Air Raids- Kyushu Raid , July RRFE 50 21 July 1944


Radio explained the mass evacuation of school children by classes.

Rushing production of new fire engines.

"The blackout action during air raids by the general public can hardly be said to be flawless"

Also instructions on shelters, etc.

Losses minimized



Raids

RRFE 55 29 Sept 44

Bravado about home island raids gone. "The day when the enemy America will attack our mainland is approaching nearer every day."

Also much emphasis on the probabicity of a very long war. "...the war has just begun, the real fighting is still to come in the distant future." Sept 2.

Air Raids RRFE 60 8 December 1944

Re the 4 raids on Tokyo Nov 24,27, 29, and Dec 3. The damage was "slight", the defenses of the capital the best in the world, and people should accept this challenge by recoubling production efforts.

Nov 30 warning issued by Communications Miny that "careless communications through telegraphs and telephones regarding air raids are liable to present good material to the enemy in acquiring information as to the effectiveness of the attack..."

Said that American followed usual "bestial" practices of bombing primarily hospitals and schools.

Toko population complimented on their conduct f durig g the raids.

Air Raids RRFE 64 2 February 1945

Raids in December and January treated as war of nerves, promises of better shelters, and prediction that though // aerial attack will become "more intense" "Air raids must definitely not make you fed up and quit."

Aif Raids FEC Daily 9 March 1945

Bdcast of 8 March pointed out that most raids were timed to disturb peoples sleep, thus treating bombings primarily an attack on morale.

Air Raids RRFE 68 16 March 1945

Koiso message after March 10 raid on Tokyo, called on the city&s residents to "refresh your inspiration as well as strengthen you absolute conviction in our ultimate victory." Spoke of agger he felt as he stood "in the midst of ruin and destruction." Reminded that "because of prevailing conditions," the government might not be able to "carry on speedily every available measure."

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Air Raids RRFE 69 30 March 1945

Nagoya raid of 12 March: Tokyo claimed that Jap defenses were resonsible for bringing down 22 and damaging 60 of the 130 attacking planes. The fact that the follow-up raids on Osaka of March 13-14 and on Kobe March 17 were by 90 and 60 B-29s respectively was taken as an indication that the enemy is receiving a fatal blow in each raid over the homeland."

While radiot commentators described the week prior to March 19 as the outset of the "war's final and grimmest stage," there was no further mention of "air-raid defenses remainingcompletely undistrubed. Frequently described the damag as "not small" or "considerable." People urged to bury their valuables, and to remove all obstacles, such as signs, which would impair fire-figters.

Central Army Ho admitted that "owing to the new U.S.tactics" they must once more "restudy the air defense structure."

Air Rdids FMAD, J Home Morale Under Bombing

"The cry for unity in everything was growing loud in Japan (during the sring of 1945), as the bases for such unity were being blasted. The more and more frequent reassurances...that all Japanese were bearing up manfully under the blows of the enemy, provide evidence that, in reality, the fondations of morale were being cracked." p.14

Air Raids FCC Daily 20March 1945

Raids treated as strengthening the fighting fibre of civilians:

"Victims have attained the mental stature of ouf Special Attack Corps. As the war increases in viblence, others will also learn more about the state of mind of our fighting men. Then will the efforts of the nation's hundred million become truly unified."

Air Raids RRFL 72 18 May 1945

Air raids on Japan proper have only served to steel the fighting spirit of the Japanese people through anger and the desire for revenge.

Air Raids FCC Daily 9 May 1945

Raido made much of the Emp's "graciously" granting a rescript in regrand to the relief of raid victims and that he also "granted a monetary gift from the Privy Purse. Also much of the government' sactivities to aid relief measure! But If 8 May 1915

RRFE 78 28 July 1945

Reaction of the radio to the naval bombardment in early July was sidence at first, then reporters and ey-witness sotries indicating suprise and confusion, followed by the usual ppda material that damage was slight and claims of heavy destruction of attacking planes. Confusion is excused as a result of experiencing shelling for the first time.

Stae, in connection with coordinated fleet and B-29 raids, that the future promises only more and larger attacks until the "opportune moment" arrives.

Pol Difficulties-Tojo's fall CRRFE 50 21 July 1944

After fall of Sapipan the Cabinet " offered apologies for its meager power and expressed the anticipation of the immediate appearance of a new, strong Cabinet to successfully posecute the war." Jhhy 20

Third interview with NISHIZAWA, Nobushige, Police Affairs

Section, Police Affairs Bureau of the Home Affairs Ministry (TOKYO)
on 17 Nov 45. SUBJECT: Changes in ARP during the war; people's
attitudes during and after air raids.

"I would like to say one thing I am unable to explain without more thorough study of the matter is that, in spite of cruel bombings and war, at no time did I feel nor the majority of the people feel any deep hatred of Americans. At time of Russo-Japanese war and Chinese war, the people were coordinated by hatred of the enemy. I think therefore it was a war fostered by the military. There was no real hatred in spite of your economic blockade before the war. It is an amazing thing. I am not saying this just to be polite or to fawn."

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Special Interview - Mayor of Isahaya, NAGASAKI Prefecture. 28 Nov 45. SUBJECT: Changes in people's livelihood during the period of the G.E.A. War.

6010 (1)

"Though I was just a boy then and cannot myself remember, the old ones tell me that at the start of the Chinese War and of the Russo-Japanese War the morale and fighting spirit was very much better. There was the attitude that it was a matter of life and death. This was conspicuously absent in the beginning of the present Chinese War. Conspicuously. People said, 'Why should we die in this war, what is the good of it?' As the war wore on, this apathy increased. However the government whipped up war spirit by propaganda and it reached quite a frenzy, especially as the war was going so successfully. When the war began to go against us, morale dropped."

MY KABAYAMA, SUKEHIDE, Publicity Bureau of the Foreign Office in charge of Radio Monitoring Subj: Radio Monitoring and Popular Morale.

T What was their explanation of the cause of the war?

K Of course, it was written in the Emperor's Rescript and all that kind of thing. It came so suddenly that the mind of the people was not ready to digest it. The war fell from the blue, they were not ready to get warmed up, from the very beginning, especially the older people who experienced the Sino-Japanese war and the Russo-Japanese war. At that time people used to have very strong anti-Russian feelings. People hoped that we would be able to avoid this war in some way or another, such as sending Ambassador KURUSU to America to

2d SASAKI Interview; 26 Dec 45 6034 (Discussion of Col Sasaki's essay "Effects of the Bombing on Public Opinion and (Gov't) Policies regarding it"; Propaganda activities of the IRAA)

M How do you explain this lack of animosity as compared to the Russo-Japanese or the

S The people were tired of the war which had gone on since 1937 and their foremost problem was one of food and daily living. In the former wars it was not one of the homeland and the effects of the war then were not as bad as these. The food problem and the bombing came right at the same time. It was a matter of a lot of bad things

INTERVIEW with TANAKA, Y., School Education Bureau, Ministry of Education, Meiji Bldg, TOKYO, 18 Dec 45.

6034

(2)

"The Japanese people were pulled toward war all during that time. When the Pacific War started, people were very gloomy. People brightened up a little bit when good reports were received, but toward the end, doubts and anxiety greatly increased. The majority were wishfully hoping for peace before utter destruction occurred."

- Q. Do you think that the ordinary people were in support of the war at the start?
- A. It was very unpopular because we were exhausted ever since the Manchurian Incident. It was always war, war, war! It was quite different from the Russo-Japanese War, when the conviction that there was a just purpose was widespread and patriotism was profound. They did not think this war was necessary for self-defense. The cause of the China war was always changing. First they said it was to defend the Chinese against Communism, and then they said it was to defend the Chinese and the Orientals against invasion by the Western Powers.

MR KABAYAMA, SUKEHIDE, Publicity Bureau of the Foreign Office in charge of Radio Monitoring Subj: Radio Monitoring and Popular Morale

k Well, I felt that at the beginning of the war, about 4 years ago, the people, expecially the people on the street, were not informed about the real cause of the war. I think that was the biggest mistake the Government committed. Perhaps, as you know, exactly 4 years ago, 3 weeks before the outbreak of the war, even in those days when times between the United States and Japan were very grave, people were not allowed to attend anti-American or newspapers were not allowed to print with big letters what was going on between the United States and Japan, and how the American demands were difficult and all that kind of thing. The war came 8 December 1941, very abruptly, to most of the people. They had the hope gave it to the radio and people.