


HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234 c/o PM, SAN FRANCISCO

RESTRICTED

INTERROGATION NO. 498



Division of Origin: Military Analysis

SUBJECT: Planning of the Pearl Harbor attack; reasons for Japanese emphasis on carrier construction; reasons for expansion into Solomons and Indian Ocean; causes of Japan's defeat; Japanese war aims.

Persomnel Interrogated and Background:

Fleet Admiral NAGANO Osami - Supreme Naval Advisor to Emperor; member board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals. Understands but does not speak English. Graduate of Naval Academy and Naval Staff College. Served in USA 1913-14 and, as Naval Attache, 1920-23. Chief delegate to Geneva Conference, 1931, and London Conference, 1935. Navy Minister, HIROTA Cabinet, 1936. CinC 1st & Combined Fleets Feb 37. Chief of Naval General Staff Apr 41 to Feb 44. Aptd Supreme Naval Advisor to Emperor, February 1944.

Where-Interrogated: Home of Admiral NAGANO

Interrogators: Col. Ramsay D. POTTS, AC
Cmdr. W. Wilds, USNR

Interpreter: Mr. MIZOTA, a Japanese National

Allied Officers

Present: Lt. Cmdr. Walter NICHOLS, USNR

SUMMARY

Admiral NAGANO stated that prior to 1941 the Japanese Navy had no plans for attacking Pearl harbor, though it planned to strike south for raw materials. Due to its inferiority to the U.S. Fleet it intended to fight defensive Naval battles in home waters under cover of island-based aircraft. The plan to attack Pearl Harbor was first developed by the Combined Fleet and was accepted by the Naval General Staff in October. The realization that Japan would have to fight a combination of Allied Navies made the Pearl Harbor attack necessary in order to eliminate temporarily one part of that combined strength. He did not know if spy-reports of American Naval war maneuvers were utilized in planning the attack. As a result of damage inflicted at Pearl Harbor he estimated it would take ten months for the U. S. fleet to organize new task forces; but expected the Americans to use all available ships and was, therefore, not surprised by the size of the American forces involved in the Coral Sea and Midway battles.

Carrier development by the U.S. gave the impetus to Japanese emphasis on carrier construction and by 1939-40 carriers had become the principal offensive power of the Japanese Navy.

The Tokyo High Commands directed Japan's expansion into the Solomons and the Indian Ocean. This was considered strategically necessary in order to protect essential occupied territory with outlying zones which could be used for peripheral defense in depth.

The Admiral attributed Japan's defeat to several factors, including inability to maintain supply lines and inferiority to the U.S. in civil engineering capacity. However, in his opinion the factor which contributed most to Japan's defeat was insufficiency of carrier and land-based aviation support. He considers control of the air most important in modern warfare and believes the importance of armies and navies has been reduced by air development.

Admiral NAGANO was not familiar with Japan's war aims, but believes not even the most optimistic Japanese expected Japan to defeat the U.S. and Britain. The Japanese hoped that by protracted warfare they could force a negotiated peace.

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498 -1-

Q. Upon receiving appointment as Chief of the Naval General Staff in April of 1941, did you receive any specific directive, as to what your goal would be, from the Navy Minister, from the Premier, or from the Emperor?

A. I believe that my appointment to that position was chiefly the result of recommendation by my immediate predecessor, Prince FUSHIMI and when taking over from the Prince I was requested to do my utmost in filling the position as successor; and as I already knew just what the general situation was, I was not given any direct instructions by the Emperor, by the Prime Minister, or by the Navy Minister.

I would like to add this: At the time of the formation of the Three-Power Pact, my predecessor, Admiral Prince FUSHIMI, expressed his view that, even with the Three-Power Pact in existence, it would be better for Japan not to undertake war against the United States and Great Britain, and that was constantly in my mind.

Q. At the time that you assumed this post, were plans already drawn up for the execution of certain maneuvers in case there should be war with the United States?

A. No, there were no definite plans regarding operations in the event of war with the United States. However, every year the Japanese Navy used to draw plans, imaginary enemies being the United States, England, China and other countries, and those annual plans would deal with the sort of operations to be carried out in the event of war with any one of those countries; so the one that was on hand at the time was a plan that I think had been drawn up in about December 1940.

Q. Was there an imaginary plan for the attack of an imaginary island and similar to the Pearl Harbor installation?

A. No. For many years prior to that time, Japan's Naval plans had been based upon the strategy of waiting for you to attack in our home waters, because of the very wide difference in the strength of our Navy and yours. In other words: Our plan was to do the most to defend the mandated islands and Japan proper, and never had there been any plan drawn up to go as far out as Hawaii.

Q. Had those plans which were drawn up in previous years been drawn up in contemplation of fleet action—i.e., fleet against fleet?

A. Yes, mainly fleet against fleet, but since our fleet was definitely numerically weaker, that difference was to be made up by air power based in the mandated islands, and it was our intention that we should choose the battleground.

Q. At what time did you, then, revise or have drawn up a plan for attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. I can't remember the exact time, but I believe it was around May or June of 1941 that the Combined Fleet began to study the possibility. You didn't ask for this, Colonel, but I shall give you the reason for the attack on Pearl Harbor: Prior to the war, the annual plans that the Navy had drawn up were made on the basis of single enemies—America or Great Britain or China as the case may be. Never had we contemplated a war in which more than one of those would be our enemies at the same time, but the situation arose where that became more or less necessary owing to the fact that, leading up from the China Incident, Japan was completely cut off from supplies of various kinds and from oil in particular, and it was necessary to get these somewhere, and that was only possible in the South. Now, our Navy was inferior as compared with yours alone—

Q. At this time, in the middle of 1941?

A. Yes, and when it was compared with the combined Navies of the four countries involved, of course the weakness was much, much greater. Consequently, it was necessary to eliminate at least one part of that combined naval strength, and it was decided to deliver a blow against your fleet in

Hawaii in the hope of cutting that arm out of the affair before there could be a combination of strength with the other naval forces.

Q. What new factors in naval warfare or weapons made it possible to consider such an action as the strike against Pearl Harbor where it previously had not been considered?

A. None. That attack was undertaken purely from strategic necessity and not because there was introduction of any new weapon as you probably have already found out; we had developed no new weapons unless you call those midget submarines new weapons. It was our plan from the beginning that the attack should be undertaken with aircraft.

Q. Did the Japanese Navy use as a basis for planning any war maneuvers, reports of war maneuvers, conducted in Hawaii by the United States Army and Navy?

A. In other words you mean did we plan our attack on the basis of those reports?

Q. Yes, from our own maneuvers?

A. I can't say; I don't remember. The plan was brought to me, I think, about October of that year. The plan had been all drawn up by the Combined Fleet and was brought to me, and that is the first I knew about it.

Q. Do you know of anybody who could tell me if they did get the basic idea from our own war maneuver?

A. If there is anyone who knows about it it would be the Chief of the Third Section of the Bureau of Naval-Military Affairs; I don't know just who he was: He was the predecessor to Admiral ONA; and possibly there was an Admiral KOSHIMA who was a member of Admiral KOGA'S Combined Fleet. He is about the only one who might know, who is left alive.

Q. Going back to the middle of 1941, on what basis did you appraise the fact that the Japanese Navy was weaker than the American Navy?

A. As much as I regret, it was just an obvious fact that we were weaker. It was decided as a result of the London Conference that the ratio was 5-5-3, but actually I think that it was more than 5-5-3 because of the greater strength of aircraft—that is, the surface vessels ratio was 5-5-3 but you had a superior advantage in aircraft; so that Navy against Navy it was more than 5 to 3.

Q. You say that, because of our dominance in aircraft: Are you speaking just of our Naval aircraft?

A. Yes, it is quite unnecessary to include the Army air force; you were sufficiently superior in Naval air force alone.

Q. Was your estimate based upon relative tonnages, or did you take into consideration the longevity of the particular ships, and the new weapons on the ships?

A. I never found it necessary to go into details on that; generally speaking there was such a great difference in strength.

Q. Did your estimate of that disparity in strength hold for the period immediately prior to Pearl Harbor? Was there still that great disparity in strength?

A. Yes, I think so, and the inferiority of our naval air force to yours was less in quantity than in quality. There was a difference in quantity, but the difference in quality was even greater.

Q. In the quality of aircraft?

A. Yes.

Q. Immediately after Pearl Harbor what was your estimate of the comparative strength of the two navies—that is, after you had had time to utilize intelligence sources to find out what the damage was?

A. At the time of the Japanese-Russo War, I was attached to the Army. I went ashore with a landing party in the siege of Port Arthur, and after we took that port, I had charge of the refloating of Russian battleships that were sunk in the harbor; and on the basis of that experience of some thirty years back, I figured that it would take your Navy from three to four months to refloat the ships that had been sunk in Pearl Harbor, and that, with your tremendous industrial capacity and experience the balance would go in your favor again very shortly, but that, as a result of the attack on Pearl Harbor, we had gained about three to four months' time, and that we must make the most of it.

Q. I'd like to go back into the pre-Pearl Harbor period now and ask: What was the reason for the program of greater emphasis on carriers which the Japanese embarked on just prior to the war? Did the emphasis come from England, from European experience, or just from technological planning?

A. No, I think our principal teacher in respect to the necessity of emphasizing aircraft carriers was the American Navy. We had no teachers to speak of besides the United States in respect to the aircraft themselves and to the method of their employment. We did not have much to learn from Great Britain or France, and we were doing our utmost all the time to catch up with the United States.

Q. In the attack on Pearl Harbor, no carriers were sunk. Was that disappointing in the outcome of this attack? Was it a disappointing feature?

A. Ofcourse there were none sunk because there were none in the harbor—

Q. That is right.

A. —and disappointment may not be quite the correct word: It was a matter of regret that there were none in the harbor.

Q. Would the Admiral say that the Pearl Harbor attack was a partial failure in that it did not result in the loss of U.S. carriers?

A. No, I wouldn't say that the attack was a failure in any way because the result was considerable, and the fact that there were no carriers there cannot be attributed to our fleet.

Q. Did the Admiral correctly estimate the speed with which we would employ our task forces built around carriers—independent task forces without the protection of those battleships which had been sunk?

A. Since by new construction you could steadily increase the size of your fleet, I estimated that you would be able to organize new task forces within about ten months.

Q. Did the battle of the Coral Sea, then, and the Battle of MIDWAY come as surprises? Not in the result, but in the matter of the size of the force that we were able to send out against you?

A. There was a slight misunderstanding on your previous question. I understood your question to mean my estimate of the time it would require for you to organize task forces employing new ships; i.e. when would the task forces built around new ships—newly built ships—become active; and that was why I gave the figure of ten months. But taking into account the ships sunk in Pearl Harbor and not taking into consideration the new ships, I expected of course, that small task forces would become active at any time.

- Q. Now, you have stated that the original basic plan was to wait for us to attack you where you could operate under favorable conditions of your own choosing. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, why didn't you wait within the inner perimeter? Why did you continue to expand into the SOLOMONS and into INDIA and continue to commit instead of fortifying the places you had already secured?
- A. I think the reason for the extension of our line as far as GUADALCANAL was the fact that the attack on HAWAII and operations to the south at first proved so successful, and the advance was made so smoothly, that we felt we could safely go as far as GUADALCANAL and RABAU.
- Q. Was this the deliberate policy of Tokyo or was it a further pushing forward by the commands in the field?
- A. The general outline was determined by consultation between the Army and Navy high commands in Tokyo. The opinion of the fleet of course might have been taken into consideration before making that decision, but it was, generally speaking, a policy formulated in Tokyo.
- Q. Certain staff officers of the Second Fleet have said that they wanted to stop the expansion on the perimeter originally agreed upon. They gave as the reason the fact that their ships crews and fighting personnel were exhausted from continuous commitment. Did that view become known in the higher circles in TOKYO, and was it given consideration?
- A. I think that such an opinion was quite plausible as a personal opinion because points of view vary with different officers, but I think that all information necessary for execution of the general plan was on hand in TOKYO.
- Q. And that the commanders in the field generally agreed that they could continue to expand? They didn't, in other words, enter a dissenting vote against this, or protest?
- A. I believe that there was no dissenting voice from among the local commanders. There might possibly have been exceptions, but such exceptions would never be brought that far up the line. Usually I would think that everything was going smoothly, but I found out afterwards that there were some rough waves under the surface at the time.
- Q. Did you and your staff make a careful study of the supply problems involved in this further expansion before you gave your approval to this plan?
- A. Yes, that question was naturally studied with the utmost care, because the failure or success of an operation depends principally upon whether the supplies get through or not. Simultaneously the question of procurement of supplies from the South was also given very careful study. I now believe that our failure to maintain supply was one of the large causes for our defeat.
- Q. Previously you stated that you needed land-based aviation. You gave that as one of the reasons for the failure but didn't refer to any specific operation, and I wonder what specific operation you thought would have been successful if you had had land-based aviation? Were you speaking of this particular part of the expansion or were you speaking of the war as a whole, or of some other phase of the operations?
- A. I would make that a general statement applying to practically all phases of our operations in the South, and of course throughout I had the feeling that if we only had more airplanes we could carry out all operations according to our original plan.
- Q. Were you referring to more carrier-based air in addition to the land-based air?

- A. Yes, Of course I would attach equal importance to carrier-based planes, In addition I would bring out another very important factor, the difference in our Civil engineering construction capacity. Whereas you had tremendous experience in construction of roads, transcontinental roads, even the digging of the Panama Canal, we had no similar engineering experience or equipment with the result that we could not complete an airfield in a month's time, whereas you could build one in a small fraction of that time. The same applied to road construction: Our roads in NEW GUINEA, for example, were simply impossible. Our inability to construct airfields and roads quickly was another major cause of our defeat.

Mr. MIZOTA (Interpreter): I was just telling the Admiral of a remark made by a friend of mine in Tokyo the other day upon viewing a Bulldozer for the first time; he remarked that that spelled the difference between Japanese and American power.

- Q. At the time of PEARL HARBOR in December 10 1941, what relative value did the Admiral place upon the U.S. carriers as compared with the U.S. battleships?

- A. No effort was ever made to compare the values mathematically, but I think that at the time of the attack on PEARL HARBOR, in the opinion of all Japanese naval officers, the order of importance was undoubtedly, (1) aircraft carrier, followed by (2) battleship, so that were there to be a group of ships of various types, undoubtedly the most popular target would have been the aircraft carrier. To the best of my memory, all orders issued on operations made aircraft carriers the primary target.

- Q. Did you feel that all Japanese naval officers of any rank and influence felt that this was the proper priority at that time?

- A. Yes, exactly. Recently you have read comments in newspapers by would-be "experts" to the effect that the Japanese officers at the time probably did not know the true value of aircraft carriers, but I do not believe that there were any Naval officers quite as ignorant as that. I recall that around 1937 and 1938, just about the time that I was Navy Minister, there was prevalent in your country the naval theory that decisive fleet engagements would have to take place under air cover, i.e., a fleet must have control of the air over the scene of battle. That idea was taken up by the JAPANESE at the time, and as time went on emphasis was placed on air support. I think the point you raised is more or less a remnant of the idea which I think prevailed in your Navy when I was Naval Attache in Washington; namely, that the battleship was striking force of a fleet and that the air arm, if it did play a part, would be merely an auxiliary of the fleet—used for a reconnaissance, etc.—and that idea, adopted, by the Japanese led to the construction of such very large ships as the YAMATO and the MUSASHI: but later we realized the greater power and importance of the aircraft carriers.

- Q. At what time did the naval air force become the principal offensive striking power of the Japanese navy?

- A. I think that it was around 1939 and 1940 that the situation really became known to our officers and therefore led to the decision to turn our attention more towards aircraft carriers. Around that time—namely 1939 and 1940—there developed among some of our officers the feeling that we were safe as long as we had sufficient air strength. In other words, some of our men had ideas similar to those of General Mitchell at the time of the Washington Conference.

- Q. Did this view prevail in military circles?

- A. Yes, just before the beginning of the war I think that that idea prevailed.

- Q. Do you believe that, if you had retained control of the air; you could have successfully repelled any attempts to come into the inner defenses of Japan?

- A. If we had absolute control of the air, I am sure that no one could have penetrated into the inner islands; certainly no surface craft could have come in—I would make an exception of the submarines.
- Q. Were the Japanese naval air forces ever successfully employed against U.S. submarines?
- A. I think that some result was obtained toward the end of the war, and certainly everything possible was done to work out anti-submarine devices such as airborne magnetic detectors, but even to the end none of these were ever quite satisfactory; no satisfactory results were obtained. We were so far behind you in the development of radar that our submarines suffered as a result, and your submarines benefited from that difference.
- Q. Admiral, what did you expect to do with the two or three months' time which you gained, as you said a moment ago, from the successful attack at PEARL HARBOR? What value did the time have, what did it represent?
- A. That time was spent in occupying, developing, and defending the southern areas in which the raw materials that we needed so badly were located. Our theory of defense was: This is the area we want to defend; therefore, in defense of that, we must take the next; and in order to defend that, we must take the point beyond. That is the explanation for our attack on RABAU and other outlying points.
- Q. It is the concept of using time to acquire space so that space can in turn be traded for time; is that what you mean?
- A. No, what I said about our over-expansion had nothing to do with your question about the time element; I was explaining why we extended our line beyond the areas to be occupied in our original plan. At the time of the MANCHURIAN affair the Chinese delegate at Geneva warned that Japan would occupy what it referred to as a last portion of territory then, in order to protect that, it would have to take more territory, then in order to protect that, it would have to go a little further. The extension of our line into GUADALCANAL and into the Indian Ocean can be explained that way.
- Q. Our last comments, Admiral, raised this fundamental question: On what basis did Japan expect to end the war? How did Japan, when it declared war, expect to bring the war to a close?
- A. I do not believe that in the mind of even the most optimistic there was any idea that we could drive either America or Great Britain to their knees. The general idea must have been that this would be a very long, protracted war, that in time it would end somehow. That was the idea prior to the outbreak of the war.
- Q. We have gotten the opinion that the hope was that, America would start and fight and suffer some losses, and then more or less get tired of this business while Japan would stubbornly hold within the defensive perimeter. We'd get tired and then we'd have some sort of a moderated peace. I'm just wondering if that is what you mean?
- A. I think so. Mr. MIZOTA. As a matter of fact a certain Admiral—(I won't mention his name) at the time the war had gone on about a year—asked me: "You know the Americans better than I do. Wouldn't you think they'd get tired, and don't you think that they'll want to quit when this goes on and on long enough? They suffer losses and so do we!"
- Q. What did you reply?
- A. Mr. MIZOTA: I think I know Americans better than you do."
- Q. Admiral, I'd like to ask, when the PEARL HARBOR plan was formulated, was it done at the insistence of the Army or was it done indepently by the Navy?

- A. It was purely Navy in origin. The idea of the PEARL HARBOR attack originated in the Combined Fleet. The study was pursued there, then it was brought to the Naval General Staff for consideration. There was a dissension of opinion in the General Staff; some were opposed to it as being too risky. After considerable argument the objection was overruled and the plan was accepted.
- Q. Now the operations against the PHILIPPINES: Was that a Navy plan in origin or was it an Army plan in origin?
- A. I am not certain, but I think that originated in the Army. I think the question is somewhat similar to asking me whether the child was the father's or the mother's, but I think the plan was the Army's.
- Q. You have previously stated that the Army and Navy were equally interested in the Southern Resources area. Did the Navy's greater dependence upon oil give it a slightly more primary interest in that region?
- A. I think it was about equal. It is natural to think that the Navy would be more interested, but I recall that the Army too was very insistent that we should secure the resources.
- Q. Was consideration ever given to a drive into that area without attacking the United States at PEARL HARBOR and in the PHILIPPINES?
- A. Yes, definitely. It was considered, especially by the section of my staff which was opposed to the attack on PEARL HARBOR, the contention being that we should first undertake the operations against the Southern Region and that, should the United States forces intervene we could fall back upon our long-practiced plans to meet them on our own ground.
- Q. Did this plan receive any support from any segment of the Army?
- A. To the best of my knowledge the Navy never voiced its opinion on purely Naval plans. There might have been some argument before the matter got to me, but it never came to my attention that there had been any support or opposition made to the plan to go directly South instead of first attacking HAWAII.
- Q. What considerations determined that this plan to drive directly South would be obviated in favor to the other plan, to attack the United States at the same time?
- A. As already stated, one reason for the opposition to attack on PEARL HARBOR was that it was risky and too speculative, whereas on the contrary, if we were to go directly South, take the islands where the resources were located and start managing those islands, then when your forces attacked those islands we could fall back on the methods which we had studied and practiced, year after year; the primary reason for discarding this plan was that both operations could be carried out simultaneously, and that is exactly what we did.
- Q. In retrospect, does the Admiral think that the plan to drive directly South would have been a better plan, without attacking PEARL HARBOR and the PHILIPPINES?
- A. No, I do not think so, inasmuch as I feel that the results we obtained at PEARL HARBOR were considerable. However, if we were to go back to 1941 and had the job to do all over again and the question were put to me. I would want to think it over a considerable time before I made my decision. My reason for saying that I would hesitate a long time before making a decision is that the attack was carried out late in the year when the stormy season had already set in, and it was difficult to carry out such a large-scale operation under such conditions. Also I think it was extremely lucky that we were not discovered before arriving at PEARL HARBOR, because had we been spotted we might have suffered a defeat similar to MIDWAY.

- Q. Before that operation at PEARL HARBOR, did the Navy deliberately choose Sunday morning as opposed to some other morning, because it thought we would be less alert?
- A. Yes, Sunday was chosen after deliberate consideration because, for some time prior to that, we had been hearing over your radio reports of your fleet movements; namely, that the ships were usually out on week days on their exercises, came into port Friday, stayed over Saturday and Sunday, and went out again Monday or Tuesday. We felt that we could be certain that all the ships would be at anchor on Sunday.
- Q. Did you think we would be recovering from the Saturday night parties?
- A. Yes, I thought you would be recovering from hangovers.
- Q. I would like to ask a clarification of the following statement, which you made in a previous interview, relative to the shipments of oil in the Southern area; "In the early stages, submarines constituted the main difficulty, but afterwards it was your air force, and I believe your air force, once it got operating, was more effective than submarines in checking shipment of our oil." I would like to know if that was the reason why it was necessary to make such a strong stand in the PHILIPPINES, to prevent us from getting air bases to interdict the South China Sea?
- A. No, I believe that our stubborn defense of the PHILIPPINES was but one manifestation of the Japanese tradition that, once a place is occupied, it is to be defended to the last.
- Q. Did you consider the loss of SAIPAN a critical turning point in the war?
- A. Yes, I think it was a very serious blow to Japan.
- Q. Why was the loss of SAIPAN of such a critical nature?
- A. Your acquisition of SAIPAN, in addition to opening the way for direct contact with the PHILIPPINES and CHINA, served as a base for direct air attacks upon Japan proper.
- Q. Did the experience of the Germans serve as an example of what might happen to Japan if SAIPAN were occupied by us? In other words, did you look to Germany's experience under air attack as a sample of what might happen? Is that why you feared it?
- A. Of course at that time I had already left my position so what those in the Naval Staff thought I do not know, but personally I thought it was a critical turn regardless of the situation in Germany.
- Q. I would like to ask this question: In modern war as we have just fought it, what do you consider most important - control of the water surface, control of the ground, or control of the air?
- A. I think that the circumstances would vary according to the condition of the enemy, its position, etc.; but generally speaking, the primary importance is control of the air, with a well-proportioned army and navy. However, I think that the importance of the army and navy has been greatly reduced as a result of air development.
- Q. In conclusion, would the Admiral care to make a general statement about the factors on each side that brought victory to the United States?
- A. That would be an extremely difficult question to answer if you were asking for a detailed list of the various factors on the two sides. As a general reply I would give you four Chinese characters: "YUU SHOO REPPAI", which, literally translated would be, "Victory to the superior, Defeat to the Inferior."
- Q. As a matter of national strength, resources?

- A. Yes, all factors. If I were to give you one factor as the leading one, that led to your victory, I would give the air force.
- Q. By the American air forces, does the Admiral mean, the Army air forces or the Navy?
- A. I mean the air collectively as such--what fell on our heads from above. I mean the air force collectively whether it was controlled by the Army or the Navy. The air force looked all the same to me.
- Q. Admiral, could the war have been brought to a close, in your opinion--this will have to be a personal opinion as contrasted with an official opinion--without the entry of Russia into the war and without the employment of either Atom-bomb?
- A. Speaking very frankly, I think we would have been able to extend the war for a considerable time at considerable sacrifice on your part, but I think it would have been impossible for us to win the victory even without Russia's entry and without the use of the Atomic bomb.
- Q. Admiral, once the decision was made to attack the United States, and to enter the war, what were the Japanese war aims? How did Japan expect to bring the war to a close and what were her terms for bringing the war to a close?
- A. Just prior to the actual beginning of the war?
- Q. Yes. I would like you to refer to your previous answer. Can you be more specific as to the basis on which the implied negotiated peace would have been achieved? (Note: See Page 8.)
- A. Of course that becomes principally political in nature. My thought--and I'm thinking of my colleagues at the time--was that we could put up a good fight for two years--and I think that we did put up a very good fight for two years; that is just the way it turned out. I knew that after two years it would become more and more difficult and thought that the aim then would be to arrive at some sort of a compromise, should a time come when a compromise was possible the terms of that compromise would be primarily a political question and that would be left almost entirely to the statesmen.