oct to 1800, 260Oct45

CT Hq continued checking Japanese repatriates entering HAKATA Harbor.

LT-128 sent one sentry patrol in the northern section of its zone of responsibility.

LT-228 sent two (2) sentry patrols in its zone of responsibility.

Japanese personnel guarding dumps in zone of responsibility were relieved by Civil Police.

126th Fld Arty Bn continued improving billeting area. Sent one officer with each patrol from LT-128 and LT-228.

No casualties for the period.



C O N F I D E N T I A L

1800. 26Oct to 1800. 27Oct45

CT Hq continued checking Japanese repatriates entering HAKATA Harbor.

LT-128 Installations guarded by Japanese Naval personnel relieved by Civil Police.

Chinese FW guard detachment returned from the ORIO, NOGATA, TAGAWA Area at 1600, having been relieved by the 127th Inf Regt.

Patrol to the NAMAZUNDA Prison completed investigation and returned to camp at 1030. Nothing unusual found at the prison.

Sent one sentry patrol in the southern section of its zone of responsibility.

LT-228 sent one sentry patrol to check installations that were taken over by Civil Police, and one sentry patrol in the northern section of its zone of responsibility.

126th Fld Arty Bn continued improving billeting area. Installations guarded by Japanese Naval personnel relieved by Civil Police.

No casualties for the period.

1800. 27Oct to 1800. 28Oct45

CT Hq continued checking Japanese repatriates entering HAKATA Harbor.

LT-128 continued routine guard missions.

LT-228 continued routine guard missions.

126th Fld Arty Bn CO, and S-3 went to OITA, to reconnoiter billeting area.

No casualties for the period.

1800. 28Oct to 1800. 29Oct45

CT Hq relieved guard of the 58th Air Service Group with one Civil Police. This guard was placed over Jap ordnance in the 58th Air Service Group area in ZASSHONOKUMA. Continued checking Japanese repatriates entering HAKATA Harbor.

LT-128 continued routine guard missions.

LT-228 relieved one NCO and twelve men from the KYUSHU Aircraft Plant and Jap "Pusher Plane" at 1030, in the ZASSHONOKUMA District. Three (3) communication men were sent from this group to reinforce the guard at KASUGA Wpns Factory. (KASUGABARU Station)

126th Fld Arty Bn made advance preparations to move to OITA.

No casualties for the period.



C O N F I D E N T I A L

1800, 29Oct to 1800, 30Oct45

CT Hq continued checking Japanese repatriates entering HAKATA Harbor.

LT-128 sent one sentry patrol to check sentries in zone of responsibility.

LT-228 sent one sentry patrol to check the southern section of the LT's zone of responsibility.

126th Fld Arty Bn loaded rail transportation in preparation for movement to OITA.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 30Oct to 1800, 31Oct45

CT Hq continued checking Japanese repatriates entering HAKATA Harbor.

Continued relieving with Civil Police Japanese military personnel guarding dumps. Received orders to be prepared to move to SASEBO on 2 and 5Nov45.

LT-128 relieved guards previously maintained by LT-228. Sent one sentry patrol in northern section of LT zone of responsibility.

LT-228 made preparations to move to SASEBO on 2Nov45.

126th Fld Arty Bn commenced movement by rail to OITA.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 31Oct to 1800, 1Nov45

CT Hq continued checking Japanese repatriates entering HAKATA Harbor.

LT-128 completed relieving guard previously maintained by LT-228.

Sent one sentry patrol in northern section of LT zone of responsibility.

LT-228 completed loading rail transportation for movement to SASEBO.

126th Fld Arty Bn completed movement by rail to OITA. Detached from CT-28 at 0800, 1Nov45.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 1Nov to 1800, 2Nov45

CT Hq continued checking Japanese repatriates entering HAKATA Harbor.

Made preparations to turn over all guards of CT to the 127th Infantry Regiment, 32nd Inf Div.

LT-128 sent out one sentry patrol in the northern section of LT zone of responsibility.

1370



C O N F I D E N T I A L

LT-228 (-1 Plat) left in three (3) trains, 0810, 0925, and 1040 for SASEBO. Attached to 5th MarDiv for operational control.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 2Nov to 1800, 3Nov45

CT Hq continued checking Japanese repatriates entering HAKATA Harbor, and continued making preparations to turn over all guards of CT to 127th Infantry Regiment.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 3Nov to 1800, 4Nov45

CT-Hq Examiner Team checking incoming repatriates at HAKATA Harbor relieved by 127th Inf Regt.

LT-128 All guards except those at IIZUKA Frison Camp relieved by 1st Bn, 127th Infantry Regiment.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 4Nov to 1800, 5Nov45

CT Hq All guard posts relieved by 127th Inf Regt and CT zone of responsibility passed to the control of the 127th Inf Regt at 1500.

LT-128 made preparations to move to SASEBO.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 5Nov to 1800, 6Nov45

CT Hq completed movement of CT-28 (- Wpns Co) to SASEBO.

LT-128 left FUKUOKA at 0810 and arrived at SASEBO at 1330. H&S Co, 28th Mar (-), 3d Flat, Sup Co, C Co, 5th Engr Bn (-), 1 Plat, 2d Bn, 28th Mar, departed from FUKUOKA at 1010 and arrived at SASEBO at 1530. Released all attachments to control of parent organization.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 6Nov to 1800, 7Nov45

CT Hq opened CP at 0800 in Bldg #23, Marine Camp, AINOURA (AINOURA Naval Training Station). Returned to control of 5th Marine Division. Inspected by General Kreuger, CG, 6th Army, from 0840 to 1025.

1st Bn, 28th Mar relieved 3d Bn, 28th Mar of ten guard posts in the SASEBO area. Its CP opened at ONO Barracks (78.35-18.05), with "A", "B", and "C" Cos, billeted at YAMANOYA Barracks (75.50-17.20). Commenced improvement of assigned billeting areas.



C O N F I D E N T I A L

2nd Bn, 28th Mar reverted to CT-28 control with its CP at the EAST SIDE NAVY YARD (78.1-11.5). Continued routine guard missions.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar reverted to CT-28 control. The battalion had been under operational control of the 5th Mar Div since its return from MOJI at 1541, 22Oct45 and was billeted in Bldg #22, Marine Camp AINOURA. Continued routine guard in area formerly occupied by the 2nd Bn, 27th Mar. Relinquished ten guard posts to the 1st Bn, 28th Mar.

Vpns Co (-) arrived from FUKUOKA at 1745, 6Nov and were billeted in Bldg #31, Marine Camp AINOURA.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 7Nov to 1800, 8Nov45

CT Hq initiated a training program for personnel not on guard.

1st Bn, 28th Mar continued routine guard missions. Hq Co, "A" and "C" Cos moved to Marine Camp AINOURA (Bldg #46). "B" Co moved to the SASEBO Fortress Headquarters. (77.3-15.3)

2nd Bn, 28th Mar sent one motorized patrol to reconnoiter the area around HAIKI. Continued routine guard missions.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar continued routine guard missions. Fire in warehouse (66.2-18.8) about 1700. The warehouse was used for storing dynamite. Fire fighting detail was sent out from Marine Camp, AINOURA. The warehouse blew up about 1930 with no resulting casualties. The fire fighting detail was secured and sent back to camp at 2015.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 8Nov to 1800, 9Nov45

CT Hq comm need disposing of Japanese materiel in CT zone of responsibility.

1st Bn, 28th Mar continued routine guard missions.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar continued routine guard missions. Established traffic control station just east of HAIKI.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar continued routine guard missions. Established traffic control station at the SASEBO, HIRADO, AINOURA road junction.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 9Nov to 1800, 10Nov45

CT Hq continued disposition of enemy materiel.



C O N F I D E N T I A L

1st Bn, 28th Mar continued routine guard missions.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar continued routine guard missions.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar continued routine guard missions.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 11Nov to 1800, 12Nov45

CT Hq conducted inspection of guard details in the western section of CT zone of responsibility. Supervised training program.

1st Bn, 28th Mar sent one motorized patrol in the SAISHI, YUNOKI, SECHINARA, ERI Area. Continued training and routine guard missions.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar sent one motorized patrol to IMARI and one patrol to HAIKI. The IMARI patrol was a two day patrol to return at approximately 1630, 13Nov45. Continued routine guard missions. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

3rd Bn, 28th Mar sent out one motorized patrol in the northern section of Bn zone of responsibility. Continued training and routine guard missions. Two men were fired upon at 1115, 11Nov45 while walking around the weather deck of the old Japanese battleship anchored in the bay, northwest of Marine Camp AINOURA. The incident was investigated and a patrol searched the area north of the ship but nothing was discovered.

The remainder of Wpns Co arrived from FUKUOKA at 2012, 11Nov45 and were billeted in Bldg #31 Marine Camp AINOURA.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 12Nov to 1800, 13Nov45

CT Hq continued disposing of Japanese materiel. Supervised training program.

1st Bn, 28th Mar sent one motorized patrol in the MIKAWACHI, YOSHIFUKU, YOSHUKU, SATO, URANOSAKI Area. Continued training and routine guard missions.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar continued training and routine guard.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar sent out one motorized patrol in the northern section of the Bn zone of responsibility. Continued training and routine guard missions.

No casualties for the period. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

1800, 13Nov to 1800, 14Nov45

CT Hq continued disposing of Japanese materiel. Supervised training program.



C O N F I D E N T I A L

1st Bn, 28th Mar sent out one motorized patrol in the KURONDA, HIGASHI-UMEME, MIYANO, IMARI Area. Continued training and routine guard missions.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar sent out one motorized patrol to KARATSU and vicinity. This was a two day patrol. Continued training and routine guard missions.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar sent one motorized patrol in the EGUCHI, SHIMO, SHISA, NAKANA, KUROSHIO, SHIRAHAMA Area. Continued training and routine guard missions.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 14Nov to 1800, 15Nov45

CT Hq furnished eight officers and sixteen men to lead search parties checking shrines and schools in SASEBO to see if surrender terms had been complied with. Continued disposition of enemy materiel.

1st Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training and routine guard. Two day patrol which left 14Nov45 was still operating in the vicinity of KARATSU.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 15Nov to 1800, 16Nov45

CT Hq continued disposition of enemy materiel.

1st Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard. Sent a three day patrol to the area around KARATSU.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard. Sent one road reconnaissance patrol to the area just north of SASEBO.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 16Nov to 1800, 17Nov45

CT Hq continued disposition of enemy materiel.

1st Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard. One patrol continued to operate in vicinity of KARATSU.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

No casualties for the period.



C O N F I D E N T I A L

1800, 17Nov to 1800, 18Nov45

CT Hq continued disposition of enemy materiel.

1st Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard. Patrol to KARATSU and vicinity expected to return late, 18Nov45.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 19Nov to 1800, 19Nov45

CT Hq continued disposition of enemy materiel.

1st Bn, 28th Mar sent one patrol to the area of MIKAWACHI, YOSHINUKU, YOSHUKU, YANAYE, SATO, and URANOSAKI. Continued training, and routine guard.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar sent one patrol to the area around KARATSU. This patrol to remain in that vicinity for three (3) days.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar sent one road reconnaissance patrol to the area north of SASEBO. Sent one (1) officer and twenty-five (25) men to SHISHIMACHI to maintain law and order among rioting Chinese laborers.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 19Nov to 1800, 20Nov45

CT Hq continued disposition of enemy materiel. Lt Col Rich, 3d Bn 6th Marines and party arrived 1900, 19Nov45 to make preparations for relief of CT-28. Lt Col Rich was joined by Lt Col Fuller, Regt'l Ex Officer, 6th Marines on the morning of 20Nov45.

1st Bn, 28th Mar sent one patrol to the MIKAWACHI, ARITA, MIMASAKA, IMARI, YUNOKI Area. Continued surveillance, training and routine guard.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar sent out patrol to all guard posts in the Bn zone of responsibility to determine the advisability of consolidating some of these posts. Patrol which left on 19Nov45 to the area around KARATSU continued its mission. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar sent one patrol to the OGITA, INITA, KOTEDA, BOTA, SHINO-GAME Area. The patrol which went to investigate the Chinese situation at SHISHIMACHI returned at 1315, 20Nov45. No proof existed of any physical violence which may have been created by the Chinese. The Chinese and Japanese were duly warned, and after evacuating the Chinese



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to the dock area, the patrol returned to camp. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 20Nov to 1800, 21Nov45

CT Hq continued disposition of Japanese materiel. Made preparations for turning over all remaining buildings in the LOVE, MIKE, NAN and OBOE Areas, SASEBO Harbor, to the 8th Service Regiment.

1st Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar continued patrol to KARATSU. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar sent one patrol to the area just north of AINOURA. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 21Nov to 1800, 22Nov45.

CT Hq Holiday Routine (Thanksgiving). Holiday routine for personnel not otherwise engaged.

1st Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, and routine guard. Holiday routine for personnel not otherwise engaged.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, and routine guard. Holiday routine for personnel not otherwise engaged.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance and routine guard. Holiday routine for personnel not otherwise engaged.

Sent one motorized patrol to the KOSASA-USUNCURA Area.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 22Nov to 1800, 23Nov45

CT Hq continued disposition of Japanese materiel. Began drawing war trophies for issue to personnel of this regiment.

1st Bn, 28th Mar sent one patrol to the MIKAWACHI, ZOSNIKU, YAMAYA, SATO, ARANOSAKI, SECHIHARA Area. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar sent one patrol to reconnoiter area between IMARI and KARATSU. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar sent one reconnaissance patrol to cover area north of AINOURA. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

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No casualties for the period.

1800, 23Nov to 1800, 24Nov45

CT Hq continued disposition of Japanese materiel. Released that part of SAGA Ken in zone of responsibility to 2d Mar Div at 1000.

1st Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar continued patrol of the area between IMARI and KARATSU. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar sent one reconnaissance patrol to area north of AINOURA. Continued surveillance, training and routine guard.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 24Nov to 1800, 25Nov45

CT Hq continued disposition of Japanese materiel. Continued drawing war trophies for issue to personnel of the regiment.

1st Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar The patrol to the IMARI and KARATSU Area returned to camp at 1700, 25Nov45. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar sent one reconnaissance patrol to the area just north of AINOURA. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 25Nov to 1800, 26Nov45

CT Hq continued disposition of Japanese materiel. Started issuing war trophies to personnel of this regiment. Trophies were issued to officers and enlisted men according to point system, regardless of rank.

1st Bn, 28th Mar sent one reconnaissance patrol to the KURONDA, ARITA, MIYANA, WIMASAKA, HIGASHI-UMEME, IMARI Area. Continued surveillance, training and routine guard.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard. Was relieved of guard in LOVE, MIKE, NAN, OBOE Areas, SASEBO Harbor, by 8th Service Regiment.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar sent one reconnaissance patrol to cover the area north of AINOURA. Continued surveillance, training and routine guard.

No casualties for the period.



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1800, 26Nov to 1800, 27Nov45

CT Hq continued disposition of Japanese materiel. Continued issuing war trophies to personnel of this regiment.

1st Bn, 28th Mar sent one patrol to the YUNOKI, SECHIHARA Area. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar sent one reconnaissance patrol to the area north of AINOURA. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 27Nov to 1800, 28Nov45

CT Hq continued disposition of Japanese materiel. Completed issuing war trophies to personnel of this regiment.

1st Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar sent one reconnaissance patrol to the area north of AINOURA. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

No casualties for the period.

1800, 28Nov to 1800, 29Nov45

CT Hq continued disposition of enemy materiel.

1st Bn, 28th Mar sent one surveillance patrol to YUNOKI, SECHIHARA Area. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, training and routine guard.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar sent one reconnaissance patrol to cover the area north of AINOURA. Continued surveillance, training, and routine guard. Reconnaissance patrol in area north of AINOURA discovered what looked like an Allied cemetery, (1270.5-1126.7) which bore the following names.

SKINNER, O.V.  
WINCHESTER, F.  
HARRISON, F.  
BAILEY, A.  
HONNEYBALL, T.  
HUGHES, T.  
BAGSHAW, R.

DONNELLY, T.  
BRIGHTWELL, T.  
WALSH, P.  
FARMER, J.  
ASKEW, H.  
FOXCRRAFT, C.D.  
LONG, J.E.

MC NAB, J.A.  
BANKS, R.  
HART, L.  
DARE, I.  
MANN, W.  
ROUY, F.

All bodies were buried in one grave, covered by a brick structure which probably contain their ashes. The position does not appear to be over one (1) year old.

No casualties for the period.



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1800, 29Nov to 1800, 30Nov45

CT Hq continued disposing of enemy materiel.

1st Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance and routine guard.

2nd Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance, and routine guard.

3rd Bn, 28th Mar continued surveillance and routine guard. Commenced relief of 1st Bn guard in SASEBO.

No casualties for the period.

At the close of this report, the regiment is preparing for return to the states and subsequent demobilization. The 3d Bn, 6th Marines will relieve the regiment at 1000, 10Dec45.

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# C O N F I D E N T I A L

## 6. JAPANESE COMPLIANCE WITH SURRENDER TERMS

The Japanese were very cooperative in complying with surrender terms in both the FUKUOKA and SASEBO area. However, prior to actual occupation of JAPAN, during the period 15-18 August 1945, certain documents, records, etc., were burned on "orders from Headquarters, TOKYO."

After occupation began, minor instances where failure to comply with terms was evidenced were a result of a misunderstanding of orders. There was no evidence of actual intent to evade the terms.

## 7. SUPPLY, EQUIPMENT, AND LOGISTICS

Let it suffice to say that, with few exceptions, supplies, equipment, and logistics were satisfactory throughout the operations. For a more detailed discussion see Annex DOG.

## 8. SPECIAL FEATURES

### a. Naval Gunfire, Air, Artillery.

Naval gunfire, air, and artillery support never progressed beyond the general planning stage in the regiment. During the voyage from HAWAII to JAPAN plans were laid for utilization of support as outlined in Division and Corps operation plans. None of the support was used or needed since the landing at SASEBO was made without opposition.

### b. Procurement.

Procurement of Japanese labor and materiel was never arranged directly with Home Ministry officers, but with Military Government officers of higher command echelons. See Annex DOG.

### c. Inventory, Safeguarding, and Disposition of Surrendered Materiel.

(1) While operating in the FUKUOKA area under 32d Division control the regiment handled disposition as follows:

(a) Upon locating dumps or warehouse of arms, armament, ammunition, or supplies which had to be destroyed or turned over to the Home Ministry, a representative of the Civil Police Force was taken to the location and signed for the responsibility of guarding the materiel until disposition could be made. Police guards were inspected frequently by a Marine Officer for alertness and sufficiency of number requisite to the size of the dump.

(b) When the Disposition Section was ready to dispose of the materiel, a Battalion Depot Control Group would inventory it and either supervise its destruction by Japanese laborers, or, in the case of foodstuffs and construction material not needed by Allied Forces, would turn it over to the Home Ministry.

(2) In general the same methods of inventory and disposition were used while operating under the 5th Marine Division in the SASEBO area. However, we were not permitted to use Civil Police Guards on uninventoried.



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materiel. Initially, this made necessary the use of about 77% of the regiment on guard and outpost duty. As materiel was disposed of the guards were taken off. See Annex DOG.

### d. Chinese Laborers.

#### (1) FUKUOKA area.

There were approximately 3,800 Chinese laborers divided among eleven mining camps in this area. The laborers were divided into three incompatible factions: Nationalist (or Chiang Kai-Shek) Chinese, Communist Chinese, and volunteer laborers with no party affiliations. They were a constant source of trouble. Fighting was frequent, both among themselves and with the Japanese.

It became necessary on 7 October, 1945 to send Marine detachments to maintain law and order in the mining camps. There were minor difficulties thereafter, but the presence of Marines was usually sufficient to quell any disturbances.

Responsibility for maintaining law and order in the camp was taken over by the 127th Infantry when the regiment returned to SASEBO on 6 Nov 45.

#### (2) SASEBO area.

Only in one instance did the 28th Marines have any dealings with Chinese laborers in this area. On 19 Nov 45 a disturbance was reported in a mining camp at SHISHIMACHI where 177 Chinese were awaiting transportation to HARIO where they were to go aboard ship for CHINA. A detachment of one officer and twenty-five men was sent to the camp to maintain law and order during the night and until the Chinese left the camp for HARIO. No disturbances occurred and the detachment returned to Marine Camp, AINOURA on 20 Nov 45.

### e. Examination of Japanese Repatriates.

While operating under FUKUOKA Occupation Force and 32nd Infantry Division control, CT-28 was responsible for examination of Japanese repatriates entering HAKATA Harbor from ports outside of the main islands of JAPAN. To accomplish this mission, an Examiner Team was organized as follows:

- 1 1st Lt, Chief Examiner
- 1 2nd Lt, Asst To Chief Examiner
- 2 Medical Officers
- 2 Special Agents (CIC)
- 2 Rifle Squads
- 4 Interpreters

Initially, the mission of the Team was to "spot-check" incoming personnel for loot, excess food, excess currency and securities, and to confiscate same; to supervise examination of repatriates by Japanese medical personnel; and to take into custody any suspicious personnel as directed by the CIC component of the Team.



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The Examiner Team functioned continuously from 13Oct45 to 4Nov45 when the 127th Infantry relieved CT-28. The Civil Police were used during this period to maintain order in the dock area and to see to it that all incoming personnel were checked by the Examiner Team. Two to five thousand repatriates were examined daily by the Team.

During the period the Team functioned, no loot, or excess food was found on repatriates. Some securities and a considerable amount of currency in excess of that authorized (200 yen enlisted, 500 yen officers, 1,000 yen civilians) were confiscated however, and turned over to a representative of the Japanese Government.

The regiment was not responsible for handling repatriates while operating in the SASEBO area.

9. CONCLUSION

a. Assault Operation.

(1) Comments:

Thank God we didn't have to fight in JAPAN.

(2) Recommendations:

None.

(b) Occupation Operations.

(1) Comments and Recommendation.

(a) Having adequate shipping for the combat team from embarkation point to target, proved its advantages from the planning phase to the actual landing. The maintenance of one BLT aboard one ship from embarkation to landing eliminated many personnel problems such as occur when complicated transfers are effected enroute to target.

(b) The necessity for joint operations by S-2 and S-3 makes it advisable to consolidate both offices to insure complete coordination.

(c) The T/O strength of the S-2 section was found excessive for operations as encountered in JAPAN. Total strength of two officers and six enlisted is recommended.

(d) The need for one enlisted and two officer linguists in Regt'l Hq was never demonstrated during the occupation since a pool of civilian linguists was maintained by the FUKUOKA Occupation Force and 32nd Infantry Division, under which most of our operations were conducted. It is recommended that the pool system be instituted and continued within the Division language section and that one officer be attached to Regt'l Hq to coordinate requests from each battalion. Battalion enlisted interpreters are necessary and should be continued in their present status.

(e) It is recommended that all questions involving liaison with Japanese officials (except problems purely local in nature) be handled exclusively by Division Headquarters. In some cases it was necessary for S-2.



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to request G-2 personnel and Japanese liaison officials in direct contact with G-2, to provide information which might better have been requested directly by G-2 from their own liaison officers. Verification of liaison reports can best be checked by regiment. The reports themselves should be the subject of direct intercourse between G-2 (or G-3) and the Japanese department concerned.

(f) It is recommended that regiment be informed in advance of steps taken by advance parties, such as seizure of documents or investigation of order of battle. Duplication of effort and consequent "loss of face" has resulted through the efforts of patrol leaders and staff officers who were not informed of similar previous efforts by other echelons.

(g) It is recommended that reports of disposition by any echelon within a particular regimental zone be submitted to the appropriate S-2 office in order that targets files may be kept accurate and up to date at all times.

(h) The unit mission made necessary procurement of a number of motor vehicles in addition to those organic to the regiment. This was accomplished without great difficulty but would have not been necessary if organic one ton trucks had accompanied the regiment. On many occasions it was found necessary to use M29C Cargo Carriers to tow water trailers and to transport patrols. Such use of these special purpose vehicles led to rapid breakdown, and, as a result, the majority were inoperational during most of the occupation. It is recommended that general purpose vehicles be given priority over special types on similar missions in the future.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEGE

*F. E. Haynes*  
F. E. HAYNES,  
Captain, USMC,  
S-3.

ANNEXES: ABLE, Pertinent Operation Orders, Administrative Orders and Overlays Issued During Occupation.

BAKER, S-1 Report.

CHARLIE, S-2 Report.

DOG, S-4 Report.

EASY, Sig Com Report.

DISTRIBUTION: CG, 5th MarDiv (75) CG, 32d InfDiv (1)  
Ea Bn (2)  
Wpns Co (1)  
H&S Co (1)  
Ee StfSec (1)

C O N F I D E N T I A L



C O N F I D E N T I A L

Annex ABLE to 28th Marines, Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN

Administrative Orders, Operation Orders and Sketch- overlays  
Issued During Occupation

1. The following orders and sketch-overlays are included  
in this Annex:

- a. CT-28 AdmO 1-45
- b. CT-28 Warning O 3-45
- c. CT-28 AdmO 4-45
- d. Dispatch, 1020, 7Oct45, Concerning Chinese labor camps.
- e. Dispatch, 1500, 12Oct45, concerning CT zone of responsibility.
- f. CT-28 Opn O 36-45.
- g. Dispatch, 1345, 8Nov45, concerning assignment of zone of responsibility in SASEBO Area.

2. Because of the frequent movement of troops on short notice and the constantly changing situation, most orders were issued verbally over the telephone or in conferences with CO's of units.



CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS, 28TH MARINES  
5TH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,  
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

4 OCTOBER, 1945.

CT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER)

NUMBER.....1-45) : Movement to Fukuoka Area.

Maps: War Dept. Map Kyushu - 1:500,000.

Reference: (a) CT Warning Order No. 3-45.

1. PERSONNEL.

- (a) Uniform and Equipment - as set forth in reference (a).
- (b) Rations - Unit distribution of rations to be carried by individuals to all units of task organization by RQM, 28th Marines, on 4 October 1945, at Bldg. 69, NTS, Ainoura.
- (c) Movement to railhead - as set forth in Annex ABLE, except drivers and passengers in road serials.
- (d) Movement in road serials - as set forth in Annex BAKER.
- (e) Billeting - as arranged by advance billeting detail in accordance with instructions of Commanding General, Fukuoka Occupation Force.
- (f) Stragglers - Unauthorized sightseers and souvenir hunters:
  - 1. In Sasebo area - to be turned over to Provost Marshal, 5th Mar Div.
  - 2. In Fukuoka area - to be turned over to Provost Marshal, Fukuoka Occupation Force.
- (g) Mail.
  - 1. Postal facilities for in-coming and out-going mail to be furnished by postal section attached to 28th Marines.
  - 2. All Navy and Marine Corps personnel will continue to use current FFO addresses.

2. EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.

- (a) Camp equipment, including all storage tents, flies, and prefabricated latrines, will be carried by using organization.
- (b) Movement to rail-head.
  - 1. All units submit requests for required motor transportation of equipment and supplies to this office prior to 1200, 4 October 1945.

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2. Movement priorities - In accordance with personnel priorities as set forth in Annex ABLE.

3. SUPPLY.

(a) Method of Supply. Initially, to all units of task organization through RQM, 28th Marines.

4. RESUPPLY.

(a) Initially, all classes including medical, by rail from 8th Service Regiment, Sasebo, via RQM, 28th Marines.

5. MOTOR TRANSPORTATION.

(a) Routing.

1. All 1/4 and 1 - ton self propelled vehicles by most direct improved road route in road serials set forth in Annex BAKER.
2. Minimum of two (2) passengers in each vehicle proceeding by road to Fukuoka.
3. Vehicles over one (1) ton rated capacity and all trailers to be staged and rail car loaded at Sasebo railroad station on verbal movement orders from this headquarters.
4. All rail loaded vehicles to have fuel tanks 3/4 full.
5. Full combat loads for above vehicles in accordance with rated capacity.

(b) Employment:

1. Low priority vehicles - as directed by MTO, 28th Marines. To be released for combat loading four (4) hours prior to directed staging time.

6. MISCELLANEOUS.

.... (a) Current prohibitions regarding throwing of food to natives to be enforced by units during all phases of this movement.

(b) Units to provide own guards for vehicles and equipment at staging point. Any pilfering of government property to be dealt with promptly and severely.



# CONFIDENTIAL

(c) No food, clothing, or supplies of any nature to be given, sold, or bartered to Japanese civilians or members of Japanese Armed Forces.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEDGE:

DISTRIBUTION:	CG, VAC	(5)	CO, B Co, 5MT BN	(2)
	CG, 5MarDiv	(2)	CO, Auto Repr. Co	(2)
	CO, LT 228	(5)	CO, Serv Co 5 ServBn	(2)
	CO, LT 328	(5)	CO, Supp Co, 5th ServBn	(2)
	CO, H&S Co, 28thMar	(1)	S-1	(1)
	CO, WpnsCo, 28thMar	(1)	S-2	(1)
	CO, C Co, 5EngrBn	(2)	S-3	(2)
	CO, 5th Ord Co	(2)	RQM	(2)
	CO, C Co, 3d MPBn	(2)	RMTO	(1)

## OFFICIAL

/s/ J. W. DOWNER  
Captain, USMCR  
AS - 4.

ANNEX ABLE TO:

CT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER)

: Rail Movement to Fukuoka.

NUMBER.....1-45)

1. RCT-28 will on 5 and 6 October 1945 move by rail to Fukuoka according to the following schedule:

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Time Lv</u> <u>NTS</u>	<u>Time Lv</u> <u>Sasebo RR Sta.</u>	<u>No. Per-</u> <u>sonnel</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Serial</u> <u>Commander</u>
#1	0430, 50Oct	0700	435 3 438	2dBn, 28Mar H&SCo, 28Mar	Captain Saverence
#2	0730, 50Oct	1000	440	2dBn, 28Mar	Captain Naylor
#3	1100, 50Oct	1300	65 235 137 437	CoC-3dMP(Prov) less 1st Plat H&S, 28Mar WpnsCo, 28Mar	1stLt Selders
#4	0430, 60Oct	0700	233 134 367	I Co, 28Mar C Co, 5EngrBn	1stLt Hopkins
#5	0730, 60Oct	1000	238 30 45 33 83 429	3dBn, 28Mar 3dFl, OrdCo 3dFl, ServCo 3dFl, SuppCo B Co & 2dFl 12 Force MT Bn	1stLt Padovano

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#6

1100,60Oct

1300

240

L Co,28Mar

1st Lt

Konover

2. Serial Commanders will be responsible for loading personnel in trucks on the east side of the NTS drill field, unloading troops at the Sasebo Railroad Station, loading baggage and personnel on trains, and unloading at Fukuoka.

3. I Co., 3d Bn, 28th Marines, will remain on the 4th Serial train and continue to Moji.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEDGE

DISTRIBUTION:	CG, VAC	(5)	CO, B Co, 5TH MT BN	(2)
	CG, 5th MarDiv	(2)	CO, Auto Repr Co	(2)
	CO, LT 228	(5)	CO, Serv Co, 5th Serv Bn	(2)
	CO, LT 328	(5)	CO, Supp Co, 5th Serv Bn	(2)
	CO, H&S Co, 28thMar	(1)	S-1	(1)
	CO, "pns Co, 28th Mar	(1)	S-2	(1)
	CO, C Co, 5thEngrBn	(2)	S-3	(2)
	CO, 5th Ord Co	(2)	RQM	(2)
	CO, C Co, 3dMP Bn	(2)	RMTO	(1)

O F F I C I A L

/s/ J. W. DOWNER,  
Captain, USMCR  
S-4

4 October, 1945

ANNEX BAKER TO:

CT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER)

: Road Serials - Fukuoka movement.

NUMBER . . . . . 1-45)

1. Serial I - Commander - 1stLt. C. L. Hrnóir C Co, 3d MP Bn.

<u>VEHICLE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
1/4 T, 4x4, Truck	"C" Co. 3d MP Bn	1
1/4 T, 4x4, Truck	2nd Bn, 28th Mar	8
Cargo Carrier, M29C	2nd Bn, 28th Mar	2
1/4 T, 4x4, Truck	"pns Co 28th Mar	1
1/4 T, 4x4 Truck	H&S Co, 28th Mar	4
1/4 T, 4x4, Ambulance	H&S Co, 28th Mar	2
1 T, 4x4 Truck, cargo	H&S CO, 28th Mar	1
1/4 T, 4x4, Truck	3d Flat, Ord Co	1
1/4 T, 4x4, Truck	"C" Co, 5th Engr Bn	2
1 T, 4x4, Truck	"C" Co, 5th Engr Bn	2
1 T, 4x4, Truck	"C" Co, 3rd MP Bn	1
1/4 T, 4x4, Truck	"C" Co, 3rd MP Bn	3

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2. Serial II - Commander - 1stLt. W.R. Henderson H&S Co,  
28th Marines.

1/4 T, 4x4, Truck	3rd Bn, 28th Mar	9
Cargo Carrier, M29C	3rd Bn, 28th Mar	1
1/4 T, 4x4, Ambulance	H&S Co, 28th Mar	2
1/4 T, 4x4, Truck	3rd Plat, Ord Co.	1
Cargo Carrier, M29C	H&S Co, 28th Mar	1

3. Serial I will form at 0730, 5 October, 1945 in front of RQM Warehouse, 28th Marines Building No. 69. Convoy intervals and speed to be governed by serial commander.

4. Road signs will be followed scrupulously in making this convoy movement.

5. On arrival at KASHII station in Fukuoka Serial Commander will report with convoy to CG, Fukuoka Occupation Force or his representative.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEDGE

DISTRIBUTION:	CG VAC	(5)		
	CG, 5MarDiv	(2)	CO, B Co, 5th MT Bn	(2)
	CO, LT 228	(5)	CO, Auto Repr Co	(2)
	CO, LT328	(5)	CO, Serv Co, 5th Serv Bn	(2)
	CO, H&S Co 28th Mar	(1)	CO, Supp Co, 5th Serv Bn	(2)
	CO, Tpns Co 28th Mar	(1)	S-1	(1)
	CO, C Co, 5th Engr Bn	(2)	S-3	(2)
	CO, 5th Ord Co	(2)	S-2	(1)
	CO, Co Co 3rd MP Bn.	(2)	RQM	(2)
			RMTD	(1)

O F F I C I A L

/s/ J. W. DOWNER,  
Captain, USMCR,  
AS - 4

4 October, 1945.

Addendum #1 to:  
CT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER)

: Movement to Fukuoka Area.  
NUMBER . . . . . 1-45)

1. Unloading - Fukuoka area.

(a) Initially under direction of S-4 BLT 228.

(b) To be directed by RQM, 28th Marines upon arrival  
in Fukuoka.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

(c) Working Party.

1. For organic equipment and supplies - unit responsibility.
2. For CT rations, water, and supplies - company strength working party to be provided by BLT 228 and 3rd Flat, Supply Company.

2. Dumps and Warehouses

(a) Location of temporary dumps and permanent organization warehouses or supply rooms to be as directed by Commanding General, Fukuoka Occupation Force.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEDGE:

DISTRIBUTION:	CG, VAC	(5)	CO, B Co, 5th MT Bn	(2)
	CG, 5thMarDiv	(2)	CO, Auto Repr Co	(2)
	CO, LT 228	(5)	CO, Serv Co, 5th Serv Bn	(2)
	CO, LT 328	(5)	CO, Supp Co, 5th Serv Bn	(2)
	CO, H&S Co, 28thMer	(1)	S-1	(1)
	CO, Wpns Co, 28th Mar	(1)	S-2	(1)
	CO, C Co, 5th Engr Bn	(2)	S-3	(2)
	CO, 5th Ord Co	(2)	HQM	(2)
	CO, C Co, 3rd MF Bn	(2)	RMTD	(1)

O F F I C I A L :

/s/ J. W. DOWNER  
Captain, USMCR,  
AS - 4.

3 October, 1945

CT WARNING ORDER)

: Movement to Fukuoka Area.  
NUMBER.....3-45)

Reference: (a) Disp. 021147/1, CG, 5th MarDiv, dtd 20Oct45.

1. GENERAL.

a. CT 28, less BLT 128, "K" Co, and attachments of those organizations, has been ordered to prepare for early movement to the Fukuoka Area by rail and motor transportation.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L



C O N F I D E N T I A L

b. Movement of personnel and supplies to entraining point, or to Fukuoka by motor serial, will be scheduled by this Headquarters in a forthcoming order.

II. PERSONNEL.

a. All elements of task organization set forth in reference (a), less rear echelon groups established by CO, CT 28.

III. EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.

a. 5th MarDiv will lay down at entraining point all Class I, III, and V supplies necessary for mounting out entire CT except following:

One (1) U/F-all weapons-in hands of troops or in CT dumps.

b. Class II and IV (To be obtained through normal supply agencies).

(1) Class II and IV - less Engineer and Cold Wet-Weather Clothing - 30 das.

(2) Class II - Engineer.

(a) Water Purification Supplies only - 30 das.

c. Equipment.

(1) Organizational.

(a) Minimum necessary to carry out assigned mission for period of thirty (30) days.

(2) Water Purification Units.

(a) "C" Co, 5th Engr Bn, less 1st Plat, will carry sufficient water purification units to provide water for entire task organization.

(3) Chemical Warfare.

(a) Gas masks, protective ointment, and eye-shields, plus 10 das maintenance items, will be carried in unit supply.

IV. SUPPLY.

a. Method of supply to be covered in forthcoming administrative order.

V. RESUPPLY - All Class s.

a. To be covered in forthcoming administrative order.



C O N F I D E N T I A L

VI. INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES.

- a. Uniform-Utility, w/steel helmets; leggings; cartridge belts, w/two (2) filled canteens; normal arms; field transport pack, w/brown side of shelter-half cut.
- b. Cots will be rolled inside bedding rolls and entrucked with troops; loading into baggage or freight cars at entraining point will be accomplished by unit working parties.
- c. Officers' clothing rolls, bedding rolls, and trunks will be handled in the same manner as set forth in VI(b) above.
- d. Units will issue one (1) "K" ration and one (1) "D" ration to each individual prior to movement.
- e. Ammunition - One (1) U/F now in hands of troops.

VII. MEDICAL SUPPLIES.

- a. Spray equipment and DDT in advance echelon or leading elements.
- b. Adequate amounts of other medical supplies sufficient for 30 days.

VIII. VEHICLES.

- a. Employment as prescribed in forthcoming administrative order.
- b. Combat loaded if rail shipped.
- c. Load limit one (1) ton for road serials.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEDGE:

DISTRIBUTION:	CG, VAC	(5)	CO, B Co, 5th MT Bn	(2)
	CG, 5TH MARDIV	(2)	CO, Auto Repr Co	(2)
	CO, LT 228	(5)	CO, Serv Co 5th Serv Bn	(2)
	CO, LT 328	(5)	CO, Sup Co, 5th Serv Bn	(2)
	CO, H&S Co, 28th Mar	(1)	S-1	(1)
	CO, Wpns Co, 28th Mar	(1)	S-2	(1)
	CO, C Co, 5th Engr Bn	(2)	S-3	(2)
	CO, 5th Ord Co	(2)	RQM	(2)
	CO, C Co, 3rd MF Bn	(2)	RMTO	(1)

O F F I C I A L :

/s/ J. W. DOWNER,  
Captain, USMCR,  
AS - 4.

C O N F I D E N T I A L



C O N F I D E N T I A L

28 October, 1945.

CT-28 ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER)

NUMBER.....4-45

Disposition of Enemy War Materials.

Reference: (a) Annes KING, to VAC Administrative Order No. 6-45.  
(b) 32nd InfDiv Memo dated 27 October, 1945.  
(c) Attachment 3, 6th Army Administrative Order 19/2, dated 6 October, 1945.

1. GENERAL.

- a. Purpose - To accomplish all possible disposition and destruction of Japanese war materials in CT-28 area of responsibility.
- b. Classes - Such materials will be divided into the following general classes:
  - (1) Materials and equipment which can be used only for war purposes.
  - (2) Materials and equipment which can be converted to peacetime uses.
- c. Disposition - Materials not required for use of own units will be disposed of as follows:
  - (1) Class I
    - (a) Articles authorized by reference (a) as war trophies will be collected, inventoried, and centrally stored as directed by the CT Disposition Officer.
    - (b) All others - Destroy as directed in reference (c) and turn back resulting scrap to Japanese Home Ministry through CT Procurement Officer.
  - (2) Class II - Turn over to Japanese Home Ministry through CT Procurement Officer.

2. DISPOSITION METHODS

- a. Personnel - The disposition and destruction of materials will be effected by the following CT personnel:
  - (1) A CT-28 Disposition Officer as appointed by the CT Commander with duty of carrying out all disposition as ordered by references and further directives.
    - The Disposition Officer will have no collateral duties and will be responsible for effective functioning of Depot Control groups.
  - (2) The 3rd Platoon, Ordnance Company, 5th MarDiv will be placed at the disposal of the CT Disposition Officer for use in effecting disposition of Japanese Ordnance material.



- (3) Depot Control groups - Each battalion will form three (3) Depot Control groups, each to consist of two (2) non-commissioned officers for supervisory duties, and two (2) Privates first class or privates, record clerks. Rosters of these groups will be submitted to the CT Commander and the CT Disposition Officer in triplicate. These groups will have no collateral duties and will function directly under the CT Disposition Officer.
- (4) RCT Procurement Officer will be appointed to deal with the Japanese Home Ministry through the Procurement Officer, 32nd Inf Div. Dealing directly with above ministry is expressly forbidden for any member of this command.
- (5) Labor - All labor used in destruction or disposition will be Japanese, obtained through the CT Procurement Officer.

b. Inventories will be made on Class I, War Trophies, beginning with those at present in camps occupied by units. The CT Disposition Officer will submit these to the Disposition Officer, 32nd Inf Div as individual warehouse inventories are completed. Inventories of destroyed materials will be made concurrently with disposition and turned in to the Disposition Officer, 32nd Inf Div with all records. Further inventories need not be made of materials to be turned over intact to the Japanese Home Ministry. The receipt obtained by the CT Procurement Officer will be turned over to the Disposition Officer to account for closing out of the dumps concerned.

c. Records - Depot Control groups will maintain Stock and Scrap Record Cards and Debit and Credit Vouchers as set forth in Section IV, reference (a). The CT Disposition Officer will cause a master set of the above records to be kept at CT Headquarters, turning over those kept by individual control groups to the higher echelon when a dump is closed out.

d. Report - The CT Disposition Officer will render weekly reports of control groups to the Disposition Officer, 32nd Inf Div as required in Paragraph 3a, of reference (b).

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEGE:



C O N F I D E N T I A L

DISTRIBUTION: CG, 32nd Inf Div (5) C Co, 5th Engr Bn (2)  
CG, 5th Mar Div (2) C Co, 5th Med Bn (2)  
CO, LT-128 (5) S-1 (1)  
CO, LT-228 (5) S-2 (1)  
CO, 126th FA Bn (5) S-3 (2)  
CO, H&S Co, 28th Mar (1) RQM (2)  
CO, Wpns Co, 28th Mar (1) CT Disposition Officer (2)  
3d Ord Plat (1) RMTD (1)  
B Co, 12th Force MT Bn (2)

O F F I C I A L :

/s/ J. W. DOWNER  
Captain, USMCR,  
S-4.

O P E R A T I O N O R D E R S A N D D I S P A T C H E S

1. TO: BLT-128 1020, 70Oct45

You will send one officer and one NCO plus three groups of one NCO and nine men each to guard three PW camps vicinity IIZUKA this date. On 8Oct45 three groups of one NCO and nine men will be sent to guard three more PW Camps. Total of six groups with one officer in overall command. Men to leave this date will meet Maj Wood at CT Hq Bldg at 1300 this date. Maj Wood will provide orders and guides. BLT-128 provides transportation and supplies. Suggest one Jeep and trailer remain with officer commanding group. These groups should be relieved weekly. Group makes reports direct to Maj Wood. Men should take all personal gear and should carry at least one U/F.

HAYNES S-3

TO: BLT 128, 228 1500, 120Oct45

2. 1 RCT 28's zone of responsibility has been extended as shown on enclosure (a) (See Sketch - overlay showing zone fr 120Oct to 140Oct).  
2 Units will continue execution of assigned missions and will initiate further missions in areas newly assigned.

HAYNES S-3



RCT - 28 (- 3d Bn)  
In the Field  
0800I, 24 October, 1945.

Opn Order)  
: Reassignment of Occupation Zone of Responsibility.  
No. 36-45)

Map: AMS L571, Central JAPAN, 1:250,000.

TASK ORGANIZATION:

(a) <u>1st Bn, 28th Mar</u>	Lt Col BUTTERFIELD
(b) <u>2nd Bn, 28th Mar</u>	Lt Col McDONOUGH
(c) <u>126th Fld Arty Bn</u>	Lt Col KEARNS
(d) <u>RCT - 28 Hq Gp:</u>	Col LIVERSEDGE

28th Marines (-1st, 2d, 3d Bns, 126th Fld Arty Bn, Wpns Co)  
Co C, 5th Med Bn  
Co C, 5th Engr Bn (-3d Plat)  
3d Plat, Ord Co, 5th Serv Bn  
3d Plat, Serv Co, 5th Serv Bn  
3d Plat, Sup Co, 5th Serv Bn

1. a. Current intelligence summaries.  
b. 32d Inf Div at 0800I, 24Oct45, relieves FOF of all tactical responsibility and assumes command of assigned zone of responsibility and completes implementation of missions outlined in VAC Opn Plan 2-45 and instituted by FOF.
2. RCT-28 assumes command of assigned zone of responsibility 0800I, 24Oct45; continues and completes implementation of missions outlined by FOF and 32d Inf Div. (See sketch-overlay showing zone fr 24Oct to 6Nov45)
3. a. 1st Bn, 28th Mar will:
  - (1) Continue execution of assigned missions in zone of responsibility.
  - (2) Execute further missions assigned by CO, RCT-28.



C O N F I D E N T I A L

b. 2nd Bn, 28th Mar will:

- (1) Continue execution of assigned missions in zone of responsibility.
- (2) Execute further missions assigned by CO, RCT-28.

c. 126th Fld Arty Bn will:

- (1) Relieve as soon as practicable all other units of RCT-28 in assigned zone of responsibility.
- (2) Execute missions assigned by CO, RCT-28.

d. RCT-28 Hq Gp will:

- (1) Continue checking repatriated Japanese entering HAKATA Harbor for loot, excess food, and weapons. Continue execution of other assigned missions in RCT zone of responsibility.

x. (1) Place special emphasis on:

- (a) Prevention of looting.
- (b) Execution of sanitary precautions in assigned billets.

- (2) Dispose of enemy equipment in accordance with a disposition directive to be issued later.

4. No change.

5. a. Index 20, SOI, 20Sept45, 32d Inf Div.

b. Cl's	32d Inf Div	FUKUOKA
	126th Fld Arty Bn	KASHII Station
	1st Bn, 28th Mar	KYUSHU Airplane School
	2nd Bn, 28th Mar	KASHII Station
	RCT-28	EAST PARK, FUKUOKA

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEDGE

/s/ F. E. HAYNES,  
Captain, USMC,  
S-3.

ANNEX: ABLE (Opn overlay)

DISTRIBUTION:	1st Bn (3)	En StfSec (1)	Co C, 5th MedBn(1)
	2d Bn (3)	CG, 32d InfDiv (1)	3d Flat, OrdCo (1)
	126th Fld Arty Bn (3)	Co C, 5thEngrBn(1)	3d Flot, ServCo(1)
	F-I-L-E (1)		3d Flat, SupCo (1)



C O N F I D E N T I A L

OPERATION ORDERS AND DISPATCHES (CONTINUED)

TO: 1st Bn, 2nd Bn, 3rd Bn.

1345, 8Nov45

4. Enclosure: (a) Overlay showing Zones of Responsibility. (see sketch overlay showing zones fr 6Nov to 30Nov45)
- (1) Effective upon receipt this msg, units assume responsibility of zones as shown on Enclosure (A)
- (2) Responsibility includes: a. Exercising surveillance over zone. b. Posting guards as ordered by this Hq or as deemed necessary by Bn C.O. c. Initiating patrols to cover assigned zone to insure that no military installations or storage areas exist that have been overlooked by previous patrols. Submit daily with Opns report an overlay showing routes covered by patrols. Use map scale 1:25,000 or 1:250,000.
- (3) S-2, 28 will furnish list of targets previously covered by patrols.
- (4) Disposition of enemy material will be a function of this Hq and will be handled by the Regimental Disposition Officer and Depot Control Groups as organized at present.

HAYNES S-3


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C O N F I D E N T I A L



30NOV45  
 SKETCH-OVERLAY SHOWING  
 CT-28 ZONE OF RESPONSIBILITY  
 6-120CT45  
 MAPS: AMS, L571 CENTRAL JAPAN SHEET 45  
 1:250,000

F. E. HAYNES,  
 CAPT, USMC,  
 S-3.




1370  
 1180

1399

CONFIDENTIAL

- 15 -





1400

30NOV45


SKETCH-OVERLAY SHOWING  
CT-28 ZONE OF RESPONSIBILITY

12-24OCT45

MAPS: VAC OCCUPATIONAL  
ZONE, SHEET 2

F. E. HAYNES,  
CAPT USMC,  
S-3.






30NOV45  
 SKETCH-OVERLAY SHOWING  
 CT-28 ZONE OF RESIONSIBILITY  
 24OCT - 5NOV45.  
 (126TH FLD ARTY BN WAS ATTACHED TO  
 CT-28 FROM 21OCT TO 1NOV45 BUT  
 NEVER RHYSICALLY TOOK OVER A BN ZONE  
 WITHIN THE CT ZONE).  
 MAP: AMS, L571 CENTRAL JAPAN SHEET 45  
 1:250,000.

F. E. HAYNES,  
 CAPT, USMC,  
 S-3.



EAST CHINA SEA



SKETCH-OVERLAY SHOWING  
CT-28 ZONE OF RESPONSIBILITY  
6-24NOV45 (SINGLE SOLID LINE)  
24-30NOV45 (DOUBLE BROKEN LINE)  
(ON 24NOV45 THAT PORTION OF  
SAGA KEN IN CT-28'S ZONE  
PASSED TO CONTROL OF 2D MARDIV)  
MAP: AMS, L571 CENTRAL JAPAN  
SHEET 45  
1:250,000

F. E. HAYNES,  
CAPT USMC,  
S-3.



C O N F I D E N T I A L

Annex BAKER to 28th Marines Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

S-1 REPORT

During the planning phase for the OLYMPIC OPERATION, the S-1 section conducted school for its command post personnel, both in the office and in the field. Upon receipt of directives for the occupation of JAPAN, all personnel had been thoroughly + trained, and embarkation plans were drawn up. The following table shows assignments to each of the ships allocated to CT-28:

HAMBLETON (APA-114)

CT-28 (Command Ship)

CT-28, less 3 Bns & M-7 Platoon	28	331
Co C, 5th Engr Bn, less 3 Platoons	2	35
Co C, 5th Med Bn, less Coll Section	7	44
Det., ASCO, 5th Mar Div	2	11
Liaison Party, 5th Tk Bn	1	3
Liaison Party, 3d Bn 13th Mar	1	3
Co D, 3d Prov MP Bn	5	58
	<u>46</u>	<u>485</u>

MONTROSE (APA-212)

BLT-128

1st Bn, 28th Marines	42	891
1st Plat, Co C, 5th Engr Bn	1	44
1/3 Coll Sec, Co C, 5th Med Bn		14
Det, ASCO, 5th Mar Div		5
Liaison Party, 5th Tk Bn		3
Liaison Party, 3d Bn, 13th Mar	2	12
	<u>45</u>	<u>969</u>

KINGSBURY (APA-177)

BLT-228

2nd Bn, 28th Marines	41	872
2d Plat, Co C, 5th Eng Bn	1	44
1/3 Coll Sec, Co C, 5th Med Bn		14
Det, ASCO, 5th Mar Div	3	16
Liaison Party, 5th Tk Bn		3
Liaison Party, 3d Bn, 13th Mar	2	12
	<u>47</u>	<u>961</u>

SEVIER (APA-233)

BLT-328

3d Bn, 28th Marines	43	891
3d Plat, Co C, 5th Engr Bn		45
1/3 Coll Sec, Co C, 5th Med Bn		14
Det, ASCO, 5th Mar Div	4	27
Plat, Co D, 3d Prov MP Bn	1	24
Liaison Party, 5th Tk Bn		3
Liaison Party, 3d Bn, 13th Mar	2	12
	<u>50</u>	<u>1017</u>



C O N F I D E N T I A L

MERRICK (AKA-97)

H&S Co.	6	37
1st Bn,	1	
2d Bn	1	
3d Bn	1	
Co C, 5th Engr Bn	1	22
Co C, 5th Med Bn		5
3d Bn, 13th Marines		6
	<u>10</u>	<u>70</u>
Total CT-28 Troops Embarked	198	3502
Attached for transportation	103	1434
Total Embarked	301	4936

2. Commanding Officers of Troops aboard each vessel were furnished sufficient Post Exchange supplies for health and comfort of personnel embarked, and the American Red Cross provided books, playing cards and other games suitable for shipboard use.

3. Assignment of Chaplains was made by the Division G-1, with a view to providing each ship with both a Catholic and a Protestant Chaplain.

4. Immediately upon arrival at Pearl Harbor, on August, 28, 1945, and during the period the ships of CT-28 were anchored there, liberty was authorized for 50% of all personnel daily, from 0900 until 1800.

5. During the voyage from PEARL HARBOR to SAIPAN, all personnel of the S-1 Section were thoroughly briefed on the operation, and functioned normally with respect to administration. During the period September 13 to 16, inclusive, 1945, ships of CT-28 were at anchor at SAIPAN. Due to lack of recreational facilities ashore, no liberty was granted.

6. During the period September 22 to October, 6, 1945 the CT Command Post was set up at the former Naval Training Station, AINOURA, and personnel in that area were billeted in barracks thereat. Commencing 10 Oct 45 liberty in the SASEBO-AINOURA Area was authorized for 25% of all personnel daily from 0900 to 1800. By coordination with S-4, trucks were provided for liberty parties to SASEBO, and return.

7. On 6 October, 1945, the Command Post was moved to FUKUOKA, and established in the IFOTEI Building in East Park, which also housed the FUKUOKA Occupation Force CP. Personnel were quartered in the Japanese Gymnasium in East Park. liberty was granted daily from 0900 to 1800 for 33-1/3% of the personnel, which was later modified to provide one day liberty each seven days; on 30 October, liberty hours were extended to 2300.

8. On 6 November, 1945, the Command Post returned to Marine Camp, AINOURA, all CT-28 Troops having returned to the SASEBO Area.

9(a) During the entire period covered by this report, the "I"-Section functioned normally, executing all administrative details devolving upon it.



C O N F I D E N T I A L

(b) Religious services were conducted at least once each week, the Chaplains moving from Area to Area in order to accomplish this.

(c) The American Red Cross representative distributed articles for health and comfort as they became available, and investigated family matters for officers and enlisted as required.

(d) No prisoners of war.

(e) No combat casualties.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVEREDGE

*M. S. Smith*  
M. S. SMITH  
1stLt, USMC  
S-1

APPENDICES:

1. Special Service Report
2. Post Office Report.



C O N F I D E N T I A L

Appendix 1 to Annex BAKER (S-1 Report), to Operation Report, 28th  
Marines Occupation of JAPAN.

SPECIAL SERVICE REPORT

1. The Regimental Special Service section was formed on 29 September, 1945, pursuant to a directive from the Commanding General, 5th Marine Division, with First Lieutenant Harry B. Pierce (032051), U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, as officer in charge, and Second Lieutenant Richard A. Sprowls (044054), U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, as educational guidance officer. In accordance with the same directive, each battalion appointed a special service officer, and formed a Special Service section. All Special Service sections were fully staffed and in operation by 1 October, 1945.
2. While at Marine Camp, AINOURA, during the period October 1 to 5, inclusive, 1945, outdoor movies were held in the regimental area when weather permitted. When inclement weather prevailed, personnel attended the 5th Marine Division movies inside one of the camp warehouses.
3. Upon arrival at FUKUOKA on 6 October, 1945, the Regimental Special Service section sponsored or conducted the following program.
  - (a) Movies held daily at 2d Bn area. Arrangements made for Japanese operators and projectors for movies at 1st Bn area and 3d Bn at MOJI. Films alternated among units.
  - (b) Frequent contacts made for distribution of newspapers and magazines to all units.
  - (c) Two representatives sent to SASEBO for Corps Educational Conference, October 21-27, 1945.
  - (d) Daily mimeographed newspaper published.
  - (e) Two boxing smackers held at 1st Bn area. Prizes given to contestants; transportation provided for men wishing to attend from other areas; bank concert before bouts.
  - (f) Arranged for Division Band Concerts at 2nd Bn area: gave first group of high point discharges sent-off at KASHII Station.
  - (g) Arranged for conducted tours through KYUSHU Imperial University.
  - (h) Japanese Language School in progress at 2d Bn area when Regiment returned to SASEBO. Japanese Professor from KYUSHU Imperial University met with approximately 30 enrollees. Instructors' lesson plan mimeographed by Special Service.
  - (i) Educational survey made of all men in 28th Marines and report made to Division, including (a) subject most interested in; (b) teachers available; (c) number taking correspondence courses from MCI and USAFI.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

- (j) Textbooks issued battalions for self-study courses.
  - (k) Wrapping paper and twine furnished personnel for mailing packages.
  - (l) Arranged for personnel to use sailboats in 1st Bn area.
  - (m) Transportation furnished daily for liberty parties going to FUKUOKA.
  - (n) Sponsored Regimental Halloween Dance for officers October 31. Army Nurses were guests.
  - (o) Athletic field cleaned and made suitable for three (3) softball fields in FUKUOKA.
  - (p) Basketball and volleyball tournaments held in 2d Bn area. 2d Bn invited Japanese teams and played games on Sundays.
  - (q) 1st Bn had advantage of adequate gymnasium facilities for indoors sports and movies. Japanese experts gave demonstrations in Judo and Kendo.
  - (r) 2d Bn had well-equipped Recreation Hall. Loudspeakers arranged for programs to be received in several different places. Published weekly mimeographed newspaper variety of games, newspapers, library books, reading writing tables, ping-pong tables.
  - (s) Sports equipment pre-rated to all battalions.
4. Upon moving to Marine Camp, AINOURA on November 6, the following program was carried out:
- (a) All personnel briefed on opportunities offered in Division School. Approximately 250 enrolled in the school.
  - (b) Lectures on Veteran Benefits given to all available personnel periodically.
  - (c) Four members, one from each battalion and H&S attending Corps Special Service School at SASSEBO November 17-23, 1945.
  - (d) Participated in field day on Marine Corps Birthday, November 10, 1945.
  - (e) 3d Bn operates beer hall for enlisted men.
  - (f) Battalion Special Service personnel made daily trip to receive and distribute current periodicals, newspapers, magazines, etc.
  - (g) 28th Marines movie operated in 2d Bn area.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L



C O N F I D E N T I A L

) (h) 28th Marines won the softball tournament and competed in touch football and other sports.

(i) Arranged boxing smoker on 22Nov45.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEGE

*M. S. Smith*

M. S. SMITH  
1stLt, USMC  
S-1

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

Appendix 2 to Annex BAKER (S-1 Report, to Operation Report, 28th Marines, Occupation of JAPAN.

POST OFFICE REPORT

The Regimental Post Office was under the supervision of Captain Clarence S. Wick, (AFM), U.S. Marine Corps. The operating personnel were members of Headquarters Company, Headquarters Battalion, 5th Marine Division and all instructions concerning the Post Office were issued by the Division Postal Officer.

The personnel disembarked at SASEBO 24 September, 1945 and the regimental post office was installed in building #37, Marine Camp, AINOURA. Stamps were placed on sale 27 September, 1945, but no money order business was opened until after moving to FUKUOKA on 6 October 1945. This move caused the Post Office to be closed two days and business was resumed on 8 October, 1945, at which time both stamps and money orders were sold. While at FUKUOKA a branch for the sale of stamps and mailing of letters was opened at the Base Force Headquarters building and packages were mailed at the KASHII Warehouse Camp station where the main Post Office was located.

The post office was again moved to Marine Camp, AINOURA on 3 November 1945, leaving a branch with the Base Force at FUKUOKA, and business was reopened 5 November 1945.

\$5,000 in postage stamps was normally carried on hand throughout the occupation operation.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEDGE

*M. S. Smith*  
M. S. SMITH  
1stLt, USMC  
S-1

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

ANNEX CHARLIE, to 28th MARINES Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN

INTELLIGENCE

A. Narrative of planning for assault and occupation missions.

1. Maps, photographs, hydrographic, weather, terrain and other information furnished, its accuracy and adequacy.

a. Assault.

Preliminary orders for the assault operation were received by this regiment on 1 August, 1945. On that date a conference room was established under guard for the use of the Regimental Staff, and planning commenced.

Sample maps of 1:250,000 and 1:50,000 scale, plus area studies of Southern KYUSHU, aerial photos of the VAC zone of responsibility and hydrographic charts of the VAC landing beaches were furnished the regiment in sufficient quantities for initial study.

On 12 August, due to the imminence of surrender by the Japanese Government, the assault plans were halted and all pertinent material was later recalled by the 5th Marine Division.

On 20 August, preliminary plans for the present operation were received and planning recommenced for the occupation of Northern KYUSHU.

b. Occupation.

Through the cooperation of the G-2 Mapping and Photographic section, the combat team was always well supplied in advance with adequate maps, photos and information material for each occupational mission. However, rapid changes in the regimental zone of responsibility while attached to FUKUOKA Occupation Force, made it difficult to maintain complete coverage in any single scale.

1:500,000 Road Map. This map was of little tactical value, but was useful to motor transport units operating over the main road net.

LMS L571, 1:250,000, Central JAPAN. This map was adequate for strategic purposes and was employed mainly for plotting battalion and regimental zones of responsibility. It was useful for patrols only when covering improved highways.

LMS L772, 1:50,000, KYUSHU. Although this was used as the basic operations, patrol and situation map, its value was limited by the faulty editing and poor reproduction of certain sheets. Since it was not up to date, many installations, highways, etc. were not found as shown. In one case a battalion command post occupying reclaimed land appeared by coordinates to be several yards at sea.



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AMS L872, 1:25,000, KYUSHU. This map was profitably employed as a situation map covering concentrated areas both in SASEBO and FUKUOKA. It was used to augment the 1:50,000 map when complete coverage was not readily available. However, the same general criticisms apply as in the case of AMS L772, 1:50,000.

Aerial mosaics, town plans and information sheets furnished by G-2 in ample quantities were used extensively by advance billeting parties and for locating important targets in industrial areas. Continuance of their use is recommended.

## 2. Data furnished by advance reconnaissance detail.

Prior to debarkation in SASEBO Harbor this regiment was furnished with adequate information on the landing beaches, road conditions, billeting facilities, disposition of Japanese troops and local compliance with the surrender terms. The majority of information provided was of general, rather than intelligence value.

## B. Training and organization of Intelligence Section for Occupational Mission.

### 1. Training.

Training films formed the basis of much of the intelligence section's instruction both prior to and following the enemy surrender. Motion pictures of every available phase of Japanese living, including government, home and social life, agriculture, industry, sports and recreation were augmented by lectures in general subjects such as civil government, military customs and courtesy and interior guard duty.

Attached linguists conducted instruction in civilian phrases before embarkation and while enroute to JAPAN. This training was accompanied by large-scale distribution of individual phrase books and lectures on Japanese psychology, customs and history.

Japanese maps were used in training, while road patrols and both topographical and area sketching were emphasized.

### 2. Organization.

To handle the numerous required reports and records, five additional typewriters, provided by G-2, were divided among the regimental and battalion intelligence sections and clerical ability was sought among replacements joining these sections.

The allowed T/O strength of three officers and twenty-two enlisted was found excessive for occupational duty so long as no patrols were required of the regimental intelligence section. Consequently, strength was reduced in October to two officers and eight men.



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### C. Intelligence Functioning During Occupation.

1. Collection and verification of information from Jap Army, Navy, Airforce.

The main function of the regiment in this regard was the physical checking of demobilization reports, inventories, and other information submitted directly to higher echelon by Japanese Army and Navy liaison officials. These investigations were accomplished by battalion patrols. In cases involving Order of Battle reports, the patrols were accompanied by G-2 linguists attached to regimental headquarters.

In certain instances, such as while exercising control over shipping in HAKATA Harbor, liaison was performed directly with Army, Navy, prefectural police and shipping officials by S-2 and S-3, using attached G-2 officer interpreters.

2. Inventorying Jap equipment.

Actual inventorying of Japanese equipment was not handled by the intelligence section. However, infantry patrol leaders were instructed to spot-check all major items encountered during their operations. Records of equipment thus reported, including the location, description, and amount, were maintained by this section for the information of disposition officers. In FUKUOKA these files, plus related maps and overlays were kept up to date and delivered to disposition officers of the 127th Army Regiment when our zone of responsibility passed to Army control. Similar records covering this regiment's operations in SASEBO area were compiled and maintained on a day to day basis.

3. New equipment encountered.

Patrol leaders were not especially qualified to determine whether or not Jap equipment was new or hitherto unknown by our forces. However, since all items were reported to S-2 and S-3 through channels, any equipment of unusual interest was immediately reported by this regiment to higher echelon.

Visiting officers of special intelligence units such as NAVTECHJAP, were furnished with maps by S-2 and directed through S-2 and S-3 channels to those installations which they sought to investigate in our zone. On occasion, the investigation of S-2 files by these officers proved helpful in checking aircraft, radar and other equipment previously reported in our zone.

4. Liaison with Japanese Forces.

Japanese liaison officials were available through 5th Marine Division Headquarters while the regiment was operating in SASEBO, and through FUKUOKA Occupation Force and 32nd Infantry Division Headquarters while operating in the FUKUOKA area.



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Since these officers were in contact with Army, Navy and Prefectural Headquarters, they were able to assist greatly in the location of undemobilized units and in guiding patrols or staff officers to installations when exact locations were unknown.

Prior to and following the FUKUOKA phase, little need for liaison was necessary in the SASEBO area, since this regiment was initially in reserve and upon its return to AINOURA most matters requiring dealings with the Japanese, except demobilization, had been accomplished by the two previous occupation regiments.

## 5... Civilian attitude.

Cooperation on the part of all Japanese civilians was uniformly excellent. Misunderstandings arose on some occasions due to the differences of language and the general Japanese tendency to avoid direct answers in conversation. Our advance patrols in each area were usually viewed with some concern, particularly in urban areas. In all cases, however, local officials and civilian police were cooperative even to the extent of feeding and entertaining the members of reconnaissance units in addition to providing all required information.

## 6. Language personnel distribution.

All linguists were used constantly as instructors during the planning phase and while enroute to our objective. Lectures in phrases, conversation, psychology, geography, etc., were delivered to all troops prior to landing.

For occupation, as for combat, two language officers and one enlisted linguist were attached to regimental headquarters from G-2, plus one enlisted linguist per battalion. On 7 November, an additional officer and enlisted interpreter, familiar with our zone, were attached to the regiment to aid in the disposition of surrendered material.

During both periods of occupation in SASEBO, this number was more than sufficient for patrol operations, maintenance and liaison.

While the regiment operated under FUKUOKA Occupation Force and 32nd Infantry Division control, the regimental language force was inadequate to handle numerous patrols and was augmented by the drafting of several English-speaking Japanese daily from a pool maintained initially by Force and later by the 32nd Infantry Division. Procurement was handled by attached language officers through intelligence channels.

So long as this civilian pool was available, one language officer in regimental headquarters was sufficient.

### a. Handling of documents.



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No documents of intelligence value were translated within the regiment. Maps and inventories (many of which were in English) comprised virtually all documents handled by our attached interpreters and these were immediately forwarded to higher intelligence channels. Such information as had not already been burned by the Japanese or turned over directly to higher echelon officials was gained largely by interrogation. In some instances, necessary translations to and from the English were made by Japanese liaison personnel under the supervision of our linguists.

b. Interrogations.

Much valuable information was derived through patrol and investigative interrogations conducted by the two officer linguists. Neither the enlisted linguists nor the civilian Japanese interpreters possessed the vocabulary required for detailed military conversations.

All information thus derived was made the subject of periodic or special reports to G-2.

7. Release of Allied PW's.

This section had no contact with Allied prisoners of war.

8. Repatriation of foreign nationals.

Koreans were the only foreign nationals repatriated from the regimental zone of responsibility, although close supervision was maintained over Chinese awaiting return to their homeland from mining camps in KYUSHU.

In the case of the Koreans, the regiment was not involved except to supervise civilian police and Korean liaison officials in the maintenance of law, order and sanitation.

Guard detachments were maintained in the various mining camps occupied by Chinese laborers and close administration maintained.

The intelligence section was not involved in the repatriation of other foreign nationals, since none was encountered.

9. Repatriation of Japanese nationals from abroad.

The only contact with repatriated Japanese experienced by this regiment occurred during operations in the FUKUOKA area. In this connection, joint supervision was maintained by S-2 and S-3 over all personnel and troops debarking at HAKATA Harbor from ports other than those in the Japanese home islands during the period 14 October to 5 November, 1945. Several conferences involving S-2 and S-3 with local police and harbor authorities were necessary prior to the initiation of the program.

Under this plan, Examiner Teams, consisting of officers, interpreters and several enlisted men, inspected all incoming shipping to check compliance with SCAP directives including searches for loot, securities and excessive amounts of currency. S-2 submitted daily reports including all facts concerning sailing orders, status and destination of passengers, both military and civilian. Complete Order of Battle information was also reported on all military passengers.



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Commencing 18 October, this headquarters impounded several thousand pounds of mail from incoming and outgoing vessels in coordination with the 4th Advance Gensership Detachment and during the same period Examiner Teams confiscated approximately thirty thousand excess yen in the hands of repatriated Japanese, which was later delivered by S-2 to local customs authorities upon orders from G-2, 32nd Infantry Division.

D. Japanese compliance with surrender terms.

Military forces and civilians in our zone appear to have complied with the surrender terms after the landing of our occupational forces. Prior to that date, however, notably during the period 15 - 18 August, when surrender intent became known locally, as in the case of officers at ASHIYA Airfield (1370.1-1200.5) and 4th AA Division Temporary Headquarters at TSUKUSHI (1361.5-1151.8), classified documents were burned, meteorological and other technical equipment destroyed or distributed, and looting, blamed on "civilians, children and the typhoon" took place at some military installations. No positive evidence of post-occupational evasion was discovered.

E. Comments and recommendations.

1. Occupational operations demonstrated the need for close coordination between S-2 and S-3, since guards, patrols, demobilization of Japanese forces and liaison activities usually involved joint supervision. It is recommended that the S-2 and S-3 offices and staffs be combined in battalion and regiment in future occupational assignments.

2. It is recommended that the S-2 Section be reduced in strength and organized as follows: Two officers, one section chief (capable of organizing, composing and supervising reports and records), two clerks, one draftsman, one assistant draftsman, and one runner. Total: Two officers and six enlisted.

3. In many instances it was found that intelligence material had been collected with or without receipt by other units or technical specialists operating in the regimental zone. Without a standardized receipt form accompanied by instructions to the Japanese, it was impossible for patrol leaders to determine the truth of many of their statements concerning the previous confiscation or disposition of material. Unless all echelons are instructed to coordinate partial or complete disposition through intelligence channels, all records of installations and their contents are useless and the accuracy of Japanese inventories cannot be verified.

4. The need for maintenance of accurate up to date intelligence and disposition records by each unit cannot be overemphasized in those areas subject to constantly changing occupational forces. Very little information concerning the intelligence activities of previous units occupying the final SASEBO zone of responsibility was available. As a result, duplication of previous efforts was unavoidable.



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5. Since Japanese liaison officials were closely associated with Division headquarters, duplication of effort occurred in FUKUOKA on some occasions when the regimental S-2 was called upon to furnish strategic guard and demobilization reports. This necessitated borrowing the Japanese liaison officials who might better have submitted their reports directly to G-2. Therefore, in order to avoid such a duplication in the future, it is recommended that the regimental function be that of checking the accuracy and veracity of liaison reports but that the reports themselves be the result of direct intercourse between G-2 and the Japanese officials concerned.

6. Although the enlisted interpreters were constantly employed in each battalion, the need for three linguists in regimental headquarters was never demonstrated. It is suggested that the pool system be established in Division headquarters and that one officer, assisted by one enlisted linguist, be attached to each regimental S-2 section to conduct the procurement of interpreters for each battalion in addition to handling special interrogation assignments.

7. It is felt that documentary translation is beyond the scope of the regimental section and should be accomplished exclusively by higher echelon except in minor cases of tactical emergency.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEDGE

*W. C. O'Donnell*  
W. C. O'DONNELL  
1stLt, USMCR  
S-2.



# C O N F I D E N T I A L

Annex DOG to 28th Marines Operations Report, Occupation of JAPAN

## 1. PLANNING

30 November, 1945

### S-4 REPORT

#### a. Assault Operation.

S-4 planning for an intended assault on the Japanese islands began during July of this year with a preliminary study of weather, road, and beach conditions in the target area. During this period certain service personnel from units of the regiment, both officer and enlisted, were required to attend a familiarization class in nomenclature, fitting, and proper use of cold wet-weather clothing. Knowledge acquired in this class was of value to quartermaster personnel in ensuing operations. During the first two weeks of August, service personnel received practical training in supply matters during battalion and regimental landing exercises and field problems.

#### b. Occupation Operation.

Planning for the occupation was hurried and consisted largely of formulation of loading plans by the Transport Quartermaster (Appendix 1). Other S-4 planning was mainly determination of equipment separation into forward and rear echelon groups, such determination being based on directives from higher authority and study of the unit mission.

## 2. SUPPLY

#### a. General.

Initial supplies of all classes were placed aboard vessels transporting the RCT in quantities approximating those set forth in 5th MarDiv Administrative Memorandum No. 33-45. These were mainly supplies, IOE, and were spotted dockside on request of Transport Quartermasters, and loaded in such manner that each vessel had aboard a horizontal section of all supplies. Resupply after landing was through normal channels while in the SASEBO Area and by rail direct from the 8th Service Regiment while in the FUKUOKA Area. During the latter period the service elements of the regiment acted as supply agency for troops in approximately brigade strength, including some U.S. Army units. In spite of this increased load, supply functioning was efficient at all times and all difficulties arising were promptly overcome. On return to the SASEBO Area on 6 November 1945, supply was again taken up through normal channels and proceeded smoothly for the remainder of the operation.

#### b. Class I

##### (1) Rations

Emergency type rations were issued to the troops prior to debarkation and they were subsisted on such during the initial stay in the SASEBO Area. "B" type rations were used during the first days



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in FUKUOKA; however, self containment was lost on this ration because of the great increase in the number of troops supplied and it was necessary to revert to emergency types until resupply could be effected. Adequate rations were provided at all times, although it became necessary to supplement the 10-in-1 type ration with an issue of 1/3 "C" ration in a few instances. Fresh bread was served for two days only, during the FUKUOKA phase destruction of the bakery by fire on the third day of its operation made further issue impossible. Replacement of ovens was never effected, but the lack of bread was partially compensated for by issuance of ingredients to unit galleys. "A" type rations were issued on two occasions in the FUKUOKA Area and became a regular item upon return to SASEBO.

(2) Water

Sufficient portable water was carried in supplies, FOB, for all cooking and drinking purposes until water purification units could begin functioning. During the FUKUOKA phase purified water was supplied to approximately 5,000 U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine personnel on the basis of a minimum of 2 1/2 gallons per man per day. No untreated water was issued for drinking purposes at any time during the operation.

c. Class 2

Class 2 supplies were generally adequate throughout the operation. Expenditure of allowances created temporary shortages from time to time but resupply was effected before curtailment of activities or hardship resulted.

d. Class 3

Supplies of this class were always ample and sufficient stocks always on hand in dumps to meet any eventuality.

e. Class 4

Critical shortages of items which would fall in this class developed on several occasions during the operation. The most notable were cold wet-weather clothing, screen wire, and DDT powder. Additional clothing was procured before hardship or danger to health was suffered and special measures taken to secure the other items which were required for health and comfort.

f. Class 5

Supplies of this class were carried in sufficient quantity at all times. Very little expenditure occurred except for normal loss on issues to troops, and demolitions used in disposition work.



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### 3. EQUIPMENT

Equipment carried by the regiment on this operation was generally adequate for all needs, with one or two exceptions. It is believed that one ton trucks, many of which were left in the base echelon, would have been of more value than the M29C Cargo Carriers which were carried. Engineer equipment was notable for its excellent performance and suitability for the mission; nothing was in excess and nothing lacking.

### 4. LOGISTICS

#### a. Transportation

Movement of units from place to place on KYUSHU was accomplished largely by rail during the initial stages of the operation. This was due to the condition of the roads and the fact that many bridges had to be rebuilt or repaired before heavy vehicles could use them. Rail transportation was efficiently handled at all times and troop movements made on schedules comparing favorably with similar moves on United States rail lines. Supply in the FUKUOKA Area was over the same rail net and left nothing to be desired.

#### b. Drums and Pellets

Tilson drums were used extensively for organic supplies, equipment, and clothing on the various moves and were highly satisfactory, reducing pilferage and labor in handling. Pellets were used to some extent during the waterborne move to the target but were not used thereafter.

#### c. Traffic

Movement of traffic was generally satisfactory after Engineer repairs to roads and bridges had been made. No difficulty was experienced in reversing normal driving procedure, that is, driving to the left instead of right.

### 5. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

#### a. Assault Operation.

No comments or recommendations

#### b. Occupation Operation.

##### (1) Rations

10-in-1 type rations were found to be highly satisfactory for use of patrols or small groups doing individual cooking, but were not suitable for use by unit galleys because of the inadequacy of the menu as regards the mid-day meal. It is recommended that a higher



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proportion of "B" or "C" rations be carried on this type operation, particularly where a cold, wet climate is to be encountered.

(2) Sanitary Supplies.

During the opening phases of the operation, and when units occupied new areas, heavy demands for DDT powder were encountered. This was due to infested condition of billets and was the proper agent for use in preparing them for occupation. However, requests were often made for excessive quantities of the powder; for example, a battalion requested an emergency issue of a quantity sufficient to make spray solution for 500 acres of floor space. It is recommended that four to six rifle company personnel be indoctrinated in proper use of this agent in preparing billets for occupancy.

(3) Transportation

The unit mission made necessary procurement of a number of motor vehicles in addition to those organic to the regiment. This was accomplished without great difficulty, but would not have been necessary if organic one ton trucks had accompanied the regiment. On many occasions it was found necessary to use M29C Cargo Carriers to tow water trailers and to transport patrols. Such use of these special purpose vehicles led to rapid breakdown, and, as a result, the majority were inoperational during most of the occupation. It is recommended that general purpose vehicles be given priority over special types on similar missions in the future.

- APPENDICES: 1. Transport Quartermaster  
2. Quartermaster  
3. Medical  
4. Ordnance  
5. Disposition  
6. Procurement  
7. Motor Transport  
8. Engineer

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEDGE

*J. W. Downer*  
J. W. DOWNER  
Capt, USMCR,  
S-4.

C O N F I D E N T I A L



C O N F I D E N T I A L

Appendix 1 to Annex DOG (S-4 Report) to Operation Report, 28th  
Marines Occupation of JAPAN.

TRANSPORT QUARTERMASTER REPORT

1. PLANNING

a. Assault Operation.

Planning for the assault operation had reached the stage of preparation of loading plans for base and target echelons when the mission was changed to occupation. a.

b. Occupation Operation.

This consisted of formulation of loading plans based on directives from higher authority.

2. TRANSPORT LOADING

Preparations for loading of the CT began with spotting of FOE supplies and organic equipment and vehicles on the docks during the afternoon of 24 August 1945. Actual loading began soon after ships arrived on the morning of 25 August. Three (3) APA's and the AKA were loaded at the docks and one (1) APA was loaded in the stream by lighterage. Average time for loading a modified combat load on the APA's was twenty-six (26) hours; loading time for the AKA was 40 hours. Average tonnage carried by APA's was 750 long tons; by the AKA 1500 long tons. All ships carried more than normal combat load, yet cargo was stowed in such manner that selective unloading would have been possible at the target if necessary.

3. UNLOADING AT TARGET

Unloading was delayed somewhat because of lack of dock space and an initial scarcity of lighterage. Three (3) APA's unloaded in the stream using several types of landing craft, plus LSM's as lighters. One (1) APA and the AKA were unloaded at dock as soon as space became available. Average time for unloading APA's was twenty-three (23) hours, while the AKA was unloaded in forty-two (42) hours.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEDGE

*J. W. Downer*  
J. W. DOWNER  
Capt, USMCR,  
S-4.



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Appendix 2 to Annex DOG (S-4 Report) to Operation Report, 28th  
Marines, Occupation of JAPAN.

QUARTERMASTER REPORT

1. There was an adequate amount of all types of supplies initially. Resupply in the SASEBO area through normal channels was good. Storage space at AINOURA was sufficient..
2. Warehousing facilities in the FUKUOKA area were ideal. The rail unloading area was in the immediate vicinity of the RCT-28 warehouse. Resupply from the 8th Service Regiment was generally very good. The only critical shortages noted were Class 4 items. There was a shortage of DDT powder due to large expenditure of same during preparation of billets for occupancy. There was also a shortage of certain sizes of cold wet-weather clothing, mainly shoe-pacs. The Ordnance, Service and Supply platoons attached to RCT-28 efficiently effected the supply problem.
3. Upon return to the SASEBO area supply was operated through normal channels.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEDGE

*Wm J. Donnelly*  
W. J. DONNELLY  
1stLt, USMCR  
Regt'l QM.



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Appendix 3 to Annex D-G (S-4 Report) to Operation Report, 28th  
Marines, Occupation of JAPAN.

MEDICAL REPORT

1. TRAINING

a. There was no preliminary training for the Medical Units, except for normal reorganization after the IWO JIMA operation.

b. No particular preparations were made for the landing other than normal combat loading of Units 5 to 10. The remaining Units were carried hold loaded for use upon establishment of a semi-permanent base of operations. Most preparations were based on verbal orders.

2. IN TRANSIT

Inneculations of the entire Regiment and attached units were brought up to date while aboard ship. There was an outbreak of influenza on board two of the APAs in the convey, those carrying the First and Third Battalion, which commenced on the 11th of September and lasted until the 22nd.

3. SASEBO AREA

AIN URA Naval Barracks was furnished as quartering area for the 28th Regiment. It was clean, but most of the sanitary appliances would not function. The ground water table was eighteen inches below the surface, necessitating the construction of portable heads in old bomb shelters. Medical resupply was from the Division Medical Storeroom.

4. FUKUOKA AREA

a. The units of the Regiment were divided between the KASHII Warehouse Area and the Industrial School Area. Sanitation was poor by military standards in both locations. This condition was corrected as rapidly as possible.

b. Due to the fact that the Medical Field Prophylactic Units were turned in to a Field Depot before the Regiment left Camp Tarawa, in accordance with Division orders, Prophylaxis Stations were not adequately stocked until gear could be brought from SASEBO.

c. All insect infested areas were sprayed with DDT before troops moved in.

d. On return to SASEBO, the Regiment was again billeted at AIN URA. Sanitation was adequate.



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5. SUPPLY

Supply was adequate, but somewhat slow. The first and greatest deficiency was in Venereal Prophylactic material, but this was remedied. Routine medical resupply was difficult in FUKUKA because of the lack of supply attached to FOF Command.

6. COMMENT

a. Medical supply was not well coordinated nor adequately planned for an occupation. It would have been adequate for an assault.

b. By removing the tops of old bomb shelters, adequate temporary latrines could be constructed.

c. Water for drinking was supplied by Division Water Points in adequate quantity and quality.

d. Cold weather clothing was late in arriving and distribution limited at first. However, few upper respiratory infections occurred.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

a. The Medical Field Units removed from the Table of Organization for a Regimental Aid Station should be replaced; namely Units 22, 32, and 39, for use in occupation Duty.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEDGE

*William F. Lynn*  
WILLIAM F. LYNN  
Lt. Comdr. (MC) USNR,  
Regt'l Surgeon



C O N F I D E N T I A L

Appendix 4 to Annex D.G (S-4 Report) to Operation Report, 28th  
Marines, Occupation of JAPAN.

ORDNANCE

1. In the planning phase for the assault operation, orders were received that this CT would carry three (3) units of fire (CINCFOA), and the 5th MarDiv would carry two additional units of fire (CINCFOA) for the CT. For training we were allowed two units of fire (CINCFOA), and upon these being exhausted, this training allowance was raised to three units of fire.
2. A complete inspection of all ordnance items was conducted by Division during June and July. All equipment which could be repaired was repaired by the Ordnance Co during this period. Equipment which could not be repaired by the company was replaced.
3. a. When the assault operation was changed to an occupation operation, the ammunition allowance was cut so that this CT carried one (1) unit of fire (AFFAC) and the 5th MarDiv carried an additional two units of fire (AFFAC) for the CT.  
  
b. Allocation of ammunition per ship was done by Division and this CT carried the allotted amount. Loading of this ammunition was done by CT personnel.
4. During the operation in JAPAN this CT maintained an ammunition dump only once. This occurred when the CT was sent to occupy FUKUOKA and the surrounding area. Upon completion of this mission the ammunition was turned into the 32d Div. The greatest ordnance function here has been supplying explosives and accessories for demolishing Japanese materiel, and preparing excess Marine Corps equipment for disposition pending return of the Regiment to the States.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEDGE

*W. R. Henderson*

W. R. HENDERSON

1st Lt, USMCR

Ordnance Officer.



# C O N F I D E N T I A L

Appendix 5 to Annex DOG to Operation Report, 28th Marines,  
Occupation of JAPAN.

## DISPOSITION OF SURRENDERED MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT REPORT

### 1. GENERAL

a. A disposition section was established on 29 October, 1945 in compliance with CT-28 Adm O, No. 4-45, dated 28 October, 1945, and other existing directives.

b. The purpose of the Disposition Section was to direct and control the processing and disposition of surrendered Japanese supplies, material and equipment located in the CT-28 zone of responsibility.

### 2. ORGANIZATION OF THE CT DISPOSITION SECTION

#### a. Headquarters Section (1)

(1) CT Disposition Officer (Major)	-----1
(2) Ass't Disposition Officer (2ndLt)	-----1
(3) Clerks (Ifc)	-----2
(4) Drivers (Ifc)	-----2
(5) Interpreter	-----1
TOTAL	<u>7</u>

#### b. Battalion Depot Control Group (3)

(1) Depot control officer (2nd Lt)	-----1
(2) Depot control team leaders (2ndLt)	-----5
(3) Depot control teams ldrs, ass't (Sgt)	---6
(4) Record clerks (Pfc)	-----6
(5) Drivers (Pfc)	---4
(6) Interpreter	-----1
TOTAL	<u>23</u>

### 3. FUNCTIONS OF THE CT DISPOSITION SECTION

#### a. Battalion Depot Control Group.

- (1) Given area of responsibility within the CT zone of action.
- (2) Locate, inventory and dispose of all Japanese materials within the zone of responsibility assigned.
- (3) Disposition of material considered to be non-essential for use of Allied Forces and of no military value is turned over to the Japanese Home Ministry.
- (4) Materials termed essential for use of Allied Forces were held and stored in warehouses centrally located within the battlion zone of responsibility, pending requisition by higher echelon.



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(5) Disposition of explosives and ammunition has been accomplished either by burning the powder when the type powder permits or by blowing up small quantities of the stores at one time. Whatever material remaining in either case is classified as Ferrous, Aluminum or Copper scrap and returned to the Japanese Home Ministry. Dumping ammunition at sea has not been accomplished to date due to lack of barges and other craft suitable for hauling the stores.

(6) Large caliber weapons (coastal guns) anti-aircraft guns, machine guns and other installation of a military nature have been rendered inoperative, converted to scrap and signed over to the Japanese Home Ministry according to the classification stated in (5) above.

(7) As each dump, warehouse, or military installation is cleared Disposition Report Forms are submitted for checkage, file and further distribution to the Hq Sections as prescribed by 5th Mar Div Standard Operating Procedure No. 254-1945, Inventory of, Accounting for, and Reporting Japanese Material. The only record kept by the control team being one copy of the inventory report of that dump.

(8) All handling of Japanese explosives whenever practicable and possible has been by Japanese technicians under the supervision of Marine demolition technicians.

b. Headquarters Section

(1) Coordinates activities of the three (3) battalion Depot Control Teams and maintains a central control over the disposition of Japanese surrendered materials.

(2) Maintains records on all dispositions made in the CT-28 zone of responsibility, giving location, amounts and signatures of persons (Officers) making the disposition.

(3) Maintains a situation map showing the locations and type of dumps in each of the three battalion zones of responsibility giving references to the inventories and disposition record.

4. ESTIMATE OF WORK DONE WITHIN CT-28 ZONE OF RESPONSIBILITY

a. Material returned to Japanese Home ministry

(1) Approximately eighty (80) percent of all materials that can be turned over to the Japanese Home Ministry as governed by existing regulations has been turned over as of 30Nov45.

b. Explosives and Ammunition destroyed-Approximately twenty (20) percent.



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c. Ordnance (with exception of explosives and ammunition), signal, engineer, medical and chemical materials not needed by occupation forces destroyed - approximately ninety (90) percent.

d. Controlled items to be issued to troops as war trophies-ninety six percent (96%).

### 5. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY DISPOSITION SECTION.

a. Lack of Japanese transportation (trucks and barges).

b. Lack of qualified Japanese demolition and ordnance personnel.

c. No suitable areas for demolition of Japanese ammunition. The only Japanese ordnance material destroyed by demolition was located in remote areas and for the most part inaccessible to motor vehicles.

d. Inadequate records kept by the Disposition Section of organizations previously occupying areas taken over by this Regiment.

e. Japanese labor undependable.

### 6. RECOMMENDATIONS

a. It is believed that a disposition section could have operated much more efficiently had the section been organized and prepared to function before the occupation forces landed. Had such a section been established prior to the initial landing, certain directives prepared by the disposition section would have saved much time and duplication of effort. One example: several inventories were made between the time of landing and the time the Disposition Section commenced operation. In all cases however, the inventories did not fulfill the needs of the Disposition Section and necessitated another inventory.

b. Establishing a section to overcome the obstacles and carry out the tasks of disposition efficiently, requires time and organization. A section cannot function properly when it is organized one day and expected to commence operations the next.

c. There should be close liaison among the Disposition Officers, Procurement Officer and Military Government. Procurement can give valuable information to the Disposition Officers concerning equipment and material needs for allied troop operations. At times this information was not available to the Disposition Officer and necessitated contacting the Staff and Special Staff section heads in higher headquarters. This situation resulted in a few instances releasing certain supplies and equipment to the Japanese Home Ministry when our own troops could have used them in operation. It is necessary to deal directly with Military Government in matters pertaining to labor and transportation.



C O N F I D E N T I A L

d. It is recommended that, when possible contracts be made with Japanese transport companies and similiar organization for disposition of large ammo and explosive dump. Only supervisory personnel are required in this case and the risk to Allied Military personnel is greatly lessened.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEDGE

*G. A. Gilliland*  
G. A. GILLILAND

Maj, USMC

Reg'l Disposition Officer.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L



C O N F I D E N T I A L

Appendix 6 to Annex D-G (S-4 Report) to Operations Report, 28th  
Marines, Occupation of JAPAN.

PROCUREMENT REPORT

1. Procurement of Japanese labor, labor and services, and materials for use of this regiment was never arranged directly with the Home Ministry offices, but with Military Government officers attached to higher echelons of command. Labor was procured and used on a daily basis by all units subsequent to 1 October 1945. This labor performed camp police work, unloading and moving of supplies, and generally took the place of Marine working parties. Labor and services were procured on three occasions for skilled work on a contract basis, such as installation of water line extensions and repairs to existing camp electrical facilities. Materials procured were in all cases from military stores and consisted mainly of construction, plumbing, and electrical supplies which were used in erection of buildings or facilities needed for health and comfort of troops. In every instance, request for the desired materials was made through the Military Government Procurement Officer and acknowledgement and inventory rendered upon receipt.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEDGE

*J. W. Downer*  
J. W. DOWNER  
Capt, USMCR,  
S-4



C O N F I D E N T I A L

Appendix 7 to Annex DQG (S-4 Report) to Operation Report, 28th  
Marines, Occupation of JAPAN.

MOTOR TRANSPORT REPORT

1. During the entire period of the operation, organic motor transport of this regiment required augmentation by assignment of additional vehicles from higher echelons. The special nature of this operation, requiring widespread road reconnaissance patrols, and self-containment regarding rations, water, and fuel over various periods, made demands on motor transport extremely heavy. During the FUKUOKA phase one (1) company of Force Motor Transport, plus one (1) platoon of an Automotive Repair Company, was attached to the regiment. Both units proved invaluable during this period. Operational requirements could not have been met without them. On return to SASEBO these units were detached and it was found necessary to request vehicles from the Division Motor Transport Officer to enable normal operations and disposition of enemy materials to proceed.

2. On the whole, most motor vehicles functioned in a satisfactory manner, one notable exception being the M29C Cargo Carrier. This is not a suitable general purpose vehicle. After the opening days of the operation very little could be done with those organic to the regiment. It is believed that additional one (1) ton trucks should have been carried in the shipping space taken up by the M29C's.

3. The accident rate was not abnormal, in spite of narrow roads and streets and the change in driving customs. Poor conditions of the roads caused additional wear which was met to some extent by narrowing the period between servicings.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEDGE

*J. W. Downer*  
J. W. DOWNER  
Capt, USMCR,  
S-4.



C O N F I D E N T I A L -

Appendix 8 to Annex DOG (S-4 Report) to Operation Report, 28th  
Marines, Occupation of JAPAN.

ENGINEER REPORT

1. INITIAL PLANNING AND OPERATION

Company "C" 5th Engineer Battalion embarked from HILO, HAWAII as engineer teams (reinf plato) attached to the battalions of the 28th Marines Regiment. Their mission was clearly outlined as engineer or combat support such as was called for in the then uncertain occupation of northern KYUSHU, JAPAN.

2. FUKUOKA OCCUPATION

a. During the first phases of the occupation of FUKUOKA, Company "C" 5th Engineer Battalion reverted to Regimental control and was assigned all engineer responsibilities for that area and such outposts as were designated. Briefly their entire work is summed in four groups: water supply, road construction, camp maintenance, and utilization of Japanese engineer materials. It might be noted that to supply water the company had to use available equipment and men to maximum. An average of 15,000 gallons per day was used. Camp maintenance was simplified by the abundance of Japanese material and labor.

b. The engineer missions of Company "C" were absorbed by various Army units when the 32d Inf Division assumed control of FUKUOKA.

3. In SASEBO, from 6Nov45 to 30Nov45, no engineer unit was assigned to the regiment. Engineer missions were accomplished upon request to higher echelons.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEDGE

*J. W. Downer*  
J. W. DOWNER  
Captain, USMCR  
S-4.



C O N F I D E N T I A L

Annex EASY to 28th Marines Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

SIGNAL COMMUNICATION REPORT

1. TRAINING

a. Training for the assault on KYUSHU began on 30 April after the first group of replacements had arrived after return from the IWO JIMA Operation.

Training consisted of the following:

Electricity and Magnetism  
Map reading and use of compass  
Security  
Phonetic alphabet  
Radio code, sending and receiving  
Message writing  
Codes and ciphers  
Message center procedure  
Message center logs, preparation and use of  
Visual Signaling  
R/T and W/T procedure  
SOI and SOP  
Installation, operation, and maintenance of switchboards  
TC-4 BD-71 and 72  
Wire ties and splices  
Pole line construction  
Simplex and phantom circuits, including repeating and loading  
coils  
Field telephone circuits  
Installation, operation, and maintenance of field telephone,  
EE-8  
Wire laying and tagging  
Switchboard procedure  
Line route maps, circuit and traffic diagrams  
Trouble shooting  
Local battery telephone systems  
Test stations  
Frequency modulation  
Installation, operation, and maintenance of radio equipment,  
TBX, TCS, SCR-608, SCR-300A, SCR-610  
Antennas and transmission lines  
Practice radio nets  
Installation, operation, and maintenance of telegraph set TG-54  
Radio anti-jamming defenses  
All hands fired their weapons, and received instruction in  
field sanitation, hand grenades, first aid, gas defense, infantry tactics,  
identification, mines and booby traps.



# C O N F I D E N T I A L

Conditioning hikes were carried out frequently.

In addition, each section was instructed in the work of the other sections.

There were no changes in training for occupational duty, since the instruction was largely technical and prepared the sections for any type of duty.

2. Installation, operation, and maintenance of signal communications was largely normal during the occupation operation.

3. During the FUKUOKA phase dividing regimental headquarters between FUKUOKA and KASHII Station (a distance of about 4½ miles) necessitated the organization of Gasper X-ray exchange at KASHII Station to serve attached units and non-operational components of regimental headquarters. All trunk circuits were paralleled by spare circuits, and test stations were installed at frequent intervals to facilitate maintenance. All circuits were installed at least eighteen feet above the deck on existing Japanese pole lines. Where three or more circuits followed the same route, they were cabled. Wire #130 was used for all inside installations and for cabling from outside terminals to the "A" frame of the regimental switchboard. Altogether, more than 300 miles of telephone circuits were installed and operated by this regiment.

4. Message center operation was normal. Scheduled messenger runs were made to all units three times daily.

5. Little radio operation was done, the main reliance being on wire. One radio team was attached to the Third Battalion and one to the FUKUOKA Occupation Force to operate in force nets. Weapons Company manned the radio sets of the military police while in the FUKUOKA Area. Two radio teams were attached to the First Battalion to operate stations at outposts too far away for wire communications. Large patrols used TCS Radios to maintain contact with their battalion headquarters.

6. Signal supply was adequate. Initial extra supply of wire was obtained from Division, and no replenishment of any sort was required.

## 7. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATION

a. Radio equipment was more than adequate. Radio was used to maintain contact with motorized patrols and convoys, as primary means of communication with isolated outposts, and in the event of wire failure.

b. In a static occupation, wire is the primary means of communication. The allowance of insulators IN-25 should be increased to 300 per regimental headquarters, and 100 for each battalion. The same allowance should be made of brackets BF-57. Gloves LC-10 should be issued



C O N F I D E N T I A L

on the basis of one per lineman's equipment MTE-1. Allowance of switchboards BD-72 should be increased to one per infantry battalion. Telephones, EE-8, should be increased to 60 per regimental headquarters and 40 per infantry battalion. Allowance of terminal strip TM-184 should be increased to 20 per regimental headquarters and 12 per infantry battalion. Increase in allowance of wire W-110B to 75 miles per infantry regimental headquarters and 35 per infantry battalion is advisable. An additional 25 miles of cable CC-358 and 8 cable stub CC-356 is advisable. The allowance of wire W-130 should be reduced to 3 miles per infantry regimental headquarters and infantry battalion.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL LIVERSEDGE

*G. R. Lockard*

G. R. LOCKARD

Major, USMC

Regt'l Com Officer



JRC/wrz

HEADQUARTERS,  
13TH MARINES, 5TH MARINE DIVISION, FMF.,  
C/O FPO, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

CONFIDENTIAL

30 November, 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.  
To : The Commanding General, 5th Marine Division.  
Subject: 13th Marines Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

1. In compliance with Division Special Order Number 355-1945, Annex JIG to Division Operation Report, Occupation of JAPAN is submitted herewith.

42/10000  
J. A. BEMIS.

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Arty Gp  
5th MarDiv (Reinf)  
In the Field  
30 November, 1945.

File No. 1975-20.

Annex JIG (13th Marines Opn Report) to 5th MarDiv Opn Report, Occupation of JAPAN.

1. PLANNING.

(a) Written information relative to the landing on the Southwest coast of KYUSHU, JAPAN was received 30 July, 1945. A conference room was established and key members of the staff were kept up to date on incoming information. Photographs and orders were studied, and staff conferences were held, but due to a change in plans written orders were not completed and dissemination was not made to subordinate units.

(b) Occupation.

This phase was accomplished aboard ship. The regimental staff was embarked aboard one ship and frequent conferences were held throughout the voyage. Regimental Operation Orders 25-45, 25A-45 and 25B-45 were prepared covering the preferred, first and second alternate plans. These were disseminated to the 1st and 2nd battalions at Saipan but distribution to other units was impossible due to their being embarked in separate convoy. Photographs of the SASEBO Harbor area were studied and temporary billets, storage areas and unloading facilities were selected. Plans were initiated for expediting unloading of essential equipment and material for any expected contingency.

2. TRAINING.

(a) Assault.

Schools were organized in gunnery technique, chemical warfare, surveying, intelligence, air observation, Japanese language, photo interpretation, and difficult driving. Battery, battalion and regimental tests in tactics and gunnery were conducted to ascertain relative efficiency of the units, great stress being placed on discovered weaknesses.

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Annex JIG (13th Marines Opn Report) to 5th MarDiv Opn Report, Occupa-  
tion of JAPAN. (Cont'd). 30Nov45.  
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Battalions conducted overhead firing exercises for each infantry battalion, and forward observer parties and liaison teams accompanied infantry companies and battalions on numerous field exercises to effect complete collaboration. CPXs were conducted including one on a division level. A large terrain board was constructed and all officers were required to fire a minimum of all types of problems. Numerous day and night problems were conducted by flash and sound ranging teams. Available films relative to JAPAN were shown to all hands.

(b) Occupation

In the short time available prior to embarking aboard ship and during the voyage, intensive training in interior guard duty, courtesy and military customs, Japanese language, military government, and related subjects was conducted. Special stress was placed on the terrain, facilities, customs, and habits of the Japanese.

3. ORGANIZATION

- (a) Organic four (4) battalions.
- (b) 5th Amph DUKW Company.
- (c) Company "C", 20th Amph Truck Battalion.
- (d) VMO-5.

4. OPERATIONS ASHORE

22 September

Operations ashore commenced when elements of Headquarters established a CP at the SASEBO Aircraft Factory at 1030. First battalion landed at 1145, occupied position and was ready to fire by 1240 as an emergency procedure. Other battalions had started unloading by 1800, but did not occupy firing positions.

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Annex J1G (13th Marines Opn Report) to 5th MarDiv Opn Report, Occupa-  
tion of JAPAN. (Cont'd). 30 Nov 45.  
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23 September

Unloading operations were continued and completed by the 1st, 2nd, and 4th battalions, VMO-5, and Co "C", 20th Amph Trk Bn.

24 September

First and Second Battalions began movement to Naval Stores Area (1282.8-1112.7) for guarding and billeting; completely established the following day. Other units occupied buildings in SASEBO Aircraft Factory.

25 to 29 September

Following reconnaissance of previous day, "B" Btry, 1st battalion moved to KAWATANA, Naval Stores Area (1292.9-1101.5) for guarding and billeting. Reconnaissance of and preparations for movement to HIU Ammunition Depot (1281.5-1111.0) were made by the 4th battalion.

29 September to 2 October

Fourth battalion began movement to HIU Ammunition Depot for guarding and billeting. Third battalion and Regimental H&S continue guarding SASEBO Aircraft Factory. Orders were received assigning zone of responsibility for patrolling and uncovering Japanese war materials and breaches of Terms of Surrender.

2 to 7 October

Patrolling in assigned zone of responsibility was conducted. Second battalion established two patrols in conjunction with 10th Marines to execute surveillance missions in the southern zone of responsibility.

10, 11 October

Typhoon swept SASEBO and vicinity inflicting heavy damage to numerous dwellings, communications and power facilities. No casualties were suffered.



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Annex JIG (13th Marines Opn Report) to 5th MarDiv Opn Report, Occupa-  
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12 October

Detachments were dispatched to URAGASHIRA (1281.5-1105.2) and HARIO Naval Barracks (1285.0-1104.0) to execute surveillance and report on repatriation and demobilization of returning Japanese Military Forces of Korea (58th Army).

13, 14 October

Fourth battalion discovered remnants of 312th Japanese Army Division (Home Defense Unit) near HAMASAKI (1306.56-1147.51). Equipment was inventoried and placed under surveillance for later destruction. Demobilization of 9,956 returning troops began at URAGASHIRA.

15 to 18 October

Regimental Educational Program initiated by establishing unit schools. Approximately twenty-five (25) percent of zone of responsibility had been completely patrolled.

18 October

Co "C" 20th Amph Trk Bn was detached from this regiment. Several hundred assorted weapons, including rifles, swords, shotguns, daggers, etc. had been collected in the zone of responsibility at this date. Demobilization of the second group of Japanese repatriates consisting of 332 personnel from DAITO SHIMA began.

19, 20 October

Demobilization of the third group, 10,242 military personnel from KOREA, began.

21 to 25 October

Disposition of Japanese war materials and essential civilian commodities was commenced.

25, 26 October

Unloading and processing of 2,295 Japanese troops of the 58th Army from KOREA began.

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Annex JIG (13th Marines Opn Report) to 5th MarDiv Opn Report, Occupa-  
tion of JAPAN. (Cont'd). 30Nov45.  
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27 October

Elements of the Japanese 58th Army, numbering 9,798, began unloading at URAGASHIRA for demobilization.

28, 29 October

Repatriation of Japanese military forces from KOREA continued. 8,405 were unloaded for demobilization.

30, 31 October

The assigned zone of responsibility for patrolling was eighty-three (83) percent completed. Unloading and processing of 5,608 returning troops of the 58th Army in KOREA began.

1, 2 November

Large quantities of equipment of the 312th Division were destroyed by the Fourth battalion. The regiment completed patrol of assigned zone of responsibility. Unloading of 9,808 Japanese troops of the 58th Army began at URAGASHIRA.

3 November

The 121st FA battalion (Army) was attached to this regiment.

4 to 7 November

Forty (40) tons of ammunition were loaded for dumping at sea; equipment of the 312th Division and four (4) 15cm guns were destroyed. Third battalion began movement of airplane wings and spare parts from NITO Aircraft Factory.

7 November

"Spot Checking" of critical points in the zone of responsibility continued. Twenty-nine (29) warheads and six (6) anti-aircraft guns were destroyed.

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Annex JIG (13th Marines Opn Report) to 5th MarDiv Opn Report, Occupa-  
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8 November

Commenced unloading three (3) LSTs returning 4,200 Japanese Troops from KOREA and the S.S. FORT BUFFALO returning seven hundred (700) Japanese Marines which had been a part of the defense forces of HONKONG.

9, 10 November

Twelve (12) buildings, containing civilian materials, were signed over to the Japanese Home Ministry by the 1st Bn. Two (2) LSTs unloaded 3,990 Japanese troops of the 111th Division at URAGASHIRA for demobilization.

11, 12 November

Elements of the Japanese 96th Division of KOREA, totaling 2,199, were unloaded at URAGASHIRA for demobilization. Destruction of war materials continued.

13, 14 November

The 2d and 3rd Bns destroyed several tons of aircraft parts located at the NITO Aircraft Factory.

15, 16 November

Over 15,000 type 604 motor projectiles, 250 aerial bombs and 52 depth charges were loaded aboard ship for disposal at sea. The total number of repatriates unloaded at URAGASHIRA was 69,761 at this date.

17, 18 November

Destruction of war materials continued. Liaison with relieving units of 2d MarDiv established and preparations made for same.

19, 20 November

First group of 919 Chinese repatriates arrived at URAGASHIRA from NAGASAKI area for transport to North China. 2,998 Japanese troops arrived at URAGASHIRA for demobilization.

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Annex JIG (13th Marines Opn Report) to 5th MarDiv Opn Report, Occupa-  
tion of JAPAN. (Cont'd). 30Nov45.  
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21 November

1,080 Chinese arrived at HARIO for repatriation. Three (3) LSTs unloaded 2,989 Japanese troops at URAGASHIRA for demobilization.

22 November

2,337 Chinese arrived at HARIO Naval Barracks to await transport to North China. Three (3) LSTs unloaded 2,980 Japanese troops at URAGASHIRA for processing and later demobilization.

23 November

121st FA Bn, relieved by 2nd Bn, began movement to KURUME for assignment with 32d InfDiv. 2,887 Chinese coal miners and laborers loaded aboard LSTs at URAGASHIRA for shipment to North China.

24 November

121st FA Bn completed movement to KURUME; detached from this unit. Disposition continued. Zone of responsibility in SAGA KEN re-leased to control of 2d MarDiv.

25 November

Preparation made for exchange of personnel with 10th Marines. 2,994 Japanese troops from TAKU, China unloaded at URAGASHIRA for processing and demobilization.

26 November

Transfer of personnel between 4th Bn, 13th Marines and 4th Bn, 10th Marines and 1/5 H&S Batterys of 13th and 10th Marines effected. 1,488 Japanese Army troops, 227 Navy troops, and 880 civilians unloaded at URAGASHIRA.

27 November

Transfer of personnel between 3rd Bn, 13th Marines and 2d Bn, 10th Marines and 1/5 H&S Batterys of 13th and 10th Marines effected. 2,967 Japanese Army troops unloaded at URAGASHIRA for demobilization.



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Annex JIG (13th Marine Opn Report) to 5th MarDiv Opn Report, Occupa-  
tion of JAPAN. (Cont'd). 30Nov45.  
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28 November

Transfer of personnel between 2d Bn, 13th Marines and 3rd Bn, 10th Marines and 1/5 H&S Batterys of 13th and 10th Marines effected.

29 November

Transfer of personnel between 1st Bn, 13th Marines and 1st Bn, 10th Marines and 1/5 H&S Batterys of 13th and 10th Marines effected. 3,006 Japanese troops from China unloaded at URAGASHIRA. 1,299 Chinese outloaded.

30 November

Transfer of 1/5 H&S Btry, 13th Marines with H&S Btry, 10th Marines effected. 2,856 Japanese Army troops unloaded at URGASHIRA.

5. CONCLUSIONS

(a) During the period of occupancy from 22 September to 30 November, 1945 the following amounts (approximate) of Japanese War materials were destroyed: 188,350 assorted rounds artillery and mortar ammunition; 24,914 aerial bombs (filled and empty); 400 tons aircraft parts; 30 tons of signal equipment; 1,785 machine guns (assorted); 20 tons machine gun spare parts; 161 war making machines; 270 torpedos; 649 tons torpedo parts; 1,518 mines; 3,485 depth charges; 83 artillery and AA guns; 17 tons artillery and AA gun parts; 60 tons explosives; 3,917 gas masks; 282 aerial cameras.

(b) An area of approximately 515 square miles was completely patrolled and investigated by elements of this regiment.

(c) Supervision of unloaded, inspection and demobilization or repatriation of 99,042 incoming Japanese troops or civilians and supervision of handling and loading of 6,135 foreign nationalists for repatriation were effected by detachment of this regiment.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) For operations of this nature, it is recommended that a minimum of eight interpreters be assigned to an artillery regiment for language schooling while enroute and for operations ashore.

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Annex JIG (13th Marines Opn Report) to 5th MarDiv Opn Report, Occupa-  
tion of JAPAN. (Cont'd). 30Nov45.  
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(b) It is recommended that any units moving into an occupational operation set up SOPs covering inventorying and disposition before, or at the earliest practical time after arrival at the zone of occupation.

(c) It is recommended that Japanese maps showing prefect-  
ural, shi, and machi boundaries and the town or city in each of these areas which provides Japanese control be distributed to subordinate units. Zones of responsibility for each unit could then be assigned from these maps using shi and machi boundaries which would facilitate liaison and control within these areas.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL BENIS.

E. C. FERGUSON,  
LtCol, USMC,  
Executive Officer.

APPENDIX: 1 - S-1 Report  
APPENDIX: 2 - S-2 Report  
APPENDIX: 3 - S-4 Report

\*DISTRIBUTION: G-3, 5thMarDiv (75); CO (1); ExO (1); S-1 (1); S-2 (1);  
S-4 (1); Each Bn (5); War Diary (5); FILE (10).

OFFICIAL

*JR Crockett*  
J. R. CROCKETT,  
Major, USMC,  
S-3.

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APPENDIX 1 (S-1 Report) to Annex JIG to Fifth Marine Division Operation Report,  
Occupation of JAPAN.

1. On 30 July, 1945, the date of commencement of planning for the Assault Operation, this regiment had an actual strength of 175 officers and 2,404 enlisted which included 9 officers and 57 enlisted Naval personnel. On 1 September, 1945, the date of departure from the Hawaiian Area, the actual strength was 172 officers and 2,422 enlisted, of which 7 officers and 202 enlisted were left with the rear echelon.

2. The artillery group landed and the regimental command post was established at the Naval Aircraft Factory, SASEBO, on 22 September, 1945. As soon as facilities could be made available, a post office, post exchange, and special service section was organized and commenced operations. The post exchange and post office were branches of the Division and managed by personnel furnished by Division Headquarters, assisted by personnel furnished from units of the regiment. These sections were serving all units of this regiment including those stationed at outlying localities. Due to the distance in certain cases, this arrangement was not entirely satisfactory, but could not be improved due to the lack of qualified personnel necessary to further extend these activities.

3. Special Service sections were organized within the regiment in accordance with present, G-series, Tables of Organization. These sections organized and supervised the various activities normally assigned. A schedule of athletic games and competitions was arranged. Movies and a very limited number of troop shows were obtained. In addition an education program was established with classes of instruction in various phases of law, mathematics, history, English, and agriculture, on both the battalion and regimental level.

4. Considering the very poor housing conditions, and limited liberty and recreation opportunities because of the need for personnel required in the performance of guard, patrol duty, disposal and repatriation work during the period of occupation, morale was considered to be excellent.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL BEMIS

E. C. FERGUSON,  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,  
Regimental Executive Officer

OFFICIAL:

*P. W. Potigether*  
P. W. POTIGETHER,  
Captain, U.S.M.C.  
Reg'tl Adjutant.

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APPENDIX 2 (S-2 Report) to Annex JIG to 5th Marine Division Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.

A. Planning for assault operation commenced on 30 July, 1945 at which time the first information was received regarding the assault operation.

1. Maps, photos and other materials.

The map used was the A.M.S. L872, scale 1/25,000. This map was first received on 22 August. It was found to be suitable in all respects except that width of roads was not always accurately shown. Sufficient maps were received while enroute to the target. Two battalions which were transported in a separate convoy had only maps for planning purposes until after landing at Sasebo.

The map of Central Japan, scale 1/250,000 was also used in limited quantity. The A.M.S. L872, scale 1/50,000, was received several weeks after landing.

No photographs were received in sufficient quantity to distribute to battalions. The only photos received were a few vertical photos of beach areas.

Mosaics, scale 1/25,000, were received in large quantity, but the terrain features were so indistinct as to make them useless. They were discarded.

No models or vectographs were received.

B. Training and Organization of the Intelligence Section for the Occupational Mission.

The Intelligence Section consisted of one (1) Captain, one (1) Lieutenant, two (2) intelligence clerks, one (1) draftsman, and two (2) radio operators.

Training for the Occupational Mission was conducted aboard ship while enroute to the target. This training consisted of a thorough briefing of the section on their duties upon landing, Surrender Terms, Geography of Japan, Customs of the Japanese People, Japanese Language, Military Government, etc.

C. Intelligence Functioning During Occupation.

1. Upon landing, as there was no opposition, the intelligence became concerned with reconnoitering the area and making recommendations for the security of the area.



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APPENDIX 2 (S-2 Report) to Annex JIG to 5th Marine Division Operation  
Report, Occupation of Japan. (Cont'd)  
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2. Inventorying Japanese Equipment.

Beginning 24 September, the Intelligence Section of each battalion commenced inventorying all Japanese military materials, equipment and installations. These inventories lacked accuracy because some equipment and materials could not be identified, and insufficient interpreters were available to determine the correct nomenclature and quantity.

In most cases the Japanese had prepared inventories covering each installation. Some of these inventories were in English and our forces merely made a physical check of the inventory, submitted by the Japanese.

The inventorying of all Japanese military materials, equipment and supplies was accomplished by 1 November, 1945.

3. New equipment encountered.

It was not determined whether or not any equipment encountered was new.

4. Liaison with Japanese Forces.

The liaison was conducted mainly by higher echelons.

5. Civilian Attitude.

The attitude of the Japanese civilians was one of unexpected friendliness, curiosity and willingness to cooperate with our forces. Many people displayed fear upon first encountering our forces. This gradually disappeared. The Japanese seemed very willing to give information of any kind and often volunteered information.

6. Language Personnel Distribution.

a. There were no language personnel with this regiment when landed which was a decided handicap. There were Japanese officials at the beach when the regiment landed, but because of the complete lack of linguists, practically no information could be obtained. Approximately one week after landing, an interpreter was attached to the regiment. Subsequently three more linguists were attached.



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APPENDIX 2 (S-2 Report) to Annex JIG to 5th Marine Division Operation  
Report, Occupation of Japan. (Cont'd)  
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Many Japanese were found who could speak English. A number of these were hired through the Japanese Liaison Committee. This greatly aided liaison and relieved our shortage of interpreters.

b. Handling of Documents.

All Japanese documents were reported immediately to the S-2 of the regiment. These documents were then examined by an interpreter and if found to contain important information, they were reported immediately to G-2 for disposition.

c. Interrogation.

Organized interrogation was not conducted by this regiment. However, at the repatriation center at Uragashira, high ranking Japanese officers returning from abroad were questioned upon landing in order to obtain order of battle information.

7 Release of Allied Prisoner's of War.

This regiment was not assigned the mission of releasing Allied Prisoner's of War.

8. Repatriation of Foreign Nationals.

On 12 October a detail of officers and men were stationed at Hario Barracks and at Uragashira to supervise and report on the handling of outgoing and incoming repatriates. During the period 12 October to 30 November, a total of 99,042 Japanese troops arrived from abroad and were processed at these stations. During the same period there were 6,135 outgoing Chinese and Korean repatriates processed.

D. Japanese compliance with surrender terms.

Ashes were found which indicated that the Japanese had burned documents prior to our arrival. No other evidence of non-compliance with the surrender terms was noted.



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APPENDIX 2 (S-2 Report) to Annex JIG to 5th Marine Division Operation  
Report, Occupation of Japan. (Cont'd)  
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BY ORDER OF COLONEL BEMIS

L. C. FERGUSON,  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,  
Regimental Executive Officer.

OFFICIAL:

*DW Bennion*

D. W. BENNION,  
Captain USMC,  
S-2

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APPENDIX 3 (S-4 Report) to Annex JIG to Fifth Marine Division Operation Report,  
Occupation of JAPAN.

1. QUARTERMASTER

Supplies were furnished by Division on an automatic supply basis. "C", "K" and "10 in 1" rations were supplied daily commencing 22 September. "B" rations were made available as soon as a suitable galley was constructed. First issue of "B" rations was made on 30 September. First issue of fresh meats was made on 29 October.

Issue of winter clothing was slow due to moving of Division Quartermaster warehouses. A full issue of winter clothing, with the exception of shoe pacs, was made. Shoe pacs were issued to only 75% of the personnel due to inability to obtain correct sizes.

Stationery supplies were inadequate for the large number of reports, inventories, and orders necessary in an operation of this type.

2. MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

The medical Department of this organization was combat loaded aboard LSTs and APAs and landed at the target on A day. Sickbays were immediately set up by all units.

Supplies and equipment were adequate and no shortages were experienced. Quartermaster resupply was adequate at all times.

No specific medical problems were experienced and sanitation squads continuously maintained facilities. Japanese water supply was limited to external usage.

3. DISPOSITION

Disposition of Japanese War Materials and Equipment was initiated on 22 October, 1945, with the setting up of a Disposition Section as a separate staff section and the appointment of Commander Noble S. Martin, U.S.C. & G.S., as Regimental Disposition Officer.

Surrendered Materials were disposed of in accordance with instructions laid down in Annex "FOX" to Division Administrative Order No. 1-45.

Japanese labor, trucks, and ships, under Marine supervision were used exclusively in the handling of Japanese ammunition and explosives.



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APPENDIX 3 (S-4 Report) to Annex JIG to Fifth Marine Division Operation Report,  
Occupation of JAPAN.  
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All weapons seized were rendered inoperative with the exception of items classified as War Memorials or War Trophies. These items were turned over to Division War Trophy Section.

Inert projectiles and bombs were dumped at sea from U. S. Navy LSM's and LCT's utilizing Japanese Labor for working parties.

The regiment was allocated 202 swords, 42 Japanese medals, 67 pistols, 45 binoculars, and a sufficient number of rifles, carbines and shotguns to distribute one firearm to each man in the regiment. Officers and first pay grade NCO's received a sword, the remainder of the regiment received a rifle or carbine, and the rest of the war trophies were distributed by lottery to the men excluding officers and first pay grade.

The paper work involved in the disposition of Japanese war materials was a problem, as the order for the setting up of the forms for inventorying and disposition work were received on 23 October, one month after the regiment had landed in Japan, and after most of the actual physical inventorying of equipment had been completed. Since reports were to be submitted on required forms giving items in specified units, much duplication of clerical work resulted and many of the areas had to be re-inventoried.

#### 4. MOTOR TRANSPORT

The transportation available was not sufficient due to the extensive patrolling necessary and heavy demands from division for transportation.

The number of flat tires was extremely high due to the poor condition of all roads. Due to this, the supply of tire patches, tubes, replacement valves, etc., was highly inadequate.

It was necessary to "dead line" many vehicles due to lack of spare parts.

On 29 November, 1945 the following vehicles were transferred to the Second Marine Division: one (1) station wagon; fifteen (15)  $\frac{3}{4}$  ton 4x4 trucks; thirty-five (35) 1 ton 4x4 trucks.

#### 5. PROCUREMENT

Procurement of Japanese materiel for housekeeping and recreational purposes was handled in accordance with annex "KING" of Division Administrative Order Number 1-45 and modification No. 1 thereto.



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APPENDIX 3 (S-4 Report) to Annex JIG to Fifth Marine Division Operation Report,  
Occupation of JAPAN.  
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Numerous items of Japanese equipment and supplies were procured for use  
by the artillery group.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL BEMIS

E. C. FERGUSON,  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,  
Regimental Executive Officer.

OFFICIAL:

*D. S. Carmichael*  
D. S. CARMICHAEL,  
Captain, USMCR.  
S-4



WRC/rlw

HEADQUARTERS, 5TH TANK BATTALION,  
DIVISION SERVICE TROOPS, 5TH MARINE DIVISION, FMF,  
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

CONFIDENTIAL

3 December, 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.  
To : The Commanding General, 5th Marine Division.  
Subject: 5th Tank Battalion Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.

1. This organization began the planning and training for the assault on the Japanese empire immediately upon the completion of the rehabilitation phase after the IWO JIMA operation. The planning and training were both centered on two objectives: (1) The reorganization of the Tank Battalion to meet terrain conditions in the Japanese empire. (2) The revision of tactical employment as a result of experiences of tank units on IWO JIMA and OKINAWA. Several organizational changes were effected such as the organization of a Flame Tank Company, however, the effectiveness of these changes were never determined since a new Table of Organization which was prepared while the unit was absent on IWO JIMA was placed into effect prior to the departure of this unit from the Hawaiian Islands. The training was centered on three objectives. Primarily Tank-Infantry training for all the Infantry of the Division in the basic fundamentals and the standard operating procedure of Tank-Infantry employment. This was necessitated by the fact that as a result of casualties on IWO JIMA and the consequent replacements the infantry was not experienced in Tank-Infantry tactics. Secondarily training in tank tactics which emphasized two points, defense against anti-tank measures and the attack of anti-tank guns. Thirdly, tactical training in the forcing of defiles, since due to the terrain factors of the Empire and the dependency of supply upon a road net it was realized that the primary mission of the tank unit would be to force the existing roads; defiles in the existing road net were numerous and it was considered that they would be well defended. In addition every effort was made to provide from within the Tank Battalion a reconnaissance screen which is necessary in large land mass operations.

2. The mission of this unit for the occupation of Japan was to land with the assault elements and support any unit which encountered resistance. Mounted reconnaissance units were furnished by this battalion to each infantry unit. They landed with the infantry unit and via the radio reported no resistance over the entire division front. On the night of the landing, the tanks went into bivouac at the SASEBO Naval Air Station and remained there throughout the occupational period.



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Subject: 5th Tank Battalion Operation Report, Occupation  
of Japan. (Cont'd)

Page #2.  
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3. A detachment from this unit formed the OITA occupation group and carried out the imposition of the surrender terms in OITA KEN until relieved by elements of the 32nd Army Division. Throughout this period no difficulties were encountered and the cooperation of the Japanese left nothing to be desired. There was a significant factor noted that the Japanese operated most effectively when exposed to harsh dictorial measures.

4. In addition to the detailed recommendations contained herein, there is a broad recommendation which applies to all Marine Corps units. It is believed by the undersigned that had an assault operation become necessary upon the Japanese empire that the organic transportation of a Marine division would have failed most miserably. The existing road net would not have stood the traffic of our two and one-half (2½) ton trucks or tanks. It is therefore recommended that in any such operation in the future that one (1) ton trucks be supplied and that the road building equipment of Engineer, Tanks, and Pioneer units be expanded materially. It is felt that instead of a Marine unit being given standard equipment to fight anywhere in the world, that the Tables of Organization should be revised to permit sufficient flexibility to permit a unit to adapt itself to the varying requirements of the target selected.

*W. R. Collins*  
W. R. COLLINS  
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HEADQUARTERS, NAVAL AIR STATION COMFLAND,  
SASEBO AREA, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION, FMF,  
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

CONFIDENTIAL

17 November, 1945.

From: S-3, 5th Tank Battalion.  
To : The Commanding Officer, 5th Tank Battalion.  
Subject: Annex Able to Annex King.

OPERATION ORDER:#1: Defense of Bivouac, Oita Occupation Group.

1. Plans for control and dispersion of any disturbance within the area under control of Oita Occupation Group.

(a) The command is divided into five (5) tactical units of platoon size, the platoons being composed of machine gun sections and riflemen. In addition to these tactical units, there are the several staff sections, medical section, engineer section, and communication section.

(b) There is an established military police and security patrol consisting of thirty (30) men under the control of the Provost Marshall and an additional section of nine (9) men comprising the headquarters guard. The Military Police patrols are established on a twenty-four (24) hour basis with walking and mounted posts during daylight hours and mounted patrols during the hours of darkness.

(c) In the event that any disturbances arise, these patrols will notify immediately the Oita Occupational Group Headquarters, the Commander of Troops, at the billeting area, the Civilian Police, and will insure that all men on liberty return immediately to duty. The Senior Officer present at the billeting area will cause the platoons to be assembled and armed immediately, providing for a mobile "riot squad" of two platoons to be entrucked with SCR 510 and sent upon order to the scene of any disturbance, the remainder of the troops to be held in mobile reserve, either for defense of the billeting area or for dispatch to any place needed. The engineer personnel will take all steps to safeguard the water distillation plant at the billeting area and the medical section will stand by in the sick bay. The communications section will take all steps to provide ample radio and telephone communications throughout the billeting area, outside the billeting area, and to higher echelons of command. Upon being notified of any disturbance or attack, the communications officer will inform the Commanding General, Fifth Marine Division via radio and keep channels open to that headquarters. Dispatcher will supply two 2½ ton trucks for "riot squad".

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Subject: Annex Able to Annex King. (Cont'd)  
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(d) The following assignments of duty to officers will be in effect in the event of any emergency requiring action by our troops.

LtCol.	COLLINS	Commanding Officer.
Capt.	BRUNS	Executive Officer.
Capt.	JONES	Commander of Troops.
Capt.	SANDS	S-4
Lt.	MOORE	S-3
Lt.	MORGAN	Commander of barracks defense.
Lt.	STEINAU	Commander of mobile riot squad.
Lt.	JARVIS	Platoon Commander, 1st Platoon, "B" Company.
Lt.	DONEIER	Platoon Commander, 2nd Platoon, "B" Company.
Lt.	STEMKOSKI	Platoon Commander, 1st Platoon, "A" Company.
Lt.	JONES	Platoon Commander, 2nd Platoon, "A" Company.
Lt.	EBAUGH	Platoon Commander, 3rd Platoon, "A" Company.
Lt.	SPLAIN	Commander of Military Police patrols and supervisor of civilian police activities.
Lt.(jg)	ROBBINS	Surgeon
WO.	MILLS	Communication chief.

(e) The first and second platoon of "B" Company are designated as the mobile unit. The first, second, and third platoons of "A" Company are designated as the reserve unit.

2. Plan for the defense of the billeting area of Oita Occupation Group in the event of an actual attack on that area:

(a) In the event of an actual attack on the billeting area of the Oita Occupation Group, the following plan will be put into operation.

(b) The billeting area is enclosed in a rectangular compound with earth revetments around all four sides. There are a number of small Japanese earthworks, built as air-raid shelters, throughout the compound. All gates to the compound, except the main entrance, will remain closed at all times. In the event of an attack the main gate will be closed and locked.

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Subject:      Annex Able to Annex King.  
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(Cont'd)

(c) The first platoon of "B" Company will be responsible for the north side of the compound, the second platoon of "B" Company for the east side, the first platoon of "A" Company for the south side, and the second platoon of "A" Company for the west side. These platoons will be so disposed as to give machine gun cover down the roads entering the compound, final protective lines along the earth revetments constituting the compound perimeter and riflemen posted in the upper stories of the buildings around the perimeter.

(d) The third platoon of "A" Company will be positioned generally in the center of the compound as reserve unit, prepared to deliver effective fire from earthwork positions in this area and also to lend aid to any section of the perimeter defense which should become hard-pressed.

(e) In the event of an attack on the billeting area or other disturbances, the Provost Marshall will insure that the Civilian Police are notified and that all available are dispatched to the scene of the disturbances

(f) In the event of an extended siege, S-4, through available communication facilities will insure that higher headquarters are requested to supply Oita Occupation Group by air-drop.

(g) Blackout regulations will be in effect and sign and countersign will be as established in previous orders.

*Edward H. Splain*  
EDWARD H. SPLAIN,  
2ndLt., USMCR,  
S-3.

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HEADQUARTERS, NAVAL AIR STATION COMLAND,  
SASEBO AREA, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION, FMF,  
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

CONFIDENTIAL

17 November, 1945

From: S-3, 5th Tank Battalion.  
To : The Commanding Officer, 5th Tank Battalion.

Subject: Annex Able to Annex King.

OPERATION ORDER #2: Defense of Naval Air Station Area.

Maps: (a) Sasebo - 1/22,900.  
(b) Photographs - drawing of NAS.

1. (a) See annex BAKER to 5th Marine Division Operation Plan 25-45 and Intelligence Studies and Summaries issued.

2. The Fifth Tank Battalion will be prepared to defend against and subsequently disperse, capture, or destroy any hostile groups within its area of responsibility that interfere with the accomplishment of its mission. It will further be prepared to support any separate unit in the Sasebo area.

3. PLAN I

(a) Company "C", 5th Tank Battalion will on orders from the Commanding Officer, 5th Tank Battalion send out radio Operators to take up positions where they can observe enemy action along routes of approach to this area. Tanks will immediately take up defensive positions where they can command these approaches.

(b) Company "B" will be on call to support Company "C" as needed.

(c) Elements of "A", "B", and "C" Companies will have unused tanks dug in at strategic positions and weapons manned to provide a cross-fire for the immediate area of the Naval Air Station.

(d) Drivers will be available to supply Company "C" with necessary replenishment tanks as may be needed.

(e) All available personnel will be dug in a strategic point in a ring of defense.

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Subject: Annex Able to Annex King.  
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(Cont'd)

PLAN II

(a) Company "C", 5th Tank Battalion will be prepared on order from the Commanding Officer, 5th Tank Battalion, to proceed via selected route to any unit in the Sasebo area. Recon units will lead the way and control all traffic to insure least possible delay in movement.

(b) Company "B" will remain on call at present location. Recon units will proceed to strategic points so that traffic control can be instantaneous in the necessity of movement.

(c) H&S Company (Maintenance) and sufficient personnel to man (2 per tank) the remaining vehicles will be prepared to resupply any unit with new vehicles manned by original crews.

(d) All units will call for replenishment vehicles rather than endeavor to free one in rice paddies and delay support. Retreiver and recovery teams will coordinate salvage work.

4. (a) Supply will be automatic from the Battalion C.P. (79:10-08.90) by truck to forward outposts. Replenishments of other than automatic supplies will be radioed into the Battalion C.P.

(b) Administrative reports will be submitted not later than 1600 to the Battalion C.P.

5. Communication will be by radio in accordance with 5th Marine Signal. 5th Tank Battalion C.P. will be in command vehicle and will advance in rear of assault company in Plann II. In Plan I, C.P. will be centrally located to rear of perimeter defense.

*Edward H. Splain*  
EDWARD H. SPLAIN,  
2ndLt., USMCR,  
S-3.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

ANNEX BAKER OF ANNEX KING

Appendix 3 - Special Services

TRAINING PERIOD

(a) EDUCATION

Due to the fact that during this period military training was of prime importance, no formal classes were held in academic or vocational studies. However, correspondence study in the Marine Corps Institute and The United States Armed Force Institute was greatly encouraged. The battalion school tent was made available to all hands for study in the off hours and tutors were obtained from qualified officers and enlisted personnel in order to give all students as much assistance as possible.

(b) RECREATION

All available means for recreation were provided within the battalion and activities provided by the division were made readily accessible to all hands. This battalion provided the following recreational facilities:

- (1) Battalion recreation room with a beer canteen and ping pong tables, and facilities for playing cards and other similar indoor games.
- (2) Library for leisure time reading and letter writing.
- (3) Company swimming parties were held regularly at the beach.
- (4) Fishing parties.

The following divisional recreational facilities were made available to all hands:

- (1) Moving picture (nightly).
- (2) USO Shows.
- (3) Red Cross Canteen.

(c) ATHLETICS

Within the battalion large competition was had in softball and volley ball, while within each company, a similar competition program was had between platoons. Body building classes were held daily and results were very encouraging.

C O N F I D E N T I A L



C O N F I D E N T I A L

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ANNEX BAKER OF ANNEX KING---Appendix 3-Special Services (Cont'd)  
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Seven members of the battalion participated on the Service Troops team of the Division baseball league. Attendance at these games by members of this organization was always high.

(d) PERSONAL AFFAIRS

Inasmuch as the war was still in progress during this period, post-war problems among personnel of this organization were practically nil. Personal affairs problems were well confined to emergency furloughs which were handled by the individual companies in cooperation with the battalion adjutant.

OCCUPATION PERIOD

(a) EDUCATION

A battalion school offering academic courses in high school level subjects was organized with first classes commencing 14 October, 1945. Instruction was offered in the following courses.

- (1) Basic Mathematics
- (2) Algebra I
- (3) Elementary Physics
- (4) Bookkeeping and Accounting
- (5) Fundamentals of Electricity
- (6) Livestock Production
- (7) Farm Management
- (8) American History

Enrollment in the battalion school was ninety-six (96). Instructors were obtained from officers and enlisted men in the battalion, who had either teaching experience or sufficient educational background in the classes which they held to qualify as good instructors.

In addition to the battalion school, correspondence study in the Marine Corps Institute and United States Armed Force Institute was greatly encouraged. A Special Study Hall was made available as were tutors in all courses. Correspondence study enrollees in the organization at the time of this report totaled forty-three (43).

Interviews were held by the educational officer and the educational NCO in which personnel awaiting discharge were advised and helped to plan their educational program after release from the service. Such interviews numbered nine (9).

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ANNEX BAKER OF ANNEX KING—Appendix 3—Special Services (Cont'd)  
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(b) RECREATION

A battalion library was established in which the following facilities were made available to all hands:

- (1) Fiction and non-fiction books.
- (2) Current magazines.
- (3) Stars and Stripes Daily Paper.
- (4) Sporting News.
- (5) Daily Spearheads.
- (6) Letter writing facilities, with stationery furnished.

A battalion recreation hall adjacent to the Post Exchange was established with facilities for drinking beer and coca cola, playing ping pong, and other various games such as acey-ducey, card games, monopoly, etc.

A branch Post Exchange was installed.

The 5th Division Band was made available to play for our entertainment on two separate occasions, 5 November, and 19 November, 1945.

A Japanese entertainment group was procured and it presented shows on 5 November, and 15 November, 1945.

A quiz show, composed of local talent, was held on the evening of 10 November, 1945 and cash prizes were awarded to the participants.

In addition to the above, each company had its own reading room which was used for study periods, reading and letter writing.

16mm Moving Pictures were held nightly commencing 28 September, 1945. Two showings were held each night to insure that every one in the battalion had an opportunity to attend.

Jap seaplane floats were obtained for building boats and a great number of men spent their recreation hours building and sailing these boats.

A Jap fishing boat was put into operation and served as a crash boat and as a recreation boat for fishing and sight seeing trips.

(c) ATHLETICS

The following athletic facilities were constructed:

- (1) Softball diamond
- (2) Football field

C O N F I D E N T I A L



C O N F I D E N T I A L

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ANNEX BAKER OF ANNEX KING--Appendix 3--Special Services (Cont'd)  
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- (3) Two volley ball courts
- (4) Indoor, four wall, handball court.
- (5) Body-building room
- (6) Boxing room

Round-robin league competition was held in softball with each company having a representative team, and to fill out the league teams were entered by neighboring Marine and Army units. In addition, the 5th Tank Battalion has a team entered in an area league sponsored by the 5th Amphibious Corps, and the same team has played games with the teams from Camp Ainoura and from ships in the harbor. Attendance for the tank battalion team games was always high and enthusiasm was great.

Volley ball competition was placed on the same basis as softball.

Touch football was organized on the same basis.

Boxing and body-building instruction was held regularly.

With the above mentioned athletic facilities made available to all personnel it is estimated that at least 90% of the tank battalion, or all personnel who so desired, were able to take an active part in athletics.

(d) PERSONAL AFFAIRS

Personal affairs lectures and interviews were held by the 5th Marine Division Personal Affairs Officer as well as by the Battalion Special Services Officer. The lecture phase was incorporated with the daily training schedule and interviews were made available at any time. New information was passed on to all hands as soon as it became available, through medium of bulletin boards, memorandums, and publications to all companies.

During the occupation period, interviews concerning the following were held:

- (1) Civil Service references (7)
- (2) Emergency Furloughs (2)
- (3) G. I. Bill of Rights (14)
- (4) Life Insurance (5)
- (5) Income Tax (2)

C O N F I D E N T I A L



ANNEX BAKER OF ANNEX KING

Appendix 5 - Adjutant's Report.

31 May, 1945. The Tank Battalion was six (6) percent overstrength after joining replacements received on IWO JIMA. All replacements were trained at Track Vehicle Battalion, Special Training Regiment, San Diego.

The unit was under company administration with four (4) battalion clerks for the battalion administrative work, including 2 and 3 sections. The administrative unit was instructed in the reporting of casualties and the prognosis report.

The battalion left the training area on 25 August and embarked upon twelve (12) LSMs and three (3) APAs. Liaison teams of two (2) men and a jeep driver were assigned to and travelled with each infantry battalion.

All companies landed at Green Beach #1 in the SASEBO Naval Air Station Area on 22 September, 1945. The landing was made without incident, and Lieutenant Colonel W. R. COLLINS assumed command of the Naval Air Station Area.

On 1 October a centralized personnel section was established, company clerks being consolidated in a central office.

Upon the directive to have "A" Company, reinforced, move to OITA as the OITA KEN occupation group the administrative section was divided so as to fulfil duties of separate 1, 2 and 3 sections. Upon being relieved by a unit of the 32nd Army Division, "A" Company reinforced, returned to battalion control.

A directive was received to detach and transfer officers and enlisted men with less than 50 points to the Second Marine Division and units in the VAC, and to receive and join high point men from these organizations. On 25 November details began moving by rail to and from SASEBO to NAGASAKI and units of VAC. All transfers were completed on 29 November. Transfers and joinings were effected as listed below:

	<u>JOINED</u>			<u>TRANSFERRED</u>	
	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>		<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>
2dTkBn.....	8	255	2dTkBn.....	10	333
VAC.....		150	VAC.....		11
TOTAL	8	405	TOTAL	10	407

Total strength of Battalion, 30 Nov 45.

	<u>Off</u>	<u>Enl</u>	
	18	522	USMC
	1	7	USN
TOTAL	19	529	



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HEADQUARTERS, NAVAL AIR STATION COMMAND,  
SASEBO AREA, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION, FMF,  
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

CONFIDENTIAL

17 November, 1945.

From: S-2, 5th Tank Battalion.  
To : The Commanding Officer, 5th Tank Battalion.  
Subject: Annex Charlie to Annex King.  
Maps: KYUSHU AMS Scale 1:25,000.  
KYUSHU AMS Scale 1:250,000.

Upon return to the island of HAWAII after the IWO JIMA operation a period of intensive training was initiated for the Battalion Intelligence Section and all Reconnaissance and Liaison Personnel. This training entailed the proper functioning of the Battalion Command Post, tank intelligence information, map and aerial photograph reading, study of Japanese Language, tactics and compass problems.

On 10 May, 1945, the intelligence section undertook the training of all company Reconnaissance and Liaison teams. Extensive field problems dealing with all phases of scouting and patrolling, field sketching, route reconnaissance both mounted and dismounted, and compass problems were prepared and conducted by this section.

On 13 May, 1945, this section published an order governing the marking of tanks. Special numbers were used to indicate officers' tanks and flame thrower tanks. Each company used a definite block of numbers and an identifying color. The numbers were eighteen (18) inches high, were plainly visible for several hundred yards and were painted on the sides of the turret, on the bustle and atop the tank to aid in aerial observation.

During the period 11-15 June, 1945, a school in the fundamentals of the Japanese Language was conducted by the G-2 Language Section. The instruction consisted of proper pronunciation, common phrases and a familiarization with the Japanese place names. These classes were attended by all officers, key non-commissioned officers and Reconnaissance and Liaison men.

Commencing 9 July, 1945, infantry men from all Regiments were brought to the Tank Battalion to be trained as tank guides. This section participated and instructed in the following subjects: Tank Intelligence information, the proper use of tanks with infantry, the proper mine clearing tactics and the capabilities and limitations of the tank.

During the period 19-20 July, 1945, this section conducted a Gas and Decontamination School and all chemical personnel throughout the battalion participated. The school stressed the use of decontaminating agents,

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Subject: Annex Charlie to Annex King. (Cont'd)

vesicant kits, gas identification, use of the gas mask, and entry into the gas chamber.

Beginning 25 July, 1945, the Division Intelligence Section conducted a series of orientation lectures on the following subjects: Prisoners of War, Psychological Warfare, Japanese Documents and the function of Language Personnel. These lectures contained much valuable information and were made part of the daily schedule.

During the period 18-20 July the Battalion Reconnaissance and Liaison Teams under the direction of the Battalion Reconnaissance and Liaison Officer participated in a repetition of the Armored Force Problem stressing the screening phase composition and tactics of the screen were emphasized and the Air Observers were used to a decided advantage. Large white numbers were marked on the jeep hoods and by using this number the plane could direct a considerable number of jeeps easily. It was determined that at least one (1) reconnaissance vehicle must be used for every four hundred (400) yards of front in fairly smooth terrain and that armored cars or light tanks accompany the screen so as to disperse or capture any resistance encountered by the screen and to insure the uninterrupted advance of the main body.

The period from 11-26 August, 1945, was devoted to briefing and preparation for the coming operation. The operation of the battalion command post during a fast moving situation was especially emphasized. The intelligence section was briefed as thoroughly as orders permitted at that time. Also during this period all possible information on the forthcoming operation was collected into briefs to be opened by the various troop commanders at an appointed time.

During the voyage from HILO, HAWAII to SASEBO, KYUSHU a regular schedule of briefing and lectures on the pending operation and enforcement of surrender terms were conducted. Previously prepared intelligence information had been supplied Troop Commanders aboard the various vessels carrying this command. Additional information was distributed by courier whenever possible.

At approximately 1400 22 September, 1945, the Battalion Command Post landed and set up in the Administration Building of the Sasebo Naval Air Station (1278.99-1108.85 1/25000 AMS L872). Immediate steps were taken to contact Japanese Liaison Personnel to ascertain whether or not all the terms of surrender had been carried out. Everything proved satisfactory and the Japanese Liaison men rendered valuable assistance.

Combat Team 26 had also set up their C.P. at the SASEBO Naval Air Station and was the senior unit present. On 25 September, 1945, Combat Team 26 moved on and the tank battalion assumed tactical control of the SASEBO Naval Air Station.

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Subject: Annex Charlie to Annex King. (Cont'd)  
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Commencing 25 September, 1945, immediate steps were taken to guard all intelligence targets and patrols were sent out to reconnoiter this command's area of responsibility. Members of the section scoured every target for intelligence value and all information was submitted in batch form and on periodic reports. Japanese Naval Technician Teams were present and cooperated to the fullest extent.

Inventories of all installations were conducted either by this command or subordinate units on the Air Station. Complete inventories were submitted through appropriate channels.

On or about 5 October, 1945, the Oita Occupation Group was formed by Division Order. The Battalion Intelligence Section with the exception of one (1) Intelligence Non-commissioned included in the group. The main body boarded a train on 13 October, 1945, and reached OITA on the same night.

Upon arrival, the Japanese Liaison Committee and the Allied Military Government Section of OITA KEN were contacted in regard to all information they had obtained prior to our arrival. Such information was consolidated by this section for further disposition to the 5th Marine Division.

All military personnel and civilians were very cooperative and eager to assist occupation forces. Cooperation on the part of the civilian police was all that could be desired. No trouble was encountered throughout the whole occupational period.

Active patrolling was performed to search for new intelligence targets and to place the occupation forces constantly in the public eye.

All remaining military units in OITA KEN were ordered to submit complete demobilization records, order of battle reports and inventories.

Six (6) man jeep patrols were sent to all outlying districts throughout OITA KEN to investigate all known intelligence targets, to search for unreported installations, and to insure that the demobilization of Japanese Armed Forces was being effected. These patrols proved very successful and received excellent cooperation from the Japanese.

Periodic shipping reports for all ports throughout OITA KEN were submitted to Division once weekly. These reports covered both entrance and departure and listed the ship's name, gross tons, type of ship, cargo, probable sailing date, destination and appropriate remarks. These reports were submitted to this section daily by liaison committee and were combined into weekly reports.

Daily demobilization changes were a part of the S-2 Periodic Reports. Once weekly the entire demobilization records of all Japanese Military units still functioning were submitted as an annex to the intelligence report. Other annexes included reports on war plants, new weapons, maps of military installations, reports on special units and patrol reports. Everything of even the slightest intelligence value was included in these reports.

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Subject: Annex Charlie to Annex King.  
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(Cont'd)

On 31 October, 1945, an advance detail and Reconnaissance Party of three hundred and fifty (350) men from the 126th Field Artillery Battalion arrived by train and preparations were begun to relieve the OITA Occupation Group.

All documents and records were turned over to the relieving unit whose staff officers were indoctrinated into their tasks by the men who were being relieved. On 5 November, 1945, the Oita Occupation Group loaded aboard the train and returned to their parent organization at the Sasebo Naval Air Station.

Beginning 8 November, 1945, the Tank Battalion embarked on a regular forty-four (44) hour weekly schedule. The intelligence section participated as instructors in various subjects.

REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. In the opinion of this office the SCR-510 Jeep and portable radio is not suited to reconnaissance and liaison work. The radio is too large and too heavy to be carried when men are working with front line troops. The set must be dismantled and then it is a two man load. When put together the radio is too heavy to be carried by one man and two men would make excellent targets. It is recommended that a smaller lighter radio be used or a smaller radio that can contact the SCR-510 and can be carried into the front lines easily. The larger radio could be left at the Infantry Battalion Command Post and all information transmitted to it from the smaller radio.

2. There is no provision in the present Table of Organization for a screen whose duty it is to provide reconnaissance and protection for the main body. The 1/2 ton 4x4 (jeep) is not adequate because it carries very little fire power and no armor protection. It is recommended that light tanks or armored cars be used to provide protection and fire power to the screen. It is further recommended that the 1/2 ton 4x4 be replaced by the "Weasel" w/radio.

3. The intelligence and operations sections should be integrated in our opinion. The two and three sections work together very closely and all members of these sections should be able to do any of the jobs required. At present the Table of Organization strength of the sections are inadequate in the opinion of this section based upon actual battle requirements. The sections combined should number six (6) men with the following duties:

Gunnery Sergeant  
Platoon Sergeant

Chief of both sections.  
Chief of intelligence section.

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Subject:                   Annex Charlie to Annex King.                   (Cont'd)  
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Sergeant	Clerk.
Corporal	Operations Map.
Corporal	Journal, work book.
Private First Class	Intelligence Radio Operator.

At present there is no provision for an intelligence radio in this battalion's Table of Organization. That should be remedied.

4.           In the opinion of this office the enlisted men in the two and three sections are not adequately trained. All intelligence men should be graduates of Combat Intelligence School, at least, in addition to other appropriate schools.

5.           The Reconnaissance and Liaison Personnel as prescribed by the present Table of Organization are far from adequate. A Tank Company is normally attached to an infantry regiment and must have liaison at the regiment, all the battalions and any other supporting unit. At least four (4) teams of five (5) men each are needed by each company. The four (4) teams go to regiment and each of the battalions. Five (5) men are required because two (2) men man the radio and three (3) serve as reconnaissance.

*Edward H. Splain*  
EDWARD H. SPLAIN,  
2ndLt., USMCR,  
S-2

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HEADQUARTERS, NAVAL AIR STATION COMMAND,  
SASIBO AREA, FIFTH MARINE DIVISION, FIFTH  
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

CONFIDENTIAL

17 November, 1945.

From: S-3, 5th Tank Battalion.  
To: The Commanding Officer 5th Tank Battalion  
Subject: Annex Dog to Annex King.  
Maps: KYUSHU AMS Scale 1:25,000.  
KYUSHU AMS Scale 1:250,000.

Upon return to HAWAII from the island of IWO JIMA a meeting of representatives from the first, third, fourth and fifth tank battalions was held at FMF, PAC in Pearl Harbor to standardize tank infantry coordination and to submit recommendations relative to the adoption of a suitable table of organization for the Marine Tank Battalion. As a result of this meeting, Fleet Marine Force Headquarters issued a Standardized Operation Procedure for tank-infantry training. A new table of organization as recommended by the meeting was forwarded for approval.

On 5 May the tank companies commenced a series of problems with the artillery regiments. These problems involved the movement of tanks under timed fire, the training of tank officers in the adjustment and technique of artillery fire and the training of Artillery Forward Observers in observing and adjusting fire from within a tank. This period of training lasted two weeks during which time the enlisted men and officers of this unit reached a suitable degree of proficiency in the directing of artillery fire.

On 13 May this battalion organized a Flame Company in expectation that such a company would be included in a new Table of Organization. Nine (9) flame tanks arrived, but the Flame Company was disbanded on or about 5 August when the expected Table of Organization proved different from what was anticipated. The flame tanks were then placed in the various companies, one to each platoon.

On 22 May the tank battalion undertook the training of the crews of the M7B1 Gun Carriages. This training involved vehicle maintenance and repair, driving, gunnery, and the tactical use of the M7B1 with a medium tank company and battalion.

Throughout the training period all the tank companies held their own tactical and firing problems involving the use of the flame throwers and tank dozers as well as the conventional tanks. On 28 May the tank dozer drivers and assistant drivers attended a bull dozer school conducted by the 5th Engineer Battalion.

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Subject: 5th Tank Battalion Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.  
(Cont'd)  
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During the period 4-7 June, 1945, (inclusive) a course of instruction covering mines and demolitions was conducted by the 5th Engineer Battalion. A total of ten (10) men per company attended this school. These men were members of tank dozer crews who were to assist and effect clearance of mines when so dictated by the situation.

During the week of 11 June, 1945, two (2) men from each company attended a field wire school. The men, although not communication personnel, received sufficient instruction to enable them to perform necessary telephone and field wire duties should the occasion arise during the coming operation.

Also during the first week in June problems were conducted incorporating tank-infantry coordinations with all the infantry companies, the Engineers and the Artillery included. Each infantry company received a minimum of one (1) days training with approximately nine (9) tanks, including a flame thrower tank and a dozer tank, participating. The mornings were devoted to a blackboard lecture by a tank officer which embraced visual signals, engine signals, the operation of the tank-infantry phone and a general discussion of the tank-infantry standard operating procedure as edited by this battalion. After the lecture the infantry men were given short rides in the tank and then practiced visual signalling and infantry tactics in connection with the tanks. During the afternoon a short problem was conducted featuring a situation in which a combined tank and infantry attack was stopped by a mine field, the mine field cleared by engineers, the tanks move through the infantry and attack positions heavily defended by small arms fire, encounter anti-tank fire and then pull into defiladed positions to cover a general infantry attack. This was a firing problem during which the infantry men guided and directed tank fire, dummy mines with a small charge were used.

During the period 11-20 June, 1945, the Battalion Executive Officer conducted a series of problems involving indirect fire and the use of tanks as artillery. A firing battery of tanks was set up and a target, several hundred yards away brought under fire. Officers and senior enlisted men manning an Observation Post observed the fire and by radio sent back the changes using the same teams as used by the artillery. Another officer in command of the tanks computed and made the necessary adjustments until such time as the target became the center of the impact area. During this period all officers and senior non-commissioned officers received valuable training in the observing and adjusting of artillery fire.

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Subject:           5th Tank Battalion Operation Report, Occupation of Japan  
                  (Cont'd)  
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During the period 20-22 June, 1945, this battalion conducted an Armored Force Problem involving the movement of a tank battalion with supporting units 12 to 15 miles from their source of supply. The problem lasted three days and consisted of a mock landing with three (3) reinforced Battalion Landing Teams, the breaching of a belt of enemy resistance including a mine field and the capture of a small mountain which was heavily defended by our own men acting as the enemy. Approximately one hundred (100) of this battalion's men acted as enemy infantry and harassed the tank force with infiltration tactics throughout the night and while on the march.

The second day consisted of a twelve mile motor march, with a reconnaissance screen functioning ahead of the main body through hostile territory. The screen and the main body were harassed by small groups of enemy snipers all during the day until the main body of the enemy was again encountered late in the afternoon. After beating off the enemy a tactical bivouac was established for the night. Small groups of the enemy infantry again infiltrated during the night.

The third day consisted of a firing problem (without the enemy) simulating the attack and seizure of the enemies main defenses. All during the problem the Division Air Observers had been handicapped by bad weather but now the weather broke and they proved to be of great assistance during the attack. Individual tanks, and platoons were guided to the enemy positions, also suitable routes of egress were selected by the Air Observers. The large numbers painted on the tanks were easily visible from the air and greatly aided the Observers in identifying the tanks. A tank radio (SCR 510) had been installed in the plane and worked out very well. The enemy positions were taken swiftly without any loss of movement. The Battalion Commander decided not to return to camp and for the next two days this battalion conducted problems on the use of the smoke shells, the spotting of targets by aerial observers and the direction of the jeep screen from the air. All problems were very satisfactory and upon completion the battalion returned to camp.

Commencing 2 July, 1945, a school for all officers and Staff Non-commissioned Officers (line) was conducted by this battalion for the purpose of acquainting our men with other units throughout the division and to further cooperation with these units. The officers giving the lectures were asked to speak on the problems entailed in a large land mass operation and how they could aid this command and how we could help them. The lecture given by a representative of the 5th Motor Transport Battalion

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Subject: 5th Tank Battalion Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.  
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entailed a blackboard problem is which Motor Transport had to supply fuel and provisions to the tanks over some fifty (50) land miles. The difficulties entailed were thoroughly discussed and several points on how we could be of assistance were brought out. Members of the G-2, G-3, G-4, the infantry company and battalion, the engineers, artillery, naval construction battalion, JASCO and many others contributed lectures along the same line.

On 3 July, 1945, two (2) men from each company attended a course in the operation and maintenance of the "Weasel", conducted by the 5th Motor Transport Battalion. At the time it was believed that this battalion might be issued Weasels but such was never the case.

On 5 July, 1945, all wheeled vehicle and half-track drivers attended a mud obstacle course conducted by the 12th Force Motor Transport Battalion. The obstacle course simulated rice paddies and afforded valuable training in driving over boggy terrain and field expedients helpful in such terrain.

Commencing 9 July, 1945, two (2) men per infantry platoon from all regiments were brought to the tank battalion to live and to work with this command during a regular two week period. The first week was spent almost entirely in lectures and demonstrations within the battalion area. The future tank guides were made thoroughly familiar with the tank including its capabilities and limitations. Lectures were given on tank-infantry standardized operating procedure, visual and engine signals, the operation of the tank-infantry phone, tank mines and how to disarm them, tank markings and identification and necessary tank intelligence information. Also during the first week the guides spent a day in the field riding in the tanks where a practical demonstration of a tank's capabilities and limitations took place. During the second week the guides rode in the tanks as crew members throughout the whole weeks schedule.

The battalion continued its practice of indoctrinating all personnel into the employment of tanks over large land masses. Problems were conducted for the battalion officers and men on the sand table and lectures were given by the Commanding Officer of this battalion.

During the week of 18 July, 1945, special emphasis was laid on defense of the bivouac in particular. Lectures and sand table demonstrations were held daily and problems were conducted utilizing one (1) tank company as enemy and demonstrating the defense of the bivouac against enemy mechanized attack.

On 3 August, 1945, the battalion parade was conducted on IWO JIMA Field. Decorations and Commendations were presented to men of this command by the Division Commander.

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A Regimental Combat Team problem was conducted with the 28th Regiment on August 9-11 (inclusive). The Battalion Command Post, most of Headquarters and Service Company and "B" and "C" Companies participated. The problem was conducted by Combat Team 28 and the tanks were used as a supporting arm.

The period from 11 to 26 August (inclusive) was devoted to the Battalion Landing Team problems, inspections, and briefing and preparation for the forthcoming Amphibious Operation was continued. On 26 August, 1945, the battalion began to load aboard ship.

During the voyage from HILO, HAWAII to SASANO, KYUSHU a regular schedule of briefing and lectures on the pending operation and enforcement of surrender terms were conducted. The tank battalion was distributed over more than twenty (20) ships and the briefing had to be conducted by the senior tank officer present on each ship.

Normal attachment of Reconnaissance and Liaison Teams was affected prior to embarkation to Division and to each Regiment. A team of fifteen (15) men and two (2) officers landed at the Aircraft Factory (1280.85-1110.90) 1/25,000 AMS L872 which was the designated landing area for this unit. Reconnaissance proved that landing was impracticable and the tanks were ordered ashore on the green beaches after a reconnaissance of these beaches were made. The Tank Battalion Command Post was set up in the Administration Building of the Naval Air Station, (1273.99-1108.85 1/25,000 AMS L872).

No opposition of any kind was encountered and Japanese Liaison Officials were present to offer assistance to the occupying forces.

The tanks could not be moved from the Naval Air Station because of the poor roads and the Tank Battalion was ordered to remain. Lieutenant

Colonel W. R. COLLINS was designated Commanding Officer of the Naval Air Station, Sasano.

Surveillance and inventory of the Naval Air Station was begun on or about 25 September and complete inventories were submitted to G-2.

On or about 5 October, 1945, the Oita Occupation Group, consisting of "A" Company reinforced was formed by Division Order. An advance detail consisting of two (2) officers and thirteen (13) men left for Oita by train on 12 October, 1945, to prepare the way for the main body. The main body arrived in Oita on 13 October, 1945.

The Occupational Command Post was established in the Kempei Tai building at (650.45-1120.39 AMS 1/250,000 Map of Central Japan). The troops were billeted at the 47th Regiment barracks (650.35-1120.30 AMS 1/250,000) and a defense plan was formulated.

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                  (Cont'd)  
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Cooperation on the part of the military services and the civilian population was excellent. The police proved to be of great assistance in collecting controlled items.

A meeting with the Liaison Committee proved very satisfactory and all requests were supplied promptly. For a time the cooperation of the Navy was not all that could be desired, but after a consultation with Japanese Naval Officers matters rapidly improved.

Six (6) man jeep patrols were dispatched regularly to outlying districts of OITA KEN to gather all possible information. Forty-seven (47) major installations were uncovered and maps, order of battle reports and inventories collected on each.

The Oita Naval Air Field was found to be operational and regular (OY) Plane courier runs were instituted between OITA and SASEBO on 16 October, 1945.

There were no incidents between men on liberty and civilians. At all times the highest degree of friendliness and hospitality was extended to our troops.

On 31 October, 1945, an advance detail and reconnaissance party of three hundred and fifty (350) men from the 126th Field Artillery Battalion arrived by train and preparations were begun to relieve the Oita Occupation Group.

All documents and records were turned over to the relieving unit whose staff officers were indoctrinated into their tasks by the men they were relieving. On 5 November, 1945, "A" Company reinforced loaded aboard the train and returned to their parent organization at SASEBO. The Group Executive Officer remained until 9 November, 1945, to assist the relieving unit.

During the period 12 October to 5 November, 1945, the remainder of the Tank Battalion at SASEBO conducted a schedule embracing close order drill, ceremonies and inspections, educational programs and athletics.

Beginning 8 November, 1945, the battalion embarked on a regular forty-four (44) hour weekly schedule entailing subjects strictly military in nature, an extensive educational program, ceremonies, inspections, practice marches and group athletics.

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REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That a continuous study be maintained in peace time of tank employment and technological improvement of the vehicle itself. It is a prophetic and significant factor that the explosion of the first atom bomb and its effects was observed from a specially built lead lined tank.
2. That tanks be considered, and treated as primary offensive weapon and arm rather than a secondary supporting unit. This has been recommended by Divisional Commanders as a result of actual combat. It should be supplemented by instruction and indoctrination of officers by Marine Corps Schools.
3. That a suitable Table of Organization be drawn up for the Marine Tank Battalion which can be skeletonized in peace time, but which is capable of furnishing the structure for an adequate Marine Tank Battalion in Combat. The Table of Organization now in effect weakened, rather than strengthened the Tank Battalion, and if it had been necessary for tank units to use this Table of Organization in combat, such weakening would have become obvious.
4. That some allowance be made either in the Tank Battalion or as Division Troops to provide for a reconnaissance screen to insure the movement of troops and armored units over large land masses. The present Reconnaissance Company is not adequate, adequately equipped nor adequately trained to work with and for a mechanized unit. Such a unit must be highly mobile with sufficient armor and fire power to handle small skirmishes and small points of enemy resistance.
5. That the tracked vehicle platoon of the Ordnance Company be abolished as such. Echelons of maintenance (so far as tank repair is concerned) has never functioned within the Marine Corps nor will it ever be feasible because of our size, composition, and mission. However such a platoon should be included in each tank battalion to perform all necessary maintenance as is dictated by the situation. This too should function in peace time as well as during war. At least a cadre should be formed within each battalion.
6. That more Communication Personnel be included in the Tank Battalion Table of Organization on the basis of having more radios than any other unit within a Marine Division. A definite increase in the number of radio maintenance and repair men is needed.

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Subject: 5th Tank Battalion Operation Report, Occupation of Japan.  
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7. That there is at present no unit within a division directly responsible for mine clearance. Heretofor the Engineer Battalion has been made responsible, but after they have made their normal attachments to Regiments, Battalions etc, there is only those men of Headquarters and Service Company remaining intact. Also there are no men specifically trained for these duties only, now is there any unit within the present Engineer Battalion charged specifically only with mine removal.

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## ANNEX EASY OF ANNEX KING

### Appendix 1 - Transport Quartermaster

Original plans for lifting the Tank Group, which includes the 17 Gun Carriages of the Infantry Regiments, called for fifteen (15) LSM's. Fourteen (14) LSM's were assigned to the Tank Battalion with space reserved on each of the fourteen (14) for one (1) Shore Party vehicle. The fifteenth (15th) LSM was assigned to the Shore Party but was under the control of the Tank Embarkation Group Commander. The plan proved to be not feasible because of the amount of Shore Party equipment to be lifted. Final plans assigned twelve (12) LSM's to the Tank Battalion and three (3) LSM's to the Shore Party. With the twelve (12) LSM's, the following vehicles were lifted: Forty-three (43) medium tanks, three (3) medium tanks with bulldozer, nine (9) flame tanks, four (4) tank recovery vehicles, twelve (12) 105mm gun carriages, four (4) 43 personnel carriers, nineteen (19) 2-ton 6x6 trucks, eighteen (18) 2-ton 4x4 trucks, five (5) 6x6 shop trucks, and fourteen (14) assorted trailers. In addition to the vehicles, forty thousand (40,000) "I" rations were loaded.

### Appendix 2 - Quartermaster

On 12 May, 1945, the 4-Section of this organization began preparations for an assault operation. All equipment and supplies were inventoried and requests for additional equipment and supplies to bring the battalion up to authorized allowances were submitted. Re-supply began almost immediately and by the time this organization departed from the Hawaiian Area, all equipment and supplies were one hundred per cent (100%) of authorized allowance.

During the period 12 May, 1945, to 15 August, 1945, numerous requests for unauthorized equipment and supplies were submitted, of which approximately fifty per cent (50%) were acted upon. Recommendations were made for additional equipment such as POA-CWS Flame Tanks, tank mounting bulldozers, extended flame hose, T-18 periscopes, flails for tanks, weasels, and equipment for additional protection of tanks. The additional flame tanks were received two (2) days prior to departure. The tank mounting bulldozers were received by the Rear Echelon. The flame hose, T-18 periscopes, and additional protective equipment were received in time to be applied for use.

Prior to departure from the Hawaiian Area, excess items of all types and classes were turned in to the nearest supply agency.

On 12 August, 1945, ten (10) days prior to departure from the Hawaiian Area, TO G-76, G-79 and G-80 became effective for this organization. Numerous changes in rolling stock and tracked vehicles affected current allowances, necessitating changes in allowances of approximately fifty per cent (50%) of all authorized items. Division Quartermaster Transfer Orders were issued to adjust equipment to authorized allowances.

The change from operational to occupation mission made only negli-



gible changes in types of equipment and supplies to be lifted by the forward echelon.

From 22 September, 1945, the landing date of this organization, to the present time, re-supply has been adequate and sufficient.

### Appendix 3 - Medical

#### (a) Gear

Medical supplies were assembled for combat. Sufficient stocks of plasma, morphine, battle dressings and the like were divided between the Battalion Aid Station and the three (3) two- (2) man teams of corpsmen allocated to each tank company, so that each might act independently, if necessary. It was planned that the Battalion Aid Station would be both mobile and independent of supply for a week or more. The materiel of the aid station was loaded aboard a one-half ( $\frac{1}{2}$ ) ton trailer so that it could be easily moved and rapidly set up in a new position.

#### (b) Personnel

Medical personnel received intensive training in first aid for casualties, first aid for chemical warfare cases and daily field exercises in working with tanks. Three (3) field bivouacs were held during the training period.

#### (c) Troops

The troops received repeated lectures on first aid for injuries and chemical warfare agents, on tropical diseases and their prevention and on venereal diseases and how to avoid them.

The medical supplies were altered to increase the stores for the Sick Bay. As much DDT as possible was procured.

(d) Installations at the Sasebo Naval Air Station were inspected. The barracks were sprayed with DDT prior to billeting the troops. Heads were erected, water samples taken, the Sick Bay set up and a Pro Station established.

#### (e) Occupation of Oita, 13 October, 1945, to 5 November, 1945.

A portion of the Medical Department was attached to the forces composing the Oita Occupation Group. At Oita, all buildings were sprayed with DDT prior to occupation by the troops, a Sick Bay was erected, two (2) Pro Stations were established and water samples were taken and sent to Sasebo for analysis. The Japanese military hospitals in the Ken were inspected, and a questionnaire submitted to them.

#### (f) Return to Sasebo Naval Air Station

Since return to the Sasebo Naval Air Station, the regular routine of the administration of the Sick Bay has prevailed.

### Appendix 4 - Ordnance

When rehabilitation of this organization began, upon the return from Iwo Jima, twenty-five (25) tanks and three (3) tank recovery vehicles were on hand. New or rebuilt engines were placed in these tracked vehicles, new track was put on all tanks and all armament and turret mechanism was overhauled. During the period 1 June to 25 August, twenty-seven (27) new tanks, one (1) new recovery vehicle and nine (9) flame



tanks were received. All new tanks were thoroughly checked and modifications of local manufacture were installed. Forward echelon combat vehicles consisted of twenty-three (23) old and rebuilt tanks, nine (9) new flame tanks, three (3) old recovery vehicles and one (1) new recovery vehicle.

Since arriving in the Sasebo Area all tanks have been given a fifty (50) hour check and modified storage procedure has been carried out. Winterization of all vehicles has been completed.

Individual weapons of all personnel were inspected by the Division Ordnance Company prior to departure from the Hawaiian Area and all unserviceable weapons were replaced.

#### Appendix 5 - Disposition of surrendered materiel and equipment

Inventories of all surrendered materiel and equipment were submitted to Division. Disposition of all surrendered materiel and equipment in the Sasebo Naval Air Station Area was undertaken by VAC and is now in progress. Assistance was furnished by the 5th Tank Battalion with the use of flame throwing tanks. These tanks were used to ignite piles of planes and other inflammable materiel.

Disposition of surrendered materiel and equipment in Oita Ken by this organization consisted of collection and shipment to the 5th Marine Division of twenty-three thousand nine hundred and seventy-five (23,975) articles appearing on the Controlled Items and War Trophies List. Plans for destruction of surrendered aircraft and other war materiel were effected and steps were taken for the assembly of such items. Land and sea transportation for the disposal of surrendered ammunition was requested from the Home Minister of the Prefectural Government. This transportation was not furnished prior to departure from the Oita Ken Area.

#### Appendix 6 - Procurement

Procurement of serviceable surrendered materiel has been satisfactory. Many items in the local area were put to use for the improvement of living conditions and appearances. For example, the local Fire Department is made up of surrendered vehicles.

#### Appendix 7 - Motor Transport

Motor Transport equipment landed with this organization has been sufficient for all purposes. Maintenance of motor vehicles has been difficult at times due to lack of parts and equipment. Parts should be more plentiful and available, and should not consist of sets of parts, but rather parts which have a high fatality rate.

#### Appendix 8 - Shore Party

Inasmuch as this organization does not have sufficient personnel or equipment for shore party work, no training or planning, except un-



loading of LST's, was undertaken. Upon arrival at the Sasebo Naval Air Station, this battalion took over control of all beaches in the immediate area. Supervision of unloading, assignment of ships to beaches, assignment of storage area and temporary billeting of personnel were controlled by this organization. Navy SP Control Teams were not sufficient in personnel to lend assistance other than directing ships to the beaches. At least fifty per cent (50%) of all ships landing at the Sasebo Naval Air Station beaches did not have sufficient personnel to unload. The Officer-In-Charge of Troops did not know what to do or where to go and in most cases was unable to contact parent organizations. Information as to the location of temporary destinations should be made known to all concerned.

#### Appendix 10 - Periodic Reports

During the period May to August, 1945, the following reports were submitted:

- (a) Monthly readiness report to Division.
- (b) Monthly report reflecting status of materiel of this organization to G-4.

Reports submitted by this organization since arrival in Sasebo Naval Air Station are as follows:

- (a) S-4 Daily Periodic Report to G-4. This was discontinued on 3 October, 1945.
- (b) Daily Ammunition Report to G-4. This was discontinued on 3 October, 1945.
- (c) Daily Motor Vehicle Report to Motor Transport Officer.
- (d) Weekly Motor Vehicle Report to Motor Transport Officer.
- (e) Monthly Motor Vehicle Report to Motor Transport Officer.



PART 6

Maps to accompany 5th Marine Division  
Operation Report, OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

Annex LOVE

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MAPS


To Accompany

5th Marine Division Operation Report

OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

All sheets enclosed are shown by index  
plots on next two pages.






INDEX SHEET  
 FOR 1:250 000 MAPS  
 AMS # L571

AC OF S - G2  
 5TH. MARINE DIVISION

1485



FUKUOKA



INDEX

SHEETS

FOR 1:25000 MAPS

AMS # L872

AC OF S-G2

5TH. MAR. DIV.

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HEIGHTS IN METERS



TOI-MISAKI, JAPAN  
N3100-E13100/100



HEIGHTS IN METERS

KAGOSHIMA, JAPAN  
N3100-E13000/100










KUMAMOTO, JAPAN  
N 3200-E 13000/100






A. M. S. 1571

First Edition, AMS 1, 1944

Second Edition, AMS 2, 1944

Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army, by the Army Map Service (U. S. Army, Washington, D. C., 1944). Compiled from Japan, 1:50,000, Japanese Imperial Land Survey, (1903-1935); Japan, 1:200,000, Japanese Imperial Land Survey, (1911-1919). Raised from Japan, 1:200,000, Japanese Imperial Land Survey, (1941). See Japan Bureau Charts, (1934), R. Ando, editor, Japanese Hydrographic Charts 197, 198, 213, 1212, United States Hydrographic Charts 1660, 1915, 1675; and Intelligence Data. All place names transcribed according to the Modified Hepburn (Roman) System.



Scale 1:250,000




CONTOUR INTERVAL 100 METERS  
POLYCONIC PROJECTION  
PER THOUSAND YARD WORLD POLYCONIC GRID BANDS 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 800, 900, 1000, 1100, 1200, 1300, 1400, 1500, 1600, 1700, 1800, 1900, 2000, 2100, 2200, 2300, 2400, 2500, 2600, 2700, 2800, 2900, 3000, 3100, 3200, 3300, 3400, 3500, 3600, 3700, 3800, 3900, 4000, 4100, 4200, 4300, 4400, 4500, 4600, 4700, 4800, 4900, 5000, 5100, 5200, 5300, 5400, 5500, 5600, 5700, 5800, 5900, 6000, 6100, 6200, 6300, 6400, 6500, 6600, 6700, 6800, 6900, 7000, 7100, 7200, 7300, 7400, 7500, 7600, 7700, 7800, 7900, 8000, 8100, 8200, 8300, 8400, 8500, 8600, 8700, 8800, 8900, 9000, 9100, 9200, 9300, 9400, 9500, 9600, 9700, 9800, 9900, 10000, 10100, 10200, 10300, 10400, 10500, 10600, 10700, 10800, 10900, 11000, 11100, 11200, 11300, 11400, 11500, 11600, 11700, 11800, 11900, 12000, 12100, 12200, 12300, 12400, 12500, 12600, 12700, 12800, 12900, 13000, 13100, 13200, 13300, 13400, 13500, 13600, 13700, 13800, 13900, 14000, 14100, 14200, 14300, 14400, 14500, 14600, 14700, 14800, 14900, 15000, 15100, 15200, 15300, 15400, 15500, 15600, 15700, 15800, 15900, 16000, 16100, 16200, 16300, 16400, 16500, 16600, 16700, 16800, 16900, 17000, 17100, 17200, 17300, 17400, 17500, 17600, 17700, 17800, 17900, 18000, 18100, 18200, 18300, 18400, 18500, 18600, 18700, 18800, 18900, 19000, 19100, 19200, 19300, 19400, 19500, 19600, 19700, 19800, 19900, 20000, 20100, 20200, 20300, 20400, 20500, 20600, 20700, 20800, 20900, 21000, 21100, 21200, 21300, 21400, 21500, 21600, 21700, 21800, 21900, 22000, 22100, 22200, 22300, 22400, 22500, 22600, 22700, 22800, 22900, 23000, 23100, 23200, 23300, 23400, 23500, 23600, 23700, 23800, 23900, 24000, 24100, 24200, 24300, 24400, 24500, 24600, 24700, 24800, 24900, 25000, 25100, 25200, 25300, 25400, 25500, 25600, 25700, 25800, 25900, 26000, 26100, 26200, 26300, 26400, 26500, 26600, 26700, 26800, 26900, 27000, 27100, 27200, 27300, 27400, 27500, 27600, 27700, 27800, 27900, 28000, 28100, 28200, 28300, 28400, 28500, 28600, 28700, 28800, 28900, 29000, 29100, 29200, 29300, 29400, 29500, 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APPROXIMATE MEAN DECLINATION 1960  
FOR CENTER OF SHEET  
ANNUAL MAGNETIC INCREASE 1° INCREASE

As diagram only to obtain numerical values,  
to determine magnetic north line, connect the  
point "P" on the south edge of the map  
with the value of the angle between GRID  
NORTH and MAGNETIC NORTH, as plotted on  
a degree scale of the north edge of the map.



GOTO SOUTH, JAPAN  
NAGASAKI-KEN  
N 3200 E12800/100





OITA, JAPAN  
N 3300-E13100/100





... ..





GLOSSARY

bay	bay	bay	bay
channel	channel	channel	channel
coast	coast	coast	coast
depth	depth	depth	depth
distance	distance	distance	distance
height	height	height	height
latitude	latitude	latitude	latitude
longitude	longitude	longitude	longitude
name	name	name	name
population	population	population	population
road	road	road	road
river	river	river	river
sea	sea	sea	sea
shore	shore	shore	shore
strait	strait	strait	strait
town	town	town	town
village	village	village	village
water	water	water	water
width	width	width	width
area	area	area	area
volume	volume	volume	volume
weight	weight	weight	weight
length	length	length	length
width	width	width	width
height	height	height	height
depth	depth	depth	depth
distance	distance	distance	distance
time	time	time	time
temperature	temperature	temperature	temperature
pressure	pressure	pressure	pressure
humidity	humidity	humidity	humidity
wind	wind	wind	wind
clouds	clouds	clouds	clouds
precipitation	precipitation	precipitation	precipitation
soil	soil	soil	soil
vegetation	vegetation	vegetation	vegetation
fauna	fauna	fauna	fauna
flora	flora	flora	flora
minerals	minerals	minerals	minerals
climate	climate	climate	climate
geology	geology	geology	geology
topography	topography	topography	topography
hydrology	hydrology	hydrology	hydrology
meteorology	meteorology	meteorology	meteorology
astronomy	astronomy	astronomy	astronomy
biology	biology	biology	biology
chemistry	chemistry	chemistry	chemistry
physics	physics	physics	physics
mathematics	mathematics	mathematics	mathematics
history	history	history	history
geography	geography	geography	geography
politics	politics	politics	politics
economics	economics	economics	economics
social sciences	social sciences	social sciences	social sciences
humanities	humanities	humanities	humanities
arts	arts	arts	arts
literature	literature	literature	literature
music	music	music	music
dance	dance	dance	dance
theater	theater	theater	theater
film	film	film	film
television	television	television	television
radio	radio	radio	radio
internet	internet	internet	internet
mobile phones	mobile phones	mobile phones	mobile phones
computers	computers	computers	computers
video games	video games	video games	video games
books	books	books	books
magazines	magazines	magazines	magazines
newspapers	newspapers	newspapers	newspapers
television	television	television	television
radio	radio	radio	radio
internet	internet	internet	internet
mobile phones	mobile phones	mobile phones	mobile phones
computers	computers	computers	computers
video games	video games	video games	video games
books	books	books	books
magazines	magazines	magazines	magazines
newspapers	newspapers	newspapers	newspapers

A.M.S. 1571

First Edition (AMS 1) 1944

Second Edition (AMS 2) 1944

Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army, by the Army Map Service (AMS), U. S. Army, Washington, D. C., 1944. Compiled from Japan, 1:50,000 Japanese Imperial Land Survey, (1940-44); Japan, 1:200,000 Japanese Imperial Land Survey, (1929); Revised from the Japanese Bureau of Survey, (1934); Japan, 1:200,000 Japanese Imperial Land Survey, (1908-1912); Atlas of Japan, (1940); 2. Otsuchi, editor, Japanese Hydrographic Charts, Numbers 165, 166, 177, 190, 193, 196, 1212; United States Hydrographic Charts, Numbers 2305, 2404, 5314, 5314, 5676, and Intelligence Data. All place names transcribed in their Japanese form according to the Modified Hepburn (Romaji) System.

## LEGEND

Large city	OSAKA	OSAKA
Small city	OSAKA	OSAKA
Town	OSAKA	OSAKA
Village	OSAKA	OSAKA
Settlement	OSAKA	OSAKA
National highway	OSAKA	OSAKA
all weather road 600 ft. wide	OSAKA	OSAKA
Provincial road	OSAKA	OSAKA
usually metalled over 60 ft. wide	OSAKA	OSAKA
Road 2 to 60 ft. wide	OSAKA	OSAKA
Track of Train	OSAKA	OSAKA

Scale 1:250,000



CONTOUR INTERVAL 100 METERS

PSEUDO-CYCLIC PROJECTION

SEE PRELIMINARY 1940 MAPS FOR DETAILED DATA. THIS MAP IS A SUMMARY OF THE DATA.

HEIGHTS IN METERS

SASEBO, JAPAN  
N3300-E12900/100





GOTO NORTH, JAPAN  
NAGASAKI-KEN  
N3300-E12800/100



\_\_\_\_\_





CASTING: KIN  
1. HIGUCHI SONOJI SUN  
2. CHIWATA MURE  
3. OMURA CHI



OMURA NE, JAPAN  
NAGASAKI-KEN  
N3255-E12952.7/5x7.5



1498





NAGASAKI-KEN

1. NISHI-SONOGI-GUN
  - a. NAGOYA-MURA
  - b. INUBIKI-MURA
  - c. ŌHISA-MURA
  - d. KUKITSU-MURA
2. ŌMURA-SHI
3. ISAHAYA-SHI



OMURA SE, JAPAN  
NAGASAKI-KEN  
N3250-E12952.7/5x7.5



LEGEND

Navy Lookout Tower	• Shrine
Factory	• Temple
Bank	• Green
Power Magazine	• Pagoda
Water Wheel or Mill	• Church
Generating Plant	• Japanese Government Building

- ☐ Foreign Government Building
- ☐ Military Reservation
- ☐ Naval Reservation
- ☒ Dragon Headquarters
- ☒ Brigade Headquarters
- ☐ Fortress and Defense Position

- Battlefield Headquarters and G
- Regimental Headquarters
- Nasal Station
- Secondary Nasal Station
- Nasal Camp
- Army Camp

Tongliao Post	1	Customs House
Secondary Control Post	2	Tax Office
Search Mark	3	Quarantine Office
Spice Warehouse	4	Meat Office
Old Barracks	5	Government Managers Bureau
Spring	6	Office in Factory
Arch	7	Office of Maritime Affairs

National Highway  
 More Perfectly Road  
 More than 2 Miles Wide  
 More than 2 Miles Wide  
 More than 2 Miles Wide  
 Less than 2 Miles Wide  
 Impassable to Cars  
 Two-lane Road (1) Narrow (1) Wide

**Boundaries:** International  
Domestic  
**Provinces:** **(Detailed)**  
Sub-national / Sub prefectoral  
Local: Municipality

Government Lands  
Property Lines

Iron Bridge  
Wooden Bridge  
East Bridge  
East Ford  
West Ford  
Passenger Ferry (Single Boat)  
Passenger and Horse Ferry

Height of Bank  
Depth of Water

☐ Lighthouse  
☐ Radio Mast  
☐ Warning Signal  
☐ Boat Anchorage  
☐ Ship Anchorage  
☐ Anchorage  
☒ (A) Flower Garden  
☐ (B) Grove  
☐ (C) Tree Garden  
☒ (X) Grotto  
☐ Food Storage  
☐ Food Storage  
☐ Fuel Lighter

(a) 10	(d) Orchard	(g) Orchard
(b) 20	(e) Tea	(h) Temple
(c) 30	(f) Mubens	(i) Dry Hills

(a) 10	(d) Wet Land	(g) Gender
(b) 20	(e) Farm	(h) Broad
(c) 30	(f) Ramble	(i) Grass


  

(a) 10	(d) Ramble	(g) Flow
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(D) Talus Slope



HEIGHTS IN METERS



APPROXIMATE WORK OCCUPATION 1980:  
FOR CENTER OF WEST  
COUNCIL, MAINE: (1980) / WESTERN





For use by  
War and Navy Department Agencies only  
Not for sale or distribution

KYUSHU 1:25,000

IMARI SE

TYPE G-EMERGENCY REPRODUCTION

SHEET 4046 I SE

**LEGEND**


Density of Construction in Urban Areas  
Dense Moderate Sparse

• New Lookout Tower  
• Factory  
• Bank  
• Powder Magazine  
• Water Wheel or Mill  
• Generating Plant  
• Quarry Well  
• Fence  
• Bamboo Fence  
• Stone Wall  
• Earthen Wall  
• Hedge  
• Cemetery  
• Ditch  
• Shrine Gate  
• Shrine Lantern  
• Monument  
• Statue  
• Signpost  
• Stone Steps  
• Crane  
• Oil Well  
• Mine Marker  
• Stumps  
• Isolated Trees  
• Chimney  
• Triangulation Point  
• Secondary Control Point  
• Bench Mark  
• Spot Elevation  
• Old Battlefield  
• Spring  
• Tomb  
• Castle Site  
• Volcano  
• Mineral Spring  
• Material Dump  
• Mine  
• Boundary Marker


• Shrine  
• Temple  
• Grave  
• Pagoda  
• Church  
• Japanese Government Building  
• Foreign Government Building  
• Military Reservation  
• Naval Reservation  
• Division Headquarters  
• Brigade Headquarters  
• Fortress and Defense Headquarters  
• Battalion Headquarters and Garrison  
• Regimental Headquarters  
• Naval Station  
• Secondary Naval Station  
• Naval Camp  
• Army Camp  
• Shipyard  
• Prefectural Seat  
• Subprefectural, Island Office or Gun Seat  
• City Office  
• Town, Village or Ward Office  
• School  
• Hospital  
• Isolation Hospital  
• Post Office  
• Police Station  
• Court of Appeals  
• Prison  
• Customs House  
• Tax Office  
• Forestry Office  
• Mining Office  
• Government Monopoly Bureau  
• Office of Maritime Affairs  
• Meteorological Station  
• Post Office with Telegraph and Telephone Service  
• Post Office  
• Telegraph Office  
• Telephone Office

Natural Features  
Main Prefectural Road  
More than 3 Meters Wide  
More than 2 Meters Wide  
More than 1 Meter Wide  
Less than 1 Meter Wide  
Impermeable to Cars  
Tree-lined Road (A) Narrow (B) Wide  
Power Lines along Road (A) Ordinary (B) High Tension  
Government Railways (A) Two Tracks (B) Single Track  
Freight Railways (C) Double (D) Single  
Boundaries  
International  
Prefectural  
Provincial (Shimoda)  
Gun-shi, Subprefectural  
Municipal, City, or Town  
Government Land  
Property Lines  
(A) Iron Bridge  
(B) Wooden Bridge  
(C) Fast Bridge  
(D) Fast Road  
(E) Vehicular Road  
(F) Passenger Ferry (Single Boat)  
(G) Passenger and Horse Ferry (Two Boats)  
(H) Steam Ferry  
Lighthouse  
Radio Mast  
Warning Signal  
Boat Anchorage  
Ship Anchorage  
Anchorage  
Fixed Beacon  
Fixed Beacon (Lightless)  
Buoys (Lightless)

(A) Flower Garden  
(B) Grove  
(C) Trunk Garden  
(D) Orchard  
(E) Cultivated Marsh  
(F) Tea  
(G) Irrigated Rice Field  
(H) Mulberry  
(I) Dry Rice Field  
(A) Wild Land  
(B) Palm  
(C) Bamboo  
(D) Conifer  
(E) Broadleaf Trees  
(F) Grass Land  
(A) Cliff  
(B) Rock Outcropping  
(C) Scattered Rock  
(D) Talus Slope  
(E) Depression  
(F) Karst Gully  
(G) Draining Bank  
(H) Talus Slope



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AMS 1872

Compiled by Army Map Service 1945


Scale 1:25,000

CONTOUR INTERVAL 20 METERS  
WITH AUXILIARY CONTOURS AT 10 METER INTERVALS

Reproduced by the 30th Engr. Base Top. Bn. AFMOPAC No. 4540 August 1945

1. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
2. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
3. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
4. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
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6. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
7. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
8. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
9. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
10. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
11. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
12. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
13. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
14. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
15. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
16. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
17. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
18. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
19. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
20. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
21. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
22. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
23. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
24. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
25. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
26. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
27. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
28. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
29. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
30. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
31. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
32. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
33. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
34. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
35. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
36. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
37. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
38. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
39. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
40. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
41. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
42. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
43. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
44. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
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46. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
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48. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
49. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
50. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
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52. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
53. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
54. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
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58. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
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62. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
63. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
64. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
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71. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
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73. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
74. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
75. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
76. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
77. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
78. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
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89. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
90. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)  
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97. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
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99. 3PR XX1 DC 3 M12 - Rev. 1 (1945)  
100. 2PR 4MC 33 - 1945 (1945)






Compiled by API  
and Repro Sections  
5th MarDiv  
3 October 1945  
From AMS L872  
and Jan Map





Reproduced by the 30th Engr. Base Top. Bn. AFMOPAC No. 4540 August 1941







A. SAGA-KEN  
1. FUKITSU-GUN  
a. OISHINO-MACHI  
B. NAGASAKI-KEN  
2. HIGASHI-SONOGI-GUN  
a. KAWATANA-MACHI  
c. SONOGI-MACHI  
d. CHIWATA-MURA



CONTOUR INTERVAL 10 METERS, WITH AUXILIARY CONTOURS  
AT 5 METER INTERVALS

ELEVATIONS ARE BASED ON MEAN 2

ZONE C

THE LAST THREE DIGITS OF THE U.S. NUMBER ARE OMITTED

NOTE: UPDATES USING THIS MAP WILL MAKE PERSON CORRECTIONS AND DELETING DATA EASY

TO THEIR ATTENTION AND WAS DIRECT TO THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, WASHINGTON.

Paddy fields are generally subject to inundation, however, they may be seasonally dry.

HYDROGRAPHIC DATUM, APPROXIMATE  
LEVEL OF LOWEST LOW WATER

HEIGHTS IN METERS—DEPTHS IN FATHOMS

Reproduced by the 30th Engr. Base Top. Bn. AFMIDPAC No. 4540 August 1945



SONOGI SE, JAPAN  
NAGASAKI-KEN  
N3300-E12952.7/5x7.5





GLOSSARY

-bana	point
-gawa	river
-gun	county
-jima	point
-kawa	river
-ken	prefecture
-ko	harbor
-shi	township
-saki	cape, point
-seto	strait
-shima	island
-take	mountain
-ura	inlet; beach; lake
-wan	bay; gulf
-yama	mountain, ridge, hill
-saki	cape, point



COMPILED BY

1. Source: 1:50,000 (1945) of Japan, Army 1945	2. Source: 1:50,000 (1945) of Japan, Army 1945
3. Source: 1:50,000 (1945) of Japan, Army 1945	4. Source: 1:50,000 (1945) of Japan, Army 1945

1:50,000 (1945) of Japan, Army 1945



INDEX TO BOUNDARIES

1. SONOGI SW	2. SONOGI SW
3. SONOGI SW	4. SONOGI SW
5. SONOGI SW	6. SONOGI SW
7. SONOGI SW	8. SONOGI SW
9. SONOGI SW	10. SONOGI SW

A.M.S. 1872

Type F (AMS 1) 1945  
Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers by the Army Map Service, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C. Compiled in 1945 from aerial photography dated 1945 by stereophotogrammetric methods by reference to Japan, 1:200,000, Japanese Imperial Land Survey, Nagasaki, 1941, and from Japan, 1:50,000, Japanese Imperial Land Survey, Sonogi, 1934, with planimetric detail partially revised from aerial photography dated 1945 by photogrammetric methods. Hydrography compiled by U. S. Hydrographic Office, U. S. Navy, 1945. Place names transcribed according to the modified May form. (Commap System).

## LEGEND

Alignment and classification of roads in areas not covered by aerial photography is not reliable. In areas of photo coverage, alignment of roads is reliable but classification is not reliable.	Build-up area
Dual highway, generally hard surfaced	Fence, Fumelle, Cemetery
Main road, surfaced, two lanes wide	Temple, Shrine, Pagoda
Other roads, generally unsurfaced and one lane wide	Dike or wall, Masonry, earth
Track and trail	Masonry retaining wall, Revetment
RAILROADS	Depth curves in fathoms, Soundings in fathoms
3' gauge, single track, with station	Limiting danger line
2' gauge, double track	Rock bar at low tide
4' gauge, single track	Rock beach
4' gauge, double track	Sunken rocks, Principal navigational light
Narrow gauge or light single track	Woods, Brushwood
Narrow gauge or light double track	Brushwood
In street or road	Orchard
High tension line	Bamboo
Waterwheel or Mill, Anchorage, Chimney	Paddy field
BOUNDARIES	
Prefecture	
Gun, Shi, or Sub Prefectural	
Machi or Mura	

APPROXIMATE MEAN DECLINATION 1945  
FOR CENTER OF SHEET  
ANNUAL MAGNETIC CHANGE 1' WESTWARD  
Use diagram only to obtain numerical values.  
For determining magnetic north line, connect the point "P" on the south edge of the map with the value of the angle between G.M. NORTH and MAGNETIC NORTH, as printed on the degree scale at the south edge of the map.

CONTOUR INTERVAL 20 METERS, WITH AUXILIARY CONTOURS AT 10 METER INTERVALS

ELEVATIONS ARE BASED ON MEAN SEA LEVEL

POLYCONIC PROJECTION

ONE THOUSAND YARD WORLD POLYCONIC GRID, BAND 18, ZONE C  
THE LAST THREE DIGITS OF THE GRID NUMBERS ARE OMITTED

NOTE: OFFICERS USING THIS MAP WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY ERRORS WHICH MAY BE MADE IN THEIR ATTENTION AND WILL BE DIRECT TO THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, WASHINGTON, D. C.

HYDROGRAPHIC DATUM, APPROXIMATE LEVEL OF LOWEST LOW WATER

HEIGHTS IN METERS—DEPTHS IN FATHOMS


Scale 1:25,000



Reproduced by the 30th Engr. Base Top. Bn. AFMIDPAC No. 4540 August 1945.


TO GIVE GRID AND TARGET AREA REFERENCES ON THIS SHEET  
FIGURES, SONOGI SW, are printed around the margin of the map.  
These are to be used in the following manner:  
USE ONLY THE LARGER FIGURES PRINTED IN THE MARGIN ON THE FACE OF THE MAP.

FOR STANDARD MILITARY GRID REFERENCE	FOR TARGET AREA DESIGNATION
Take West edge of square in which point lies, and read the figure printed opposite this line on North or South margin as on the line itself on the face of the map. Estimate fourth Eastward.	Take South edge of square in which point lies, and read the figure printed opposite this line on East or West margin as on the line itself on the face of the map. Estimate fourth Northward.
STANDARD MILITARY GRID REFERENCE	FOR TARGET AREA DESIGNATION
Take number of the 100 yard square in which the point lies.	Take letter of the 200 yard square in which the point lies.
TARGET AREA DESIGNATION	(Location within 200 yard square)
Nearest corner grid or target area reference (Approximately 17 miles)	



SONOGI SW, JAPAN  
NAGASAKI-KEN  
N3300-E12945.2/5x7.5





## GLOSSARY

-lake-----mountain  
 -gun-----county  
 -kita-----river  
 -kuni-----prefecture  
 -machi-----township  
 -shi-----city  
 -cho-----village  
 -ri-----town  
 -jima-----island  
 -yama-----mountain

## COVERAGE DIAGRAM



A. Aerial Photography (Reliability good)  
 1. Sonogi (1:25,000) April 1945  
 2. Sonogi (1:25,000) April 1945  
 3. Sonogi (1:25,000) April 1945  
 4. Sonogi (1:25,000) April 1945  
 5. Sonogi (1:25,000) April 1945  
 6. Sonogi (1:25,000) April 1945  
 7. Sonogi (1:25,000) April 1945  
 8. Sonogi (1:25,000) April 1945  
 9. Sonogi (1:25,000) April 1945  
 10. Sonogi (1:25,000) April 1945

## INDEX TO BOUNDARIES




A. SAGA-KEN  
 1. NAGASAKI-KEN  
 2. NAGASAKI-KEN  
 3. NAGASAKI-KEN  
 4. NAGASAKI-KEN  
 5. NAGASAKI-KEN  
 6. NAGASAKI-KEN  
 7. NAGASAKI-KEN  
 8. NAGASAKI-KEN  
 9. NAGASAKI-KEN  
 10. NAGASAKI-KEN

## A.M.S. 1872

This map (AMS 1872) was prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers by the Army Map Service, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C. It is based on the Japanese Imperial Land Survey, Nagasaki, 1941, and from Japanese Imperial Land Survey, Sonogi, 1934, with planimetric detail partially derived from aerial photography dated 1944-1945 by photo planimetric methods. Hydrography compiled by the Hydrographic Office, U. S. Navy, 1945. Place names transcribed according to the modified Hepburn-Roman System.

## LEGEND

Alignment and classification of roads is not reliable. The area of photo coverage is not reliable. Road highest generally hard surface. Main road, surfaced, two lanes with other roads, generally unsurfaced and one lane wide. Pack and trail. 2.5" gauge, single track with staves. 2.5" gauge, double track. 4.5" gauge, single track. 4.5" gauge, double track. Narrow gauge or light, single track. Narrow gauge or light, double track. In street or road. High tension line. Waterwheel or Mill. Anchorage, Chinese. Boundary. Gun, Sh. or Sub. Prefecture. Machi or Mura.



CONTOUR INTERVAL 20 METERS, WITH AUXILIARY CONTOURS AT 10 METER INTERVALS  
 ELEVATIONS ARE BASED ON MEAN SEA LEVEL  
 POLYCONIC PROJECTION

ONE THOUSAND YARD WORLD POLYCONIC GRID, ZONE C

THE LAST THREE DIGITS OF THE GRID NUMBER ARE OMITTED

NOTE: OFFICIALS USING THIS MAP WILL HAVE ADEQUATE CORRECTION AND ADJUSTMENT MADE TO THEIR ATTENTION AND WILL BE SENT TO THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Paddy fields are generally subject to inundation, however, they may be seasonally dry.

HYDROGRAPHIC DATUM, APPROXIMATE LEVEL OF LOWEST LOW WATER


HEIGHTS IN METERS—DEPTHS IN FATHOMS

TO ONE GRID AND TARGET AREA REFERENCES ON THIS SHEET	
FIGURES, SHOWING THE GRID NUMBER, ARE PRINTED IN THE MARGIN OF THE MAP.	
THESE ARE FOR THE GRID NUMBER.	
USE ONLY THE LARGER FIGURES PRINTED IN THE MARGIN OF THE MAP.	
FOR STANDARD MILITARY GRID REFERENCE	
Take West edge of square in which point lies, and read the figure printed opposite this line in the margin of the map.	Take South edge of square in which point lies, and read the figure printed opposite this line in the margin of the map.
Estimate location Eastward.	Estimate location Northward.
FOR TARGET AREA DESIGNATION	
Take NUMBER of the 1000 yard square in which the point lies.	Take LETTER of the 100 yard square in which the point lies.
TARGET AREA DESIGNATION	(Square within 100 yard square)
Reading: 1000 yard grid or target area reference (1000 yard square) (approximately 12 miles)	



SONOGI NW, JAPAN  
 N3305 E12945.2/5x7.5





## GLOSSARY

-bana	point
-dake	mountain
-hana	point
-jima	island
-ken	prefecture
-ko	harbor
-machi	township
-saki	cape, point
-se	reef, shoal; rapids
-shi	municipality, city
-shima	island
-ura	inlet; beach; lake
-wan	bay, gulf
-yama	mountain, ridge, hill
-zaki	cape, point

## COVERAGE DIAGRAM



COMPILATION METHOD	STEREO	PHOTO
1. Stereoscopic	STEREO	PHOTO
2. Stereoscopic	STEREO	PHOTO
3. Stereoscopic	STEREO	PHOTO

## INDEX TO BOUNDARIES



NAGASAKI-KEN	1. NAGASAKI-KEN
2. NAGASAKI-KEN	2. NAGASAKI-KEN
3. NAGASAKI-KEN	3. NAGASAKI-KEN
4. NAGASAKI-KEN	4. NAGASAKI-KEN
5. NAGASAKI-KEN	5. NAGASAKI-KEN

CONVERSION  
GRAPH  
NOT at the  
scale of the  
map


Feet  
10,000  
8,000  
6,000  
4,000  
2,000  
1,000  
0

Meters  
3,000  
2,000  
1,000  
0

## LEGEND

Alignment and classification of roads in areas not covered by aerial photography is not reliable. In areas of photo coverage, alignment of roads is reliable, but classification is not reliable.	
Dual highway, generally hard surfaced	—
Main road, surfaced, two lanes wide	—
Other roads, generally unsurfaced and one lane wide	—
Track and trail	—
30" gauge, single track, with station	—
30" gauge, double track	—
48" gauge, single track	—
48" gauge, double track	—
Narrow gauge or light, single track	—
Narrow gauge or light, double track	—
For street or road	—
High tension line	—
Waterwheel or Mill, Anchorage, Chimney	—
BOUNDARIES	
Prefectural	—
City, Shi, or Sub-Prefectural	—
Machi or Mura	—
Other	—

APPROXIMATE MAGNETIC DECLINATION 1945  
FOR CENTER OF SHEET  
ANNUAL MAGNETIC CHANGE - WESTERLY  
Use degrees only to obtain horizontal values.  
To determine magnetic north line connect the  
point "P" on the north edge of the map  
with the value of the angle between GRID  
NORTH and MAGNETIC NORTH, is plotted on  
the degree scale of the north edge of the map.



## CONTOUR INTERVAL 20 METERS, WITH AUXILIARY CONTOURS AT 10 METER INTERVALS

ELEVATIONS ARE BASED ON MEAN SEA LEVEL

POLYCONIC PROJECTION

ONE THOUSAND YARD WORLD POLYCONIC GRID, BAND 18, ZONE C


THE LAST THREE DIGITS OF THE GRID NUMBERS ARE OMITTED

NOTE: OFFICERS USING THIS MAP WILL NEED HORIZONTAL CORRECTIONS AND POSITIONS WHICH COME TO THEIR ATTENTION AND WILL BE SENT TO THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, WASHINGTON, D. C.

HYDROGRAPHIC DATUM, APPROXIMATE LEVEL OF LOWEST LOW WATER

HEIGHTS IN METERS—DEPTHS IN FATHOMS

TO GIVE GRID AND TARGET AREA REFERENCES ON THIS SHEET	
FIGURES, GIVE THE SMALLER FIGURES PRINTED AROUND THE MARGIN OF THE MAP.	
There are two lines for the full or half of the map.	
USE ONLY THE LARGER FIGURES PRINTED IN THE MARGIN OR ON THE FACE OF THE MAP.	
POINT	
FOR STANDARD MILITARY GRID REFERENCE	
Take West edge of square in which point lies, and read the figure printed opposite this line on East or West margin or on the line itself on the face of the map.	Take South edge of square in which point lies, and read the figure printed opposite this line on East or West margin or on the line itself on the face of the map.
Estimate tenth Eastwards	Estimate tenth Northwards
STANDARD MILITARY GRID REFERENCE	FOR TARGET AREA DESIGNATION
Take NUMBER of the 1000 yard square in which the point lies.	Take LETTER of the 100 yard square in which the point lies.
TARGET AREA DESIGNATION	Locate within 100 yard square.
Report similar grid and target area reference (20,000 yards approximately 10 miles).	



OMODAKA NE, JAPAN  
NAGASAKI-KEN  
N3305-E12937.7/5x7.5





## GLOSSARY

-baru-	field
-dake-	mountain
-gun-	county
-jima-	point
-jima-	island
-ken-	prefecture
-ko-	harbor
-mine-	mountain
-mura-	township
-saki-	cape, point
-se-	reef, shoal; rapids
-shima-	island
-take-	mountain
-ura-	inlet; beach; lake
-wan-	bay, gulf
-yama-	mountain, ridge, hill

## COVERAGE DIAGRAM



## COMPILED METHOD

Source	Scale	Vertical	Horizontal	Photo	Plan
1. Survey of Japan (1943)	1:25,000	1:25,000	1:25,000	1:25,000	1:25,000
2. Survey of Japan (1943)	1:50,000	1:50,000	1:50,000	1:50,000	1:50,000
3. Survey of Japan (1943)	1:100,000	1:100,000	1:100,000	1:100,000	1:100,000

## INDEX TO BOUNDARIES




NAGASAKI-KEN	1. NISHI-SONO-GUN	2. HIGASHI-SONO-GUN
	3. OMODAKA-MURA	4. SAKINABO-MURA
	5. NAKATSUGANA-MURA	
	6. OMODAKA-MURA	
	7. KURISHI-MURA	

A.M.S. 1872

Type C (AMS 15, 1945)

Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers by the Army Map Service (U.S. Army, Washington, D. C.) Compiled in 1945 from aerial photography dated 1943-1945 by stereophotogrammetric methods by reference to Japan, 1:200,000, Japanese Imperial Land Survey, Nagasaki, 1941. Hydrography compiled by the Hydrographic Office, U.S. Navy, 1945. Place names transcribed according to the modified Hepburn (Roman) System.



Scale 1:25,000  
CONTOUR INTERVAL 20 METERS, WITH AUXILIARY CONTOURS AT 10 METER INTERVALS

Topography is less accurate in areas compiled from oblique photography

ELEVATIONS ARE BASED ON MEAN SEA LEVEL

POLYCONIC PROJECTION

ONE THOUSAND YARD WORLD POLYCONIC GRID BAND IN ZONE C

THE LAST THREE DIGITS OF THE GRID NUMBERS ARE LIMITED

NOTE: OFFICERS USING THIS MAP WILL HAVE RECEIVED CONDITIONS AND ADDITIONS WHICH COME TO THEIR ATTENTION AND ARE ADJUSTED TO THE LATEST OF ENGINEERS, WASHINGTON, D. C.


Paddy fields are generally subject to inundation; however, they may be seasonally dry.

HYDROGRAPHIC DATUM: APPROXIMATE LEVEL OF LOWEST LOW WATER

HEIGHTS IN METERS—DEPTHS IN FATHOMS

TO GIVE GRID AND TARGET-AREA REFERENCES ON THIS SHEET	
FIGURE: IGNORE THE SMALLER FIGURES PRINTED AROUND THE MARGIN OF THE MAP. THESE ARE FOR FINDING THE GRID COORDINATES.	USE ONLY THE LARGER FIGURES PRINTED IN THE MARGIN OR ON THE FACE OF THE MAP.
POINT	
FOR STANDARD MILITARY GRID REFERENCE	
Take West edge of square in which point lies, and read the figure printed opposite this line on North or South margin or on the line itself on the face of the map.	Take South edge of square in which point lies, and read the figure printed opposite this line on East or West margin or on the line itself on the face of the map.
Estimate tenths Eastward	Estimate tenths Northward
FOR TARGET-AREA DESIGNATOR	
Take NUMBER of the 1000 yard square in which the point lies.	Take LETTER of the 500 yard square in which the point lies.
TARGET-AREA DESIGNATOR	(Letters within 100 yard square)
Nearest center grid or target-area reference—100,000 yards (approximately 10 miles)	

## INDEX TO ADJOINING SHEETS



OMODAKA SE, JAPAN  
NAGASAKI-KEN  
N3300-E12937.7/5x7.5





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[illegible]





Scale 1:25,000


CONTOUR INTERVAL 20 METERS  
WITH AUXILIARY CONTOURS AT 10 METER INTERVALS

AMS L872

Compiled by Army Map Service 1945

3PR X81 BG. SM 100. Apr. 1942  
3PR X81 BG. SM 152. Apr. 1945  
3PR X81 BG. SM 102. Apr. 1945  
21PR. 4MC. 27. 1945. 1948  
21PR. 4MC. 39. (29) Spt. 1948  
Vertisols. June 1949













## GLOSSARY

1000	mountain	1000	mountain
500	hill	500	hill
200	low hill	200	low hill
100	low hill	100	low hill
50	low hill	50	low hill
20	low hill	20	low hill
10	low hill	10	low hill
5	low hill	5	low hill
2	low hill	2	low hill
1	low hill	1	low hill
0	low hill	0	low hill

## COVERAGE DIAGRAM



## INDEX TO BOUNDARIES



1. NAGASAKI KEN	2. SAGA KEN
3. KITA MATSUURA GUN	4. NISHIKI MATSUURA GUN
5. TAKAHAMA MURA	6. KUROKAWA MURA
7. TUKURAWA MURA	8. KUROKAWA MURA
9. IMARUO MURA	10. KUROKAWA MURA
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97. KUROKAWA MURA	98. KUROKAWA MURA
99. KUROKAWA MURA	100. KUROKAWA MURA

Scale 1:25,000

CONTOUR INTERVAL 20 METERS, WITH AUXILIARY CONTOURS  
AT 10 METER INTERVALS

ELEVATIONS ARE BASED ON MEAN SEA LEVEL

POLYCONIC PROJECTION

ONE THOUSAND YARD GRID (MILITARY) IS SHOWN IN ZONE C  
THE LAST THREE DIGITS OF THE GRID NUMBER ARE THE YARDNOTE: DISTANCE ALONG THIS MAP WILL BE LESS THAN ACTUAL DISTANCE. THIS MAP IS FOR  
REFERENCE ONLY AND SHOULD NOT BE USED FOR NAVIGATION PURPOSES.

Paddy fields are generally subject to inundation, however, they may be irrigated dry.

## LEGEND

Alignment and classification of roads is based on aerial photography. In areas of photo coverage, alignment of roads is reliable, but classification is not reliable.

Dual highway, generally hard surface.

Main road, surfaced, two lanes with other roads, generally surfaced and one lane wide.

Track and trail.

RAILROADS

30" gauge, single track with station.

30" gauge, double track.

40" gauge, single track.

40" gauge, double track.

Narrow gauge or light, single track.

Narrow gauge or light, double track.

To street or road.

High tension line.

Waterhead or Mill, Anchorage, Dam, etc.

BOUNDARIES

Prefectural.

Gun, Shi, or Sub Prefectural.

Machi or Mura.

Built-up area.

Forest, Park, Cemetery.

Temple, Shrine, Pagoda.

Dike or wall, Masonry earth.

Majority retaining wall, Right-of-way.

North corner or station, Soundings.

or telephone.

Limiting danger line.

Rocks, bare or low tide.

Rock beach.

Surfer rock, Principal navigational light.

Rocks, fringed.

Boulder.


Ditch.

Bamboo.

Paddy field.

APPROXIMATE MEAN MAGNETIC DECLINATION  
FOR CENTER OF SHEET  
MAGNETIC DECLINATION CHANGES 1" WESTERLY  
PER ANNUAL. TO DETERMINE MAGNETIC NORTH, ADD  
THE DECLINATION TO THE MAGNETIC NORTH. TO  
DETERMINE MAGNETIC SOUTH, SUBTRACT THE  
DECLINATION FROM THE MAGNETIC SOUTH. TO  
DETERMINE TRUE NORTH, ADD THE DECLINATION  
TO THE MAGNETIC NORTH. TO DETERMINE TRUE  
SOUTH, SUBTRACT THE DECLINATION FROM THE  
MAGNETIC SOUTH.





## GLOSSARY

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## COVERAGE DIAGRAM



## COMPILED BY



## INDEX TO BOUNDARIES



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CONTOUR INTERVAL 20 METERS, WITH AUXILIARY CONTOURS AT 10 METER INTERVALS

ELEVATIONS ARE BASED ON MEAN SEA LEVEL

POLYCONIC PROJECTION

ONE THOUSAND YARD WORLD POLYCONIC GRID BAND IN ZONE C

THE LAST THREE DIGITS OF THE GRID NUMBER ARE WRITTEN

NOTE: USERS OF THIS MAP WILL HAVE TO MAKE CORRECTIONS FOR DISTORTION WHICH MAY BE ENCOUNTERED IN THE LAST THREE DIGITS OF THE GRID NUMBER.

Paddy fields are generally subject to inundation, however, they may be seasonally dry.

HYDROGRAPHIC DATUM: APPROXIMATE LEVEL OF LOWEST LOW WATER

HEIGHTS IN METERS—DEPTHS IN FATHOMS

LEGEND

Alignment and classification of roads in areas not covered by aerial photography is not reliable. In areas of photo coverage alignment of roads is reliable, but classification is not reliable.

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Alignment and classification of roads in areas not covered by aerial photography is not reliable. In areas of photo coverage alignment of roads is reliable, but classification is not reliable.

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Alignment and classification of roads in areas not covered by aerial photography is not reliable. In areas of photo coverage alignment of roads is reliable, but classification is not reliable.

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
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A.M.S. 1872

Type F-AMS 1, 1945

Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers by the Army Map Service (T.V.) U. S. Army, Washington, D. C. Redrawn in 1945 from Japan, 1:50,000, Japanese Imperial Land Survey, Hirado, 1903. Photographic detail revised from aerial photography dated 1945 by photogrammetric methods. Hydrography compiled by the Hydrographic Office, U. S. Navy, 1945. Place names transcribed according to the modified Hepburn (Romaji) system.

CONVERSION  
TABLE  
NOT at the rear  
of the map

## LEGEND


- Alignment and classification of roads in areas not covered by aerial photography is not reliable. In areas of photographic coverage alignment of roads is reliable, but classification is not reliable.
- Dual highway, generally hard surfaced
- Main road, surfaced, two lanes with other roads, generally unsurfaced and one lane wide
- Trunk and trail
- 30" gauge, single track, with station
- 36" gauge, double track
- 48" gauge, single track
- 48" gauge, double track
- Narrow gauge or light, single track
- Narrow gauge or light, double track
- In street or road
- High tension line
- Waterwheel or Mill, Anchorage, Chimney
- Boundaries
- Prefectural
- Gun, Ski, or Sub Prefectural
- Machi or Mura
- Run-up area
- Fence, Fences, Cemetery
- Temple, Shrine, Pagoda
- Line to wall, Masonry earth
- Masonry retaining wall, Revetment
- Depth, Cuttings or Trenches, Soundings
- in Trenches
- Lighting, Signal line
- Rocks, Bare at low tide
- Rock beach
- Sudden rocks, Principal navigational light
- Woods, Brushwood
- Brushwood
- Orchard
- Bamboo
- Paddy field

APPROXIMATE MEAN DECLINATION 1945  
FOR CENTER OF SHEET

ANNUAL MAGNETIC CHANGE 1" WESTERLY

Line diagram only for obtaining magnetic values.

To determine magnetic north line, connect the point point "P" on the south edge of the map with the value of the angle between GRID NORTH and MAGNETIC NORTH, as shown on the degree scale at the north edge of the map.



CONTOUR INTERVAL 20 METERS, WITH AUXILIARY CONTOURS  
AT 10 METER INTERVALS

ELEVATIONS ARE BASED ON MEAN SEA LEVEL

POLYCONIC PROJECTION

ONE THOUSAND YARD WORLD POLYCONIC GRID, BAND 18, ZONE C

THE LAST THREE DIGITS OF THE GRID NUMBERS ARE OBTAINED

NOTE: OFFICERS USING THIS MAP WILL HAVE ADEQUATE CORRECTIONS FOR DISTORTION WHEN USED TO THE CENTER OF CHINA, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Paddy fields are generally subject to inundation, however, they may be seasonally dry.

HYDROGRAPHIC DATUM: APPROXIMATE  
LEVEL OF LOWEST LOW WATER

HEIGHTS IN METERS—DEPTHS IN FATHOMS

## GLOSSARY

- |       |    |                 |    |
|-------|----|-----------------|----|
| gun   | 砲台 | county          | 県  |
| hara  | 原  | prefecture      | 県  |
| kei   | 街  | road            | 道  |
| mae   | 前  | cape point      | 岬  |
| shi   | 市  | channel         | 海峡 |
| shimo | 下  | mountain, ridge | 山  |
| suifu | 水府 |                 |    |
| tema  | 田  |                 |    |

## COVERAGE DIAGRAM



## COMPILATION METHODS


1. Hydrographic compilation - Reliability good
2. Survey 1911-1912 (1912) 37' vertical, April 1945
3. Survey 1911-1912 (1912) 37' vertical, April 1945
4. Survey 1911-1912 (1912) 37' vertical, April 1945
- In areas compiled from 37' photography only, no indication is made between woods and brushwood.

## INDEX TO BOUNDARIES



NAGASAKI-KEN  
KITA-MATSUURA-GUN  
HIRADO-MACHI

## INDEX TO ADJOINING SHEETS



HIRADO NW, JAPAN  
NAGASAKI-KEN, KITA-MATSUURA-GUN  
N3325-E12930.2/5x7.5



AMS 1212  
Type F-AMS 1, 1945

Scale 1:25,000


Reproduced by the 10th Four Base Top. Bn. AFMID-PAC No. 4540 August 1945.

CONTOUR INTERVAL 20 METERS, WITH AUXILIARY CONTOURS  
AT 10 METER INTERVALSHYDROGRAPHIC DATUM: APPROXIMATE  
LEVEL OF LOWEST LOW WATER

HEIGHTS IN METERS - DEPTHS IN FATHOMS

ISAHAYA NE, JAPAN  
N3255E13007 7.5x7.5





No Data Available

Reproduced by the 30th Engr. Base Top. Bn. AFMIDPAC No. 4540 August 1945

[illegible]


ISAHAYA SE, JAPAN  
NAGASAKI-KEN  
N3250-E13007.7/5x7.5



- LEGEND OF SYMBOLS ON  
ORIGINAL J.I.L.S. MAPS

- [illegible]

- [illegible]



AMS 1872

LEGEND OF AMS PHOTO REVISION SYMBOLS

[illegible]

CONTOUR INTERVAL 20 METERS, WITH AUXILIARY CONTOUR  
AT 10 METER INTERVALS

[illegible]

HEIGHTS IN METERS

Reproduced by the 30th Engr. Base Top. Bn. AFMIDPAC No. 4540 August 1945



ISAHAYA SW, JAPAN  
NAGASAKI KEN  
N3250 E13000 2.5x7.5



LEGEND

Arched Window Tower	• Shrine
Factory	• Temple
Gink	• Grave
Golden Myriad	• Pagoda
Kashikien (or Mill)	• Church
Generating Plant	• Japanese Government Building
	• Foreign Government Building
Ministry Wall	• Military Reservation
Fences	• Naval Reservation
Bamboo Fences	• Division Headquarters
Stone Wall	• Brigade Headquarters
Earthen Wall	• Fortress and Defense Headquarters
Hedge	• Battalion Headquarters and Garrison
Cemetery	• Regimental Headquarters
	• Naval Station
	• Secondary Naval Station
Ditches	• Naval Camp
Shrine Gate	• Army Camp
Stone Lathern	• Shipyard
Monument	• Prefectural Seat
Statue	• Sub-prefectural Head Office (or Gun Seat)
Spring	• City Office
Stone Steps	• Town Village or Ward Office
Cyber	• School
Oil Well	• Hospital
Message Market	• Isolation Hospital
Mound	• Gendarmere Post
Planted Trees	• Police Station
Chimney	• Court of Appeals
Transplantation Point	• Prison
Secondary Control Point	• Customs House
Beach Mark	• Tax Office
Spot Elevation	• Embassy Office
Old Battlefield	• Mining Office
Spring	• Government Municipality Bureau Office (or Factory)
Tower	• Office of Machine Affairs
Castle Site	• Communication Station
Volcano	• Post Office (with Telegraph and Telephone Service)
Mineral Spring	• Post Office
Material Dump	• Telegraph Office
Mine	• Telephone Office
Boundary Marker	

National Highway  
Main Protection Road  
More than 2 Meters Wide  
More than 2 Meters Wide  
More than 1 Meter Wide  
Less than 1 Meter Wide

Feeder Railways: (A) Double (B) Single

**Boundaries:** International  
Prefectural  
City/Town/Village  
**Counties:** **Tokyo**  
Gomaba Subprefecture  
Ward, Machi or Mura  
Government Lands  
Property Lines

- Iron Bridge
- Wooden Bridge
- Flat Bridge
- Flat Ford
- Vehicular Ford
- Passenger Ferry (Single Boat)
- Passenger and Horse Ferry (Two Boats)


1. Reef Anchorage  
2. Ship Anchorage  
3. Anchorage  
4. Commercial Port  
5. Coast Beacon  
6. Coast Beacon (lighted)  
7. Buoy (lighted)  
8. Tower Light

(A) ☐ Orchard  
 (B) ☐ Tea  
 (C) ☐ Rubber  
 (D) ☐ Coffee

(A) Mud Land (D) Sanding  
(B) Palm (E) Broad wall 1  
(C) Bamboo (F) Grass Land

(A) Cliff (E) Depression  
(B) Rock Outcropping (F) Ravine Gull  
(C) Scattered Rock (G) Crumbling

(D) Tulus Skape



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Scale 1:25,000







No Data Available

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A.M.S. LB72

Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers, by the Army Map Service (LH), U. S. Army, Washington, D. C. Copied in 1945 from Japan. 1:25,000. Japanese Imperial Land Survey, Ushiro, 1932. Place names enclosed according to the Modified Hepburn (Romaji) System.

Elevation measured from the mean tide of Tokyo Bay.



THE DISTANCE FROM THE POINT OF ORIGIN TO THE POINT OF DESTINATION IS THE LENGTH OF THE PATH.



INDEX TO ADJOINING SHEETS



ONE THOUSAND YARD WORLD POLICONIC GRID BAND III. ZONE "C"  
THE LAST THREE DIGITS OF THE GRID NUMBERS ARE OMITTED

NOTE: OFFICERS USING THIS MAP WILL MAKE NECESSARY CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS WHICH COME TO THE ATTENTION OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, WASHINGTON, D. C.

HEIGHTS IN METERS:

INDEX TO BOUNDARIES



1. Sag-kan  
a. kinsokhime gun  
b. Sag-kan

## GLOSSARY

[illegible]

KASHIMA NE, JAPAN  
SAGA-KEN  
N3305 E13007 7/5x7.5


1521



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## LEGEND

- Density of Construction in Urban Area**  
 Dense  
 Medium  
 Sparse
- Legend**
- New Lookout Tower
  - Factory
  - Bank
  - Power Station
  - Water Wheel or Mill
  - Generating Plant
  - Masonry Wall
  - Fence
  - Bamboo Fence
  - Stone Wall
  - Earth Wall
  - Hedge
  - Cemetery
  - Ditches
  - Shore Gate
  - Stone Labyrinth
  - Mound
  - Statue
  - Signpost
  - Stone Steps
  - Crane
  - Oil Well
  - Mineral Spring
  - Stumps
  - Isolated Trees
  - Chimney
  - Transpiration Point
  - Secondary Control Point
  - Bench Mark
  - Spot Elevation
  - Old Battlefield
  - Spring
  - Tomb
  - Cattle Site
  - Volcano
  - Mineral Spring
  - Mutual Dump
  - Mine
  - Boundary Marker
  - National Highway
  - Major Prefectural Road
  - More than 3 Meters Wide
  - More than 2 Meters Wide
  - More than 1 Meter Wide
  - Less than 1 Meter Wide
  - Impassable for Carts
  - Tree-lined Road: (A) Narrow (B) Wide
  - Power Lines along Road: (A) Ordinary (B) High Tension
  - Government Railways: (A) Two Tracks (B) Single Track
  - Feeder Railways: (A) Station (B) Double (C) Single
  - Boundaries: International, Prefectural, Provincial (Quadrant), Gun, City, Subprefectural, Ward, Machi, or Mura, Government Land, Property Lines
  - (A) Iron Bridge, (B) Wooden Bridge, (C) Foot Bridge, (D) Foot Ford, (E) Vehicular Ford, (F) Passenger Ferry (Single Boat), (G) Passenger and Horse Ferry (Two Boats), (H) Steam Ferry
  - Light House, Radio Mast, Warning Signal
  - Boat Anchorage, Ship Anchorage, Anchorage
  - Commercial Port, Fixed Beacon, Fixed Beacon (Lightless), Buoy (Lightless)
  - (A) Flower Garden, (B) Grove, (C) Truck Garden
  - (A) Orchard, (B) Tea, (C) Mulberry
  - (A) Wild Land, (B) Paddy, (C) Bamboo
  - (A) Cliff, (B) Rock Outcropping, (C) Scattered Rock, (D) Talus Slope
  - (E) Depression, (F) Ravine, Gully, (G) Crumbling Bank, (H) Talus Slope




Scale 1:25,000



CONTOUR INTERVAL 20 METERS

ONE THOUSAND YARD WORLD POLYTONIC GRID ZONE C  
 THE LAST THREE DIGITS OF THE GRID NUMBER ARE OBTAINED

HEIGHTS IN METERS




APPROXIMATE MEAN DECLINATION 1966  
 FOR CENTER OF SHEET  
 ANNUAL MAGNETIC CHANGE 1 WESTERLY

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LEGEND

	New Lockout Tower		Shrine
	Factory		Temple
	Bark		Grave
	Power Magazine		Pagoda
	Water Wheel or Mill		Church
	Generating Plant		Japanese Government Building
	Masonry Wall		Foreign Government Building
	Fences		Military Reservation
	Bamboo Fences		Naval Reservation
	Stone Wall		Division Headquarters
	Earthen Wall		Brigade Headquarters
	Hedge		Fortress and Defense Headquarters
	Cemetery		Battalion Headquarters and Garrison
	Ditches		Regimental Headquarters
	Shrine Gate		Naval Station
	Stone Lantern		Secondary Naval Station
	Monument		Naval Camp
	Statue		Army Camp
	Signpost		Shipyard
	Stone Steps		Prefectural Seat
	Crane		Sub-prefectural, Island office or Gun Seat
	Oil Well		City Office
	Ministry Marker		Town, Village or Ward Office
	Stumps		School
	Isolated Trees		Hospital
	Chimney		Isolation Hospital
	Triangulation Point		Gendarmerie Post
	Secondary Control Point		Police Station
	Bench Mark		Court of Appeals
	Spot Elevation		Prison
	Old Battlefield		Customs House
	Spring		Tax Office
	Tomb		Forestry Office
	Grave Site		Mining Office
	Volcano		Government Ministry Bureau, Office or Factory
	Mineral Spring		Office of Maritime Affairs
	Material Dump		Meteorological Station
	Mine		Post Office (with Telegraph and Telephone service)
	Boundary Marker		Post Office
			Telegraph Office
			Telephone Office

National Highway  
Main Preferential Roads  
More than 3 Meters Wide  
More than 2 Meters Wide  
More than 1 Meter Wide  
Less than 1 Meter Wide  
Impassable for Cars  
Tree-lined Roads (A) Narrow (B) Wide  
Power Lines along Road (A) Ordinary (B) High Tension  
Government Railways (A) Two Tracks (B) Single Track  
Feeder Railways (C) Station (D) Double (E) Single  
Boundaries  
International  
Prefecture  
Province (**Shimabetsu**)  
City, Town or Subprefecture  
Ward, Machi or Mura  
Government Lands  
Property Lines  
(A) Iron Bridge  
(B) Wooden Bridge  
(C) Fast Ford  
(D) Fast Ford  
(E) Vehicular Ford  
(F) Passenger Ferry (Single Boat)  
(G) Passenger and Horse Ferry (Two Boats)  
(H) Steam Ferry


(A) Lightness	(B) Boat Anchorage	(C) Commercial Port
(D) River Mouth	(E) Ship Anchorage	(F) Fjord Beach
(G) Winding Loggia	(H) Anchorage	(I) Fjord Beach Lightness
		(J) Bay Lightness

(A) Flower Garden	(B) Single	(C) Truck Garden
(D) Orchard	(E) Cultivated marsh	(F) Tea
(G) Mulberry	(H) Impregnable non forest	(I) Dry Rock Forest
(J) Wild Land	(K) Orchard	(L) Palm
(M) Bamboo	(N) Bamboo Trees	(O) Grass Land

(A) Cliff	(B) Depression
(C) Rock Outcropping	(D) Ravine Gully
(E) Scattered Rock	(F) Crumbling Rock
(G) Talus Slope	



Prepared in 1945 by the 30th Engineer Base Bn. No. 4200 (PAC). (Sourced from AMS 1.772 Sheet 4146-14 First Edition (AMS 13, 1943); revised (AMS 21, 1945).

7° 00' OR 128 MILS

1° 41' OR 30 MILS

APPROXIMATE MEAN DECLINATION 1946  
FOR CENTER OF SHEET

ANNUAL MAGNETIC CHANGE = WESTERLY

ONE THOUSAND YARD WORLD POLYTOPIC GRID BAND — ZONE C

HEIGHTS IN METERS

INDEX TO ADJOINING SHEET

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0.000 1 00	0.000 10 00	0.000 10 00
0.000 1 00	0.000 10 00	0.000 10 00








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
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33°25'

130°07'40.4"  
33°25'




AMS 1872

Prepared in 1945 by the 30th Engineer Base Top. Bn.  
AFMIDPAC. Enlarged from AMS 1772 Sheet 4147 in  
First Edition (AMS 17, 1943; revised AMS 23, 1945)



Scale 1:25,000




CONTOUR INTERVAL 20 METERS

ONE THOUSAND YARD WORLD POLYCONIC GRID, BAND 10, ZONE C  
THE LAST THREE DIGITS OF THE GRID NUMBERS ARE OMITTED

HEIGHTS IN METERS

Reproduced by the 30th Engr. Base Top. Bn. AFMIDPAC No. 4541 August 1945.

INDEX TO ADJOINING SHEETS






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
## LEGEND

- Density of Construction in Urban Areas  
Dense Moderate Sparse
- Navy Lookout Tower  
Factory  
Bank  
Powder Magazine  
Water Wheel or Mill  
Generating Plant  
Masonry Wall  
Fences  
Rampart Fences  
Stone Wall  
Earthen Wall  
Hedge  
Cemetery  
Ditches  
Shore Gate  
Stone Lantern  
Monument  
Statue  
Signpost  
Stone Steps  
Crane  
Oil Well  
Mineral Marker  
Shrubs  
Isolated Trees  
Chimney  
Tramway Point  
Secondary Control Point  
Bench Mark  
Spot Elevation  
Old Buttehead  
Spring  
Tomb  
Castle Site  
Volcano  
Mineral Spring  
Material Dump  
Mine  
Boundary Marker
- Shrine  
Temple  
Grave  
Pagoda  
Church  
Japanese Government Building  
Foreign Government Building  
Military Reservation  
Naval Reservation  
Division Headquarters  
Brigade Headquarters  
Fortress and Defense Headquarters  
Battalion Headquarters and Garrison  
Regimental Headquarters  
Naval Station  
Secondary Naval Station  
Naval Camp  
Army Camp  
Shipyards  
Prefectural Seat  
Subprefectural, Island Office or Gun Seat  
City Office  
Town, Village or Ward Office  
School  
Hospital  
Isolation Hospital  
Gendarmine Post  
Police Station  
Court of Appeals  
Prison  
Customs House  
Tax Office  
Forestry Office  
Mining Office  
Government Monopoly Bureau  
Office or Factory  
Office of Maritime Affairs  
Meteorological Station  
Post Office with Telegraph and Telephone Service  
Post Office  
Telegraph Office  
Telephone Office
- National Highway  
Main Prefectural Road  
More than 3 Meters Wide  
More than 2 Meters Wide  
More than 1 Meter Wide  
Less than 1 Meter Wide  
Impossible for Carts  
Tramway Road: (A) Narrow (B) Wide  
Power Lines along Road: (A) Ordinary (B) High Tension  
Government Railways: (A) Two Tracks (B) Single Track  
Feeder Railways: (C) Double (D) Single  
Boundaries: International  
Prefecture (Shaded)  
Gun, Shiro or Subprefectural  
Ward, Machi or Mura  
Government Lands  
Property Lines  
(A) Iron Bridge  
(B) Wooden Bridge  
(C) Foot Bridge  
(D) Foot Ford  
(E) Vehicular Ford  
(F) Passenger Ferry (Single Boat)  
(G) Passenger and Horse Ferry (Two Boats)  
(H) Steam Ferry  
Lighthouse  
Radio Mast  
Warning Signal  
Flower Garden  
Grass  
Track Garden  
Orchard  
Tea  
Mulberry  
Wild Land  
Palm  
Bamboo  
Cliff  
Rock Outcropping (F) Ravine, Gully  
Scattered Rock  
Crumbling Bank  
Talus Slope  
Cultivated marsh  
Impounded rice field  
Dry Rice Field  
Conifers  
Broad-leaf Trees  
Grass Land  
Depression  
Scattered Rock  
Crumbling Bank  
Talus Slope



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
Scale 1:25,000



CONTOUR INTERVAL 20 METERS

ONE THOUSAND YARD WORLD POLYCONIC GRID BAND 18A ZONE C  
THE LAST THREE DIGITS OF THE GRID NUMBERS ARE OMITTED

HEIGHTS IN METERS



APPROXIMATE MEAN DECLINATION 1945  
FOR CENTER OF SHEET  
ANNUAL MAGNETIC CHANGE 1 WESTERLY

